Category: Litigation

Attorneys Facing An Uphill Battle In Litigation Should Consider Option Value When Arguing Valuation

Let me tell you a sad story; Joe owned a marketing company and earned a prosperous living for several years. Joe’s business was growing rapidly and all seemed right with the world. Then a trusted employee left Joe’s firm, taking with him half of Joe’s customers in violation of his non-compete agreement. Joe’s business slowly suffered and lost customers until eventually his firm declared bankruptcy.

Joe sued his former employee and asked for damages related to the value of his firm. Joe’s attorney argued to the court for compensation based on the value of Joe’s firm that was destroyed by the employee. Yet the attorney left out one critical question when arguing the case; how should the law account for the fact that Joe’s business was growing rapidly until the employee left?

Perhaps Joe had several big accounts that he might have been able to sign had the employee not engaged in unfair trade practices. Without taking these factors into account, Joe’s attorney is under-representing the value of Joe’s claim and leaving compensation on the table for no reason.

In finance, this idea of the possibilities that could plausibly occur in the future is called an embedded option or a real option and it is extremely useful in a variety of cases from divorce proceedings and business bankruptcies to merger disputes and matters of economic harm. In the scenario above, Joe’s firm had the ability to potentially continue to grow and become even more successful than it was at the time before Joe’s employee left. Hence the damage done to Joe is greater than simply the lost historical value of the firm. He has also lost the possibility of much more value in the future.

The crux of modern asset valuation is based on a concept called the time value of money. Essentially the idea is that because money received in the future is worth less than money received today, we can value assets or a business based on their associated cash flows and an appropriate discount rate. This approach forms the basis of everything from stock valuation on Wall Street to proper methods for computing interest rates in bankruptcy. This facet of valuation is well understood. But what about the future opportunities or chances of cash flows that are uncertain?  That’s what embedded options address.

The concept of embedded options might seem abstract or even too nebulous for many judges to buy into in a court case, but the reality is that real options have significant value and are often a subject of serious financial negotiations. Particularly for small firms, real options are often important and serve as the basis for various types of convertible debt and warrant grants.

As a finance professor and frequent consultant to companies on matters of asset valuation and financial forecasting, I have long taken it for granted that the techniques used in the finance profession were well understood and universally applied across many other industries including the law. I was very surprised to learn when I started doing expert consulting work, this is not the case. Lawyers often neglect to ask for damages based on real options in their cases. This leaves an important tool out of the litigation toolbox.

In discussing real options thus far, it might seem like they are primarily useful for parties alleging damages, yet they can also be useful for defendants as well. In particular, defendants need to understand how real options are valued and also understand the four appropriate metrics for calculating economic harm as it relates to options (compensating variation, equivalent variation, Paasche indices, and Laspeyres indices). I’ll talk more about these in a future column though.

When valuing real options, there are various statistical techniques that can be used. The math is not necessarily important here, but the concepts are. Essentially, real options increase in value in situations where there is greater uncertainty, and when interest rates in the broader economy rise. Those conditions make real options an exciting tool in today’s courts. With the Fed finally starting to raise interest rates, real options should become marginally more valuable. More importantly, situations with significant amounts of uncertainty lead to greater volatility in intrinsic asset prices.

These volatile situations are often the very situations that lead to court cases for attorneys – a business deal that went wrong leads to a bankruptcy but could have led to a hugely successful company, a merger agreement could result in substantial cost savings for both firms or substantial value destruction for investors and is being challenged by shareholders, a wrongful death case for an individual in the prime of their lives leaves so many possible futures unexplored. Thanks to new statistical techniques and greater computing power, these situations and others can be effectively modeled through computer simulations and valued by economists in ways that would have been unimaginable a decade ago.

Representing clients fairly and to the best of one’s ability in court is the foremost duty of an attorney. To do that, attorneys need to understand the tools of business and the cutting-edge techniques being used in asset valuation. Failing to use these tools is not only a disservice to clients, but a severe hindrance to the attorney as well. In a competitive legal market, the Joes of the world will flock to those attorneys that free themselves to position their clients for maximum success in court.

Article By Dr. Michael McDonald of Fairfield University Dolan School of Business

© Fairfield University Dolan School of Business

New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 3 Must Read Changes

Although the Supreme Court will say they’re simply more “proportional,” it seems they were trying to find a new phrase that would lead to less abuse of the relevancy standard.  This, however, is only one of the significant changes recently doled out in the December 1, 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).  It will be interesting to see how these new standards evolve.  With respect to IP litigation and expert discovery, we see three major changes:

Faster

Andale!  The new rules are speeding things up.  Remember when you used to have 120 days to serve the defendant in federal court?  You could file your complaint, sit back, enjoy a cup of java and relax a little. The Supreme Court says, “No longer.”  The previous Rule 4(m) deadline has been shaved down to a mere 90 days ─ a period that can fly by when you’re trying to locate or track down a difficult defendant.  Once the defendant is served, the court must issue a Rule 16(b)Scheduling Order within 90 days, as opposed to the previous 120.  Everything has been expedited. This is significant because the Rule 26(f) (known by many as the “meet and confer”) requirement is tied to this date as well as the commencement of discovery.  Meaning, the new rules have accelerated the first few stepping stones of the litigation process by as much as one to two months. Ultimately, litigants will be required to disclose experts and respond to expert discovery sooner.  For plaintiffs and defendants alike, case strategy, themes and expert opinions will need to be formulated and forged much sooner. If you’re working under a ticking expert clock, we’re here to help.

