Litigation Archives - Page 54 of 107 - The National Law Forum

When Good Sites Go Bad: The Growing Risk of Website Accessibility Litigation

For a growing number of companies, websites are not only a valuable asset, but also a potential liability risk. In recent years, the number of website accessibility lawsuits has significantly increased, where plaintiffs with disabilities allege that they could not access websites because they were incompatible with assistive technologies, like screen readers for the visually impaired.

If you have never asked yourself whether your website is “accessible,” or think that this issue doesn’t apply to your company, read on to learn why website accessibility litigation is on the rise, what actions lawmakers and the courts are taking to try to stem the tide, how to manage litigation risk, what steps you can take to bring your company’s website into compliance, and how to handle customer feedback on issues of accessibility.

The Growing Risk of Website Accessibility Litigation

In recent years, there has been a nationwide explosion of website accessibility lawsuits as both individual lawsuits and class actions. Plaintiffs have brought these claims in federal court under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and, in some cases, under similar state and local laws as well. In 2018, the number of federally-filed website accessibility cases skyrocketed to 2,285, up from 815 in the year prior. In the first half of 2019, these cases have increased 51.7% over the prior year’s comparable six-month period, with total filings for 2019 on pace to break last year’s record by reaching over 3,200.

Why Website Accessibility Litigation is on the Rise

The ADA was enacted in 1990 to prevent discrimination against people with disabilities in locations generally open to the public (known as public accommodations). The ADA specified the duties of businesses and property owners to make their locations accessible for people with disabilities, but it was enacted before conducting business transactions over the internet became commonplace. With the rapid growth of internet use, lawsuits emerged arguing that websites were places of public accommodation under the meaning of the ADA.

These claims have presented serious questions about whether, when, and how website owners must comply with the ADA. There is no legislation that directly sets out the technical requirements for website accessibility. And while the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has stated that “the ADA applies to public accommodations’ websites,” it has not clarified exactly what standards websites must meet to comply with the law. In the absence of clear guidance, courts considering the question have frequently looked to the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), first developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 1999, but most recently updated in 2018.

In 2017, federal district courts in Florida and New York ruled that business websites failing to meet WCAG guidelines can violate Title III of the ADA, opening the door for litigants to bring an onslaught of claims in these courts. As a result, the rate at which these suits have been filed has skyrocketed, especially in New York and Florida, reaching businesses based throughout the U.S. and internationally. With the pace of these suits showing no signs of slowing, it is critical that every business operating a website consider how to manage the growing risk of litigation.

A Future Fix?
Some recent developments suggest that lawmakers or courts may soon stem the tide. Congress may decide to enact precise standards, or the DOJ might give clarification or promulgate new rules. At the state level, lawmakers in New York have announced plans to address website accessibility suits based on an outcry from the business community.

Recent decisions in the Southern District of New York and the Fourth Circuit suggest that companies can successfully move to dismiss accessibility suits after mooting claims by taking swift remedial action or by showing that the plaintiff was neither eligible nor in a location to receive the goods or services provided on the website. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court may soon weigh in on whether Title III of the ADA categorically applies to all websites and apps.

How to Manage Litigation Risk for Website Accessibility

Knowing your level of exposure is an important first step. Individual risk is currently based on three factors:

Location: Brick and mortar locations, the delivery of products, or the performance of services in New York or Florida heighten a company’s exposure.
Industry: The present trend shows that retail, food service, hospitality, banking, entertainment industries, and educational institutions are especially at risk.
Current website structure: Sites with e-commerce functions or purchased from third-party developers not currently in compliance with WCAG standards are popular targets.

Unfortunately, it is often difficult to predict the cost and complexity of bringing a website into WCAG compliance-based simply on viewing it. An audit of the source code is often required. That said, you can start with a review of your site and develop plans and processes for accessibility. The first steps can include:

Assess current compliance: Use free online tools like wave and chrome vox and/or enlist a third-party audit to help you understand your current level of accessibility.
Plan for future compliance: Create an overall plan for achieving accessibility on a timeline that makes business sense.
Take immediate action: Adopt first-step improvements that can be implemented immediately, and create a process for considering accessibility before all future implementations.

Bringing your business into compliance with WCAG web standards does not need to be a standalone project. By integrating accessibility into regular updates, redesigns, and new pages, you can make meaningful improvements as part of your existing process. And if you don’t have a process for ongoing maintenance and updates on your website, consider whether your website is still looking fresh and modern and if it is still an accurate expression of your corporate brand.

Include in-house and third-party development teams as stakeholders in the process. Make accessibility a discussion in all new engagements and set expectations for accessibility going forward for new and existing teams:

Increase accessibility awareness: Make accessibility the topic of the next all-hands meeting with all stakeholders.
Ask third-party developers and vendors: Specifically, discuss your website’s current accessibility and which site options are readily available.
Integrate accessibility in projects: Ensure that agreements for ongoing and future site additions and upgrades incorporate accessibility. Seek representations, ask about compliance levels, and consider seeking warranties and indemnification.

Good customer care is always good business, but making thoughtful use of feedback on your website is a critical step to reducing your risk of an accessibility lawsuit. Everyone on the customer care team should be trained on the risk posed by non-compliance, and they should be empowered to carefully consider and respond to website feedback. The development team should also ensure that the site, whatever its level of WCAG compliance:

Encourages feedback: Provide a way for users to give feedback on and receive assistance with accessibility.
Supports engagement with feedback: Document, consider, and carefully respond to user feedback.
Reflects expert input: When receiving feedback, notices, complaints, or threatened litigation, consult with legal counsel and website accessibility experts as early as possible to ensure that your next steps limit potential liability.

