Category: Litigation

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Capitalized Legal Fees Incurred by Pharmaceutical Company

 

McDermottLogo_2c_rgbIn a recently released Field Attorney Advice, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Office of Chief Counsel concluded that a pharmaceutical company must capitalize legal fees incurred to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval for marketing and selling generic drugs and to prevent the marketing and sale of a competing generic drug.  The IRS Office of Chief Counsel also concluded that it could impose an adjustment on audit to capitalize legal fees that the taxpayer expensed in prior years, including years closed by statute of limitations.

In a recently published Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Field Attorney Advice (FAA 20131001F, March 8, 2013), the IRS Office of Chief Counsel concluded that a pharmaceutical company must capitalize legal fees incurred to obtain U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for marketing and selling new generic drugs and to prevent the marketing and sale of a competing generic drug.  The IRS also concluded that the Commissioner could change the taxpayer’s method of accounting for the legal fees and impose an adjustment on audit to capitalize legal fees that the taxpayer expensed in prior years, including years closed by the statute of limitations.

NDA and ANDA

In order to market or sell a new drug in the United States, a New Drug Application (NDA) must be submitted to and approved by the FDA.  An NDA consists of clinical and nonclinical data on the drug’s safety and effectiveness, as well as a full description of the methods, facilities and quality controls employed during manufacturing and packaging.  An NDA also must disclose all the patents that cover the drug.

To market or sell a generic version of an existing FDA-approved drug, the maker of the generic drug must submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for FDA approval.  An ANDA generally is not required to include preclinical and clinical trial data to establish safety and effectiveness.  Instead, an ANDA applicant must show that its generic drug is bioequivalent to an existing drug.  In addition, an ANDA applicant is required to provide certification that the ANDA will not infringe on the patent rights of a third party.  Specifically, if an applicant seeks approval prior to the expiration of patents listed by the NDA holder, then a “paragraph IV certification” must be submitted by the applicant to certify that it believes its product or the use of its product does not infringe on the third party’s patents, or that such patents are not valid or enforceable.  The first generic drug applicant that files an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification is granted, upon approval, 180 days of marketing exclusivity.

For an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, the applicant must send notices to the NDA holder for the referenced drug and to all patentees of record for the listed patents within 20 days of FDA notification that the ANDA is accepted for filing.  If neither the NDA holder nor the patent holders bring an infringement lawsuit against the ANDA applicant within 45 days, the FDA may approve the ANDA.  If the NDA holder or the patent holders file a patent infringement lawsuit against the ANDA applicant within 45 days, a stay prevents the FDA from approving the ANDA for up to 30 months.  If, however, the patent infringement litigation is still ongoing after the 30 months, the FDA may approve the ANDA.

The Facts

The taxpayer is a pharmaceutical company engaged in developing, manufacturing, marketing, selling and distributing generic and brand name drugs.  In the process of filing ANDAs with a paragraph IV certification, the taxpayer incurred legal fees in lawsuits filed by patent and NDA holders for patent infringement.  In addition, the taxpayer as an NDA holder incurred legal fees in a lawsuit it filed against an ANDA applicant with a paragraph IV certification to protect its right to sell its branded drug until all patents expired.  The taxpayer sought to deduct its legal fees as ordinary and necessary business expenses.

The IRS Analysis

Legal Fees Incurred in the Process of Obtaining FDA Approval of ANDAs

The IRS concluded that the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer as an ANDA applicant to defend actions for patent infringement in the process of filing the ANDA with paragraph IV certification must be capitalized under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4.  The IRS characterized the fees as incurred to facilitate the taxpayer obtaining the FDA-approved ANDAs with paragraph IV certification, which granted the applicant the right to market and sell a generic drug before the expiration of the patents covering the branded drugs, and by filing early, potentially with a 180-day exclusivity period.  As such, the IRS concluded, the fees are required to be capitalized as amounts paid to create or facilitate the creation of an intangible under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(5).  In so concluding, the IRS rejected the taxpayer’s argument that its fees did not facilitate obtaining FDA-approved ANDAs because it could have commercialized its generic drugs after the 30-month stay expired regardless of the outcome of the lawsuits.  The IRS reasoned that the filing of the ANDAs with paragraph IV certification and the defense of the patent infringement lawsuit were a part of a series of steps undertaken in pursuit of a single plan to create an intangible.