Stronger

Do you believe the previous “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” was a weak standard?  It appears the Supreme Court did, or at least they believe the standard was too often used to expand the permissible scope of relevant evidence, which was not the intent. The new Rule 26(b) defines discoverable evidence as that which is: a) relevant (simple as that ─ it must be relevant) and b) “proportional to the needs of the case.”  While the latter may seem a little loose, it likely will create a stronger resistance to outlandish, burdensome, disproportional discovery requests, such as “all emails sent within your entire corporate infrastructure since 2004.”  Interestingly ─ while we’re on this topic ─ in the ESI (electronically-stored information) department, the new Rule 37(e) also provides a stronger, more uniform standard for sanctions available if a party fails to properly preserve ESI.  The Committee notes suggest excessive effort was being exerted to preserve ESI once litigation commenced and too much litigation time was spent fighting over arguably-applicable sanctions for failure to preserve ESI.  The new rule allows the court to award curative measures only upon a finding of 1) failure to preserve ESI and 2) prejudice. In addition, the sanctions must be “no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”  This is definitely a cleaner, stronger standard that will hopefully lead to less costly and less frequent ESI disputes.

More Stringent

“I have a patent and you infringed it.”  Previously, under Form 18 ─ “Complaint for Infringement” ─ in the FRCP Appendix of Forms, this bare-bones allegation was all you needed to file a complaint for patent infringement.  However, the new rules amendment to Rule 84 has abdicated the Appendix of Forms and while the Committee has clearly stated its intent that this abdication “does not alter existing pleading standards,” it seems many IP attorneys can see the writing on the walls.  If there is no longer a sanctioned form that permits such bare-bones allegations, many believe IP complaints will now need to meet the “plausibility” requirements of the Supreme Court’s long-standing Iqbal and Twombly precedent.  Only time will tell, but IP attorneys should anticipate more motions to dismiss under the plausibility standard and the need to file more detailed complaints for patent infringement.

© Copyright 2002-2015 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.
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Ariosa v. Sequenom: In Search of Yes After a Decade of No

The Federal Circuit this Wednesday declined to reconsider its June decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom, a closely watched medical diagnostics case involving patents on cell-free fetal DNA testing. Biotech companies, investors, and patent lawyers alike should expect a prompt petition for certiorari, and should hope that the Supreme Court grants it.  (Disclosure: I was one of twenty-three law professors who submitted an amicus brief urging the Federal Circuit to grant en banc rehearing.)

In the last decade, the Supreme Court has suggested in case after case that the inventions they were considering were not merely unworthy of patent protection because they were, say, not inventive enough or useful enough or disclosed in enough detail. Rather, the Court in these cases gave us information about the very boundaries of the patent system—by placing the disputed inventions outside those boundaries altogether. But they have not yet told us what is just inside those boundaries.

This legal uncertainty has a significant chilling effect on investment in innovation, one that we are increasingly able to quantify.  As USPTO Chief Economist Alan Marco and I explained in a 2013 paper in the Yale Journal of Law and Technology, when a court issues a decision resolving the legal uncertainty over whether a patent was valid, that newfound certainty actually moves the market as much as the initial patent grant does.  In other words, the unpredictability of courts forces the market to discount—by as much as half—how much trust to put in the legal rights that the Patent Office issues.

Patent holder Sequenom certainly experienced the downside of that uncertainty, as Wednesday’s rehearing denial sent its stock price tumbling over 14% in just two days.  Others have taken a hit as well, such as the large-cap DNA analysis firm Illumina, which has pursued Ariosa in a separate patent litigation and whose stock price fell 7% across the same two-day period.

The reason for this uncertainty is that we are effectively back in the late 1970s, when the Court was prominently rejecting inventions as patent-ineligible subject matter—Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972 and Parker v. Flook in 1978—without saying anything concrete about what was eligible.  Relief would come only after Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 1980 and Diamond v. Diehr in 1981, when the Court finally produced binding precedents going the other way.

The result is that today’s patentees can only try to run away from the settlement risk mitigation patent in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (2014), the breast cancer genetic diagnostic patent in AMP v. Myriad (2013), the thiopurine dosage monitoring patent in Mayo v. Prometheus (2012), the energy futures risk hedging patent application in Bilski v. Kappos (2010), and, although they were never definitively adjudicated, the vitamin deficiency diagnostic patents in LabCorp v. Metabolite (2006).  There is no case yet to run toward.

Ariosa v. Sequenom could have been that case and still can be, if the Court grants certiorari.  Certainly the Federal Circuit order has framed the issue well.  The per curiam order denying en banc rehearing was accompanied by three opinions that addressed in different combinations both the reach and the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s recent precedents.

Judge Dyk’s concurrence concluded that the precedents, particularly Mayo and Alice, do apply to the present facts and that those precedents are generally sound.  He invited “further illumination” from the Supreme Court only on whether the all-important inventive concept must come at the second step of the two-step Mayo test (application of the natural law or abstract idea) or may also come at the first step (discovery of the natural law).  Meanwhile, Judge Newman’s dissent concluded that the precedents, particularly Mayo and Myriad, do not apply here, for the facts “diverge significantly.”  She found the Sequenom patent’s subject matter to be eligible and would have proceeded to more specific patentability analysis under §§ 102, 103, 112, etc.

Their midpoint and the best argument for certiorari was Judge Lourie’s concurrence, which agreed that Mayo controls, with “no principled basis to distinguish this case from Mayo”—but which also urged that Mayo and the Supreme Court’s other precedents from Bilski onward are an increasingly unsound basis for differentiating between natural laws and abstract ideas on the one hand, and applications of those laws and ideas on the other hand.  Echoing a previously expressed position of the Patent Office, he favored the “finer filter of § 112” for issues of indefiniteness or undue breadth (rather than what the agency’s post-Bilski Subject Matter Eligibility Guidelines called the “coarse filter” of § 101).

He also pushed back directly against a argument that the Supreme Court frequently invokes to express its preference for flexible standards that foster over predictable rules that can be manipulated: the draftsman’s art.  Decisions from Flook and Diehr to Mayo and Alice have rested in part on the suspicion that patent lawyers may at any time evade substantive doctrinal limitations through clever claim drafting.  To this Judge Lourie’s opinion aptly responded that “a process, composition of matter, article of manufacture, and machine are different implementations of ideas, and differentiating among them in claim drafting is a laudable professional skill, not necessarily a devious device for avoiding prohibitions.”

