Category: Labor & Employment

Breaking Federal Developments in Labor and Employment September 2017

Salary Test for Exempt Status Invalidated

Under the prior administration the DOL had issued amendments to certain exemptions from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which would have dramatically increased the number of employees eligible for overtime pay to over 4 million workers within the first year of implementation. The amendments were to be effective on December 1, 2016, however their implementation was stayed by a federal judge last November, as reported in our November 2016 Client Alert.

The new regulations were to essentially double the salary threshold for employees who would be exempt from overtime payments, assuming they met one of the three exemptions, from $455 per week or $23,660 per year, to $913 per week or $47,476 per year. Under these regulations, even if employees performed duties that would otherwise indicate they were exempt from overtime, if they made less than $47,476 per year, their employers would have to pay them overtime regardless of their duties. Just last week, a federal judge in Texas invalidated the new regulations, and specifically found that, while a salary test was permissible, the minimum threshold of over 47K per year was too high, and in fact obviated the need for any other duties based analysis, which has always been at the heart of the executive, administrative, or professional exemptions.

Employer Tip

For the time being, employers can feel comfortable relying on the duties test to determine eligibility for overtime, however, the DOL has indicated that it is still looking at the minimum salary threshold, and employers should expect that threshold to increase from the current number of $23,660. Employers would be well advised to take a look at their currently classified exempt employees making between 24-35K per year to determine whether such employees truly meet the duties test, and whether such employees are being paid at appropriate levels.

EEO-1 Salary Reporting Requirements Blocked

The new EEO-1 forms with reporting information for 2017 were to have included salary information in addition to the usual reporting requirements. The EEOC was presumably intending to use such information to target companies for Equal Pay investigations and complaints. Reporting is still due using the EEO-1 forms in March 2018, but the OMB has just announced that the forms are not going to require the reporting of salary information by gender and other protected characteristics, so employers have a reprieve with respect to federal reporting requirements.

Employer Tip

Employers should be mindful that the state and federal equal pay laws are still applicable, and it is always a good idea to do a self-audit of comparative pay data based on gender, race, and other protected characteristics in order to ensure compliance with such laws. Please also refer back to our April 2017 Client Alert with respect to NY pay equity laws and the salary history ban that goes into effect next month for NY employers.

New I-9 Form in Effect September 18, 2017

Employers should be aware that a new I-9 form is going into effect on September 18th. The link to the new form can be found here.

This post was written by David I. Rosen of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. © Copyright 2017

What the Demise of DACA Means for Employers

Absent congressional action, the Trump administration’s decision to wind down the DACA program will end the work authorization of DACA beneficiaries.

In a decision announced earlier today by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the Trump administration rescinded the memorandum that created the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Concurrently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will begin a six-month winding-down of the DACA program, which was created in 2012 and through which approximately 800,000 beneficiaries have qualified for employment authorization in the United States.

According to today’s announcements, effective immediately USCIS will no longer accept new or initial applications for DACA benefits, which includes renewable two-year work permits. Applications already received and awaiting adjudication will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Individuals who have work permits that will expire prior to March 5, 2018 may file for a two-year extension of their current work authorizations, provided that they do so by October 5, 2017. Individuals with work permits set to expire after March 5, 2018 will not be permitted to extend their employment authorizations and will lose employment eligibility when their current permits expire. Accordingly, all DACA beneficiaries will be without employment authorization by March 5, 2020.

Background

Former US President Barack Obama announced the creation of DACA in June 2012 to remove the threat of deportation for and to provide temporary employment authorization to individuals who were brought to the United States as children and who either entered unlawfully or overstayed their periods of admission. Eligibility for DACA benefits was available to any individual who at the time could show that he or she

  • was under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012;

  • came to the United States before reaching his/her 16th birthday;

  • had continuously resided in the United States from June 15, 2007 through the present time;

  • was physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012 and at the time of making his/her request for consideration of deferred action with USCIS;

  • had no lawful status on June 15, 2012;

  • was currently in school, had graduated, or had obtained a certificate of completion from high school, had obtained a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, or was an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; and

  • had not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and did not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety.

