Category: Litigation

Large Damages OK, but Injunctive Relief Too Broad Re: Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc. Patent Infringement Case

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Addressing a finding of infringement that resulted in a lost-profits and reasonable royalty damages award of more than $300 million, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling of infringement and damages, finding that sufficient evidence supported the findings.  Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., Case No. 12-1029 (Fed. Cir., May 1, 2013) (Rader, C.J.).

Versata sued SAP in 2007 over two patents that provide particularized pricing data based on factors such as the type of customer, type of product and size of the order.  Starting in the mid-1990s Versata sold its software, called Pricer, to many large companies, including as IBM, Lucent and Motorola.  SAP began offering software that provided customized pricing as part of its enterprise software in 1998.  As acknowledged by the Federal Circuit, when “SAP entered the market by bundling hierarchical pricing into its enterprise software, the market for Pricer disappeared.”

At a first trial, SAP was found to have infringed both patents, but the lower court later granted SAP judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of non-infringement as to one of the patents and ordered a new trial on damages based on a change in governing law.  In a second trial, the jury awarded Versata $260 million in lost profits and $85 million in reasonable royalties.  Further, the district court permanently enjoined SAP from continuing to sell its customized pricing software. Predictably, SAP appealed.

SAP argued to the Federal Circuit that its accused products did not infringe and that, in any event,  the lost-profits and royalties damages, as well as the permanent injunction, should be set aside as improper for various reasons.  On the infringement issue, SAP argued that it could not infringe because its software is not capable of performing the necessary tasks (required by the claims) without additional computer instructions.  As for damages, SAP argued that the lost profits and reasonable royalty damages were improperly calculated as a matter of law and should be set aside.  SAP also argued that the injunction was overbroad in that it would prevent the company from offering maintenance and additional licenses to previously existing users.

As to the issue of infringement, the Federal Circuit found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of infringement.  The Court noted that the record “clearly support the jury’s conclusion that SAP’s accused products infringe the asserted claims without modification or additional computer instructions.”

In considering SAP’s arguments on damages, the Federal Circuit rejected some of SAP’s arguments on lost profits damages noting that they should have been raised under a Daubert challenge.  The Court found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s damages findings on lost-profits and reasonable royalty damages.

However, the Federal Circuit agreed that the permanent injunction as entered was overbroad and remanded the case to the district court for modification of the injunction.

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Total Settles Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Bribery Claims for $398M

Katten Muchin

On May 29, French oil and gas company, Total SA, agreed to pay $398 million to settle US civil and criminal allegations that it paid bribes to win oil and gas contracts in Iran in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Notably, the criminal penalty is the fourth-largest under the FCPA and the case marks the first coordinated action by French and US law enforcement agencies in a major foreign bribery case.

In a scheme that allegedly began nearly 20 years ago in 1995 and continued until 2004, Total allegedly paid approximately $60 million in bribes to induce an intermediary, designated by an Iranian government official, to help the company win contracts with National Iranian Oil Co. The contracts gave Total the right to develop three oil and gas fields and included a portion of South Parys, the world’s largest gas field. Total allegedly characterized the bribes as “business development expenses” in its books and records.

The DOJ filed a three-count criminal investigation charging Total with FCPA conspiracy and internal controls and books-and-records violations. Total agreed to resolve the FCPA charges by paying a $245.2 million criminal penalty, which was at the bottom of the $235.2 to $470.4 million range of fines available under the US Sentencing Guidelines. The company also settled a related civil case with the US Securities and Exchange Commission for $153 million in disgorgement of its profits in the scheme. The criminal case will be dismissed after three years if Total complies with the deferred prosecution agreement, which requires Total to (i) retain a corporate compliance monitor, who will conduct annual reviews; (ii) cooperate with authorities and (iii) implement an enhanced compliance program designed to prevent and detect FCPA violations. The compliance program requires, among other things, that Total’s Board of Directors and senior management “provide, strong, explicit and visible support and commitment” to the company’s anti-corruption policy and that they appoint a senior executive to oversee the program and report directly to an independent authority, such as internal audit, the Board or a committee thereof. Total’s problems, however, are not over. French prosecutors have recommended that the company and its chief executive officer be brought to trial on violations of French law, including France’s foreign bribery law.

U.S. v. Total SA, 13-cr-239 (E.D. VA. May 29, 2013).

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NetSpend: Delaware Chancery Criticizes Single-Buyer Negotiating, Use of DADW & Revlon Process, But Denies Injunction

GT Law

In a nutshell, plaintiff’s motion to enjoin Total System Services’s $16 per share/$1.4 billion (cash) acquisition of Netspend Holdings was denied because the balance of the equities tipped in favor of the defendants (i.e., the court’s perceived risk to the target’s stockholders of a deal that might fail in the face of a MAC or breach when it was the only deal on the table) even though Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded that it was reasonably likely that at trial the plaintiff would successfully establish that the Netspend board did not conduct a reasonable Revlon value maximizing process.