In these regards, Judge Lourie’s approach may well represent the “center” of the Federal Circuit on subject-matter eligibility.  He was in the en banc majority in Bilski and authored the panel opinion in Mayo.  He authored both panel majority opinions in Myriad (before and after the Supreme Court’s GVR order).  And he authored the five-judge en banc plurality opinion in Alice, whose analysis was ultimately consolidated and endorsed in the Supreme Court’s opinion in that case.

With the issues so well framed and the recent subject-matter eligibility precedents so well synthesized, then, there is reason to be optimistic that a decade of hearing “no” from the Supreme Court may finally give way to a “yes” and better orient us on the true boundaries of our patent system.

Article By Saurabh Vishnubhakat of Texas A&M University School of Law

© Copyright 2015 Texas A&M University School of Law

Vermont GMO Battle Continues in Second Circuit

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is currently in the midst of an interlocutory appeal by the Grocery Manufacturer’s Association (“GMA”) and others of the District Court of Vermont’s denial of a request for a preliminary injunction against Vermont’s “Right to Know” Act.

The Act, passed by the Vermont legislature on May 8, 2014, and effective July 1, 2016, has the stated goal of establishing a system to allow for informed decisions by consumers with respect to the potential health effects of “genetically engineered foods,” commonly referred to as “GMOs.”  The Act applies to products entirely or partially produced with genetic engineering, with a focus on raw agricultural commodities and covered processed foods.  Labels on covered food products must either state that they are “produced with genetic engineering” or “may be produced with genetic engineering.”  Limited exceptions are made for foods derived entirely from animals, restaurant foods, alcoholic beverages and foods that have been independently verified to have “minimal” GMO content.  Penalties under the Act include $1,000.00 per day, per product, fines for food manufacturers.

The GMA filed its initial Complaint with the District Court in June 2014, and sought a preliminary injunction in September 2014.  U.S. District Judge Christina Reiss refused to enjoin the law in a ruling issued on April 27, 2015, which was promptly appealed to the Second Circuit.  Oral argument in the appeal took place on October 8, 2015.

The crux of the issue before the Second Circuit is the proper standard for evaluating GMA’s position that the Act violates the First Amendment by imposing a burden on speech by, inter alia, food manufacturers, based upon the content of that speech.  In reaching her decision to deny the preliminary injunction, Judge Reiss applied the less-stringent First Amendment analysis set forth in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,  471 U.S. 626 (1985).  Given what the appellants term the “controversial” information/disclosures mandated by the Act, they argue the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) and its stricter level of scrutiny applies.  Appellants further rely on Second Circuit precedent, arguing that the case of Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996), bars the state legislature from enacting a law that “trammel[s] manufacturer’s free speech rights to appease “consumer curiosity” and was ignored by the District Court.  The State of Vermont continues to argue that the District Court’s reliance on Zauderer and its less-stringent “rational basis” test was proper, in that the Act merely serves to provide consumers with “factual information.”

The Second Circuit panel reviewing the case addressed the issue of ripeness during oral argument, and remains, given the impact of the Act as the first of its kind to have a set effective date, at the forefront of debate over the regulation of GMO food and food products.  The Second Circuit’s decision bears watching, as the costs to industry resulting from enactment of the Act and the potential domino effect of similar acts being passed by other state legislatures could be significant and will require extensive advanced planning to ensure compliance.

The Second Circuit case is Grocery Manufacturers Association, et al. v. Sorrell, Case No. 15-1504.  The District Court case is Case No. 5:14-cv-117 and the Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction is Document #95.  A link to a .pdf copy of the Order is provided immediately here.

Article By Scott K.G. Kozak of Armstrong Teasdale

© Copyright 2015 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved

Obergefell Uncertainty re: Same Sex Spousal Benefits

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court removed a cloud of uncertainty for same-sex couples when it ruled, in the landmark decision of Obergefell v. Hodges, that the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require all states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples seeking to marry and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other states. We previously discussed the ruling in our blog post, Same-Sex Marriage Decision: Uniformity in All States. However, as discussed below, the Obergefell ruling left at least two unanswered questions.

Retroactivity

Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority in Obergefell did not state whether the decision should be applied retroactively. Retroactive application could require employers to revisit their past practices in providing employee benefits to same-sex couples. To date, no guidance has been issued by the IRS or other federal agencies to assist employers in this respect. Some news outlets have reported that the Social Security Administration intends to apply the Obergefell decision retroactively, but to date no official guidance has emerged.

The retroactivity conundrum is highlighted in at least two lawsuits initiated in Federal courts over the past year that challenge employers’ denials of health benefits to the same-sex spouses of employees.

  • In Cote v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., an employee sought repeatedly to have her same-sex spouse added to her health insurance but was denied. While Wal-Mart did extend benefits to same-sex spouses in the wake of the Windsor decision, the employee and her spouse had accumulated significant medical bills prior to Windsor. The employee is challenging Wal-Mart’s pre-Windsor denials and is seeking class-action status for the suit.

  • In Considine v. Brookdale Senior Living, an employee’s request to have her same-sex spouse added to her health plan was denied because Brookdale Senior Living did not offer health insurance coverage to same-sex spouses. After requesting briefs in mid-July on the impact of the Obergefell decision, the court recently sent the parties to arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Ms. Considine’s employment agreement.

In both of these cases the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) found probable cause that the defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their gender, a theory the EEOC has advanced in such cases since 2012.

Some courts interpreting state law have already found in favor of the retroactive recognition of same-sex marriages, including a federal court in Alabama and a state court in Pennsylvania. The Alabama case involved a wrongful death suit where state law required damages to be distributed under the laws of intestate succession. The plaintiff prevailed in having his same-sex marriage recognized retroactively and received the proceeds of the suit, even though the marriage ceremony was performed in 2011 and the plaintiff’s same-sex spouse died that same year, which was before Alabama recognized same sex marriage.

