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OFCCP Releases Disability Self-Id Public Service Video

As part of its ongoing effort to provide employers with tools to educate and inform employees and non-employees about affirmative action obligations, Office of Federal Contract Compliace Programs, OFCCP, has released a new disability self-identification public service-like video entitled Disability Inclusion Starts With You.

Coinciding with its recognition of National Disability Employment Awareness Month, the Agency invites employers and community organizations to download the video and use it as a way to inform employees (and potential employees) about the importance of self-identification. The video also explains the regulatory obligation employers have to request this information and emphasizes the voluntary nature of the process.

The video and additional information can be found of OFCCP’s webpage.

Article By Laura Mitchell of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Paid Sick Days Required by Growing Number of Cities and States

Paid sick leave laws are gaining traction across the nation and are not showing any signs of slowing down. As we recently reported, on September 7, 2015, President Obama signed an Executive Order requiring certain covered federal contractors and subcontractors to provide up to 56 hours of paid sick leave to an employee per year. Four states (California, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Oregon) have passed paid sick leave legislation, and more than 20 cities have passed comprehensive paid sick leave legislation, including:

CA: Emeryville, Oakland and San Francisco
MD: Montgomery County
NJ: Bloomfield, East Orange, Irvington, Jersey City, Monclair, Newark, Passaic, Paterson and Trenton
NY: New York City
OR: Portland and Eugene (preempted by state law)
PA: Philadelphia and Pittsburgh
WA: Seattle and Tacoma
Washington, D.C.

Additional localities (e.g., Long Beach and Los Angeles, CA) have enacted paid sick leave ordinances to provide paid sick leave for employees working in certain industries, such as hotel workers. Some of these laws go into effect in 2016. However, most are already in effect, and covered employers must now comply.

For what reasons can employees use leave?

Though each varies, generally, these laws require employers to provide employees with paid leave to diagnose, care for or treat their own, or their family member’s illness, injury or condition, or for preventative medical care. Permissible uses are often broader than typical sick leave. Some laws also require employers to provide paid leave for domestic violence, stalking or sexual assaults. The local ordinance in Emeryville, CA, offers paid leave for care of service animals.

How much leave must employers provide?

Most of the jurisdictions allow employers to either provide a lump sum of leave up front each year or accrue one hour of paid sick leave per every 30 hours worked, but not all. Each law generally places a cap on usage and accrual. However, some jurisdictions such as Seattle, WA, offer much more generous caps on accrual.

What if we already provide paid leave (PTO or vacation) in excess of seven days per year? Do we need a separate sick pay policy, or can we incorporate it into PTO?

While it is possible to incorporate covered sick leave into a general PTO policy, employers must ensure that the PTO policy still meets the minimum requirements of the law(s), which is sometimes impractical. In most cases, employers will need to alter, for example, their accrual method, advance notice provisions, acceptable reasons for use and PTO carryover.

Which employees are eligible?

Employee eligibility requirements for paid sick leave tend to be minimal. For instance, many laws offer paid sick leave to not only regular full-time employees but also to part-time or temporary employees. Often times, an employer need not have a facility or office in the city or state to be covered. For instance, under California’s paid sick leave law, an employee need only work in California for 30 days per year to be eligible for paid sick time. This could mean that an employee who does not live in and/or is not based out of California may still be eligible for paid sick leave under California state law.

What other provisions do I need to consider?

In addition, the laws generally include anti-retaliation provisions, notice and posting requirements and recordkeeping obligations. Some laws, such as California’s, require employers to provide written notice of available paid sick time with each pay stub.

What should employers do?

Employers should first analyze whether their company is subject to any current or pending paid sick leave laws. Here are some initial questions to ask:

Does my company have a facility in any of the states/cities mentioned?
Does my company employ a sales force (or salesperson) or other employees in the city/state?
Do my company’s managers, salespersons, technicians or other employees travel for business in the city/state? If so, how frequently?

If employers determine their business may be covered under state and/or local paid sick leave law(s) listed above, they need to familiarize themselves with the specifics of those jurisdictions and implement the necessary changes to policies and practices. We are happy to assist in identifying coverage and implementing compliant changes.

