Category: Litigation

Life in The Fast Lane: How Urban Car Ads Depicting ‘Street Art’ Can Backfire

Vehicle manufacturers and their ad agencies really love to show off their driving machines in action. Television commercials depict sturdy, reliable trucks hauling tons of cargo; four-wheel-drive SUVs navigating perilous terrain in extreme weather conditions; and sleek sedans cruising through cityscapes of gleaming skyscrapers and funky urban streets.

It is on the funky urban streets where car manufacturers can sometimes steer in the wrong direction. Their commercials often feature street scenes that may include recognizable landmarks, historic buildings, public art installations like sculptures and wall murals, and even distinctive graffiti. Carmakers aren’t the only retailers entranced by “street art.” Makers of athletic shoes and apparel like to incorporate graffiti-like designs into their fashions and ads, as well. Filming other people’s art, even when in public view, can result in copyright claims, litigation and attorneys’ fees, not to mention potential damages. This article offers a brief roadmap for avoiding such claims.

Over the last decade, at least four automobile manufacturers have found themselves embroiled in copyright litigation as a result of having incorporated public art into their advertisements. (A word of caution to other retailers: American Eagle Outfitters, Coach, H&M, Marriott International, McDonald’s, Moschino, North Face and Roberto Cavali, among others, also have found themselves navigating lawsuits over the alleged appropriation of street art.)

In 2011, Fiat released a television commercial featuring Jennifer Lopez, seemingly driving through her old Bronx neighborhood, where she grew up. “Here, this is my world,” she says in voice over, as stereotypical Bronx scenes pass by. One of those scenes included an intersection splashed with murals created by the group that calls itself “TATS Cru,” which then asserted a claim of copyright infringement. Soon after the car company became aware of the issue, the claim was quickly settled out of court. (Incidentally, the commercial was also controversial for reasons unrelated to the infringed-upon mural: JLo wasn’t actually driving the car around her old neighborhood; rather, it was driven by a double, and JLo did the voice over from Los Angeles.)

In 2018, General Motors launched an advertising campaign for its Cadillac line. Labeled “The Art of the Drive,” the campaign featured images of Cadillac vehicles with scenes from Detroit in the background. One of those images included a large mural by a Swiss graffiti artist professionally known as “Smash 137,” who had been commissioned by a Detroit art gallery to create an outdoor mural on the outdoor elevator shed of a 10-story parking garage. He sued G.M. for copyright infringement.

The company argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed on the grounds that the parking garage was an “architectural work,” the mural was incorporated into that structure and, therefore, it was permissible to use a photograph of the structure in its ads. After the court rejected this argument and it was clear the lawsuit was headed for a jury trial, the lawsuit settled.

And in 2019, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC was threatened with lawsuits by several artists who claimed that Instagram photos posted by Mercedes-Benz of its G 500 luxury truck in the foreground of colorful Detroit murals infringed upon their copyright rights. Rather than wait to be sued, the automobile company took the initiative and filed federal lawsuits in which it asked the court for a determination of non-infringement. As G.M. had done, Mercedes-Benz argued that the 1990 federal law that extended copyright protection to architectural designs (the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, or AWCPA) allowed the company to post photographs of the exteriors of buildings visible from public spaces, notwithstanding the artwork painted on them.

The muralists filed a motion seeking the summary dismissal of the car company’s lawsuits on several grounds, including that the AWCPA did not permit the company’s copying of their artwork. Soon after the court denied that motion, the parties reached a settlement and the lawsuits were dropped.

Most recently, Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. finds itself in the litigation fast lane. On November 11, another artist who is supposedly known for her work in a variety of media, including murals and street art, sued the car manufacturer, as well as Marvel Entertainment, over a 2018 cross-promotional commercial for Audi vehicles and the motion picture Avengers: Endgame. (Korsen v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Case No. 21-cv-08893 (C.D.Cal. 2021).) The plaintiff alleges that her works have been displayed in Los Angeles-area galleries and public spaces and that she has worked with major clients like Red Bull, Whole Foods and the City of Los Angeles. According to her complaint, Korsen created an original mural on 7th and Mateo Streets in downtown Los Angeles (i.e. one of those gritty urban landscapes mentioned at the start of this article). The mural can be seen prominently in the Audi/Marvel commercial, which apparently was featured widely on Audi’s official YouTube channel, Facebook Live and at the Los Angeles Auto Show, among other places.

To be sure, this plaintiff’s claim may be subject to numerous challenges and defenses. For one thing, the advertisement ran in 2018, and the plaintiff’s claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. So even if the commercial continued to air within three years of the filing date of the complaint, a substantial portion of any profits that might be attributed to the marketing campaign could well be out of the plaintiff’s reach. In addition, it appears that the plaintiff did not actually register her work with the US Copyright Office until November 2019, long after the alleged infringement commenced in 2018. This would mean that the plaintiff may be ineligible for an award of statutory damages (which plaintiffs often elect when their actual damages or the defendant’s profits are difficult to establish) and, importantly, the recovery of attorneys’ fees. And, even if the plaintiff still might be eligible for statutory damages, she would not be entitled to an award of up to $150,000 for each allegedly infringing photograph of her mural, as she demands. The Copyright Act makes clear that a copyright plaintiff may seek only one award of statutory damages for each infringed work, regardless of the number of infringing works.