In the Pennsylvania case, the plaintiff sought to receive spousal death benefits from various benefits providers, inheritance tax treatment as a spouse, and access to a jointly-owned safety deposit box following the death of her common-law same-sex spouse. Finding in the plaintiff’s favor, a state judge recognized the 2001 same-sex common law marriage despite the fact that it was not recognized under state law when celebrated, and the plaintiff’s same-sex spouse died before same-sex marriage was recognized in Pennsylvania.

Self-Insured Health Plans

Another lingering question concerns Obergefell’s effect on employers that sponsor self-insured health plans. After Obergefell, will state and/or federal anti-discrimination laws require those plans to offer benefits to same-sex spouses? ERISA generally preempts state regulation of self-insured health plans, and there is nothing in ERISA or other federal law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. Obergefell does not appear to apply. However, as noted above, the EEOC has taken the position that discrimination against an employee based on the employee’s sexual orientation equates to discrimination based on gender. The EEOC’s approach is currently being tested in the courts. In the meantime, any employer that elects not to offer self-insured medical benefits to spouses of same-sex couples risks attracting the attention of the EEOC.

Article By Jeremy T. Coffey, William B. Duff, Edward Spacapan Jr, B. Frank Thorn
Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2015 Schiff Hardin LLP

Controlled Burn: Attorney Perspective on Lone Pine Orders

A Lone Pine order is basically a controlled burn, or it accomplishes the same objective at least.  In theory, it is a “fire” used to prevent the growth or blaze of meritless litigation.  Don’t want a nasty, complex lawsuit to grow or blaze out of control?  Hit it with a Lone Pine order early on in hopes of killing that volatile vegetation. Is it fair?  It depends on which side of the courtroom you’re sitting on.  Because it acts essentially as an early motion for summary judgment, generally speaking, plaintiff’s attorneys hate them, defense lawyers love them. Does it work?  A recent opinion from the Colorado Supreme Court suggests a similar response is required. It depends on which courtroom you’re sitting in – federal or state (and if state, which one).

So what is a Lone Pine order?  It’s basically a case management order from the court that requires plaintiffs to produce a certain measure of evidence to support their claims at a very early stage in the litigation.  Typically, the orders require plaintiffs to produce evidence of (1) exposure; (2) damage (a disease or property damage); and (3) causation.  Lone Pine orders are most often used in complex litigation to identify meritless claims and streamline the litigation. They are typically issued under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows courts to adopt special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2).  This sounds kind of like an ambiguous instruction to The Fixer in the mafia: “We need you to handle this Big Nicky.”  As a defense attorney, if you want to put some heat to a complex case, you ask the judge for a Lone Pine order.  If plaintiff’s counsel cannot put forth sufficient evidence to support the claims, the case is dismissed.  The burn is initiated, the dry, delicate tinder is extinguished and there will be no raging wildfire today.

While defense attorneys will argue the bar is not high ─ in that plaintiff’s counsel should have compiled evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of a Lone Pine order long before filing suit ─ plaintiff’s attorneys see Lone Pine orders as premature summary judgment because it forces them to make a prima facie showing of their claims before they are entitled to a lick of discovery from the defendant.  Even assuming the burden can be met, it still requires plaintiff’s counsel to essentially “show their hand” very early in the litigation without a similar requirement from the defense.  In short, while a Lone Pine order can be an effective case management tool, it is a pretty high bar to set right out of the gate before any discovery has been conducted in the case.  This is likely the reason the Colorado Supreme Court recently struck down the trial court’s use of a Lone Pine order in Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp. No. 13SC576, 2015 WL 1813000 (Colo. Apr. 20, 2015).

In Strudley, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case following their failure to make a sufficient evidentiary showing under a Lone Pine order.  Plaintiffs appealed and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed based on its conclusion that Lone Pine orders were not permitted under Colorado law.  The Colorado Supreme Court recently affirmed, finding Colorado’s Rule 16 did not provide a trial court with authority to “fashion its own summary judgment” by filtering and dismissing claims during the early stages of litigation.  This finding was based primarily on a comparison of the state rule and its federal counterpart and Colorado’s decision not to adopt the “special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protected actions” that are included in the federal version of Rule 16.  The court rejected defendant’s arguments that the spirit of the state rule encouraged early dismissal of frivolous claims in explaining a stated goal does not equate to a grant of authority to achieve that goal.

While Strudley was a win for the plaintiff’s side and shows that an overly-aggressive state court Lone Pine order may face scrutiny on appeal, it seems this was an anomaly overall.  Most federal courts and many state courts find the federal version of Rule 16 supports use of a Lone Pine order to identify meritless claims and streamline litigation.  It’s like a controlled burn of their docket.

Article by Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices
© Copyright 2002-2015 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Deflategate: A Critique of Judge Berman’s Decision

By now, almost everyone is familiar with Judge Berman‘s decision vacating Commissioner Roger Goodell’s award upholding a four-game suspension of New England quarterback Tom Brady in connection with the tampering of air levels in footballs during the 2015 AFC Championship game. Judge Berman found that Commissioner Goodell’s award was deficient in the following respects:

(1) that Brady had no notice that the conduct for which he was suspended — being generally aware of the misconduct of an equipment assistant and locker room attendant who deflated the balls and then refusing to cooperate with the subsequent investigation — was prohibited conduct for which he could be disciplined;

(2) that Brady was denied the opportunity to examine one of the two lead investigators who authored the investigative report upon which Commissioner Goodell relied, namely NFL Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jeff Pash; and

(3) that Brady was denied equal access to investigative files, including witness interview notes.

Judge Berman did not remand to correct these errors, but simply vacated the award.

Did Judge Berman Properly Follow the Standard for Review? How sound was Judge Berman’s decision? 

