Category: Labor & Employment

Changing Course: “Contract Coverage” is the New Standard for Unilateral Action

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) departed from precedent last week when it addressed whether an employer’s unilateral action under a collective bargaining agreement was lawful.

The case in question – M.V. Transportation, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit Union Local #1637, AFL–CIO, CLC., Case 28– CA–173726 – concerned what standard the Board should apply to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement grants an employer the right to take certain unilateral actions, without further bargaining with the union. Under prior case law, the Board had applied the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard, under which the employer would be found to have violated the Act unless a provision of the collective bargaining agreement specifically refers to the type of employer decision at issue, or mentions the kind of factual situation that the case presents.

In M.V. Transportation, the Board noted that several appeals courts have rejected the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard in favor of a “contract coverage” standard, including, importantly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which, by statute, has full jurisdiction to review NLRB decisions.  Under the “contract coverage” standard, the decision-maker must examine the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the action taken by an employer was within the “compass or scope of contractual language granting the employer the right to act unilaterally. The Board cited the example of a collective bargaining agreement that broadly grants the employer the right to implement new rules and policies and to revise existing ones, noting that under such circumstances, an employer would not violate the law by unilaterally implementing new attendance or safety rules or by revising existing disciplinary or off-duty-access policies.

While the Board did choose to adopt the “contract coverage” standard, it did not totally abandon the “waiver” concept. It warned that if an agreement does not clearly cover the employer’s disputed act, and that act has materially, substantially and significantly changed a term or condition of employment constituting a mandatory subject of bargaining, the employer will have violated the law unless it demonstrates that the union clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the change, or that its unilateral action was privileged for some other reason.

In a move that is becoming more common in NLRB cases, the Board also decided to apply the new standard retroactively in all pending unilateral change cases where the determination of whether the employer violated the law turned on whether contractual language granted the employer the right to make the change in question.

Under the new standard, employers should take care in collective bargaining to make sure that the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement supports any unilateral action that the employer wants to reserve the right to take. The language should be clearly written and explicit in its grant of authority, and its meaning should be clear when applying ordinary principles of contract interpretation. By doing that, the employer can assure that its unilateral action does not violate the law or the agreement.

Copyright © 2019 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Uh-Oh: Company’s Social Media Policy Ruled Unlawful

Facebook. Instagram. Twitter. Snapchat. As the list of social media platforms continues to grow and people increasingly choose to use them as communication vehicles, more and more employers are drafting and implementing policies seeking to regulate their employees’ posted content and messaging on those sites. A recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) advice memo, however, is another reminder that companies – including non-union ones – should keep in mind there are legal parameters that come into play in this sphere.

At issue in the case was a company’s social media policy that prescribed certain expectations for employees on social sites and proscribed various types of statements on such platforms. The board ultimately concluded two provisions in the policy ran afoul of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

The first provision found to be unlawful stated:

“Make sure you are always honest and accurate when posting information or news, and if you make a mistake, correct it quickly. Be open about any previous posts you have altered. Remember that the Internet archives almost everything; therefore, even deleted postings can be searched. Never post any information or rumors that are false about Friendship Ridge, fellow employees, owners, residents, suppliers, people working on behalf of Friendship Ridge.”

The NLRB determined this was unlawful because “Board and court precedent has long recognized that employees have the right to make a wide variety of statements in the context of a labor dispute, including inaccurate statements, as long as those statements do not constitute malicious defamation.” In other words, the proscription here was too broad.

The second provision held to be unlawful provided:

“Maintain the confidentiality of Friendship Ridge private or confidential information. Do not post internal reports, policies, procedures or other internal business related confidential communications.”

This was found to violate the NLRA because “the requirement that employees keep confidential the Employer’s ‘policies, procedures’ would reasonably be interpreted by employees to include information about their terms and conditions of employment.” Under the NLRA, employees have the presumptive right to disclose and discuss the terms and conditions of their employment – such as wage rates – so this too was overbroad.

While having a social media policy may make sense, it is important for any company that decides to maintain such a policy to keep in mind that there are limits on what can be proscribed.

 

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

For more on workplace & social media see the Labor & Employment law page of the National Law Review.

California Arbitration Roundup: Employers Are 3-1 For Favorable Arbitration Rulings

California employers received mostly good news this past month on the arbitration front, with a trio of pro-employer arbitration-related rulings.  The California Supreme Court’s recent ruling invalidating an employer’s arbitration agreement (discussed below) is a notable exception.