The key facts and observations in the case included, among others:

– A single-buyer negotiating strategy employed by the Netspend Board with no formal pre-sign check (although a go-shop was asked for several times in the negotiations and repeatedly rejected by the buyer, the repeated asks appear to have helped obtain the $16 per share price.

– An unaffected 45% premium without giving effect to an immediate pre-sign, positive earnings release by Netspend).

– Netspend had prior bad experience with collapsed sale processes and, therefore, it was queasy about undertaking another formal or elongated process.

– Netspend was not “for sale” and responded to Total System’s initial IOI and commenced discussions mainly because Netspend’s 31% stockholder and 16% stockholder wanted to exit an illiquid and volatile stock (Netspend was content to execute management’s stand-alone operating strategy absent a compelling price).

– Appraisal rights are available under DGCL 262; Vice Chancellor Glasscock questioned whether Netspend’s directors had a “reliable body of evidence” and “impeccable knowledge” of the company’s intrinsic value in the absence of a pre-sign market check and despite Netspend’s prior failed sale processes some years before.

– The fairness opinion obtained by the Netspend board was “weak” under all of the circumstances (putting more pressure on the directors’ understanding of the company’s intrinsic value).

– No interloper surfaced even after the transaction litigation delays (putting maximum pressure on plaintiff’s demand for an injunction); the deal protection package was pretty plain vanilla (the break up fee was in the “northern sector” of the range at 3.9% of total equity value, but certainly not preclusive or coercive; matching rights and other buyer protections were customary).

– A reasonable arms-length negotiating strategy was employed to obtain the $16 per share.

– Netspend’s CEO (who led the negotiations with appropriate Board participation and oversight) was not conflicted (in fact, he was found to be aligned with the non-affiliate stockholders in several respects).

– The nominees of Netspend’s 31% stockholder and 16% stockholder constituted a majority of the Netspend Board (but Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that their interests were aligned with the non-affiliate shareholders).

– Two private equity firms had conducted diligence and looked at buying a significant stake in the company from Netspend’s 31% stockholder and 16% stockholder at a materially lower price than Total System’s initial (and final) bid, but they never indicated a desire to buy 100% of Netspend.

– The support agreements entered into between Total Systems and each of the two large stockholders were coterminous with the merger agreement (but were not terminable upon the Netspend Board’s withdrawal of its declaration of advisability of the merger agreement).

In a noteworthy passage, Vice Chancellor Glasscock faulted the decision of the Netspend Board not to waive the “don’t ask-don’t waive” clauses in the confi-standstills with the two private equity firms at the time discussions commenced with Total Systems and, in the case of any post-sign unsolicited “superior offers” that might arise, he noted the ineffectual fiduciary out to the no-shop covenant in the merger agreement which required Netspend to enforce and not waive pre-existing standstills (thus, the private equity firms were precluded from lobbing in a post-sign jumping bid).

Vice Chancellor Glasscock refers to Vice Chancellor Laster’s In re Genomics decision and to Chancellor Strine’s decision in In re Ancestry pointing up, again, the Court’s sensitivity to, and the highly contextual nature of, DADW provisions in pre-sign confi-standstill agreements and perhaps further underscoring the distinction between using a DADW in a single-buyer negotiating strategy vis a via using one in a formal auction setting or where a full pre-sign market check is conducted.

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How Monsanto Applies to Nonagricultural Biotechnology

Womble Carlyle

The facts behind the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Monsanto v. Bowman are simple enough. Farmers are able to buy soybeans containing Monsanto’s patented glyphosate resistance technology under a license that permits them to plant and grow one generation of crops. Vernon Bowman skirted this program, however, by purchasing commodity soybeans from a grain elevator knowing that the seeds would nonetheless likely contain the very same Monsanto technology. He then planted the seeds, raised crops, and saved seeds from these crops to plant new crops. The Supreme Court held that Bowman’s actions infringed Monsanto’s patents because unlicensed growth of the seeds was a new making of the patented invention. Consequently, the doctrine of patent exhaustion did not provide any defense as to these new seeds.

This was not a surprising result for the biotechnology industry. The idea that patent rights in seed progeny are not exhausted by the original sale of their “parents” was well established in the United States, and is even codified in the European Biotechnology Directive.

The Court left us with a relatively clear answer regarding the scope of patent exhaustion related to seeds. The use of the purchased, licensed seeds for consumption and/or processing cannot be interfered with by the original seller, as the patent rights on those individual (sold) seeds have been exhausted. The planting and cultivation (i.e., replication) of those seeds, however, can only be done under a license from the patentee. In other words, even though someone sells you a bag of seed, you have no right to plant and grow that seed without a license (although there may be a good argument that the license should be implied in appropriate cases).

So, where does Bowman leave us when it comes to determining the infringement or enforceability of self-replication biotechnology patents outside of the agricultural context? For other patented self-replicating (or easily replicable) technologies, the circumstances may present more complicated questions.

