Category: Labor & Employment

Are Your AI Selection Tools Validated? OFCCP Provides Guidance for Validation of AI-Based Algorithms

We have long counseled employers using or contemplating using artificial intelligence (“AI”) algorithms in their employee selection processes to validate the AI-based selection procedure using an appropriate validation strategy approved by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (“Uniform Guidelines”).  Our advice has been primarily based on minimizing legal risk and complying with best practices.  A recently updated Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQ”) from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) provides further support for validating AI-based selection procedures in compliance with the Uniform Guidelines.

On July 23, 2019, the OFCCP updated the FAQ section on its website to provide guidance on the validation of employee selection procedures.  Under the Uniform Guidelines, any selection procedure resulting in a “selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact,” which in turn requires the validation of the selection procedure.  These validation requirements are equally applicable to any AI-based selection procedure used to make any employment decision, including hiring, termination, promotion, and demotion.

As stated in the Uniform Guidelines, and emphasized in the FAQ, the OFCCP recognizes three methods of validation:

  1. Content validation – a showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job in question;

  2. Criterion-related validation – production of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive or significantly correlated with important aspects of job performance; and

  3. Construct validation – a showing that the procedure measures the degree to which candidates possess identifiable characteristics that have been determined to be important in successful performance on the job.

With the exception of criterion-related validating studies, which can be “transported” from other entities under certain circumstances, the Uniform Guidelines require local validation at the employer’s own facilities.

If a selection procedure adversely impacts a protected group, the employer must provide evidence of validity for the selection procedure(s) that caused the adverse impact. Thus, it is crucial that employers considering the implementation of AI-based algorithms in the selection process both conduct adverse impact studies and be prepared to produce one or more validation studies.

The new FAQ also provides important guidelines on the substantial methods utilized by OFCCP in evaluating potential adverse impact.  In accordance with the Uniform Guidelines, OFCCP will analyze the Impact Ratio – the disfavored group’s selection rate divided by the favored group’s selection rate.  Any Impact Ratio of less than 0.80 (referred to as the “Four – Fifths Rule”) constitutes an initial indication of adverse impact, but OFCCP will not pursue enforcement without evidence of statistical and practical significance.  For statistical significance, the OFCCP’s standard statistical tests are the Fisher’s Exact Test (for groups with fewer than 30 subjects) and the Two Independent-Sample Binomial Z-Test (for groups with 30 or more subjects).

With the publication of this new FAQ, employers – and particularly federal contractors – should be sure to evaluate their use of AI-based algorithms and properly validate all selection procedures under the Uniform Guidelines.  Moreover, although not addressed in the OFCCP’s new FAQ, employers should also ensure that their AI-based algorithms are compliant with all other state and federal laws and regulations.

©2019 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Employers Beware: SC Abolishes Common-Law Marriage

On July 24, 2019, South Carolina joined the ranks of Alabama, Pennsylvania, and others in abolishing future recognition of common law marriages in the state.  The state will continue to recognize all common law marriages in effect before this date, but they will be subject to a higher standard of proof.  On and after July 25, 2019, all South Carolina marriages will require the issuance of a marriage license.

This ruling from the South Carolina Supreme Court came after many legislative attempts at abolishing common law marriage failed.  The court determined the paternalistic reasons behind the original recognition of a common law marriage, e.g., the stigma of unwed mothers, children out of wedlock, and the logistics of the “circuit minister” or other official required to cover a large territory, no longer apply.  With the elimination of future common law marriage recognition, the court also handed down a new standard of proof parties must meet to continue to be considered married under common law.  Probate cases in South Carolina use the “clear and convincing evidence” standard to prove marriage, and now this standard applies to the living too.

Our workforce is transient.  Employees residing in South Carolina often move across state lines for work and personal reasons.  And many companies with principal offices outside South Carolina choose to open locations in South Carolina.  For that reason, this ruling reaches beyond state lines, and it is important for all employers to understand its implications upon benefit plans and leaves of absence.