Whether Volkswagen wins, loses or settles this dispute, one thing is certain: It will have to spend time, effort and attorneys’ fees to achieve a resolution of this plaintiff’s claims. It may also find itself the subject of negative publicity. Automobile manufacturers and other retailers would be prudent to follow some basic steps before releasing this type of advertisement to the public, thereby potentially sparing themselves such costs.

First, a proposed advertisement should be reviewed at the concept and/or script stage for potential third party intellectual property issues. Second, all of the proposed locations for photography or filming should be vetted properly for the presence of copyright-protected artwork, third-party trademarks and the like. Third, the creators of the marketing campaign should discuss with qualified counsel the risks associated with filming or photographing publicly-viewable art and business signage, including: (1) how visible the artwork/signage will be and for what duration; (2) whether the artwork/signage can or should be covered over and/or replaced with approved content prior to filming, or blurred in post-production; (3) whether there is any conceivable fair use or other defense to a potential claim of infringement; and (4) whether it would be prudent to contact the content/signage owner and obtain permission for the proposed use.

©2022 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
Article by David Halberstadter with Katten.
For more articles about copyright litigation, visit the NLR Intellectual Property Law section.

A Very Simple Proposal to Tweak the FLSA to Benefit Both Employees and Employers

A number of years ago, I received a kind note around the holidays from my opposing counsel in a wage-hour class action, thanking me and my firm for being their “partners” in addressing employment issues.

Maybe the word he used wasn’t “partners,” but it was something close to it.

At first, I must admit that I thought he was joking.

Then I realized that this attorney, for whom I have great respect, got it.

He got that employers are not looking to violate employment laws, and that the attorneys who represent them are not trying to help their clients violate the laws.

He got that the opposite is true – employers are trying to comply with the laws, and their attorneys are trying to help them do so.  No employer is hoping to get sued.  Not one.  And lawyers advising employers on how to violate the laws will soon be looking for new clients.  Or a malpractice attorney.

The general public may not understand this notion, and, unfortunately, many employees and plaintiffs’ lawyers may not, either.

The desire of employers and their counsel to comply with the law plays out thousands of times every day, to the great benefit not just of employers, but of employees.

All management-side employment lawyers worth their salt have stories about how they worked with their clients to prevent a manager from terminating an employee’s employment, or cutting an employee’s pay, or implementing a problematic policy, by explaining the law and the potential repercussions.  Some lawyers have hundreds of these stories.

“You should give the employee another chance,” is an expression that may as well be on a tape recording, it’s used that often.  “Document the problem, sit down with the employee to explain how they need to do things differently, and give the employee another chance.”  “If you make that change, you’re walking right into a class action that you will have difficulty defending.”

Often – usually – employers will understand and follow their counsel’s advice once distanced from the heat of the moment.

They’re looking to do the right thing, to treat their employees fairly.  And, yes, to comply with the law.

It’s an approach that works in virtually every context except perhaps one – the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The FLSA actually works to dissuade employers from working with employees to correct many wage issues.

Why is that?

Because, unlike other employment laws, the FLSA generally doesn’t permit employers and employees to resolve wage disputes, short of the very litigation or agency complaint that neither employers nor employees really want.

The FLSA generally forbids the very amicable resolutions that would benefit both employers and employees.

And perhaps it’s time to change that.

In a perfect workplace, if employees have issues, whatever they might be, they would speak with their managers or with human resources and resolve their disputes amicably.

And, for the most part, the law not only permits them to do so, but encourages them to do so.

If employees believe they have been harassed, they can take their concerns to their employer and let their employer investigate and take corrective action, if appropriate.

If employees believe they have been discriminated against, they can share their concerns with their employer and resolve their disputes.

And if part of the resolution is a payment of some sum that the employer and employee agree to be fair, they can enter into a settlement agreement whereby those claims are resolved.  That is, the employee can accept some agreed-upon sum of money and sign a release.  And the employee can review the settlement agreement with his or her attorney beforehand in deciding whether the terms are fair.  If not, the employee won’t sign it.

But these very same employees who are able to amicably resolve virtually any dispute with their employers generally are not allowed to do so with FLSA claims.

If employees believe they were not paid for all time they worked, they cannot simply speak with their managers or human resources personnel to resolve the issue, get the problem fixed, and move on.  No, generally speaking, the only way they can resolve the issue is to file a lawsuit or a complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL).

If employees believe their overtime pay was miscalculated, the only way they and their employers can resolve the claim is by suing or going to the DOL.

If employees believe that they have been misclassified as exempt, they can’t resolve the issue with their manager or human resources personnel.  No, they have to sue or file a DOL complaint.

And if employers identify an issue – an error on someone’s paycheck, or a concern that an employee might have been misclassified – the best they can do is to correct the issue and pay the employee, then sit back and hope that the employee doesn’t turn around and sue about the very issue the employer wanted to resolve, but couldn’t.

It’s a system that is built to increase litigation, often unnecessarily, at the expense of amicable resolutions of issues that may arise.

There is no good reason that employees can be trusted to resolve other employment disputes without litigation or an agency complaint, but can’t be trusted to do so with regard to wage claims.