At the time, the Obama administration described the implementation of DACA as a response to congressional failure to pass the Dream Act, which would have provided a path to residency and citizenship for eligible individuals. Proponents of the DACA policy described it as a legitimate exercise of executive branch prosecutorial discretion. Critics described DACA as an unconstitutional overreach of executive authority. The decision by the Trump administration to rescind and wind down DACA now shifts attention back to Congress, where debate concerning so-called “Dreamers” is already part of a larger discussion involving overall immigration limits, the border wall, E-Verify, and other immigration-related issues. Whether Congress will create and pass legislation that provides for continued employment eligibility for DACA beneficiaries is uncertain, as is the question of whether President Donald Trump would sign any such legislation.

What Employers Need to Know

Individuals who have employment authorization based on DACA benefits remain employment authorized until the expiration of their employment authorization documents (EAD). Employers who properly completed Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, at the time of hire will have on file for any DACA beneficiaries the Form I-9 wherein Section 1 indicates that the employee has temporary employment eligibility that expires on the indicated date. As with any other employee who indicates that s/he is a foreign national with temporary employment eligibility, the employer is under an obligation to reverify that individual’s employment authorization by completing Section 3 of Form I-9 in accordance with the guidance in the USCIS Handbook for Employers M-274. Individuals who are unable to provide evidence of their continued employment eligibility may no longer be employed.

Employers are not required to take any other preemptive action with respect to employees who are DACA beneficiaries as their employment authorization continues through the validity date of their EADs. However, for purposes of planning and contingencies, employers may wish to determine who among their workforce is currently employed pursuant to DACA benefits by reviewing Forms I-9 already on file and photocopies already on file of any EAD that was presented and photocopied at the time of Form I-9 completion. An individual whose work authorization is based on DACA benefits will have an EAD that reflects employment eligibility based on Category C33. As a general rule, employers should not take additional measures to affirmatively identify DACA beneficiaries in their workforce, and should consult employment or immigration counsel to address any questions or concerns in this regard.

In addition, DACA beneficiaries who previously received Advance Parole documents that permitted international travel should consult with counsel prior to using a facially valid Advance Parole document for travel. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) retains the authority to determine the admissibility of any person presenting at the border. Further, USCIS may terminate or revoke Advance Parole at any time.

This post was written by Eric S. Bord of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved  Copyright © 2017

Monopoly Money or the Real Deal? Exploring the Possibility of Paying Employees in Bitcoin

Bitcoin, the most popular form of digital or crypto-currency, is gaining traction as an investment vehicle and a way to pay for goods and services. More than 100,000 merchants worldwide now accept Bitcoin, allowing consumers to book a hotel stay, take a taxi, or buy a car.  The buzz around crypto-currency continues to grow as Bitcoin options will likely soon be traded on the futures exchange and regulators consider how to monitor Bitcoin transactions.

So what about paying employees in Bitcoin? Here are some things to consider before diving into the digital currency market.

What is Crypto-currency?

Virtual or digital currency is a digital representation of value that has no paper or coin equivalent. Crypto-currency such as Bitcoin uses encryption to control its creation.  Virtual currency is electronically created and stored and does not have the backing of a commodity, bank, or government authority. Additionally, virtual currency does not have the status of legal tender.  This means that a creditor can refuse virtual currency as payment for a debt.

Convertible virtual currency is a class of virtual currency that can be substituted for real currency. As of this week, 1 Bitcoin could be converted into to approximately $4,594.69 USD.

How Do I Get and Use Bitcoin?

Bitcoin is available online and may be purchased with cash, credit card, or wire transfer. A Bitcoin user would set up an online “wallet” that manages his or her transactions.  Each user has a unique address that is identified by a series of letters and numbers and each transaction in Bitcoin is also identified by a series of letters and numbers that can be viewed on a public ledger blockchain.info and shared with other devices on the Bitcoin network.