Biotechnology inventions such as cell lines, bacteria, and other living material often must exist in a condition of continuous self-replication simply to be maintained for any use. Vectors, plasmids, etc., replicate within cells, and from generation to generation within host cells, allowing for production of vastly more nucleic acid copies than initially used for transfection. Even small linear nucleic acids such as those used for primers and probes may be “replicated” to generate large quantities relatively easily using PCR or other methods in molecular biology. In each case, (cells, viruses, vectors, probes), something analogous to planting, watering, cultivating, is required. In view of the Bowman decision, the question persists as to whether such replication will be permitted or considered an unlicensed “remanufacture” or new making of the original, patented item.

In this regard, we note that Justice Kagan left open the possibility that the replication might be “a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose.”[1] Certainly, the replication contemplated in this part of the opinion is that which must necessarily occur in connection with some authorized practice of the invention. Maintenance of culture cells, for example, where the cells are necessarily replicating only for the purpose of maintaining the culture during its authorized use or in preparation for such use is one example that seems to fit comfortably within this aspect of the Court’s opinion.  In other words, a license for multigenerational use of a cell line may be implied in these circumstances, even if it is not given expressly.

Other technologies may not present quite so simple an analysis. DNA vectors can be used for a variety of purposes, not all of which require replication. For example, vectors can be used as probes or markers, they can be used to transport sequences of interest for further manipulation, or they can be used as immunizing agents. None of these uses require or specifically contemplate replication. Of course, some vectors are used in contexts where replication is likely or assumed (e.g., transfection of cells or bacteria, generation of transgenic tissues or organisms). The consideration of vectors under Bowman will, therefore, likely depend more heavily on context, including the sales and licensing practices of the patentee.

Some commentators have characterized the Bowman holding as “limited to the facts,” pointing to the Court’s comment that “[o]ur holding today is limited – addressing the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating technology.”[2] Attempts to limit Bowman to its specific facts should be taken carefully. Indeed, the Court cut through much of the surrounding facts to reach its core holding – that replication is a new making of the patented invention and an infringement in the absences of a license. Accordingly, it does appear that the holding may address the most important “situation” for all self-replicating technologies, even if it does not address all of the context-dependent permutations of the facts involving self-replication technologies.

Consequently, assertions of “self-replicating” material turning otherwise innocent parties into patent infringers are simply not credible. To paraphrase the Court in Bowman, the soybeans Bowman took home from the grain elevator didn’t plant themselves, didn’t spray themselves with glyphosate, and didn’t otherwise cultivate themselves to produce the unauthorized crop. Similarly, in biotechnology, it is likely that unauthorized and infringing activity will quite clearly fit the Monsanto “situation” and be easily recognizable as infringement. For example, maintaining an initial cell culture in the hands of the licensee-purchaser, although it also involves replication, should be easily distinguished from distribution of the culture (or vectors, or phage, etc.) to unauthorized third parties.

Nonetheless, given the potential for unnecessarily complex analysis and possible confusion of courts, patent holders should carefully consider how their license provisions may be used to clarify not only express grant and restriction provisions, but also how the license may shape an understanding of how the invention works and its intended use. The dividing line between authorized and infringing activity will be influenced by context, and parties are well advised to define that context by the licensing contract and not rely on the bare contours of the doctrine of patent exhaustion. The license is the place where the parties involved, the patent holder and the licensee, have a chance to agree on what is authorized and what is not. It is also the place where the patent holder has an opportunity to shape future interpretations of what the practice of the invention encompasses and what it does not. An effort to be as comprehensive as possible in the positive, express grant of the license may be as important as the restrictions that are expressly stated. If, as is quite possible, the restrictions fail to contemplate the full scope of intended unauthorized activities, a grant of authorization that is more specific may allow a court to more accurately determine what is “necessary but incidental” to the authorized practice of the invention and what is not.

The Bowman decision provides the biotech community some much needed clarity regarding self-replicating inventions. Perhaps equally important, the Court displayed a keen sensitivity to the negative implications of an overly broad exhaustion doctrine. While there will undoubtedly be further development of the law as it is applied to different technologies, the fundamental ability to control self-replicating inventions at each generation through the grant or withholding of a license places authority where it belongs – with the patentee. And, by reducing the need for complex work-arounds, the clarified authority and more calibrated level of control provided by theBowman decision should facilitate licensing negotiations to the benefit of both parties.

This article was written by guest bloggers Christopher Jeffers, Ph.D., Carl Massey, Jr., Thomas F. Poché, Ph.D.

[1]Although the Court referenced the copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1), in conjunction with this “necessary but incidental” fact pattern, the statute actually considers only computer programs and states there is no infringement if “a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer programin conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner.” From this, better language in the Bowmanopinion might have been “necessary and essential” or even “necessary and incidental.” 

[2] Bowman Op. at 10.