None.

There is no good reason why employees can be allowed to amicably resolve a race or sex discrimination concern, for instance, but the same employees can’t be allowed to resolve a wage claim – not even as part of the resolution of the race or sex discrimination concern.

None.

The argument that an employee wouldn’t understand the nuances of the FLSA flies about as far as a turkey.  The FLSA is no more nuanced than Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act, and employees are allowed to resolve those claims outside of litigation or an agency complaint.

And don’t forget that employees could always have an attorney review a proposed FLSA settlement before they ever enter into it.  If it wasn’t fair, the attorney would surely tell the employee that and try to negotiate better terms, right?

Ultimately, it’s the employees’ decision.  If they don’t like the terms of a proposed resolution of FLSA claims, they can always file suit or a DOL claim then.

If you assume that employers and employees would like to have the opportunity to try to resolve their FLSA disputes prior to litigation or a DOL claim, then it is time to amend the FLSA to give them to right to do so.

And the blueprint for what legislation could look like is easy to find – it’s right in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  Or, more specifically, it’s right in the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA) amendments to the ADEA.

For reasons that remain somewhat mystifying, releases of age discrimination claims under the ADEA require specific terms that releases of other types of federal discrimination claims do not.  Among other things, such releases must specifically reference the ADEA, they must advise employees that they have the right to consult with an attorney, they must provide the employee with 21 days to consider the release (or 45 days under some circumstances), and they must provide the employees with 7 days to revoke an agreement after signing.

There is no reason that the FLSA couldn’t be amended to permit private settlements along the same lines – with a requirement that the release specifically reference the FLSA, that it advise employees that they have the right to consult with an attorney (or the DOL), that they have 21 days to consider the release, and that they may revoke the release within 7 days.

Don’t like the settlement proposed by your employer?  Don’t sign it.

Don’t understand it?  Talk with a lawyer or the DOL.

Need time to think about it?  You’ve got plenty of time.

Have second thoughts after signing the agreement?  Revoke it.

If such bells and whistles are sufficient to protect older workers who wish to settle age discrimination claims, they should be sufficient to protect all employees who wish to resolve FLSA claims.

Employees would benefit from a system that would encourage employers to address wage issues – and, not incidentally, by which they might not have to share 30-40% of their settlement with lawyers.

Employers would benefit from a system that would help them address those issues while avoiding litigation – saving on paying attorney’s fees to attorneys like me.

The courts and the DOL wouldn’t be clogged with claims that cry out for resolution.

The only people who wouldn’t benefit from this proposed amendment would be the lawyers.

And if you’re worried about us lawyers, you should call a doctor.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more articles on employment laws, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

WEBSITE LAYOUT PASSES MUSTER: Court Enforces Cruise Line’s TCPA and Arbitration Disclosures Over Objection

Those of you who attended Lead Generation World heard me discuss the big trend from back in 2020 in which Courts were refusing to enforce online disclosures owing to perceived problems with website layout.

Things like “below the button” disclosures and distracting visual elements were often described as defeating a manifestation of assent to disclosure terms in that unfortunate line of cases.

Well, 2022 has brought a couple of cases that have determined website disclosures to be just fine. Yesterday I reported on a big win by Efinancial, and today we have a nice victory by a cruise ship company.

In Barney v. Grand Caribbean Cruises, Inc., CASE NO. 21-CV-61560-RAR, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8263 (S.D. Fl. January 17, 2022) the Defendant moved to enforce an arbitration provision on its website arguing that the Plaintiff had agreed to the terms and conditions by submitting a sweepstakes entry form.

Predictably, the Plaintiff argued that the disclosures were not enforceable because the website layout was insufficient–specifically that the font was too small and the terms excessively lengthy.

The Court was not impressed.

Noting that the disclosure was plainly readable and above the button–and it required a check box–the Court simply refused to heed the Plaintiff’s argument that he didn’t know he was agreeing to consent and arbitration. Here’s the analysis:

First, in terms of placement, the Website does not tuck away its statement regarding the Terms & Conditions in an obscure corner of the page where a user is unlikely to encounter it. Rather, the statement is located directly between the contact information fields and the “Submit Entry” button. The user is required to check the box indicating assent to the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted. Id. ¶ 14. Thus, it is impossible that a user would miss seeing the statement regarding the Terms & Conditions or—at the very least—the checkbox indicating assent to them. Second, rather than merely informing the user that the Terms & Conditions exist, the statement directs the user to the precise location where the Terms & Conditions can be accessed—namely, at the “bottom of the page.” Finally, and most significantly, the user is required to check an acknowledgement box to accept the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted through the Website—an affirmative act indicating [*14] assent. The checkbox accompanies the statement, which specifically includes language indicating that the user “agree[s] to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions.” Thus, there is an explicit textual notice that checking the box will act as a manifestation of an intent to be bound. A reasonable user confronting a statement that “I consent to receive e-mail, SMS/Text messages, and calls about offers and deals from an automatic dialing system and/or pre-recorded voice technology” and “confirm that I am over age 25 [and] agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions that are hyperlinked at the bottom of the page” would understand that he or she is assenting to the linked terms, including those pertaining to mandatory arbitration. And the record shows that Plaintiff indeed checked the box before clicking “Submit Entry.” Connolly Decl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s objections to the design of the Website hold no water. Plaintiff assails the statement regarding the Website’s Terms & Conditions as “lengthy” with “extremely small font that blends into the background.” Resp. at 9. But as seen in the screenshot of the Website on the day of Plaintiff’s visit, the statement’s text is clearly legible [*15] and not overly long. Indeed, it is roughly the same size and color as the text indicating the fields for “First Name,” “Last Name,” “Email,” and “Phone Number.” Plaintiff also objects to the placement of the link to the Terms & Conditions at the bottom of the page. Id. at 10. But, as discussed supra, that is precisely where the statement directed the user to view them.