From an analysis of his opinion and well-established Supreme Court authority he was supposed to follow, it may have been the Judge himself who overstepped his bounds. It is important to remember that Commissioner Goodell’s role was that of arbitrator; the collective bargaining agreement permitted him to assume that role if he so chose and he did so choose. The level of deference that courts must give an arbitrator is extreme: in essence, as long as the arbitrator is arguably construing or applying the contract, and acting within the scope of his authority, a court cannot overturn his decision. While Judge Berman superficially acknowledged this standard, it does not appear that he actually followed it. Instead, he appeared to apply some type of “common law of the workplace” to find that Brady’s treatment was fundamentally unfair.

The first sign that Judge Berman was straying from his role was his failure to cite or acknowledge any of the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases establishing the basic principles regarding judicial review of labor arbitration awards in the collective bargaining context. The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that a court is not authorized to reconsider the merits of a labor arbitration award even though the parties may allege the award was decided on errors of fact or on a misinterpretation of the contract. The Supreme Court has explained this extreme deference as emanating from the federal policy inherent in Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) favoring the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration. In essence, the parties contracted for the settlement of their dispute by an arbitrator of their choice; if dissatisfied with his decision, they are free to select a different arbitrator in the future.

The Supreme Court’s Garvey Decision

In particular, Judge Berman did not cite or deal with the Supreme Court’s decision in Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey. This was striking, as that case, like Brady’s, arose in the context of the review of an arbitrator’s award under the collective bargaining agreement of a professional players association. The facts and decision the Garvey case are worth reviewing, as they demonstrate just how deferential the Supreme Court expects courts to be:

Steve Garvey, an All-Star first baseman, alleged that his contract with the San Diego Padres had not been extended in the 1988 and 1989 baseball seasons as part of the owners’ collusion in the market for free agents that an arbitrator had found to have taken place. He sought damages under a framework that had been set up to determine and evaluate individual player’s claims for damages due to that finding of collusion. Garvey’s main piece of evidence was a letter from the Padres’ President, Ballard Smith, admitted to the non-extension of the contract due to the collusion. However, the arbitrator rejected Garvey’s grievance by discrediting the letter because it contradicted the President’s testimony in the earlier arbitration in which the collusion had been found to exist. Bizarrely, however, in that earlier proceeding the same arbitrator specifically had found that testimony to be non-truthful in concluding there had been collusion.

Finding the arbitrator’s decision “completely inexplicable and border[ing] on the irrational,” the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the award, finding the only justification for the arbitrator’s decision was “his desire to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” Reversing, however, the Supreme Court claimed to be “baffled” by what the Court of Appeals did in light of the clearly expressed deferential standard for reviewing labor arbitration awards under Section 301. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the arbitrator’s ruling may have appeared to the Court of Appeals as “improvident or even silly,” but even so that did “not provide a basis for a court to refuse to enforce the award.” According to the Supreme Court, even when a federal judge considering the arbitration award is “convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, it does not suffice to overturn [the arbitrator’s] decision.” This is also true when an arbitrator’s “procedural aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct,” for a federal court may not “interfere with an arbitrator’s decision that the parties [players and owners] bargained for.”

Judge Berman Relied More on the Federal Arbitration Act Than Cases Under Section 301

Had Judge Berman paid closer heed to decisions such as Garvey, he might have been less inclined to wade into the weeds of assessing Commissioner Goodell’s claimed procedural aberrations. Judge Berman instead appeared to rely more heavily on cases applying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which establishes four limited statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award. Judge Berman zeroed in on the FAA’s exceptions allowing vacatur where the arbitrator is “guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy” or in “exceeding his powers.”

The problem with relying on the FAA, however, is that the FAA has been held not to apply to labor disputes, although to be sure federal courts have often looked to the FAA for guidance in labor arbitration cases. Section 301, which does apply, does not provide statutory grounds for vacating a labor arbitration award, although, as seen, the Supreme Court has made clear what a court may not do. As the body of case law applying Section 301 has developed, the main reasons a court may vacate a labor arbitration award appear to be if (i) the award does not “draw its essence” from the labor agreement, meaning it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement, imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement, or is based on “general considerations of fairness and equity” instead of the exact terms of the agreement; or (ii) it violates a well-settled and prevailing public policy.

The Problems With Judge Berman’s Findings

Judge Berman first found fault in Commissioner Goodell’s award because the Judge found that Brady did not have notice that he could receive a four game suspension for general awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs, or for non-cooperation with the NFL’s investigation. He also attacked Commissioner Goodell’s reasoning in looking to penalties for violations of the league’s steroid policy as a justification for upholding a four game suspension. He further found that Brady had no notice he could be suspended rather than fined. Citing decisions by other arbitrators involving NFL players, Judge Berman concluded that Commissioner Goodell violated the “law of the shop” by failing to find there was inadequately notice of prohibited conduct and potential discipline.

In all of this, however, Judge Berman was doing what the Supreme Court has stated a judge should not do: second-guessing the arbitrator. For example, the so-called “law of the shop” is not something akin to the common law that a court must follow. Rather, it is up to the labor arbitrator alone to interpret precedent by other arbitrators or, as the Supreme Court has put it, to simply to conclude “that he was not bound by” a prior arbitrator’s decision. Judge Berman relied heavily on decisions by other arbitrators in other high-profile NFL cases — such as “Bounty-Gate” and the Ray Rice and Reggie Langhorne cases — to find that Brady was entitled to the type of notice that Judge Berman thought he was entitled to. But that simply was not Judge Berman’s role to say.

Moreover, Brady’s notice contentions were acknowledged and rejected by Commissioner Goodell in his post-hearing detailed award that was also based on his assessment of the evidence — including Brady’s credibility and the exhaustive Wells investigative report upon which he relied. There can be no question that in so doing the Commissioner was “arguably construing or applying the contract,” which is all it took to require enforcement of his award. In short, the Commissioner was entitled to disbelieve that two equipment employees would take it on their own to deflate the footballs without the knowledge or involvement of the quarterback of the team, and to conclude that Brady’s awareness was conduct detrimental to public confidence in the integrity of the game. He also was entitled to believe that Brady deserved to be penalized for refusing to cooperate with the investigation and then destroying his cell phone rather than turn it over to the investigators, even if there was no specific rule that said he could not do this.

