Category: Labor & Employment

Circuit Court Upholds Michigan Public Act 53: Public Schools Prohibited from Collecting Union Dues

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Responding to a challenge to the constitutionality of Michigan Public Act 53, which prohibits public schools from collecting union dues from employees, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the act is constitutional. The result of this ruling is that, at this point, public schools are statutorily precluded from collecting dues for the union under any bargaining agreement that was entered into, renewed or extended after March 16, 2012.

The plaintiffs, who are school unions and union members, argued that the act violates their First Amendment and Equal Protection rights.  The district court, agreeing with the plaintiffs, had issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the law.  The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, dissolved the injunction and remanded the case “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”  It is unclear whether any viable challenge to the statute remains for the district court to address or whether dismissal of the claim is now in order.

The 6th Circuit ruled that Public Act 53 does not violate the First Amendment.  The plaintiffs argued that unions need membership dues to engage in speech and if the public schools don’t collect the union dues for them, the unions will have a hard time collecting the dues themselves.  Therefore, Public Act 53 violates the unions’ right to free speech.  The majority opinion stated that the First Amendment prohibits government from limiting the freedom of speech, but it does not give the right to use government payroll systems for the purpose of obtaining funds for speech.  The court concluded that Public Act 53 does not restrict speech.  It “merely directs one kind of public employer to use its resources for its core mission rather than for the collection of union dues.”

Similarly, the Court decided that the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim fails.  The plaintiffs argued that Public Act 53 violates the Equal Protection clause of the 14 Amendment because it applies only to unions that represent school employees and not to other public employers.  The court held that there is a legitimate interest in this classification.  That is, the Michigan legislature “could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers.”

It remains to be seen whether the Sixth Circuit’s opinion ends the debate or if there will be continued challenge.

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Timely Performance Management in Avoiding Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Liability

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Managing the performance or conduct of an employee who has recently utilized leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) can be a legal minefield for employers.  If the poorly performing employee does not improve his or her performance upon return from FMLA leave, the employer may be hesitant to take further employment action against the employee for fear that the timing of the decision will create a risk of liability under state or federal leave laws.  A comparison of two recent court decisions serves as an important reminder that contemporaneously addressing and documenting performance or conduct issues as they occur can go a long way in protecting the employer from liability in a later FMLA retaliation claim.

In Benimovich v. Fieldston Operating, LLC, Case No. 11-CV-780 (S.D.N.Y 3-22-2013), the plaintiff, Galina Benimovich, took FMLA leave to undergo and recover from knee replacement surgery.  While on leave, the employer hired and trained a replacement.  When Benimovich learned that she had been replaced, she contacted the employer and offered to return from leave.  When the parties met a few days later to discuss the situation, the employer terminated Benimovich’s employment.

Benimovich subsequently filed a lawsuit against the employer alleging a variety of claims, including a claim that the employer had unlawfully terminated her in retaliation for exercising her FMLA rights.  The employer defended that its owners had actually decided to terminate Benimovich months before she took FMLA leave, but that they wanted to hire and train a replacement before firing her. The employer claimed its motivation to terminate Benimovich was poor performance, specifically inaccurate processing of payroll records, manipulation of time records, failure to issue accurate paychecks, and untimely payments to vendors.

The court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim.  In allowing the case to go forward, the court noted that the temporal proximity between the leave and the termination was suspect.  However, the court also relied heavily on the fact that there was no written documentation substantiating Benimovich’s alleged performance problems or the owners’ decision to terminate Benimovich months earlier.  The court further noted that Benimovich’s performance was rarely, if ever, criticized.

Contrast the outcome in Benimovich with the analysis and decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit in Brown v. City of Jacksonville, Case No. 12-1730 (8th Cir. 2013).  The plaintiff in Brown took FMLA leave from August 9, 2008 through October 18, 2008 to undergo hip replacement surgery.  A few months before going on leave, Brown received a written warning for insubordination.  Brown’s supervisors had also verbally counseled her regarding her performance on a number of occasions.

After returning from leave, Brown received another written warning for failure to perform her duties as purchasing manager.  Brown filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which led the City to conduct an internal investigation into Brown’s complaints.  The investigation revealed that Brown’s co-workers considered her to be a very negative presence in the workplace and felt they had to walk on “pins and needles” due to Brown’s attitude issues.  Additionally, the investigation revealed that Brown’s co-workers were able to adequately perform Brown’s purchasing duties during her absence.  The City concluded that Brown was creating a hostile work environment for her co-workers and terminated her employment for “failure in performance of duties” and “failure in personal conduct.”

Following her termination, Brown filed a lawsuit against the City alleging FMLA retaliation and a number of other discrimination claims.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit approved of the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer on Brown’s FMLA retaliation claim.  First, the court noted that the timing of Brown’s termination – eight months after returning from leave – did not raise an inference of discrimination.  Second, the court held that the undisputed evidence (which included written warnings) showed that Brown was warned about her poor performance prior to even going on leave.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City.