California Supreme Court Invalidates Employer’s Arbitration Agreement As Unconscionable.

In OTO LLC v. Ken Kho, the California Supreme Court ruled that an Oakland Toyota dealership’s arbitration agreement with a former employee was unenforceable and was so unfair and one-sided that it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  “Arbitration is premised on the parties’ mutual consent, not coercion, and the manner of the agreement’s imposition here raises serious concerns on that score,” the majority opinion said.

In 2013, Ken Kho, then an employee of the dealership, One Toyota, was asked to sign several documents, including an arbitration agreement.  Kho signed it, and was later terminated.

The California Supreme Court acknowledged that California and federal laws strongly favor arbitration. However, the Court considered the following factors in determining that One Toyota’s arbitration agreement was unconscionable:

  • The arbitration agreement purported to waive Kho’s right to file a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner and to have a “Berman” hearing before the Labor Commissioner (while not dispositive, the Court noted that this remains a significant factor in considering unconscionability of employee arbitration agreements);

  • The agreement was presented to Kho in his workspace, along with other employment-related documents;

  • Neither its contents nor its significance was explained;

  • Kho was required to sign the agreement to keep the job he had held for three years;

  • Because One Toyota used a piece-rate compensation system, any time Kho spent reviewing the agreement would have reduced his pay;

  • A low-level employee (a porter) presented the agreement to Kho, “creating the impression that no request for an explanation was expected and any such request would be unavailing”;

  • By having the porter wait for the documents, One Toyota conveyed an expectation that Kho sign them immediately, without examination or consultation with counsel;

  • There was no indication that the porter had the knowledge or authority to explain the terms of the agreement;

  • Kho was not given a copy of the agreement he had signed;

  • The agreement was written in an extremely small font in the form of a “single dense paragraph” of 51 lines, and the text was “visually impenetrable” and “challenge[d] the limits of legibility”;

  • The sentences were complex, filled with statutory references and legal jargon;

  • Kho was not offered a version to read in his native language (while the Court noted this factor, it did not consider it because it did not know Kho’s English proficiency);

  • The arbitration agreement did not make clear One Toyota’s obligation to pay arbitration-related costs (and rather cited to statutory provisions and referenced legal precedent; the Court noted “It would have been nearly impossible to understand the contract’s meaning without legal training and access to the many statutes it references. Kho had neither.”);

  • One Toyota’s agreement did not mention how to bring a dispute to arbitration, nor did it suggest where that information might be found (e.g., by citing to a commercial arbitration provider such as JAMS or AAA); and

  • One Toyota’s arbitration process was complicated to navigate and would likely require an attorney, making it cost-prohibitive for Kho.

The Court concluded that “[w]e have not said no arbitration could provide an appropriate forum for resolution of Kho’s wage claim, but only that this particular arbitral process, forced upon Kho under especially oppressive circumstances and erecting new barriers to the vindication of his rights, is unconscionable.”

Employers would thus be well-advised to revisit their employee arbitration agreements to ensure that they do not contain any of the defects discussed by the Supreme Court in the Kho case.

NLRB Upholds Employer Conduct Related to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements

In Cordúa Restaurants, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 43 (2019), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) addressed the lawfulness of employer conduct surrounding mandatory arbitration agreements for the first time since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis, where the Court held that mandatory arbitration agreements do not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (see here).  In Cordua Restaurants, the NLRB ruled in part that employers are not prohibited under the NLRA from: (1) informing employees that failing or refusing to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement will result in their discharge; and (2) promulgating mandatory arbitration agreements in response to employees opting in to a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act or state wage-and-hour laws.

The NLRB’s decision in Cordua Restaurants is a natural extension of the Supreme Court’s analysis and ruling in Epic Systems.  There, the Court held that Congress, when passing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, instructed courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written.  Since the passage of the FAA predates the NLRA by ten years, and since the NLRA says nothing about overruling the FAA, the NLRB could not, under the guise of enforcing the NLRA, rule that an arbitration agreement that otherwise is lawful on its face violates the NLRA.  This decision by the NLRB is further evidence of that agency’s retreat from past policies advanced by the NLRB in the prior administration and likely will not be overruled.