Judge Berman was on similarly weak footing in attacking the punishment meted out (suspension versus fine) because he thought it was error for Commissioner Goodell to uphold the penalty by borrowing from the schedule of penalties for violations of the league’s steroid policy. Again, such judgment calls are quintessentially for the arbitrator, and the suspension penalty echoed the penalty that the Patriots themselves had issued to its equipment employees for their roles.

Relying on the FAA, Judge Berman further justified his decision to vacate Commissioner Goodell’s award based on the latter’s refusal to allow Jeff Pash to testify at the arbitration hearing. Judge Berman found this to be “fundamentally unfair,” because Pash was the co-lead investigator of the investigation, known as the Wells Report. Commissioner Goodell had excluded Pash because Pash had not in fact played substantive role in the investigation, his role having been limited to comments on the draft of the report. Commissioner Goodell moreover regarded any testimony by Pash  as cumulative, as Wells, the report’s architect, was allowed to testify. But Judge Berman determined that Pash would have had valuable insight into the course and outcome of the investigation and into the drafting and content of the Wells Report. Therefore, he found that Brady was prejudiced because he could not explore how truly independent the report was.

Again, Judge Berman appeared to have simply second-guessed Commissioner Goodell, given that Commissioner Goodell had substantial discretion to admit or exclude evidence without having to “follow all the niceties observed by the federal courts.”  Commissioner Goodell had at least a colorable basis for excluding Pash’s testimony. Indeed, his rationale for excluding that testimony was that which a court might have applied. Further, Judge Berman’s conclusion as to how Brady was prejudiced appeared speculative as to whatever additional value Pash’s testimony would have supplied.

Judge Berman came closest to presenting a valid basis for vacating the award in his determination that Commissioner Goodell had improperly denied Brady equal access to Wells’ investigative files and interview notes. Commissioner Goodell had justified his denial of access to those files, including interview notes, because they had played no role in the disciplinary decisions, which were based on the Wells Report itself. But as Judge Berman observed, the Wells Report was based on those notes. Furthermore, compounding the prejudice to Brady was that Wells’ law firm, Paul, Weiss, acted as both independent counsel and as retained counsel to the NFL during the arbitration hearing. NFL counsel therefore had access to the investigate file for direct and cross examination while Brady had no such access.

These observations have some merit. After all, it does not seem fair that Brady had no access to the notes and interviews upon which the report was based, especially when the same law firm that produced the report also represented the NFL at the arbitration hearing. But Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement expressly limited discovery to the exchange of exhibits upon which the parties intended to rely at the hearing. The Commissioner’s decision to deny additional discovery was based on his interpretation of that provision, such that it at least arguably “drew its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, as stated, Commissioner Goodell asserted that the investigation notes played no role in his decision on appeal, and other notes had been provided, such as the interview notes from the NFL’s own investigators.

Judge Berman Should Have Remanded

The final error in Judge Berman’s decision is that he did not remand the case. The procedural and due process errors appeared to be correctable. For example, Judge Berman could have instructed Commissioner Goodell to reconvene the hearing to allow Brady to access the Wells investigative files and to call Pash as a witness. In the Garvey case, the Supreme Court expressly criticized the Ninth Circuit for not remanding, because by not remanding the court in essence was deciding the case. Here, too, Judge Berman in essence was resolving the dispute, and without even making any judgment as to whether Brady did or did not have a role in the tampering that took place.

Immediately after Judge Berman issued his decision, the NFL announced it was appealing. Based on Judge Berman’s apparent failure to properly follow the applicable highly deferential standard, the NFL’s chances for success on appeal appear to be good.

Article By Irving M. Geslewitz of Much Shelist, P.C.
© 2015 Much Shelist, P.C.

Deflategate: A Critique of Judge Berman's Decision

By now, almost everyone is familiar with Judge Berman‘s decision vacating Commissioner Roger Goodell’s award upholding a four-game suspension of New England quarterback Tom Brady in connection with the tampering of air levels in footballs during the 2015 AFC Championship game. Judge Berman found that Commissioner Goodell’s award was deficient in the following respects:

(1) that Brady had no notice that the conduct for which he was suspended — being generally aware of the misconduct of an equipment assistant and locker room attendant who deflated the balls and then refusing to cooperate with the subsequent investigation — was prohibited conduct for which he could be disciplined;

(2) that Brady was denied the opportunity to examine one of the two lead investigators who authored the investigative report upon which Commissioner Goodell relied, namely NFL Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jeff Pash; and

(3) that Brady was denied equal access to investigative files, including witness interview notes.

Judge Berman did not remand to correct these errors, but simply vacated the award.

Did Judge Berman Properly Follow the Standard for Review? How sound was Judge Berman’s decision? 

From an analysis of his opinion and well-established Supreme Court authority he was supposed to follow, it may have been the Judge himself who overstepped his bounds. It is important to remember that Commissioner Goodell’s role was that of arbitrator; the collective bargaining agreement permitted him to assume that role if he so chose and he did so choose. The level of deference that courts must give an arbitrator is extreme: in essence, as long as the arbitrator is arguably construing or applying the contract, and acting within the scope of his authority, a court cannot overturn his decision. While Judge Berman superficially acknowledged this standard, it does not appear that he actually followed it. Instead, he appeared to apply some type of “common law of the workplace” to find that Brady’s treatment was fundamentally unfair.

The first sign that Judge Berman was straying from his role was his failure to cite or acknowledge any of the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases establishing the basic principles regarding judicial review of labor arbitration awards in the collective bargaining context. The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that a court is not authorized to reconsider the merits of a labor arbitration award even though the parties may allege the award was decided on errors of fact or on a misinterpretation of the contract. The Supreme Court has explained this extreme deference as emanating from the federal policy inherent in Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) favoring the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration. In essence, the parties contracted for the settlement of their dispute by an arbitrator of their choice; if dissatisfied with his decision, they are free to select a different arbitrator in the future.