There are a number of distinguishing factors that explain the differing outcomes in Benimovich and Brown – including the amount of time between the employee’s leave and termination.  Importantly, however, employers should also take note of the critical role that written warnings and performance counseling played in the Eight Circuit’s award of summary judgment to the employer.  The employer in Brown was able to justify its termination and avoid liability in a tricky situation because it had the written documentation and prior performance counseling to support its claim of poor performance.   Conversely, the employer in Benimovich was denied summary judgment because it had failed to document either the purported performance issues or the earlier decision to terminate.

No doubt, terminating or taking adverse employment action against an employee who has recently utilized legally protected leave rights is risky, and an employer should consult legal counsel before taking any such action.  However, these cases illustrate that proper documentation of performance and disciplinary issues is one of the most important preventative steps an employer can take now to reduce the risk of future liability.

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Seventh Circuit Addresses Obligations Regarding the Interactive Process under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)

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A common scenario often faced by employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) involves an employee’s request for time off as a reasonable accommodation. In Basden v. Professional Transportation, Inc., No. 11-2880 (7th Cir, May 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals provides guidance in this area. There, the court explained that the employer was not liable under the ADA, even though it failed to engage in the interactive process, because the employee failed to show that the requested accommodation (a 30-day leave) would have resulted in her ability to perform the essential functions of the job.

Employee Two Weeks Shy of Leave Entitlement

Professional Transportation, Inc. (PTI) provides 24-hour ground transportation services. Terri Basden was hired as a dispatcher in June, 2007. After numerous absences in 2007 and early 2008, she received a verbal warning for absences in March 2008 and a written warning for further absences in April 2008.

Basden provided doctors’ notes reflecting that she had been referred to a neurologist with a possible diagnosis of multiple sclerosis after emergency room tests showed brain abnormalities indicative of the disease. After several job transfers, Basden was granted a request for a part time position on May 1, 2008. She incurred additional absences in May which resulted in suspension. While on suspension, Basden submitted a request for a 30-day leave of absence due to “complications due to medical illness (MS).” PTI policy provides employees with one year of service may be eligible to take a 30-day, unpaid leave of absence. However, Basden had not been employed for one year. PTI denied her request for leave, and thereafter terminated Basden when she failed to return to work following her suspension.

Employee Could Not Show Leave Would Enable Her to Perform Essential Functions

Basden sued PTI, claiming that PTI violated the ADA by terminating her instead of accommodating her request for 30 days leave, that PTI failed to engage in the interactive accommodation process required by the ADA, and that PTI did not show that the requested leave was unreasonable. The district court granted summary judgment for PTI.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first observed that an employee’s request for an accommodation under the ADA requires the employer to engage in a flexible, interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation. In this case, the employee requested a 30-day leave that, according to the employer’s policy, she would have been eligible for with two weeks’ additional seniority. The court noted that PTI’s response to this request, specifically, failing to engage in an interactive process, denying the leave, and terminating her, was not an appropriate employer response under the ADA.

However, the court held that PTI’s actions did not violate the ADA. The failure to engage in the interactive process is not an independent basis for liability under the statute, and in any event, such a failure is actionable only if it prevents identification of an appropriate accommodation. Thus, even if an employer fails to engage in the interactive process, that failure need not be considered if the employee fails to show that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation.

Here, PTI cited regular attendance as an essential function of Basden’s job. Yet, Basden did not demonstrate that she was able to come to work regularly at the time of her termination, or that her regular attendance could have been expected either following the requested leave or with any other accommodation. Therefore, the court held, summary judgment for PTI was appropriate on the ADA claim despite any shortcomings in PTI’s response to Basden’s request. (Basden also alleged violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which the court also affirmed summary judgment on because Basden had not worked for PTI for 12 months at the time of her leave request and thus was not eligible for leave under the statute.)

Identify and Document Essential Functions

Of course, employers should continue to comply with their obligations to engage in the interactive process. However, as this case suggests, the obligation to explore and provide accommodation does not necessarily extend to accommodations that are or would be futile and would not enable the employee to perform essential functions. This case highlights the importance of well-written job descriptions that clearly set forth essential job functions. An employer’s identification of and ability to prove essential functions of the job can be used to guide the interactive process and its obligations to provide accommodation under the ADA, and can play a key role in defending a lawsuit under the ADA.

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Issues Guidance on Lawful Confidentiality Language

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On July 30, 2012, the NLRB (“Board”) issued a decision in Banner Health System dba Estrella Medical Center, 358 NLRB No. 93 holding, among other things, that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) (which prohibits employers from interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights), by restricting employees from discussing any complaint that was then the subject of an ongoing internal investigation.