California Court of Appeals Compels Employee to Arbitrate Claims Even Though He Filed Suit Before Signing Arbitration Agreement

In Quiroz Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium, the California Court of Appeals compelled an employee to arbitrate his claims against his employer even though the employee filed his lawsuit two days before he signed an arbitration agreement.  The Court held that the arbitration agreement was clear in that it required arbitration of any claims and that it did not contain any restriction based on when a claim was filed.

In the case, Quiroz Franco, the employee, was given an arbitration agreement on March 9, 2018, and a Spanish translation shortly thereafter.  On March 19, 2018, he filed a lawsuit against his employer, alleging harassment, discrimination, and wage and hour claims among others.  On March 21, 2018, Quiroz Franco handed in his signed arbitration form, which the employer used to attempt to compel him to arbitrate. The lower court ruled that the claims in the employee’s suit started to accrue before he signed the arbitration agreement, so arbitration couldn’t be compelled.  The employer appealed and the Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision.

California Court of Appeals Rules that Unfair Competition Law Claims Are Arbitrable

In Clifford v. Quest Software Inc., the California Court of Appeals addressed whether an employee’s claim against his employer for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the UCL) was arbitrable, ruling that it was.  The employee brought various wage and hour claims against his employer, and the employer moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ arbitration agreement.  The trial court granted the motion in part and ordered to arbitration every cause of action except the employee’s UCL claim, which the court concluded was not arbitrable.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the employee’s UCL claim was subject to arbitration along with his other causes of action—more good news for California employers.

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

New Jersey and New York Further Strengthen Wage and Hour Laws to Protect Employees: Part 1 – NJ Developments

On August 6, 2019, New Jersey substantially amended its wage and hour laws in several critical respects by, among other provisions, expanding the statute of limitations, increasing damages and criminal penalties, strengthening anti-retaliation provisions and, overall, making it easier and more lucrative for employees to prevail on wage and hour claims. The new “Wage Theft” Law is effective immediately, except for one provision identified below. Here is a summary of the key provisions:

    • The Statute of Limitations Expands from 2 to 6 years – The amendment triples the amount of time available to file claims for unpaid minimum wage and overtime payments, thereby tripling the potential damages available to employees. New Jersey now joins New York in implementing a 6-year statute of limitations for such claims. In contrast, the statute of limitations under federal law remains at 2 years or 3 years, depending on whether a willful violation was committed.

    • Liquidated Damages – The amendment provides that, in addition to having to pay earned, unpaid wages, employers also will be liable for liquidated damages of up to 200% of the wages owed. Previously, liquidated damages were not available under New Jersey law. A limited “good faith” defense will be available to first-time violators under certain circumstances.

    • Anti-Retaliation – The amendment expands the anti-retaliation provisions by making it a disorderly persons offense to take retaliatory action by discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee for making a complaint, instituting an action, or informing other employees about their rights concerning wages and hours of work.There is a rebuttable presumption of retaliation for adverse actions taken within 90 days of an employee filing a complaint with the Department of Labor or a court action. Liquidated damages are available for claims of retaliation.

    • Fines and Penalties – It is now a disorderly persons offense for an employer to (i) knowingly fail to pay wages, compensation or benefits when due, (ii) take retaliatory action, or (iii) fail to pay agreed-upon wages within 30 days of the date when payment is due. An employer who commits any such offense must pay wages due plus 200% of that amount in liquidated damages, reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, a fine of $500 for a first offense (which increases for subsequent offenses) and, under certain circumstances, an additional penalty of 20% of wages due and/or imprisonment. The amendment provides for a broad definition of “employer” to include officers of a corporation and “any agents having the management of that corporation.”

    • Creation of a New Crime – The amendment creates a new crime of “pattern of wage nonpayment” for a person convicted of violating certain provisions of the Criminal Justice Code and/or wage and hour laws on two or more occasions. Though this is classified as a “3rd – degree” crime, there is no presumption of nonimprisonment. This provision will become effective three months from the August 6 enactment date.

    • Joint and Successor Liabilities – The amendment expands the circumstances under which organizations may now be held liable as joint or successor employers.

    • Failure to Maintain Records – The amendment provides that employers who fail to produce required records are subject to a rebuttable presumption that allegations by the employee concerning the time period the employee was employed and the wages that are due are true.

    • Employer Notice Requirement – The amendment imposes a new written notice obligation on employers. NJ employers will be required to distribute both to current employees and new hires a form the NJ Department of Labor and Workforce Development will publish.

