Category: Labor & Employment

Seventh Circuit: ADA Does Not Prohibit Discrimination Based on Future Impairments

On October 29, 2019, railway operator Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”) prevailed before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit – which covers Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin – in a case in which the company argued that its refusal to hire an obese candidate due to an unacceptably high risk that the applicant would develop certain obesity-related medical conditions incompatible with the position sought did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

Ronald Shell applied for a job with BNSF as a machine operator position.  Per its standard practice when the applied-for position is safety-sensitive, as was the heavy equipment operator position sought by Shell, BNSF required him to undergo a medical examination.  During the medical examination, the examiner determined that Shell’s body mass index (“BMI”) was 47.  BNSF had a practice of refusing to hire individuals with a BMI higher than 40 for safety-sensitive positions.  In Shell’s case, the employer expressed concern that his obesity, although not causing any present disability, would cause Shell disabilities in the future, such as sleep apnea, diabetes, and heart disease.  BNSF asserted that this risk was significant because a sudden onset of any of these conditions could be catastrophic for a heavy machine operator.  BNSF therefore did not place Shell in the position.

Shell sued, arguing that he was “disabled” under the ADA’s definition of that term because BNSF had “regarded him as” having a disability.  The ADA not only protects individuals who are actually disabled or have a record of being disabled, but also protects individuals who have been subjected to an adverse employment action because of an actual or perceived physical impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits a major life activity.  Shell argued that by refusing to hire him based on the risk of future disabilities that he was at risk of as a result of his obesity, BNSF essentially treated him as though he currently had those conditions.

The Court ruled that the ADA does not protect non-disabled employees from discrimination based on a risk of future impairments.  The Court cited precedent from the Eighth Circuit, where BNSF also faced challenges to its practice of refusing to hire obese applicants due to the risk of future impairments.  The Eighth Circuit, like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, also has held that the statutory language of the ADA does not protect non-disabled individuals who have a risk of disability in the future.

Of note, Shell also argued at the trial court level that his obesity constituted an actual disability, rendering BNSF’s refusal to hire him based on this characteristic a violation of the ADA for this reason as well.  However, as you may recall from our blog post from earlier this year, just a few months ago, the Seventh Circuit addressed this argument in another case, Richardson v. Chicago Transit Authority, and held that obesity, by itself, is not a disability for purposes of the ADA unless it is caused by an underlying physiological disorder.  Shell did not present any evidence in his case of such an underlying disorder, and thus could not, therefore, claim that he was actually disabled.  Notably, the federal appellate courts are split on this issue, which may tee it up for consideration by the United States Supreme Court in the future.  In contrast, among the appeals courts that have addressed the issue of future disabilities, all have agreed, thus far, that the ADA’s reach does not extend to potential or likely future disabilities of currently non-disabled individuals.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more ADA litigation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

PTSD Compensation for First Responders without Associated Physical Injury Revisited by Ohio Legislature in New House Bill

With the recent proliferation of mass shootings and other deadly incidents, several states have taken on the issue of allowing mental and/or emotional impairments caused by post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to be a compensable workers’ compensation condition for first responders without the requirement of a physical injury.

In June 2019, House Bill 80, the budget bill for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, included such a proposal. After the bill passed the House, the Senate stripped the policy provisions on the mental-only diagnosis issue out of the proposed budget. Senate leaders indicated while there may be a reason for a special circumstance, it should be studied and debated separately from the workers’ compensation budget. In July 2019, leadership vowed to consider the legislation later in the year.

True to their word, the issue was revived in September 2019 by Representative Thomas Patton. House Bill 308 reintroduced the issue of PTSD coverage for first responders exposed to traumatic events in the course and scope of their employment. Two hearings on the bill have already occurred, most recently on Oct. 22, 2019. Proponent testimony was offered by several organizations and individuals. The statements reiterated concerns first responders are not able to pursue avenues for compensation under the law set forth by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co. Interestingly, one of the organizations offering proponent testimony was the Ohio State Medical Association.