Website accessibility is a fast-moving area of law that is primed for reform. With an increasing number of conflicting decisions and the possibility of new legislation or Supreme Court guidance, we will be closely monitoring this topic in the coming years.

This article was written by Melanie A. Conroy, Suzanne King, Margaret Coughlin LePage and Sarah L. McGarrell of Pierce Atwood LLP.

For more on web accessibility see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet Law page.

Going Beyond: When Can Courts Look Past the Record in an APA Review?

Regulated companies need to understand what material courts can consider when they review administrative decisions. The Administrative Procedure Act generally allows courts to consider only the existing administrative record when reviewing agency decision-making to determine whether agency decisions are arbitrary and capricious. But the Supreme Court recently reminded us that this rule is not absolute by looking beyond the record in Dep’t of Commerce v. New York to block an agency decision that it found to be based on a “contrived,” pretextual rationale.

Regulated companies may be able to ask courts to consider information beyond the administrative record if they can show that the agency acted in bad faith or exhibited improper behavior. A company’s ability to present the court with information beyond a record carefully constructed by an agency can be a powerful tool.

The following cases illustrate that a movant may not need to conclusively prove that the agency behaved improperly to convince a court to review evidence beyond the administrative record. But the evidence must form a picture that gives the court reason to believe there was bad faith or improper behavior. Here’s a breakdown of several case examples:

Dep’t of Commerce v. New York Goes Beyond the Record

Dep’t of Commerce v. New York presented the Court with a challenge to Secretary of Commerce Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In defense of his decision, the Secretary presented a record showing that the Department of Justice had asked that the question be added so it could more effectively enforce the Voting Rights Act. But extra-record discovery revealed that the DOJ’s request was not the real reason that Secretary Ross had added the question. Rather, extra-record discovery showed that the Secretary had planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the DOJ. Viewed in that light, the Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Writing for the majority of a fractured Court, the Chief Justice acknowledged that while “[i]t is hardly improper for an agency head to come into office with policy preferences and ideas . . . and work with staff attorneys to substantiate the legal basis for a preferred policy,” the Court “cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.” The Court noted that to confine itself to the administrative record and ignore the Secretary’s extra-record actions would be “to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.”

To understand why this decision is important, observers need to take a deep-dive into the Court’s decision. Why could the courts look beyond the administrative record here? Because the district court invoked—maybe prematurely in this case—an exception to the rule against extra-record discovery from Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. This exception gives courts discretion to go beyond the existing administrative record if the party challenging the agency action makes “a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” underlying the agency decision.

**When Do Courts Use Overton Park to Look Beyond the Record?**

While every circuit has recognized the Overton Park exception—and most also recognize other, circuit-specific exceptions that allow for a party challenging an agency decision to supplement the record—the overwhelming majority of courts have declined to use Overton Park’s exception to look beyond the administrative record. In his Dep’t of Commerce v. New York dissent, Justice Thomas followed this school of thought. He disagreed that plaintiffs had made a sufficiently “strong showing” of bad faith or improper behavior by Secretary Ross and noted that the Supreme Court “ha[s] never before found Overton Park’s exception satisfied.”

Given the fact that the APA requires courts to defer to agency decision-making, the courts’ reluctance to embrace Overton Park is unsurprising. Nonetheless, some have looked beyond the record.

In Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, for example, the district court allowed the party challenging the agency decision to supplement the record after it made a strong showing of improper behavior behind a decision of the Department of the Interior. There, three Indian tribes had applied to the United States to convert a greyhound racing facility into an off-reservation casino. When the Department denied the application, citing the “strong opposition of the surrounding communities,” the tribes challenged the decision. The tribes argued that the Department’s reason was pretextual and pointed to unexplained procedural delays; suspicious communications between opposition tribes, senators, lobbyists, and White House staff; and a draft report from the Indian Gaming Management Staff, which had recommended that the application be approved.

The court initially limited its review to the record because plaintiffs had not proven improper behavior. But it then reversed course and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, noting that Overton Park’s “strong showing” requirement did not—and, logically, could not—require conclusive evidence of improper behavior. Instead, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff had “suppl[ied] sufficient evidence . . . as to raise suspicions that defy easy explanations.”

Following Babbitt’s lead, the district court in United States v. Sanitary Dist. of Hammond also allowed extra-record discovery, there after the party challenging an EPA decision had made a sufficient showing of bad faith. In that case, an EPA official recused herself from a dispute to avoid the appearance of partiality. But suspicions were later raised when she, without explanation, reinstated herself after receiving poignant, critical questions from her chosen successor’s counsel. The court allowed extra-record discovery to reveal any potential impropriety behind her decisions. The court noted that while it had “not f[ound] that bad faith or improprieties in fact influenced the [decision],” the defendant had made “a ‘strong showing’ that the evidence of record ‘suggests’ that bad faith or improprieties ‘may have influenced the decision maker.’”

Key Takeaways

A court’s decision to go beyond the record—as explained by the lower court in Dep’t of Commerce v. New York—is most often “based on a combination of circumstances that [when] taken together, [are] most exceptional.” Observers may note that the Court’s decision to go beyond the record in Dep’t of Commerce v. New York seems to conflict with last term’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii. But maybe they can be reconciled. There, the state of Hawaii and three U.S. citizens challenged Presidential Proclamation No. 9645—colloquially referred to as the “travel ban”—which placed elevated immigration restrictions on eight countries, six of which were predominantly Muslim. The plaintiffs argued that the President’s extra-record statements showed that the national security justifications behind the ban were, in fact, pretext for the Proclamation’s true animus: religious discrimination. Given the nature of then-Candidate Trump’s public statements, the case seemed to present the Court with the opportunity to consider evidence of pretext that went beyond the record.