After July 24, 2019, it no longer is enough for employees claiming an employee is a “spouse” for employee benefit plan purposes simply to establish they were married under the common law of South Carolina.  Now, the critical factor is the date as of which that marriage was established.  The documents submitted to prove the marriage (e.g., tax returns, documents filed under penalty of perjury, introductions in public, contracts, and checking accounts) must also reflect this timing.

This Court decision will also have implications for employees in South Carolina seeking to take a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act to care for a spouse with a serious health condition.  Before July 25, 2019, eligible employees could take a leave of absence under the FMLA to care for a common law spouse with a serious health condition.  Yet after this Court ruling, employees can only take FMLA leave to care for a common law spouse if that common law marriage was established on or before July 24, 2019.  Employers should remember that under the Department of Labor’s FMLA Regulations, employees can be required to provide reasonable documentation evidencing the existence of a valid marriage.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

Inclusion Does Not Stop Workplace Bias, Deloitte Survey Shows

In Deloitte’s 2019 State of Inclusion Survey, 86% of respondents said they felt comfortable being themselves all or most of the time at work, including 85% of women, 87% of Hispanic respondents, 86% of African American respondents, 87% of Asian respondents, 80% of respondents with a disability and 87% of LGBT respondents. But other questions in the company’s survey show a more troubling, less inclusive and productive office environment, and may indicate that simply implementing inclusion initiatives is not enough to prevent workplace bias.

While more than three-fourths of those surveyed also said that they believed their company “fostered an inclusive workplace,” many reported experiencing or witnessing bias (defined as “an unfair prejudice or judgment in favor or against a person or group based on preconceived notions”) in the workplace. In fact, 64% said that they “had experienced bias in their workplaces during the last year” and “also felt they had witnessed bias at work” in the same time frame. A sizable number of respondents—including 56% of LGBT respondents, 54% of respondents with disabilities and 53% of those with military status—also said they had experienced bias at least once a month.

Listening to those who say they have witnessed or experienced bias is especially important. When asked to more specifically categorize the bias they experienced and/or witnessed in the past year, 83% said that the bias in those incidents was indirect and subtle (also called “microaggression”), and therefore less easily identified and addressed. Also, the study found that those employees who belonged to certain communities were more likely to report witnessing bias against those communities than those outside them. For example, 48% of Hispanic respondents, 60% of Asian respondents, and 63% of African American respondents reported witnessing bias based on race or ethnicity, as opposed to only 34% of White, non-Hispanic respondents. Additionally, 40% of LGBT respondents reported witnessing bias based on sexuality, compared to only 23% of straight respondents.

While inclusion initiatives have not eliminated bias, Deloitte stresses that these programs are important and should remain. As Risk Management previously reported in the article “The Benefits of Diversity & Inclusion Initiatives,” not only can fostering diversity and inclusion be beneficial for workers of all backgrounds, it can also encourage employees to share ideas for innovations that can help the company, keep employees from leaving, and insulate the company from accusations of discrimination and reputational damage.

But building a more diverse workforce is only the first step, and does not guarantee that diverse voices are heard or that bias will not occur. Clearly, encouraging inclusion is not enough and more can be done to curtail workplace bias. And employees seeing or experiencing bias at work has serious ramifications for businesses. According to the survey, bias may impact productivity—68% of respondents experiencing or witnessing bias stated that bias negatively affected their productivity, and 70% say bias “has negatively impacted how engaged they feel at work.”

Deloitte says that modeling inclusion and anti-bias behavior in the workplace is essential, stressing the concept of “allyship,” which includes, “supporting others even if your personal identity is not impacted by a specific challenge or is not called upon in a specific situation.” This would include employees or managers listening to their colleagues when they express concerns about bias and addressing incidents of bias when they occur, even if that bias is not apparent to them or directly affecting them or their identity specifically.