The business community remains opposed to any legislation that would allow for a “mental-mental” avenue for claimants. Rob Brundrett, director of public policy for the Ohio Manufacturers Association, provided testimony on House Bill 80 earlier this summer. Beyond merely the increased cost to employers, if a mental-only diagnosis were allowed, Mr. Brundrett noted the potential expansion of workers’ compensation beyond first responders could be required.

“If we erode the physical-injury requirement for peace offers, firefighters, and emergency medical workers, it may be difficult to justify not doing the same for other professionals who seek equal treatment,” Mr. Brundrett said in his testimony.

How such a proposal would be funded is also a concern of employers. Mr. Brundrett, who is closely following House Bill 308, has indicated that several discussions in the Senate have occurred in recent weeks on a potential bill that would provide PTSD coverage for first responders outside of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation system. This proposal would, of course, be the preference of the business community.

While passage of this issue in the past has been unsuccessful, the August 2019 mass shooting in Dayton and its impact on first responders may result in this bill moving through the legislature. Dinsmore’s workers’ compensation group will continue to monitor this bill, as its passage would have a profound impact on employers.

If you wish to see the proponent testimony and follow the bill, you can obtain more information here.

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

For more on mental health, see the National Law Review Health Law & Managed Care page.

Can You Spy on Your Employees’ Private Facebook Group?

For years, companies have encountered issues stemming from employee communications on social media platforms. When such communications take place in private groups not accessible to anyone except approved members, though, it can be difficult for an employer to know what actually is being said. But can a company try to get intel on what’s being communicated in such forums? A recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) case shows that, depending on the circumstances, such actions may violate labor law.

At issue in the case was a company that was facing unionizing efforts by its employees. Some employees of the company were members of a private Facebook group and posted comments in the group about potentially forming a union. Management became aware of this activity and repeatedly asked one of its employees who had access to the group to provide management with reports about the comments. The NLRB found this conduct to be unlawful and held: “It is well-settled that an employee commits unlawful surveillance if it acts in a way that is out of the ordinary in order to observe union activity.”

This case provides another reminder that specific rules come into play when employees are considering forming a union. Generally, companies cannot:

  • Threaten employees based on their union activity
  • Interrogate workers about their union activity, sentiments, etc.
  • Make promises to employees to induce them to forgo joining a union
  • Engage in surveillance (i.e., spying) on workers’ union organizing efforts

The employer’s “spying” in this instance ran afoul of these parameters, which can have costly consequences, such as overturned discipline and backpay awards.

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

For more on employees’ social media use, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

National Football Players Association Joins Forces with the National College Players Association in Effort to Market Name, Image and Likeness Rights for Student Athletes

The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) has announced a partnership with the National College Players Association (NCPA) to jointly explore the marketing and licensing of all college athletes and how they can be paid for the use of their name, image and likeness through the NFLPA’s licensing affiliated entity, REP Worldwide.

Seeking to maximize the value of California’s Fair Pay To Play Act, recently signed into law by California Governor Gavin Newsom, which has empowered California student-athletes to seek financial opportunities relating to the marketing of their name, image and likeness beginning in January 2023, NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith stated, “We are proud to partner with the NCPA and offer the services of REP Worldwide to offer all athletes the same world class service that NFL players receive. For the first time, a legislature has indicated that these students have rights just like everyone else and we support this continuing movement towards fairness. Regarding the NFLPA’s new partnership with the NCPA, Smith added, the new relationship

“will explore opportunities for merchandise, gaming and other officially licensed products. We will also review how recent developments impact television broadcast revenues in pursuit of fairness.”

Ramogi Huma, former UCLA Bruins linebacker and current NCPA Executive Director, commented as well. “I am grateful that college athletes will finally have representation that cares only about fairness for the athletes.” He continued, “We are on the right side of history and invite the NCAA’s commercial partners to join us. It’s time to embrace a new beginning.”

Despite the announcement of the partnership, the potential relationship between these two entities and college athletes is still unclear.

While representatives of the NFLPA and NCPA continue to express their future role as one of “representation,” college athletes as a group are not viewed as employees and are neither unionized nor legally recognized as a collective group. Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the Fair Labor Standards Act recognizes student-athletes within their definition of employee.

