Category: Labor & Employment

New DOL Salary Threshold for Most White-Collar Exemptions Is Now in Effect

Update July 1, 2024: The U.S. Department of Labor’s new rule on the required salary threshold for employees to qualify as exempt from overtime is now in effect as of July 1, 2024. Although the federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas issued an injunction blocking enforcement of the new rule against the State of Texas as an employer on Friday, June 28, 2024, that injunction does not apply to other employers, including private businesses. Thus, the new salary thresholds for exempt status, as detailed below, are in effect nationwide. Other lawsuits challenging the regulation remain ongoing, and should continue to be monitored for any further developments.

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has issued a final rule that significantly raises the required salary threshold for many salaried exempt employees starting July 1, 2024. Under this final rule, issued on April 23, 2024, the guaranteed salary that most employees must receive to qualify as exempt from the overtime rules will increase dramatically over the next nine months. Effective July 1, it will jump from $35,568 per year to $43,888 per year; and then just six short months later, on January 1, 2025, it will jump to $58,656 per year.

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employees who work in executive, administrative, professional, and certain computer positions must generally meet both the salary basis test and the job duty requirements to be classified as exempt from the overtime rules. In addition to being paid on a salary basis (which means there can be no deductions from salary, subject to certain limited exceptions), the threshold salary is currently $684 a week, amounting to $35,568 annually. The final rule raises the threshold for salaried employees significantly, according to the following schedule:

  • Effective July 1, 2024: $844 per week (equivalent to $43,888 per year)
  • Effective January 1, 2025: $1,128 per week (equivalent to $58,656 per year)
  • Effective July 1, 2027, and every three years thereafter: To be determined based on available earnings data

In addition, the new rule increases the total annual compensation threshold for highly compensated employees from $107,432 per year to $132,964 per year effective July 1, followed by yet another increase to $151,164 per year effective January 1, 2025. This will result in an increase of nearly $44,000 per year to the salary threshold necessary to qualify for the highly compensated employee exemption.

It is widely expected that various business and industry groups may file suit to attempt to block these changes from taking effect. Many employers may remember that a similar scenario occurred in 2016, when the DOL under the Obama Administration proposed a large increase in the salary threshold for these white collar exemptions, before that increase was blocked by court action. If the final rule issued by the DOL is not blocked through court action, it will mean significant changes for employers in compensation structure, as more employees nationwide will qualify for overtime pay unless their salaries are increased over the new threshold.

Employers should immediately review their workforces to determine what changes, if any, may be necessary if the final rule takes effect. Possible considerations include:

  • Raising the annual salary of employees who meet the duties test to at least $43,888 as of July 1, and $58,656 as of January 1, 2025, to retain their exempt status;
  • Converting employees to non-exempt status and paying the overtime premium of one-and-one half times the employees’ regular rate of pay for all overtime hours worked; or
  • Converting employees to non-exempt status and eliminating or reducing the amount of overtime hours worked by such employees.

Similar considerations should be undertaken with highly compensated employees. While it is wise to review pay practices proactively and identify potential changes that may become necessary, employers may wish to continue to monitor legal developments prior to actually implementing such changes. As employers will recall from 2016, significant changes can occur between the announcement of a final rule and the date on which it is scheduled to become effective.

Employers are encouraged to consult with legal counsel to discuss their options and strategies for implementing these changes, if necessary.

© 2024 Varnum LLP

Two Blockbuster U.S. Supreme Court Decisions May Spell End of NLRB’s Expansion of Reach of NLRA as Well as How Agency Prosecutes Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court issued two blockbuster decisions this week, both of which likely will curtail the ability of federal agencies, including the NLRB, to prosecute cases and expand the law.

In a 6-3 decision announced Thursday in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy et al., U.S., No. 22-859 (Jun. 27, 2024), the Supreme Court ruled that when the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant, the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury. As reported here, this decision could affect a future ruling in Space Exploration Technologies Corp., v. NLRB, No. 24-40315 (5th Cir. 2024), a case challenging the authority of National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) on the same grounds.

Perhaps more significant, a 6-2 decision announced Friday in Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al., No. 22-451 (Jun. 28, 2024), eliminates the deference given to federal agencies to interpret laws by reversing the Chevron decision.

Jarkesy: Viability of Agency Administrative Law Judges Put Into Question

Jarkesy Background
In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) initiated an enforcement action and sought civil penalties for alleged fraud against Defendants. Relying on relatively new authority conferred by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC opted to adjudicate the matter itself before an agency ALJ. In 2014, the SEC ALJ issued a decision levying civil penalties as well as other relief against the Defendants.

Defendants petitioned for judicial review at the Fifth Circuit, which held in 2022 that the agency’s decision to have an ALJ adjudicate the case violated the Defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Fifth Circuit also identified two further constitutional problems: (1) Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the SEC to choose whether to litigate this action in court or adjudicate the matter itself; and (2) the insulation of SEC ALJs from executive supervision, with two layers of for-cause removal protections, violated the separation of powers doctrine.

On March 8, 2023, the SEC appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court. Oral argument was heard on November 29, 2023.