As you can see the Court found the layout to be perfectly appropriate and was particularly moved by the presence of the opt in check box. Although many cases have recently enforced disclosures WITHOUT checkboxes, they do remain favored by the Courts.

I think Barney represents a case of a pretty clearly enforceable provision. The above-the-button text coupled with the radial button and the clear articulation of the terms being accepted made this an easy case for the court.

I will note that the TCPA consent is connected to the terms and conditions lingo–I don’t love that since the TCPA disclosure should be “separately signed”. But the agreement by the consumer that they are over 25 is a nice touch–helps to protect against claims that minors are supplying consent illegally.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more articles about TCPA litigation, visit the NLR Litigation section.

SDNY Allows Skechers to Walk Away from Trademark Claims

After Skechers began selling open-back women’s shoes under the name “Commute Time” in August 2018, Easy Spirit, owner of the mark TRAVELTIME for similar shoes, sued Skechers in April 2019 for trademark and trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act and New York law.  In January 2021, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment on the trade dress claims for Skechers, and the remaining trademark infringement claims—trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a), false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and common law trademark infringement under New York state law, proceeded to trial.  Following a twelve-day bench trial, the district court dismissed the trademark infringement claims, finding no likelihood of confusion existed between the marks.

As the opinion recounted, to succeed on a claim for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a), Easy Spirit needed to prove the validity of its mark (which Skechers did not contest) and a likelihood of confusion between the marks.  Analyzing likelihood of confusion, the court assessed the eight factors used by the Second Circuit:  (1) strength of the prior owner’s mark; (2) similarity between the marks; (3) competitive proximity of the products; (4) likelihood that the prior user will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith; (7) quality of the defendant’s product; and (8) buyer sophistication.

First, in analyzing the strength of Easy Spirit’s TRAVELTIME mark, the court examined its inherent distinctiveness and acquired distinctiveness in the marketplace.  Regarding inherent distinctiveness, the court found that TRAVELTIME was “modestly” inherently distinctive because it was plainly suggestive.  In other words, the mark required some imagination for a purchaser to “go from ‘travel time’ to the idea of movement, then to what one might need when moving, and finally to the product, an open-back comfort shoe.”

As to acquired distinctiveness, which the court explained referred to the recognition that the mark earned in the marketplace as a designator of Easy Spirit’s goods, the opinion analyzed six factors used by the Second Circuit:  (1) advertising expenditures; (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source; (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product; (4) sales success; (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark; and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s use.

Here, the court noted that Easy Spirit did not provide advertising expenditures or other evidence showing how many consumers its TRAVELTIME-specific advertising reached, as opposed to Easy Spirit advertising generally.  Regarding unsolicited media coverage, the court stated that Easy Spirit presented only one piece of evidence from before 2018, so it was unclear if the mark acquired secondary meaning before Skechers started selling its Commute Time shoe that year.

The sales success factor favored Easy Spirit however, as the court cited evidence that the TRAVELTIME shoe became the number-one-selling shoe in U.S. department stores in 2016 and amassed $26.3 million in sales between July 2017 and March 2019.  The court also determined that length and exclusivity moderately weighed in Easy Spirit’s favor because whole Easy Spirit had sold TRAVELTIME shoes continuously since 2004, other shoe companies routinely used marks containing the words “time” or “travel”—including Easy Spirit for its other products.

Thus, the court concluded that Easy Spirit had not provided strong evidence that TRAVELTIME acquired secondary meaning before Skechers began using the Commute Time mark, and accordingly the strength of the mark factor weighed “only moderately” in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

Second, the court held that the marks were not similar based on their overall impression on consumers.  It found several differences in their appearance, including that:  (1) TRAVELTIME is one word while Commute Time is two; (2) TRAVELTIME generally appears in all capital letters but Commute Time does not; and (3) TRAVELTIME is written on one line yet Commute Time generally appears on separate lines.  The court also found that TRAVELTIME appeared on a minimalist beige box with simple orange lettering alone, while Commute Time appeared on a jewel-toned patterned box with various shapes, accents, and other Skechers marks.  And the opinion noted that “travel” and “commute” neither sounded the same nor were synonymous.

Third, the court found no evidence of actual confusion.  It pointed out that Easy Spirit did not submit any consumer survey showing confusion, and while Easy Spirit did not need to, the absence of a survey was evidence actual confusion could not be shown.  The opinion also emphasized Skechers’ survey showing 0% confusion, which Easy Spirit failed to adequately rebut or discredit.  Specifically, the court rejected Easy Spirit’s concern as to the universe of participants, that the survey showed participants the parties’ websites and not those of third-party retailers, and incentives given to participants.  It held that the survey properly targeted consumers beyond women 55-years-and-older because prospective customers should be counted, any marketplace could be replicated given the parties sold their shows on multiple platforms, and incentives are commonly accepted for surveys.