How and if, the NFLPA, Rep Worldwide and the NCPA can represent all college athletes and serve as their collective voice in exploring group marketing opportunities is a question that remains to be answered.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

For more on sports representation, see the National Law Review Entertainment, Art & Sports law page.

AB 1291 Forces California Cannabis Companies To Sign “Labor Peace Agreements” With Unions, But Statute May be Unconstitutional

 

On October 12, 2019, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill 1291 (“AB 1291”) into law, which requires companies to sign a so-called “labor peace” agreement with a union or risk losing their cannabis license; thereby, strengthening already union-friendly statewide cannabis law. AB 1291 was supported and endorsed by various unions, including the United Food and Commercial Workers Western States Council, a 170,000-member branch representing thousands of cannabis workers. This bill, as well as other California statutes and local laws, signals a growing insistence by state and local regulators that employers doing business in California accept pro-union requirements. However, many of these new pro-union laws, including AB 1291, may be unconstitutional.

The main takeaways of AB 1291 are as follows:

  1. Effective January 1, 2020, California cannabis license applicants must sign so-called labor peace agreements with a union within 60 days of their 20th hire or risk losing their cannabis license.
  2. Employers and business associations seeking to challenge AB 1291, and other similar state or local union-related ordinances, are encouraged to speak with experienced labor counsel to discuss their options.
  3. Employers seeking to comply with AB 1291 and sign labor peace agreements should conduct due diligence on the labor unions they are considering entering into negotiations with. Not all unions are the same. Additionally, businesses should be thoughtful about what they agree to put into a labor peace agreement to satisfy the requirements under California’s cannabis laws. For example, these agreements are frequently mistakenly referred to as “neutrality agreement.” Neutrality agreements typically contain a commitment from the employer to remain “neutral” through a union organizing campaign. In contrast, AB 1291 does not use the term “neutral(ity)” and, thus, arguments can be made that strict “neutrality” is not required under the statute and may not need to be included in the labor peace agreement. Thus, employers should speak with experienced labor counsel before negotiating labor peace agreements with unions.

Background

Since its adoption into law in 2018, the Medicinal and Adult Use of Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (“MAUCRSA”) has required applicants for state cannabis licenses with 20 or more employees to “provide a statement that the applicant will enter into, or demonstrate that it has already entered into, and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement.”1 (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 26015.5(a)(5)(A).) A labor peace agreement, as defined under California’s cannabis laws, must contain the following commitments, at a minimum:

  1. Employer shall not “disrupt” efforts by the union to “communicate with, and attempt to organize and represent” the employer’s employees;
  2. Employer shall give the union “access at reasonable times to areas in which the employees work, for the purpose of meeting with employees to discuss their right to representation, employment rights under state law, and terms and conditions of employment;” and
  3. Union and its members shall not engage in picketing, work stoppages, boycotts, and any other economic interference with the employer’s business.

(Cal. Lab. & Prof Code § 26001(x).)

Effective January 1, 2020, AB 1291 requires an applicant for a state license under MAUCRSA with 20 or more employees to provide a notarized statement that the applicant will enter into, or demonstrate that it has already entered into, and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement. If the applicant has less than 20 employees and has not yet entered into a labor peace agreement, AB 1291 requires the applicant to provide a notarized statement as a part of its application indicating that the applicant will enter into and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement within 60 days of employing its 20th employee. By expanding the scope of the crime of perjury, AB 1291 imposes a state-mandated local program and authorizes the Bureau of Cannabis Control, the Department of Food and Agriculture, and the State Department of Public Health to revoke or suspend a license for a violation of these requirements.

AB 1291 May Be Unconstitutional

AB 1291 poses substantial questions as to whether it is unconstitutional due to preemption by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) under two complementary preemptions doctrines: Garmon and Machinists. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the states are constitutionally barred by the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy clause from regulating conduct that NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits. Garmon preemption exists to protect the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) primary jurisdiction and to preclude a state’s interference with its interpretation and enforcement of the integrated regulatory scheme that is the NLRA. Indeed, Congress delegated exclusive authority to the NLRB because it sought to establish a single, uniform national labor policy that would be unaffected by the vagaries of state law or shaped by local attitudes or prejudices. (Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).) In Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court similarly declared that the NLRA forbids states to regulate conduct that Congress intended “to be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’” Together, Garmon and Machinists preempt state and local policies that would otherwise interfere with the “integrated scheme of regulation” and disrupt the balance of power between labor and management embodied in the NLRA.