The IRS further concluded that the cost recovery of the capitalized legal fees incurred to obtain the FDA-approved ANDAs must be suspended until the FDA approves the ANDAs, and the capitalized fees must be amortized on a straight-line basis over 15 years as section 197 intangibles.

Legal Fees Incurred to Protect Its Right Against Other ANDA Applicants with Paragraph IV Certification

With respect to the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer as an NDA holder in the litigation against another ANDA applicant, the IRS characterized the fees incurred to defend the validity of the patents owned by the taxpayer as amounts paid to defend or perfect title to intangible property that are required to be capitalized under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(9).  In contrast, the fees incurred by the taxpayer in the litigation relating to determining whether valid patents have been infringed are not required to be capitalized under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(9).

The IRS further concluded that the capitalized fees incurred to protect the patents and the FDA-approved NDA must be added to the basis of the patents to be depreciated under section 167.  The cost recovery begins in the months in which the legal fees were incurred and is allocated over the remaining useful lives of the patents.

In characterizing the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer in defending the validity of its patents as costs of defending or perfecting title to intangible property, the IRS distinguished the legal fees at issue from the litigation expenses incurred by the taxpayers in defending a claim that their patents were invalid in Urquhart v. Comm’r, 215 F.2d 17 (3rd Cir. 1954).  In Urquhart, the taxpayers were participants in a joint venture that was engaged in the business of inventing and licensing patents.  The taxpayers obtained two patents involving fire-fighting equipment and, after threatening litigation against Pyrene Manufacturing Company, brought an infringement suit against a customer of Pyrene, seeking an injunction and recovery of profits and damages.  The case was dismissed, and Pyrene subsequently commenced an action against the taxpayers seeking a judgment that the taxpayers’ patents were invalid and that its own apparatus and methods did not infringe the patents.  A counterclaim was filed for an injunction against infringement, and an accounting for profits and damages.  Pyrene did not raise any questions as to title to, or ownership of, the patents and was successful in the lawsuit.  The patents held by the taxpayers were found to be invalid.  In holding that the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the IRS’s contention that the litigation was for the defense or protection of title.

Distinguishing the FAA from Urquhart, the IRS focused on the fact that the taxpayers in Urquhart were professional inventors engaged in the business of exploiting and licensing patents, and that Urquhart involved the taxpayers’ claims for recovering lost profits.  By emphasizing that Pyrene did not raise any issue as to title to the patents in Urquhart, the IRS seemed to ignore the fact that, like the taxpayer in the FAA, Pyrene sought a judgment on the validity of the taxpayers’ patents and that the outcome of the litigation in Urquhart also focused on the validity of the patents.

Change of Accounting Method for Legal Fees Incurred by the Taxpayer 

The IRS also concluded that the taxpayer’s treatment of its legal fess associated with each ANDA or patent as either deductible or capitalizable is a method of accounting that the Commissioner can change on an ANDA-by-ANDA or patent-by-patent basis.  The consequence of this conclusion, if valid, is that the IRS can impose on audit an adjustment to capitalize legal fees that the taxpayer deducted in prior years, including years closed by the statute of limitations.  For example, the IRS can include in the taxpayer’s gross income for the earliest year under examination an adjustment equal to the amount of the legal fees the taxpayer previously deducted, less the amount of amortization that the taxpayer properly could have taken had the taxpayer capitalized the legal fees.

A taxpayer that voluntarily changes its method of accounting, however, receives more favorable terms and conditions than a taxpayer that has its method of accounting changed by the IRS on examination.  For example, a taxpayer that changes its method of accounting voluntarily can spread the adjustment resulting from the change over four taxable years, and the first year of the adjustment is the current taxable year as opposed to the earliest open taxable year.

The publication of this FAA likely will bring the attention of examining agents to this issue.  Therefore, if a taxpayer believes it is using an improper method of accounting for legal fees (or any other item), it should carefully consider whether to voluntarily change its method of accounting before the IRS proposes to change the taxpayer’s method of accounting on examination.

Article By:

Employee’s Deactivation Of Facebook Account Leads To Sanctions

DrinkerBiddleRegMark_rgb_hires

The latest Facebook case highlights how courts now intend to hold parties accountable when it comes to preserving their personal social media accounts during litigation.  Recently, a federal court ruled that a plaintiff’s deletion of his Facebook account during discovery constituted spoliation of evidence and warranted an “adverse inference” instruction against him at trial.  Gatto v. United Airlines and Allied Aviation Servs., et al. , No. 10-CV-1090 (D.N.J. March 25, 2013).