To minimize the impact of such a confidentiality mandate on employees’ Section 7 rights, the Board found that an employer must make an individualized determination in each case that its “legitimate business justification” outweighed the employee’s rights to protected concerted activity in discussing workplace issues.  In Banner Health, the employer did not carry its burden to show a legitimate business justification because it failed to make a particularized showing that:

  • Witnesses were in need of protection;
  • Evidence was in danger of being destroyed;
  • Testimony was in danger of being fabricated; or
  • A cover-up must be prevented.

The Board concluded that the employer’s one-size-fits-all rule, prohibiting employees from engaging in any discussion of ongoing internal investigations, clearly failed to meet these requirements.

More recently, the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel clarified the limits of how such policies could be drafted without running afoul of Section 7 in an advice memorandum released on April 24, 2013 (dated January 29, 2013).   The Region had submitted Verso Paper, Case 30-CA-089350 (January 29, 2013) to the Office of the General Counsel for advice regarding the confidentiality rule at issue and whether it unlawfully interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights.  Specifically, the Verso Code of Conduct contained this provision prohibiting employees from discussing ongoing internal investigations:

Verso has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations.  In every investigation, Verso has a strong desire to protect witnesses from harassment, intimidation and retaliation, to keep evidence from being destroyed, to ensure that testimony is not fabricated, and to prevent a cover-up.  To assist Verso in achieving these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence.  If we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Reiterating that employees have a Section 7 right to discuss disciplinary investigations of their co-workers, the General Counsel’s Office found that the Verso Paper provision did not allow for a case-by-case analysis of whether or not the employer’s business justification for the restriction outweighed the employees’ Section 7 rights as required by Banner Health.  According to the General Counsel’s Office, the employer may establish this by presenting facts specific to a given investigation that give rise to a legitimate and substantial business justification for imposing confidentiality restrictions.

However, in footnote 7 of its advice, the General Counsel’s Office, after noting that the first two sentences of the Verso Paper rule lawfully set forth the employer’s interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations, surprisingly put forward a modified version of the remainder of the Verso Paper provision that it said would pass muster under Banner Health:

Verso may decide in some circumstances that in order to achieve these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence.  If Verso reasonably imposes such a requirement and we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Although this guidance is not binding, combining this language above with the first two sentences of the Verso Paper provision could certainly strengthen an employer’s argument that its intent was not to violate an employee’s Section 7 rights, but rather, to lawfully put employees on notice that if the employer “reasonably” imposes a confidentiality requirement, they must abide by it or face discipline.  However, employers must remain mindful that using a provision like this suggested does not obviate the need for the employer to engage in the particularized case-by-case determination of its substantial and legitimate business need that would permit it to impose confidentiality restrictions on the investigation.

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Automation of U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) Form I-94 and Release of New Immigration Form I-9

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Visitors to the United States May Need to Print Form I-94 Arrival/Departure Records

U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) will begin a new program on April 30, 2013 that will end issuance of paper Form I-94 Arrival/Departure Records for many visitors. Foreign visitors arriving in the United States via air or sea who need to prove their lawful immigration status will be required to access their arrival information online and print their own Form I-94 Arrival/Departure Records (Form I-94). A hard copy of Form I-94 is required to begin employment, apply for a Social Security Number, and obtain a driver’s license or identification document.

CBP indicated that it expects this automation to save the government an estimated $15.5 million per year. Because advance information is transmitted only for air and sea travelers, CBP will continue to issue paper Forms I-94 at land border ports of entry.

CBP will phase in the I-94 automation at air and sea ports of entry in April and May. Foreign visitors will continue to receive a paper I-94 until the automated process arrives at their port of entry. If a visitor does not receive a paper Form I-94 record to verify immigration status or employment authorization, the record number and other admission information will be available here. A CBP officer will stamp the travel document (passport) of each arriving nonimmigrant traveler showing the date of admission, class of admission and the date until which the traveler is admitted. The visitor will not need to print Form I-94 to provide to the government upon departure. A CBP Fact Sheet may be found here.

All U.S. Employers Required to Use New Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 as of May 7, 2013

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will require all U.S. employers to use its revised Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 as of May 7, 2013. All employers are required to complete an Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 (Form I-9) for each new employee hired in the United States. The updated Form (Revision Date 03/08/13) includes new information fields and has been expanded to two pages. USCIS has stated that the new formatting will reduce errors and provide clearer instructions for both employees and employers. The List of Acceptable Documents has not changed.

Employers should NOT require current employees to complete the new Form I-9. The new Form will be used only for new employees or when reverifying the work authorization for current employees. The new employee may complete the Form after acceptance of the job offer, and no later than the first date of hire. The new instructions confirm that an employer has three business days to complete the Form; in the case of reverification, the employer must re-verify the document(s) before the work authorization expires.