It appears AB 1291’s purpose is to afford unions greater rights than provided under the NLRA and make it easier for unions to organize cannabis employers. AB 1291 arguably presents the type of state interference in labor-management relations that Garmon and Machinists preemption forbids. For example, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (“Golden State I”), 475 U.S. 608, 616 (1986), the Supreme Court held that while the NLRA “requires an employer and a union to bargain in good faith, … it does not require them to reach agreement,” nor does it demand a particular outcome from labor negotiations.” The substance of labor negotiations, and the results therefrom, are among those areas Congress intentionally left to the free play of economic forces when it legislated in the field of labor law. (Id.) In that case, the Supreme Court found that Machinists preempted the City of Los Angeles’ (“City”) refusal to renew a taxi cab company’s license when it failed to reach an agreement with striking union members. By conditioning the renewal of the taxi cab franchise on the acceptance of the union’s demands, the City effectively imposed a timeline on the parties’ negotiations and undermined the taxi cab company’s ability to rely on its own economic power to resist the strike. (Id. at 615.) The Supreme Court held that the City could not pressure the taxi cab company into reaching a settlement and thereby “destroy[] the balance of power designed by Congress, and frustrate[] Congress’ decision to leave open the use of economic weapons.” (Id. at 619.)

The facts of Golden State I are instructive here. Like the taxi cab company in Golden State I, California cannabis businesses now face a Hobson’s “all or nothing” choice under AB 1291. If a cannabis business refuses to negotiate a labor peace agreement with a labor organization, it effectively loses the right to do business in California. But if the cannabis business negotiates a labor peace agreement, the union knows full well that it can hold out for significant concessions in exchange for its members giving up one of their most valuable economic weapons – the power to strike.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) is also instructive. At issue in Brown was California’s Assembly Bill 1889 (“AB 1889”), prohibiting certain private employers from using state funds to “assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” (Id. at 63 [quoting Cal. Govt. Code §§ 16645.1–16645.7].) The Court held that AB 1889 was unconstitutional. As explained by the Court, the current text of Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA are amendments made to the NLRA in 1947 as part of the Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft Harley Act, for the purpose of overturning earlier NLRB precedent. The NLRA was amended in in several key respects. First, it emphasized that employees “have the right to refrain from any or all” union activities. (29 U.S.C. § 157.) Second, it added Section 8(b), which prohibits unfair labor practices by unions. (29 U.S.C. § 158(b).) Third, it added Section 8(c), which protects speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the NLRB. (29 U.S.C. § 158(c).) Specifically, Section 8(c) provides:

The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.

With the amendments, Section 8(c) “manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” (Id. at 6-7.) That Congress amended the NLRA, rather than leaving to the courts the task of correcting the NLRB’s decisions on a case-by-case basis, is “indicative of how important Congress deemed such ‘free debate.’” (Id. at 7.) In addition, Sections 8(a) and 8(b) “demonstrate that when Congress has sought to put limits on advocacy for or against union organization, it has expressly set forth the mechanisms for doing so.” (Brown, 554 U.S. at 67.) Moreover, “the amendment to §7 calls attention to the right of employees to refuse to join unions, which implies an underlying right to receive information opposing unionization.” (Id.) “[T]he addition of §8(c) expressly precludes regulation of speech about unionization so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” (Id. [internal quotation omitted].) Thus, based on these overriding principles, the Court concluded that “California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily interfere[s] with an employee’s choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union” and struck down AB 1889. (Id. at 68 [internal quotation omitted].)

AB 1291 is arguably no different. By forcing unwilling cannabis businesses to negotiate and accept labor peace agreements, AB 1291 compels a result Congress deliberately left to the free play of economic forces. The NLRA does not allow state and local governments to interfere with employer rights to communicate with employees regarding unionization under Section 8(c). Nor does it allow state and local governments to “introduce some standard of properly balanced bargaining power . . . or to define what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an ideal or balanced state of collective bargaining.” (Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-50.) Yet, this is exactly what AB 1291 appears to do. Accordingly, AB 1291 may be unconstitutional.