Article By Farrah N.W. Rifelj & Holly E. Courtney of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

No Pay Can Be OK – A New Test to Determine the Primary Beneficiary in Unpaid Internships

This summer, two federal appellate courts declined to follow the U.S. Department of Labor’s six factors for determining whether an unpaid intern is an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). In doing so, those courts — the Second Circuit (covering Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) and the Eleventh Circuit (covering Alabama, Florida, and Georgia) — instead adopted a more modern, flexible approach.

In the case before the Second Circuit, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., the plaintiffs were unpaid interns who asserted that they were entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs were improperly classified as unpaid interns and should rather be classified as employees, and granted a motion to certify the class of interns (a discussion of the district court’s decision is available here). The district court based the decision on a Supreme Court precedent from 1947, Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947), a case dealing with the “trainee exception” to the FLSA for prospective railroad employees. Upon review, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order, setting out its own set of factors to be considered in determining whether an unpaid intern is entitled to compensation as an employee under the FLSA. In doing so, the Second Circuit departed from the six-part Department of Labor test based upon Portland Terminal, finding that test too rigid. The Second Circuit adopted a more flexible test looking to see whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship.

The Second Circuit indicated that the non-exhaustive factors for determining whether an unpaid intern at a for-profit business should be considered an employee for purposes of the FLSA include:

The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is expectation of compensation. Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the intern is an employee – and vice versa.
The extent to which the internship provides training that would be similar to that which would be given in an educational environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training provided by educational institutions.
The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of academic credit.
The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the academic calendar.
The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial learning.
The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant educational benefits to the intern.
The extent to which the intern and the employer understand that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship.

Each of these factors need to be weighed and balanced in light of the circumstances. No one factor is dispositive, and courts are permitted to consider relevant evidence that is not contained in the above factors.

The Second Circuit noted that this flexible test better reflects the role internships play in today’s economy, recognizing that students gain value from practical, real-world experience, while also remaining true to the Portland Terminal inquiry as to whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship. The Second Circuit noted that the updated test first looks at what the intern receives for his/her work, and second, that it provides courts flexibility to examine the economic reality between the intern and employer. Also of note is that the Second Circuit emphasized an individualized approach to examine whether an intern qualifies as an employee under the FLSA. This could indicate a limitation on class action suits for unpaid interns moving forward.

A few months after the Second Circuit’s decision in Glatt, the Eleventh Circuit considered a similar issue in Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., a case where the plaintiffs were former students attending a master’s degree program to become certified registered nurse anesthetists. As part of obtaining a degree, the students were required to participate in clinical curricula. The plaintiffs sought wages and overtime for their clinical hours. The Eleventh Circuit also found the Department of Labor’s six factors too rigid and adopted the seven non-exhaustive factors that the Second Circuit identified in Glatt. The Eleventh Circuit did not expressly reach the issue of whether students were FLSA employees, and time will tell whether the decision is distinguished as applying primarily to internships for academic credit and/or certification requirements, or whether it will have broader application.

While the decisions from the Second and Eleventh Circuits are positive developments for employers, the landscape regarding unpaid interns and the FLSA is still evolving as case law in this area continues to develop. Many lawsuits have been filed by interns or former interns seeking wages and overtime under the FLSA. Many of these cases have settled in the multi-million dollar range, many other cases remain pending, and it is likely that more cases will be filed. The consensus between the Second and Eleventh Circuits on the departure from the Department of Labor’s six-part test toward a more flexible and updated primary beneficiary test may be persuasive as other circuits consider the issue, but it remains unknown to what extent other courts will agree with these decisions. Because only the Second and Eleventh Circuits have adopted this more flexible approach, the Department of Labor will continue to follow the stricter six-part test for determining whether an unpaid intern qualifies as an employee under the FLSA.

Article By Elise E. Libbey of Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP

Fifth Circuit Rules Employer-Mandated Transit Time May Make Lunch Break Compensable

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction over Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, ruled recently that security guards’ “off-the-clock” meal periods may be compensable when they were required to travel for 10 to 12 minutes from their work stations to get their meals. Naylor v. Securiguard, Inc., No. 14-60637 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2015) available here.