The new Form I-9 does NOT change any requirements relating to remote hires. USCIS’s position is that the employer representative who signs the attestation must be the same person who physically examines each original document to determine if it reasonably appears to be genuine and relates to the employee. An employer with remote hires may delegate the verification to a person who serves as an agent of the employer, but that agent must examine the documents and complete Section 2 or Section 3 of the Form I-9. The employer retains the liability for the actions of the agent.

A Spanish language version of the new Form is also available on the USCIS website for use in Puerto Rico only. Spanish-speaking employers and employees in the 50 states, Washington, DC, and other U.S. territories may refer to the Spanish version but must complete the English-language version of the Form.

Employers may receive monetary fines for all substantive and uncorrected technical Form I-9 violations. Penalties for these violations, which include failure to utilize the correct version of the Form I-9, range from $110 to $1,100 per violation.

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Takeover Code Amendments Extend the Rights of Pension Scheme Trustees

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Amendments include new requirements regarding offerors’ intentions, documents provided to trustees, trustees’ opinions on offers, and publication of agreements between offerors and trustees.

On 22 April, the Code Committee of the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the Panel) published response statement RS 2012/2 (the Response Statement), which introduces amendments to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code).[1] The Response Statement follows a consultation to consider extending the rights of trustees of offeree company pension schemes. Broadly, the amendments to the Code provide the following:

  • An offeror is required to state its intentions with regard to the offeree company’s pension scheme.
  • Certain information is required to be published in the offer document or otherwise provided to pension scheme trustees.
  • Trustees are allowed to provide an opinion on the effects of an offer on the company’s pension scheme.
  • Agreements between an offeror and pension scheme trustees that relate to pension scheme funding may be required to be published if they are material.

Background

On 19 September 2011, significant changes were made to the Code, including an extension of the obligations of the offeror and offeree in relation to information to be provided to, and the obligation to publish opinions of, the offeree company’s employees and employee representatives. During the Panel’s consultation on those changes, the pensions industry lobbied significantly for similar provisions to be added to the Code in relation to trustees of pension schemes. Proposed amendments to the Code were published in public consultation paper PCP 2012/2 (the PCP)[2] on 5 July 2012, and a period of consultation followed. The Response Statement sets out the Panel’s response to that consultation and the resulting changes to be made to the Code. Although many of the changes will be adopted as originally proposed in the PCP, certain modifications have been made.

In determining the new regime, the Panel has been mindful that the intended effect of the changes is to create a framework within which the effects of an offer on an offeree company’s pension scheme can become (i) a debating point during the course of the offer and (ii) a point on which the relevant parties can express their views.

Application of New Code Provisions to Defined Benefit Schemes

The new provisions of the Code are limited to funded pension schemes sponsored by the offeree (or any of its subsidiaries) that (i) provide pension benefits (either in whole or in part) on a defined benefit basis—and (ii) have trustees (or managers, in the case of non-UK schemes). The Code provisions are not limited to UK pension schemes and apply to all such schemes, regardless of size or materiality in the context of the offeree’s group.

The new provisions do not apply to pension schemes that provide pension benefits only on a “defined contribution” basis, as the Panel believes that the provisions of the Code granting rights to employees and employee representatives already create an appropriate framework for discussion in relation to the impact of an offer, and the offeror’s intentions, in relation to such schemes.

Publication of Offeror’s Intentions in Relation to Pension Scheme

An offeror will now be required to include in the offer document a statement of its intentions with regard to relevant offeree pension schemes, including with respect to employer contributions and arrangements for deficit funding, benefits accruals for current members, and the admission of new members to the scheme. However, the Panel has not required that the offeror include a statement on the likely repercussions of its strategic plans for the offeree company on relevant pension schemes. Similarly, the Panel has confirmed that such statements do not need to include an assessment of the future ability of the offeree company to meet its funding obligations to its pension scheme.

The Panel also confirmed that the general rule under Note 3, Rule 19.1 of the Code will apply to statements of intention made in respect of pension schemes. This means that an offeror will be considered to be committed by any such statements for 12 months after the offer ends (or such other period of time as is specified in the offeror’s statement), unless there has been a material change of circumstances.

Under the PCP, the Panel originally proposed to require the offeree to include in its offeree circular its views on the effects of the implementation of the offer—and the offeror’s strategic plans for the offeree—on the offeree’s pension schemes. However, following the consultation, the Panel did not make these changes but did confirm that the offeree board may include its views on these subjects in the offeree circular should it wish to do so.

