Category: Labor & Employment

Take a Screen Shot of This: Supervisor Unlawfully Interrogated Employee Through Text, NLRB Says

Texting has become one of the most common ways  people communicate. Despite its prevalence, however, texting can raise serious concerns for employers, particularly when such communication takes place between a supervisor and employee in the context of a union election.  A recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) case makes that point clear. In RHCG Safety Corp and Construction & General Building Laborers, Local 79, the Board held that a coercive text message from a supervisor to an employee could serve as evidence that an employer unlawfully interrogated employees concerning their union support.

This decision echoes other NLRB decisions holding that an unlawful interrogation does not need to be face-to-face to be in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Board has held that such unlawful interrogation can occur over a phone call, a written job application form, and now, it seems, via a short text message containing 40 characters.

The case arose in the context of a union election. During the union’s campaign, an employee texted his supervisor asking if he could return to work after a leave of absence. The supervisor responded, by text message, “U working for Redhook or u working in the union?” (Redhook is how RHCG Safety is known.) The Board found that by juxtaposing working for the employer with working in the union, the supervisor’s text strongly suggested that the two were incompatible. The Board accordingly ruled that the text constituted an unlawful interrogation and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.

Significantly, the NLRB found that for purposes of determining legality, it doesn’t matter whether the message actually coerced the employee, so long as the interrogation was coercive in nature. To this end, the Board found certain facts weighed in favor of making the text coercive in nature. First, the employee was not an open union supporter at the time of the interrogation. Second, the supervisor did not communicate to the employee any legitimate purpose for asking if he was working in the union. Finally, the supervisor didn’t provide the employee with any assurances against reprisals.

This case suggests that seemingly offhanded communications between supervisors and employees may be determined to be coercive, interrogative, and in violation of the NLRA. Employers should consider their communication policies and train supervisors on methods of communicating with employees, particularly during a union election.

Read more legal analysis at the National Law Review.

This post was written by Minal Khan of  Barnes & Thornburg LLP.

Chicago and Cook County Paid Sick Leave Laws Go Into Effect July 1: Are You Ready?

As the holiday weekend approaches, many employers in Chicago and Cook County find themselves scrambling to prepare for the Chicago and Cook County Paid Sick Leave Ordinances that will take effect this Saturday, July 1, 2017. The Ordinances, though straightforward in their purpose of providing some limited sick paid time off to employees, raise a number of thorny, confusing questions and various administrative concerns for all employers. To add to this uncertainty, the City of Chicago only yesterday released its extensive final interpretative rules on the City’s Ordinance, which raise a number of interpretative questions and, in places, appear to diverge from the previously-issued final rules of the Cook County Commission on Human Rights on the County’s Ordinance. Not only that, the list of Cook County’s municipalities that are opting out from the County’s Ordinance has been changing, literally, by the hour. To help you get up to speed and make any final necessary changes, in this Alert we will review some key requirements and provide responses to some FAQs employers have been asking related to paid sick leave in Chicago and Cook County.

Paid Sick Leave Requirements

The Ordinances require employers in Chicago and certain municipalities in Cook County to provide all employees, regardless of full-time, part-time, seasonal, or temporary status, with one (1) hour of paid sick leave for every for 40 hours worked, up to a maximum accrual cap of 40 hours in any benefit year. Employees are entitled to begin using accrued paid sick leave following 180 days of employment, provided they have worked at least 80 hours in any 120 day period.

Employees must be allowed to use paid sick leave for any of the following reasons:

  • The employee is ill, injured, or requires medical care (including preventive care);

  • A member of the employee’s family is ill, injured, or requires medical care;

  • The employee or a member of his or her family, is the victim of domestic or sexual violence; or

  • The employee’s place of business, or the childcare facility or school of the employee’s child, has been closed by an order of a public official due to a public health emergency.

