Category: Litigation

Analysis: U.S. Supreme Court Upholds the Affordable Care Act: Roberts Rules?

The National Law Review recently published an article by Meghan C. O’Connor and William O. Jackson of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding The U.S. Supreme Court’s Healthcare Ruling:

Today, June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision upholding thePatient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the “ACA” or “Act”). The decision marks the culmination of a legal battle and public debate that began soon after the ACA was enacted. The Court upheld the individual mandate, perhaps the most controversial provision of the ACA, but limited the expansion of Medicaidunder the ACA. All provisions of the ACA will continue to be in effect, with some limits on the Medicaid expansion. In order to prevent a constitutional violation due to the Medicaid expansion portion of the ACA, the Court held that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) is not permitted to apply §1396c of the Act to withdraw existing Medicaid funds to a state for failing to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion provisions. Though today’s decision will have far-reaching effects in political discourse, the Court emphasizes its deference to Congress and its sensitivity to its judicial role: “We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies. That judgment is entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders. We ask only whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions.”

Key points from decision:

  • Individual mandate not supported by Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause
  • Individual mandate must be construed as a tax, which is upheld under Congress’s taxing power
  • Expansion of Medicaid program constitutional, but HHS may not penalize states that choose not to participate in the expansion of Medicaid
  • Decision strikes a balance between principles of federalism and judicial restraint

I. Background

On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law. The 2700-page Act contained numerous provisions that, when implemented, would alter the health insurance and health care delivery systems in the United States more significantly than any federal law since the creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965. Significant ACA provisions include the expansion of coverage under federal health care programs, such as Medicaid; the creation of new programs to integrate and reform health care delivery, such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program; and the minimum coverage provision at §1501 of the ACA that requires, with limited exceptions, individuals to maintain minimal essential health care coverage as of 2014 (commonly referred to as the “individual mandate”) or make a “shared responsibility payment”. After the enactment of the ACA, individuals, organizations, and 26 states brought suit against the federal government alleging, among other things, that the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion were unconstitutional. After multiple federal appeals court decisions with diverging opinions, the Supreme Court granted review.

This article will discuss the four main issues at play during the oral arguments, highlights of the Court’s decision, and implications of the Court’s decision.

II. The Issues At Play

In March 2012, the Supreme Court heard three days of oral arguments focusing on four issues: (1) whether the Court could even hear arguments about the constitutionality of the ACA; (2) whether the individual mandate was unconstitutional; (3) if so, whether the individual mandate, and potentially other provisions of the ACA, could be “severed” from the remaining portions; and (4) whether the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA were constitutional.

1. Could the Supreme Court Even Hear the Case?

Before the Court addressed the constitutionality of the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion, the Court determined that the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”) did not apply to the lawsuits challenging the ACA. Under the AIA, courts may not hear lawsuits that attempt to restrain the imposition or collection of a tax. If the AIA did apply to the ACA lawsuits, the Court would have been prevented from hearing the case until the parties had exhausted other remedies.

The Court held that the AIA did not prevent the Court from hearing the challenge to the individual mandate because the mandate is not a “tax” for purposes of the AIA. This decision is not surprising given that during oral argument, the Court expressed skepticism about whether the AIA applied to the case and whether the case could be considered an exception to the AIA.

Today’s decision is interesting in that it distinguishes between whether a law is a “tax” for purposes of Congress’s taxing power versus the Court’s jurisdiction under the AIA. The government argued that the mandate was not a tax for purposes of the AIA but that it was a tax for purposes of Congress’s constitutional authority. At oral argument, Justice Alito noted to the Solicitor General “[t]oday you are arguing that the penalty is not a tax. Tomorrow you are going to be back and you will be arguing that the penalty is a tax.” Justice Scalia also questioned the Solicitor General regarding the labeling of the mandate as a “penalty” rather than a “tax”: “The President said it wasn’t a tax, didn’t he?”

Despite these exchanges, Chief Justice Roberts ultimately focused on whether Congress intended for the AIA to apply. The Court agreed with the government and held that Congress’s decision to describe the shared responsibility payment in §5000A(b)(a) as a “penalty” and not a “tax” demonstrates that Congress did not intend for the AIA to prohibit jurisdiction.

2. Is the Individual Mandate Constitutional?

The central issue in the case was whether Congress had the power under the Constitution to mandate that individuals purchase health insurance and assess a tax or penalty against those individuals who refuse or fail to purchase such insurance. As a general principle of the U.S. federalist system, the federal government may only pass laws under those powers that are enumerated in the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause. All other powers remain with the individual states. The ACA lawsuits challenged the individual mandate as an unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause.

The Court telegraphed its skepticism with the Commerce Clause justification during oral argument in March. The justices questioned whether the government was “creating commerce” and whether the penalty associated with the individual mandate was actually a proper exercise of the taxing power.

In a 5-4 decision (with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joining Chief Justice Roberts), the Court concluded that the individual mandate was constitutional and could be upheld under Congress’s taxing power as the imposition of a tax on those who do not have insurance. However, the individual mandate could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause.

• “Creating” Commerce.