Take Aways

Wage and hour compliance has long been a vulnerable area for employers, and New Jersey employers must now contend with wage and hour protections that are among the strongest in the nation. It is more imperative than ever for New Jersey employers to (i) properly classify workers, where warranted, as employees rather than as independent contractors, (ii) properly classify employees as exempt or non-exempt from overtime requirements, (iii) timely pay employees all wages, compensation and benefits due, including overtime, and (iv) maintain required wage and hour records for at least 6 years.

 

© Copyright 2019 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.
For more wage-hour laws, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

DHS Proposes Fee of $10 to File H-1B Petition

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed a fee of $10 per H-1B petition. The agency considers this to be an “appropriate, nominal fee” to recover some costs involved.

In January 2019, DHS published the rule establishing an H-1B electronic registration system. At that time, no fee was proposed, but the “door was left open.” In mid-August, DHS announced that there would be a fee.

As to what information will be required, that is still a bit up in the air – again, the door is left open by DHS. The agency wants enough information to be able to check for fraud, duplicate registrations filed by the same company, and to ensure that those selected during the registration period ultimately file H-1B petitions. In addition to company identification, each registration would include the beneficiary’s:

  • Full name
  • Date of birth
  • Country of birth
  • Gender
  • Passport number

Each registration also will require the petitioner to complete an attestation about the “bona fides” of the registration. Frivolous registrations, DHS warns, “may be referred to appropriate federal law enforcement agencies for investigation and further action as appropriate.” Under a “catch-all,” DHS could require: “any additional basic information requested by the registration system to promote certainty.”

Some concerned about frivolous registrations suggested that information include job title, worksite address, salary offers, SOC code, LCA wage level, and specific educational qualifications. Others suggested including disclosure of any recent labor violations or disputes and EEOC complaints and whether the petitioner is H-1B dependent. DHS rejected these ideas (for now), noting that much of that information would be used to review eligibility once an H-1B petition is filed.

Questions remain about what DHS does with the information it gathers during the electronic registration. In accordance with the Administration’s “Buy American, Hire American” Executive Order,  DHS is already gathering and sharing much information on its H-1B Data Hub. The public can search the number of H-1B approvals and denials by company and by year. The public also can see, by employer, the number of approved H-1B petitions by salary and degree type. In addition to making the information public, DHS has stated in a description of the H-1B registration tool that it “may share the information with other Federal, State, local and foreign government agencies” and “may also share [the] information, as appropriate, for law enforcement purposes or in the interest of national security.” The full scope of this statement is not yet known.

It is unclear whether the electronic registration will be ready in 2020 or when the promised trial period for stakeholders will occur.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

ARTICLE by Amy L. Peck of Jackson Lewis P.C.
For more on DHS filing, see the National Law Review Immigration Law page.

Giving It Your Best Shot: Maintaining a Compliant Vaccination Program in the Healthcare Sector

Workplace vaccination programs are not new. While many focus on influenza, healthcare employers often impose more robust requirements to protect employees and vulnerable patient populations. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends healthcare workers receive several vaccinations, including: hepatitis B; influenza; measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR); varicella (chickenpox); tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis (Tdap); and meningococcal. Many states have enacted laws requiring such vaccinations for healthcare workers. (The CDC maintains a list of state requirements.) Indeed, because healthcare workers can be at a heightened risk for both exposure and transmission of disease to patients, families, and coworkers, prominent medical groups such as the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) recommend mandatory vaccinations consistent with CDC recommendations as part of an effective infection prevention and control program.

Recent outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles and pertussis, have focused public attention on the need for employee vaccine programs. For example, the CDC reports that between January 1, 2019 and August 8, 2019, there were a total of 1,215 confirmed cases of measles in the United States, the highest number since 1994. This is despite the fact that measles was eliminated in the United States in 2000, due to an effective MMR vaccination program. The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that the rise of measles cases is likely due to a decline in people getting the vaccine. (The CDC has additional information about measles and the safety and efficacy of the MMR vaccine.)

Healthcare institutions are increasingly mandating that employees receive vaccinations, such as Tdap and MMR. But, while mandatory vaccination programs are on the rise, so are challenges from employees. Employee objections to vaccines (strengthened by misinformation about vaccines such as MMR), and thus litigation, have increased in recent years. While employers may not always have to accommodate generalized or unfounded objections to vaccinations, employees do have legally cognizable objections to being vaccinated under certain circumstances. Specifically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) takes the position that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require employers to provide exemptions from mandatory vaccination policies or other accommodations to employees with religious objections and disabilities.

