Obama Administration Delays Until 2015 Large Employer Shared Responsibility Requirements, Reporting and Tax Penalties

Dickinson Wright LogoOn July 2, 2013, the Department of Treasury announced a one-year delay in the employer shared responsibility mandate under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and related information reporting.

Complexity Leads to Delayed Reporting Implementation

The Department said that over the past several months, the Administration engaged in dialogue with businesses about the new employer and insurer reporting requirements under ACA. It took into account employer concerns about the complexity of the requirements and their need for more time to implement them effectively. Based on this, the Administration announced that it will provide an additional year, to January 1, 2015, before the ACA mandatory employer and insurer reporting requirements begin. It said the delay is designed to meet two goals. First, it will allow the Department to consider ways to simplify the new reporting requirements consistent with the law. Second, it will provide time to adapt health coverage and reporting systems while employers are moving toward making health coverage affordable and accessible for their employees. The Department said that within the next week, it will publish formal guidance describing the transition. In doing so, it said it is working hard to adapt and be flexible about reporting requirements as it implements the law.

More specifically, the Department said that the ACA includes information reporting (under Code Section 6055) by insurers, self-insured employers, and other parties that provide health coverage. It also requires information reporting (under Code Section 6056) by certain employers with respect to the health coverage offered to their full-time employees. The Department expects to publish proposed rules implementing these provisions this summer, after a dialogue with stakeholders – including responsible employers that already provide their full-time work force with coverage that exceeds the minimum employer shared responsibility requirements – in an effort to minimize the reporting, consistent with effective implementation of the law.

Once these rules have been issued, the Administration will work with employers, insurers, and other reporting entities to strongly encourage them to voluntarily implement this information reporting in 2014, in preparation for the full application of the provisions in 2015. It said that real-world testing of reporting systems in 2014 will contribute to a smoother transition to full implementation in 2015.

Delayed Implementation of Shared Responsibility and Tax Penalties

The Department said it recognizes that this transition relief will make it impractical to determine which applicable large employers owe the shared responsibility tax payment for not providing minimum essential coverage that is affordable and provides minimum value (under Code Section 4980H) for 2014. Accordingly, the Department is extending transition relief on the employer shared responsibility payments. Under the transition relief, applicable large employers will not owe either the $2,000 tax or the $3,000 tax for 2014. Any employer shared responsibility tax payments will not apply until 2015. During the 2014 transition period, the Department strongly encourages employers to maintain or expand the health coverage they provide to their employees.

Importantly, the Department said its actions do not affect employees’ access to the premium tax credits available under the ACA, although without employers reporting on who they provide coverage to, it is hard to see how the government will know which individuals qualify for a tax credit. Without more, this suggests that the Department intends that marketplaces for individuals will still be available January 1, 2014. It also suggests that most Americans will still have to obtain health benefits coverage or pay the individual tax. It is not clear if the notice employers are required to send to all employees by October 1, 2013 advising them of the marketplaces will still be required. The upcoming guidance should address this and other requirements. The Department also said that this delay does not change the compliance requirements under any other provision of the ACA. This suggests that the PCORI fee payable by July 31, 2013 is still due, the 90-day maximum waiting period for benefits eligibility in 2014 still applies, etc.

Hopefully, the upcoming guidance will provide more detail on on-going employer responsibilities. Until then, it appears that, presuming there are no additional delays or relief:

  • Employers will not have to count full-time employees and full-time equivalents in 2013 to determine if they are applicable large employers beginning January 1, 2014.
  • Applicable large employers will not have to determine their full-time employees for purposes of providing minimum essential coverage in 2014.
  • Applicable large employers who do not provide minimum essential coverage to all full-time employees in 2014 will not owe the $2,000 tax times all full-time employees (minus 30) if one full-time employee purchases coverage through a marketplace and obtains a tax credit or subsidy.
  • Applicable large employers that provide minimum essential coverage that is not affordable or does not provide minimum value in 2014 will not owe the $3,000 tax times all full-time employees who purchase coverage through a marketplace and receive a tax credit or subsidy.
  • Employers will not have to report to the government on their full-time employees and health plan coverage in 2014, although the government will urge voluntary reporting.
  • Employers that have been considering adjusting the structure of their workforces to minimize the number of their full-time employees appear to have additional time in which to analyze and implement workforce changes.
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In a Pro-Employee World, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings Offer Employers Hope

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In a pair of important opinions released last week, both of which are helpful to employers, the U.S. Supreme Court raised the bar for employees asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. _, No. 12-484 (2013), the Court ruled that an employee claiming retaliation must do more than show that retaliatory animus was a “motivating factor” for discipline – it must be the “but-for” cause.  In Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. _, No. 11-556 (2013), the Court ruled that for employers to be held vicariously liable for the actions of a “supervisor,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “supervisor” had power to take a “tangible employment action,” such as transferring or terminating the employee. Authority merely to direct aspects of the employee’s work will not suffice.