A key issue involved whether Congress was creating commerce by requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. During oral argument, Justice Kennedy questioned the government on whether it could “create” commerce by requiring an individual to perform an affirmative act and then regulate that act under the Commerce Clause. The government argued that health care is unique since nearly all persons will be in the health care market at some point, many times the choice to be in the market is uncontrollable and unpredictable, and the result of being uninsured shifts costs to the insured.

In today’s opinion, the Court emphasized that Congress’s broad power to regulate commerce “presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.” Roberts noted that the mandate creates activity to “compel individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product” rather than regulating existing commercial activity. Consequently, the individual mandate cannot be upheld under the Commerce Clause.

The dissent also rejected the use of the Commerce Clause to support the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Justice Scalia wrote “[t]he Federal Government can address whatever problems it wants but can bring to their solution only those powers that the Constitution confers, among which is the power to regulate commerce… Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem power.”

• Necessary and Proper Clause.

The Court also assessed whether the individual mandate was constitutional under Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause because the mandate was integral to the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions of ACA. The Court rejected the government’s argument, concluding that this would give Congress the “extraordinary ability” to create the predicate necessary to the exercise of its power.

• Is the Individual Mandate Actually a Tax?

Despite holding that the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause do not support the constitutionality of the individual mandate, the Court found that the mandate could be sustained under Congress’s taxing power. The Court held that “Congress had the power to impose the exaction in §5000A under the taxing power, and that §5000A need not be read to do more than impose a tax. That is sufficient to sustain it.” Consequently, while the ACA’s description of the shared responsibility payment as a “penalty” and not a “tax” is “fatal” to the application of the AIA, Congress’s choice of words does not “control whether an exaction is within Congress’s constitutional power to tax.” Instead, the “mandate can be regarded as establishing a condition—not owning health insurance—that triggers a tax—the required payment to the IRS.”

The Court then offered a straightforward analysis of its taxing power: “[t]hose subject to the individual mandate may lawfully forgo health insurance and pay higher taxes, or buy health insurance and pay lower taxes. The only thing they many not lawfully do is not buy health insurance and not pay the resulting tax.”

Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Roberts’s majority opinion holding the mandate constitutional under Congress’s taxing power. The Court’s liberal justices would have held the individual mandate constitutional under the Commerce Clause as well, but avoided issuing a concurring opinion that would support a constitutional differentiation but make no practical difference in the implementation of ACA.

Justice Scalia’s dissent is also not surprising, as it echoes his comments at oral argument. The dissent notes, “[w]hat is absolutely clear… is that there are structural limits upon federal power—upon what it can prescribe with respect to private conduct… Whatever may be the conceptual limits upon the Commerce Clause and upon the power to tax and spend, they cannot be such as will enable the Federal Government to regulate all private conduct…”

3. Is the Individual Mandate Severable from the Rest of the ACA?

When a statute or law is held unconstitutional, the Court may eliminate certain provisions of the statute (severing it) or strike the entire statute. At issue with regard to the severability issue was whether other ACA provisions could and/or should be severed from the individual mandate provision if the individual mandate was found unconstitutional. Since the individual mandate was found constitutional, the Court did not address the severability of other ACA provisions.

4. Is Medicaid Expansion Under the ACA Constitutional?

Perhaps the most unexpected component of today’s decision is the limitation imposed on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Medicaid funds medical care for needy individuals through a federal and state partnership under which the federal government provides matching funds to states that agree to comply with federal requirements. Congress may change Medicaid requirements, and participating states must amend state Medicaid plans to comply with changes in federal law. Under the ACA, Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility to certain individuals under age 65 who do not receive Medicare and who have an income up to 133% of the federal poverty level. The ACA requires states to provide limited Medicaid coverage to these newly eligible individuals beginning in 2014. Funding of the expansion will not follow traditional matching guidelines; instead 100% of the expansion will be paid for by the federal government through 2016, with the federal share decreasing to 90% by 2020.

Congress’s authority under the Constitution includes spending funds, and setting conditions on the spending of those funds, in order to promote the general welfare. However, Congress’s spending power is limited such that it cannot use the power to compel states to adopt federal policies. At issue was whether the ACA unconstitutionally compels states to expand Medicaid by making expansion of Medicaid eligibility a requirement for receipt of federal Medicaid funds despite increased federal funding to subsidize the expansion.

The majority concluded that the Medicaid expansion is constitutional. However, the Court held that it would be an unconstitutional expansion of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause for the federal government to withhold Medicaid funding to the states for non-compliance with the ACA’s expansion provisions. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the ACA to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that states accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”

Rather than invalidate the Medicaid expansion in its entirety, the Court adopted a more limited remedy of severing the penalty provisions from the ACA. Section 1396c gives the Secretary the authority to withhold all further Medicaid payments to the state if the Secretary determines the state is out of compliance with any Medicaid requirement, including those contained in the expansion. The Court ruled that the Secretary could not use this section to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion. However, §1396c remains applicable to the existing Medicaid program, and it could be used by the Secretary to withdraw funds provided under the ACA if a state that has chosen to participate in the expansion fails to comply with the requirements of the ACA.