But of course Trump v. Hawaii, unlike Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, did not involve any agency decision-making. It instead involved a challenge leveled directly at the Executive itself on a matter squarely within its traditional province: national security. This distinction compelled the Court to defer to the Executive and limited the Court’s consideration of extra-record material. Thus, the Court applied a rational basis review and found that even if the challenging party could demonstrate pretext, the President’s non-religious justifications rationally supported the entry restrictions.

Ultimately, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York reminds us that an administrative record may be permeable under the right circumstances. And although the “substantial showing” bar remains high, perhaps courts will now be more apt to allow extra-record discovery when reviewing agency decision-making. That willingness could enable companies to more effectively challenge agency decisions based on pretextual reasoning—reasoning that would not be reflected in the administrative record.

Article by J. Michael Showalter and James Cromley of Schiff Hardin LLP.

For more on the Administrative Procedure Act see the Administrative & Regulatory page on the National Law Review.

Court Lets Trader Joe’s Out of Sticky Situation Over Honey Advertising

A magistrate judge in the Northern District of California recently dismissed a putative class action alleging that Trader Joe’s misled its consumers about the purity of its manuka honey. Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 4:18-CV-04418-KAW, 2019 WL 2579219 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2019).

Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action lawsuit alleging that Trader Joe’s engaged in “false, misleading, and deceptive marketing” by representing that its Trader Joe’s Manuka Honey product was “entirely” manuka honey when, purportedly, the product’s manuka honey content had been “adulterated by the inclusion of cheaper honey.” Manuka honey is produced from the nectar of New Zealand’s manuka tree and is said to have numerous medicinal benefits.

Plaintiffs specifically challenged the product’s “100% New Zealand Manuka Honey” label and the ingredient statement that lists “manuka honey” as the sole ingredient because Plaintiffs’ laboratory tests demonstrated that only between 57.3% and 62.6% of the pollen found in the product was from the manuka flower, with the remainder deriving from “other floral sources.” Plaintiffs claimed Trader Joe’s mixed manuka honey with non-manuka honey, and in doing so violated “consumer protection and similar laws in all fifty states” – which allegedly incorporate the adulteration and misbranding provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”) – and committed common-law fraud and breach of warranty.

In her opinion, Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore cut straight to the point and rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the honey was adulterated. Citing hearing testimony, she noted that Plaintiffs’ adulteration allegation was premised on “bees visiting different floral sources and returning to the hive resulting in a lower manuka pollen count, rather than the manufacturer purposefully mixing Manuka honey with non-manuka honey.” Under Section 342(b) of the FDCA, a product is adulterated only:

(1) If any valuable constituent has been in whole or in part omitted or abstracted therefrom; or (2) if any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefor; or (3) if damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or (4) if any substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed therewith so as to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its quality or strength, or make it appear better or of greater value than it is.

None of those definitions was met in this case, Judge Westmore held, because any impurities in the honey were introduced by the bees that made it, and not by Trader Joe’s. She, therefore, granted Trader Joe’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend as plaintiffs “could not plead sufficient facts to support their adulteration theory.” Judge Westmore also ruled that to the extent the applicable state laws imposed different standards than the FDCA, they were preempted.

Along similar lines, Judge Westmore found that the product’s label was not misleading. According to FDA guidance, honey is a “single ingredient food” that may be labeled with the plant or blossom name so long as that plant or blossom is the “chief floral source.” Trader Joe’s argued that “100%” in the phrase “New Zealand Manuka Honey” could refer to either manuka honey or the fact that the honey comes entirely from New Zealand. Because Plaintiffs’ adulteration theory failed and the “chief floral source [was] undisputedly Manuka,” Judge Westmore held that the label was accurate and that a reasonable person would not be misled. She dismissed Plaintiffs’ common law fraud and breach of express warranty causes of action on similar grounds.

This article was written by Lawrence I Weinstein, Carl Mazurek and Marc Palmer of Proskauer Rose LLP.

For more on food labeling, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Max Scherzer, a $5 million settlement, and How They All Relate to Workplace Parental Leave Policies

Washington Nationals’ pitching ace Max Scherzer recently took parental leave and helped shine a light on a hot employment topic: ensuring that employers’ parental leave policies are fair and gender-neutral.

This issue also gained attention in May 2019 when JPMorgan Chase, one of the world’s largest banks, reached a $5 million settlement about the bank’s parental leave program. As part of the settlement, the bank will make payments to a group of male employees who were discouraged from taking 16 weeks paid parental leave to care for a new child. The settlement also directs JPMorgan Chase to implement a parental leave program that is fair and gender-neutral. JPMorgan Chase denied the allegations.

At first glance, JPMorgan Chase’s parental leave program seemed gender-neutral. It offered 16 weeks of paid leave for “primary caregivers” and 2 weeks for “secondary caregivers.” The bank, however, allegedly applied the policy differently when a male employee versus a female employee requested leave. That is, female employees requesting parental leave were presumed to be the primary caregivers, while male employees were presumed to be the secondary caregivers. The plaintiffs claimed that, for a male employee to receive parental leave as a primary caregiver, he had to show that his spouse or domestic partner had returned to work, or that he was the spouse or partner of a mother who was medically incapable of caring for the child. Female employees who had given birth themselves were not subject to this requirement.

The named plaintiff in the settlement, Derek Rotondo, requested 16 weeks of parental leave as a “primary caregiver” after the birth of his second child. Human resources, according to Rotondo, informed him that a father requesting parental leave would only be considered a “primary caregiver” if he could show that the mother had to return to work before the 16 weeks elapsed, or that she was “medically incapable” of caregiving. Rotondo could not demonstrate either option, and he received only two weeks of parental leave.

Rotondo then filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenging JPMorgan Chase’s practice of denying primary caregiver leave to fathers. He also filed a class action complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals. Rotondo received 16 weeks parental leave, and the five thousand other male employees who were denied parental leave as a “primary caregiver” will be compensated from a fund created by the $5 million settlement.

This is not the first time that a step towards gender equality was taken in a case involving male plaintiffs who sought caregiver benefits, only to find out that the benefits are not available to them because they are men. Rotondo was represented by lawyers from the A.C.L.U.’s Women’s Rights Project, which was founded by now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the early 1970’s. Ginsburg was an A.C.L.U. lawyer when she argued Moritz v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue System before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Moritz was the first federal court case to hold that discrimination on the basis of sex is unconstitutional. In that case, Moritz claimed a tax deduction for the cost of a caregiver for his mother, but the IRS denied it because the agency only allowed the deduction to be claimed by women and formerly married men. Ginsburg argued that no rational basis in the law exists for treating men and women differently. Moreover, she argued that the proper remedy was to allow men to claim the deduction as well, instead of eliminating the deduction for everyone.

Of course, in some families one parent is the primary caregiver to the children and one parent, for whatever reason, needs to return to work more quickly than their partner. The larger problem (for companies and their employees) is where the employer presumes a connection between an individual’s gender and that individual’s role at home. Doing so presumptively differentiates among employees and their parental leave needs based on sex. The settlement between JPMorgan Chase and their employees demonstrates that companies do so at their own risk.

As Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted, “[w]omen will have achieved true equality when men share with them the responsibility of bringing up the next generation.”

This article was written by Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.

For more on parental leave policies, please see the Labor & Employment page on the National Law Review.

Claims of False Advertising and Unfair Competition Are Not Disparagement or Defamation

Most commercial general liability policies include coverage for personal and advertising injury claims by third parties. In a recent case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether claims of false advertising and unfair competition brought against a competitor entitled the policyholder to a defense under its personal and advertising injury coverage.

In Albion Engineering Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 18-1756 (3rd Cir. Jul. 10, 2109) (Not Precedential), the policyholder was sued by a competitor alleging claims for false advertising and unfair competition based on the allegation that the policyholder’s products were represented as being made in the US when they were really made overseas. The policyholder sought coverage from its carrier under its personal and advertising injury coverage, particularly for publication of material that slanders or libels a person or disparages a person’s goods, products or services. The carrier disclaimed and the policyholder brought suit seeing to enforce coverage. The district court dismissed the complaint after summary judgment in favor of the carrier.

On appeal, the policyholder contended that the claims in the underlying suit were essentially disparaging and defamatory. In applying New Jersey law, the circuit court rejected the policyholder’s arguments because nothing alleged by the underlying claimant or in the extrinsic evidence discovered constituted the publication of false statements about the competitor. Under New Jersey law, for the duty to defend to arise, the false and defamatory statement has to be made about another (in this case about the competitor’s products). “For the suit to fall within the policy’s coverage, [policyholder] must demonstrate [competitor] brings a claim that [policyholder] (1) made an electronic, oral, written or other publication of material that (2) slanders or libels [competitor] or disparages [competitor’s] good, products, or services.” Here, said the court, the claims were about the policyholder’s own products, not about the competitor’s products. Thus, because the policyholder had not shown that the competitor’s claims constitute disparagement or defamation claims made by the policyholder about the competitor’s products, the carrier had no duty to defend the underlying lawsuit.

Article by Larry P. Schiffer of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

For more insurance cases, see the National Law Review Insurance Reinsurance & Surety page.

Blocked from Adding Citizenship Question to Census, Administration Moves to Gather Data

President Donald Trump announced that the Administration will not be proceeding with any further census litigation. The 2020 Decennial Census, which is already being printed, will be sent out without a citizenship question. Nevertheless, President Trump does want to obtain statistics on the number of residents in the country who are and are not U.S. citizens. By means of an executive order, he is eliminating “obstacles to data sharing” and asking all government agencies to immediately hand over any and all relevant statistics and numbers to the Commerce Department. The President said that the Commerce Department will use this data, including data from the Social Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security, to come up with an even more accurate count of citizens, non-citizens, and undocumented individuals than the citizenship question on the census would have yielded. The President indicated that this count will affect an “array of policy decisions” possibly including apportionment.

In his statement, the President made his view clear that people should be proud and glad to declare that they are U.S. citizens. Indeed, USCIS statistics indicate that naturalization applications skyrocketed just prior to the 2016 election – more green card holders want to become U.S. citizens. There are approximately 740,000 pending naturalization applications. In the New York area alone the backlog is anywhere from 12 months to 24 months. Additional evidence of delays is seen in the number of lawsuits that are being filed in federal district courts due to these unreasonable delays. These lawsuits are at a 10-year high.

In what appear to be further attempts to restrict the processes for obtaining U.S. citizenship, the Administration has suggested that birthright citizenship could be limited, created a task force to “denaturalize” U.S. citizens who may have lied (intentionally or non-intentionally) on the citizenship applications, opposed creating a path to citizenship for DACA and TPS recipients, and been denying passports to individuals by questioning the validity of their birth certificates.

We will continue to follow how the new Commerce Department figures will account for all of the non-citizens who since 2015 have been trying become U.S. citizens and have been blocked by new USCIS policies that have created widespread delays.

This article was written by Forrest G. Read IV of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more on the census & citizenship questions, please see the National Law Review Immigration page.

Federal Circuit Uphold TTAB Ruling on Specimens of Use

Part of the trademark registration process is submitting a specimen of the mark as used in commerce (“specimen of use”). Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) upheld the decision of a split Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) panel that refused to register the trademark “CASALANA” for “knit pile fabric made with wool for use as a textile in the manufacture of outerwear, gloves, apparel, and accessories,” stating that Siny Corp. (the applicant) did not submit an acceptable specimen of use. See In Re: Siny Corp. (Fed. Cir. Case. No. 18-1077).

Siny Corp. had submitted a specimen where the mark was not shown on images of the goods or on images of the packaging. Also, the Siny Corp. website did not allow direct ordering. Instead, it listed a phone number and e-mail “for sales information.” Nonetheless, Siny Corp. maintained that its website qualified as a display of goods at their point-of-sale because its web-page specimen had the phrasing “for sales information” (i.e., it was a “display associated with the goods” that should be considered a specimen of use sufficient to purchase those goods).

During prosecution the examining attorney disagreed with the reasoning of Siny Corp., stating that the phrasing “for sales information” was not enough to enable customers to make the sale. Rather, it was just a way to obtain more information and lacked details to complete the order – such as cost, quantity, payment and shipping.

The TTAB panel, in reviewing the determination of the examining attorney, found that even though Siny Corp. customers would need the support of sales staff because their goods were industrial materials for use in manufacturing, nearly all details needed to complete a transaction were not present on the website. Thus, the website could not be considered a display for point-of-sale.

On appeal to the CAFC, Siny Corp. maintained that its website specimen established a “display associated with the goods” and argued that the Board used “overly rigid requirements” in determining that the specimen did not qualify as a display associated with the goods.

The CAFC agreed with Siny Corp. about the Board holding of In re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cautioning against bright-line rules in this context. However, it disagreed with Siny Corp. that the Board in the instant case had used improperly “rigid” requirements stating, in fact, that the TTAB had prudently considered the website specimen’s contents and ruled the specimen does not cross the line from advertising to suitable display associated with the goods.

In hindsight, the website could have been modified a few ways that may have been acceptable: (1) providing pricing information on the site; (2) providing an e-commerce option to purchase; (3) putting the mark on the images of the goods or on images of the packaging rather than just the surrounding website text; and/or (4) changing the general “for sales information” statement to “call to purchase, pricing available on request.” Alternatively, documentary evidence of the sales process may have been acceptable, showing that purchasing consumers saw the website, called the number, and in fact bought the goods. The foregoing are all considerations to keep in mind when presented with issues regarding specimens which claim use in commerce.

Article by Stewart Mesher of K&L Gates.

For more on trademarking see the National Law Review Intellectual Property page.

The Federal Grand Jury: Ten Tips If You Receive a Subpoena

Other than having to respect testimonial and constitutional privileges of the people called to appear before it, a federal grand jury can pretty much do what it wants in questioning witnesses and compelling the production of documents. Federal grand jury subpoenas are almost never quashed on grounds that they call for irrelevant information or go beyond the grand jury’s authority. Federal grand juries have a maximum of 23 members, 16 of whom must be present to form a quorum. Indictments are returned by a vote of 12 or more members. Federal grand juries typically sit for a term of 18 months and meet at regular intervals. As a practical matter, a grand jury will almost always return an indictment presented to it by a prosecutor. This is the basis for Judge Sol Wachtler’s famous saying that a prosecutor can get a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich.” Testifying or providing documents to such a powerful body entails grave risks. You should never attempt to face these risks without the help of an experienced white collar criminal defense attorney. Here you will find 10 tips for responding to federal grand jury subpoenas that call for your testimony or documents. Of course, every case is different and you should always develop a strategy in consultation with your attorney.

1. Keep Your Attorney Close at Hand.

Your lawyer can’t be with you in the grand jury room, but he or she can be right outside the room and you have the right to consult with him or her after each and every question. In fact, you can spend as much time as you need conferring with your lawyer, as long as you are not attempting to disrupt the grand jury process. You can also leave the grand jury room in order to brief your attorney about the questions being asked and your responses. In most federal jurisdictions you can also take notes of any questions asked during the grand jury session. These can later be shared with your attorney.

2. Beware of Agreeing to Pre-Grand Jury Interviews

You are under no obligation to talk to government agents before the grand jury process begins. Some Assistant United States Attorneys trick unrepresented persons into interviewing with federal agents prior to the beginning of the grand jury session. The letter accompanying the witness’ subpoena may ask or direct the witness to appear an hour or two early at the grand jury room or the U.S. Attorney’s Office. These pre-grand jury interviews are dangerous and ill-advised and the government has no authority to compel them. You may make a harmful admission during one of these interviews. In addition, you may be accused of lying to a government agent during the interview. Lying to government agents during an interview, like lying to the grand jury, is a federal crime. At the grand jury session, however, there will be an official recording and/or transcript of the proceedings, so there will be no dispute about what you say. The pre-grand jury agent interview will not be recorded. Two federal agents will take notes of what you say and it will be their word against yours in the event of a dispute.

3. Don’t be Bullied or Misled About Grand Jury Secrecy.

Federal grand jurors, grand jury court reporters and the prosecutors running the grand jury are under a strict duty to keep any “matter occurring before the grand jury” a secret. This duty is codified in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Violations of this rule can result in sanctions or criminal contempt charges against a prosecutor. But the rule of secrecy does not apply to federal grand jury witnesses. If you are a grand jury witness, you have the right to tell the whole world about your grand jury testimony. Of course, it may not be in your interest to do this. You may want to keep your appearance before the grand jury under close wraps. You need to understand, however, that it is your call-not the government’s. But some federal prosecutors attach cover letters to grand jury subpoenas, informing the witness that revealing the contents, or even the existence, of the subpoena “may impede” a criminal investigation. These cover letters then “request” non-disclosure of the subpoena (and/or the documents requested in the subpoena) and ask the witness to notify the prosecutor if the witness has any “problems” with non-disclosure. You should by no means put up with this nonsense. If you receive a cover letter like this, you should consider having your attorney write a polite response to the prosecutor or the case agent including the following language: “Your cover letter requests non-disclosure of the subpoena (and/or the documents requested in the subpoena) and asks to be notified if there are problems with such non-disclosure. I am reluctant to have my client take on a formal affirmative obligation, regarding either non-disclosure of the subpoena or notification of problems with such non-disclosure, beyond the requirements, if any, found in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) or in some other statutory or court authority you can point me to. Rest assured, however, that my client has absolutely no desire to compromise your investigation or to publicize the existence of either the subpoena or your investigation.”

4. Insist on Grand Jury Secrecy from the Government.

As mentioned, Rule 6(e) prohibits the government from revealing “a matter occurring before the grand jury.” This prohibition, of course, covers the content of grand jury testimony. But it goes much further. The government cannot even reveal that you appeared before the grand jury or that you have been subpoenaed or scheduled to appear. Many prosecutors and agents get sloppy about this and reveal that a person or company has been subpoenaed. In addition, some grand juries have waiting rooms where multiple witnesses are invited to wait until they are called. In these situations, each witness is told, in effect, that the other witnesses waiting with him have been summoned to appear “before the grand jury.” On other occasions, members of the press, who know what day the federal grand jurors meet, have been tipped off to be at the courthouse entrance, so that they can see a grand jury witness enter and draw the obvious conclusion. Your white collar criminal defense attorney should be vigilant in guarding against these abuses and should put the federal prosecutors handling your appearance on notice not to violate grand jury secrecy with such maneuvers.

5. Let Your Attorney Accept Service of the Subpoena.

Your attorney should arrange with the prosecutor to accept service of the grand jury subpoena on your behalf. This spares you the embarrassment of being personally served by FBI agents at your home or in the workplace. What if the agents don’t know or care that you have an attorney, and decide to serve you personally anyway? You should politely accept service, tell the agents that you have an attorney, and decline to answer any and all substantive questions about the case. Refer all questions to your attorney. What if you don’t yet have an attorney when you are personally served with the grand jury subpoena? Politely accept service and tell the agents that you will decline to answer any substantive questions until you have had the opportunity to obtain an attorney. You are under no obligation to do anything other than accept service of the subpoena. If you say anything at all about the case to the agent you could be making dangerous admissions that may be used against you at a later time. For example, let’s say that you are being investigated in connection with an alleged tax fraud scheme involving foreign trust accounts. Assume that there are no documents which on their face tie you to any such trust accounts. Then an FBI Special Agent (or an IRS Criminal Investigation Division Special Agent) serves you with a grand jury subpoena for all records related to those foreign trust accounts. When she serves the subpoena, the agent asks: “Are you going to cooperate?” You respond: “Yes, I’ll cooperate. You’ll get the documents.” What have you done? You have just admitted to the government that you possess or have access to the foreign trust account documents. You have in effect acknowledged a connection between yourself and the foreign trusts. If you instead respond to the agent as follows: “I’m sorry, but I have an attorney and she will be contacting you,” you have admitted nothing.

6. Learn the Difference Between Types of Grand Jury Subpoenas.

Federal grand jury subpoenas are for: (a) testimony (ad testificandum); (b) documents or objects (duces tecum); or (c) both. The face of the subpoena will inform you which type of subpoena you received. You will be subpoenaed as an individual or as a custodian of records for a business entity. In many instances, individuals have the right to refuse to answer grand jury questions by invoking the Fifth Amendment’s Privilege against Self-Incrimination. Corporations and other business entities, however, cannot invoke this privilege. But since a corporation operates through human agents, it must designate a custodian of records when subpoenaed by the federal grand jury. Under Supreme Court case law the corporate custodian is only required to answer a narrow category of questions, related to how the subpoenaed documents were searched for and gathered. If you are properly subpoenaed as a business custodian, it is very important that you limit your answers to this narrow category of questions. Prosecutors love to get corporate custodians into the grand jury room and ask extra questions. These questions might seem innocuous, but they are often very dangerous. You need to have your white collar criminal lawyer with you for consultation, right outside of the grand jury room, to ensure that you are not tricked into answering one question too many. Some federal prosecutors have recently started the practice of issuing one subpoena to a person in that person’s individual capacity and his custodial capacity. This tactic is dangerous, confusing, and, in my view, unauthorized. It is tantamount to issuing one subpoena to two persons or companies. Your attorney should insist on two separate subpoenas-one for you as an individual and one to the company’s custodian of records.

7. Don’t Testify if You Have Exposure.

As mentioned above, if you are subpoenaed for testimony in your individual capacity, you may be able to avoid answering substantive questions by invoking the Fifth Amendment’s Privilege against Self-Incrimination. This is true even if you are not a target of the investigation. Keep in mind that even if a prosecutor designates you a witness or subject, rather than a target, this designation provides you with no rights or protection and can be changed at any time. The right to invoke the Privilege against Self-Incrimination is much broader than most witnesses and attorneys realize. If a truthful answer to a grand jury question would even tend to incriminate you, you can invoke the privilege and refuse to answer. How can an answer tend to incriminate you? If it furnishes a link in the chain that might lead to your conviction. Can a person who is totally innocent of wrongdoing invoke the privilege? Absolutely! The Supreme Court has ruled that the privilege protects the innocent as well as the guilty. Why would an innocent person want to invoke the privilege? To keep from being ensnared by a mistaken, incompetent, or unscrupulous prosecutor. Take the following example. The federal grand jury is investigating a corporation for accounting fraud. You work in the corporation’s accounting department. The prosecutor believes that any accounting department employee who reviewed Document X and later booked entries related to Document X is guilty of fraud. You looked at Document X and later booked entries related to Document X, but don’t believe you defrauded or intended to defraud anyone. No record shows that you reviewed Document X and no other person knows that you reviewed Document X, but several documents and co-workers can establish that you booked entries related to Document X. If you testify at the grand jury and truthfully admit that you reviewed Document X, you will tend to incriminate yourself, even though you don’t believe that you are guilty, because you will furnish a link in the chain that the prosecutor may use to indict and convict you. You also may be able to invoke the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to avoid producing certain documents. Although documents created prior to receipt of a grand jury subpoena are typically not covered by the Privilege, this is not always the case. If the very act of producing a document would tend to incriminate you, the Privilege will often apply. For example, if you are under investigation for receiving classified documents, and you are subpoenaed for those documents, the very act of producing the classified documents to the grand jury is in itself incriminating.

8. Review Your Prior Testimony.

Some federal prosecutors like to call witnesses back to the grand jury to testify on multiple occasions. This is dangerous because it can cause you to inadvertently give inconsistent testimony under oath. Under §1623(c) of the federal criminal code, the government can prosecute you for testifying to two irreconcilably contradictory statements under oath, and the government does not even have to prove that either of the statements in question was false. When you are called back to the grand jury to testify for a second time, your attorney should insist on your right to review ahead of time the official transcript of your first session. In this way, you can refresh your recollection as to your earlier testimony, correct any mistakes, and prepare yourself for the upcoming session. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently ruled that grand jury witnesses, even if they have not been called back to testify for a second time, have an inherent right to review a transcript of their earlier testimony.

9. Conduct a Shadow Grand Jury.

If you have the money, your attorney can often conduct what is known as a shadow grand jury. Friendly witnesses will sometimes inform you if they have been subpoenaed to the grand jury and you and your defense team can often figure out who else the government may call. Grand jury witnesses are then interviewed, before or after they testify, giving you valuable information on where the investigation is heading. Of course, grand jury witnesses are under no obligation to cooperate with your defense team, and the use of shadow grand juries often infuriates prosecutors. You should proceed with great caution and make sure that all interviews are carefully documented so that your defense team is not accused of witness tampering or obstructing justice. And it should go without saying that your attorney and his staff should conduct and arrange all interviews-not you.

10. Don’t Wait Until the Last Minute.

Do NOT wait until one day or one week before your grand jury appearance date to contact a federal criminal defense attorney. Any decent attorney will need time to discuss the facts of your case with you in detail and talk to the Assistant U.S. Attorney who is running the grand jury. In other words, your attorney needs time to assess your level of exposure and develop a game plan. This can’t be done overnight. On rare occasions, prosecutors issue “forthwith subpoenas” requiring witnesses to appear before the grand on very short notice. Even in these situations, you should immediately consult an attorney who can advise you on how to proceed. At the end of the day, you may be nothing more than a routine witness, asked to provide routine documents. But federal grand juries exist to investigate, and prosecute, serious crimes. You could be stepping into a mine field. Don’t go it alone and don’t wait until the last minute to seek professional help.

This article was written by Solomon L. Wisenberg of Nelson Mullins.

For more on appearing in court & litigation, please see the National Law Review pages on Civil Procedure or Litigation & Trial Practice.

A Judge’s Tips for Keeping Trade Secrets “Secret”

Just because information is sufficiently sensitive and valuable that it can qualify as a “trade secret” does not mean that it will qualify unless the owner of the information takes adequate steps to protect its secrecy.

In a recent decision, Judge John J. Tharp, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois explained that “there are two basic elements to the analysis” of whether information qualifies as a “trade secret”: (1) the information “must have been sufficiently secret to impart economic value because of its relative secrecy” and (2) the owner “must have made reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information” (internal quotation marks omitted).^[1]

According to Judge Tharp, some of those “reasonable efforts” that a company can take to maintain the secrecy of its information include:

using non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements with employees;
enacting a policy regarding the confidentiality of business information that is more detailed than a mere “vague, generalized admonition about not discussing [company] business outside of work”;
training “employees as to their obligation to keep certain categories of information confidential”;
asking departing employees whether they possess any confidential company information, and, if they do, instructing them to return or delete it;
adequately training IT personnel about data security practices;
restricting access to sensitive information on a need-to-know basis; and
as appropriate, labelling documents “proprietary” or “confidential.”

As Judge Tharp made clear, companies that fail to institute reasonable measures to protect sensitive information do so at their own peril.

_{[1] Abrasic 90 Inc. v. Weldcote Metals, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-05376 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2019) at 11.}

This article was written by Peter A. Steinmeyer and Erica McKinney from Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more on employer/employee relations see the National Law Review Labor & Employment page.

US Supreme Court Refines Impossibility Preemption Doctrine, Changes Litigation Dynamics

Following confusion from a 2009 decision, the US Supreme Court on May 20, 2019, decided a significant impossibility preemption case. This new decision will change the dynamics of litigation involving the impossibility defense, and will introduce new litigation uncertainty due to a shift in the decision maker for impossibility preemption.

IN DEPTH

On May 20, 2019, in a unanimous judgment, the US Supreme Court decided Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, No. 17-290, an important impossibility preemption case, and held that the judge, not the jury, must decide whether a state-law failure-to-warn claim is preempted because there is “clear evidence” that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would not have approved a change to a drug’s label to include the warning.

The Court’s decision in Albrecht comes on the heels of its decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 US 555 (2009), which held that a pharmaceutical manufacturer could escape liability under state-law failure-to-warn claims if the manufacturer could provide “clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to [the drug’s] label.” Confusion blossomed after Wyeth in the lower courts as to how to apply the “clear evidence” standard and, importantly, whether the “clear evidence” decision was for the judge or the jury.

The Fosamax Litigation

Albrecht involved state-law claims for Merck’s alleged failure-to-warn about “atypical” femur fractures in consumers taking Fosamax, a drug that treats osteoporosis in postmenopausal women. In 2008, Merck sought FDA approval through the Prior Approval Supplement (“PAS”) process to add warnings to Fosamax’s label about “atypical” femur fractures in patients. The FDA did not approve Merck’s label change, and stated that there was “inadequate” justification for the new warning. Eventually, in 2011, the FDA did agree to the labeling change. But the interim years provided fertile ground for plaintiffs to sue Merck for failing to warn about the risk of “atypical” femur fractures.

In that litigation, Merck won summary judgment at the district court, arguing that the state-law claims were preempted because the FDA did not permit the label change that was at the heart of the failure-to-warn case. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that the “clear evidence” standard from Wyeth was a factual burden of proof and required that Merck show by “clear and convincing” evidence that the FDA would have rejected the proposed warnings, that this determination is a question of fact for the jury and that there were material facts in dispute as to whether Merck could satisfy that standard.

The Court’s Decision and Concurring Opinions

In an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Third Circuit’s decision. The Court framed the issue as one of federal preemption and whether it was “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” The state law at issue was the requirement for drug manufacturers to warn about risks of taking a particular drug. The federal law was the FDA’s regulation of the content of drug warning labels.

The Court explained that after a drug’s initial label is approved by the FDA, there are several ways in which a company can change that label if new or different warnings are needed as time passes. One way is called the “changes being effect” or “CBE” process, which allows a company to change a label without pre-approval by the FDA, though the FDA may review that change after it is made and approve or disapprove of it. Another method, the one used by Merck, is the PAS method, which requires the FDA’s pre-approval before the change can be made.

The Court explained that, under Wyeth, to succeed on the defense of impossibility preemption, the manufacturer must demonstrate that federal law—that is, the FDA after being fully informed regarding the justification for a label change—prohibited “the drug manufacturer from adding a warning that would satisfy state law.” The Court went on to explain that because the CBE process allows a manufacturer to make a label change without prior FDA approval, “a drug manufacturer will not ordinarily be able to show that there is an actual conflict between state and federal law such that it was impossible to comply with both.”

After providing that descriptive recitation of Wyeth, the Court proceeded to the normative portion of its decision, stating first that it would not further define Wyeth’s use of “clear evidence” in terms of evidentiary standards because the issue of preemption is one for the judge and not the jury, and the judge must “simply ask himself or herself whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably conflict.’” In coming to that conclusion on the “determinative question,” the Court relied upon its seminal patent litigation decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., where it concluded that the construction of claims of a patent are for the judge not the jury to decide, to conclude that “judges, rather than lay juries are better equipped to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination” and whether the determination conflicts with state law. The Court acknowledged, as it did in Markman, that the legal question before the courts may contain contested facts, but those factual questions are “subsumed within an already tightly circumscribed legal analysis.” The Court then vacated the judgment of the Third Circuit because the Third Circuit incorrectly concluded that the preemption issue was one of fact, not law.

Although the judgment of the Court was unanimous, its reasoning was not. Justice Clarence Thomas, although he joined in the Court’s opinion, wrote a concurring opinion to explain his “understanding of the relevant pre-emption principles and how they apply to this case.” Justice Thomas explained that he remained “skeptical” that “physical impossibility” is the correct test. Instead, a logical contradiction test between state and federal law is the correct test under the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause. But even under the “physical impossibility” test, Justice Thomas would have concluded that Merck could not prevail because there was nothing that prevented Merck from using the CBE process to change the Fosamax label. And, even if Merck believed that the FDA would have ultimately disapproved of its label change under the CBE process, that “hypothetical” would not have rendered the earlier change impossible; “hypothetical agency action is not ‘Law.’”

Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, only concurred in the judgment. Justice Alito explained that he agreed with the Court on the “only question that it actually decides”—namely, whether the preemption question is for the judge or jury. Justice Alito then discussed what he viewed to be critical omissions in both the discussion of the law and facts in the Court’s opinion in an effort to ensure that the Court’s opinion was not “misleading on remand.”