In addition to providing employees with paid sick leave, employers are required to inform employees about their rights to paid sick leave by posting the Chicago and Cook County notices in the workplace and distributing these notices to employees with their first paycheck following the Ordinances’ effective date, or with any new employee’s first paycheck.

Frequently Asked Questions

When updating their employment policies and/or practices, employers should be mindful of the following frequently asked questions:

Do the Ordinances apply to all employees working in Chicago and/or Cook County?

The Ordinances are broadly worded such that employers are required to provide paid sick leave to all employees working in the geographic boundaries of the City of Chicago and/or Cook County. However, the Cook County Ordinance permits municipalities in Cook County to opt out of the Ordinance prior to its effective date.

So far, more than half of the municipalities in Cook County have opted out of the Cook County Ordinance, meaning that employers are not required to provide paid sick leave to employees working in these locations. However, if an employee should change work locations, or travel for work, into a municipality that has not opted out of the Cook County Ordinance (such as the City of Chicago), the employee would be entitled to accrue paid sick leave for hours worked in that municipality.

Are employees able to carryover accrued paid sick leave?

The Ordinances permit employees to carryover half of their accrued unused paid sick leave, up to a cap of 20 hours, into the next benefit year. Employees working for employers covered by the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) may carryover up to an additional 40 hours of paid sick leave into the next benefit year, to be used exclusively for FMLA-specific purposes.

Nonetheless, in most instances, employers may cap the amount of paid sick leave that an employee can use in a benefit year at 40 hours. The exception to this rule being that employees who carryover and use all 40 hours of FMLA-specific paid sick leave may use an additional 20 hours of regular paid sick leave in any benefit year. Thus, in limited circumstances employees may be able to use as many as 60 hours of paid sick leave in a single benefit year.

Are employers permitted to front-load paid sick leave?

Both Ordinances permit employers to front-load paid sick leave at the start of the benefit year, or at the time of hire. Employers who front-load paid sick leave do not need to track paid sick leave accrual or permit the carryover of paid sick leave into the next benefit year, provided that the requisite amount of paid sick leave has been front-loaded. The precise amount of paid sick leave to be front-loaded may depend on whether the employer is subject to FMLA and/or based in Chicago or Cook County, as their respective rules address front-loading differently. Employers with questions regarding the precise amount of paid sick leave that must be provided to employees should contact counsel.

Are employers able to provide paid time off in lieu of paid sick leave?

Employers may provide employees with paid time off (PTO) instead of paid sick leave, provided that all their employees are provided at least as much PTO as the Ordinances require to be made available for paid sick leave use in a benefit year. Employers should note, however, that accrued unused PTO must be paid out upon termination of employment. There is no such requirement to pay out accrued unused paid sick leave.

Recommendations

In light of the impending effective date for Chicago’s and Cook County’s Paid Sick Leave Ordinances, it is important that employers take any remaining necessary steps to ensure that their paid sick leave policies and practices will comply with the Ordinances. Policies that do not provide the requisite benefits to employees, or those that are silent on key issues such as paid sick leave accrual and/or usage restrictions, will be construed against the employer and could lead to costly violations.

This post was written by Alexis M. Dominguez and Sonya Rosenberg  of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP.

Rule the Rules of Workplace Wellness Programs

Being Healthy in the workplace is a great goal, but there are considerable factors to keep in mind.  The book covers health and workplace wellness, but the focus is on the legal and logistic aspects and helping guide the professionals developing legally healthy wellness programs in the workplace.

ABA WellnessClick here to purchase the guide.

The approach of this book is to inform the reader of the “what,” “why” and “how” of workplace wellness program laws:

 1) What laws are important for workplace wellness program compliance;

 2) Why do those laws exist and why are they important for workplace wellness program design and implementation; and

3) How can workplace wellness professionals and organizations apply workplace wellness laws effectively?