III. Impact of the Decision

Whether denominated as a mandate or a tax, the Court’s validation of Section 1501 avoids much of the uncertainty that would have resulted if the ACA was struck down. Providers may proceed, for now, with the assumption that the ACA will reduce the burden of providing care to uninsured and underinsured individuals. The Court’s ruling also relieves providers of the need to re-think, or undo, other operational and strategic planning that was implemented under the ACA, such as the move away from fee-for-service to value-based and quality-based reimbursement in an accountable care environment; bundling; bonuses; incentives for various ACA initiatives in areas such as electronic medical records, public health, preventive care, and others; physician quality reporting initiatives; requirements for tax-exempt hospitals such as community health needs assessments, financial assistance, and billing and collection policies; and many other areas of the ACA that might have collapsed with the whole ACA house of cards if the ACA had been struck down in its entirety. Hospital stocks surged ahead on the initial news of the Court’s decision while insurance company stocks fell, suggesting the market’s assessment of the winners and losers from the case.

From a constitutional law perspective, the path taken by the Court in reaching its decision is extremely important. On the one hand, the Court’s conclusion that the individual mandate could not be justified under either the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that the Court will continue to police the boundaries of Congressional power in a federalist system. Congress may have the power to regulate commerce – what people do – but it does not have the power tocompel commerce – what people do not do. In a similar vein, the Court concluded that the Medicaid penalty provisions ran counter to the nation’s “system of federalism” as Congress improperly went beyond pressure to compulsion.

On the other hand, in upholding the individual mandate under Congress’s power under the Taxing Clause (even notwithstanding statements by the President and the Congress that this was not a tax), the Court gave deference to Congress in searching for any reasonable construction of the law in order to save the ACA from unconstitutionality. The Court also found the means to preserve the expansion of Medicaid by severing only the penalty provisions. In so doing, the Chief Justice remained true to his philosophy of judicial restraint rather than judicial activism, placing himself firmly in the company of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Justice Felix Frankfurter.

The Medicaid ruling is significant for states – and for providers. This means that each state will have the ability to determine whether or not to accept the Medicaid expansion terms, without the risk of losing all of its Medicaid programs should the state decide not to agree with expanded eligibility requirements. The ACA was structured so that most everyone had health care coverage – either through employer-provided plans, insurance purchased by individuals, or government-provided programs. The ACA expanded eligibility for Medicaid to provide health care for poor persons who do not have employer-sponsored insurance and who would be unable to pay for their own health insurance. If a state declines to enact the expansion, there will be a gap. The size of the gap—or the number of uninsured individuals—will depend on how eligibility standards are set. For providers, this likely translates into uncompensated care.

In Wisconsin, Medicaid eligibility has been more expansive than required by the federal government. Therefore, the question about what carrots and sticks apply to the Wisconsin Medicaid program is not clearly answered in the decision. This will likely be the subject of consideration and potential debate as the Wisconsin legislature develops the next biennial budget.

Perhaps the greatest impact from the ACA decision will be felt in the upcoming elections. The Court’s characterization of the individual mandate as a “tax” will shape the political debates in the months to come. House Speaker John Boehner, presidential candidate Mitt Romney, and their supporters have already vowed to repeal the ACA following the decision, using the ACA “tax” as their rallying cry. As a result, some uncertainty will remain through and beyond the fall as elected officials sort out what provisions should remain and what should be modified or eliminated. Some of the provisions have proven popular with voters; other provisions have not. And, absent a Republican sweep in November, a total repeal of the Act is not likely. Nonetheless, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker indicated that the state would not take action to implement provisions of the ACA until after the November elections and that he is counting on the next president and Congress to repeal it.

©2012 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

Employer Group Health Plans and the Constitutionality of the ACA

Focus turns to completing 2012 and 2013 compliance tasks following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision.

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that virtually the entire Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) is constitutional (with the exception of a Medicaid issue that is not directly relevant to employers), validating the full range of past, present, and future ACA requirements. Employers now must continue to press ahead with 2012 and 2013 ACA compliance requirements, particularly if these tasks were placed on a back burner awaiting the decision.

The Decision

Writing for a 5-4 majority in National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., found that the individual mandate in the ACA is a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing authority, stating that “[t]he Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax.” Chief Justice Roberts also wrote that “because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.” Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, Stephen G. Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr., dissented.

Next Steps for Employers

Now that the ACA has been upheld, employer group health plans must focus on a number of pressing tasks for 2012 and 2013 compliance with the ACA. In the coming weeks and months, employers should do the following:

  • Determine whether they are appropriately aggregating group health plan valuation data in order to support 2012 Form W-2 reporting.
  • Prepare to receive, and properly distribute or apply, any Medical Loss Ratio rebates associated with 2011 insured health coverage.
  • Finalize Summary of Benefits and Coverage material for inclusion in the 2013 Open Enrollment package.
  • Complete updates to Summary Plan Descriptions and plan documents to capture and describe the 2011 and 2012 ACA changes to their plan design.
  • Reflect the 2013 plan year $2,500 cap on salary deferral contributions into healthcare spending accounts in 2013 Open Enrollment material, payroll processes, and administration systems.
  • Understand and begin to determine the patient-centered outcomes trust fund fees due in July 2013.
  • Begin to identify whether their group health plans are both affordable and available to full-time employees in order to avoid any shared responsibility penalty in 2014.
  • Prepare for audits associated with their participation in the Early Retiree Reinsurance Program, if applicable.
  • Review possible design changes to retiree drug programs to reflect the change in Medicare Part D subsidy taxation rules.
  • Review future plan design changes to blunt the balance sheet impact of the 2018 Cadillac Tax.