According to the survey, 73% of respondents reported feeling comfortable talking about workplace bias, but “when faced with bias, nearly one in three said they ignored bias that they witnessed or experienced.” If businesses foster workplaces where people feel comfortable listening to and engaging honestly with colleagues of different backgrounds, create opportunities for diversity on teams and projects, and most importantly, address bias whenever it occurs, they can move towards a healthier, more productive work environment.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2019 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
For more on workplace discrimination issues, please see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Note To Chicago Employers: Expansive New Work Scheduling Rules Take Effect July 2020

The Chicago City Council passed the Chicago Fair Workweek Ordinance on July 23, regarding advance scheduling notice for certain employees in certain industries, including healthcare, hotels, restaurants, and retail, among others. Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot has already indicated that she will sign the new ordinance in short order, describing it as the most expansive worker scheduling policy in the country, including the first in the country to cover healthcare employers.

The ordinance, which goes into effect in July 2020, imposes significant administrative requirements relative to the employer/employee relationship. Chicago employers should consider familiarizing themselves with them now in order to avoid penalties in 2020.

Details and Penalties of the New Ordinance

The ordinance will require covered employers operating in the City of Chicago to provide employees with 10 days advance notice of scheduled work, generally beginning on July 1, 2020. After June 30, 2022, the period of required advance notice of the work schedule will increase to 14 days. The work schedule must be posted in a conspicuous location at the workplace, or must be emailed upon the request of the employee.

In addition, the ordinance provides a carve-out for smaller employers, only applies to employees who earn less than $50,000 annually or $26.00 per hour or less, and does not apply to independent contractors or day and seasonal laborers.

Employers generally covered by the law are those who have 100 or more employees (in total, not just in Chicago), or 250 or more employees in the case of nonprofit entities. Restaurants covered by the ordinance are those with more than 30 locations and at least 250 total employees (and franchisees with four or more locations). Of the total employee count, for the employer to be governed by the law, at least 50 of their employees must be “covered” employees.

If employers make changes inconsistent with the requirements of the ordinance, the employees must receive compensation. The amount of compensation will depend on the nature of the scheduling change.

Right to Decline Work Scheduled

Employees under the ordinance have the right to decline any work scheduled that does not comply with the required advance notice period. Further, if an employer alters an employee’s schedule after the deadline, depending on the particular circumstances, the employer may be required to pay the employee an additional hour for each altered shift. The ordinance also prohibits retaliation against the employee for exercising rights conferred by the scheduling ordinance.

A number of exceptions do apply. For example, schedule changes caused by power outages, blizzards, a mutually agreed-upon shift trade, or a schedule change that is mutually agreed upon by the employer and employee and confirmed in writing.

The Chicago Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection has been tasked with enforcing this new ordinance. Employers who violate this law will be subject to a fine of between $300 and $500 for each offense. The law also establishes a process by which an employee may initiate a civil action under the law, beginning with a written complaint to the department.

 

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more employment ordinances nation-wide, please see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

Don’t Slip Up: When Are California Employers Required to Pay for Employees’ Shoes?

A hot-button issue in California is whether an employer is required to pay for or reimburse an employee for shoes that are required as a condition of employment. A recent ruling by the California Court of Appeal highlights the complexity of the issue and lack of concrete guidance on a critical question: whether California workplace safety law requires an employer to pay for nonspecialty safety shoes, such as generic steel-toe boots, that the employer allows the employee to wear off the jobsite.

An employer’s failure to properly pay for or reimburse for the shoes it requires its employees to wear as a condition of employment can expose the employer to civil liability and/or regulatory enforcement by California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA). Indeed, there has been a dramatic uptick in both civil class action claims against employers and regulatory enforcement by Cal/OSHA alleging failure to pay for or reimburse for the cost of shoes required as a condition of employment. These difficult scenarios range from generic waterproof shoes requirements in food processing plants to nonspecific requirements for work boots to be worn on construction sites.