The plaintiff, a ground operations supervisor at JFK Airport, allegedly suffered permanent disabling injuries from an accident at work which he claimed limited his physical and social activities.  Defendants sought discovery related to Plaintiff’s damages, including documents related to his social media accounts.

Although Plaintiff provided Defendants with the signed authorization for release of information from certain social networking sites and other online services such as eBay, he failed to provide an authorization for his Facebook account.  The magistrate judge ultimately ordered Plaintiff to execute the Facebook authorization, and Plaintiff agreed to change his Facebook password and to disclose the password to defense counsel for the purpose of accessing documents and information from Facebook.  Defense counsel briefly accessed the account and printed some portion of the Facebook home page.  Facebook then notified Plaintiff that an unfamiliar IP address had accessed his account.   Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff “deactivated” his account, causing Facebook to permanently delete the account 14 days later in accordance with its policy.

Defendants moved for spoliation of evidence sanctions, claiming that the lost Facebook postings contradicted Plaintiff’s claims about his restricted social activities.  In response, Plaintiff argued that he had acted reasonably in deactivating his account because he did know it was defense counsel accessing his page.  Moreover, the permanent deletion was the result of Facebook’s “automatically” deleting it.  The court, however, found that the Facebook account was within Plaintiff’s control, and that “[e]ven if Plaintiff did not intend to deprive the defendants of the information associated with his Facebook account, there is no dispute that plaintiff intentionally deactivated the account,” which resulted in the permanent loss of  relevant evidence.  Thus, the court granted Defendants’ request for an “adverse inference” instruction (but declined to award legal fees as a further sanction).

The Gatto decision not only affirms that social media is discoverable by employers, but also teaches that plaintiffs who fail to preserve relevant social media data will face harsh penalties.  Employers are reminded to specifically seek relevant social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, LinkedIn accounts) in their discovery requests since such sources may provide employers with sufficient evidence to rebut an employee’s claims.  This case also serves as a reminder and a warning to employers that the principles of evidence preservation apply to social media, and employers should take steps very early in the litigation to preserve its own social media content as it pertains to the matter.

Article By:

 of

Second Circuit Bars Criminal Defendant from Accessing Assets Frozen by Regulators

Katten Muchin

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld a district court’s refusal to release nearly $4 million in assets frozen by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to help a defendant fund his criminal defense.

Stephen Walsh, a defendant in a criminal fraud case, had requested the release of $3.7 million in assets stemming from the sale of a house that had been seized by regulators in a parallel civil enforcement action. In denying Walsh’s motion to access the frozen funds, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government had shown probable cause that the proceeds had been tainted by defendant’s fraud, and were therefore subject to forfeiture. Though Walsh and his wife had purchased the home in question using funds unrelated to the fraud, Walsh ultimately acquired title to the home pursuant to a divorce settlement in exchange for a $12.5 million distributive award paid to his wife, at least $6 million of which, according to the court, was traceable to the fraud.

Agreeing with the District Court, the Second Circuit found that although the house itself was not a fungible asset, it was “an asset purchased with” the tainted funds from the marital estate by operation of the divorce agreement and affirmed the denial of defendant’s request. Further, since Walsh’s assets did not exceed $6 million at the time of his arrest, under the Second Circuit’s “drugs-in, first-out” approach, all of his assets became traceable to the fraud.

U.S. v. Stephen Walsh, No. 12-2383-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2013).

 of

U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers

The National Law Review recently published an article, U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers, written by Jennifer Cerven of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

Barnes & Thornburg

 

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal from Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan on the issue of whether state and local government employees can bypass the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and sue for age discrimination under an equal protection theory. The case is Madigan v. Levin, Docket Number 12-872.

Appellate courts are split on whether the ADEA is the exclusive route for state and local government employees to bring a claim for age discrimination, or whether an equal protection claim via Section 1983 is available. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Plaintiff, a former Assistant Attorney General, could go forward with a Section 1983 age discrimination claim against certain defendants (including Madigan) in their individual capacity.  The Seventh Circuit decided that the ADEA does not preclude a Section 1983 claim, but acknowledged that its decision was contrary to rulings in other circuits holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.

The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that state and local government employees may avoid the ADEA’s remedial regime by bringing age discrimination claims under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1`983.