Implications

While the Supreme Court decision is an important milestone in the federal debate over expanding healthcare coverage, it likely represents just the first in a series of future federal discussions and actions in the coming months and years.

The federal debate now moves to the November election cycle. The ACA no doubt will play a large role in the upcoming elections, but it is premature to expect any quick legislative reversals to ACA provisions, as any changes would require a significant shift in power.

In the interim, employer group health plans should continue to examine and implement those ACA requirements that will be effective in 2012, 2013, and later years into the design and operation of their group health plans.

We will release future LawFlashes and hold webinars as further guidance becomes available.

Copyright © 2012 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

U.S. Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act Decision: Impacts on Life Sciences

The National Law Review recently published an article by Robyn S. Shapiro of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, regarding the U.S. Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act Decision:

The June 28, 2012 U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Act”) impacts the life sciences industry in a number of ways, including impacts on innovation and compliance initiatives by medical device, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology companies.

Innovation

A number of provisions in the Act provide incentives and resources for product innovation.  First, it is expected that more than 30 million Americans will obtain health care coverage on account of the Act.  A bigger pool of Americans with health coverage to pay for treatment will yield growth in pharmaceutical sales and, perhaps, the ability to charge higher drug prices, which, in turn, could spur innovation.  In addition, the Act created the Therapeutic Discovery Project Program, through which $1 billion in new therapeutic discovery project grants and tax credits will be awarded.  In 2010, 2,923 companies specializing in biotechnology and medical research in 47 states and the District of Columbia received awards under the grant program.  Firms can opt to receive either a grant or a tax credit under the program, which allows both profitable companies and start-ups that are not yet profitable to benefit.  A third measure in the Act likely to have a positive impact on innovation is a provision that gives biotech companies a dozen years of exclusive rights to the data underpinning their products.

On the other hand, the ruling leaves intact a 2.3% excise tax on medical devices, which is estimated to cost the industry $20 billion over the next 10 years, and which manufacturers fear will burden innovation.  On the other hand, some believe that, as in the case of pharmaceutical manufacturers, expansion of health care coverage will increase the demand for medical devices and offset the effect of the tax.

The Supreme Court ruling affects not only the speed but also the direction of life sciences product innovation.  PricewaterhouseCoopers[1] has identified five broad pillars of medical technology innovation: financial incentives (such as reimbursement for adoption of new technologies), resources for innovation (such as academic medical centers), a supportive regulatory system, demanding and price-insensitive patients, and a supportive investment community of venture capitalists and other investors.  Various provisions in the Act promote the development of more cost-effective ways of delivering care, including a measure that calls for more real-world evidence of a new drug’s superiority over other treatments in order to qualify for reimbursement.  Such provisions may spur more definitive product innovation, as opposed to production of “me too” drugs and new devices that make only modest improvements to existing products.

Compliance

Certain provisions in the Act impact compliance initiatives in the life sciences industry.  The Act includes “Sunshine Provisions,” which require pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers to track and report payments and other transfers of value greater than $10 to physicians and teaching hospitals.  While under prior laws improper industry-provider relationships primarily were uncovered by whistleblowers and government investigations, the Sunshine Provisions place the onus on life sciences manufacturers to disclose their relationships with providers, for review by others.  This enhanced transparency and data accessibility could result in sharper scrutiny by enforcement agencies of information about improper relationships and violations of fraud and abuse laws.  Moreover, other provisions in the Act enhance the government’s ability to pursue violations of existing fraud and abuse laws–e.g., revisions to the intent requirement of the Anti-Kickback Statute; and strengthening of fraud enforcement tools through changes to the False Claims Act, civil monetary penalty laws, sentencing guidelines and exclusion authority, and dedication of $250 million for fraud and abuse enforcement.  These changes will require life sciences companies to carefully structure and manage relationships with providers, and ensure that their compliance initiatives include efficient and effective operating procedures for tracking and reporting payments, educating and training sales and research personnel, and auditing and monitoring provider relationships.

[1] PricewaterhouseCoopers, Medical Technology Innovation Scoreboard: the Race for Global Leadership, January 2011.

©2012 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

The Supreme Court Paves the Way to End Consumer Class Actions

Last year, the Supreme Court removed state law prohibitions on contractual agreements to waive class action rights.  Because disputes involving small dollar amounts (only $30.22 per plaintiff in a recent Supreme Court case and a $2.99-per-month service for plaintiffs in a recent 11th Circuit decision) provide little incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers (or the plaintiffs themselves), these cases have often materialized as class actions resulting in massive class fees and statutory damages.  As a result, many businesses include arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts that contain a class action waiver provision to require individual plaintiffs to bring their claims on their behalf alone.

Although most courts have enforced class action waivers in arbitration provisions considering the U.S. Supreme Court’s long-standing position that arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms, some state high courts have struck down contractual agreements not to bring class actions, including class arbitrations, as unconscionable and a violation of state public policy.  At least California, New Jersey, and Massachusetts’ Supreme Courts had issued such decisions in the last seven years.  See Discover Bank v. L.A. County Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (Cal. 2005); Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006); Feeney v. Dell Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 2009).