Provision of Information to Pension Scheme Trustees

The amendments to the Code provide that trustees of the offeree company’s pension scheme will be entitled to receive the same documents that offerors and offerees are required to make available to employee representatives. These documents include the following:

  • The announcement that commences the offer period
  • The announcement of a firm intention to make an offer
  • The offer document
  • The offeree board circular in response to the offer document
  • Any revised offer document
  • The offeree board circular in response to any revised offer document

Pension Scheme Trustees’ Opinion on the Offer

Under the revised Code, pension scheme trustees will have the right to require the offeree’s board of directors to publish the trustees’ opinion on the effects of the offer on the pension scheme, and the offeree will be obliged to notify such trustees of this right at the commencement of the offer. As with employee representatives’ opinions, if the trustees’ opinion is received in good time, the opinion must be appended to the offeree board circular. If it is not received in good time, it must be published on a website, with such publication to be announced on a Regulated Information Service.[3] The Panel has confirmed that the trustees’ opinion may cover more than the impact of the offer on the benefits that the scheme provides to members (and other matters to be included in the offeror’s statement in the offer document) and that the opinion may also extend to the trustees’ views on the impact of the offer on the post-offer ability of the offeree company to make future contributions to the pension scheme (i.e., the strength of its funding covenant).

Unlike employee representative opinions, the offeree will only be responsible for the costs incurred in the publication of the trustees’ opinion and not for any other costs incurred in relation to its preparation or verification.

Agreements Entered into Between an Offeror and Pension Scheme Trustees

The revised Code also contains certain provisions relating to any agreements between an offeror and the trustees of an offeree pension scheme, for example, in relation to the future funding of that scheme. Following the consultation, the Panel determined that any such agreements should be treated in the same manner as any other offer-related agreement, with certain variations. As a result, the amendments contain the following requirements for agreements between offerors and pension scheme trustees:

  • Where any such agreement is a material contract for the offeror within the meaning of the Code, it should be published on a website in the same manner as any other material contract.
  • Where such an agreement is not material, but is nevertheless referred to in the offer document, there will be no requirement to publish it on a website.
  • Where such an agreement relates only to the future funding of the pension scheme, it will be excluded from the general prohibition on offer-related agreements contained in Rule 21.2(a).[4]

Pensions Regulator

The Panel has confirmed, following discussions with the UK Pensions Regulator, that there will be no obligation under the Code for the offeror or offeree to send offer-related documentation to the Pensions Regulator, nor will there be any obligation on the Panel to notify the Pensions Regulator of takeover offers. Accordingly, it is for the offer parties (and any other interested parties) to decide whether they wish to engage with, or seek clearance of the offer from, the Pensions Regulator.

Entry into Force

The amendments introduced by the Response Statement will take effect on 20 May 2013, and an amended version of the Code will be published on this date.

[1]. View the Response Statement here.

[2]. View the PCP here.

[3]. The UK Financial Conduct Authority has published a list of information services that are approved Regulated Information Services in Appendix 3 of the Listing Rules, which is available here.

[4]. The Panel, however, emphasised that any obligations or restrictions on the trustees regarding any other offeror or potential offeror would not be permissible.

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Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) Liability And Private Equity Firms

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Last month’s decision out of the Delaware District Court in Woolery, et al. v. Matlin Patterson Global Advisers, LLC, et al. was an eye opener for private equity firms and other entities owning a controlling stake in a faltering business.  Breaking from the norm, the Court refused to dismiss private equity firm MatlinPatterson Global Advisers, LLC (“MatlinPatterson”) and affiliated entities from a class action WARN Act suit alleging that the 400-plus employees of Premium Protein Products, LLC (“Premium”), a Nebraska-based meat processer and MatlinPatterson portfolio company, hadn’t received the statutorily-mandated 60 days advance notice of layoffs.

According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s performance began to decline in 2008 and, upon the downturn, the defendants became more and more involved in Premium’s day-to-day operations, including by making business strategy decisions (e.g., to enter the kosher food market), terminating Premium’s existing President, and installing a new company President.  Things got bad enough that, in June 2009, the defendants decided to “furlough” all of Premium’s employees with virtually no notice and close the plant.  The defendants then, in November 2009, converted the furlough to layoffs, and Premium filed for bankruptcy.  According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s head of HR raised WARN Act concerns back in June, when the decision to close the plant and furlough the employees was made, and the defendants ignored the issue.

With Premium in bankruptcy, the plaintiffs, unsurprisingly, turned to MatlinPatterson and the other defendants as the targets of their WARN Act claim, asserting that they and Premium were a “single employer.”  The Court then applied the Department of Labor’s five-factor balancing test, namely (1) whether the entities share common ownership, (2) whether the entities share common directors or officers, (3) the existence of de facto exercise of control by the parent over the subsidiary, (4) the existence of a unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, and (5) the dependency of operations between the two entities.  This test often favors private equity firms, and on balance it did so in Woolery too, with the Court finding that the plaintiffs had made no showing as to three of the five factors.  The Court nevertheless refused to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint alleged that the defendants had exercised de facto control over Premium and then essentially giving that factor determinative weight.