The Supreme Court’s Garvey Decision

In particular, Judge Berman did not cite or deal with the Supreme Court’s decision in Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey. This was striking, as that case, like Brady’s, arose in the context of the review of an arbitrator’s award under the collective bargaining agreement of a professional players association. The facts and decision the Garvey case are worth reviewing, as they demonstrate just how deferential the Supreme Court expects courts to be:

Steve Garvey, an All-Star first baseman, alleged that his contract with the San Diego Padres had not been extended in the 1988 and 1989 baseball seasons as part of the owners’ collusion in the market for free agents that an arbitrator had found to have taken place. He sought damages under a framework that had been set up to determine and evaluate individual player’s claims for damages due to that finding of collusion. Garvey’s main piece of evidence was a letter from the Padres’ President, Ballard Smith, admitted to the non-extension of the contract due to the collusion. However, the arbitrator rejected Garvey’s grievance by discrediting the letter because it contradicted the President’s testimony in the earlier arbitration in which the collusion had been found to exist. Bizarrely, however, in that earlier proceeding the same arbitrator specifically had found that testimony to be non-truthful in concluding there had been collusion.

Finding the arbitrator’s decision “completely inexplicable and border[ing] on the irrational,” the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the award, finding the only justification for the arbitrator’s decision was “his desire to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” Reversing, however, the Supreme Court claimed to be “baffled” by what the Court of Appeals did in light of the clearly expressed deferential standard for reviewing labor arbitration awards under Section 301. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the arbitrator’s ruling may have appeared to the Court of Appeals as “improvident or even silly,” but even so that did “not provide a basis for a court to refuse to enforce the award.” According to the Supreme Court, even when a federal judge considering the arbitration award is “convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, it does not suffice to overturn [the arbitrator’s] decision.” This is also true when an arbitrator’s “procedural aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct,” for a federal court may not “interfere with an arbitrator’s decision that the parties [players and owners] bargained for.”

Judge Berman Relied More on the Federal Arbitration Act Than Cases Under Section 301

Had Judge Berman paid closer heed to decisions such as Garvey, he might have been less inclined to wade into the weeds of assessing Commissioner Goodell’s claimed procedural aberrations. Judge Berman instead appeared to rely more heavily on cases applying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which establishes four limited statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award. Judge Berman zeroed in on the FAA’s exceptions allowing vacatur where the arbitrator is “guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy” or in “exceeding his powers.”

The problem with relying on the FAA, however, is that the FAA has been held not to apply to labor disputes, although to be sure federal courts have often looked to the FAA for guidance in labor arbitration cases. Section 301, which does apply, does not provide statutory grounds for vacating a labor arbitration award, although, as seen, the Supreme Court has made clear what a court may not do. As the body of case law applying Section 301 has developed, the main reasons a court may vacate a labor arbitration award appear to be if (i) the award does not “draw its essence” from the labor agreement, meaning it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement, imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement, or is based on “general considerations of fairness and equity” instead of the exact terms of the agreement; or (ii) it violates a well-settled and prevailing public policy.

The Problems With Judge Berman’s Findings

Judge Berman first found fault in Commissioner Goodell’s award because the Judge found that Brady did not have notice that he could receive a four game suspension for general awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs, or for non-cooperation with the NFL’s investigation. He also attacked Commissioner Goodell’s reasoning in looking to penalties for violations of the league’s steroid policy as a justification for upholding a four game suspension. He further found that Brady had no notice he could be suspended rather than fined. Citing decisions by other arbitrators involving NFL players, Judge Berman concluded that Commissioner Goodell violated the “law of the shop” by failing to find there was inadequately notice of prohibited conduct and potential discipline.

In all of this, however, Judge Berman was doing what the Supreme Court has stated a judge should not do: second-guessing the arbitrator. For example, the so-called “law of the shop” is not something akin to the common law that a court must follow. Rather, it is up to the labor arbitrator alone to interpret precedent by other arbitrators or, as the Supreme Court has put it, to simply to conclude “that he was not bound by” a prior arbitrator’s decision. Judge Berman relied heavily on decisions by other arbitrators in other high-profile NFL cases — such as “Bounty-Gate” and the Ray Rice and Reggie Langhorne cases — to find that Brady was entitled to the type of notice that Judge Berman thought he was entitled to. But that simply was not Judge Berman’s role to say.

Moreover, Brady’s notice contentions were acknowledged and rejected by Commissioner Goodell in his post-hearing detailed award that was also based on his assessment of the evidence — including Brady’s credibility and the exhaustive Wells investigative report upon which he relied. There can be no question that in so doing the Commissioner was “arguably construing or applying the contract,” which is all it took to require enforcement of his award. In short, the Commissioner was entitled to disbelieve that two equipment employees would take it on their own to deflate the footballs without the knowledge or involvement of the quarterback of the team, and to conclude that Brady’s awareness was conduct detrimental to public confidence in the integrity of the game. He also was entitled to believe that Brady deserved to be penalized for refusing to cooperate with the investigation and then destroying his cell phone rather than turn it over to the investigators, even if there was no specific rule that said he could not do this.

Judge Berman was on similarly weak footing in attacking the punishment meted out (suspension versus fine) because he thought it was error for Commissioner Goodell to uphold the penalty by borrowing from the schedule of penalties for violations of the league’s steroid policy. Again, such judgment calls are quintessentially for the arbitrator, and the suspension penalty echoed the penalty that the Patriots themselves had issued to its equipment employees for their roles.

Relying on the FAA, Judge Berman further justified his decision to vacate Commissioner Goodell’s award based on the latter’s refusal to allow Jeff Pash to testify at the arbitration hearing. Judge Berman found this to be “fundamentally unfair,” because Pash was the co-lead investigator of the investigation, known as the Wells Report. Commissioner Goodell had excluded Pash because Pash had not in fact played substantive role in the investigation, his role having been limited to comments on the draft of the report. Commissioner Goodell moreover regarded any testimony by Pash  as cumulative, as Wells, the report’s architect, was allowed to testify. But Judge Berman determined that Pash would have had valuable insight into the course and outcome of the investigation and into the drafting and content of the Wells Report. Therefore, he found that Brady was prejudiced because he could not explore how truly independent the report was.