Oregon Expands Effort to Achieve Equal Pay

This month, Oregon joined a number of other states, including California, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New York by strengthening existing equal pay laws. The new law, the Oregon Equal Pay Act of 2017 (“OEPA”), has three (3) central components:

  • Applying equal pay protections to disparities based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, veteran status, disability or age;
  • Curbing an employer’s ability to obtain or rely upon an applicant’s prior compensation to determine his or her current compensation; and
  • Changing and substantially limiting the defenses available to employers sued for alleged equal pay violations.

The bulk of the OEPA’s substantive provisions is effective January 1, 2019.

Broadening Scope of Equal Pay Protections

The OEPA prohibits disparities in “wages or other compensation” between employees performing work of a “comparable character” based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, veteran status, disability or age. Work is of a “comparable character” if it requires “substantially similar knowledge, skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions [.]” This is a substantial expansion of prior law, which only applied to sex-based pay disparities.

The OEPA also limits an employer’s ability to rely upon prior compensation by:

  • Making it unlawful to seek information about an applicant’s or employee’s compensation history; and
  • Prohibiting employers from screening job applicants or determining compensation based on a prospective employee’s current or past compensation.

However, these pay history restrictions do not apply “during a transfer, move or hire of [an] employee to a new position with the same employer.”

Limited Defenses to Equal Pay Claims

Under prior Oregon law, an employer could defend a sex-based pay disparity by demonstrating that it was based on (a) a seniority or merit system, or (b) good faith factors other than sex.

However, under the OEPA an employer can only pay differential wages for work of a comparable character if the disparity is attributable to “a bona fide factor that is related to the position in question and is based on” one or more of the following:

  • A seniority system;
  • A merit system;
  • A system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
  • Workplace locations;
  • Travel, if travel is necessary and regular for the employee;
  • Education;
  • Training; or
  • Experience.

The employer must also demonstrate that the factor(s) creating the pay disparity account for the entirety of the differential.

Potential Limits on Remedies

In addition to back wages, employees bringing claims under the OEPA may also seek compensatory and punitive damages. However, the law limits remedies against employers that take specified steps to achieve pay equality.

Under the OEPA, a court “shall” disallow an award of compensatory or punitive damages if the employer shows that within three (3) years of the employee bringing the OEPA claim, the employer conducted a good faith equal pay analysis that: (a) was “[r]easonable in detail and scope in light of the size of the employer”; (b) related to the protected class at issue in the action (e.g., sex, age, race, etc.); and (c) “[e]liminated the wage differentials for the plaintiff and [] made reasonable and substantial progress toward eliminating wage differentials for the protected class asserted by the plaintiff.”

What This Means for Employers

Because the bulk of the OEPA changes are not yet effective, now is the time for employers to commence their compliance efforts including:

  • Reviewing job applications to ensure they do not seek prior compensation information;
  • Auditing compensation data to identify protected class-based disparities, if any. If this analysis reveals disparities, employers can avoid or limit future claims and damages by eliminating any identified differentials;
  • Training managers and human resources professionals regarding the permissible considerations when making compensation decisions, and how to document such decisions;
  • Revising employee job descriptions to ensure they reflect the substantive distinctions between positions – i.e., the fact that jobs are not of a “comparable character” is reflected in job descriptions; and
  • Revising employee reviews on which compensation decisions are based to ensure they reflect the considerations that are permissible grounds for a pay disparity under OEPA.
This post was written by Brian K. Morris of Polsinelli PC.

 

Department of Labor Signals Move to Limit Definition of “Employment”

On June 7, 2017, U.S. Secretary of Labor Alexander Acosta announced the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) 2015 and 2016 Administrative Interpretations regarding joint employment and independent contractors. While this withdrawal signals the current administration’s attempt to limit the expansive definition of “employment,” the DOL made clear that it does not relieve companies of their legal obligations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act.