1 A labor peace (aka a labor harmony agreement) is essentially a contract between an employer and an organized labor union in which the employer agrees to help the union organize the employer’s workforce (i.e., unionize) by providing, for example, certain information or agreeing not to interfere with the union organizing efforts, in exchange for the union’s agreement not to strike or cause other disruption in the employer’s workforce during a union organizing campaign. Because these agreements open the door to union activity within the workplace, they should not be entered into casually. Rather, unionization may result in increased labor costs, contractual contributions to union pension plans, loss of flexibility, and adherence to union rules set forth in a legally binding contract. In addition, once a union is recognized or certified as the collective bargaining representative of employees, it is practically impossible to terminate that relationship. Indeed, only after a costly and divisive decertification election can a workforce return to the merit-based and flexible non-union environment.

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

For more on union regulation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

To Stalk or Not to Stalk . . . That Is the Question – Using Social Media for Applicant Review

Now more than ever, employers are using social media to screen job applicants. According to a 2018 survey, 70 percent of employers use social media to research candidates. Using social media to research job applicants can provide you with useful information, but it can also get you into trouble.

When you review an applicant’s social media account, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc., you may learn information regarding the applicant’s race, sex, religion, national origin, or age, among other characteristics.

As our readers are aware, a variety of state and federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit employers from choosing not to hire a candidate based on a number of legally protected classes. Just as it would be unlawful to ask an applicant if he or she has a disability during an interview and fail to hire that applicant based on his or her disability, it would also be illegal not to hire an applicant because you observed a Facebook post in which she expressed her hope to be pregnant within the next six months.

Consider the following best practice tips for using social media to screen applicants:

  1. Develop a Policy and Be Consistent – Implement a policy detailing which social media websites you will review, the purpose of the review and type of information sought, at what stage the review will be conducted, and how much time you will spend on the search. Applying these policies consistently will help to combat claims of discriminatory hiring practices should they arise.
  2. Document Your Findings – Save what you find, whether it is a picture or a screenshot of a comment the applicant made. What you find on social media can disappear as easily as you found it. Protect your decision by documenting what you find. In case the matter is litigated, it can be produced later.
  3. Wait Until After the Initial Interview – Avoid performing a social media screening until after the initial interview. It is much easier to defend a decision not to interview or hire an applicant if you do not have certain information early on.
  4. Follow FCRA Requirements – If you decide to use a third party to perform social media screening services, remember that these screenings are likely subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act requirements because the screening results constitute a consumer report. This means the employer will be required to: 1) inform the applicant of the results that are relevant to its decision not to hire; 2) provide the applicant with the relevant social media document; 3) provide the applicant notice of his or her rights under the FCRA and; 4) allow the applicant to rebut the information before making a final decision.
  5. Do Not Ask for Their Password – Many states have enacted laws that prohibit an employer from requesting or requiring applicants to provide their login credentials for their social media and other internet accounts. Although some states still allow this, the best practice is not to ask for it. Further, while it is not illegal to friend request a job applicant, proceed with caution. Friend requesting a job applicant (and assuming the applicant accepts the request) may provide you with greater access to the applicant’s personal life. Many people categorize portions of their profiles as private, thereby protecting specific information from the public’s view. If you receive access to this information you may gain more knowledge regarding the applicant’s protected characteristics. If you are going to friend request applicants, you should include this in your written policy and apply this practice across the board.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP

More information for employers considering job applicants on the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Bite Your Tongue: NLRB Rules that Produce Company’s Media, Confidentiality Policies are Lawful

The NLRB under the current administration continues to issue decisions that factor in legitimate business considerations of employers when evaluating rules that are alleged to restrict employee protections under the NLRA.  One such recently issued decision, LA Specialty Produce Company, 368 NLRB No. 93 (October 10, 2019), may have particular significance because it addresses an important issue — restrictions on communications responsive to inquiries from the media.

The restriction at issue in the LA Specialty case provided as follows:

“Employees approached for interview and/or comments by the news media, cannot provide them with any information. Our President, Michael Glick, is the only person authorized and designated to comment on Company policies or any event that may affect our organization.”