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Non-Compete Agreements Aren’t for Everyone: The Necessity of Proving a “Legitimate Business Interest”

Womble Carlyle

It is a longstanding tenet of North Carolina law:  A company must have a legitimate business interest to justify using non-competes in its employment agreements.

Employers often focus on specific language describing the scope of their non-competes – should it be six months, one year or two years?  Should it be citywide, statewide, or is a larger territory reasonable?  And although the scope of a non-compete is critical, two recent North Carolina court decisions emphasize that you can’t use a non-compete in just any situation.  There must be a legitimate business interest which merits its use.

What qualifies as a legitimate business interest?

In Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, P.A. v. DiMichele, the NC Court of Appeals enforced an employment agreement prohibiting the defendant physician from practicing medicine in competition with the plaintiff surgical clinic for two years within a 35-mile radius of its Pinehurst facility.

In reversing the trial court’s finding of no irreparable harm, and remanding the case with instructions to grant the PI, the Court focused on several key findings which demonstrated the employer had strong, legitimate and protectable business interests to justify the use of non-competes:

  • In its more than 60 years of existence, the clinic had invested many resources “cultivating relationships with patients, employees, and various entities in the region in which it does business.”
  • The clinic annually spent significant sums “to develop and maintain a loyal patient base and goodwill in the community.”
  • The clinic provided the physician with “extensive confidential information regarding all aspects of plaintiff’s medical practice and business affairs.”
  • The clinic also provided the physician with an extensive patient base and the support necessary to maintain a successful medical practice, reputation and goodwill in the community.

In contrast – and reaching a different result – in Phelps Staffing, LLC v. C.T. Phelps, Inc., the Court of Appeals found that a staffing company failed to establish a legitimate business interest supporting its use of non-competes.   A number of factors undermined the staffing company’s case:

  • The employees at issue were “general laborers”;
  • The employees did not have access to trade secrets or proprietary information; and
  • The staffing company admitted that the primary purpose of the non-compete was to prevent competition from other temporary staffing companies.

The Court had little trouble affirming the trial court’s finding that the non-compete was “merely an attempt to stifle lawful competition between businesses and that it unfairly hinders the ability of plaintiff’s former employees to earn a living.”

These North Carolina cases are in sync with the national trend.  For example, in Gastroenterology Consultants of the North Shore v. Mick S. Meiselman, an Illinois appellate court invalidated a physician’s non-compete because the former employer failed to show a legitimate protectable interest.  The evidence showed that the doctor had been practicing in the relevant territory for about 10 years before his employment with the practice, the practice did not introduce the doctor to his patients or his physician-referral sources, the practice did not advertise, promote or market the doctor’s practice, and the doctor maintained his own office and telephone number.  The practice merely provided some administrative support for the doctor.  As a result, the practice lacked a legitimate interest to justify the non-compete.

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Six Ways to do Business Overseas While Reducing the Perils of Future Litigation

Sheppard Mullin 2012

As an executive or in-house counsel, your work likely reaches across the globe.

90% of companies in the United States are involved in litigation—much of it international. American companies have increased overseas business from 49% in 2008 to 72% as late as 2010.

If you work for a medium to large corporation, you are liking working overseas or interacting with colleagues that are. This means that you are likely working around the clock putting out fires, making deals, and juggling regulatory hurdles. Are you worried of running so fast in such unknown territory that you may miss something? Do you wish you had more time to learn everything to minimize your company’s business and litigation risks?

I have good and bad news. The bad—it is nearly impossible to know all of the intricacies of international law, customs, or the unique business challenges facing your company. The good news—you don’t have to. The reality is that ignorance of international law is not what gets you in trouble . . . facts do. Case in point, see Wal-Mart’s bribery scandal in Mexico.

Here are six habits you already know and should put into practice to reduce the risks of bad facts leading to future international litigation:

1. Watch What You Put in Email

You are in charge of an international project and the pressure is mounting. Your foreign counterparts seek written assurances. So, you go on the record via email stating definitively and unequivocally the company’s position. Years later and, with hindsight, you learn you were wrong and it comes back to bite you in litigation. Or maybe you feel especially close to your Brazilian counter-part after a night of food and drinks, so you share information via email about your company’s “issues.” That email is later produced in litigation and becomes evidence against your company.

Remember, emails live on forever and travel . . . fast! Like water leaks, emails go unnoticed until the full impact of their damage emerges years later.

This is basic, but often key in litigation. If you are doing business overseas: watch your tone, grammar, use of local colloquialisms, or use of vague undefined terms (e.g. “material” breach). Avoid definitive words like: “always,” “never,” or “definitely.” Give yourself margin for error. If you are assuming, say so in your email. If you still need approval for your written position, note as much in the email. Ask yourself, “is what I am writing something I would be okay having blown up on an overhead projector in court?” If so, send away.

2. Write Facts Down and Do So Clearly

The fear of bad facts or cross-examination should not deter you from writing. Given the language barriers of international work, communication is vital to your success. So, you should write emails and correspondence. But how? The key is clarity of facts.