Fourth, the court examined whether Skechers acted in bad faith or with an intent to deceive consumers about the source of its product.  It determined that evidence showing Skechers based some measurements of its shoe on TRAVELTIME but included several aesthetic and functional differences demonstrated an intent to compete rather to deceive.  The court noted that companies in the shoe industry commonly incorporate features of other products in order to compete.

Fifth, the court determined that the customer sophistication factor also weighed in Skechers’ favor.  As neither party presented direct evidence of consumer sophistication, the court stated it could rely solely on indirect indications of sophistication, such as nature of the products or their price.  The court rejected Easy Spirit’s argument that because its customers were older women they were not sophisticated consumers of women’s shoes, finding it borderline “offensive” and contrary to common sense.  It also found the price points of the shoes sufficiently high to indicate thoughtful purchases.

Finally, while Skechers did not contest that the proximity of the goods factor weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion, the court independently found this factor weighed in Easy Spirit’s favor because the Commute Time shoe was sold to the same class of purchasers, thorough the same marketing channels, and for approximately the same price as the TRAVELTIME shoe.  It did not assess the remaining two factors—bridging the gap and disparity of goods—because the parties agreed they did not apply.

In closing, the court held that no likelihood of confusion existed given the absence of any direct evidence that customers were actually confused or survey evidence of actual confusion.  Accordingly, it dismissed the federal trademark infringement claim.  And because the federal false designation of origin and common law trademark infringement claims also required a likelihood of confusion, the court dismissed those remaining claims too.

The case is Easy Spirit, LLC v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 19-cv-3299 (JSR), _ F. Supp. 3d _, 2021 WL 5312647 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021).

© 2022 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
For more articles about trademarks, visit the NLR Intellectual Property Law section.

Supreme Court to Address Role of “Prejudice” in Evaluating Waiver of Arbitrability

One of the best ways for companies facing media and privacy risk to protect themselves from expensive class action litigation is by including an arbitration provision in the applicable terms and conditions. While it’s not always clear at the outset of litigation whether the plaintiff agreed to the terms, companies often have to invoke arbitration quickly out of fear that they will be found to have waived arbitration. But in its coming term, the U.S. Supreme Court is now poised to address the critical point of whether prejudice to the plaintiff is a necessary element for a finding of waiver.

The Court agreed to decide whether prejudice is a required element in determining whether the right to arbitrate has been waived when it granted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Robyn Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (No. 21-328). The case reached the Supreme Court after the Eighth Circuit found that Sundance, Inc., a company that owns over 150 Taco Bell franchises nationwide, did not waive its right to arbitrate the plaintiff’s claims, despite waiting almost eight months after the filing of her Complaint to move to compel arbitration.

There is, at a present, a circuit split on the question of whether prejudice plays a role in the waiver analysis. Nine out of the twelve federal circuit courts—the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—have explicitly found that prejudice is a required element to establish a waiver of the right to arbitrate. But the remaining three circuit courts—the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits—have held that prejudice is not a required element.

In this case, the plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a proposed putative class, filed suit against Sundance on September 25, 2018 in the U.S. Southern District of Iowa, alleging that it had failed to pay employees for overtime hours worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Because an action containing nearly identical allegations had been pending in the Eastern District of Michigan for nearly two years, Sundance first filed a motion to dismiss or stay the claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), which the District Court ultimately denied.

Thereafter, Sundance, plaintiff, and the plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Michigan action voluntarily attended mediation in an attempt to achieve a global resolution of the claims asserted against Sundance. Plaintiff’s claims were not resolved at the mediation, and three weeks later (nearly eight months after the case had been filed), Sundance moved to compel arbitration.

The motion to compel arbitration was filed before the parties attended an initial scheduling conference with the District Court and before the parties had engaged in any discovery. Nonetheless, the District Court denied the motion, finding that Sundance had waived its right to arbitration because it acted inconsistently with its right by invoking the “litigation machinery,” which prejudiced plaintiff.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that—in light of the totality of the circumstances—plaintiff had not been prejudiced by Sundance’s eight-month delay because, during that time, the parties were briefing the quasi-jurisdictional issue raised in the motion to dismiss or stay and then waiting on the District Court’s ruling on same, rather than litigating the merits of the claim.

Plaintiff sought review by the Supreme Court, asking it to answer the following question: “Does the arbitration specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court’s instruction [in , 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)] that lower courts must ‘place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?’”

In response, Sundance argued that despite the apparent split, the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits nonetheless consider prejudice in determining if the right to arbitrate has been waived. Per Sundance, “[a]t bottom, all of the Circuits are looking at the totality of the circumstances, as they should, in assessing waiver, and all are considering the existence of prejudice, whether as a mandatory or non-mandatory factor, as part of the assessment, based upon highly overlapping facts.”

Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court agrees, but we will continue to track and report on this case.

© 2022 Vedder Price

Article By Bryan Clark and Julia L. Koechley of  Vedder Price

For more articles on the Supreme Court, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.