No one should be surprised by the decision given the plaintiffs’ allegations, which had to be accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage.  They presented an ugly picture of a private equity firm dictating the most critical decisions (to close plant, layoff employees) and then attempting to duck the WARN Act’s dictates. The decision is nevertheless a cautionary tale for private equity firms and at first blush it presents a catch 22: (a) do nothing and watch your investment sink or (b) get involved and risk WARN Act liability.

So what is a private equity firm, lender or majority investor to do?  Obviously, the best scenario is to build in the required 60-day notice period or, if applicable, utilize WARN Act exceptions, including the “faltering company” and “unforeseen business circumstances” exceptions.  Even where that’s not possible, private equity firms and other controlling investors need not take a completely hands off approach.  They would, however, be best-served (at least for WARN Act purposes) to do the following:

  • Provide only customary board-level oversight and allow the employer’s officers and management team to run the employer’s day-to-day operations
  • Although Board oversight and input can occur, continue to work through the management team on major decisions, including layoffs and potential facility closures
  • Avoid placing private equity firm or lender employees or representatives on the employer’s management team
  • Have the employer’s management team execute employment contracts with the employer, not the private equity firm or lender, and have the contracts, for the most part, create obligations only to the employer
  • Allow the employer to maintain its own personnel policies and practices, as well as HR oversight and function

What the courts are primarily concerned with in these cases are (a) a high degree of integration between the private equity firm or lender and the actual employer, particularly as to day-to-day operations, and (b) who the decision-maker was with regard to the employment practice giving rise to the litigation (typically the layoff or plant closure decision).  Private equity firms and lenders that have refrained from this level of integration have had, and should continue to have, success in avoiding WARN Act liability and returning the focus of the WARN Act discussion to the actual employer.

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Supreme Court (Sort Of) Approves “Picking Off” Strategy in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action Cases

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If you have ever received a complaint alleging minimum wage or overtime violations from one of your employees, the United States Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, or a similar state agency (in Wisconsin, the Labor Standards Bureau of the Equal Rights Division), you have probably considered the possibility that other employees might raise similar claims.  Depending on the size of your workforce, this single-employee headache could quickly evolve into a class action or collective action migraine.

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a single employee may file a wage and hour lawsuit on behalf of himself and other “similarly situated” employees.  The FLSA’s collective action mechanism requires potential plaintiffs to opt into the lawsuit, meaning that individuals must choose to participate in the case.  This mechanism differs from a class action lawsuit because individuals covered by a class certified by the court mustopt out of the case.  In other words, in a class action, an individual covered by a certified class must choose to not participate in the case.

Defense counsel have typically attempted to protect employers from prolonged and costly collective action litigation by “picking off” the named plaintiff(s) in lawsuits filed under the FLSA.  This “picking off” strategy refers to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a defendant to make an offer of judgment to the plaintiff.  An offer of judgment amounts to giving the plaintiff the full relief requested in the complaint and costs accrued by the plaintiff.  A plaintiff’s acceptance of a Rule 68 offer of judgment moots (i.e., a dispute no longer exists) the case as to the plaintiff, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction.

In the collective action context, however, employers have had mixed results on the issue of whether acceptance of a Rule 68 offer by the named plaintiff(s) also moots the claims of the potential collective group of affected employees.  The question also remained:  what happens when the named plaintiff(s) rejects the Rule 68 offer of judgment?

On Tuesday, April 16, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision, Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, that attempted to answer this question.  In this case, the employer, Genesis, made a Rule 68 offer of judgment to the plaintiff, Symczyk, while simultaneously answering the complaint and prior to Symczyk moving for conditional certification.  By its terms, the offer automatically expired after ten days.  Symczyk did not accept the offer, and Genesis moved for judgment in its favor, arguing that its offer of judgment mooted Symczyk’s claim and the potential collective action.  Symczyk did not contest Genesis’ argument that the offer fully satisfied her claim.  The district court agreed with Genesis and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that Genesis’ Rule 68 offer mooted Symczyk’s claim, but it disagreed about the effect the offer had on the potential collective action.  The court of appeals held that allowing a defendant to “pick off” named plaintiffs for the purpose of avoiding the certification of a collective action would run contrary to the purpose of the collective action mechanism permitted by the FLSA.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff “has no personal interest in representing putative, unnamed claimants, nor any other continuing interest that would preserve her suit from mootness.”  According to the Supreme Court, a Rule 68 offer of judgment that renders the claims of the named plaintiff(s) moot also eliminates the plaintiff’s interest in the collective action.  More importantly, the Supreme Court held that a collective action under the FLSA, even if “conditionally certified” by a court, does not give the “class” of potential plaintiffs “an independent legal status.”  A “conditional certification” simply results in “the sending of court-approved written notice to employees[.]“  Thus, the Supreme Court has given some legitimacy to the strategy of “picking off” named plaintiffs by offering them full relief through a Rule 68 offer of judgment.