This means, writing facts, not conclusions or opinions. When you portray facts, be objective and detail-oriented. For example, retell the other side’s position and your company’s response. Don’t assume that the other side will stick to the same story they told you orally, so document it.

However, you are often called to make conclusions or state an opinion. When you do, make sure you identify why, the process leading to the conclusion/opinion, and what factors could change your initial viewpoint.

Litigation is drama and international litigation is drama on a global scale where each side gives their “story.” Take the lead and document the “real story” by writing it down. When you do, and litigation erupts, a litigator like me can clearly and persuasively tell your story.

3. Respect Cultural Sensitivities, But Don’t Be Afraid to Follow Up

You are in meetings with your counter-parts in Asia and essential business issues come up. Yet, you are concerned about being culturally sensitive and not losing “face.” So, you let the issue pass and put it on your to-do list. As the days pass, hundreds of other “to-do” issues join it on your list and you forget.

Respect cultural sensitivities, but always follow-up. Better yet, document it, follow-up over the phone or in person, and document what you did. I have seen clients’ major multi-million dollar litigation matters get sidetracked because an executive failed to follow-up on a legitimate concern and subsequently “waived” the issue.

4. Be a Gatekeeper and Assert Your Contractual Rights

Companies and their executives fly to the moon to strike an international deal that benefits the company. They hire great lawyers to put in all the bells and whistles to protect their business interests. Yet, when the deal meets the reality of daily business life, gravity takes over and the precious rights protected in the contract fall flat to earth.

If you are the executive sent overseas to manage the project or handle the international distribution business, become the gatekeeper. That means: read the previously negotiated contract, understand it, ask questions about it, know it intimately, and then follow the terms of the contract.

If the contract gives you the right to documents from the foreign company, politely, but firmly get your documents. If the contract calls for a delivery schedule, follow it and insist the other side do the same. If the contract requires your foreign counterpart to act a certain way, do a number of things, or behave within the confines of a certain standard, make sure they do.

Your failure to know your contract and follow it, could waive important rights, change the terms of the contract, and create multiple avenues of arguments for the other side. This could come to haunt you later when you are back in the United States and the project you were in charge of heads to litigation.

5. Ask Questions, Look Around, and Gather Information

Maybe the most important and underused tool in your arsenal to reduce the risk of overseas business leading to litigation is to ask questions.

As you undertake your overseas assignment, you will notice that some things don’t make sense. When this happens, ask questions. Who is the foreign executive you are dealing with? What is his role in the company? Why is he asking you to meet with him and a foreign government official at a swanky resort? Could this be a problem? Maybe, but you will never know where you and your company stand unless you ask questions.

While you are asking questions, look around. If you are managing a construction project in Qatar, get on the ground and look at the project site. Don’t rely on others to tell you what is happening, see it for yourself. Open your eyes . . . is anything off? What’s there that shouldn’t be there? What isn’t there that should be there? If you know your contract (as in Tip 4 above), you will know what doesn’t look right.

Gather readily available information. The reality is that international litigation becomes very difficult and expensive from the United States when all of the evidence remains overseas. So, if you hear your foreign counter-part discuss a “regulation,” “policy,” or “contract” that they are relying on, ask to have a copy . . . and actually get it. Doing so will give your company an advantage in discovery if litigation ensues.

In the end, use your senses. What do you see and hear? Does it smell or feel right? If not, take note, ask questions, and gather information as it occurs.

6. Seek Advice

Note, it is wise to seek advice on international law when doing business overseas. Whether you are working on an international investment deal,cross border real estate transaction, want to protect your intellectual property, or are worried about immigration exposure, it is good business to get counsel.

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U.S. Supreme Court Unanimously Upholds Creditability of UK Windfall Tax

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In a rare unanimous decision with potentially far-reaching impact on taxpayers claiming foreign tax credits, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a “windfall tax” imposed by the United Kingdom was creditable under IRC Section 901.

On May 20, 2013, in a rare unanimous decision with potentially far-reaching impact on taxpayers claiming foreign tax credits, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a “windfall tax” imposed by the United Kingdom was creditable under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 901.  This decision definitively establishes the principles to be applied when determining whether a foreign tax is creditable under Section 901, expressly favoring a “substance-over-form” evaluation of a foreign tax’s economic impact.

The UK windfall tax was enacted in 1997 as a means to recoup excess profits earned by 32 UK utility and transportation companies once owned by the government.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the UK sold several government-owned utility companies to private parties.  After privatization, the UK Government prohibited these companies from raising rates for an initial period of time.  Because only rates and not profits were regulated, many of these companies were able to greatly increase their profits by becoming more efficient.  The increased profitability of these companies drew public attention and became a hot political issue in the United Kingdom, which ultimately resulted in Parliament enacting a windfall tax designed to capture the excess or “windfall” profits earned by these companies during the years they were prohibited from raising rates.  The tax was 23 percent of any “windfall” earned by such companies, which was calculated by subtracting the price for which the company was sold by the United Kingdom from an imputed value based on the company’s average annual profits.  Both PPL Corporation and Entergy Corporation owned interests in two of these 32 privatized companies and took a U.S. tax credit for the windfall taxes paid to the United Kingdom.