Just as wise employers seek to immunize their workforces from harmful pathogens, employers may also seek to immunize their vaccination programs from common legal claims. Employers may want to take into consideration the following issues:

Is the vaccination program mandatory?

Will the vaccination program be voluntary, mandatory, or a hybrid based on employee classification and work setting? Voluntary programs are attractive from the standpoint of avoiding employee objections and ADA/Title VII accommodation issues, but compliance rates may be inadequate or the healthcare setting may favor a mandatory program for some or all healthcare workers. Employers may want to consult the CDC’s recommendations, review applicable state vaccination laws, and assess the risks posed in their facilities in coordination with their infection prevention and control programs.

Is the workforce unionized?

Are nurses or other employees represented by a labor union? Employers with unionized workforces generally must bargain with the unions before imposing mandatory vaccination programs.

Who is covered?

In deciding whether to adopt a mandatory program, what is the scope of the mandate? Is it necessary to require vaccines for all employees (including clerical workers, etc.), or is it more appropriate to reserve the mandatory program for healthcare workers involved in direct patient contact or healthcare workers in vulnerable patient settings, such as the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), pediatric intensive care unit (PICU), emergency department, or operating room? Some employers may find it more effective to implement a mandatory program with respect to a subset of healthcare workers in patient-contact roles, while offering an incentivized voluntary program to others.

Will the program permit exceptions or accommodations?

What accommodations will be permitted, and what is the process for evaluating such requests? In particular, employers should consider having a process to receive and evaluate employee requests for exemption or accommodation due to disability or sincerely held religious beliefs.

  • Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may be required for an employee with a disability, unless it would result in an undue hardship or a direct threat to the safety of the employee or the public. In these cases, employers can work with their infection-control team to determine the risks of exposure and transmission. For example, with employees objecting to a Tdap or MMR vaccine, the risk for a nurse working in the NICU may be very different than that of an office assistant in the back office. The ADA analysis for undue hardship and direct threat are fact specific and complicated.
  • Under Title VII, an accommodation may be required for sincerely held religious beliefs, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. Employers should be aware that the EEOC and courts interpret “religion” broadly, and the term is not limited to major faiths but may include “religious beliefs that are new, uncommon, not part of a formal church or sect, only subscribed to by a small number of people, or that seem illogical or unreasonable to others.” Under Title VII, an undue hardship may exist where there is more than a de minimis cost or burden. The EEOC has considered several factors when determining whether an undue hardship exists, such as (1) the assessment of the public risk at that time, (2) the availability of other means of infection control, and (3) the number of accommodation requests.
  • Employers must maintain medical information and vaccination records collected from employees as confidential files in accordance with ADA requirements.
  • State vaccination laws—including where certain vaccines are mandatory for certain categories of healthcare workers—may also be relevant in designing and implementing a workplace vaccination policy.

What types of accommodations would be permitted?

Where an employer decides, after a case-by-case analysis, that an accommodation is required, it may consider is viable in the healthcare setting. Some common options include the following:

  • Requiring an employee to wear a mask, gown, or other safety gear. This option may depend on the nature of the risk, as a mask may be a reasonable accommodation for influenza in some settings, but it may not be sufficient in a setting with particularly vulnerable patients or with other pathogens that have multiple means of transmission.
  • Modifying an employee’s duties to remove at-risk activities, such as direct patient contact.
  • Temporary or permanent transfers to other positions or work areas that do not contain the same risks to patient safety.
  • Providing alternative vaccines. For example, some employees might have religious objections based on the contents of a vaccine itself, such as its use of swine products or fetal cell lines. In some cases, it may be possible to provide an alternative vaccine from a different manufacturer that does not contain the objectionable ingredient.

Healthcare employers may have legitimate reasons for requiring employee vaccinations and may want to give thoughtful consideration to federal and state employment law protections, as well as the objective medical risks applicable to specific employee groups, healthcare settings, and patient populations, before imposing sweeping mandatory policies. Such organizations may consider reviewing their vaccination programs to avoid unnecessary exposure to discrimination claims.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more vaccination legal considerations see the National Law Review Biotech, Food, Drug law page.