Many businesses had argued these obligations were unduly burdensome on employers. For the past several years, the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has worked with the IRS and numerous states to combat employee misclassification and to ensure that workers receive all the wages, benefits and protections to which they are entitled. In Fiscal Year 2015, for example, WHD investigations resulted in some $74 million in back wages for more than 102,000 workers, many of which were concentrated in traditionally low-wage industries such as janitorial, temporary help, food service, day care and hospitality. Withdrawal of the Administrative Interpretations may be the first step to rein in these enforcement efforts.

Specifically, the DOL has withdrawn guidance regarding:

  • The Presumption That Most Workers Are Employees: The withdrawn guidance on independent contractors stated that “most workers are employees” under the FLSA. United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that there is no single rule or test for determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of the FLSA. Thus, even now, the inquiry into independent contractor status remains complex and fact-intensive.

  • The Expansion of the “Joint Employer” Definition: The withdrawn guidance on joint employment distinguished between “horizontal” joint employment and “vertical” joint employment scenarios. Under this guidance, the joint employment inquiry focused on the “economic realities” of the relationship between the employee and the potential joint employer. Its withdrawal signals a shift back to applying joint employer status only when a business has direct control over another business’s workplace.

More is expected from the Trump Administration and the courts on the ever-changing law surrounding independent contractors and joint employment.

This post was written by Angela M. Duerden and Elisabeth (Lisa) Shu of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP.

Defendants’ Timing Defense to DTSA Claims Faces Mixed Results

With the law’s first anniversary in the rear view mirror, defendants have established a viable defense to claims arising under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) – a plaintiff may be precluded from bringing a claim under DTSA if it only alleges facts that show acts of misappropriation occurring prior to May 11, 2016 (the date of DTSA’s enactment).   In the last few months, four different courts have tackled this “timing defense,” and defendants raising it in motions to dismiss DTSA claims have encountered mixed results.

In Brand Energy & Infrastructure Servs. v. Irex Contr. Grp., No. 16-cv-2499, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43497 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2017), a Pennsylvania federal court rejected the defendants’ attempt to invoke the timing defense because the plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged various times after the enactment of the DTSA that the defendants “used” the plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets.  The court also noted the plaintiff’s inclusion of allegations in the amended complaint showing that “to this day, the defendants continue to ‘obtain access to [its] confidential and proprietary business information ….”  Based on this pleading, the court held that the plaintiff could pursue its DTSA claim.  Similarly, in AllCells, LLC v. Zhai, Case No. 16-cv-07323, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44808 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017), a California federal court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss a DTSA claim because “even if [defendants] copied and thus acquired the alleged trade secrets before May 11, 2016, [the plaintiff] has sufficiently alleged that there was at least use of the trade secrets after that date.  Hence, the Act applies.”

In Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-cv-03545, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017), a plaintiff’s DTSA claim survived dismissal, overcoming the defendant’s argument that “no acts occurred after the effective date of the Act.”  The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the inevitable post-enactment disclosure of its trade secrets to the defendant by its former employee were sufficient to state a plausible DTSA claim:  “[i]f it is plausible that some of the alleged trade secrets maintain their value today, then it is also plausible that [defendant] would be continuing to use them.”  The court noted, however, that further discovery would be needed to determine whether post-enactment disclosure of the trade secrets was in fact inevitable.

By contrast, a California federal court granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss where a complaint lacked sufficient allegations regarding the timing of the alleged appropriation in Cave Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Truven Health Analytics Inc., No. 15-cv-02177, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62109 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017).  In Cave, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant acquired trade secrets and used them in a 2014 client meeting, but that conduct predated the enactment of the DTSA.  The court held that plaintiff had failed to make any “specific allegations that defendant used the alleged trade secrets after the DTSA’s May 11, 2016 enactment.”  Because the plaintiff failed to allege that any “postenactment use occurred,” the plaintiff had not stated a plausible DTSA claim.