The private security guards in Naylor were required to leave their work sites and travel to other locations for meals or breaks in order to preserve the appearance of the worksite. The court reasoned that a jury could find this mandated transit time predominately benefited the employer, rather than the employee, making it compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

The court noted that, when this mandated round trip travel time to break areas was only a few minutes in duration, it is “de minimis” and would not transform the 30-minute break to compensable time. However, at some point, employer-mandated travel time during an employee’s lunch break shortens the length of the break enough to make it a compensable “rest” period. Under the FLSA, “rest” periods of 20 minutes or less are generally compensable because they are considered to benefit the employer by rejuvenating the employee. Ten to twelve minutes of transit time cut too much into the “lunch breaks.”

Significantly, the court did not set a bright line rule for the precise number of transit minutes an employer may require away from the work station during a lunch break before the entire break becomes compensable.

The conversion to compensable time may entitle the employees to both compensation for the 30-minute meal periods and resultant weekly overtime once that time is added to other hours worked.

The ruling also raises questions of whether the mandatory transit time rationale applies to breaks required in other contexts, such as offsets to “30-minute” break requirements under collective bargaining agreements or state laws, or to other break activities, such as clothes changing, going through security or reassigning equipment. Providing employees written notice of which break-related activities are required and clearly stating their options to eat meals and engage in other break activities without mandatory transit or other activities that may reduce their meal periods might preclude any such issues.

Article By Robert E. Sheeder, Nancy M. O’Connor & Clayton M. Davis of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Act Now: The Department of Labor may experience a shutdown on 10/1/2015

Although Congress continues to discuss the Fiscal Year 2016 budget, if an agreement is not reached or continuing resolution passed, the Department of Labor (DOL) will experience a shut down as of October 1, 2015. Should this happen, both the iCERT and PERM online filing systems will not accept applications and users will no longer have access to the system. This shutdown will impact immigration cases including: E-3, H-1B, H-2A, H-2B, and PERM applications. In addition, the DOL will not be able to receive or review any filings received by mail. Employers are urged to review their upcoming expiration dates and deadlines to ensure they submit all necessary applications and responses on or before September 30, 2015.

Article By Jennifer Blloshmi of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

HIPAA: Disclosing Exam Results to Employers

Physicians and other providers are often paid by employers to conduct drug tests, fitness-for-duty or return-to-work exams, or employment physicals for employees. In such circumstances, the physician may mistakenly assume that they may disclose the test and exam results to the employer without the patient’s authorization, but that is not correct.

As with any other protected health information, physicians and other providers generally need the patient’s written, HIPAA-compliant authorization to disclose exam results to the employer. (45 CFR 164.508(a); see also 65 FR 82592 and 82640). However, unlike other treatment situations, a provider may condition the performance of an employee physical or test on the patient’s provision of an authorization, i.e., the provider may refuse to perform the exam unless the patient executes a valid authorization. (45 CFR 164.508(b)(4)(iii); 65 FR 82516 and 82658). In addition, the employer may condition the employee’s continued employment on the provision of the exam results (at least under HIPAA), thereby creating an incentive for the employee to execute the authorization. (65 FR 82592 and 82640). The foregoing rules also apply when the health care provider is the employer, e.g., when a hospital employee receives treatment or tests at the hospital. In those situations, the hospital/employer generally may not access or use the patient/employee’s health information for employment-related purposes without the patient’s written authorization. (67 FR 53191-92).

An employee who receives an unfavorable test or exam result may attempt to block disclosure by revoking their authorization. Although patients are generally entitled to revoke their authorization by submitting a written revocation, HIPAA contains an exception that limits revocation if and to the extent that the provider has taken action in reliance on the authorization. (45 CFR 164.508(b)(5)). That exception should apply when the provider has conditioned and provided the test or exam in reliance on the patient’s authorization.