Note, however, that the Supreme Court did not hold that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer renders a claim (the named plaintiff’s or the collective action claim) moot.  Because Symczyk waived these arguments in the lower courts, the Supreme Court simply assumed, without deciding, that the unaccepted Rule 68 offer rendered her claim moot.

While, at first blush, the decision seems like a great win for employers, it has potential limitations, many of which Justice Elena Kagan points out in her dissent, including the following:

  1. Symczyk waived several important arguments throughout the litigation, including the argument that the unaccepted Rule 68 offer in fact did not moot her individual claim.
  2. The Genesis case addresses a scenario in which no other plaintiffs had yet joined the collective action (due in part to the timing of Genesis’ offer to Symczyk and her failure to move for certificaiton).
  3. The Court simply ignored the limitations of a Rule 68 offer of judgment, including that Rule 68 only gives courts authority to enter judgment when the plaintiff accepts the offer and that “[e]vidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.”

Despite the limitations of the Genesis decision, employers can take comfort in the Court’s indication of its leanings regarding collective actions.  In addition to the Court’s holding regarding the mootness issue, employers can also point to the Court’s statements calling into question the legitimacy of applying class action rules and precedent to collective actions under the FLSA.

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Recent Social Media Developments Impacting Employers

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NLRB: Latest Decisions Addressing Social Media Policies and Activities

Within the past several months, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB“) has issued four precedent-setting opinions addressing the legality of an employer’s use of social media as a basis for taking adverse employment action. These decisions apply to both unionized and non-unionized workforces.

The key issue in each of these cases was whether the employer’s actions compromised the right of employees to engage in “protected concerted activities” for the purpose of their “mutual aid and protection.” However, as noted in a prior alert, recent federal case law could void all NLRB decisions dating back to January 4, 2012 (including those discussed below). Until there is clarity the NLRB decisions continue to be significant in shaping social media use, policy and practice.

On April 19, 2013, the NLRB, in Design Technology Group, LLC, found that an employee’s Facebook posts that criticized a manager’s handling of employee concerns were a “classic connected protected activity” under the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”).

In that case, workers had approached their manager about closing the store they worked in at 7 PM instead of 8 PM, because of safety concerns. The manager advised that she would discuss those concerns with corporate officials, but the issue was never resolved. Subsequently, two employees posted messages on Facebook that were critical of how the manager handled that issue. Another employee showed the manager those posts and six days later, both employees who made the critical Facebook posts were fired by the manager.

The NLRB determined that the Facebook posts were part of the employees’ efforts to convince their employer to close the store earlier in the evening, based on their concerns about working late in an unsafe neighborhood. The NLRB found that those posts were protected under the Act and that the employees’ terminations constituted unfair labor practices.

Design Technology comes on the heels of three other NLRB social media rulings issued late last year.

In Hispanic United of Buffalo (December 14, 2012), the NLRB held that the termination of five employees for violating an employer’s policies on the basis of their social media activity was unlawful. In that case, five employees posted comments on Facebook that were critical of a co-worker who was scheduled to meet with and complain to management about their work performance. The employer terminated the five employees for “bullying and harassing” the co-worker in violation of its policies.

Hispanics United of Buffalo applied settled NLRB law regarding oral communications among co-workers to the social media context. Under NLRB precedent, employees’ comments regarding the terms and conditions of their employment are protected if their comments are “concerted” — meaning they are “‘engaged in, with or on the authority of other employees,” not only by “one employee on behalf of himself.” Finding the actions of these employees to be protected, the NLRB set a relatively low threshold for interpreting social media activity as protected concerted activity under the Act.

The Hispanics United decision is especially controversial because it may conflict with an employer’s competing obligation under federal and state discrimination laws to prevent workplace harassment. And, the decision may ultimately be in conflict with workplace anti-bullying laws in those states where such legislation is being actively considered. In Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. (September 28, 2012), the NLRB ordered another employer to rescind its social media policy. In that case, the employer terminated the employee for multiple reasons, including violation of the employer’s “Courtesy” rule requiring employees to be “courteous, polite and friendly” to customers, vendors, suppliers and fellow employees and not to use “language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.”

The NLRB held that the “Courtesy” rule violated the NLRA because employees could “reasonably construe its broad prohibition against ‘disrespectful’ conduct and ‘language’ which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership as encompassing Section 7 activity.” However, the NLRB upheld the employee’s termination, finding it was not motivated by protected concerted activity, but rather was solely based on the employee’s Facebook postings that did not relate to the terms and conditions of his or any other employee’s employment. The NLRB did not address whether other posts would be protected by the Act.

In Costco Wholesale Corp. (September 7, 2012), the NLRB ruled that an employer’s overbroad social media policy violated the National Labor Relations Act because it prohibited employees from posting statements “that damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation or violate the policies outlined in the Costco Employee Agreement.” The NLRB ordered Costco to rescind the policy based on its finding that the policy inhibited employees from engaging in protected concerted activity.