Running Backs NLRB Petition Seeks To “Stiff Arm” NFL Players Association With New Bargaining Unit

An upstart labor organization, the International Brotherhood of Professional Running Backs (IBPRB), has filed a petition with Region 13, the Chicago office of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), seeking to form a separate union for the National Football League’s running backs. The unit clarification petition, NLRB Case No. 13-UC-246227, seeks to sever and create a separate running back bargaining unit from the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA), which has historically represented all NFL players regardless of position.

A unit clarification or “UC” petition generally is used to resolve disputes regarding the unit placement of disputed positions, typically newly created positions, in a process referred to as an accretion. However, a UC petition also can be used as a method to affect the subdivision of an existing bargaining unit, as the IBPRB seeks to do here. A severance effort is most often undertaken when some changed circumstances have occurred that have negated any “community of interest” (similarity of terms and conditions of employment) that may have previously existed among the bargaining unit and raise uncertainty regarding the continued appropriateness of the existing bargaining unit.

The petition filed by the IBPRB cited “the unique career structures” of running backs as its basis for the loss of the necessary community of interest between the running backs and the other NFL player members of the NFLPA.

For a successful UC petition, the petitioner must show “recent, substantial changes in their operations, or that other compelling circumstances exist which would warrant disregarding the long-existing bargaining history” of the parties. In Batesville Casket Company, Inc., 283 NLRB 795 (1987), the NLRB relied upon the standard established in Rock-Tenn Co., 274 NLRB 772 (1985), and dismissed a UC petition because the employer-petitioners did not show any “recent, substantial changes in their operations, or that other compelling circumstances which would warrant disregarding the long-existing bargaining history” of the parties.

It may be difficult for the IBPRB to meet the “recent, substantial changes” test.

While the role of a running back has evolved over recent years as the passing game has become the dominant force in offensive schemes, the basic mission of the position– to carry the ball, catch passes, and block – is unchanged. Whatever may be the unique career structures to which the IBPRB referred in the petition (the average career of an NFL running back is 2.5 years compared to 3.3 years for all positions), it may be difficult for the union to show that there have been “recent, substantial changes” in the running back position to satisfy the Batesville Casket threshold for unit clarification.

In representation cases such as this, the regional office of the NLRB conducts an initial investigation and holds a hearing if appropriate. A notice of hearing has not yet been issued. The NLRB may still be in a huddle.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

More sports law on the National Law Review Entertainment, Sports & Art law page.

OFCCP Proposes New Rule to “Ensure Religious Employers are Protected”

As previewed in the Spring regulatory agenda, the Office of Federal Compliance Contract Programs (OFCCP) has proposed a new rule to clarify aspects of a religious exemption available to federal contractors. In the proposed rule, the agency said it intends to address concerns from religious organizations that ambiguity in the exemption left them reluctant to participate in federal contracts.

The proposed rule was published August 15 in the Federal Register. OFCCP will accept public comments on the rule for 30 days, until September 16, 2019.

The rule would clarify the religious exemption in Executive Order 11246, which includes anti-discrimination obligations for federal contractors. The exemption allows religious organizations to prefer individuals of a particular religion, while still requiring adherence to other anti-discrimination provisions. The rule comes one year after OFCCP issued a Directive reminding its staff to tread lightly when dealing with religious contractors and “proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of . . . religious beliefs.”

As proposed, the rule would clarify that:

  • The exemption covers “not just churches but employers that are organized for a religious purpose, hold themselves out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose, and engage in exercise of religion consistent with, and in furtherance of, a religious purpose.”

  • Religious employers can condition employment upon acceptance of, or adherence to, a religious tenet, provided that they do not discriminate based on other protected bases.

  • Define terms such as “Religion,” “Particular Religion,” and religion “As understood by the employer.”

The rule does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or LGBTQ protections. However, it does cite Masterpiece Cakeshop, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision involving a business owner’s decision to deny service to gay customers based on the owner’s religious beliefs.  In a news release, OFCCP said it considered that case while drafting the rule, in addition to other Supreme Court cases, statutes, and executive orders.

Today’s proposed rule helps to ensure the civil rights of religious employers are protected,

said Patrick Pizzella, acting U.S. Secretary of Labor.

“As people of faith with deeply held religious beliefs are making decisions on whether to participate in federal contracting, they deserve clear understanding of their obligations and protections under the law.”

The proposed rule also comes at the same time it has been reported by Bloomberg Law that the Department of Justice and EEOC are seemingly taking differing positions on LGBTQ rights before the Supreme Court.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019
For more on religious protections, see the National Law Review Civil Rights page.

Does Inconsistency Always Kill the Cat?