Greenwashing and the SEC: the 2022 ESG Target

A recent wave of greenwashing lawsuits against the cosmetics industry drew the attention of many in the corporate, financial and insurance sectors. Attacks on corporate marketing and language used to allegedly deceive consumers will take on a much bigger life in 2022, not only due to our prediction that such lawsuits will increase, but also from Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations and penalties related to greenwashing. 2022 is sure to see an intense uptick in activity focused on greenwashing and the SEC is going to be the agency to lead that charge. Companies of all types that are advertising, marketing, drafting ESG statements, or disclosing information as required to the SEC must pay extremely close attention to the language used in all of these types of documents, or else run the risk of SEC scrutiny.

SEC and ESG

In March 2021, the SEC formed the Climate and Environmental, Social and Governance Task Force (ESG Task Force) within its Division of Enforcement. Hand in hand with the legal world’s attention on greenwashing in 2021, the SEC’s ESG Task Force was created for the sole purpose of investigating ESG-related violations. The SEC’s actions were well-timed, as 2021 saw an enormous increase in investor demand for ESG-related and ESG-driven portfolios. There is considerable market demand for ESG portfolios, and whether this demand is driven by institute influencers or simple environmental and social consciousness among consumers is of little importance to the SEC – it simply wants to ensure that ESG activity is being done properly, transparently and accurately.

Greenwashing and the SEC

The SEC has stated that in 2022, it will be taking direct aim at greenwashing issues on many different levels in the investment world. As corporations and investment funds alike increasingly put forth ESG-friendly statements pertaining to their actions or portfolio content, the law has thus far failed to keep pace with the increasing ESG statement activity. It is into this gap that the SEC sees itself fitting and attempting to ensure that the public is not subject to greenwashing. In order to tackle this objective, expect the SEC to focus on the wording used to describe investments or portfolios, what issuers say in filings, and the statements made by investment houses and advisors related to ESG.

From this stem several topics that the SEC’s ESG Task Force will scrutinize, such as: whether “ESG investments” are truly comprised of companies that have accurate and forthright ESG plans; the level of due diligence conducted by investment houses in determining whether an investment or portfolio is “ESG friendly”; how investment world internal statements differ from external public-facing statements related to the level of ESG considerations taken into account in an investment or portfolio; selling “ESG friendly” investments with no set method for ensuring that the investment continues to uphold those principles; and many others.

2022, the SEC, and ESG

Given the SEC’s specific targeting of ESG-related issues beginning in 2021, we predict that 2022 will see a great degree of SEC enforcement action seeking to curb over zealous marketing language or statements that it sees as greenwashing. Whether these efforts will intertwine with the potential for increased Department of Justice criminal investigation and prosecution of egregious violators over greenwashing remains to be seen, but it is nevertheless something that issuers and investment firms alike must closely consider.

While there are numerous avenues to examine to ensure that ESG principles are being upheld and accurately conveyed to the public, the underlying compliance program for minimizing greenwashing allegation risks is absolutely critical for all players putting forth ESG-related statements. These compliance checks should not merely be one-time pre-issuance programs; rather, they should be ongoing and constant to ensure that with  ever-evolving corporate practices, a focused interest by the SEC on ESG, and increasing attention by the legal world on greenwashing claims, all statement put forth are truly “ESG friendly” and not misleading in any way.

Article By John Gardella of CMBG3 Law

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

Sixth Circuit Clarifies When Statute of Limitations Commences in False Claims Act Whistleblower Retaliation Cases

On January 10, 2022, the Sixth Circuit held in El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 2022 WL 92565 (6th Cir. Jan 10, 2022) that the statute of limitations period for a False Claims Act whistleblower retaliation case commences when the whistleblower is first informed of the retaliatory adverse employment action.

El-Khalil’s False Claims Act Whistleblower Retaliation Claim

While working as a podiatrist at Oakwood Healthcare, El-Khalil saw  employees submit fraudulent Medicare claims, which he reported to the federal government. In 2015, Oakwood’s Medical Executive Committee (MEC) rejected El-Khalil’s application to renew his staff privileges.  After commencing a series of administrative appeals, El-Khalil found himself before Oakwood’s Joint Conference Committee (JCC) on September 22, 2016. The JCC, which had the authority to issue a final, non-appealable decision, voted to affirm the denial of El-Khalil’s staff privileges.  On September 27, 2016, the JCC sent El-Khalil written notice of its decision.

Three years later, on September 27, 2019, El-Khalil sued Oakwood for retaliation under the False Claims Act whistleblower retaliation law.  Oakwood moved for summary dismissal on the basis that the claim was not timely filed in that the JCC’s decision became final when it voted on September 22, 2016 and therefore the filing on September 27, 2019 was outside of the 3-year statute of limitations. The district court granted Oakwood’s motion and El-Khalil appealed.

Sixth Circuit Denies Relief

In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that the text of the FCA anti-retaliation provision (providing that an action “may not be brought more than 3 years after the date when the retaliation occurred”) is unequivocal that the limitations period commences when the retaliation actually happened. It adopts “the standard rule” that the limitations period begins when the plaintiff “can file suit and obtain relief,” not when the plaintiff discovers the retaliation. The retaliation occurred on September 22 when the JCC voted to affirm the denial of El-Khalil’s staff privileges, and the JCC’s September 27 letter merely memorialized an already final decision.