Jarkesy Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution entitled Defendants to a jury trial where the SEC sought civil penalties for securities fraud. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts reasoned that the SEC’s antifraud provisions “replicate common law fraud” claims, which must be heard by a jury. As a result, where a claim brought by an agency (1) resembles common law causes of action; and (2) seeks a remedy traditionally obtained in a court of law, a Seventh Amendment jury right attaches to the claim.

The Court recognized an exception to this general rule under a “public rights” doctrine, which permits non-Article III courts to adjudicate matters that “historically could have been determined exclusively by [the executive and legislative] branches.” However, causes of action that are “quintessentially suits at common law” and not “closely intertwined” with a public right—like the anti-fraud provisions at issue here—are unable to utilize this exception and must be heard in Article III courts.

Because the jury trial issue resolved the case, the Court declined to reach the nondelegation or removal issues. As a result, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jarkesy on these issues remains good law.

Sotomayor Dissent in Jarkesy
In dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that Congress has latitude—via the Constitution as well as prior Supreme Court decisions—to assign the enforcement of civil penalties “outside the regular courts of law.” This would be the case “even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.”

Justice Sotomayor also raised issue with the majority’s interpretation of a public rights doctrine. Notably, the dissent challenges the majority’s claim that most causes of actions that should be protected under the doctrine involve areas of the law where political branches “traditionally held exclusive power…and had exercised it.” To this end, Justice Sotomayor argues that the majority cannot distinguish between Congress’ enacting of statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and its enacting of the Dodd-Frank Act. The dissent implies that neither labor relations nor securities were traditionally governed by political branches, thus (purportedly) refuting the majority’s reliance upon this principle.

NLRB Implications
Similar to the SEC, the NLRB utilizes ALJs to adjudicate violations of the NLRA. Contrary to the SEC, however, the NLRB ALJ scheme has been in place for decades. These judges hear and decide unfair labor practice cases in quasi-judicial hearings that affect the rights of parties to the cases. Moreover, unlike potential violations of the NLRA, the SEC is not always the exclusive forum for vindication of securities issues. The Department of Justice often prosecutes securities laws issues and private plaintiffs can bring lawsuits to vindicate civil claims. Contrast this with the NLRB, which is the exclusive forum for the vast majority of issues arising under the NLRA.

In the wake of the Fifth Circuit’s 2022 decision in Jarkesy, on January 4, 2024, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“SpaceX”) filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas challenging the constitutionality of NLRB ALJs. SpaceX specifically argued that: (1) the NLRB’s structure is unconstitutional in that it limits the removal of NLRB ALJs and Board Members and permits Board Members to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial power in the same administrative proceeding; and (2) the Board’s expanded remedies constitute consequential damages, and therefore violate employers’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial-by-jury.

Because the Supreme Court in Jarkesy declined to reach the nondelegation or removal issues, the Fifth Circuit’s decision on these issues remains good law. This makes the current forum battle even more significant, as the Jarkesy Fifth Circuit opinion could provide dispositive precedent for SpaceX’s removal and nondelegation arguments. In addition, the Supreme Court’s ruling on the Seventh Amendment issue might support SpaceX’s argument that the Board’s expanded consequential damages remedies should be adjudicated in a trial by jury, depending on how the court interprets the current state of NLRB remedies.

As reported here, in Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022), the NLRB expanded remedies under the NLRA to include “all direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered as a result of the respondent’s unfair labor practice.” The Board has been committed to expanding remedies since 2021, when General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo issued a memorandum on this subject. NLRB Regional Offices have also been aggressive in seeking these expanded remedies, which arguably are punitive rather than remedial in nature. In its Complaint, SpaceX used the Board’s position on remedies, coupled with the Jarkesy Fifth Circuit ruling, to argue that the Board has sanctioned compensatory relief that can only be issued through a trial by jury.

However, this position could be impacted by the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Thryv, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 23-60132 (5th Cir. May 24, 2024). In this decision, the Court vacated the Board’s ruling in Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022) on the merits, and thus did not reach the consequential damages issue. The Court did however label this remedy as “draconian” and “a novel, consequential-damages-like labor law remedy.” The Board therefore will require a new case to codify the issuing of consequential damages. It remains to be seen how this ruling would impact SpaceX’s Seventh Amendment argument concerning consequential damages, which could be a key element of its potential reliance on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jarkesy.

Court Deference to Agency Positions Dead: Chevron Reversal
In a massive blow to agency power, the U.S. Supreme Court on Friday reversed Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in a case involving a fishing industry rule. Under Chevron, on review of agency action, where the relevant statute was silent or ambiguous regarding a specific issue, courts were directed to defer to agencies and were not to “impose [their] own construction on the statute.” Thus, where an agency offered “a permissible construction of the statute,” courts were to defer to the agency even if the court would have reached a different conclusion. In the years since Chevron was issued, reviewing courts often remarked that they were bound to uphold an agency determination even if they disagreed with the interpretation. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that Chevron could not be reconciled with the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), which commands “the reviewing court” to decide “all relevant questions of law” arising on review of agency action, which of course includes interpretation of the federal statute at issue. As a result, the majority determined that there should be no deference to agencies in answering legal questions, although deference is mandated for judicial review of agency policy-making and fact-finding. The majority concluded that, in deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court had required judges to “disregard their statutory duties,” which required this Court to “leave Chevron behind.”