The Board’s general counsel issued a complaint alleging that the rule in its entirety violated the NLRA because it purportedly chilled employees from exercising their section 7 rights under the NLRA, including the right to discuss work issues publicly when asked to comment by the press.  The administrative law judge found the rule to be overly broad, and therefore unlawful, because on its face it could be construed to cover NLRA-protected activities; however, the Board disagreed with this reading of the rule.  While the Board recognized that the first sentence of the rule, standing alone, might suggest that employees may never speak to the news media when approached for comment, it concluded that an objectively reasonable employee would understand that the second sentence qualified the first sentence by explaining that only the company president was authorized and designated to comment on company matters. Thus, read as a whole, a reasonable employee would understand that he or she is only precluded from speaking on behalf of the employer when approached for comment.

The Board also designated this rule as a “category 1” rule under the principles announced by the Board in Boeing Co., a Board decision that was issued in December of 2017. “Category 1” rules include rules the Board designates as lawful, either because (i) the rule, when reasonably interpreted, does not prohibit or interfere with the exercise of NLRA rights; or (ii) the potential adverse impact on protected rights is outweighed by justifications associated with the rule.  See our client alert here.  Since there is no Section 7 right to speak to the media on behalf of the employer, the Board concluded that the employer’s media contact restriction, when reasonably interpreted, would not potentially interfere with the exercise of Section 7 rights.

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

For more NLRB decisions, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Can an Employee be Fired for Being Gay or Transgender?

HR Professionals will soon know the answer to this question.

The United States Supreme Court is preparing to settle a contentious debate on employee protections under federal employment discrimination laws.  On October 7th, the Court returned from its summer break to start the new term.  The Court did not have to wait long before it tackled a complex case because on October 8th, the Court heard two major oral arguments with potentially far-reaching implications for both employers and employees.  Both cases focus on the prohibitions in employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).  Under Title VII, Congress made it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”  The question that the Court will address is whether employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is prohibited employment discrimination “because of sex.”

The first case the Court heard was a consolidated matter involving cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda) and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia), both of which involve men who claim they were fired from their jobs because of their sexual orientation.

Second Circuit: “Sex” is Necessarily a Factor in Sexual Orientation

The plaintiff in Zarda, Donald Zarda, was a skydiving instructor, who died in 2014.  Prior to his death, a female client complained that Zarda inappropriately touched her during a jump.  At some point, Zarda communicated to the client that he was a homosexual and “had an ex-husband,” a practice that Zarda stated he often did with female clients to put them at ease.  Altitude Express terminated Zarda in connection with the complaint; however, Zarda insisted he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.

A federal district court granted summary judgment against Zarda, reasoning that his claim was not cognizable under Title VII.  However, the Second Circuit reversed, with a majority of the court believing that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated by sex and, therefore, a “subset of sex discrimination.”  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that federal law prohibits the firing of an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.  Notably, the court reached this conclusion by taking a broad interpretation of the meaning of the text “because of sex.”  Specifically, the court reasoned that Title VII must protect sexual orientation “because sex is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.”

Eleventh Circuit: Discharge for Homosexuality Not Prohibited by Title VII

The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.  The plaintiff in Bostock, Gerald Bostock, was a Child Welfare Services Coordinator in Clayton County for over ten years.  Although Bostock had received good performance reviews for his work, an internal audit was conducted on his program’s funds.  Bostock, who is gay, claimed the audit was a “pretext for discrimination against him because of his sexual orientation.”  During an advisory meeting, where Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one person criticized Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in a gay softball league.

After his complaint was dismissed at the district court level, Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.  Referring back to a 1979 decision, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that it had already held that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”  While hinting that this earlier ruling may have been wrong, the court held that it had no choice but to follow precedent and affirm the dismissal of Bostock’s claim.

Sixth Circuit: Discrimination on the Basis of Transgender and Transitioning Status is Necessarily Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

The second case, Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, presents a similar question to Zarda and Bostock.  That is, whether employees can be fired based on their status as transgender.