In the petitioner’s brief asking the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, Madigan noted the circuit split and argued that if the Seventh Circuit’s ruling were to stand, there would be about one million state and local workers in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin who would be able to bypass the ADEA’s administrative dispute resolution process at the EEOC and go straight to court.  Madigan argued that this would undercut the ADEA and would deprive state and local governments of prompt notice of claims.

The outcome of the case will be important not only for state and municipal employers, but also for individual employees.  As a practical matter, the plaintiff could end up with no further opportunity for an age discrimination claim if the Supreme Court decides that the ADEA forecloses age claims under Section 1983.  That is because the lower court decided that the employee fell under the ADEA exclusion of policy-making level employees, 29 U.S.C. §630(f).  Moreover, sovereign immunity applies to protect states from individual suits for monetary damages under the ADEA, under Supreme Court precedent in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S.  62.

The case is likely to proceed to briefing during the current term and may be scheduled for argument in the fall term.

© 2013 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Not so Fast at the Eden Roc

The National Law Review recently published an article, Not so Fast at the Eden Roc, written by Nelson F. Migdal with Greenberg Traurig, LLP:

GT Law

 

Within hours of the appeals court’s ruling [Marriott International v Eden Roc 3-26-2013.pdf], there have been announcements about the demise of the long-term hotel management agreement and the hotel owner’s inviolate right to terminate (revoke) management agreements “at-will.”  But the wiser course might be to not speak too soon, but, rather, to ponder the consequences.  Remember that Judge Schweitzer’s prior ruling on October 26, 2012 granted Marriott’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the hotel owner from removing the hotel operator in another of a series of “midnight raids,” where the hotel owner sweeps in and removes the hotel operator.  The hotel operator at the Eden Roc chose to stand its ground, and the injunction order maintained the status quo.  In many situations, the parties are able to resolve their dispute, either on their own or with the assistance of a mediator.  In fact, the Judge urged the parties to do just that.

The parties were not able to resolve their differences, and on March 26, 2013, a New York appeals court vacated Judge Schweitzer’s injunction.  This is not a sweeping and staggering new law. Citing the 1991 Woolley case, the order merely confirms that a principal may freely remove its agent and terminate the agency relationship “at-will” (absent the presence of a “coupled interest” as part of the contract; see the attached link to our prior piece on the Turnberry decision).  (To this extent, I disagree with the appellate court’s dicta that the agreement in question is not an agency agreement; in fact it is). The order further confirms that certain contracts that have the characteristics of a personal services contract cannot be enforced by means of an injunction.  It is also not news that if a hotel owner desires to terminate its management agreement with the hotel operator in this manner, that the hotel owner may be answerable in damages to the hotel operator.  Some blog posts within the last 24 hours make reference to the recent Fairmont Hotels & Resorts termination at the Turnberry Resort.  Very few of those blog posts complete the factual story and note that the hotel owner ultimately paid Fairmont damages reported to be roughly $19,000,000, representing the approximate present value of expected future management fees. Depending on the performance of the hotel, an Owner’s summary revocation of a hotel management agreement could be akin to selling “puts”; you get to own the stock, but do you really want to own it that cost?

So, let’s just be more judicious here.  Hotel owners and hotel operators actually do talk with each other more often than not, and do enter into legally binding agreements for management of the owner’s hotel.  I will continue to advocate for good faith negotiation over litigation, and monitor the complete story, including the fact that terminating the hotel management agreement may grant an owner its wish to regain the hotel, but that will come at a price, and then, the next step is that the hotel owner will need to replace the removed hotel operator with yet another hotel operator – which hotel owners realize can add a significant expense for the owner.

©2013 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in “Pay-for-Delay” Patent Settlement Antitrust Case

The National Law Review recently published an article, Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in “Pay-for-Delay” Patent Settlement Antitrust Case, written by Jeffrey W. Brennan and Glenn Engelmann with McDermott Will & Emery:

McDermottLogo_2c_rgb

On March 25, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States heard argument on the issue of pharmaceutical patent settlement agreements between branded and generic drug companies that contain so-called “pay-for-delay” or “reverse payment” provisions. Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., involves the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) appeal of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit’s order affirming dismissal of an FTC charge that such an agreement was an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  Proof that an agreement between competitors is anticompetitive under Section 5 (which only the FTC may enforce) and under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (for which there is a private right of action) is essentially the same.  The Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. Actavis will almost certainly have major implications for the viability of FTC and private suits alleging that pay-for-delay settlements are anticompetitive, and for the level of antitrust risk facing companies that enter into such settlements.