Takeaways
These two Supreme Court decisions could substantially curtail the NLRB’s ability to bring and prosecute actions against parties (not just employers, but unions as well). While the Jarkesy Supreme Court decision is narrow, it could end the ability of the NLRB to bring certain claims in front of agency ALJs (all of whom are employed directly at the Board and who are not subject to removal). The pending SpaceX decision likely will further the development of the law, as it is a direct challenge to the NLRB adjudicatory scheme, and will also give a Circuit Court—and eventually maybe the Supreme Court—a chance to rule on additional constitutional challenges to federal agencies.

In addition, the reversal of Chevron likely will have a substantial effect on the review of NLRB cases. At time of unprecedented expansion of the reach of the NLRA—including finding non-compete agreements and confidentiality clauses unlawful—the end of Chevron deference allows a reviewing court the ability to disregard NLRB actions as not rooted in the NLRA or beyond the scope of the agency’s mandate. There is no doubt many challenges of NLRB actions will be brought as the probability of prevailing in a reviewing court has increased substantially with the end of deference.

As always, we will monitor decisions and agency actions to see how these important developments play out.

© 2024 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Supreme Court Issues Landmark Decision Upending Deference to Federal Agencies

On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States upended the 40-year-old doctrine whereby federal courts gave deference to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of federal statutes. The ruling stands to have significant implications for federal agencies’ rulemaking and enforcement of federal labor and employment laws.

Quick Hits

  • The Supreme Court held that courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency acted within its statutory authority and may not defer to an agency’s interpretation when a law is ambiguous.
  • The decision overruled the four-decades-old doctrine known as Chevron deference, in which courts had deferred to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
  • The ruling will have a major impact on federal agencies’ rulemaking authority.

The Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo held that courts must exercise independent judgment in deciding whether an agency acted within its statutory authority and may not simply defer to the agency’s interpretation of ambiguities in the law.

The decision overrules the longstanding doctrine known as Chevron deference, under which courts would defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous law that the agency administers. The deference had provided the rules of such administrative agencies with the force of law, but that authority will, at a minimum, be weakened, along with the corresponding power of the agencies.

In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that Chevron deference “defies the command of the” Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that courts “not the agency whose action it reviews … ‘decide all relevant questions of law’ and interpret … statutory provisions.” Chevron deference “requires a court to ignore, not follow, ‘the reading the court would have reached’ had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the APA,” (Emphasis in original).

The Court, in its majority, rejected the presumption that ambiguities in federal statutes are implicit delegations of authority to agencies, stating the “presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities.”

The ruling will have significant implications for the multiple federal agencies that regulate employers, including the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Community Commission (EEOC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), among others.

Chevron Deference

Under the two-step Chevron deference framework, the court would first determine whether a statute in question was clear and unambiguous regarding an issue. If the statute was clear, then the court would give effect to it. If, however, the court found the statute was ambiguous or silent on the issue, then the court would proceed to step two. At that step, the court would determine whether the agency’s interpretation was a permissible or reasonable construction of the statute. If so, the court would uphold the agency’s interpretation.

The deference had allowed federal agencies leeway to act, allowing them interpret ambiguities and fill gaps in the laws they enforce. However, the doctrine has been criticized in recent years as unconstitutionally allowing the Executive Branch’s policy positions to be advanced by federal agencies outside the democratic process and for taking power away from federal courts to interpret laws.

Background

The issue over Chevron deference came before the Supreme Court in two cases challenging a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) rule that required fishing vessels to pay the salaries of federal observers that vessels are required to “carry” under the Magnus-Stevenson Act (MSA). The MSA is silent as to whether the fishing industry is responsible for paying the costs for the observers. Given concerns about funding, the NMFS rule required the vessels carrying the observers to pay the costs despite objections from the fishing industry over its negative economic impact on the livelihoods of commercial fishermen.

In Loper Bright Enterprises, four family-owned and –operated fishing companies, argued that the NMFS cannot force vessels to pay for the observers because the MSA did not clearly give the agency power to do so. However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the agency, finding that the law’s silence on the issue created an ambiguity that required deference to the agency.

Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson recused herself from the Loper Bright case as she had sat on the D.C. Circuit panel that had ruled in the case. The Court then added Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, in which the owner of fishing vessels raised a similar challenge to the NMFS rule. The challengers argued that since the MSA provides for observers to be paid in at least three other contexts, the NMFS did not have the authority to require fishing vessels to pay for them. But the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court finding that “the rule is a permissible exercise of the agency’s authority and is otherwise lawful.”