The case involves Aimee Stephens, who was a funeral director and embalmer for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes.  While working in this position for six years, Stephens dressed and presented herself as a man without issue.  However, once Stephens communicated that she wanted to live and work as a woman before having sex-reassignment surgery, she was terminated.  The owner of the funeral home, a devout Christian, admitted that Stephens was fired because she “was no longer going to represent himself as a man.  He wanted to dress as a woman.”  The owner believed this change would violate “God’s commands.”

After Stephens filed a discrimination charge, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursued a complaint on her behalf against the funeral home.  In ruling in favor of the employer, the district court reasoned that transgender status is not a protected trait under Title VII and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) precludes the EEOC from enforcing Title VII in this instance as doing so would substantially burden the employer’s religious exercise.  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that “discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex.”  The court further ruled that the RFRA did not apply to protect the funeral home’s actions because the funeral home was not a “religious institution,” and Stephens was not a “ministerial employee” excluded from Title VII’s protections.

Stakeholders: States, Federal Government, Employers, and Employees

The Supreme Court’s ruling in these cases, which is expected in the spring or summer of 2020, has the potential to be monumental because of the many stakeholders involved.  Currently, 21 states and the District of Columbia have barred sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by statute or regulation, as have a number of counties and municipalities.  While a few other states provide protection from this type of discrimination either by agency interpretation or court ruling, the remaining states in the country offer no protection under their state laws.  This means that LGBTQ individuals who live in states such as Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and even North Carolina (at least with respect to private employers) may have no remedy to this type of employment discrimination outside of Title VII.

Additionally, states who have passed laws in this area may face challenges in enforcing those laws if the Supreme Court decides that Title VII does not protect gay and transgender status.  Many of these states lean on the EEOC’s authority to investigate claims of discrimination against companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions, and the EEOC has been successful in partnering with states to investigate discrimination claims and enforce such actions.  However, states would lose EEOC assistance should the Court decide that Title VII’s scope does not extend to sexual orientation or gender identification.

Although the EEOC traditionally has been on the side of expanding Title VII protections, the federal government in the most recent litigation has aligned itself with the employers.  In particular, United States Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” does not apply to sexual orientation or gender identity.  Accepting this interpretation, Title VII is limited to barring employers from treating women different from men in the same or similar position, and vice-versa.

Equally important to the states’ and federal government’s interest is the interest of employers.  Companies have lined up on both sides of the debate with over 36 briefs filed in support of Bostock and Zarda, and over 24 briefs filed in support of Clayton County and Altitude Express.  For example, one brief filed in support of Bostock and Zarda includes 206 companies representing businesses such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Walt Disney, Coca-Cola, and Uber.  These businesses argued that interpreting Title VII to “exclude sexual orientation or gender identity from protections against sex discrimination would have wide-ranging, negative consequences for businesses, their employees, and the U.S. economy.”  In contrast, the C12 group that represents “the largest network of Christian CEOs, business owners, and executives in the United States” filed a separate brief in support of the employers arguing that interpreting “because of sex” in Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity ignores the natural meaning of the law, “thereby bypassing the political process, shutting down debate, preventing any accommodation of divergent views, and precluding any compromise.”

Makeup of the Court: The Deciding Vote

Prior to his retirement, Justice Anthony Kennedy was the deciding vote in several gay rights cases.  However, Justice Kennedy is no longer on the bench, and these cases present the first opportunity for the public to see how his successor, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, will vote on these issues.  Also, Justice Neil Gorsuch, successor to Justice Antonin Scalia, may play a key role in deciding these issues.  Similar to Scalia, it is believed that Justice Gorsuch is more inclined to rule that courts should naturally interpret statutes as they were meant when enacted.  Should Justice Gorsuch hold firm to this view, then there is some thought that he may conclude sexual orientation and gender identity were not meant to be included as discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.  The perspectives of these new Justices are likely to dictate the Court’s ultimate decision – a decision which may directly impact the employment landscape for years to come.

© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on Employment Protections, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment and Civil Rights law pages.