In Townley v. BJ’s Restaurants, Inc., No. C086672 (June 4, 2019), the California Court of Appeal ruled that under California Labor Code section 2802 and the Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Order No. 5 applicable to the restaurant industry, BJ’s Restaurants was not required to pay for the cost of the slip-resistant shoes that it required its employees to wear as a condition of employment. In so holding, the court relied on Wage Order No. 5, which provides that a restaurant employer must pay for its employees’ work apparel only if it is a “uniform” or if it qualifies as certain protective apparel regulated by Cal/OSHA or the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

Section 2802 provides that employers are required to reimburse their employees for “necessary expenditures … incurred by the employee[s] in direct consequence of the discharge of [their] duties.” Thus, if slip-resistant shoes were part of a uniform or apparel regulated by Cal/OSHA or OSHA, then pursuant to section 2802, BJ’s Restaurants would have been required to reimburse its employees for the cost of the shoes. The court relied on a California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) opinion letter to find that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the slip-resistant shoes constituted a “uniform” within the meaning of the Wage Order No. 5:

The definition and [DLSE] enforcement policy is sufficiently flexible to allow the employer to specify basic wardrobe items which are usual and generally usable in the occupation, such as white shirts, dark pants and black shoes and belts, all of unspecified design, without requiring the employer to furnish such items. If a required black or white uniform or accessory does not meet the test of being generally usable in the occupation the emplolyee [sic] may not be required to pay for it.

The court found that because the plaintiff did not argue that the slip-resistant shoes were part of a “uniform” or were not usual and generally usable in the restaurant occupation, the employer was not required to reimburse the plaintiff for the slip-resistant shoes under Labor Code section 2802.

However, even though the court held as such, given that the plaintiff had not attempted to characterize the shoes as apparel regulated by Cal/OSHA or OSHA, the court did not reach the issue of whether the employer could be obligated to pay for the slip-resistant shoes under Cal/OSHA or OSHA. This unanswered question is bad news for California employers, as it is unsettled whether an employer is required to pay for nonspecialty protective shoes required as a condition of employment, such as generic work boots. It remains unsettled because there is a conflict between Cal/OSHA and OSHA regulations regarding generic nonspecialty protective shoes.

Shoes as Personal Protective Equipment

Under federal OSHA regulations, which were amended in 2008, an employer is required to provide personal protective equipment, including certain specialty protective shoes, at no cost to the employee. However, the federal OSHA regulations also contain an exemption that does not require the employer to pay for generic nonspecialty shoes, such as steel-toe boots, which the employer permits to be worn off the jobsite. Further, a 2011 OSHA directive interpreted this regulation as not requiring employers to “pay for non-specialty shoes that offer some slip-resistant characteristics, but are otherwise ordinary clothing in nature.”

Consistent with the federal OSHA regulations, Cal/OSHA regulations provide that “[a]ppropriate foot protection shall be required for employees who are exposed to foot injuries from electrical hazards, hot, corrosive, poisonous substances, falling objects, crushing or penetrating actions, which may cause injuries or who are required to work in abnormally wet locations.” Also consistent with federal law, California law generally provides that, if protective equipment is required by Cal/OSHA, the employer is responsible for the cost of the protective equipment.

However, California law significantly diverges from federal law when it comes to nonspecialty safety shoes that can be worn off the jobsite. Under Cal/OSHA, there is no corresponding provision that specifically exempts employers from paying for the cost of generic nonspecialty safety shoes, such as steel-toe boots. Indeed, in 2012, the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board proposed the adoption of a regulation similar to the federal regulation, which exempted employers from paying for the cost of nonspecialty safety footwear. The proposed regulation initially contained exceptions despite the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board’s having noted that “existing case law requiring employers to pay for [personal protective equipment] is more effective than the federal standard, because California enforces the employer’s duty to pay for safety devices and safeguards without the exceptions provided in the federal standard.” The regulation was ultimately not adopted. Consistent therewith, Cal/OSHA has taken the stance that if an employer requires shoes for safety purposes, whether specialty or nonspecialty, the employer must pay for the cost of those shoes.