NJ Legislative Update: Proposed Law Seeks to Protect Employee and Job Applicant Passwords

A-2878, a bill that prohibits employers from requiring, or requesting, a current or prospective employee to reveal, as a condition of employment, his or her user name, password or other means of accessing the employee’s personal social media account, has passed both houses of the NJ Legislature and is awaiting further action by Governor Chris Christie. While it is not clear as of this writing whether Governor Christie will sign or veto this bill, the implications to employers of this potential new law are far reaching.

If enacted, this bill would prohibit employers from even asking an employee or prospective employee whether he or she has a profile on a social media site. In addition, the bill would prohibit employers from requiring prospective employees to waive or limit any protection granted to them under the law as a condition of applying for or receiving an offer of employment. It provides for a $1,000 civil penalty for the law’s first violation and $2,500 for each subsequent violation. If Governor Christie signs this bill into law, New Jersey would join other states that have enacted legislation preventing employers from requesting social media access information, including Arkansas, California, Delaware, Illinois, and Michigan, though it would be the first state to prevent employers from inquiring if employees or applicants have a social media account.

Notably, the bill does not prevent employers from performing their own online search to determine if a prospective or current employee is on a social media site. Accordingly, if a social media account is publically available, an employer would not run afoul of this proposed law by independently viewing an employee’s or prospective employee’s social media account. This type of activity could have other potential pitfalls associated with it however, such as learning protected class information about applicants.

We will continue to monitor the signing status of this bill.

What These Decisions and the Prospective NJ Statute Mean to Employers

In light of the foregoing, we recommend the following:

  • Employers should review and consider revising social media polices and hiring practices to address the NLRB decisions, the new NJ legislation, if enacted, and EEO issues associated with searches on applicants.
  • With respect to policies, employers should ensure that prohibitions placed on employees’ communications do not prohibit employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity.
  • Employers should continue to exercise caution when disciplining or terminating any employee based on his/her social media activities and should also consider training its managers in this area so that they do not inadvertently run afoul of these laws.
  • It is important to consult with counsel to consider whether an employee’s comments or posts would be deemed to be protected concerted activity under the Act before any disciplinary action is taken by the employer based on those comments or posts.
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Pregnancy and Disability Discrimination the Focus of EEOC Enforcement Activity

Poyner SpruillSince Congress’ enactment of amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 2008, making it easier to establish disability status under that law, the EEOC has directed more of its attention to claims of pregnancy and disability discrimination and accommodation of pregnancy-related limitations. In its 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan, the Commission identified the investigation and pursuit of this type of claim as a national priority.  This enforcement initiative was recently demonstrated in a lawsuit filed by the EEOC against an employer which allegedly denied accommodations to an employee who suffered from complications arising from her pregnancy. The suit, EEOC v. Engineering Documentation Systems, Inc.,settled for $70,000 before a judgment on the merits was reached. However, the case serves as a reminder to employers that the issue of pregnancy-related disability is now being targeted by the EEOC.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), prohibits discrimination against employees or job applicants on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. The EEOC takes the position that Title VII and the PDA require employers to treat pregnant employees in the same manner as other employees with temporary medical conditions. For example, according to the EEOC, if an employer provides leaves of absence or light duty to employees with short-term medical conditions which render those employees unable to work, then an employee unable to work due to her pregnancy must also be afforded the same treatment.1   But Title VII is not the only potentially applicable law in this circumstance. The ADA requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodation” to an employee with an actual (or record of) disability. This raises the question whether a pregnant employee has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

Under the ADA, a disability is defined in part as a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits a major life activity. Prior to the amendments to the ADA, temporary medical conditions generally were not found by the courts to constitute disabilities, on the grounds that short-term impairments were not “substantially limiting.” However, the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) has led to a more expansive interpretation of the term “disability.” Specifically, the EEOC’s regulations implementing the ADAAA state that an impairment may be substantially limiting of a major life activity, and thus a disability, even if it is of a duration of less than six months. While the EEOC still considers pregnancy itself not to constitute a disability (See EEOC’s “Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008”), it recognizes that certain impairments resulting from pregnancy may be disabilities if they substantially limit a major life activity. As stated on the EEOC’s webpage regarding pregnancy discrimination, this could include short term complications of pregnancy such as gestational diabetes or preeclampsia.

With the possibility that more medical conditions and complications arising from pregnancy will now fall within the definition of disability under the ADAAA, employers must be more cognizant of when an obligation to consider and provide reasonable accommodation to employees with a pregnancy-related disability arises. Such accommodations might include leaves of absence, job reassignment, light duty, or job modifications, unless such accommodations would result in an undue hardship to the employer. It is also imperative that employers engage in the “interactive process” with such employees to identify reasonable accommodation. The failure to take such proactive measures can result in liability for an employer, particularly given that the EEOC is now focused on this area of enforcement.

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