There are very limited exceptions to the authorization requirement. As in other situations, a provider may disclose protected health information to an appropriate entity if necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public (45 CFR 164.512(j)), or if the disclosure is otherwise required by law. (Id. at 164.512(a)). HIPAA contains a specific exception that allows disclosures to employers if the exam was performed as part of a medical surveillance of the workplace and the employer needs the information to report work-related injuries as required by OSHA, MSHA, or similar state laws. (Id. at 164.512(b)(v)). Finally, HIPAA allows providers to disclose protected health information as authorized by and to the extent necessary to comply with workers compensation laws. (Id. at 164.512(l)).

The bottom line: if you are a physician or other provider who conducts employment physicals, tests, or exams, be sure you obtain the patient’s written, HIPAA-compliant authorization before conducting the exam and/or disclosing test or exam results to the employer.

Article By Kim C. Stanger, Pia Dean & William W. Mercer of Holland & Hart LLP

New Rules Provide Insights for Pregnancy Accommodations in Illinois

Since the start of the year, all employers in Illinois with one or more employees are required to provide accommodations for pregnant workers for conditions associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Now the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) and the Illinois Human Rights Commission (IHRC) have issued a set of proposed joint rules to assist with interpretation and enforcement of the new law.

Under amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act that went into effect on Jan. 1, 2015, employers and labor organizations must make reasonable accommodations for any medical or common condition related to pregnancy or childbirth, unless the employer or labor organization can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the ordinary operations of the business of the employer or labor organization.

Beyond the information already provided in the law itself, the rules go into further detail as to the types of accommodations that employers must consider and how an employer should engage in the interactive process when considering a request for an accommodation. The rules also provide detailed sections on consideration of job transfers and time off as reasonable accommodations.

Of particular interest is the guidance concerning when an employer can seek medical certification of an employee’s need for a reasonable accommodation. While the rules make clear that employers are entitled to obtain information in order to evaluate if a requested reasonable accommodation may be necessary, the request needs to be limited to:

The medical justification for the requested accommodation;
A description of the reasonable accommodation medically advisable;
The date the reasonable accommodation became medically advisable; and
The probable duration of the reasonable accommodation.

Moreover, employers may request documentation from the job applicant’s or employee’s health care provider concerning the need for the requested accommodation if:

The employer would request the same or similar documentation from a job applicant or employee regarding the need for reasonable accommodation for conditions related to disability;
The employer’s request for documentation is job-related and consistent with business necessity; and
The information sought is not known or readily apparent to the employer.

Under the rules as proposed by the IDHR and IHRC, the determination of whether an employer’s request for documentation from the employee’s healthcare provider concerning the need for a reasonable accommodation is job-related or consistent with business necessity will depend upon the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as whether the need for reasonable accommodation is readily apparent; whether the job applicant or employee is able to explain the relationship between the requested accommodation and her pregnancy condition; the employer’s reasons for requesting the information; and the degree to which the requested accommodation would impact the ordinary operations of the employer’s business if it were granted by the employer.

If an employee needs a reasonable accommodation beyond the probable duration identified by her healthcare provider, the employer may request additional information from the health care provider.

It is also important to note that, under the rules, medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth need not constitute a disability within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act and may be transitory in nature.

The rules, which were published in the Illinois Register, are expected to go into effect sometime in October. Once fully adopted, the rules will be found at 56 Ill. Admin. Code 2535.10 et seq. For now, they can be found in the Illinois Register. And if you are an employer in Illinois and you have not yet posted the notice required under the new law, you can print a copy from the Illinois Department of Human Rights website.

Article By Jennifer Cerven of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Department of Labor Glitch Prevents PERM Filings re: Immigration

A programming glitch, which occurred during a software update implemented by the Department of Labor (DOL) on September 1, 2015, prevented some employers from being able to file their PERM applications, the DOL announced today on its website. The DOL explained that the malfunction precluded employers from completing some of the ETA Form 9089 online.

The problem with the Permanent Labor Certification Case Management System (CMS) continues and the DOL has directed employers who are unable to complete and file an ETA Form 9089 online to mail in their PERM applications to the Atlanta National Processing Center. The DOL is authorizing those employers who tried and could not file a PERM application online between September 1, 2015 and September 11, 2015, only, to include documentation demonstrating that information in their ETA Form 9089 was affected by the programming glitch.

If your PERM application was affected last week, you must submit your ETA Form 9089 and supporting documentation before September 30, 2015. Please see the DOL’s Employment & Training Administration’s web page for filing instructions here.

Article By Rebecca B. Schechter of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Be Careful What You Say During a Union Organizing Campaign

At the same time that the current National Labor Relations Board is giving employees what seems like the unfettered ability to engage in disparagement, profane outbursts, and racist comments that accompany protected union or other concerted activity, employers are having to become ever more careful about what they say. Even truthful and seemingly innocuous statements made during an organizing campaign can be viewed, in hindsight, as having an unlawful “chilling effect” that discourages employees from exercising their rights to support a union. A recent decision from a federal appeals court in Chicago provides a cautionary tale for employers who find out about organizing activity and want to keep their workplace union-free.

On September 4, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (covering Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin) upheld the Board’s determination that an Illinois auto dealership illegally discouraged workers from supporting a union and illegally terminated a worker after learning he failed to disclose the suspensions of driver’s license following a DUI charge. The court noted that the employer learned union activity was “afoot” after receiving an anonymous voicemail from a woman who called “on behalf of the spouse of one of your employees.” The anonymous caller said that a particular employee was trying to “stir up” the unionization effort and stated that he did not have a valid license, which the dealership required, because of his DUI. After receiving this voicemail, the employer interviewed the employee, who admitted his license was invalid, and then suspended and later terminated him.

Meanwhile, the dealership’s general manager and other top managers met with workers to discuss the union organizing effort. One of the employees present secretly recorded the meeting. During the meeting, the managers said that any bargaining with the union would “start from scratch,” warned (truthfully) that its Orlando dealership had not had any bargaining negotiations even though its workers elected a union nearly three years ago, advised that pay raises were “absolutely possible” in the event employees rejected the union as it considered pay adjustments every year, responded that they “don’t know” if some employees would be demoted under union rules, and suggested that support for the union could “follow” them when they seek other employment because other employers might be hesitant to hire them.

The Board determined that the managers’ statements all had a “tendency” to discourage employees from organizing, and were therefore illegal under federal labor law. The managers’ statements were unlawful in four respects: (1) they “threatened” that it would be “futile” for workers to organize by suggesting that bargaining would start from scratch and bringing up the Orlando dealership as an example of potential negative consequences; (2) they implied “promises” of wage increases by suggesting that employees might receive pay raises if they reject the union; (3) they “threatened” workers with demotions by saying they didn’t know what would happen under the union’s rules; and (4) they “threatened” blacklisting by suggesting that employees’ support for the union would follow them.

The Seventh Circuit upheld all of the Board’s findings, although it did not review the Board’s decision from scratch but rather decided only whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the decision. The most obvious violation to the appellate court was the threat of blacklisting. The court found the other statements could reasonably be interpreted as unlawfully discouraging employees from unionizing. For example, the managers told the truth about the failure of negotiations at the Orlando dealership, but bringing this up in the context of the other statements could have been viewed by the workers as a threat that it would be futile for them to elect the union. And the managers were not off the hook when they spoke in hypotheticals or said that they were unaware of what would happen – answering “maybe” when asked about future pay increases was still an illegal promise of benefit and saying “I don’t know” if workers will be demoted under union rules was still a threat.

As to the employee who was suspended (and later terminated) after the employer found out his license was suspended, the Board found that his termination was illegal because it was motivated, at least in part, by his support for the union. The court again upheld this finding, stressing that the employee’s support for the union did not need to be the sole or even primary reason for his termination – it only needed to be a “motivating factor.” Here, there was enough evidence to show an unlawful motivation because the caller who left a voicemail singled out the employee for his union activity and the employer had shown “hostility” toward the union during its meeting with employees.

The lesson from this case is that employers need to be very careful about what they tell employees during a union organizing campaign. Even one statement that crosses the line can put everything else that was said in a worse light and ultimately get the employer in trouble. The case shows that employers should not make the following statements:

Bargaining will start from scratch (viewed as a threat that workers will lose their current pay and/or benefits).
You will receive a pay increase and/or other benefits even without a union (viewed as a promise that workers will receive benefits if they reject the union).
We are going to bargain hard if you elect a union, so do not expect things to change (viewed as a threat that supporting a union would be futile).

Perhaps you are wondering, what can employers say? Here are some examples of permissible statements:

We oppose the union and urge you to do the same.
You enjoy good pay, benefits, and job security without a union.
You have a right to refuse to sign an authorization card or speak to union representatives, and may vote against the union in an election even if you previously signed a card.
If there is an economic strike, we may permanently replace all striking workers.
The union cannot guarantee better wages, benefits, and working conditions (as long as there is no threat that workers risk losing what they currently have by supporting the union).

In short, employers can express their opposition to the union and discuss the pros and cons of union membership, such as having to pay union dues (in non-right to work states). Employers can also provide factual information about the law, the union (dues, fees, rules, officials’ salaries, etc.), and how unionized companies compare against non-unionized companies in terms of wages and benefits, competitiveness, etc. in the industry.

It is often hard to tell when an employer’s statement opposing a union might cross the line and be viewed as unlawfully discouraging workers from exercising their rights. Even true statements can be viewed as illegally tending to discourage union activity. To stay in the clear, employers should obtain legal advice before speaking in opposition to a union organizing campaign.

Article By Scott T. Allen of Foley & Lardner LLP

Colorado’s Parental Leave For Academic Activities Ended September 1

The school year is upon us and working parents will once again find themselves juggling job duties and school functions. The juggling may be a bit more difficult for some parents this year, as those that work for larger Colorado employers are no longer guaranteed time off to attend their kid’s school activities. As of September 1st, Colorado employers with 50 or more employees are no longer required by law to provide parents time off to attend academic activities for their school children. The Parental Involvement in K-12 Education Act (Academic Leave Act) automatically repealed on that date, relieving covered employers of providing that leave.

Colorado Senate Committee Shot Down Extension of Academic Leave Act

In effect since 2009, the Academic Leave Act required employers with 50 or more employees to provide its full-time employees up to 6 hours in any one-month period, and up to 18 hours per academic year, of unpaid leave from work to attend a child’s academic activities. C.R.S. §8-13.3-101 et seq. Part-time workers were entitled to pro-rated leave based on the amount of hours worked. Covered academic activities included attending parent-teacher conferences, and meetings related to special education needs, truancy, dropout prevention and disciplinary concerns.

The 2009 law specified that it would repeal on September 1, 2015. This past legislative session, Representatives John Buckner and Rhonda Fields introduced a bill that sought to extend the Academic Leave Act indefinitely. House Bill 1221 also attempted to expand the law to:

include pre-school activities, rather than just K-12;
add more covered activities to include attending meetings with a school counselor and attending academic achievement ceremonies; and
require school districts and charter schools to post on their websites and include in their district/school-wide communications information to parents and the community at large about the leave requirement.

The bill passed the House and was sent to the Senate. The Senate committee to which it was assigned voted 3-2 to kill the bill. By doing so, the bill never got to a vote in the full Senate and died. The result is that the Academic Leave Act was not extended and the original repeal date of September 1, 2015 remains.

Action Items

With the repeal of the Academic Leave Act and no federal law mandating this type of leave, Colorado employers with more than 50 employees no longer need to offer parents of school-age children leave to attend covered school functions. You may, of course, choose to voluntarily continue to offer parents time off to attend their child’s school functions. If you do, decide whether you will continue to offer it under the same terms as was mandated by law or if you wish to set your own parameters about eligibility, amount of leave, notice requirements, whether documentation of the activity is required, etc. Then, update your policies and let employees know about any changes.

If you choose not to offer parents time off to attend their child’s academic activities, update your policies and procedures to delete that type of leave. Revise your employee handbook and any intranet policies to reflect that academic leave is no longer available. Inform supervisors and managers so that they know how to handle any requests or questions. Importantly, communicate to employees that the academic leave provision was repealed and let them know about any other time off policies, if any, that may apply to allow them to attend school functions.

Article By Emily Hobbs-Wright of Holland & Hart LLP

Category: Labor & Employment

OFCCP Releases Disability Self-Id Public Service Video

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