Pay-for-delay challenges arise from settlements of patent infringement suits by branded drug patent holders against generic drug applicants under the Hatch-Waxman framework.  Two provisions must be present for the theory to apply: a restriction on generic entry until a future date (even if the entry precedes patent expiration), and payment of money or other value by the brand to the generic firm.  The payment typically is part of an ancillary agreement, such as a supply or co-promotion arrangement or IP license (coined a reverse payment because the plaintiff pays the defendant to settle).  The FTC argues that this paradigm delays competition because it likely induces the generic to settle for later entry, or would have under exclusivity provisions if it won the lawsuit.  The FTC finds the agreements presumptively unlawful and would put the burden on defendants to prove otherwise.  Defendants counter that the patent conveys a right to exclude and that these settlements promote and accelerate competition, because they enable generic entry prior to patent expiration.  Defendants assert that the burden should remain with the plaintiff to prove an anticompetitive effect.

The facts alleged in the FTC complaint squarely fit this paradigm.  The settlement occurred in 2006.  Solvay marketed branded drug Androgel.  A formulation patent claiming Androgel expires in 2020.  Generic drug firm Watson (now Actavis) had applied to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for approval to launch a generic version of Androgel and certified that the generic product did not infringe Solvay’s patent and that the patent was invalid.  Solvay sued Watson and another firm for patent infringement, then settled.  The parties agreed that Watson would not launch its generic version of Androgel until 2015—five years prior to patent expiration—and that Watson would promote Androgel to a key customer source, urologists, and be compensated by Solvay for those services.  The agreement thus contains both components of an FTC pay-for-delay paradigm: a time-restriction on generic entry and a reverse payment.

The 11th Circuit followed its own precedent in rejecting the FTC case under the “scope-of-the-patent” test.  (The Second and Federal Circuits apply the same test.)  Under that analysis, if the patent was not obtained by fraud, and the infringement suit is not a sham (i.e., objectively baseless), then a settlement does not violate the antitrust laws if its terms do not expand the exclusionary scope of the patent, such as by prohibiting generic entry even after the patent expires.  Since the Solvay-Watson settlement provided for generic entry five years before patent expiration and did not otherwise allegedly fail the foregoing tests, the 11th Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FTC complaint.  The Supreme Court likely accepted the case because of a circuit split on this issue.  In 2012, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, in which the FTC was not a party, the Third Circuit reversed a district court and applied a legal analysis that rejects the scope-of-the-patent test and essentially adopts the FTC approach.

In the oral argument, the Justices directed a number of pointed questions and comments to each side.  As noted, the government would put the burden on defendants to show that their agreement is not anticompetitive, arguing that “agreements of this sort should be treated as presumptively unlawful, with the presumption able to be rebutted in various ways” that do not include an assessment of the patent’s validity or of the strength of the infringement claim.  Members of the Supreme Court expressed skepticism about that rule.  Justice Kennedy responded, “[t]hat’s my concern, is your test is the same for a very weak patent as a very strong patent.  That doesn’t make a lot of sense.”  Justice Scalia said that to not evaluate the strength of the patent in assessing competitive effects is to leave out “the elephant in the room.”  Justice Breyer remarked that the government proposes “a whole set of complex per se burden of proof rules that I have never seen in other antitrust cases,” adding, “I’m worried about creating some kind of administrative monster.”

Justices also had pointed comments for the companies’ counsel, particularly on whether it is appropriate to find that the patent has an absolute right to exclude even though it was being tested in court.  The companies’ counsel argued that “the patent gives the patentholder the legal right to exclude” and that unless the patent is legally unenforceable, the patentholder is “entitled to monopoly profits for the whole duration of the patent.”  Justice Sotomayor said “there is no presumption of infringement” by the generic product, “[s]o what you’re arguing is that in fact a settlement of an infringement action is now creating the presumption.”  She added, “I don’t know why we would be required to accept that there has or would be infringement by the product that has voluntarily decided not to pursue its rights.”  Justice Kagan remarked that “[i]t’s clear what’s going on here is that [the brand and generic firms are] splitting monopoly profits and the person who’s going to be injured are all the consumers out there,” and that under the companies’ proposed rule, the brand and generic firm will have the incentive “in every single case . . . to split monopoly profits in this way to the detriment of all consumers.”

The Supreme Court’s term concludes in June 2013, by which time a decision is expected.