The California Supreme Court in Discover Bank held that class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements were unconscionable if the agreement is an adhesion contract and involves small amounts of damage in dispute where the party with inferior bargaining power alleges a deliberate scheme to defraud.  36 Cal. 4th at 162-63.  Similarly, in New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that the class-action waiver in the arbitration agreement was “clearly a contract of adhesion” and that the prohibition of class actions would prevent plaintiff from pursuing her statutory consumer protection rights and shield defendants from compliance with state laws.  Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 100-01. The Massachusetts Supreme Court similarly held that “public policy sometimes outweighs the interest in freedom of contract” when it refused to enforce an arbitration provision prohibiting class actions. Feeney, 908 N.E.2d at 761-62.

In April of 2011, however, the United States Supreme Court held that agreements not to arbitrate through class actions should be enforced and overruled Discover Bank in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).  In Concepcion, the putative class complained that AT&T advertised free cellular phones with the purchase of AT&T service, yet the consumers were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the phones’ retail value.  Despite AT&T’s extensive arbitration provision that was described as “quick, easy to use” and would likely result in “promp[t] full or … even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate” the Ninth Circuit,  relying on Discover Bank, nonetheless found that the waiver of the ability to bring a class action was unconscionable.  Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009).  On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that, because it is a fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and those contracts must be enforced according to their terms, and where, by contrast, state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular claim, the conflicting rule is displaced by the Federal Arbitration Act.  The Supreme Court thus reversedDiscover Bank holding that the rule of Discover Bank stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1753.

In August of last year, the Eleventh Circuit followed the rule of law established byConcepcion.  Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs in Cruz were customers of Cingular Wireless (which was acquired by AT&T) and had signed the same binding arbitration agreement that was litigated inConcepcion.  In Cruz, plaintiffs complained that Cingular Wireless had fraudulently included a $2.99 monthly “Roadside Assistance” charge to plaintiffs’ monthly bills in violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.  Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. 2:07-cv-714-FtM-29DNF, 2008 WL 4279690 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2008).  Plaintiffs alleged that they never ordered the service and the charges were hidden in their telephone bills.  The Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in Cruz before the Supreme Court rendered the decision in Concepcion; however, it was awaiting the Florida Supreme Court’s answers to a series of certified questions related to determining the substantive questions of unconscionability under Florida law and the time Concepcion was decided.

In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit echoed the Supreme Court:  arbitration provisions will be enforced as written − including waivers of class action rights. The court acknowledged that, even if Florida law would be sympathetic to plaintiff’s arguments that absent class procedures numerous claims of small values where potential plaintiffs do not even know of their claims, defendants may violate Florida law, a state policy that stands as an obstacle to the Federal Arbitration Act’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms is preempted. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1213.

The Third Circuit similarly held that the Federal Arbitration Act specifically preempted the rule established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Muhammad decision.  In Litman v. Cellco Partnership, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit stated, “[w]e understand the holding of Concepcion to be both broad and clear:  a state law that seeks to impose class arbitration despite a contractual agreement for individualized arbitration is inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the FAA, irrespective of whether class arbitration ‘is desirable for unrelated reasons.’” Id. at 231.

Although a waiver of the right to pursue a claim as a class action can be challenged under grounds of fraud or duress under the savings clause of section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, these arguments would likely require individualized arguments that could not apply in a class action context.  As a result, it appears that future “unconscionability” attacks to contractual class action waivers will fail under the analysis of Concepcion, Cruz, and Litman. This is a big win for businesses who thoughtfully draft their consumer contracts to avoid class action plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and exponential damages.

Just as a waiver of the right to a jury trial or the limiting of consequential damages have become routine in many consumer contracts, the waiver of the ability to bring a class action should be considered in all consumer contracts. For example, the language contained in the contracts enforced in the Conception and Cruz cases provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties and requires that those disputes be brought in the consumer’s “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.  Further, unless you and [business] agree otherwise, the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a representative or class proceeding.” Similar language, less than fifty words, could save millions for a business involved in consumer contracts in the wake ofConception, Cruz, and Litman.

*Until March 2012, Monica Brownewell Smith was a partner in the Litigation Department. While she raises her young children, Monica is working for the Firm as a contract attorney.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Supreme Court Strikes Down Majority of Arizona SB 1070

The National Law Review recently published an article by Jennifer G. Roeper of Fowler White Boggs P.A. regarding Arizona’s SB 1070:

The two-year long fight over the controversial Arizona immigration law, SB 1070, finally came to an end on Monday, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Arizona v. United States. SB 1070, which permitted state officials to enforce federal immigration laws, made its way to the Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit blocked portions of the bill last year. Three key provisions of the law were struck down on the grounds that they were preempted by federal immigration law, and one provision was upheld.

The first provision to be struck down was Section 3 of the bill, which made it a misdemeanor under state law for immigrants to fail to seek or carry federal registration papers. The Court held that the provision was preempted, as Congress intended registration of foreign nationals to be a “single integrated and all-embracing” federal system, leaving no room for states to regulate in the area.

The second provision appears in Section 5(C). Section 5(C) made it a crime in Arizona for immigrants to work or solicit work without employment authorization. The Court held that this provision was also preempted, as Congress had only imposed civil penalties on unlawful employment, specifically declining to impose criminal penalties.