Due to the encryption of the transactions, the users have a certain level of anonymity, but the transactions are public. One of the advantages of Bitcoin is that there are no intermediaries, which gives user’s control to send payments from one party directly to another without a financial institution making fees lower.

To prevent paying twice with the same Bitcoin, each user has its own private key and a public key. Once a transfer is initiated, the transfer is submitted to the network encoded by the public key.  The acceptance occurs when the person accepts the amount on his or her private key.  The sender signs the transaction with the private key.  This log of transactions is continually downloaded by users on the network removing the need for a third-party clearinghouse to monitor the transactions.

Theoretically, paying an employee in Bitcoins would go through the same process. However, to comply with payroll deductions and filings, employers most commonly engage a payroll service experienced in Bitcoin that handles payroll deductions and filings.

What are the withholding implications of using Bitcoins as wages?

Just like wages paid in non-virtual currency, Bitcoin compensation would be considered W-2 wages for employees. Bitcoin is also subject to federal income tax withholding, FICA, FUTA, and the self-employment tax based on the fair market value of the Bitcoin on the date it was received. 

Do Bitcoin payments meet an employer’s minimum wage and overtime requirements?

Regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) require that wage payments be in “cash or a negotiable instrument payable at par,” meaning that Bitcoin payments may not satisfy an employer’s minimum wage and overtime requirements under the FSLA. An employer could pay in a hybrid of U.S. currency and Bitcoin to meet the federal requirements and pay anything above that amount in Bitcoin.  Several state wage and hour laws also require that wages be paid in U.S. currency so it is important to check both federal and state laws before paying employees in crypto-currency.

What about exempt employees?

Most exempt employees have minimum salary requirements under federal law. The minimum salary requirement under the FLSA salary basis test must be paid in U.S. currency or a negotiable instrument.  Like the minimum wage and overtime requirements, once that threshold is met, employers may pay employees the rest of the amount in Bitcoin.

Other concerns?

For nonexempt employees, there is some gray area as to how to value Bitcoins for the regular rate calculation for overtime purposes. The timing of the valuation may have a significant economic impact due to Bitcoin’s somewhat volatile nature.  Bitcoin valuation may also be a problem when calculating the regular and back pay if an employee is misclassified as exempt.  There may also be other issues tied to Bitcoin’s volatility, the administrative cost of converting wages to Bitcoin and security of Bitcoin wallets.  Before diving into the digital currency world, it is recommended that an employer consult with legal counsel to avoid any potential pitfalls.

This post was written by Taylor E. Whitten  of  Foley & Lardner LLP © 2017
For more Labor & Employment legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Illinois Passes Religious Garb Law Clarifying Religious Protections Under Illinois Human Rights Law

On August 11, 2017, Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner signed into law Public Act 100-100, known as the “Religious Garb Law.”  The law amends the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) by clarifying the scope of protection for sincerely held religious beliefs.

Specifically, the amendment makes clear that it is a violation of the IHRA for an employer to impose a requirement that would cause an employee to “violate or forgo a sincerely held practice of his or her religion including, but not limited to, the wearing of any attire, clothing, or facial hair in accordance with the requirements of his or her religion.”  However, the law indicates that “[n]othing in this Section prohibits an employer from enacting a dress code or grooming policy that may include restrictions on attire, clothing, or facial hair to maintain workplace safety or food sanitation.”  Moreover, employers may still prohibit attire, clothing and facial hair if failing to do so would result in an undue hardship to the employer’s business.

In essence, this amendment clarifies the scope of religious protections that exist under the IHRA.  Notably, the EEOC has taken the position that Title VII protects religious garb.

This post was written by Steven J Pearlman and Alex C Weinstein of  Proskauer Rose LLP.© 2017

The Ninth Circuit Asks the California Supreme Court to Weigh in on Bag Checks

On August 16, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order certifying a question regarding an important wage and hour issue to the California Supreme Court: Is time spent on an employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing required exit searches of bags or packages voluntarily brought to work for purely personal convenience by employees compensable as “hours worked” under California law?