At the Supreme Court, the challengers in Loper Bright Enterprises argued that the Court should “either abandon Chevron for good or at least substantially cabin its scope” because it has “proved unworkable” and has “seriously distorted how the political branches operate.” They argued that stare decisis does not bar the court from abandoning the framework since the Court would not have to change the outcome of the case in which the deference was established but merely alter the interpretative methodologies used. Similarly, the challengers in Relentless argued that the deference is unconstitutional because it “compromise[es] judges’ independence when interpreting the law,” which is a power vested in the federal courts under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

Decision

In deciding Loper Bright, the Supreme Court stated that courts simply “do not throw up their hands because ‘Congress’s instructions have’ supposedly ‘run out.’” “Courts instead understand that such statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, best meaning. … So instead of declaring a particular party’s reading ‘permissible’ in such a case, courts use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity,” the Court stated.

The Supreme Court further stated that agencies do not have any special ability to interpret ambiguities, “even when an ambiguity happens to implicate a technical matter” as “Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions.” However, the Court stated that courts do not decide cases “blindly” and instead, rely on arguments from the parties and amici, noting that an agency’s interpretation “may be especially informative.”

“The better presumption is therefore that Congress expects courts to do their ordinary job of interpreting statutes, with due respect for the views of the Executive Branch,” the court stated. “And to the extent that Congress and the Executive Branch may disagree with how the courts have performed that job in a particular case, they are of course always free to act by revising the statute.”

However, the Court noted that the decision does “not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework,” as cases upholding specific agency actions “are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretative methodologies.

Justice Elena Kagan and Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented and were joined by Justice Jackson to the extent it applied to the Relentless case. In the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the justices argued that Chevron deference “has formed the backdrop against which Congress, courts, and agencies—as well as regulated parties and the public—all have operated for decades” and “has been applied in thousands of judicial decisions.”

They argued that Chevron deference is “right” and the “obvious choice” to resolve ambiguities because “[a]gencies have expertise” that “courts do not.” Further, agencies report to the president, “who in turn answers to the public for his policy calls; courts have no such accountability and no proper basis for making policy.” Moreover, “Congress has conferred on that expert, experienced, and politically accountable agency the authority to administer—to make rules about and otherwise implement—the statute giving rise to the ambiguity or gap,” Justice Kagan wrote.

Next Steps

The Supreme Court’s latest decision is likely to shift power dynamics by weakening agency authority to interpret ambiguous statutes and increasing judicial scrutiny. At a minimum, agencies may need to provide stronger justifications on the merits for their interpretations, and overall, they may be less likely to issue rulemaking in areas where statutory authority is not clear.

The decision is also likely to increase litigation and legal uncertainty, as it potentially opens the floodgates to a wave of legal challenges to overturn all sorts of existing agency rules that have been upheld citing Chevron deference and legal challenges to new agency rules moving forward. For example, this decision likely will have significant impact on the litigation challenging the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) rule purporting to ban noncompetes nationally.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Chevron, visit the NLR Litigation Trial Practice section.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Cracks Down on Employer Non-Disclosure Provisions

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has now joined the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in taking a stand against broad non-disclosure provisions in employment agreements.

Last week, the CFTC announced a settlement with Trafigura Trading LLC, in which the company agreed to pay a $55 million penalty, in part because it required employees to sign agreements that impeded voluntary communications with the CFTC.

In its decision, the CFTC specifically found:

Between July 31, 2017 and 2020, Trafigura required its employees to sign employment agreements, and requested that former employees sign separation agreements, with broad non-disclosure provisions that prohibited the sharing of Trafigura’s confidential information with third parties. These nondisclosure provisions did not contain carve-out language expressly permitting communications with law enforcement or regulators like the Commission.

The CFTC concluded that such non-disclosure provisions violate Regulation 165.19(b), 17 C.F.R. § 165.19(b) (2023), implementing Section 23(h)-(j) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)–(j), even without any additional actions impeding communications.

As a result of this finding, among others involving misappropriation of material nonpublic information and manipulative conduct, the CFTC not only levied a significant fine on Trafigura, but imposed a host of conditions and undertakings with which Trafigura was required to comply. Relevant here, the CFTC required that Trafigura modify its non-disclosure provisions to include language making clear that “no term in any such Agreement should be understood to limit or prevent the filing of a complaint with; or voluntary, lawful communication with; or disclosure of information to any federal, state, or local governmental regulatory or law enforcement agency.”

Director of the Whistleblower Office Brian Young commented, “This is the first CFTC action charging a company under regulations designed to prevent interference with whistleblower communications. This groundbreaking action demonstrates the CFTC’s commitment to protecting potential whistleblowers and puts the market on notice that the CFTC will not tolerate contractual arrangements that could impede communication by potential witnesses.”

We have long reported on the SEC’s targeting of employment agreements. With the CFTC following suit, employers should expect additional agencies to scrutinize language in employment agreements, separation agreements and other employment-related documents, such as employee handbooks and Codes of Conduct. To minimize such scrutiny and exposure employers should take action to modify non-disclosure and other provisions such as non-disparagement and confidentiality clauses that might have the purpose or effect of impeding agency communications. Such modifications must include carve-out language clarifying that nothing precludes current and former employees from communicating in any way with a government agency, such as the CFTC or the SEC. It is more important than ever for employers to work with counsel to conduct a comprehensive review of their policies, practices, and agreements for language that such agencies may find problematic.