In contrast, California employers have argued that the federal OSHA regulation exempting employers from paying for the cost of generic nonspecialty safety shoes should control in California. Indeed, in Townley, the trial court originally granted BJ’s Restaurant’s motion for summary judgment finding that the federal OSHA regulation exempting employers from paying for the cost of nonspecialty safety shoes controlled in California because California did not adopt a Cal/OSHA regulation requiring employers to reimburse employees for the cost of such shoes—and thus, BJ’s Restaurants was not required to reimburse for the cost of the slip-resistant shoe. However, as noted above, the California Court of Appeal did not reach the issue of the applicability of Cal/OSHA and OSHA to these types of situations.

Key Takeaways

What does this all mean for California employers? The short answer is that, if an employer requires employees to wear shoes with safety characteristics as a condition of employment, it may want to assess whether it is required to reimburse employees for the cost of the shoes. An employer’s failure to pay for or reimburse an employee for the cost of shoes could expose the employer to potential civil claims or regulatory enforcement by Cal/OSHA.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on employer safety requirements, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment page.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Max Scherzer, a $5 million settlement, and How They All Relate to Workplace Parental Leave Policies

Washington Nationals’ pitching ace Max Scherzer recently took parental leave and helped shine a light on a hot employment topic: ensuring that employers’ parental leave policies are fair and gender-neutral.

This issue also gained attention in May 2019 when JPMorgan Chase, one of the world’s largest banks, reached a $5 million settlement about the bank’s parental leave program. As part of the settlement, the bank will make payments to a group of male employees who were discouraged from taking 16 weeks paid parental leave to care for a new child. The settlement also directs JPMorgan Chase to implement a parental leave program that is fair and gender-neutral. JPMorgan Chase denied the allegations.

At first glance, JPMorgan Chase’s parental leave program seemed gender-neutral. It offered 16 weeks of paid leave for “primary caregivers” and 2 weeks for “secondary caregivers.” The bank, however, allegedly applied the policy differently when a male employee versus a female employee requested leave. That is, female employees requesting parental leave were presumed to be the primary caregivers, while male employees were presumed to be the secondary caregivers. The plaintiffs claimed that, for a male employee to receive parental leave as a primary caregiver, he had to show that his spouse or domestic partner had returned to work, or that he was the spouse or partner of a mother who was medically incapable of caring for the child. Female employees who had given birth themselves were not subject to this requirement.

The named plaintiff in the settlement, Derek Rotondo, requested 16 weeks of parental leave as a “primary caregiver” after the birth of his second child. Human resources, according to Rotondo, informed him that a father requesting parental leave would only be considered a “primary caregiver” if he could show that the mother had to return to work before the 16 weeks elapsed, or that she was “medically incapable” of caregiving. Rotondo could not demonstrate either option, and he received only two weeks of parental leave.

Rotondo then filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenging JPMorgan Chase’s practice of denying primary caregiver leave to fathers. He also filed a class action complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals. Rotondo received 16 weeks parental leave, and the five thousand other male employees who were denied parental leave as a “primary caregiver” will be compensated from a fund created by the $5 million settlement.

This is not the first time that a step towards gender equality was taken in a case involving male plaintiffs who sought caregiver benefits, only to find out that the benefits are not available to them because they are men. Rotondo was represented by lawyers from the A.C.L.U.’s Women’s Rights Project, which was founded by now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the early 1970’s. Ginsburg was an A.C.L.U. lawyer when she argued Moritz v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue System before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Moritz was the first federal court case to hold that discrimination on the basis of sex is unconstitutional. In that case, Moritz claimed a tax deduction for the cost of a caregiver for his mother, but the IRS denied it because the agency only allowed the deduction to be claimed by women and formerly married men. Ginsburg argued that no rational basis in the law exists for treating men and women differently. Moreover, she argued that the proper remedy was to allow men to claim the deduction as well, instead of eliminating the deduction for everyone.