IRC Section 901 grants U.S. citizens and corporations an income tax credit for “the amount of any income, war profits and excess-profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession of the United States.”  Whether a foreign tax is creditable for U.S. income tax purposes is based upon the “predominant standard for creditability” laid out in Treasury Regulation §1.901-2.  Under that approach, a foreign tax is an income tax “if and only if the tax, judged on the basis of its predominant character,” satisfies three tests.  The foreign tax must be imposed on realized income (i.e., income that has already been earned), the basis of gross receipts (i.e., revenue) and net income (i.e., gross receipts less significant costs and expenditures).  See Treas. Reg. §1.901-2(a)(3).

The Supreme Court’s decision resolved a split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits on how to apply the predominant standard for the creditability test set forth in the regulations.  The Third and Fifth Circuits took opposite views of two U.S. Tax Court decisions, PPL Corp.  v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 304 (2010), and Entergy Corp.  v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-197, which both held in favor of the taxpayers that the practical effect of the UK windfall tax, the circumstances of its adoption and the intent of the members of Parliament who enacted it evidenced that the substance of the tax was to tax excess profits, and therefore was creditable.

In PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, 665 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court, refusing to consider the practical effect of the UK windfall tax and the intent of its drafters.  Instead, the court focused solely on the text of the UK statute, which in its estimation was a tax on excess value and not on profits.  In contrast, in Entergy Corp. v. Commissioner, 683 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, finding that the tax’s practical effect on the taxpayer demonstrated that the purpose of the tax was to tax excess profits.  The court explained that Parliament’s decision to label an “entirely profit-driven figure a ‘profit-making value’ must not obscure the history and actual effect of the tax.”

In its decision, the Supreme Court agreed with both the Fifth Circuit and the Tax Court.  In applying the rules of the Treasury Regulations, the Supreme Court reinforced the three basic principles to determine whether a tax is creditable.  First, a tax that functions as an income tax in most instances will be creditable even if a “handful of taxpayers” may be affected differently.  This means that the controlling factor is the tax’s predominant character.  Second, the economic effect of the tax, and not the characterization or structure of the tax by the foreign government, is controlling on whether the tax is an income tax.  This extends the principle of “substance over form” to the characterization of a foreign tax.  Third, a tax will be an income tax if it reaches net gain or profits.  Applying these principles to the PPL case, the Supreme Court found that the predominant character of the windfall tax was that of an excess profit tax and was therefore creditable.

The PPL decision will likely have far-reaching effects on courts that wrestle with whether certain taxes paid overseas are creditable for U.S. income tax purposes.

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The Stockton Saga Continues: Untouchable Pensions on the Chopping Block?

Sheppard Mullin 2012

Judge Christopher M. Klein’s decision to accept the City of Stockton’s petition for bankruptcy on April 1, 2013 set the stage for a battle over whether public workers’ pensions can be reduced through municipal reorganization.

Stockton’s public revenues tumbled dramatically when the recession hit, leaving Stockton unable to meet its day-to-day obligations. Stockton slashed its police and fire departments, eliminated many city services, cut public employee benefits and suspended payments on municipal bonds it had used to finance various projects and close projected budget gaps. Stockton continues to pay its obligations to California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) for its public workers’ pensions. Pension obligations are particularly high because during the years prior to the recession, city workers could “spike” their pensions—by augmenting their final year of compensation with unlimited accrued vacation and sick leave—in order to receive pension payments that grossly exceeded their annual salaries.

When Judge Klein accepted Stockton’s petition April 1, 2013, he reasoned that Stockton could not perform its basic functions “without the ability to have the muscle of the contract impairing power of federal bankruptcy law.” Judge Klein noted that his decision to “grant an order for relief … is merely the opening round in a much more complicated analysis.” The question looming is whether the contract-impairing power of federal bankruptcy law is strong enough to adjust state pension obligations.

Stockton will have the opportunity to present a plan of adjustment, which must be approved through the confirmation process. No plan of adjustment can be confirmed over rejection by a particular class of creditors unless the plan (1) does not discriminate unfairly, and (2) is fair and equitable with respect to each class of claims that is impaired under or has not accepted a plan. Judge Klein said that if Stockton “makes inappropriate compromises, the day of reckoning will be the day of plan confirmation.”