The third provision struck down by the Supreme Court is Section 6, which gave local police the authority to make warrantless arrests of immigrants suspected of being removable. This provision would have provided state officers with greater arrest authority than federal immigration officers, and could be exercised with no instruction from the Federal Government. In writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that Section 6 “violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government. …[It] creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

Finally, section 2(B), one of the most controversial provisions, was upheld, as it was found to be too early to determine how the provision would be applied in practice. 2(B) requires local law enforcement to investigate into the immigration status of anyone stopped or arrested when “reasonable suspicion” exists that the person is in the U.S. unlawfully. This is the so-called “racial profiling” provision, as many believe the only way an officer could have “reasonable suspicion” that an immigrant is unlawfully present is through racial profiling. Even though the Court upheld the provision at 2(B), it nonetheless recognized these concerns, and thus left the door open for future challenges based on discrimination. Justice Kennedy stated that the Court’s holding “does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.”

Overall, the decision comes as both a victory and somewhat of a surprise to immigration community, as the Supreme Court Justices did not generally appear to be in favor of the law when oral arguments were heard in May. Nevertheless, the holding confirms what immigration advocates have argued all along— that immigration enforcement belongs to the Federal Government, and states are therefore prohibited from taking matters into their own hands.

©2002-2012 Fowler White Boggs P.A.

High Court Tosses Out Indecency Cases, Finds FCC Didn’t Give Proper Notice to Broadcasters

On June 21, 2012, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Federal Communications Commission’s effort to apply its indecency standard to brief broadcasts of nudity and “fleeting expletives.” But the Court relied not on the First Amendment’s free-speech guarantees but rather on the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.

The Court held that Fox and ABC were not given fair advance notice that their broadcasts, which occurred prior to the announcement of the new indecency policy, were covered. This retroactive application violated their due process rights.

Broadcasters were hoping for a much broader First Amendment ruling that would have permanently hamstrung efforts by the agency to police indecency on the air. Instead, although a $1.4 million fine against ABC and its affiliates and a declaration by the FCC that Fox could be fined as well were both overturned, the agency remains free to create new indecency policies and case law under 18 USC 1464, which bans the broadcast of any” obscene, indecent, or profane language.”

In ABC’s case, the transgression was showing a seven-second shot of an actress’s buttocks and the side of her breast on NYPD Blue in 2003, and in Fox’s case, it was some isolated indecent words uttered by Cher and Nicole Richie on awards shows.

Prior FCC policy stressed the difference between isolated indecent material (which was not punished) and repeated broadcasts (which resulted in enforcement action). The Court held that Fox and ABC did not have sufficient notice that these brief moments, which occurred before the new policy went into effect, could be targeted.

The U.S. government tried to argue that a 1960 statement by the FCC gave ABC notice that broadcasting a nude body part could be contrary to the prohibition on indecency. The Supreme Court said “no dice,” as FCC had in other, later decisions declined to find brief moments of nudity actionable. If the FCC is going to fine ABC and its affiliates $1.24 million, it had better provide clear, fair notice of its indecency policies.

Since the case doesn’t affect the enforceability of the FCC’s current standard, as applied to current (rather than past) broadcasts, however, broadcasters still live in fear of the possibility of big fines levied against them for a couple of obscenities or a few seconds of nudity.

We agree with longtime public interest advocate Andrew Schwartzman, who said of this ruling, “The decision quite correctly faults the FCC for its failure to give effective guidance to broadcasters. It is, however, unfortunate that the justices ducked the core 1st Amendment issues. The resulting uncertainty will continue to chill artistic expression.”

The courts can certainly review challenges to the FCC’s indecency standards, and related issues will continue to come before the courts, including the issue of whether the current indecency standard violates the First Amendment rights of broadcasters and whether any changes the FCC may make will survive First Amendment scrutiny.

Meanwhile, with this case resolved, the FCC can finally move forward with a backlog of indecency complaints pending before it. FCC Commissioner Robert M. McDowell said in response to the Supreme Court ruling that there are now nearly 1.5 million such complaints, involving 9,700 television broadcasts, and that “as a matter of good governance, it is now time for the FCC to get back to work so that we can process the backlog of pending indecency complaints.”

© 2012 Ifrah PLLC

“Obamacare” Survives – Including Path to Generic Biologicals

Recently featured in The National Law Review, “Obamacare” Survives – Including Path to Generic Biologicals, an article by Warren Woessner of  Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.:

Biotech patent attorneys rejoice – no matter if you represent generic companies or NDA holders,  the 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court upholding the “individual mandate” – not under the commerce clause, but as an appropriate use of Congress’ power to tax – means that all the CLE charges you incurred to attend seminars on the future of generic biologics was not wasted. (A copy of the decision and dissents is available at the end of this post.) If the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” had been voided in its entirety, the path to generic biologics that was included in the Act in some detail would have vanished (Title IV, subtitle A).  I summarized the features of the Act in my post of March 26, 2010 and posted an alert on March 29, 2012.