Again, Judge Berman appeared to have simply second-guessed Commissioner Goodell, given that Commissioner Goodell had substantial discretion to admit or exclude evidence without having to “follow all the niceties observed by the federal courts.”  Commissioner Goodell had at least a colorable basis for excluding Pash’s testimony. Indeed, his rationale for excluding that testimony was that which a court might have applied. Further, Judge Berman’s conclusion as to how Brady was prejudiced appeared speculative as to whatever additional value Pash’s testimony would have supplied.

Judge Berman came closest to presenting a valid basis for vacating the award in his determination that Commissioner Goodell had improperly denied Brady equal access to Wells’ investigative files and interview notes. Commissioner Goodell had justified his denial of access to those files, including interview notes, because they had played no role in the disciplinary decisions, which were based on the Wells Report itself. But as Judge Berman observed, the Wells Report was based on those notes. Furthermore, compounding the prejudice to Brady was that Wells’ law firm, Paul, Weiss, acted as both independent counsel and as retained counsel to the NFL during the arbitration hearing. NFL counsel therefore had access to the investigate file for direct and cross examination while Brady had no such access.

These observations have some merit. After all, it does not seem fair that Brady had no access to the notes and interviews upon which the report was based, especially when the same law firm that produced the report also represented the NFL at the arbitration hearing. But Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement expressly limited discovery to the exchange of exhibits upon which the parties intended to rely at the hearing. The Commissioner’s decision to deny additional discovery was based on his interpretation of that provision, such that it at least arguably “drew its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, as stated, Commissioner Goodell asserted that the investigation notes played no role in his decision on appeal, and other notes had been provided, such as the interview notes from the NFL’s own investigators.

Judge Berman Should Have Remanded

The final error in Judge Berman’s decision is that he did not remand the case. The procedural and due process errors appeared to be correctable. For example, Judge Berman could have instructed Commissioner Goodell to reconvene the hearing to allow Brady to access the Wells investigative files and to call Pash as a witness. In the Garvey case, the Supreme Court expressly criticized the Ninth Circuit for not remanding, because by not remanding the court in essence was deciding the case. Here, too, Judge Berman in essence was resolving the dispute, and without even making any judgment as to whether Brady did or did not have a role in the tampering that took place.

Immediately after Judge Berman issued his decision, the NFL announced it was appealing. Based on Judge Berman’s apparent failure to properly follow the applicable highly deferential standard, the NFL’s chances for success on appeal appear to be good.

Article By Irving M. Geslewitz of Much Shelist, P.C.
© 2015 Much Shelist, P.C.

Jurors Use Social Media To Research Case Details [VIDEO]

Jurors sometimes use social media sites to research case details, but surprisingly, doing so is not always grounds for reversal of a verdict. This video outlines case examples of this behavior, along with practical steps you can take to reduce the risk of having social media  impact your next case.

Article By IMS Expert Services Blog Author at IMS ExpertServices
© Copyright 2002-2015 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Neiman Marcus Asks Full 7th Circuit to Consider Standing Ruling in Breach Suit

A Seventh Circuit panel that allowed a data breach suit against Neiman Marcus to proceed misapplied the Supreme Court’s precedents on standing and, “if allowed to stand, will impose wasteful litigation burdens on retailers and the federal courts,” the retailer argues in a petition filed yesterday asking the full Seventh Circuit to rehear the case.

Last month, a Seventh Circuit panel ruled that Neiman Marcus customers whose credit card information potentially was exposed in a 2013 breach of the retailer’s computer systems could proceed with their proposed class action lawsuit against the retailer. The panel found that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient “injuries associated with resolving fraudulent charges and protecting oneself against future identity theft” to establish their standing to sue in federal court, and that affected customers “should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit‐card fraud in order to give the class standing, because there is an ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ that such an injury will occur.” The panel also found it “telling” that the retailer offered affected customers a year of free credit monitoring and identity-theft protection, and appeared to interpret this as a tacit acknowledgment that the risk to customers was more than “ephemeral.”

Neiman Marcus’s rehearing petition argues, among other things, that the panel’s reliance on the “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard for determining if a plaintiff has standing based on a potential future injury directly conflicts with a 2013 Supreme Court ruling, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA. In Clapper, the Supreme Court said plaintiffs seeking to establish standing based on a risk of future injury must show that the threatened injury is “certainly impending,” and the high court held that “the Second Circuit’s ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ standard is inconsistent” with that requirement.

“By using an obviously wrong and overly lenient standard to determine whether the plaintiffs’ alleged future injuries provided standing, the panel committed a critical error,” Neiman Marcus’s petition argues.

In addition, Neiman Marcus argues that “there was no risk … that [plaintiffs] would be financially responsible for any fraudulent credit card charges,” and that breaches like that experienced by Neiman Marcus — which involved only payment card data and did not expose sensitive data such as Social Security numbers — “create no meaningful risk of identity theft.” Neiman Marcus’s petition also criticizes the panel for using the retailer’s offer of a year of free credit monitoring and identity-theft insurance to a broad group of customers — including customers whose data could not “conceivably” have been compromised in the breach — as evidence that the risk of injury to customers was sufficiently concrete. Such a holding “creates an unfortunate disincentive for companies to do so in the future,” Neiman Marcus wrote.

A rehearing is especially important in this case, the petition argues, because although the panel’s decision conflicts with rulings by the Third Circuit and “numerous district court decisions,” Neiman Marcus’s case is “the only appellate decision squarely considering a retail data breach in which only payment card data is stolen,” and thus “the opinion could well shape the law of standing in such cases for years to come.”

ARTICLE BY Michael Beder of Covington & Burling LLP

© 2015 Covington & Burling LLP