Spoiler alert – this article doesn’t have anything to do with cats. But it is about something you hear all the time from employment attorneys. You have to be consistent when it comes to enforcing your attendance policies and plant rules. You have to treat all employees the same. If you don’t, there is a huge risk you won’t be successful in defending your disciplinary decisions in labor arbitrations and employment litigation. As a general rule, this is excellent advice.

Does this mean, though, that you absolutely have to be consistent 100% of the time? If you make an exception to your attendance policy by giving a particular employee one last chance (other than for reasons relating to the ADA or the FMLA), will that be the end of your ability to enforce the policy?

Will excusing a violation of a plant rule in one instance mean you can never enforce it? Will your company be a victim of the “no good deed goes unpunished” rule?

The answer is that if you make exceptions sparingly, and wisely, you will probably be okay. Here are some tips that will put you in a better position to defend the (very) occasional exception:

  1. Make sure you have a compelling reason for making an exception, something that really makes this employee’s situation very different from other cases (e.g., some combination of a long service employee, an otherwise outstanding overall record, and a believable and sympathetic explanation from the employee as to why there was a problem and why it won’t be repeated).
  2. Document why you made an exception. Two years from now, when you are defending an employment litigation and the plaintiff is pointing out how he/she was treated “worse” than the employee for whom you made an exception, you will be in a far better position to remember and explain why you made the exception, and have a judge or jury decide the exception shouldn’t be held against you, if you have contemporaneous documentation explaining the exception.
  3. Be extremely judicious in your use of exceptions. If lack of consistency becomes the rule, rather than the exception, you are going to have a very hard time enforcing your policies and rules.
  4. Make sure the circumstance in front of you today (when you are not making an exception) really is different from the circumstance where you made an exception two years ago. In other words, if the employee you are considering disciplining now is in substantially the same boat as the employee for whom you made an exception, you should rethink whether to impose the discipline.

None of this is meant to minimize the problems that can be caused by inconsistent treatment. Even the EEOC, however, recognizes that there are circumstances where disparate treatment is justifiable. Enforce your rules and policies consistently, but don’t be afraid to make an exception where circumstances, and fairness, demand it.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more in employment  & scheduling, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment page.

Does Asking About Employee’s Alcohol Use Violate the ADA?

In Lansdale v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., No. 16-4106 (July 23, 2019), the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota concluded that a jury had sufficient evidence to find that an employer’s discharge of an employee for suspected corporate credit card abuse following an investigation in which the employee was asked about his alcohol use and drinking habits did not constitute disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or corresponding state law.

Background

The employer had a policy prohibiting employees from using corporate credit cards for personal purchases and providing inaccurate expense reports. Following an audit that revealed discrepancies between the employee’s corporate credit card expenses and expense reports, the employer conducted an investigation. During the investigation, the employer interviewed the employee, who indicated that he had used his corporate card for personal charges in order to hide his alcohol consumption from his wife. During the interview, the employer asked the employee several questions about his drinking habits and how his drinking affected his health and family.  The following morning, the employer discharged the employee.

The employee contended that he had been asked impermissible disability-related questions and that his employment had been terminated based on his responses. Under the ADA, an employer “shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”

Analysis

The court found that the jury had been provided sufficient evidence to find that, even if the questions posed to the employee had been disability-related inquiries, the inquiries had not caused the termination of his employment; rather, the employee’s acknowledgement that he had used his corporate credit card for personal use was a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to find that this admission by itself was the reason for the termination.

Additionally, while alcoholism may constitute a disability under the ADA and corresponding state laws, this case confirms that an employee so claiming must still establish that he or she had an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, or that the employer regarded him or her as having such an impairment, and that it was a motivating factor in the termination decision.

Conclusion

Here, the court found that a reasonable jury, weighing the credibility of the witnesses—in  particular, the employee’s own testimony about his alcohol consumption and how it impacted him, his wife’s testimony that he drank nightly, and his doctor’s testimony that he drank more than what was recommended (though the doctor never applied any diagnostic criteria or noted any serious concerns)—could have found that the employee failed to prove that he suffered from an impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities, that the employer regarded him as having such an impairment, and that it was a motivating factor in the termination decision. In the end, the employee’s belated attempts to claim a disability to excuse his corporate credit card and expense report abuses were insufficient to establish a disability discrimination claim.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more ADA questions see the Labor & Employment Law page on the National Law Review.