I am not versed enough in regulatory law to opine on how, or if, the FDA would have continued to promulgate regulations and hold hearings on this touchy subject, but given that bureaucracies seldom opt for more work without direction from Congress, my guess is that the current process would have simply gone into limbo. I welcome your opinions on the way forward, but amidst the furious debate about whether the Act would waste or save the taxpayers’ dollars, it cannot be denied that generic versions of older biologicals would save patients a lot of money.

scotus_opinion_on_ACA_from_msnbc.com

© 2012 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

Supreme Court Upholds ACA, Including the Individual Mandate

The National Law Review recently featured an article by Meghan C. O’Connor of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding The Supreme Courts Recent Ruling on ObamaCare:

This morning, June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in theAffordable Care Act (ACA) cases. The individual mandate, requiring the purchase of health insurance, was held constitutional under Congress’ taxing power. The Court did not address the severability issue as to whether other ACA provisions are unconstitutional because the mandate survived. However, the Court did address Medicaid expansion, holding that the expansion is constitutional as long as states would lose only new federal funds – rather than all funding – for failing to comply with the new Medicaid requirements.

Stay tuned for a full summary of the Court’s decision as well as the potential effect of the decision on providers.

©2012 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

Reining in Blogging, Tweeting and Internet Surfing by Jurors

The National Law Review recently published an article about Jurors and Social Media, written by Carolyn M. Wendel of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

It is estimated that in 2011, 64 percent of U.S. Internet users utilize social networks—Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, LinkedIn, and the like—on a regular basis, amounting to nearly 148 million people. In addition, with the expansion of the smartphone market to the general populace from more limited business usage, people can access their social networks virtually anytime and anywhere, including the courtroom.  Such access creates a host of problems and recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of mistrials and overturned verdicts as a result of jurors’ use of social networking and other Internet sites.

Jurors sharing too much information.

Until recently, what went on behind the closed doors of the jury room remained largely a secret. For better or worse, the ability of jurors to instantly share thoughts and observations via blogs and social networks has offered a glimpse into the decision making process. While these instances are often used as grounds for an appeal, they account for a very small portion of the cases that are actually overturned.

The Illinois Appellate Court recently upheld an award of $4.75 million to the widow of a blind man killed by a Metra commuter train despite the fact that a juror was blogging about the case throughout the trial.  Eskew v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2011 IL App. (1st) 093450.  The defense argued the verdict must be overturned because the juror’s blog entries showed she had discussed the case with her husband, the jurors had discussed the case among themselves prior to deliberations, and, before all the evidence was in, one juror had stated, “All that’s left now is deciding how much.”  The Court, however, noted that the blog entries showed the other jurors had chastised the juror who made the statement, were generally keeping an open mind, and had been offered no outside information that would influence their decision making process. The Court upheld the verdict, concluding, “The blog entries on which the defendants rely do not indicate that premature deliberations resulted in a jury that was biased when it commenced its deliberations or that the jury’s actual deliberations and verdict were affected by any discussions during trial.  In fact, the entries indicate just the opposite.”

Generally, allegations involving jurors’ texts, tweets, or blogs do not necessitate declaring a mistrial or vacating a verdict.  In a few extreme cases—such as where jurors posted pictures of a murder weapon, blogged about fellow jurors by name, or hosted a chat room where people could ask questions about the case—the courts have taken action. Overall, however, relatively few cases have been overturned because of jurors sharing general thoughts or experiences via posts and blogs.

Jurors seeking out impermissible input and information.

Seemingly more prevalent, and responsible for the majority of mistrials and overturned verdicts, is the situation where jurors impermissibly access the Internet to bring outside information into the jury room.  In 2009 a federal judge in Florida was forced to declare a mistrial eight weeks into a drug trial after learning that jurors were using Internet search engines, Wikipedia, and other Internet sites to research issues associated with the case. Other cases show that jurors have conducted Internet searches of defendants, researched sentencing guidelines, and looked up the social networking profiles of alleged victims.  In one extreme case, a juror in England posted key facts from the case and asked her Facebook friends to vote on whether the defendant was guilty or innocent.  More often than not, where jurors have conducted their own research or solicited outside opinions, judges have been forced to declare mistrials or overturn verdicts.

How courts are responding.

Courts across the country continue to struggle with how to curtail jurors’ use of the Internet and social networking sites. Some courts have banned jurors from using cell phones or similar electronic devices in the courtroom and jury room.  Other courts are warning jurors that violations could lead to jurors being held in contempt. At this point, however, the majority of courts addressing the issue are focusing on updating their jury instructions to emphasize the impermissible uses of the Internet and social networking sites.

In 2010, a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States endorsed a set of model jury instructions for district judges aimed at deterring jurors from electronically communicating or researching about their case. The committee issued separate instructions to be given before trial and at the close of the case, specifying that during the course of the trial and deliberations, jurors “may not use any electronic device or media, such as a telephone, cell phone, smartphone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer, the Internet, any Internet service, or any text or instant messaging service; or any Internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to conduct any research about this case.”

A 2011 survey of federal and state jury instructions revealed a majority of circuits and states have such “modern” civil jury instructions that address the Internet, social media, or specific social networking sites by name.  See Eric P. Robinson, Jury Instructions for the Modern Age: A 50-State Survey of Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 Reynolds Courts & Media Law Journal 307 (2011).  A minority of the circuits and states retain “archaic” instructions that either have no language addressing jurors’ access to media, or only reference newspapers, radio, and television.Only one circuit and 10 states offer an explanation in their civil instructions as to why jurors should refrain from using the Internet and social networking sites during a trial.