In addition, the Sixth Circuit held that the False Claims Act’s whistleblower protection provision does not contain a notice provision. As soon as Oakwood “discriminated against” El-Khalil “because of” his FCA-protected conduct, he had a ripe “cause of action triggering the limitations period.” The court noted that if an FCA retaliation plaintiff could show that the employer concealed from the whistleblower the decision to take an adverse action, the whistleblower might be able to avail themself of equitable tolling to halt the ticking of the limitations clock.

Implications for Whistleblowers

Some whistleblower retaliation claims have a short statute of limitations and therefore it is critical to promptly determine when the statute of limitations starts to run.  For most whistleblower retaliation claims that are adjudicated at the U.S. Department of Labor, the clock for filing a complaint begins to tick when the complainant receives unequivocal notice of the adverse action.  Udofot v. NASA/Goddard Space Center, ARB No. 10-027, ALJ No. 2009-CAA-7 (ARB Dec. 20, 2011).  If a notice of termination is ambiguous, the statute of limitations may start to run upon the effective date of the termination as opposed to the notice date.  Certain circumstances may justify equitable modification, such as where:

  1. the employer actively misleads or conceals information such that the employee is prevented from making out a prima facie case;
  2. some extraordinary event prevents the employee from filing on time;
  3. the employee timely files the complaint, but with the wrong agency or forum; or
  4. the employer’s own acts or omissions induce the employee to reasonably forego filing within the limitations period.

See Turin v. AmTrust Financial Svcs., Inc., ARB No. 11-062, ALJ No. 2010-SOX-018 (ARB March 29, 2013).

When assessing the statute of limitations for whistleblower retaliation claims, it is also critical to calculate the deadline to timely file a claim for each discrete adverse action or each act of retaliation.  However, in an action alleging a hostile work environment, retaliatory acts outside the statute of limitations period are actionable where there is an ongoing hostile work environment and at least one of the acts occurred within the statute of limitations period.  And when filing a retaliation claim, the whistleblower should consider pleading untimely acts of retaliation because such facts are relevant background evidence in support of a timely claim.

Article By Jason Zuckerman of Zuckerman Law

For more whistleblower and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Zuckerman Law

U.S. Supreme Court Lifts Preliminary Injunctions on Healthcare Worker Vaccine Mandate

On January 13, 2022, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) Interim Final Rule (the “Rule”) in a 5-4 decision, staying the preliminary injunctions issued for 24 states by the District Courts for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Western District of Louisiana.  Therefore, the CMS vaccine mandate is in full effect for all states except Texas, which was not part of the cases before the Court.  The Rule requires nearly all workers at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified facilities—whether medical personnel, volunteers, janitorial staff, or even contractors who service the facilities—to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption.

The Court based its holding on two main points.  First, the Court held that Congress clearly authorized CMS to put conditions on funding it provides to the Medicare and Medicaid certified facilities.  The Court opined that perhaps CMS’s “most basic” function is to ensure that regulated facilities protect the health and safety of their patients, noting that Medicare and Medicaid patients are often some of the most vulnerable to infection and death from COVID-19.  Because CMS determined that a vaccine mandate is necessary to protect patient health and safety, the Court held the mandate “fits neatly within the language of the [authorizing] statute.”  The Court acknowledged that CMS has never required vaccinations in the past, but attributed this in part to the fact that states typically already require necessary vaccinations like hepatitis B, influenza, and measles for healthcare workers.

Second, the Court held that the mandate is not arbitrary and capricious, and cautioned the district courts that their role is merely to make sure an agency acts within the “zone of reasonableness.”  The Court found the administrative record sufficient to explain CMS’s rationale for the mandate and also accepted that getting the vaccine mandate in place ahead of winter and flu season satisfied the “good cause” standard for skipping the notice and comment period.

Healthcare employers subject to the Rule should immediately start implementing vaccine requirements if they have not already.  It is anticipated that in all states but Texas, CMS will likely begin enforcement of the vaccine mandate in approximately 30 days.  On December 28, 2021, CMS released guidance to state surveyors with enforcement standards to use starting 30 days from the memo, though at the time the memo only applied to the 25 states that were not enjoined.  Healthcare employers should also keep in mind that this is not the end of the road: the Court’s holding only means that the CMS vaccine mandate is in force while the 5th and 8th Circuits complete their review of the underlying state challenges to the mandate.  While the Supreme Court’s opinion sends a strong message that lower courts should uphold the mandate, there is no guarantee they will do so.

The legal landscape continues to evolve quickly and there is a lack of clear-cut authority or bright line rules on implementation.  This article is not intended to be an unequivocal, one-size-fits-all guidance, but instead represents our interpretation of where applicable law currently and generally stands.  This article does not address the potential impacts of the numerous other local, state and federal orders that have been issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including, without limitation, potential liability should an employee become ill, requirements regarding family leave, sick pay and other issues.

Article By Keeley A. McCarty and Ashley T. Hirano of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

SCOTUS Cert Recap: Civil Procedure, Bankruptcy, And Worker’s Comp

This week, the U.S. Supreme Court granted three of the cert. petitions it considered at its first conference of the new year.

The Court agreed to hear issues involving: 1) the grounds for relief from a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), 2) the limits on Congress’ authority to apply different bankruptcy rules to different parts of the country, and 3) the scope of states’ authority to apply their workers’ compensation laws to federal facilities.

Such issues are not the most high-profile the Court will address this term, as underscored by the absence of cert-stage amicus briefs in all three of the cases (though this is less uncommon than one might think; by our calculations, about 40 percent of the cert. petitions granted for plenary review last term lacked cert-stage amicus briefs). For governmental entities, bankruptcy practitioners, and federal court civil litigators, however, the cases are worth noting and following.

Rule 60(b) Motions for Relief from Final Judgment

In Kemp v. United States, the Court finally agreed to resolve what the cert. petition characterizes as a 50-year circuit split on whether the “mistake” prong of Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court’s legal error. Rule 60(b) sets out six categories of reasons why a district court may relieve a party from a final judgment, including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” under 60(b)(1) and “any other reason that justifies relief” under 60(b)(6). The lower courts agree that 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) authorize relief for at least some legal errors, but disagree about which of those provisions does so.

And that seemingly picayune distinction can matter. The Federal Rules require all 60(b) motions to be made “within a reasonable time” but set a hard one-year time limit for relief sought on 60(b)(1) grounds. This means that if Rule 60(b)(1) does not encompass legal errors, motions alleging legal errors would fall under Rule 60(b)(6) and would not need to meet the bright-line one-year rule – though such motions would then be subject to the Supreme Court’s additional requirement that 60(b)(6) motions establish “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief. Accordingly, the question in this case can mean the difference between a timely and untimely 60(b) motion, and civil litigators should be on the lookout for the Court’s answer.

Congress’ Authority to Adopt “Uniform” Bankruptcy Rules

The Court will also take up Siegel v. Fitzgerald, where it will consider the meaning of the Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause, which authorizes Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” The petitioner in this case contends that Congress violated this “uniformity” requirement by dividing the nation’s bankruptcy courts into two slightly different categories. Most operate under the U.S. Trustee program, while six (all in North Carolina and Alabama) operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator program.

In 2017, Congress increased the quarterly fees paid by debtors in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies from $30,000 to $250,000, and while this increase was immediately applicable to all pending and future cases in Trustee districts, it was imposed in Administrator districts nine months later, and then only to future cases. In Siegel the Court will decide whether this difference renders the 2017 statute unconstitutionally “non-uniform” (and, if the Court concludes it is unconstitutional, there will be a further difficult question to tackle concerning how such a defect should be remedied). Notably, even the respondent (who is represented by the U.S. Solicitor General) urged the Court to take this case, observing that though Congress eliminated the difference in 2020, the question presented in this case could affect the status of approximately $324 million in quarterly fees imposed nationwide under the 2017 statute.

In light of such figures, bankruptcy professionals across the country – especially those with cases subject to the 2017 statute – will likely have a strong interest in what the Court will say.

Limits on States’ Application of Workers’ Compensation Laws to Federal Facilities

In United States v. Washington, the Court agreed to hear the federal government’s challenge to a Washington workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to contractors at a federally owned nuclear-waste cleanup site. Under longstanding principles of intergovernmental immunity, state regulation of federal facilities is generally permissible only where such regulation is clearly authorized by Congress. And the federal government contends that the relevant statute here – which allows states to regulate workers’ compensation at federal facilities “in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State” – does not permit states to single out federal facilities for unique treatment. The state of Washington, meanwhile, counters that states routinely apply different rules to different employers, and it argues that the federal statute simply authorizes such context-sensitive regulation at private and federal facilities alike.

The dispute accordingly consists of competing interpretations of a narrow federal statute (40 U.S.C. § 3172(a)), and it is therefore difficult to see how the case could have much broader significance outside the workers’ compensation context. Contractors working at federal facilities, however, may be interested to see whether the Supreme Court opens the door for future challenges to state workers’ compensation laws.

© 2022 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Article By Kian Hudson of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

For more articles on SCOTUS, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.

U.S. Supreme Court Shoots Down COVID-19 Shot-or-Test Rule

The U.S. Supreme Court has blocked the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s emergency “vaccine-or-test” rule mandating private employers with 100 or more employees to institute a policy requiring their employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo weekly testing.

The Court ruled 6-3 to block the vaccine-or-test rule on the basis that OSHA had exceeded its authority in enacting the emergency rule. The Court described the rule as “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees.” Had the rule not been rejected by the nation’s highest court, it would have required roughly 84 million workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 or submit to weekly testing and wear a mask at work. Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan dissented.

While blocking the vaccine-or-test rule for large private employers, the Court ruled 5-4 to allow a separate rule to take effect which mandates the COVID-19 vaccine for workers in nursing homes, hospitals, and other facilities that receive Medicare and Medicaid payments from the federal government. The Court reasoned that the regulation serves to protect patients and ensure that healthcare providers take steps to avoid transmitting a dangerous virus to their patients. The Court noted: “It would be the very opposite of efficient and effective administration for a facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID–19.” Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett dissented.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress
For more articles on SCOTUS, visit the NLRLitigation / Trial Practice section.