These decisions illustrate that the likelihood of success of the timing defense largely is a matter of drafting, and provide an important takeaway for both sides of a trade secrets dispute. A plaintiff should be mindful in drafting its pleading to include factual allegations showing that the defendant’s misappropriation occurred (or inevitably will occur) after DTSA’s enactment.  The defendant, on the other hand, should carefully scrutinize the complaint to determine whether a timing defense applies.

This post was written by Jonathan L. Shapiro by Epstein Becker & Green, P.C..

Growing Questions About Employee Medical Marijuana Use Leave Employers in a Haze

The intersection of employment and marijuana laws has just gotten cloudier, thanks to a recent decision by the Rhode Island Superior Court interpreting that state’s medical marijuana and discrimination laws. In Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corporation, the court broke with the majority of courts in other states in holding that an employer’s enforcement of its neutral drug testing policy to deny employment to an applicant because she held a medical marijuana card violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the state medical marijuana law.

Background

Plaintiff applied for an internship at Darlington, and during an initial meeting, she signed a statement acknowledging she would be required to take a drug test prior to being hired.  At that meeting, Plaintiff disclosed that she had a medical marijuana card.  Several days later, Plaintiff indicated to Darlington’s human resources representative that she was currently using medical marijuana and that as a result she would test positive on the pre-employment drug test.  Darlington informed Plaintiff that it was unable to hire her because she would fail the drug test and thus could not comply with the company’s drug-free workplace policy.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging Darlington violated the Hawkins-Slater Act (“the Act”), the state’s medical marijuana law, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”). The Hawkins-Slater Act provides that “[n]o school, employer, or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ, or lease to, or otherwise penalize, a person solely for his or her status as a cardholder.”  After concluding that Act provides for a private right of action, the court held that Darlington’s refusal to hire Plaintiff violated the Act’s prohibition against refusing to employ a cardholder.  Citing another provision that the Act should not be construed to require an employer to accommodate “the medical use of marijuana in any workplace,” Darlington contended that Act does not require employers to accommodate medical marijuana use, and that doing so here would create workplace safety concerns.  The court rejected this argument, concluding:

  • The use of the phrase “in any workplace” suggests that statute does require employers to accommodate medical marijuana use outside the workplace.
  • Darlington’s workplace safety argument ignored the language of the Act, which prohibits “any person to undertake any task under the influence of marijuana, when doing so would constitute negligence or professional malpractice.” In other words, employers can regulate medical marijuana use by prohibiting workers from being under the influence while on duty, rather than refusing to hire medical marijuana users at all.
  • By hiring Plaintiff, Darlington would not be required to make accommodations “as they are defined in the employment discrimination context,” such as restructuring jobs, modifying work schedules, or even modifying the existing drug and alcohol policy (which prohibited the illegal use or possession of drugs on company property, but did not state that a positive drug test would result in the rescission of a job offer or termination of employment).

The court thus granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her Hawkins-Slater Act claims.

With respect to Plaintiff’s RICRA claim, the court found that Plaintiff’s status as a medical marijuana cardholder was a signal to Darlington that she could not have obtained the card without a debilitating medical condition that would have caused her to be disabled. Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiff is disabled and that she had stated a claim for disability discrimination under RICRA because Darlington refused to hire her due to her status as a cardholder.  Importantly, the court held that the allegations supported a disparate treatment theory.

Finally, while noting that “Plaintiff’s drug use is legal under Rhode Island law, but illegal under federal law [i.e. the Controlled Substances Act (the CSA”)],” the Court found that the CSA did not preempt the Hawkins-Slater Act or RICRA. According to the court, the CSA’s purpose of “illegal importation, manufacture, distribution and possession and improper use of controlled substances” was quite distant from the “realm of employment and anti-discrimination law.”