As an example, Indiana’s Model Civil Jury Instructions represent one of the most thorough set of instructions. The instructions start out by informing jurors that their decision must be based only on the evidence presented in the courtroom and the judge’s instructions. After listing general activities that are forbidden, the instructions specifically emphasize electronic communication and research:

[Y]ou must not communicate with anyone or post information about the case, or what you are doing in the case, by any means, including telephone, text messages, email, Internet chat rooms, blogs, or social websites, such as Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter.

You also must not Google or otherwise search for any information about the case, or the law that applies to the case, or the people involved in the case, including the parties, witnesses, lawyers, or Judges.

Finally, the instructions offer an extensive explanation of why it is important that jurors not discuss the case with anyone outside of the jury, visit any place discussed in the testimony, or access any media coverage about the case or conduct their own research. The concept of fairness is repeatedly emphasized. “These rules are designed to guarantee a fair trial” and jurors should not conduct independent research because to do so “would not be fair.”  Jurors should not talk with anyone outside the jury because, “Only you have been found to be fair, and only you have promised to be fair – no one else has been so qualified.”

Not many instructions are as thorough in the conduct they prohibit or the rationale behind the rules as the Indiana instructions. However, more and more states will likely move in this direction as there is a growing belief that only if jurors are told specifically what they cannot do and, more importantly, why they cannot do it, will the increasing trend of juror violations be reversed.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Supreme Court: Pharmaceutical Sales Reps Are Exempt from Overtime Pay Requirements Per FLSA’S Outside Sales Exemption

An article by David Barmak of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., regarding The Supreme Court’s Ruling about Pharmaceutical Sales Reps, was recently featured in The National Law Review:

In a major win for pharmaceutical companies, the Supreme Court has ruled that pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) are exempt from federal overtime pay requirements under the “outside sales exemption” of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case, Christopher v SmithKline Beecham Corp., DBA GlaxoSmithKline (No. 11-204, Decided June 18, 2012), resolves a conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal and impacts some 90,000 pharmaceutical sales representatives throughout the United States.

Under the relevant provision of the FLSA’s outside sales exemption, the employee’s primary duty must be making sales. But because of the unique regulatory environment that applies to drug companies, PSRs do not actually sell their employer’s products to physicians. Rather, PSRs meet with physicians and provide information about the benefits and uses of the company’s drugs and other medical products in the hope that the physician will be persuaded to prescribe the products to patients, as medically appropriate. Prescription drugs are then sold by pharmacies that dispense the drugs to individual customers who have a physician’s prescription. Therefore, PSRs do not actually make sales in the usual sense of the word.

As the Supreme Court noted, pharmaceutical companies have promoted their drugs through “sales reps” or “detailers” since at least the early 1950s, treating PSRs as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements without objection from the Department of Labor (DOL). In fact, the DOL did not voice any objection to this classification until 2009, when it filed an amicus brief in a case pending against Novartis in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation, 611 F. 3d 141 (2nd Cir. 2010). DOL supported the PSRs’ bid for overtime pay in that case, arguing that PSRs are not exempt under the outside sales exemption because they were not involved in a “consummated transaction,” as contemplated by the regulations issued under the FLSA. The Second Circuit gave substantial deference to the DOL’s interpretation of its regulations and ruled that the exemption did not apply, and the Supreme Court declined to review the Second Circuit’s ruling. Meanwhile, a similar case against SmithKline Beecham (which trades as “GlaxoSmithKline”) had proceeded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The DOL supported the PSRs’ claims in that case, too, but the Ninth Circuit ruled that the DOL’s interpretation of the FLSA was not entitled to controlling deference and that the sales repsdid make sales within the meaning of the regulations. The Supreme Court then agreed to review the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. (During the same period that the Novartis and SmithKline Beecham cases were wending their way through the courts, two other pharmaceutical companies, Johnson & Johnson and Eli Lilly, had won rulings in the Third and Seventh Circuits, respectively, that pharmaceutical sales reps qualified as exempt under a separate FLSA exemption, the administrative exemption.)

In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, ruling that SmithKline Beecham’s PSRs qualified as outside salesmen within the meaning of the FLSA exemption, and holding that, at least in the highly regulated environment of pharmaceutical sales, the PSRs were engaged in sales even though physicians do not actually purchase prescription drugs from them. This is so, the Supreme Court reasoned, because the FLSA broadly defines “sale” to include “… any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale or other disposition.” It concluded that the “catchall phrase ‘other disposition’ is most reasonably interpreted as including those arrangements that are tantamount, in a particular industry, to a paradigmatic sale of a commodity,” and that the PSRs’ efforts to persuade physicians to prescribe their company’s drugs met this standard.

Significantly, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant FLSA and regulatory provisions was contrary to the DOL’s own interpretations. Usually, the agency’s interpretation would have been accorded substantial deference. It was not, in this instance, because the Court found that the DOL’s interpretation was, in effect, ex post facto, arrived at following decades of silence and only after there was litigation between Novartis and SmithKline Beecham and some of their PSRs.

While the Supreme Court was clearly influenced by the unique regulatory environment in which the pharmaceutical industry operates and its decision applies first and foremost to the pharmaceutical industry, the Court’s reasoning may provide the basis for other employers to argue for the application of exemptions in other situations where there has been a long history of treating a particular class of employees as exempt without DOL interpretive guidance or enforcement activity to the contrary.

©1994-2012 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.