Stockton’s plan of adjustment will likely propose periods of debt service relief and interest-only payments for some municipal bonds, followed by amortization. Stockton intends to actually impair other municipal bonds, potentially paying only cents on the dollar. However, Stockton does not intend to reduce its pension obligations to CalPERS under the plan. Provisions of the California Constitution and state statutes prohibit the reduction of public workers’ pensions, even in bankruptcy proceedings. These California state law provisions were thought to make public pensions virtually untouchable. Yet, the plan may not be confirmable if it impairs Stockton’s obligations to bondholders but not its obligations to CalPERS. Bondholders and insurers will surely vote against and object to the plan, claiming it unfairly discriminates against them, and Judge Klein will have to decide whether the treatment constitutes unfair discrimination. The unfair discrimination claim may have merit, because an overarching goal of federal bankruptcy law is to equitably allocate losses among competing creditors. Federal bankruptcy law often trumps state laws, but there is no precedent for how federal bankruptcy law applies to California’s pension provisions.

For now, cash-strapped municipalities around the country—and their creditors—are watching to see just how Stockton will restructure its obligations.

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Patent Exhaustion Rejected: Patented Seed Purchaser Has No Right to Make Copies

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The Supreme Court in Bowman v. Monsanto Co. ruled unanimously that a farmer’s replanting of harvested seeds constituted making new infringing articles.  While the case is important for agricultural industries, the Supreme Court cautioned that its decision is limited to the facts of the Bowman case and is not a pronouncement regarding all self-replicating products.

In a narrow ruling that reaffirms the scope of patent protection over seeds, and possibly over other self-replicating technologies, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a purchaser of patented seeds may not reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.  Bowman v. Monsanto Co., Case No. 11-796 (Supreme Court May 13, 2013).

In this case, Monsanto had asserted two of its patents that cover genetically modified soybean seeds that are resistant to herbicide (Roundup Ready® seeds).  Monsanto broadly licenses its Roundup Ready® soybean seeds under agreements that specify that the farmer “may not save any of the harvested seeds for replanting, nor may he supply them to anyone else for that purpose.”  Vernon Hugh Bowman is a farmer who purchased soybean seeds from a grain elevator.  Bowman replanted Roundup Ready® seeds in multiple years without Monsanto’s permission.  The district court granted summary judgment of patent infringement against Bowman, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.  Bowman appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

On appeal, Bowman heavily relied on the “patent exhaustion” doctrine, which provides that the authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser or any subsequent owner a right to use or resell that article.  Bowman argued that the authorized sale of the Roundup Ready® seeds exhausted Monsanto’s patent rights in the seeds, because “right to use” in the context of seeds includes planting the seeds and reproducing new seeds.

Patent Implications

Speaking through Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision that Bowman’s activities amounted to making new infringing articles.  The Supreme Court held that “the exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission.”  Specifically, the exhaustion doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the particular article sold, but “leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item.”  The Supreme Court noted that if Bowman’s replanting activities were exempted under the exhaustion doctrine, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit.  After Monsanto sold its first seed, other seed companies could produce the patented seed to compete with Monsanto, and farmers would need to buy seed only once.

In rebuffing Bowman’s argument that he was using the seed he purchased in the manner it was intended to be used, and that therefore exhaustion should apply, the Supreme Court explained that its ruling would not prevent farmers from making appropriate use of the seed they purchase—i.e., to grow a crop of soybeans consistent with the license to do so granted by Monsanto.  However, as the Supreme Court explained “[A]pplying our usual rule in this context . . . will allow farmers to benefit from Roundup Ready, even as it rewards Monsanto for its innovation.”

Tying the Supreme Court’s decision in this case narrowly to seed (as opposed to other self-replicating technologies), Justice Kagan noted that the decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., in which the Supreme Court concluded that seeds (as well as plants) may simultaneously be subject to patent protection and to the narrower protection available under the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).  PVPA protection permits farmers who legally purchase protected seed to save harvested seed for replanting.  However, reconciling the two forms of protection, Justice Kagan explained, “[I]f a sale [i.e., of a patented seed] cut off the right to control a patented seed’s progeny, then (contrary to J.E.M.) the patentee could not prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed.”

Other Self-Replicating Technologies

The Supreme Court’s decision in Monsanto is, of course, important for agricultural industries.  If extended to other self-replicating technologies, it may also prove important for biotechnology companies and others  that rely on self-replicating technologies, including, for example, companies that own patent rights over viral strains, cell lines, and self-replicating DNA or RNA molecules.  If subsequent cases extend the “no exhaustion” holding of Monsanto to these technologies, patent protection would extend to copies made from the “first generation” product that is obtained through an authorized sale.