© 2013 McDermott Will & Emery

Federal Circuit Courts Find No Causal Connection in Employee Retaliation Claims

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Federal Circuit Courts Find No Causal Connection in Employee Retaliation Claims, written by Katherine G. Cisneros of Schiff Hardin LLP:

SchiffHardin-logo_4c_LLP_www

 

As employers know, retaliation cases are notoriously difficult to defend. However, two recent decisions from federal courts of appeal may help employers prevail in such cases. The Sixth and Seventh Circuit U.S. Courts of Appeals recently affirmed summary judgment in two retaliation cases, both courts holding that the employees’ claims did not establish a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action.

Timing Alone Insufficient Where Multi-Year Gap Between Protected Activity and Adverse Action

In Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., No. 2:08-cv-11652 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013), the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Hazel Park School District, finding no causal connection between a coach’s prior lawsuit and her subsequent removal from a coaching position. Fuhr served as the high school girls’ varsity basketball head coach at Hazel Park High. In 1999, Fuhr sued the school district, alleging gender discrimination based on the school district’s failure to hire her as the high school boys’ varsity basketball head coach. At the time, the boys’ and girls’ teams played during different seasons. Fuhr ultimately prevailed and in 2004 became the boys’ basketball coach. Anticipating a federal district court order requiring the basketball seasons be played at the same time, the school district removed Fuhr as the girl’ head coach in 2006 because it would be too difficult to coach two teams in the same season.

Fuhr sued, claiming that her removal as the girls’ coach and other harassing acts were retaliation for prevailing in her previous lawsuit. Fuhr claimed her principal told her that “this is a good old boys network….They are doing this to you to get back at you for winning the lawsuit.” The Sixth Circuit determined that the principal’s statement was too ambiguous to provide direct evidence of unlawful retaliation. The court next found that Fuhr failed to demonstrate a causal connection between her prior lawsuit and removal as the girls’ coach. While a close temporal proximity between events can constitute evidence of a causal connection, here, the “multi-year gap prove[d] fatal” to establishing causality. The court also added that even if Fuhr could prove causation, the school district was able to offer legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any alleged harassing actions. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the school district on Fuhr’s retaliation claim based on the lack of any temporal proximity.

Employee’s Disagreement with Employer’s Investigation Does Not Prove Retaliation

In Collins v. American Red Cross, No. 08-cv-50160 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the American Red Cross, finding that the employer’s investigation report, albeit possibly incorrect, is not evidence of unlawful retaliation or discrimination. Collins, an African-American woman, worked for the Red Cross. In 2006, Collins filed a racial discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on harassment from her co-workers. Collins received a “right-to-sue” letter, but did not file a suit. In 2007, Collins’s co-workers complained that, among other acts of misconduct, Collins said that the Red Cross was out to get minorities. The human resources officer assigned to investigate found that all of these allegations against Collins were “substantiated,” and Collins was terminated.

Collins sued, claiming that her termination was in retaliation for her filing of the EEOC charge. Collins claimed that the report did not really substantiate the claim that Collins said the Red Cross is out to get minorities, and therefore, the report must have been referring to the EEOC complaint. Although the report was “sloppy, and perhaps it was also mistaken or even unfair,” Title VII only forbids discriminatory or retaliatory terminations. Nothing in the report suggested the Red Cross was concerned with Collins’s EEOC complaint. Collins only provided speculation that the report was incorrect because of the EEOC complaint, and mere speculation is not enough to overcome summary judgment. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Red Cross on Collins’s retaliation claim because she failed to show a causal link between the filing of her EEOC complaint and her subsequent termination.

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed summary judgment on Collins’s race discrimination claim because Collins failed to prove that the Red Cross’ reason for termination was pretextual, emphasizing that “pretext means a lie.” The only piece of evidence Collins offered was that she denied all the allegations raised by her co-worker’s complaints. Denying the allegations is not enough to survive summary judgment because the “fact that a statement is inaccurate does not meant that it is a deliberate lie.” Evidence that an employer reached the wrong conclusion can suggest discrimination if the conclusion were “incredible on its face.” However, here, the court found that the report’s conclusions were not incredible, and there was nothing in the record to suggest racial animus toward Collins. While the Red Cross’s report may have been wrong, that is not enough for Collins’s claim to survive summary judgment.