Supreme Court Will not Disturb Ruling that a False Rumor about “Sleeping Your Way to a Promotion” can be a Hostile Work Environment

The U.S. Supreme Court decided not to review an appellate court decision that held a false rumor about a woman “sleeping” her way to a promotion can give rise to a hostile work environment claim.  This means that the February 2019 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc. will stand.  In Parker, the Fourth Circuit held that, where an employer participates in circulating false rumors that a female employee slept with her male boss to obtain a promotion, this constitutes Title VII gender discrimination.

Parker’s Discrimination Claim

Evangeline Parker started worked for Reema Consulting Services, Inc., (“RCSI”) at its warehouse facility as a low-level clerk.  She was promoted six times, ultimately rising to Assistant Operations Manager.  About two weeks after she was promoted to a manager position, she learned that some male employees were circulating “an unfounded, sexually-explicit rumor about her” that “falsely and maliciously portrayed her as having [had] a sexual relationship” with a higher-ranking manager to obtain her management position.

The rumor originated with another RCSI employee who was jealous of Parker’s achievement, and the highest-ranking manager at the warehouse facility participated in spreading the rumor.  Parker’s complaint alleged that as the rumor spread, she “was treated with open resentment and disrespect” from many coworkers, including employees she was responsible for supervising.

At an all-staff meeting at which the rumor was discussed, the warehouse manager slammed the door in Parker’s face and excluded her from the meeting.  The following day, the warehouse manager screamed at Parker and blamed her for “bringing the situation to the workplace.” He also stated that “he could no longer recommend her for promotions or higher-level tasks because of the rumor” and that he “would not allow her to advance any further within the company.”  A few days later, the warehouse manager “lost his temper and began screaming” at Parker, and Parker then filed an internal sexual harassment complaint with RCSI Human Resources.  Shortly thereafter, RCSI gave Parker two warnings and terminated her employment.

Lawyer pointingParker brought a discrimination claim, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.  The district court dismissed her claim on the grounds that 1) the harassment was not based upon gender and instead based upon false allegations of conduct by her, and 2) the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered the conditions of Parker’s employment because the rumor was circulated for just a few weeks.  Judge Titus found, “Clearly, this woman is entitled to the dignity of her merit-based promotion and not to have it sullied by somebody suggesting that it was because she had sexual relations with a supervisor who promoted her.”  However, he continued “that is not a harassment based upon gender.  It’s based upon false allegations of conduct by her.  And this same type of a rumor could be made in a variety of other context[s] involving people of the same gender or different genders alleged to have had some kind of sexual activity leading to a promotion.”  Ultimately, Judge Titus held that “the rumor and the spreading of that kind of a rumor is based upon conduct, not gender.

Gender-Based Rumors Can Constitute Sex Harassment

Taking into account all of the allegations of the complaint, including the sex-based nature of the rumor and its effects, the Fourth Circuit held that the rumor that Parker had sex with her male superior to obtain a promotion was gender-based in that it implied that she “used her womanhood, rather than her merit, to obtain from a man, so seduced, a promotion.”  The court found that the rumor invoked “a deeply rooted perception — one that unfortunately still persists — that generally women, not men, use sex to achieve success.”  This double standard precipitated by negative stereotypes regarding the relationship between the advancement of women in the workplace and their sexual behavior can cause superiors and coworkers to treat women in the workplace differently from men.  Thus, the rumor about Parker sleeping her way to a promotion constituted a form of sexual harassment.

The Fourth Circuit also held that Parker sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment:

[T]he harassment was continuous, preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees at the Sterling facility for the entire time of Parker’s employment after her final promotion.  The harassment began with the fabrication of the rumor by a jealous male workplace competitor and was then circulated by male employees.  Management too contributed to the continuing circulation of the rumor.  The highest-ranking manager asked another manager, who was rumored to be having the relationship with Parker, whether his wife was divorcing him because he was “f–king” Parker.  The same manager called an all-staff meeting, at which the rumor was discussed, and excluded Parker.  In another meeting, the manager blamed Parker for bringing the rumor into the workplace. And in yet another meeting, the manager harangued Parker about the rumor, stating he should have fired her when she began “huffing and puffing” about it.

Implications

Parker correctly recognizes that gender-based stereotypes can prevent women from advancing in the workplace and that Title VII bars employers from using negative gender stereotypes to harass employees.

© 2019 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
More on workplace harassment via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.