However, the Supreme Court cautioned that its decision is limited to “the situation before us” and is not an overarching pronouncement regarding all self-replicating products.  The Supreme Court suggested that its “no exhaustion” ruling might not apply where an article’s self-replication “occur[s] outside the purchaser’s control” or is “a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose,” citing computer software (and a provision of the Copyright Act) as a possible example.  As explained by Justice Kagan, “We need not address here whether or how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances.”  In this regard, the Supreme Court particularly noted that “Bowman was not a passive observer of his soybeans’ multiplication.”  Instead, Bowman “controlled the reproduction” of seeds by repeated planting and harvesting.  Thus, the Supreme Court suggests that a purchaser’s “control” over the reproduction process likely will be a key inquiry in considering the patent exhaustion doctrine as it relates to other self-replicating technologies.  Of course, it remains to be seen how broadly lower courts will interpret the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Antitrust Implications

By holding that Monsanto’s restriction on replanting was within the scope of its patent rights, the Supreme Court effectively immunized that restriction from antitrust scrutiny.  Other court decisions have called into question other license restrictions viewed as going beyond the scope of patent protection as being potentially susceptible to an antitrust or patent misuse challenge.

The Supreme Court highlighted its application of the exhaustion doctrine last addressed in Quanta, which held that “the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights in that article.”  This boundary line conventionally demarcated the end of a patent’s protection and the beginning of a potential antitrust minefield.  Some commentators may interpret the Monsanto decision to push that line further out.  Importantly, however, the Supreme Court deemed the seeds at issue to be a “new product.”  So construed, Monsanto’s restriction on replanting did not affect the product’s use, as in Quanta and Univis Lens, but rather came within the well-settled principle that “the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.”

The Supreme Court not only was doctrinally conservative in its Monsanto decision, it was also careful to explain that its holding is a narrow one.  Monsanto never exhausted its patent rights in the “new” seeds; indeed, it never truly “sold” them.  Rather, Bowman created new seed from seeds that Monsanto had sold.  The decision therefore may not portend a more general inclination to construe the scope of patent protection more broadly.  In fact, the Supreme Court went so far as to clarify that it could reach a different outcome were it presented with a different technology.

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Shippers Rolling the Dice to Gain Oil Pipeline Capacity

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With the growing capacity constraints on oil pipelines, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) has recently extended the bounds of what it considers acceptable methods of apportioning limited capacity. In Seaway Crude Pipeline Company LLC, 143 FERC ¶ 61,036 (2013), the Commission approved a new lottery system that will select, at random, new shippers who will be permitted to tender the minimum monthly volume requirement. The catch, however, is that there are approximately 275 new shippers on the system, meaning a given shipper has roughly only a 5 percent chance of winning the lottery each month. And to achieve regular shipper status and thus gain access to the 90 percent of system capacity reserved for regular shippers, it must win that lottery twelve consecutive times.

After reversing flow on its Longhaul System and commencing north-to-south transportation service, Seaway saw the number of new shippers dramatic multiply from 5 (when to service commenced) to 275 by April, 2013. Seaway alleged that some of the proliferation was due to shippers attempting to game the system and broker capacity in the secondary market. Like other oil pipelines, Seaway dedicates 90 percent of the system capacity to regular shippers and 10 percent to new shippers, and to achieve regular shipper status, Seaway’s customers must tender the minimum volume (60,000 barrels per month) for 12 consecutive months. Before the lottery, Seaway allocated the 10 percent of capacity to new shippers on a pro rata basis, but with so many new shippers, none was able to meet the requirements to achieve regular shipper status because of the relatively high minimum tender requirement. As a result the number of new shippers multiplied with those shippers informally aggregating batches to meet Seaway’s minimum monthly tender requirement.

Seaway concluded that such a system was unworkable and proposed a lottery system to replace its existing pro rata system. The lottery system will use a software-generated random process to determine which new shippers will be allowed to tender the 60,000 barrel minimum each month, meaning about 13 new shippers will get capacity for a given month.

Despite several protests, the Commission approved Seaway’s lottery system for two main reasons. First, the Commission reasoned that the lottery system will deter manipulation during the nomination process and thus make capacity more readily available to legitimate new shippers; and second, the lottery would not be unduly discriminatory because the system would apply to all new shippers.

Although this is not the first time that the Commission has approved the use of a lottery system to award new shipper capacity when a pipeline faces apportionment problems, Seaway’s proposed lottery system, coupled with the requirement that new shippers must tender the minimum monthly volumes for 12 consecutive months, means that it will be highly improbable for new shippers to ever achieve regular shipper status, unless the number of new shippers dramatically decreases. Thus, the decision treads slightly new ground on what the Commission is willing to consider as a “reasonable” remedy to address the multiplication of new shippers and the vast over-nomination issues some crude pipelines are facing in the current environment.

Finally, the Seaway decision underscores the importance of open seasons as being the principle method of obtaining reliable transportation service on oil pipelines. For example, gaining access to the Longhaul System as a new shipper is difficult enough because a prospective new shipper will now have to win the lottery simply to tender the minimum amount requirement in one month. However, to gain access to the remaining 90 percent of system capacity, that prospective customer must win the new shipper lottery 12 consecutive times. By contrast, Seaway held two opens seasons for capacity on its Longhaul System and committed shippers were able to access the 90 percent of the system capacity reserved for regular shippers. Thus, shippers seeking access to reliable capacity might consider a commitment during an open season rather than gambling on a future—and perhaps unforeseen—lottery.

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