Key Takeaways

While this decision likely will be appealed, it certainly adds additional confusion for employers in this unsettled area of the law – particularly those who have and enforce zero-tolerance drug policies. The decision departs from cases in other jurisdictions – such as California, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Washington – that have held that employers may take adverse action against medical marijuana users.  The laws in those states, however, merely decriminalize marijuana and, unlike the Rhode Island law, do not provide statutory protections in favor of marijuana users.  In those states in which marijuana use may not form the basis for an adverse employment decision, or in which marijuana use must be accommodated, the Callaghan decision may signal a movement to uphold employment protections for medical marijuana users.

While this issue continues to wend its way through the courts in Rhode Island and elsewhere, employers clearly may continue to prohibit the on-duty use of or impairment by marijuana. Employers operating in states that provide employment protections to marijuana users may consider allowing legal, off-duty use, while taking adverse action against those users that come to work under the influence.

Of course, it remains unclear how employers can determine whether an employee is under the influence of marijuana at work. Unlike with alcohol, current drug tests do not indicate whether and to what extent an employee is impaired by marijuana.  Reliance on observations from employees may be problematic, as witnesses may have differing views as to the level of impairment and, in any event, observation alone does not indicate the source of impairment.  Employers choosing to follow this “impairment standard” are advised to obtain as many data points as possible before making an adverse employment decision.

All employers – and particularly federal contractors required to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act and those who employ a zero-tolerance policy – should review their drug-testing policy to ensure that it (a) sets clear expectations of employees; (b) provides justifications for the need for drug-testing; (b) expressly allows for adverse action (including termination or refusal to hire) as a consequence of a positive drug test. Additionally, employers enforcing zero-tolerance policies should be prepared for future challenges in those states prohibiting discrimination against and/or requiring accommodation of medical marijuana users.  Those states may require the adjustment or relaxation of a hiring policy to accommodate a medical marijuana user.

The Callaghan decision also serves as a reminder of the intersection of medical marijuana use and disability.  Here, the court allowed a disability discrimination claim to proceed even though Plaintiff never revealed the nature of her underlying disability because cardholder status and disability were so inextricably linked.

Finally, employers should be mindful of their drug policies’ applicability not only to current employees, but to applicants as well. In Callaghan, the court found the employer in violation of state law before the employee was even offered the internship or had taken the drug test.

This post was written byNathaniel M. Glasser and Carol J. Faherty of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

The U.S. Department of Labor Rolls Back Obama-Era Guidance on Joint Employers and Independent Contractors

The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) announced today that it was rolling back an Obama-era policy that attempted to increase regulatory oversight of joint employer and contractor businesses.

Courts and agencies use the joint employer doctrine to determine whether a business effectively controls the workplace policies of another company, such as a subsidiary or sub-contractor. That control could be over things like wages, the hiring process, or scheduling.

Legal IT ConsultantIn a short statement, the DOL signaled that it was returning to a “direct control” standard. “U.S. Secretary of Labor Alexander Acosta today announced the withdrawal of the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2015 and 2016 informal guidance on joint employment and independent contractors. Removal of the administrator interpretations does not change the legal responsibilities of employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, as reflected in the department’s long-standing regulations and case law.”

Until 2015, the DOL interpreted the joint employer doctrine to apply only to cases in which a business had “direct control” over another business’s workplace. In 2015 and then again in 2016, under then-Labor Secretary Tom Perez (currently the Democratic National Committee Chair), the DOL changed its interpretation to state that a business may be a joint employer even if it exerted “indirect control” over another’s workplace. The 2015 and 2016 guidance effectively expanded the conditions for when one business can be held liable for employment and civil rights law violations at another company. Critics of this “indirect control” language argued that it was ambiguous and threatened to throw franchise, parent-subsidiary, and independent contractor relationships between businesses into disarray. Companies, particularly franchises, were particularly concerned that they could face liability at workplaces they did not directly oversee or control.

However, the DOL’s announcement today rescinded its guidance on “indirect control” and also rescinded guidance on independent contractors, which essentially stated that the DOL considered most workers to be employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act and that it was likely to apply a broad definition of “employee” and “employer” when investigating a company’s practices. This decision is a big win for businesses and business groups.