©2024 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more news on Employer Non-Disclosure Provisions, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

EEOC Unveils Final Rule Implementing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act PWFA

Go-To Guide:
  • Effective June 18, employers covered by the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) are required to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.
  • PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • A preliminary injunction was entered on June 17, which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for purely elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.
  • Covered employers should review the requirements of the PWFA to ensure that their workplace policies and procedures allow for the requisite accommodations under the Act and follow current challenges to accommodations regarding elective abortions under the law.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) final rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) went into effect June 18, 2024, but not without legal challenge.

The final rule, covered in a previous GT Alert, requires employers to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth. The rule includes an exception for employers if the requested accommodation would cause the business an undue hardship.

However, the requirement of a workplace accommodation for “purely elective abortions” has been enjoined from implementation and enforcement in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and against four Catholic organizations. On June 17, 2024, Judge David C. Joseph in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana ruled that the EEOC overstepped its authority by requiring workplace accommodations for “purely elective abortions.”

The motions for preliminary injunction, filed by the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as four entities affiliated with the Catholic Church, sought injunctive relief to the extent that the PWFA requires employers to accommodate purely elective abortions of employees. The court rejected the EEOC argument “that Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted [it] the authority to interpret the scope of the PWFA in a way that imposes a nationwide mandate on both public and private employers – irrespective of applicable abortion-related state laws enacted in the wake of Dobbs – to provide workplace accommodation for the elective abortions of employees.”

Based on its analysis, the court entered a preliminary injunction which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and any agency thereof, any covered entity under the final rule with respect to all employees whose primary duty station is located in Louisiana or Mississippi, and the entities affiliated with the Catholic Church that sought the court’s involvement.1

What should employers know to ensure compliance with the PWFA, given the limited injunctive relief issued? Below is a summary of the law and considerations for implementing the rule, which is now effective.

Application

  • The PWFA applies to employees, which include applicants and former employees where relevant based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
  • The PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • The states of Louisiana and Mississippi; employers located in Louisiana and Mississippi and with employees whose primary duty station is located within the states; and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lake Charles, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette, and the Catholic University of America are not required to provide accommodations for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to the pregnancy.

What Is Considered a ‘Known Limitation’?

  • A limitation is “known” to a covered entity if the employee, or the employee’s representative, has communicated the limitation to the covered entity.
  • The physical or mental condition may be a modest or minor and/or episodic impediment or problem.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions that had a need or a problem related to maintaining their health or the health of the pregnancy. “Pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” includes uncomplicated pregnancies, vaginal deliveries or cesarian sections, miscarriage, postpartum depression, edema, placenta previa, and lactation.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions who sought health care related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition itself.
  • There is possible overlap between the PWFA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because in these situations, the qualified employee may be entitled to an accommodation under either statute, as the protections of both may apply.

What Is an ‘Undue Hardship’?

  • An employer or covered entity does not need to provide a reasonable accommodation if it causes an undue hardship, meaning significant difficulty or expense, to the employer.

The PWFA Prohibits the Following Conduct by Covered Employers

  • Failure to make a reasonable accommodation for the known limitations of an employee or applicant, unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship;
  • Requiring an employee to accept an accommodation other than a reasonable accommodation arrived at through the interactive process;
  • Denying a job or other employment opportunities to a qualified employee or applicant based on the person’s need for a reasonable accommodation;
  • Requiring an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided that would let the employee keep working;
  • Punishing or retaliating against an employee or applicant for requesting or using a reasonable accommodation for a known limitation under the PWFA, reporting or opposing unlawful discrimination under the PWFA, or participating in a PWFA proceeding (such as an investigation); and/or
  • Coercing individuals who are exercising their rights or helping others exercise their rights under the PWFA.

Non-Exhaustive List Of Examples of ‘Reasonable Accommodations’

  • Additional, longer, or more flexible breaks to drink water, eat, rest, or use the restroom;
  • Changing food or drink policies to allow for a water bottle or food;
  • Changing equipment, devices, or workstations, such as providing a stool to sit on, or a way to do work while standing;
  • Changing a uniform or dress code or providing safety equipment that fits;
  • Changing a work schedule, such as having shorter hours, part-time work, or a later start time;
  • Telework;
  • Temporary reassignment;
  • Temporary suspension of one or more essential functions of a job;
  • Leave for health care appointments;
  • Light duty or help with lifting or other manual labor; or
  • Leave to recover from childbirth or other medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.