Of course, in some families one parent is the primary caregiver to the children and one parent, for whatever reason, needs to return to work more quickly than their partner. The larger problem (for companies and their employees) is where the employer presumes a connection between an individual’s gender and that individual’s role at home. Doing so presumptively differentiates among employees and their parental leave needs based on sex. The settlement between JPMorgan Chase and their employees demonstrates that companies do so at their own risk.

As Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted, “[w]omen will have achieved true equality when men share with them the responsibility of bringing up the next generation.”

 

© 2019 Zuckerman Law
This article was written by Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
For more on parental leave policies, please see the Labor & Employment page on the National Law Review.

“Bikini Baristas” Ordered to Cover-Up

The 9th Circuit court of appeals has enforced the City of Everett, Washington’s Dress Code Ordinance and amendments to the Lewd Conduct Ordinances. These ordinances require employees of “Quick-Service” facilities to cover “minimum body areas” (the dress code ordinance specifically stated that it was targeting an apparent influx of “bikini barista stands”). The owner of “Hillbilly Hotties,” a coffee stand where employees wear only bikinis, and several of the bikini baristas themselves challenged the ordinances as unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Ordinances violated their First Amendment right to free expression.

The Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling that prohibited enforcement of the Ordinances on the ground that they are unconstitutionally vague. The appeals court explained that a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to understand the terms in the Ordinance and would be adequately informed of which body areas cannot be exposed or displayed.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Plaintiffs’ first amendment claim faltered based upon their failure to show a great likelihood that their intended message would be understood by those who received it. The court found that the baristas’ acts of wearing pasties and g-strings in close proximity to customers did not necessarily convey the baristas’ purported message of female body confidence and empowerment.

Read the full decision here.

 

© 2019 Proskauer Rose LLP.
This article was written by Anthony J Oncidi and Cole D. Lewis of Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more on First Amendment questions please see the National Law Review Constitutional Law page.

Taking Vacation While on Medical Leave: Massachusetts Court Rules on Liquidated Damages Under the FMLA

On June 5, 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) issued a decision emphasizing that an employer’s well-designed and thorough internal investigations made prior to a termination decision can provide a strong defense to claims, but less carefully conducted investigations do not.

In DaPrato v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) terminated DaPrato’s employment because of its “honest belief” that his family vacation to Mexico during the last two weeks of his Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave for recovery from foot surgery was an improper use of the leave and warranted termination. The court rejected that position, and clarified the employer’s burden to avoid the award of liquidated damages (i.e., double damages) in claims brought pursuant to the FMLA.

The FMLA states that a judge “shall” award liquidated damages in accordance with statutory provisions if an employer is found liable for violating the FMLA. However, when an employer demonstrates that its conduct was “in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that [its action] was not a violation [of the FMLA]” liquidated damages are in the discretion of the judge and are not mandatory. The MWRA argued such discretionary authority should be available due to a “belief that the employee had misused FMLA leave, even if that belief is mistaken.”

The SJC emphasized that the statute requires employers to act both “in good faith” and on “reasonable grounds.” Applying this standard, the court found that, even though the defendant honestly believed it was complying with the FMLA, it lacked objectively reasonable grounds for such belief. Notably, the SJC found the MWRA’s investigation ignored the employee’s FMLA application and medical records and instead was grounded in “shock, outrage and offense” at the possibility of further FMLA leave for a scheduled knee surgery.

The MWRA’s policy that considered impermissible all vacation taken while on FMLA leave fell short the requirement that it be in good faith and reasonable. The SJC explicitly noted that an employer may not treat the mere fact that an employee went on vacation during FMLA leave, on its own, as impermissible. Instead, a vacation can be permissible or impermissible in terms of consistency with medical leave depending on whether the employee’s conduct while on vacation is consistent with his or her claimed reasons for medical leave. Only when an employer is privy to such information regarding the employer’s conduct may it consider inconsistencies between the conduct and the claimed reasons for leave when evaluating whether leave has been properly or improperly used. Here, a blanket assumption that the employee’s vacation represented an improper use of leave time and the failure to properly investigate left the MWRA unable to obtain a lesser liquidated damages amount.