Sound Employer Practices Remain Key to Successful Defenses

As is clear from the Seventh Circuit case, employer investigations remain a key component of successful defenses of claims. Employers should utilize human resources or other professionals who are trained in both conducting investigations and writing investigation reports to investigate allegations of harassment, discrimination or retaliation. Also keep in mind that, as the Sixth Circuit case suggests, if a long period of time elapses between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse action, it is likely that additional evidence of retaliatory conduct will be required in order for the employee to prevail. To defeat any such evidence, employers should be sure that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the actions taken are well-documented.

© 2013 Schiff Hardin LLP

Supreme Court Narrows ‘State Action’ Immunity From Antitrust Laws

GT Law

The U.S. Supreme Court has referred to the federal antitrust laws as “a charter of freedom [having] a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.” The antitrust laws are generally broadly worded, and they have been subject to various interpretations and reinterpretations over the past century. Certain types of anti-competitive activity, such as horizontal price fixing, have been deemed so obviously harmful to the marketplace as to be declared per se illegal. Others are judged by the so-called “rule of reason” analysis, in which courts weigh the effect on a defined market of the alleged anti-competitive activity.

Click the View Media link to read the full article.

Service of Process through Social Media

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Service of Process through Social Media, written by Philip H. Cohen with Greenberg Traurig, LLP:

GT Law

 

In the matter of Federal Trade Commission v. PCCare247 Inc., Case No. 12 Civ. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2013) (PCCare247), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sanctioned using social media as a means of circumventing the Hague Service Convention’s standard method of facilitating service among signatory states through designated Central Authorities. Granting the FTC’s motion for leave to effect service of documents by alternative means on defendants located in India, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer’s ruling appears to represent the first time a U.S. court has permitted service of process via Facebook.

In PCCare247, Indian defendants allegedly operated a scheme to convince American consumers that they should spend money to fix non-existent problems with their computers. After the Indian Central Authority was unable to formally serve the Indian defendants pursuant to the Hague Convention, the court granted the FTC’s request to serve process on the defendants by both email and through a Facebook account.

The FTC’s proposed service using Facebook presented the court with a novel issue.  Last year, another court in the Southern District of New York denied a motion to permit a party to effect service using Facebook because the plaintiff had not sufficiently established the credibility of the defendant’s Facebook account.  Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., Case No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (Fortunato).  Fortunato involved a domestic defendant accused of committing credit card fraud.  After several failed attempts at personal service, the court rejected the third-party plaintiff’s “unorthodox” proposal to serve process, including by Facebook, citing concerns about the lack of certainty and authenticity of the defendant’s purported Facebook profile.  The court questioned whether the Facebook profile was in fact operational and accessed by the party to be served, noting that the location listed on the profile was inconsistent with four potential addresses a private investigator had identified. The court opted instead for service by publication pursuant to New York rules.

Distinguishing  PCCare247 from  Fortunato, Judge Engelmayer articulated several considerations supporting his confidence in “service by Facebook.” The court observed that under Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court remains free to order alternative means of service on an individual in a foreign country so long as the means of service are not prohibited by international agreement and comport with due process.  The court acknowledged that although service by email and Facebook is not enumerated in Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention, India has not specifically objected to them. Therefore, under Rule 4(f)(3) the court found that it was free to authorize process by these means provided that doing so would satisfy due process.

Recognizing that the reasonableness inquiry is intended to “unshackle[] the federal  courts from anachronistic methods of service and permit[] them entry into the technological renaissance,” quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002), the court concluded that Facebook was “reasonably calculated to provide defendants with notice of future filings” in the case. In support of its conclusion, the court explained that the defendants ran an Internet-based  business and that the email addresses specified for the defendants were those used for various aspects of the  alleged scheme.  For two of the Indian defendants in PCCAre247, their Facebook accounts were registered to the same email addresses to be served. Moreover, the court had “independent confirmation” that one of the email addresses identified was genuine and operated by a defendant, because it had been used to communicate with the court on several occasions.  Additional evidence that the Facebook profiles were authentic included that some of the defendants listed their job titles at the defendant companies and that the defendants were  Facebook “friends” with each other. Additional considerations the court noted were: the FTC had made several good faith efforts to serve the defendants by other means; and defendants had already demonstrated knowledge of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the FTC’s proposal to serve process by both email and Facebook was a combination that satisfied due process as a means of alternative service and was highly likely to be an effective means of reaching and communicating with the defendants.

This decision suggests that under the right circumstances, where a party establishes a reasonable foundation for the authenticity of the accounts, service via email and social media may be an economical and effective option for serving process on foreign parties, or even domestic parties that are otherwise difficult to track down by traditional means.