Employer Training

  • Employers should consider training supervisors on how to respond to requests for accommodation.
  • Unlike requests for accommodation under the ADA, an accommodation pursuant to the PWFA may include a temporary suspension of essential job functions for qualified individuals (barring undue hardship to the employer).
  • Employees do not need to use specific words to request an accommodation to begin the interactive process.
  • Employers may not require that the employee seeking an accommodation be examined by a health care provider selected by the employer.
1 Further efforts to enjoin the implementation of the Rule were thwarted when the U.S. District Court for the District of Arkansas denied a motion for injunctive relief filed by a group of Republican state attorneys general on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the rule.
©2024 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

Implications of Executive Action for Family Unity and Retention of DACA Talent for Employers and Individuals

Highlights

  • On June 18, the executive branch announced one of the most significant executive actions affecting U.S. immigration since establishing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in 2012
  • The family unity action would allow many undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens to obtain green cards in the U.S. without needing to depart the country
  • The DACA provisions would make it easier for some DACA recipients to qualify for a work visa

On June 18, 2024, the Biden administration announced one of the most significant executive actions promoting family unity and streamlining the process for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients seeking to transition to work visas using existing legal authority.

Family Unity and Parole in Place for the Undocumented Spouses of U.S. Citizens

The executive actions initiate a process that will allow certain non-citizen spouses of U.S. citizens to apply for their green cards without leaving the U.S. Currently, a U.S. citizen can sponsor their non-citizen, foreign-born spouse for permanent residency by filing an I-130 immigration petition for the individual, regardless of their immigration status. Immigrant visas are available in this category without backlogs, unlike many other categories. However, undocumented spouses who didn’t enter the U.S. legally typically don’t qualify under current law to complete the permanent residency process in the U.S. In these situations, the spouse typically must depart from the U.S. to complete the process at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad, thereby triggering a 10-year penalty to lawful readmission under immigration law unless waived due to hardship to a qualifying relative. This process is lengthy, uncertain and expensive, discouraging many of these families from pursuing these steps.

To provide relief, the Biden administration proposes to use the humanitarian parole authority of the executive branch to place qualifying individuals in a legal “parole,” which would then allow them to apply for adjustment of status. Approximately half a million spouses and stepchildren of U.S. citizens in “mixed-status” households could benefit from this change, if implemented.

The availability of this program, also known as Parole in Place, for qualifying non-citizen spouses will be formalized through a rule-making process and publication in the Federal Register. However, the subsequent announcement by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on June 18 included the following specifics for individuals to qualify:

  • Continuously resided in the U.S. for 10 years since June 17, 2014
  • Physically present in the U.S. on June 17, 2024
  • Legally married to a U.S. citizen as of June 17, 2024
  • Entered the U.S. without admission or parole and do not currently hold any lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status
  • Have not been convicted of any disqualifying criminal offense
  • Do not pose a threat to national security or public safety
  • Merits a favorable exercise of discretion

This program would also include non-citizen children of these spouses (i.e., stepchildren).

All requests will consider the applicant’s previous immigration history, criminal history, the results of background checks, national security, and public safety vetting, and any other relevant information available to or requested by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Employers may stand to benefit from a substantial new group of individuals who will be work authorized and whose statuses could be legalized in the U.S. if this program proceeds.

DACA Recipients and Undocumented College Students

The administration subsequently announced that it is also taking additional steps to facilitate the process for DACA recipients to obtain work visas. DACA was created in 2012 by President Barack Obama as a means for immigrant youth who met certain eligibility requirements to qualify for work authorizations and obtain “deferred action.” While DACA protection has enabled hundreds of thousands of individuals to legally work and live in the U.S., the program has faced considerable uncertainty since 2017, when the Trump administration initially sought to terminate the program but was prevented from doing so in the federal courts.

The program continues to face legal challenges, and additional litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court is very likely. Fundamentally, DACA is not a legal status – the reliance on “deferred action” simply reflects DHS’ decision not to bring immigration removal proceedings against a specific individual. While many DACA recipients and their employers have since sought to transition to a work visa or other legal status that Congress specifically established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the process for doing so is uncertain, expensive and cumbersome. Since DACA recipients either entered without authorization or were out of status when they received DACA protection, they are typically ineligible for a transition to a lawful status within the U.S.

Instead, they are required under immigration law to “consular process” outside the U.S. and obtain a work visa at a U.S. consulate. The individual’s departure from the U.S. could trigger removal bars (similar to those described above), requiring the individual to obtain a temporary waiver of inadmissibility from the government. These waivers, known as “d3 waivers” based on the section of the INA to which they relate, can take months to obtain and the outcome of such a waiver is not certain. These cumulative issues have chilled the interest of many employers and DACA recipients in pursuing these waivers.

In the coming weeks, the administration is expected to announce additional steps to streamline the availability of d3 waivers. The U.S. Department of State will announce changes to its process for granting such waivers to DACA recipients through updates to the Foreign Affairs Manual, and DHS has indicated that it will adopt the State Department’s policy changes. These steps, if implemented, are very good news for many employers and the DACA recipients that they employ by providing a more efficient, robust and reliable process for transitioning DACA recipients to a more stable and lawful status in the U.S.

© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more on the DACA Provisions, visit the NLR Immigration section.

U.S. Supreme Court Raises Standard for Labor Board When Seeking 10(j) Injunctions

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision directing district courts to use the traditional four-part test when evaluating whether a preliminary injunction should issue at the request of the National Labor Relations Board pending litigation of a complaint under the National Labor Relations Act. No. 23-367 (June 13, 2024).

The decision settles the split among the federal circuit courts over the standard that should be applied when the Board files a motion for a “10(j)” injunction, named for the section of the Act that authorizes the Board to seek injunctive relief. Circuit courts were split on which test should apply: the traditional four-part test, a more lenient two-part test, or a hybrid of the two.

The Court’s decision raises the bar for the Board, requiring it to meet each prong of the four-part test for a court to grant an injunction. In particular, it will be more difficult for the Board to establish it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” as opposed to the more lenient standard espoused by the Board that “there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred.”

The Court vacated and remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to reevaluate the merits of the injunction request under the four-part test.

10(j) Injunctions

Section 10(j) of the Act allows the Board to seek preliminary injunctions before federal district courts against both employers and unions to stop alleged unfair labor practices during the pendency of the Board’s administrative processing of an unfair labor practice charge. Section 10(j) authorizes a district court “to grant to the Board such temporary relief … as it deems just and proper.”

The requests are rare; the Board has sought only 20 such injunctions since 2023, according to the Board’s website. Nonetheless, the standard a court will use in evaluating the injunction request has been determinative of whether the relief was granted.

Prior Standards

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, as in this case, used a two-part test to assess whether the Board was entitled to an injunction. The two-part test examined whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred,” and “whether injunctive relief is ‘just and proper.’” McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 875 F.3d 333 (2017). The Supreme Court noted in its latest decision that the Board could establish reasonable cause “by simply showing that its ‘legal theory [was] substantial and not frivolous.’”

Conversely, other courts, such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits applied the four-part test used for preliminary injunctions in traditional litigation settings set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under the Winter framework, a party seeking injunctive relief must “make a clear showing” that:

  1. He is likely to succeed on the merits;
  2. He is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
  3. The balance of equities tips in his favor; and
  4. An injunction is in the public interest.

New Standard for Labor Board

In holding that the four-part test applies to 10(j) injunction requests by the Board, the Court declined to allow Section 10(j) language “to supplant the traditional equitable principles governing injunctions.” Rather, courts should apply standard principles involved in granting injunctive relief, not 10(j)’s “discretion-inviting directive.”

The Court explained that the reasonable-cause standard in the two-part test “goes far beyond simply fine tuning the traditional criteria to the Section 10(j) context—it substantively lowers the bar for securing a preliminary injunction by requiring courts to yield to the Board’s preliminary view of the facts, law, and equities.” It noted there is a substantial difference between the “likely”-to-succeed-on-the-merits standard versus a finding that the charge was “substantial and not frivolous.” Under the “less exacting” standard, courts could evaluate injunction requests giving significant deference to the Board under even a “minimally plausible legal theory” without assessing conflicting facts or questions of law.

Accordingly, the Board must satisfy the traditional standard that requires it to make a clear showing it is likely to succeed on the merits of the claim under a valid theory of liability.

The Court’s decision to standardize 10(j) injunction requests not only raises the Board’s burden of proof, but it creates more consistency across district courts at a time employers increasingly face injunction requests by an activist Board general counsel.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024

United States | New DACA Report Breaks Down the Trillion-Dollar Cost of Ending the Program

Coalition for the American Dream published a report this week detailing the projected economic and societal costs of ending the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.

Key Points:

  • Coalition for the American Dream published the report days ahead of the 12th anniversary of the DACA program on June 15.
  • Current DACA recipients number more than 500,000. The report finds that future long-term economic losses and costs could approach $1 trillion over the lifetimes of DACA recipients.
  • Other economic and workforce impacts include:
    • As many as 168,000 U.S. jobs in DACA-owned businesses could be lost.
    • U.S. workforce losses could include 37,000 healthcare workers, 17,000 STEM professionals and 17,000 educators.
    • Lost business training and recruitment costs for current DACA employees could reach $8 billion.

Additional Information: The report’s demographic and economic estimates and business impacts are based in part on data collected in the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2022 American Community Survey, the March 2022-2023-2024 Current Population Surveys and data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Coalition for the American Dream is an organization of more than 100 businesses, trade associations and other groups representing every major sector of the U.S. economy and more than half of American private sector workers. Its mission is to seek the passage of bipartisan legislation that gives Dreamers a permanent solution.

BAL Analysis: The report notes if DACA ended and work authorizations were denied renewal, 440,000 workers would be forced from the U.S. workforce over a two-year period, with the most acute impact on health, education and STEM occupations. The business community continues to show strong support for DACA and the crucial role Dreamers play in the U.S. economy. Given the uncertain environment, DACA recipients who qualify for a renewal are urged to apply for one as soon as they can.

©2024 Berry Appleman & Leiden. All Rights Reserved.
For more on the DACA, visit the NLR Immigration section.

Supreme Court Weakens NLRB’s Ability to Obtain Injunctions in Labor Cases

On June 13, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States held that courts must assess requests for an injunction by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) using the traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctions. The ruling weakens the Board’s ability to obtain quick court orders to maintain the “status quo” in favor of workers in pending labor cases.

Quick Hits

  • The Supreme Court held that federal courts must apply the traditional four-factor equitable test for preliminary injunctions when considering the NLRB’s request for a 10(j) injunction.
  • The ruling found the NRLA does not require courts to defer to the NLRB’s initial findings of a labor violation.
  • The ruling weakens the NLRB’s ability to quickly stop employer actions it alleges are unfair labor practices.

The Supreme Court held that when considering temporary injunction requests under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), courts must apply the traditional equitable four factors as set forth in the high court’s 2008 decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. The decision means that courts must consider 10(j) injunction requests under the same equitable principles that they do for other preliminary injunctions without deferring to the NLRB’s determination that an unfair labor practice had occurred.

The unanimous decision comes in a labor dispute in which the trial court issued a preliminary injunction against an employer after applying a two-part test that only asked whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred” and whether an injunction is “just and proper.” The injunction was later affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The NLRA prohibits employers from engaging in certain unfair labor practices and allows workers to file a charge with the NLRB. The NLRA provides the NLRB with authority to seek a temporary injunction in federal court and Section 10(j) states that courts may “grant the Board such temporary relief … as it deems just and proper.”

However, the Supreme Court held that the NRLA does not strip courts of their equitable powers, and they must apply the traditional four-factor rule as articulated in Winter when considering a request for a 10(j) injunction. Under that rule, a plaintiff must show “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”

The Supreme Court rejected the NLRB’s argument that Section 10(j) informs the application of equitable principles and that courts should use a “reasonable cause” standard as applied by the Sixth Circuit in the case. The NLRB had pointed to the context that Congress has given it the authority to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges in the first instance and that courts must give deference to the NLRB’s final decisions.

Justice Clarence Thomas, in the Court’s opinion, stated that the reasonable cause standard “substantively lowers the bar for securing a preliminary injunction by requiring courts to yield to the Board’s preliminary view of the facts, law, and equities.” Justice Thomas stated the fact that the NLRB is the body that will adjudicate unfair labor practice charges on the merits does not mean courts must defer to what amounts to be the NLRB’s initial litigating position. Section 10(j) “does not compel this watered-down approach to equity,” Justice Thomas stated.

In a partial dissent, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson agreed that the NRLA does not strip courts of their equitable powers and that the injunction in the case should be overturned. However, Justice Jackson argued the Court should not ignore the fact that Congress, through the NRLA, granted the NLRB authority over labor disputes.

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s ruling raises the bar for the NLRB to seek injunctions by requiring courts to make their own assessment of the equitable factors for issuing preliminary injunctions without deference to the NLRB’s initial findings that an unfair labor practice has occurred. Under the reasonable cause standard, the NLRB merely had to show that its legal theory was not frivolous and that an injunction was necessary to protect the “status quo” pending the NLRB’s proceedings. That standard had allowed the NLRB to quickly put a stop to employer actions that its in-house attorneys believe are labor violations during the pendency of an administrative proceeding on the merits, which could take years to resolve.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more news on the Supreme Court NLRB Ruling, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

Navigating Politics in the Workplace

In this election year, employees inevitably will engage in discussions of the impactful and divisive political issues that are at the forefront of our national discourse. Employers must be aware of the ways in which political discussions in the workplace have intensified and be prepared to navigate the legal and other challenges posed by these interactions. This checklist provides employers with an overview of key topics to consider when addressing issues related to political speech in the workplace.

1. First Amendment Protection. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it generally applies only to governmental action. Private employers generally have latitude to restrict political speech in the workplace unless it implicates other legal protections.

2. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 7 of the NLRA protects non-supervisory employees in the private sector, regardless of whether they are members of a union. Employers generally cannot restrict covered employees’ discussions related to the terms and conditions of their employment, i.e., “protected concerted activity.” Political speech that also falls under NLRA protection must be considered carefully.

3. Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment Policies. Political speech may implicate discrimination or harassment concerns when it includes topics related to protected categories or characteristics, e.g., race, gender, religion. Employers should have robust anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies that cover these issues.

4. State Laws Protecting Political Speech. State laws may protect employees’ political activity, expression or affiliation. These laws include prohibitions against initimdation, threats, or adverse actions based on employee voting, political activities, or candidate endorsements. Employers must assess their policies and practices in each state where they have employees because the scope of these laws varies by jurisdiction.

5. Respectful Workplace and Other Policies. Employers should consider adopting policies that promote respectful behavior and prevent political discussions from escalating into conflicts. Employers also should consider dress code and other workplace policies concerning political attire or messages, and ensure consistent, content-neutral enforcement of those policies. When reports of potential policy violations are made, employers should respond promptly.

6. Train Employees. Employees should receive regular training on company policies and their rights, including the boundaries of political speech in the workplace.

Employers should tailor their policies to address political speech while respecting employees’ rights and maintaining a positive work environment. Each workplace is unique, however, and issues often require context and fact-specific solutions with the assistance of counsel.

2024 Goulston & Storrs PC.
For more news on Navigating Political Discussions in the Workplace, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.