Key Takeaways

While the decision focused on the narrow “honest belief” exception to liquidated damages in the FMLA, it should remind employers of the importance of objectivity in their investigations. In the context of an FMLA investigation, DaPrato reminds employers to ensure that they avoid decisions that are “honest but unconsciously biased” where, as here, the employer mistakenly believed an employee on FMLA leave could not legitimately take a vacation. Only by satisfying both the good faith and reasonableness requirements—which in this case mandated knowledge of the law surrounding employee use of vacations while on FMLA leaves—could this employer have avoided liquidated damages. Thus, DaPrato should prompt employers to be even more cautious when discharging employees for perceived misconduct and ensure their internal investigations are thorough, fair, and objective.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on FMLA policies see the National Law Review page on Labor & Employment.

Federal Court Declares That a Ban on Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Claims Is Inconsistent with Federal Law

Launched more than a decade ago, the #MeToo movement made its way into the national (and international) conversation in 2017, and, by 2018, the movement had such momentum that it spurred a cornucopia of new state laws.  One of these new laws, which became effective July 11, 2018, is a New York State statute that prohibits employers from requiring employees to submit sexual harassment claims to mandatory arbitration.  This new law is codified in Section 7515 of the Civil Practice Law & Rules of the State of New York (“C.P.L.R.”), entitled “Mandatory arbitration clauses; prohibited.”  Section 7515 reflects the New York State Legislature’s (which consists of the New York State Assembly and the New York State Senate) determination that employees should be allowed to have their sexual harassment claims adjudicated in a court of law, if that is their preference.  The introductory clause of Section 7515 also indicates, however, that legislators understood that an unqualified prohibition of mandatory arbitration might not pass muster under federal law:

Prohibition. Except where inconsistent with federal law, no written contract, entered into on or after the effective date of this section shall contain a prohibited clause as defined in paragraph two of subdivision (a) of this section.  (C.P.L.R. § 7515(b)(i).)

Hence, the statute engendered substantial uncertainty among employers.  Now, almost one year after C.P.L.R. § 7515 became law, a U.S. District Court Judge, the Hon. Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York, has addressed this confusion by opining on whether New York State may outlaw privately negotiated agreements to submit all disputes, inclusive of claims for sexual harassment, to arbitration.  In Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, et al., No. 1:18-cv-11528 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019),  Judge Cote delivered a clear message about the collision of C.P.L.R. § 7515, which operates to constrain parties’ rights to agree to arbitrate claims, and the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), which, as repeatedly reinforced by the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years, mandates substantial deference to private arbitration agreements.  Employers, especially those in the financial services industry, have reason to cheer Judge Cote’s opinion in Latif, which restores a degree of certainty about whether a mandatory arbitration clause governing an employment relationship may still be enforced—at least in some courts.

The essential facts are as follows: Mahmoud Latif (“Latif”) signed an employment agreement (the “Offer Letter”) that incorporated by reference Morgan Stanley’s mandatory arbitration program.  Read together, these documents formed the “Arbitration Agreement” between Latif and Morgan Stanley.  The Arbitration Agreement provided that any “covered claim” that arose between Latif and Morgan Stanley would be resolved by final and binding arbitration, and that “covered claims” included, among other causes of action, discrimination and harassment claims.  Nevertheless, Latif commenced an action against Morgan Stanley in federal court, asserting, among other charges, claims of sexual harassment under federal, state and municipal law.  The Morgan Stanley defendants moved to compel arbitration of the entire case, inclusive of the sexual harassment claims.  Latif opposed that motion on the basis of C.P.L.R. §7515, which, according to Latif, expressed New York State’s “general intent to protect victims of sexual harassment,” and required the Court to retain jurisdiction over the sexual harassment claims—even though those claims fell clearly within the ambit of the Arbitration Agreement.