©2013 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

East Coast Spotlight on Design Patents: Spanx v. Yummie Tummie

The National Law Review recently featured an article, East Coast Spotlight on Design Patents: Spanx v. Yummie Tummie, written by Michael A. Cicero with Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC:

Womble Carlyle

 

Certainly the recent design patent litigation between Apple and Samsung in the Northern District of California garnered significant media attention.  Design patents now reside in the media spotlight once again, but this time through East Coast litigants.  The president of a New York-based maker of women’s control tops that is a named owner of several design patents openly declared that she hopes her Georgia-based competitor “is ready for war because [she] will not lie down.”  The accused infringer actually started the litigation following its receipt of a cease-and-desist letter from the New York company’s legal counsel.

On March 5, 2013, Spanx, Inc. (“Spanx”) filed a declaratory judgment complaint in the Northern District of Georgia against Times Three Clothier, LLC d/b/a Yummie Tummie (“Yummie Tummie”), requesting the court to declare that three Spanx products do not infringe seven design patentsclaimed to be owned by Yummie Tummie.  The lawsuit has already generated a considerable amount of media coverage, including sources cited below and NBC’s Today Show.

The lawsuit pits two prominent entrepreneurs against one another.  Heather Thomson, the president of Yummie Tummie, is not only the sole inventor named in each of the patents-in-suit (as Heather Thomson Schindler), but was also one of the “Real Housewives of New York.”[1]  Sara Blakely, according to ABC News, “founded Spanx in 2000, introducing what Spanx calls a shaping camisole in 2005,” and is “the youngest woman on Forbes’ billionaires list.”

Referring to an interview Thomson gave to the publication WWD (Women’s Wear Daily),lifeinc.today.com reports:

Thomson told WWD that she first learned of the product this past November when she received an anonymous package containing the Spanx Total Taming Tank and a note saying it was on sale at QVC.  “I immediately recognized it as my original Yummie Tummie tank,” Thomson told WWD.  The unsigned note said Spanx was selling it at QVC.  A spokeswoman for Thomson declined to comment further.

“The Patents-in-Suit are related to one another,” states Spanx’s complaint, “in that [six of the patents] all claim priority to the [oldest] Patent.”  Excerpts from two of these patents appear in Figure 1, below, for purposes of illustration.

The complaint alleges that Yummie Tummie’s counsel sent Spanx a cease-and-desist letter on or around January 18, 2013, identifying the accused products as Spanx’s “Total Taming Tank,” the “Top This Tank Style 1847,” and the “Top This Cami Style 1846.”  (See Figure 2 below, depicting two of those products.)  Spanx responded to that letter on or around February 14, 2013, according to the complaint, “describing in detail significant differences between the Accused Products and the Patents-in-Suit and stating, among other things, that it does not believe the Accused Products infringe the Patents-in-Suit.”

Figure 1: Depictions of Fig. 1 from Yummie Tummie’s U.S. Patents Nos. D606,285S (left) and D632,052S (right)
Figure 2: Two accused Spanx products as shown in its website: Styles Nos. 1846 (left) and 1847 (right)

Counsel for each party then communicated with one another several times but, states the complaint, Yummie Tummie “continued to maintain that the Accused Products infringe the Patents-in-Suit and expressed a willingness to enforce its patents against Spanx.”  Thus, Spanx alleges, it has grounds for seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of the Patents-in-Suit.  The complaint requests such declaratory relief plus “costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees as provided by law.”

As of the time of this writing, Yummie Tummie has not yet filed a formal answer to the complaint (its allotted time for doing so under procedural rules has not yet expired).  Yummie Tummie has, though, already  issued a public statement regarding the lawsuit.  In a March 14, 2013 letter addressed directly to Blakely and published on Yummie Tummie’s website, Thomson states, among other things: “We brought this to your attention expecting you to stop.  Instead you’ve chosen to sue us, no doubt thinking that your massive company could intimidate ours.  We have successfully enforced our design patents in the past and will continue to do so.”

The case is Spanx, Inc. v. Times Three Clothier, LLC d/b/a Yummie Tummie, No. 1:13-cv-0710-WSD,filed 03/05/13 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, assigned to U.S. District Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.

[1] Coincidentally, the Northern District of Georgia is also the site of a legal battle between two “Real Housewives of Atlanta,” filed just one week after the Spanx lawsuit.  See prior post.

Copyright © 2013 Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC