Category: Litigation

Appellate Court Tells CitiMortgage It Can’t Force “Repurchase” Of What No Longer Exists

A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit offers some vindication for mortgage companies still facing “repurchase” demands made by the banks to which they sold residential mortgages in the years leading up to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and accelerated in 2008.  In CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Equity Bank, N.A., No. 18-1312 (8th Cir. 2019), the Eighth Circuit (which has appellate jurisdiction over the federal district courts of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and the Dakotas) reached the common-sense conclusion that a plaintiff cannot require a defendant loan originator/seller to “repurchase” a loan extinguished by foreclosure.  In such a circumstance, the court reasoned, there simply is nothing left to repurchase.  In so holding, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri  — a court that, despite being CitiMortgage’s consistently chosen forum for repurchase and contractual indemnification claims against loan sellers, had granted summary judgment to the defendant, Equity Bank, on this issue.

The relevant factual background is as follows. CitiMortgage filed suit against Equity, demanding that Equity repurchase 12 residential mortgage loans. CitiMortgage had notified Equity that it needed to take action under the cure-or-purchase provision in the parties’ Agreement.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Equity’s duty to repurchase was limited to the six loans that had not gone through foreclosure. For the loans that had not gone through foreclosure, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that Equity breached the Agreement. The court rejected Equity’s claims that CitiMortgage’s letters lacked the necessary detail to trigger its duty to perform, and that CitiMortgage waited too long to exercise its rights. But, as to the six loans that had gone through foreclosure, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that Equity owed nothing to CitiMortgage.

As part of its analysis detailing the reasons that Equity could not be required to repurchase loans already foreclosed upon, the Eighth Circuit faulted CitiMortgage for never explaining what, exactly, Equity was supposed to repurchase. We have regularly made that argument when defending clients against repurchase claims and likewise, have never gotten a satisfactory response as to what our client could repurchase.   Typically, in tacit acknowledgment of the merit of that argument, plaintiffs make sure to do something that the appellate court intimated CitiMortgage should have done in this case.  That is to seek instead what is usually an alternative contractual remedy, indemnification.   Perhaps because it considered the repurchase provision in its contract with Equity more likely to generate a significant damages award (this contract’s repurchase provision established a “repurchase price formula” favorable to CitiMortgage), CitiMortgage opted in this case to seek only the remedy of “repurchase.”

To be sure, a plaintiff’s decision to seek an “indemnification” remedy also creates obstacles to recovery in most cases of this type.  Among those obstacles are many of the same statute of limitations problems that parties asking for repurchase face, as well as substantial questions about the circumstances under which the party seeking indemnification incurred the liability for which it is seeking payment.  Relatedly, whether a particular alleged loan defect can fairly be said to have caused the plaintiff’s monetary loss is typically very much in question when a plaintiff aggregator seeks indemnification from a defendant loan seller. Many battles over such issues remain to be fought, but, in the meantime, the Eighth Circuit’s recognition that a party cannot repurchase what no longer exists is a welcome development for residential mortgage loan originators.

© 2019 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

California Board Gender Quota Law Challenged In Federal Court

Cydney Posner at Cooley LLP wrote last week about a new challenge to California’s Board Gender Quota law.  The lawsuit, Creighton Meland v. Alex Padilla, Secretary of State of California, was reportedly filed in federal district court in California by a shareholder of OSI Systems, Inc.  According to OSI’s most recently filed Form 10-Q, the company is incorporated in Delaware, its principal executive offices are in California, and its shares are traded on The Nasdaq Global Select Market.  The lawsuit alleges violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

As this case progresses, one question might be whether the plaintiff’s claim is direct or derivative.  OSI is not named as a party to the lawsuit and the plaintiff alleges that the law injures his “right to vote for the candidate of his choice, free from the threat that the corporation will be fined if he votes without regard to sex”.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s test for whether a stockholder’s action for breach of fiduciary duty is derivative or direct asks two questions:

“Who suffered the alleged harm–the corporation or the suing stockholder individually–and who would receive the benefit of the recovery or other remedy?”

Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).  Although the corporation will be fined and the fine suffered by all of the stockholders, the plaintiff is alleging that he is being injured by being denied the freedom to vote without regard to sex.  Presumably, that injury would be removed if the law is enjoined.

Interestingly, OSI does not appear in the California Secretary of State’s listing of SB 826 corporations published earlier this year.  According to the proxy statement filed by OSI last month, all of the current directors are men, but a female has been nominated for election at the upcoming meeting.

© 2010-2019 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

More on Corporate Board diversity rules on the Corporate & Business Organizations law page of the National Law Review

Clinton’s Impeachment Compared to the Trump Proceedings: Conversation with Sol Wisenberg, former Deputy Independent Counsel during the Starr Investigation

With the Trump impeachment proceedings getting ready to start this week in the House of Representatives, we thought it would be interesting to take a look back at the Clinton Impeachment.  The catalyst for President Clinton’s impeachment was the Starr Report.  Independent Counsel Ken Starr presented to the House of Representatives a case for impeaching President Bill Clinton on 11 grounds, including perjury, obstruction of justice, witness-tampering and abuse of power.  The sexual relationship between the president and former White House intern Monica Lewinsky formed the basis of the lying under oath and obstruction of justice charges.  The lying under oath charge stemmed from the Clinton v. Jones civil lawsuit, which included President Clinton’s inaccurate grand jury testimony about a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky.

Solomon L. Wisenberg played a pivotal role in the Clinton Impeachment as a Deputy Independent Counsel during the Starr investigation. Mr. Wisenberg’s grand jury questioning of President Bill Clinton was submitted by independent counsel Kenneth Starr with his report to the House of Representatives as part of the Clinton impeachment proceedings.

Mr. Wisenberg has more than two decades of experience with complex federal white-collar crime investigations and jury trials and is currently the co-chair of Nelson Mullins White Collar Defense and Government Investigations practice.  He is a sought after analyst and routinely appears in a variety of media providing commentary and answering questions on federal white-collar investigations, impeachment, public corruption under the Hobbs Act, bribery and fraud, Foreign Corrupt Practice Act violations and other intricate legal issues.

Mr. Wisenberg was kind enough to take time out of his schedule to talk with the National Law Review on the upcoming Trump impeachment proceedings and how they are similar and different from the Clinton impeachment.

The Starr Report played a central role in the Clinton impeachment proceedings; producing the perjury and obstruction of justice charges stemming from the Clinton v. Jones civil action.

In the Clinton v. Jones sexual harassment lawsuit, Ms. Jones’ attorneys included questions about Monica Lewinsky and President Clinton’s behavior with other women to show a pattern of improper behavior with women by Clinton to bolster Ms. Jones’ sexual harassment claims.

Additionally, Ms. Jones’ attorneys sought to show a pattern concerning President Clinton’s actions in covering up various inappropriate interactions with women.

Do you think the impeachment prosecutors for President Trump will introduce elements from the Mueller report to show a pattern of behavior to bolster any criminal acts and any obstruction of justice case related to the withholding of aid to Ukraine?

Mr. Wisenberg: I think there’s no doubt that they will. I’ve heard some Democratic Congressmen talking about it and it’s very clear that they feel the obstruction portion of the Mueller report has not been given sufficient attention. So I’d be shocked if it does not constitute one of the articles of impeachment.

The Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones held that a sitting president is subject to civil suits in federal court, this lead to President Clinton being deposed and perjuring himself and being impeached by the House of Representatives, on grounds of perjury to a grand jury and for obstruction of justice.

xxxx

If President Clinton was able to be deposed while in office, why are President Trump and other members of his administration, such as Mick Mulvaney, claiming immunity?

Mr. Wisenberg: Trump didn’t ever formally claim immunity, because Mueller never pressed the point. Keep in mind, Clinton vs Jones just said the president is not immune from suits while he is in office. Even President Clinton didn’t take the position that he could never be sued. President Clinton’s position was just that he didn’t have to answer lawsuits brought while he was the president, and the Supreme Court ended up saying yes you do, you don’t have that absolute immunity. But the Court also said that there needs to be respect and accommodations for the responsibilities of the office, for the president’s schedule, time, privacy, all of that kind of stuff.

However, in the Lewinsky criminal investigation where we sent President Clinton a grand jury subpoena after he ignored six of our requests to appear, we ended up withdrawing the subpoena. We did this because President Clinton’s attorney said if you withdraw the subpoena, he’ll sit for grand jury testimony. Clinton’s inquiry involved grand jury testimony, not just a deposition.  So the constitutional issue involving the President’s right to defy a grand jury subpoena for testimony alone was never tested there. I think it would’ve been an interesting issue, because Clinton did not want to be in a position where the president is being subpoenaed or responding to a subpoena, and he certainly didn’t want to be in a position of going to federal court to block the Lewinsky Grand Jury’s subpoena.

So that’s how it was worked out, and we don’t know what would have happened if he would have challenged our subpoena in court. There’s actually a case that came out in 1997. It’s the controlling law in the DC Circuit.  The Office of Independent Counsel that was investigating Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy wasn’t asking for testimony in that case. In the In Re Sealed Case, 121 F 3d 729 (1997). the issue was asking for documents and it’s actually a fairly high standard to be able to force the president to respond to a grand jury subpoena. I believe it’s quite possible that Mueller didn’t press the point because he might not have won under the test laid out for Mike Espy, even if he was just seeking testimony. Every case is dependent upon the particular facts.  And because Mueller already had been given a tremendous amount of relevant information, he may have not wanted to push it, as it’s not at all certain that he would’ve won. So not only would it have been a lengthy process that would have delayed the Mueller investigation, but Mueller may not have won on the issue. It’s not that President Trump was behaving inconsistently with the ruling in Clinton vs Jones. It’s that Mueller never forced Trump to make a choice.

Special Counsel Mueller declined to subpoena President Trump, as Mueller told the House Intelligence Committee that it looked highly unlikely that they would obtain an in-person interview with Trump and because of the perceived need to wrap up the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections.

xxxx

Do you think Mr. Mueller’s strategy of not forcing President Trump to either testify, fight the subpoena in the courts or defy the subpoena will weaken the prosecutor’s ability to use the Mueller report in the impeachment process?

Mr. Wisenberg: Oh God, no. I mean, not at all. The report is what it is. The obstruction portion of the report (I should say alleged obstruction, because even Mueller doesn’t say that Trump criminally obstructed justice) is what it is. The obstruction portion of the Mueller report is based on witness testimony.  I don’t think there’s going to be much dispute about what happened. And apparently now the House of Representatives has the grand jury backup for the Mueller report’s witness testimony. President Trump has questioned some of Don McGahn’s factual statements, but McGahn was hardly alone in detailing the President’s efforts to stymie Mueller.

The dispute would be on the suggestion that the President criminally obstructed justice. I don’t think he did on the known facts, and the only episode that is even a close call on this was when President Trump allegedly asked Don McGahn to sign a document for the White House’s records denying he’d been told to fire Mueller. I think from the Democrats’ perspective they were waiting and waiting and waiting for the Mueller report and it was a dud. The Democrats blamed Bill Barr, I think, unfairly. The Democrats tried to hold testimony on the Mueller report and, it didn’t get anywhere, again, because of all of the claims of executive privilege and related doctrines. Now that they’ve got impeachment authority in Congress the Democrats are in a much stronger position.  They can say now, any area of inquiry is allowed under our Constitutional power to conduct an impeachment inquiry.

xxxx

Based on President Clinton’s conflicting testimony, Mr. Starr presented a case that President Clinton had committed perjury. Do you think President Trump’s frequent public statements, though not under oath about the Russian interference in the 2016 election and the alleged quid pro quo in the withholding of aid to Ukraine will be used in the impeachment proceedings?

Mr. Wisenberg:  The Democrats can use anything they want if they think it is valuable to them. The Democrats might say President Trump’s frequent commentaries can be construed as non-hearsay party admissions under the Federal Rules of Evidence in any proceeding brought against President Trump. Also, where somebody is accused of criminal wrongdoing and says something about the specific accusation that turns out to be false, this can be used against him as a false exculpatory statement.   So, I see no reason why they can’t consider anything they want to consider.

To answer your specific questions about President Clinton, President Clinton lied under oath in the Paula Jones civil rights lawsuit deposition thereby obstructing justice.  The federal district judge presiding held President Clinton in contempt of court. President Clinton is the only U.S president ever held in contempt by a federal judge. Additionally, President Clinton had his secretary retrieve and remove gifts Monika Lewinsky had in her possession, when the gifts were subpoenaed in the Jones civil suit. President Clinton used a White House employee, his secretary Betty Currie to obstruct justice in a civil rights lawsuit.

There are some people who say private conduct,  even if it’s criminal, should never be impeachable and that we should not be concerned with private conduct. And there is some historical support for this position in writings by the framers and stuff like that. But President Clinton did more than that. He used a White House employee in order to hide items under subpoena. That’s textbook obstruction.

xxxx

If President Trump’s impeachment prosecutors are able to demonstrate that alleged withholding of aid to Ukraine is a criminal act, do you think it will be easier to prove intent in an obstruction of justice case?

Mr. Wisenberg:  No, I don’t think so. I don’t think that helps them on obstruction of justice unless something new related to the Ukraine business comes out, but all he did was to say it’s a perfect call. Right? I think that if you were to somehow prove that this was a campaign finance violation or, or some kind of a crime, it might be a little bit easier to get a few more votes, but I don’t see anything yet that gets them the votes they need to convict President Trump in the Senate.  I understand some people believe that putting the phone call transcript on a separate server was obstruction, but that sounds weak to me.

GOP Senators will point out that President Trump was elected, and we’re a representative democracy. We’re going to hold an election in one year. They will say it’s not right to remove him because of Ukraine. Even if they think, as Senators, that it was a mistake.

I think it is going to take something really dramatic for there to be a shift. Either a dramatic shift in public opinion based on the live testimony or just something new coming out, some new scandal to move the needle on that.

To answer your question, if somebody were to somehow to prove without question that President Trump knew he was violating the law when he made the call, that may be meaningful. And that revelation again moves the needle maybe, but you can’t ignore the politics.

Take a look at the situation with President Clinton. There was no real question in anybody’s mind that he perjured himself and that he obstructed justice, but that didn’t all of a sudden make the Democrats in the Senate vote for removal. I don’t think any of them did. The Democrats during the Clinton impeachment and removal proceedings acted very similarly to how the Republicans are acting now.  You can’t ignore the politics.

Many thanks to Mr. Wisenberg for his time and answers to our questions.

Copyright ©2019 National Law Forum, LLC

U.S. Women’s National Soccer Team Wins Class Certification in Equal Pay Fight

A federal court has ruled that the U.S. Women’s National Soccer Team’s (USWNT) equal pay claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act can move forward as a class action, as opposed to myriad individual cases.

As part of its decision, the court also allowed the USWNT’s Equal Pay Act (EPA) case to proceed as a collective action.

Factual background

Earlier this year, the USWNT players filed a complaint in federal court against their employer, the USSF. The lawsuit alleges that USSF violated the EPA and Title VII by, among other things, paying the women’s team less than the men’s team for doing equal work.

Equal Pay Act and Title VII Legal Frameworks To Prove Wage Discrimination

To win their EPA case, the USWNT must first prove a prima facie case under the EPA. The team can do so by showing:

  • the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex;
  • the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and
  • the jobs are performed under similar working conditions

If the USWNT establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the USSF to establish one of four affirmative defenses: (1) that the pay difference is due to a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system that measures quantity or quality of production, or (4) “any factor other than sex.”

If the USSF makes this showing, the USWNT can still win if it shows that the USSF’s justification for the pay disparity was a pretext.

Title VII also makes it illegal to discriminate based on sex in pay and benefits, which is why the USWNT is also suing USSF under this law. Title VII prohibits discrimination in compensation and other terms and conditions of employment, so it has a broader reach than the EPA (and also outlaws, among other things, discrimination based on race, religion, and other protected characteristics).

The USWNT Argues That, Despite Their Better Results, They Are Paid Less For Equal Work

The USWNT’s complaint contains evidence and statistics supporting their argument that the USSF has unlawfully paid them less than the men’s soccer team. For example, the complaint alleges:

The USWNT is the preeminent women’s soccer team in the world and has contributed to the finances and reputation of the USSF at least as much as the USMNT. The complaint lists three World Cup titles (which is now four titles), four Olympic gold medals, and asserts that the USSF revised its projected earnings for 2016 from a net loss of $429,929, to a net gain of $17.7 million, because of the successes of the USWNT, particularly at the 2015 World Cup.

The USSF pays the women’s team less than the men’s team, despite requiring players on both teams to perform the same job duties that require equal skill, effort and responsibilities performed under similar working conditions. The complaint states that the women’s team players spend more time practicing, playing, and promoting the USSF than the men’s team does; indeed, from 2015 to 2018, the USWNT played in nineteen more games than the USMNT.

In addition, the complaint asserts that from 2013 to 2016, the USSF paid USWNT players $15,000 for trying out and making the World Cup team. Yet the USSF paid USMNT players $55,000 for making the team.

Similarly, in 2014, the USSF paid the USMNT more than $5.3 million in bonuses after their World Cup loss in the Round of 16. While in 2015, the USSF paid the USWNT only $1,725,000 in bonuses after they won the World Cup.

Finally, the USWNT received less favorable training and travel conditions, as well as reduced marketing for their games. For example, in 2017, USSF chartered private planes for USMNT travel at least seventeen times, but zero times for the USWNT.

USSF’s Potential Defenses

To rebut these claims, the USSF might argue that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for paying USWNT players less than USMNT players is that the men’s team generates more revenue for USSF than the women’s team, which accounts for the difference in pay.  The USSF denies the allegations in the USWNT’s complaint.

According to a report, however, this may not be accurate. That is, between 2016 and 2018, USWNT games generated about $50.8 million, compared with $49.9 million for USMNT games.

Currently, player compensation is not directly linked to money generated by the team in ticket sales, brand deals, and other promotional activity. The USWNT’s complaint refers to 2016 negotiations with the USSF in which the USWNT’s union offered to enter a revenue-sharing model. Under this model, player compensation would increase in years in which the USSF derived more revenue from USWNT activities and decrease in years when it earned less from USWNT’s activities. USSF rejected the offer, according to the complaint.

© 2019 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
For more employment and other litigation outcomes, see the National Law Review Litigation & Trial Practice law page.

Seventh Circuit: ADA Does Not Prohibit Discrimination Based on Future Impairments

On October 29, 2019, railway operator Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”) prevailed before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit – which covers Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin – in a case in which the company argued that its refusal to hire an obese candidate due to an unacceptably high risk that the applicant would develop certain obesity-related medical conditions incompatible with the position sought did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

Ronald Shell applied for a job with BNSF as a machine operator position.  Per its standard practice when the applied-for position is safety-sensitive, as was the heavy equipment operator position sought by Shell, BNSF required him to undergo a medical examination.  During the medical examination, the examiner determined that Shell’s body mass index (“BMI”) was 47.  BNSF had a practice of refusing to hire individuals with a BMI higher than 40 for safety-sensitive positions.  In Shell’s case, the employer expressed concern that his obesity, although not causing any present disability, would cause Shell disabilities in the future, such as sleep apnea, diabetes, and heart disease.  BNSF asserted that this risk was significant because a sudden onset of any of these conditions could be catastrophic for a heavy machine operator.  BNSF therefore did not place Shell in the position.

Shell sued, arguing that he was “disabled” under the ADA’s definition of that term because BNSF had “regarded him as” having a disability.  The ADA not only protects individuals who are actually disabled or have a record of being disabled, but also protects individuals who have been subjected to an adverse employment action because of an actual or perceived physical impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits a major life activity.  Shell argued that by refusing to hire him based on the risk of future disabilities that he was at risk of as a result of his obesity, BNSF essentially treated him as though he currently had those conditions.

The Court ruled that the ADA does not protect non-disabled employees from discrimination based on a risk of future impairments.  The Court cited precedent from the Eighth Circuit, where BNSF also faced challenges to its practice of refusing to hire obese applicants due to the risk of future impairments.  The Eighth Circuit, like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, also has held that the statutory language of the ADA does not protect non-disabled individuals who have a risk of disability in the future.

Of note, Shell also argued at the trial court level that his obesity constituted an actual disability, rendering BNSF’s refusal to hire him based on this characteristic a violation of the ADA for this reason as well.  However, as you may recall from our blog post from earlier this year, just a few months ago, the Seventh Circuit addressed this argument in another case, Richardson v. Chicago Transit Authority, and held that obesity, by itself, is not a disability for purposes of the ADA unless it is caused by an underlying physiological disorder.  Shell did not present any evidence in his case of such an underlying disorder, and thus could not, therefore, claim that he was actually disabled.  Notably, the federal appellate courts are split on this issue, which may tee it up for consideration by the United States Supreme Court in the future.  In contrast, among the appeals courts that have addressed the issue of future disabilities, all have agreed, thus far, that the ADA’s reach does not extend to potential or likely future disabilities of currently non-disabled individuals.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more ADA litigation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

No Copyright Case Too Small: Content Creators Rejoice or Casual Infringers Beware?

An office jokester emails a funny meme she copied off Google to a colleague. A tourist snaps a picture of a painting in an art gallery and posts it to his travel blog. A teacher prints copies of a recently published Internet article and distributes to his class. A teen reposts his friend’s Instagram picture on his own social media page. To these casual infringers, no harm has been done and there’s certainly no reason to “make a federal case out of it.” But to the copyright owners, these small acts of infringement mean something. Perhaps not enough to justify the expense and time required for a federal claim, but action may be worth pursuing on a smaller scale.

Enter the pending CASE Act, intended to protect the “creative middle class,” and a potential boon to small businesses and individual content creators, while simultaneously presenting a threat to the “micro-infringements” committed by the ordinary person throughout the day. Last week, the US House of Representatives approved the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2019 (CASE Act) by a landslide 410-6 vote. The bill is intended to create a Copyright Claims Board within the US Copyright Office that would hear copyright claims of up to $15,000 per work infringed, with statutory damages capped at a total of $30,000.

If passed by the Senate, the CASE Act is likely to be a welcome avenue for graphic designers, bloggers, photographers, authors, vloggers, and other individual and small business copyright owners to protect their works. Currently, pursuing copyright infringement litigation is limited to filing suit in federal courts, the cost of which can be prohibitive for many small businesses. The proposed Copyright Claims Board provides a more affordable avenue—effectively, a copyright small claims court—to enforce copyright ownership.

Supporters say that small businesses have long needed a more efficient and affordable means to enforce their copyrights. To this point, much of the unauthorized exchange and use of Internet-based works or smaller-scale copyrighted works has been difficult to police. In fact, June Besek, the executive director of the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts at Columbia Law School, recently told the ABA Journal that many infringers knowingly exploit copyrighted material because they are confident they will never be challenged. (Anyone remember the flagrant use of Napster and LimeWire by teens in the late 1990s and early 2000s to illegally download music—excuse me, “file share”—with little fear of repercussions for their “small-scale” acts of infringement?). A number of organizations, including the American Bar Association, have expressed support for the CASE Act.

But that support, while widespread, is not universal. The American Civil Liberties Union opposes the proposed CASE Act on the grounds that it will stifle free speech and the open sharing of information. Other critics say that by lowering the threshold for infringement claims, lawmakers also are opening the door for “copyright trolls” to file nuisance infringement claims with the Copyright Claims Board. And many are less than keen on the idea that inadvertently unanswered copyright infringement complaints could cost ordinary Americans up to $30,000 in default judgments per proceeding—perhaps a small sum to a business, but potentially life-changing to many individuals—with very limited ability to appeal, under the currently proposed language of the Act.

Notably, as currently written, the small-claims tribunal established under CASE will be entirely voluntary, meaning the complaining party can elect to use the Copyright Claims Board, and the defending party may choose to opt out. But critics point out that the opt-out window is only 60 days long, and easily could be missed by an unwitting defendant.

Next, the Senate will consider the CASE Act, but observers believe it will pass with bipartisan support. The final language of the Act may be somewhat different from its current form, so stay tuned for more updates as the CASE Act makes its way through the legislature.

What the proposed CASE Act could mean for you:

Would-be plaintiffs (or defendants) appearing before the proposed Copyright Claims Board are encouraged to do so with licensed legal representation. Some have suggested that this small claims court format will allow parties to represent themselves without needing to incur the fees of legal representation. However, it is important to remember that, though the monetary stakes may be lower than in federal court, the complex legal nuances of copyright law, not to mention jurisdiction, service, discovery, evidence, joinder of parties, and expert testimony, remain the same and are best addressed by experienced legal counsel.

Owners of large copyright portfolios may find the CASE Act to allow greater leeway in defending their works against smaller-player infringers. Businesses with larger portfolios may wish to take stock of their protected works and develop an enforcement strategy, taking into account this more accessible avenue for enforcement.

Smaller companies or individual content creators, too, may find the proposed CASE Act to provide the freedom to assert their copyrights more aggressively than they have done previously. These companies and individuals also are encouraged to take stock of their copyright portfolios, and consider setting up infringement alerts through their legal representatives or third party vendors in order to take a more offensive stance.

On the opposite side of the court room, copyrighted work users are cautioned to think carefully about their use of protected works. Businesses and schools may want to consider updating policies on use and distribution of protected works, with a more conservative mindset. The relative ease of filing suit with the Copyright Claims Board may give rise to a more litigious “creative middle class.” And while the damages may be smaller-scale, the attendant legal costs may not be, and damages from multiple suits may add up quickly.

 

Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

ARTICLE BY Kristin Lamb of  Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP.
For more copyright infringement regulation, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Text Messages Inviting Independent Voters to Political Speeches by Former Presidential Hopeful Howard Schultz Were Not “Solicitations” For His Book Tour

The Western District of Washington recently held in Vallianos. v. Schultz, C19-0464-JCC, 2019 WL 4980649 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2019), that two text messages encouraging recipients to view a livestream of a political speech by the former chairman and CEO of Starbucks Howard Schultz did not amount to “solicitations” under the TCPA. While exploring a run for President, Schultz released a book, “From the Ground Up,” and went on a three-month long cross-country book tour. He also collected from voter records the phone numbers of individuals registered as having “No Party Affiliation” and sent them the text messages at issue. Named plaintiffs Cassandra Vallianos, Stacey Karney, and Mike Barker brought a putative TCPA class action against Schultz alleging that the text messages were sent to them without their consent after they had placed their cell phone numbers on the national Do Not Call Registry.

Specifically, plaintiffs made two claims: first, that Schultz sent the text messages using an auto-dialer and without the plaintiffs’ consent; second, that the calls were solicitations sent in violation of the TCPA’s Do Not Call restrictions. Plaintiffs’ claims were based on two separate text messages Schultz sent Plaintiffs. The first said “Howard Schultz will be speaking in Miami at 12:30! Watch live: https://hs.media.mi-a030[.]” The second said “Howard Schultz will be speaking about his vision for America in Miami at 12:30! Watch live: https://hs.media/mia030[.]” Plaintiffs argued that these text messages were “solicitations” under the TCPA because the text messages were sent with the goal of getting recipients to purchase Schultz’s book. Defendant Schultz moved to dismiss only the Do Not Call claim.

Acknowledging that messages that serve a “dual-purpose” by including both advertising and informational communications are solicitations for purposes of the TCPA, the court looked to the context of the messages to determine whether they constituted “solicitations” under the TCPA. The court reviewed the text messages, the webpage to which the text messages directed recipients, and the speech embedded in the website. The court found that the text messages did not facially discuss Schultz’s book. The court also found that the link in both text messages took Plaintiffs to the homepage of Schultz’s website, which included various video clips, including a livestream of Schultz’s speech and a link to a website where consumers could purchase his book. But the court held that the website was not transformed into a solicitation by the “mere inclusion of a link to a website on which a consumer can purchase a product.” The court found that the speech focused on Schultz’s political views and potential run for president, not his book. The court further found that the website was just a way to facilitate viewing of Schultz’s speech. Thus, the court ultimately determined that the messages did not constitute “telephone solicitations” under the TCPA.

With the seemingly never-ending national campaign season chugging along, we expect to see more such claims filter their way through the courts.

©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

For more on TCPA litigation, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet Law page.

Two Ways Technology Has Changed How Lawyers Practice

Technology has changed all of our day-to-day lives. It also has impacted how lawyers practice. While having the internet at our fingertips is a convenience for most of us, it can cause headaches for judges and lawyers when jurors use the internet during trial to post or search online about the case. This means that lawyers must be more tech-competent than ever before. Here are two ways that technology has changed how lawyers practice:

  1. Litigants Face the Challenge of Jurors’ Social Media and Internet Use

Imagine years of preparation, costly investigations, and hundreds or thousands of hours of work by attorneys and clients being shattered in a moment by a juror’s single click on his or her phone, tablet, or computer. Whether by posting 280 characters on Twitter discussing deliberations or punching a few words into Google to search for more information on a legal concept or a fact central to a case, jurors have the power to radically disrupt the judicial process at their fingertips.

Jurors’ use of the internet and social media during trial and deliberations can create a real toll on lawyers, litigants, and the judiciary. In fact, online activity by jurors recently has led to a mistrial in a $13 million police shooting case, a thrown-out fraud conviction, and a potential retrial for a notorious drug lord.

Judges often employ explicit instructions and the threat of contempt to dissuade jurors from googling the parties or trial lawyers, conducting independent research online, or posting about the trial or their deliberations on social media. Many then hold jurors in contempt when they deliberately disobey instructions. Judges have fined jurors anywhere from $500 to $1,200 for their online activity that disrupts a trial or verdict, and some states have flirted with legislation to increase penalties. In the United Kingdom, judges may jail jurors based on their internet use, in one case for two months when a juror googled additional information about the victims in a fraud case and shared it with fellow jurors.

Because more than 80 percent of Americans own smart phones and the average American spends at least 3 hours a day online, it is a tall order to prevent jurors from googling or tweeting. As a result, attorneys should vigorously monitor jurors’ social media from voir dire through the final verdict. As noted below, it even may be part of attorneys’ professional duty of competence to ensure that they are keeping a close eye on jurors’ Twitter feeds.

  1. Attorneys Must Be More Tech-Competent Than Before

Lawyers also must keep up with other technological changes that impact the practice of law.

Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA), a version of which has been adopted in 49 states, lawyers have a duty to provide competent representation to their clients and to maintain the knowledge and skills that their practice requires. In 2012, the ABA took the significant step of formally updating the rule to clarify that lawyers also have a duty to be competent in technology.

The new comment to the rules states that, “to maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” Since that change, 37 states have adopted the ABA’s Duty of Technology Competence as part of their version of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Texas.

While the duty is clear, it’s not clear just what technology the rule refers to. While most agree that the duty includes basic competence in everyday technologies like e-mail and Microsoft Office, it has been left to individual jurisdictions and professional organizations to provide further guidance.

For example, the New York City Bar Association has suggested that attorneys have an affirmative duty to research potential jurors’ public social media information (see New York City Bar Association Formal Opinion 2012-02). While the research can help identify biases harmful to a client’s interests, lawyers must carefully avoid any direct contact with potential jurors online (via message or friend request) lest they violate other ethical rules. Juror consulting firms have stepped in with advanced tools to search and compile potential juror’s publicly available posts. But the onus is ultimately on the lawyer to ensure they are protecting their client’s interests by doing all they can to identify biased jurors.

Further, the duty of technology competence may affect an attorney’s obligation to protect clients’ confidential information from cybersecurity risk and to use appropriate electronic discovery practices and technology. These duties were at the center of a recent data breach, where lawyers disclosed confidential customer information in an e-discovery production because the lawyer did not understand the review process or the scope of the third-party vendor’s work. Further, in California, a state that has not adopted the ABA’s Duty of Technology Competence, the state bar has issued an ethics opinion stating that an attorney’s duty of competence requires, “at a minimum, a basic understanding of, and facility with, issues related to e-discovery.”

As technology continues to change at a rapid pace and impact the practice of law, clients will expect their lawyers to pay attention. To that end, lawyers must be competent in a range of technologies directly related to the practice of law.

These are just some of the most notable ways that technology is changing the practice of law. As technology continues to advance, the practice will continue to evolve with it. Lawyers should – and may be ethically obligated – to stay abreast of and develop competence in these technologies.

© 2019 Schiff Hardin LLP

For more on legal field developments, see the National Law Review Law Office Management page.

Suit Over ‘No Preservatives’ Capri Sun Label Tossed

A proposed class action, filed in the Northern District of Illinois on October 25, 2018, against Kraft Heinz Food Co. accused the company of falsely advertising its Capri Sun juice as containing “no preservatives” when in fact it contains citric acid. Tarzian et al v. Kraft Heinz Food Company, Case No. 1:18-cv-07148. The complaint alleged that the representation that Capri Sun beverages contain “No Artificial Coloring, Flavors, or Preservatives” is unfair and deceptive advertising as the beverages contain a well-known preservative, citric acid.

In an order filed on October 10, 2019, U.S. District Judge Charles P. Kocoras dismissed the lawsuit and found that while the plaintiffs allege practices commonly used to manufacture citric acid throughout the industry, plaintiffs failed to draw a connection between the common industry practice and the actual practice used by Kraft.

This dismissal follows a dismissal of a similar matter in California federal court in 2015. Osborne v. Kraft Heinz Group, Inc., Case No. 3:15-cv-02653. In that case, plaintiffs accused Kraft of mislabeling Capri Sun drinks as “all natural” when they allegedly contained synthetic ingredients, including citric acid and natural flavor. In a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria found that plaintiff did not know whether the citric acid used in Capri Sun’s drinks was natural or synthetic. The judge ultimately granted Kraft Heinz’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend the complaint. The plaintiff never filed an amended complaint.

© 2019 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more on food labeling laws, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Whatever Happened to that Big Ringless Voicemail Decision We Were All Expecting? It Was a Nothing Burger—For Now

You’ll recall a few weeks back TCPAWorld.com featured analysis of efforts by VoApps—makers of the DirectDrop ringless voicemail platform—to stem the tide of negative TCPA rulings addressing ringless voicemail technologies. VoApps founder David King even joined the Unprecedented podcast to discuss his submission of a lengthy declaration to the court addressing how the technology works and why it is not covered by the TCPA.

Well, a few days ago the Court issued its ruling on the pending motion—a summary judgment effort by the Plaintiff—and I must say, it was rather anti-climactic. Indeed, the court punted entirely on the key issue.

In Saunders v. Dyck O’Neal, Case No. 1:17-CV-335, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177606 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 2019) the court issued its highly-anticipated ruling on the Plaintiff’s bid to earn judgment following the Court’s earlier ruling that a ringless voicemail is a call under the TCPA. It was in response to this motion that VoApps submitted a mountain of evidence that although a ringless voicemail may be a “call” it is not a call to a number assigned to a cellular service—and so such calls are not actionable under the TCPA’s infamous section 227(b).

Rather than answer the question directly the Court made mincemeat of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and treated the summary judgment motion as if it were some sort of motion to confirm the Court’s earlier ruling. This is weird because: i) no it wasn’t; and ii) there’s no such thing. As the Court put it: “Admittedly, Saunders moved for summary judgment, but her motion is in fact limited to a request for clarification of the impact of the Court’s prior ruling: Was the Court’s prior ruling that DONI’s messaging technology falls within the purview of the TCPA a ruling as a matter of law that binds the parties going forward? The answer is clearly yes.”

Great. So we now know what we already all knew—the Saunders court holds that a ringless voicemail is a call. Got it. As to the key issue of whether the calls were made to a landline to a cell phone, however, the Court finds: “These issues were unnecessary to Saunders’s motion, as she has not [actually] moved for summary judgment on her claim.”

So there you go. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was not actually a motion for summary judgment after all. So all that work by VoApps was for nothing. But not really. Obviously this fight is not yet over. The Court declined to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff meaning that further work—and perhaps a trial—lies ahead for the good folks over at VoApps. We’ll keep you posted.

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more on voicemail & phone regulation, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.