In granting Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel arbitration, inclusive of the sexual harassment claims, Judge Cote held that C.P.L.R. §7515 could not serve as the basis to invalidate the Arbitration Agreement.  The Court’s rationale is straightforward: C.P.L.R. §7515 purports to nullify agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims “except where inconsistent with federal law,” and the statute is indeed inconsistent with the FAA’s “strong presumption that arbitration agreements are enforceable.”  Judge Cote therefore stayed Latif’s court action pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings.

In light of the foregoing, to maximize the likelihood of full enforcement of an arbitration agreement, inclusive of claims for sexual harassment, employers should promptly consider the prospect of removal of a New York State court action to federal court, if circumstances otherwise permit such removal.

Finally, employers also should note that, on June 19, 2019, the New York State Legislature voted to amend Section 7515 to prohibit not only the mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims, but also the mandatory arbitration of anyallegation or claim of discrimination.  While, as of this writing, the amendment has not yet been signed into law by the executive, it appears safe to predict that states will continue, in the near future, to attempt to prohibit or constrain mandatory arbitration of discrimination/harassment claims in a way that generates apparent conflict with federal law.  The Supreme Court’s adjudication of a constitutional challenge to C.P.L.R. §7515, and/or like statutes, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution seems to be a likely end-game.

 

©2019 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
Read more on Arbitration and #MeToo on our arbitration type of law page.

New York Legislature Passes Bill Allowing Employees to Place a Lien on Employer’s Property for Wage Claims

The New York Senate and Assembly recently passed Senate Bill S2844B to strengthen current laws for employees who are victim of wage theft to secure and collect unpaid wages for work already performed from their employers. This bill would amend five sections of the law (Lien Law; Labor Law; Attachment under the Civil Practice Law and Rules; the Business Corporations Law; and the Limited Liability Law). If signed by the Governor, this bill would create a broad right for any employee to obtain a lien on an employer’s property based on the allegation of a wage claim and would significantly increase employee power in such disputes.

This bill would expand on current lien remedies and create an “employee lien,” that would allow an employee who has a wage claim to place a lien on his or her employer’s interest in property (real or personal property) for the value of that employee’s wage claim, plus liquidated damages. “Wage claim” is defined as any claim constituting a violation of New York Labor Law § 170 (overtime), § 193 (improper deductions), § 196-d (gratuities) , or § 652 and § 673 (minimum wage). Wage claims also include claims for breach of employment contract where wages are not payed under the contract, and Federal minimum wage claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206 and § 207. The employee’s lien cannot be placed on an employer’s deposit accounts or goods.

Notice of the lien must be filed within three years of the end of employment which gave rise to the wage claim. Real property notice must be filed in the clerk’s office of the county where the property is located. Personal property notice must be filed with a financing statement pursuant to section 9-501 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Employee’s liens may be filed by the employee or the New York State Department of Labor and the New York Attorney General for wage claims that are subject of their investigations, court actions or administrative agency actions. Notice of an employee’s lien must be served upon the employer within five days before or 30 days after filing notice. The lien is valid for one year unless extension is filed with the county clerk. If no action is commenced during the extension period, the lien will be automatically extinguished unless extended by a court order.

If passed, this bill would also streamline the procedures to which employees may hold the ten largest shareholders of a non-publicly traded corporation and the ten members with the largest ownership interests in a limited liability company personally liable for wage theft. The bill also contains a provision that would allow employees to examine a business corporation’s and limited liability company’s records to obtain the shareholders’ or members’ (as the case may be) names, addresses, and ownership value in the company.

Once the bill is signed by the Governor, it will take effect 30 days after becoming law and will apply to all claims for liabilities that arose prior to its passage.

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