Despite the DOL’s reversal, the Obama-era standard can still be applied to businesses through the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), an independent agency that serves as the government’s main labor law enforcer. The NLRB considers a company jointly liable for its contractors’ compliance with the National Labor Relations Act if they have “indirect” control over the terms and conditions of employment or have “reserved authority to do so.” The NLRB has not rescinded its interpretation. President Trump has yet to pick nominees for the five-member board’s two open seats, which will likely affect the NLRB’s interpretation of the joint employer doctrine and many other NLRB rules, interpretations, and guidance.

The DOL’s guidance does not affect actions taken by other federal agencies.

This post was written by James R. Hays and Jason P. Brown  Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Unanimous Supreme Court Decision in Favor of “Church Plan” Defendants

Today, the Supreme Court handed a long-awaited victory to religiously affiliated organizations operating pension plans under ERISA’s “church plan” exemption. In a surprising 8-0 ruling, the Court agreed with the Defendants that the exemption applies to pension plans maintained by church affiliated organizations such as healthcare facilities, even if the plans were not established by a church. Justice Kagan authored the opinion, with a concurrence by Justice Sotomayor.  Justice Gorsuch, who was appointed after oral argument, did not participate in the decision.  The opinion reverses decisions in favor of Plaintiffs from three Appellate Circuits – the Third, Seventh, and Ninth.

For those of you not familiar with the issue, ERISA originally defined a “church plan” as “a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by a church.”   Then, in 1980, Congress amended the exemption by adding the provision at the heart of the three consolidated cases.  The new section provides: “[a] plan established and maintained . . . by a church . . . includes a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.”  The parties agreed that under those provisions, a “church plan” need not be maintained by a church, but they differed as to whether a plan must still have been established by a church to qualify for the church-plan exemption.

The Defendants, Advocate Health Care Network, St. Peter’s Healthcare System, and Dignity Health, asserted that their pension plans are “church plans” exempt from ERISA’s strict reporting, disclosure, and funding obligations.  Although each of the plans at issue was established by the hospitals and not a church, each one of the hospitals had received confirmation from the IRS over the years that their plans were, in fact, exempt from ERISA, under the church plan exemption because of the entities’ religious affiliation.

The Plaintiffs, participants in the pension plans, argued that the church plan exemption was not intended to exempt pension plans of large healthcare systems where the plans were not established by a church.

Justice Kagan’s analysis began by acknowledging that the term “church plan” initially meant only “a plan established and maintained . . . by a church.” But the 1980 amendment, she found, expanded the original definition to “include” another type of plan—“a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.’”  She concluded that the use of the word “include” was not literal, “but tells readers that a different type of plan should receive the same treatment (i.e., an exemption) as the type described in the old definition.”

Thus, according to Justice Kagan, because Congress included within the category of plans “established and maintained by a church” plans “maintained by” principal-purpose organizations, those plans—and all those plans—are exempt from ERISA’s requirements. Although the DOL, PBGC, and IRS had all filed a brief supporting the Defendants’ position, Justice Kagan mentioned only briefly the agencies long-standing interpretation of the exemption, and did not engage in any “Chevron-Deference” analysis.  Some observers may find this surprising, because comments during oral argument suggested that some of the Justices harbored concerns regarding the hundreds of similar plans that had relied on administrative interpretations for thirty years.

In analyzing the legislative history, Justice Kagan aptly observed, that “[t]he legislative materials in these cases consist almost wholly of excerpts from committee hearings and scattered floor statements by individual lawmakers—the sort of stuff we have called `among the least illuminating forms of legislative history.’” Nonetheless, after reviewing the history, and as she forecasted by her questioning at oral argument (see our March 29, 2017 Blog, Supreme Court Hears “Church Plan” Erisa Class Action Cases), Justice Kagan rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the legislative history demonstrated an intent to keep the “establishment” requirement.  To do so “would have prevented some plans run by pension boards—the very entities the employees say Congress most wanted to benefit—from qualifying as `church plans’…. No argument the employees have offered here supports that goal-defying (much less that text-defying) statutory construction.”

In sum, Justice Kagan held that “[u]nder the best reading of the statute, a plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization therefore qualifies as a `church plan,’ regardless of who established it.”

Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence joining the Court’s opinion because she was “persuaded that it correctly interprets the relevant statutory text.” Although she agreed with the Court’s reading of the exemption, she was “troubled by the outcome of these cases.”  Her concern was based on the notion that “Church-affiliated organizations operate for-profit subsidiaries, employee thousands of people, earn billions of dollars in revenue, and compete with companies that have to comply with ERISA.”  This concern appears to be based on the view that some church-affiliated organizations effectively operate as secular, for-profit businesses.

Takeaways:

  • Although this decision is positive news for church plans, it may not be the end of the church plan litigation.  Numerous, large settlements have occurred before and since the Supreme Court took up the consolidated cases, and we expect some will still settle, albeit likely for lower numbers.
  • In addition, Plaintiffs could still push forward with the cases on the grounds that the entities maintaining the church plans are not “principal-purpose organizations” controlled by “a church.”

René E. Thorne and Charles F. Seemann III of Jackson Lewis P.C..

Employer No-Recording Policies May Violate NLRA Says the Second Circuit

On June 1, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which covers Connecticut, New York and Vermont, upheld a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) finding that Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.’s no-recording policy was overbroad and violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).

In Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. v. NLRB, Whole Foods’ employee handbook contained a provision that prohibited employees from recording conversations, phone calls, and meetings, without first obtaining managerial approval.  The court concluded that this no-recording policy violated the NLRA.  The NLRA deems it an unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights [to, among other things, engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.]  Whole Foods insisted that its policy was not intended to interfere with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity or to prevent them from discussing their jobs, and that it was merely a general prohibition against recording in the workplace.  Whole Foods argued that its policy was “to promote employee communication in the workplace” by assuring employees that their remarks would not be recorded.

Whole FoodsThe Second Circuit found, however, that the seemingly neutral policy was overbroad and could “chill” an employee’s exercise of rights under the NLRA.  In other words, the policy prohibited recording regardless of whether the recording involved an exercise of those rights.  As a result, “’employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit’ recording protected by [the NLRA].”  Despite finding that Whole Foods’ policy violated the NLRA, the Second Circuit said that “[i]t should be possible to craft a policy that places some limits on recording audio and video in the work place that does not violate the [NLRA].”  Such a policy might be acceptable if it was narrow in scope, and furthered a legitimate safety concern.

Previously, in 1989, the Second Circuit held that recording a conversation at work in violation of a no-recording policy might not be sufficient “cause” for the termination of an employment agreement under Connecticut law.  In  Heller v. Champion Int’l Corp, (2d Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit rejected the employer’s assertion that such a recording constituted an act of disloyalty on the employee’s part.  According to the Second Circuit in Heller, the employee’s surreptitious tape-recording to be sure, represents a kind of ‘disloyalty’ to the company, but not necessarily the kind of disloyalty that under these circumstances would warrant dismissal as a matter of law. . . . Considering the range of factors that might have justified [the employee’s] conduct, especially his belief that he was gathering evidence in support of a possible claim of age discrimination, we cannot say that [the employer] had sufficient cause, as a matter of law, to dismiss him.

The Second Circuit’s latest decision in Whole Foods makes clear that an overbroad no-recording policy in the workplace will be stricken in violation of the NLRA.  At the very least, courts may disregard an overbroad policy depending upon the circumstances surrounding the recording.  In order for a no-recording policy to withstand scrutiny, care must be taken to limit the scope of the prohibition, and consider whether the employee’s purpose for recording jeopardizes an employer’s legitimate interest.

This post was written by Salvatore G. Gangemi of Murtha Cullina.