The question arose in Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., an appeal in a wage and hour class action brought against Apple, Inc., by current and former nonexempt California retail store employees. In the suit, the plaintiffs sought compensation for time that they spent waiting for and undergoing exit searches whenever they left Apple’s retail store locations, pursuant to the company’s Employee Package and Bag Searches policy. The at-issue policy, which is similar to ones in place at many other large retailers, required that employees undergo unpaid, manager-performed bag/package checks before leaving the stores—at breaks or at the end of their shifts.

In July 2015, a district court certified the case as a class action. However, in November 2015, the district court granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and ruled that time spent by class members waiting for and undergoing exit-related bag searches pursuant to Apple’s policy was not compensable as “hours worked” under California law because such time was neither “subject to the control” of the employer nor time during which the class members were “suffered or permitted” to work.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that employees are under the control of the employer while waiting for and undergoing the bag checks because they are required whenever entering or leaving the premises. Apple countered that the time is not compensable because employees are not required to bring bags to work, and may avoid the searches altogether by not bringing a bag or package to the workplace. In its order certifying the issue for the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit noted that Apple’s position “finds strong support” in the seminal California Supreme Court decision Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575 (2000), in which the court held that time spent by employees using employer-mandated transportation to get to a worksite was compensable, while noting that time spent on “optional free transportation” would not be compensable. However, the Ninth Circuit expressed questions about whether differences in context—i.e., employer-provided transport to and from the workplace versus searches at the worksite—rendered Morillion distinguishable.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court previously determined that similar bag checks were not compensable in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014), the California Supreme Court has not addressed the compensability of bag checks under California’s wage and hour laws, which involve a somewhat different definition of compensable work time. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its order, the consequences of any interpretation of California law with respect to bag searches “will have significant legal, economic, and practical consequences for employers and employees” throughout California and will materially affect the outcome of many pending lawsuits. For the time being, employers should consult with qualified employment counsel to mitigate risk while we wait for the California Supreme Court to weigh in.

This post was written by Philippe A. Lebel of  Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.
Read more on litigation of wage and hour issues at the National Law Review.

The Consequences of Hate Speech in the Aftermath of Charlottesville: An Employer’s Guide to Handling Rally-Attending Employees

In the aftermath of the events in Charlottesville, Virginia, over the weekend, a Twitter account with the handle @YesYoureRacist began soliciting the assistance of the general public to identify rally attendees based on photographs. “If you recognize any of the Nazis marching in #Charlottesville, send me their names/profiles and I’ll make them famous,” the Twitter-detective tweeted. Not surprisingly, many rally attendees were quickly identified, along with their educational institutions and/or places of employment. For employers this raises an interesting question: “Does my employee who participates in a white supremacist/neo-Nazi rally enjoy any job protections from said participation?” It depends.

In the days following the events in Charlottesville, we have already seen one rally participant resign his employment; three rally participants have been terminated by their respective employers; one university has publicly condemned white supremacy but informed the public they would not expel participating students; one family has publicly disavowed their son; two web-service providers removed a neo-Nazi-themed website from its servers; one Pennsylvania firefighter is under investigation for a distasteful Facebook post directed at an African-American colleague; and two police officers, one in Massachusetts and one in Kentucky, are under scrutiny for making Facebook posts mocking counter-protesters who were run down by a motor vehicle during the rally. In today’s world of mass consumerism, and with the public pressures of social media, this type of public shaming and influence is likely here to stay.

Although public-sector workers generally cannot be terminated for their exercise of speech, many union contracts require “just cause” to terminate, and some employees have employment contracts which control grounds for termination, federal law does not offer any protections for employee hate speech in the private sector, except in limited circumstances discussed later where the employee may otherwise be engaging in protected activity. Thus, for private sector employers not subject to off-duty conduct state law protections, it is not per se illegal to fire workers if what they choose to do or say in their free time reflects poorly on your business.

Employers and employees alike are probably asking: “But what about the Constitutional right to free speech?” The First and Fourteenth Amendments offer little protection for individuals who engage in hate speech and are fired by their private employer. Although “hate speech” in and of itself may be protected (except for fighting words, or true threats of illegal conduct or incitement), a private employer is equally protected when it “speaks” by terminating its employee. Private-sector employers do not have to allow employees to voice beliefs they or other workers may find offensive. While employers in the public sector need to proceed with caution, where a worker attends and participates in something as extreme as a white supremacist/Neo-Nazi rally, the employee will generally lose the protection of the Constitution. For instance, in Lawrenz v. James, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a correctional institution’s interest in the efficient operation of a correctional facility outweighed a public-sector correctional officer’s First Amendment right to wear, off-duty, a T-shirt adorned with a swastika and the words “White Power.”

Employers must also consider whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) offers any protection to both union and non-union employees engaged in this or similar off-duty conduct. While the NLRA’s primary concern is unionized workers, Section 7 also protects nonunion workers when they engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.” As of late, the National Labor Relations Board has taken an expansive view of Section 7, recently commenting that a picketing worker who made racist comments, with no overt gestures, directed towards a group of black replacement workers was protected. The Board reasoned that one of the necessary conditions of picketing is confrontation, and that impulsive behavior on the picket line is expected, particularly when it is directed against non-striking employees. In affirming the Board’s decision in Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v National Labor Relations Board, the Eighth Circuit noted the picketing employee’s statements were not violent in character, did not contain overt or implied threats, and were not accompanied by threatening behavior or intimidating actions toward the replacement workers. The speech was protected because it was non-disruptive and occurred while the employee was engaging in protected activity (picketing). Here, it would be difficult for a Charlottesville rally participant to argue that his or her behavior under the circumstances was non-disruptive, non-threatening and/or not intimidating.

To be certain, private employers have a right to hold employees accountable for their viewpoints and to make employment decisions based on those actions, particularly where employers have a good faith belief that an employee’s viewpoints or actions may create a hostile work environment for other employees. However, as with any termination, employers should proceed with caution. Employers should not blindly trust a Twitter-verse investigation and should instead conduct their own investigation before making any employment-related decisions. Moreover, if you are a public sector employer or operate in a state subject to off-duty conduct statutes or one that does not follow the standard at-will employment doctrine, it is imperative you consult with legal counsel before proceeding with discipline or other employment-related decisions. Last, employers must not forget that if the to-be-disciplined employee also falls into a protected class, you should remain cognizant of the potential exposure with respect to a separate or inter-related discrimination claim.

Now may be as good of time as any to re-visit sensitivity and workplace harassment training.

This post was written by Janay M. Stevens of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
Read more employment law at the National Law Review.

High Time for Massachusetts Employers to Consider a Marijuana Use Policy

All employers should maintain an employee handbook or similar policy statement that clearly sets out the employer’s position on drug and alcohol use. While federal laws relating to marijuana possession and use have not changed, many states have revised their statutes to legalize, decriminalize, or otherwise permit marijuana possession and use. This has caused some confusion for employers, who must balance the conflicting state and federal rules.

Over thirty states have enacted legislation allowing marijuana use in certain situations. In some states (California and Massachusetts, for example), medical and recreational use is permitted.  In many other states, such as Connecticut and Rhode Island, only medical use is permitted.  A number of states have also adopted legislation that specifically protects marijuana users from termination from employment based solely on a positive test for marijuana.

Massachusetts does not have such a statute. However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently issued a ruling that greatly complicates the issue of how to deal with an employee who is using marijuana. In Barbuto vs. Advantage Sales and Marketing (July 17, 2017), the SJC ruled that an employee who had been terminated as a result of a positive marijuana test could bring a claim for handicap discrimination under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute.  In Barbuto, the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, who had a valid prescription for marijuana to help in treating Crohn’s disease.  After the employee was terminated because of a positive marijuana test, she brought a claim against the employer alleging, among other counts, a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute.  The trial court dismissed all of the employee’s claims.  On appeal, the SJC upheld the trial court’s dismissal of most of the claims, but held that the employee could bring a claim under the anti-discrimination statute for disability discrimination and a failure to accommodate.  The SJC then reversed the dismissal of that count and sent the matter back to the trial court.

The SJC was careful to point out that employers could limit or defeat such claims by showing that allowing marijuana use would cause an undue hardship on an employer’s business, such as where the permitted use would conflict with other requirements like the Federal Drug Free Workplace Act. The SJC also clearly stated that Massachusetts law does not require any employer to permit on-site marijuana use as an employee accommodation. Even with those limitations, however, the Barbuto ruling does create some landmines for employers.  Massachusetts employers should become very familiar with the marijuana laws applicable in all states in which they have employees, and should enact employment policies consistent with those laws (which may differ significantly from state to state).  In addition, employers should consider and adopt (and consistently apply) policies that address how a positive test is handled (including addressing any reasonable accommodation issues).  For now, in Massachusetts, an employer will need to show how accommodating an employee’s medically prescribed marijuana use creates an undue hardship on the employer, and employers wishing to prohibit all marijuana use will need to be able to show this.

This post was written byMark J. Tarallo of Murtha Cullina.

Read more employment law news at the National Law Review.

Share Recent Eighth Circuit Case Illustrates the Need for Newest Members of the NLRB to Be Confirmed Sooner Rather Than Later

In another example of a federal circuit court taking the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to task for stretching federal labor law past the point of recognition, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals recently refused to enforce a NLRB order reinstating several former employees. The former employees were discharged after they posted flyers around town insinuating their employer was selling unsafe, germ-laden sandwiches as part of a campaign to enhance their sick leave. MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 14-3099 (July 3, 2017).

In its decision, the Eight Circuit upbraided the NLRB for abandoning and ignoring the Supreme Court of the United States’ precedent regarding when an employee can be disciplined for “disloyalty” in the midst of a union organizing drive. The Eighth Circuit took particular issue with the NLRB’s interpretation of the seminal Supreme Court case NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard) and found that the NLRB’s reasoning effectively overruled Jefferson Standard.

Background

MikLin is a family business that owns and operates 10 Jimmy John’s sandwich shop franchises in the Minneapolis-St.Paul area. In 2007, several MikLin workers began an organizing campaign seeking representation by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) union.

In an attempt to garner more support for a rerun election, union supporters began a sick leave campaign in early 2011. They posted a flyer on community bulletin boards in MikLin stores with two identical images of a Jimmy John’s sandwich. Above the first image were the words, “YOUR SANDWICH MADE BY A HEALTHY JIMMY JOHN’S WORKER.” The text above the second image said, “YOUR SANDWICH MADE BY A SICK JIMMY JOHN’S WORKER.” Below the pictures, the white text asked: “CAN’T TELL THE DIFFERENCE?” The response, in red and slightly smaller, said: “THAT’S TOO BAD BECAUSE JIMMY JOHN’S WORKERS DON’T GET PAID SICK DAYS. SHOOT, WE CAN’T EVEN CALL IN SICK.” Below, in slightly smaller white text, was the warning, “WE HOPE YOUR IMMUNE SYSTEM IS READY BECAUSE YOU’RE ABOUT TO TAKE THE SANDWICH TEST.” The text at the bottom of the poster asked readers to help the workers win paid sick days by going to their website.

The day before the IWW could request a rerun election, its supporters distributed a press release, letter, and the sandwich poster to more than 100 media contacts. The press release highlighted discussed the employees’ need for sick leave and ended with a threat: If MikLin would not talk with the IWW about their demands for paid sick leave, they would proceed with “dramatic action” by “plastering the city with thousands of Sick Day posters.”

Days later, IWW supporters implemented their threat to plaster the city with posters. However, in the new version of the poster, rather than asking for support of the employees’ request for paid sick leave, the public posters listed the MikLin CEO’s personal telephone number and instructed customers to call him to “LET HIM KNOW YOU WANT HEALTHY WORKERS MAKING YOUR SANDWICH!” Two days later, MikLin fired six employees who coordinated the attack and issued written warnings to three others who assisted in it.

The NLRB Proceedings

The Board’s administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that MikLin violated the National Labor Relations Act by discharging the employees. Citing prior Board decisions, the ALJ ruled that the NLRA “protects employee communications to the public that are part of and related to an ongoing labor dispute” unless they are “so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protections.” The ALJ found that to lose the act’s protections “an employee’s public criticism . . . must evidence ‘a malicious motive’ or be made with knowledge of the statements’ falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.”

The ALJ found that the posters in question were not maliciously untrue. “While ‘it is not literally true that employees could not call in sick,’ the ALJ observed, employees ‘are subject to discipline if they call in sick without finding a replacement,’” and thus—according to the ALJ—the assertion that employees were required to work when sick was protected hyperbole. Though MikLin had a strong track record with the health department, the ALJ found that “it is at least arguable that [MikLin’s] sick leave policy subjects the public to an increased risk of food borne disease.”

A divided panel of the Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The majority found “that neither the posters nor the press release were shown to be so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection.” The public communications “were clearly related to the ongoing labor dispute concerning the employees’ desire for paid sick leave. . . . Indeed, any person viewing the posters and press release would reasonably understand that the motive for the communications was to garner support for the campaign to improve the employees’ terms and conditions of employment by obtaining paid sick leave rather than to disparage [MikLin] or its product.”

MikLin appealed the Board’s order reinstating the employees to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, a three-judge panel upheld the NLRB’s ruling, but upon rehearing en banc by the full court, the ruling was overturned.

The Eighth Circuit’s Analysis

In its full court hearing, the Eighth Circuit took the NLRB to task for significantly misreading the Supreme Court’s decision in Jefferson Standard. First, the majority focused on the Board’s interpretation that no act of employee disparagement is unprotected disloyalty unless it is “maliciously motivated to harm the employer.” They found this additional requirement impermissibly overruled Jefferson Standard.

Second the court balked at the Board’s definition of “malicious motive.” The Board excluded from Jefferson Standard’s interpretation of Section 10(c) of the NLRA all employee disparagement that is part of or directly related to an ongoing labor dispute as improper. In other words, the Board refused to treat as “disloyal” any public communication intended to advance employees’ aims in a labor dispute, regardless of the manner in which, and the extent to which, it harms the employer.

The court rejected that idea:

By requiring an employer to show that employees had a subjective intent to harm, and burdening that requirement with an overly restrictive need to show “malicious motive,” the Board has effectively removed from the Jefferson Standard inquiry the central Section 10(c) issue as defined by the Supreme Court — whether the means used reflect indefensible employee disloyalty. This is an error of law.

Rather than employee motive, the Eighth Circuit explained that critical question in the Jefferson Standard disloyalty inquiry is whether the employees’ public communications reasonably targeted the employer’s labor practices or indefensibly disparaged the quality of the employer’s products or services. The Eight Circuit found that when employees convince customers not to patronize an employer because its labor practices are unfair, subsequent settlement of the labor dispute brings the customers back—to the benefit of both employer and employee. By contrast, the court found, sharply disparaging the employer’s products or services as unsafe, unhealthy, or of shoddy quality causes harm that outlasts the labor dispute to the detriment of employees, as well as the employer.

Key Takeaways

While the Eighth Circuit’s decision is heartening, its effect will be limited for the time being as the NLRB is under no obligation to recognize the court’s interpretation of federal labor law. Further, the decision highlights the cost of fighting incorrect NLRB decisions for employers; MikLin had to appeal the ALJ’s decision to the NLRB, then appeal that decision to the Eighth Circuit, and then request a rehearing after the three-judge panel wrongly decided the appeal. Many employers simply do not have the resources to see a fight like this through to the end.

With President Trump’s selections to the NLRB being vetted by Congress this week, we can hope for a light at the end of this long, dark tunnel for employers.

This post was written byMatthew J. Kelley of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.
Go to the National Law Review for more legal analysis.

Sign of Future Changes? DOL Proposes 18-Month Extension of Transition Period for Compliance With ERISA “Fiduciary Investment Advice” Rule

On August 9, the US Department of Labor (DOL) announced in a court filing that it has proposed an 18-month extension of the full implementation of the Best Interest Contract Exemption (the “BIC Exemption”) under the ERISA fiduciary investment advice rule. The Proposed Extension would also apply to the Principal Transaction Exemption and Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (together with the BIC Exemption, the “Exemptions”). In April of this year, the DOL extended the effective date of the Rule until June 9 and limited the requirements of the Exemptions to only require compliance with the “impartial conduct standards” (ICS) through December 31 (the “Transition Period”). If the Proposed Extension is approved, full compliance with the Exemptions will not be required until July 1, 2019.

As described in our earlier advisory, “Compliance With the ERISA Fiduciary Advice Rule for Private Investment Fund Managers and Sponsors and Managed Account Advisers: Beginning June 9, 2017,” compliance with the ICS generally requires that an investment advice fiduciary (1) act in the “best interest” of plan participants and IRA owners; (2) receive no more than “reasonable compensation” (as defined under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code); and (3) make no materially misleading statements about recommended transactions, fees, compensation and conflicts of interest.

The Proposed Extension was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the form of an amendment to each of the Exemptions.

This post was written by Henry Bregstein Wendy E. Cohen David Y. Dickstein Jack P. Governale Christian B. Hennion and Gary W. Howell of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
For more legal analysis visit the National Law Review.

The Changing Landscape of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Law

From the time Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until earlier this year, federal courts have consistently held that the Act’s protections against employment discrimination did not apply to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, in March, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana) became the first court to rule the other way, holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination based on sexual orientation. What has occurred in federal courts in the wake of that decision, however, has only muddied the waters.

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s notable decision, courts had only permitted gay employees to make claims of sex discrimination if the employee could show the discrimination occurred because the employee did not conform to gender stereotypes, not simply because of the employee’s sexual orientation. The Seventh Circuit found that the gender stereotype argument is unnecessary, stating “it is . . . impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex.”

The question is far from settled. In April, in a case involving a gay skydiving instructor who claims he was fired because of his sexual orientation, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit ruled that it could not follow the Seventh Circuit’s decision. It held that a three-judge panel could not overturn precedential decisions regarding Title VII’s application to sexual orientation discrimination. Such a ruling would require a review by the entire panel of judges. The Second Circuit has granted such a review (an en bancreview), indicating that perhaps the full panel of judges may be willing to follow the lead of the Seventh Circuit.

The picture becomes fuzzier still because of conflicting input from two government agencies. In preparation for its en banc review, the Second Circuit invited the EEOC to offer an opinion on the matter. The EEOC restated a stance it has held since 2012, saying sexual orientation discrimination is inextricably linked to gender and gender stereotypes and should fall under the protection of Title VII. However, on July 26, 2017, the Department of Justice filed a brief taking the opposite position. The DOJ argued Congress did not intend Title VII to apply to sexual orientation, and that expansion of the protection should be left to Congress, not implemented by the courts. The DOJ also says that the court owes no deference to the EEOC.

Because the federal circuits are now split on the issue, the question may eventually be decided by the United States Supreme Court. The Court has already been asked to review a case in which a former security guard at a Georgia hospital claims she was forced to quit because she was gay. The Court has not yet said whether it will hear the case. Ultimately, as the DOJ suggests, Congress could pass legislation to decide the issue one way or the other.

The takeaway from this flurry of activity is that this is an area of law that is very much in flux. For decades, the position of federal courts in regards to sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII was clear. Now, the landscape has shifted, and the ground is still settling. Employers should be aware that changes are happening quickly in this area and proceed cautiously when a situation potentially involving a sexual orientation discrimination claim arises.

This post was written by Mark G Jeffries of  Steptoe & Johnson PLLC.
Much more legal analysis at the National Law Review.