Nassar and Vance represent significant victories for employers faced with Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims. The heightened requirements that charging employees now face should enhance an employer’s prospects for obtaining summary judgment and, failing that, impose a more rigorous hurdle for plaintiffs at trial.

Nassar Imposes More Stringent “But-For” Causation Test for Title VII Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff in Nassar was a physician of Middle Eastern descent. The defendant university hired him as a member of its medical faculty, and under the terms of the university’s affiliation agreement with a local hospital, the plaintiff also worked at the hospital as a staff physician. The plaintiff alleged that the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine harassed him because of her discriminatory “bias against Arabs and Muslims.” The plaintiff ultimately resigned from the university faculty, and accused his superior of discriminatory bias in his letter of resignation, which he sent to the university’s chair of Internal Medicine and other faculty members. The chair was allegedly dismayed by the public accusations of discrimination, and said that the chief must “be publicly exonerated” of the charges against her. When he learned that plaintiff had been offered a staff physician position at the hospital, the chair objected that the affiliation agreement required all staff physicians to also be faculty members, and the hospital therefore withdrew its offer to plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that he had been constructively discharged by reason of the chief’s discriminatory harassment, and that the chair subsequently allegedly retaliated against him for complaining of that harassment. A jury found for plaintiff on both claims, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed only as to the retaliation claim, holding that retaliation claims under Title VII required a showing merely that retaliation was a “motivating factor” for an adverse employment action rather than its “but-for” cause.

The Supreme Court vacated that decision, concluding that “the text, structure and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim … must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” The Court reasoned that because Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision appears in a different section from the status-based discrimination ban, which utilizes the lesser “motivating factor” causation test, the “but-for” standard applies to Title VII retaliation claims. Accordingly, “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” To establish a retaliation claim, employees must now show that their employer would not have taken the challenged employment action but for the employee’s protected activity.

Vance Limits “Supervisors” to Those with Power to Take a Tangible Employment Action

In a second critical decision for employers, plaintiff in Vance, an African-American woman, worked in the university’s Banquet and Catering Division of Dining Services. Plaintiff alleged that a fellow employee, a white woman named Davis, harassed and intimidated her because of her race.  Plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging that her white co-worker created a racially hostile work environment. “The parties vigorously dispute[d] the precise nature and scope of Davis’ duties, but they agree[d] that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.”

The District Court granted defendant summary judgment, holding the university was notvicariously liable for Davis’s alleged actions because she could not take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff and therefore was not a “supervisor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “who qualifies as a ‘supervisor’” under Title VII. The Court held that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII [only] if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim” and affirmed.

In analyzing when an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, the Court defined “tangible employment actions” to include effecting “‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” The Court specifically rejected the EEOC’s definition of “supervisor,” which tied “supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily work[,]” as “a study in ambiguity.” Hence, under Title VII, if an employee is not authorized to impose tangible employment actions against another, the employer cannot be vicariously liable for the subject employee’s alleged harassment.

Vance enhances an employer’s ability to limit the company’s responsibility for harassment. Employers should remain mindful of the duties of their employees, ensuring that only key management and supervisory personnel possess the power to effect a “significant change in employment status”. Clear definitions of an employee’s responsibilities should greatly limit any future claims of vicarious liability against employers. This more precise definition of “supervisor” should, like Nassar, increase the likelihood of dismissal at the summary judgment stage and help obtain favorable in limine and trial rulings.

Conclusion

Nassar and Vance afford significant advantages to employers defending against discrimination and retaliation claims.  Importantly, although the decisions themselves were concerned with claims arising under federal anti-discrimination (not just Title VII) laws, the Court’s reasoning may well find acceptance among state courts, which frequently apply the Title VII analysis to claims asserted under analogous state laws. Nassar and Vance are likely to prove valuable tools to employers defending against claims of discrimination and/or retaliation, increasing both the prospects of obtaining summary judgment and, if necessary, the odds of success at trial.

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China to Strictly Regulate Secondment/Staffing Business Model

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Amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law take effect on July 1, adding limitations on employment structures.

On July 1, 2013, amendments to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Labor Contract Law will take effect. The amendments increase the regulation of staffing and labor service businesses and discourage the use of secondment arrangements to avoid employer-related liabilities. The new law was published on December 28, 2012 and is an important development in China’s business community.

In recent years, increasing numbers of labor-intensive businesses, including state-owned banks and large multinationals, have used secondment services provided by staffing firms due to the difficulties involved in terminating employees and increased compliance costs in China. The secondment arrangements became attractive options among employers because the termination of such an arrangement was not subject to the numerous restrictions set forth in the labor law and regulations and avoided triggering severance obligations.

In light of the Chinese government’s amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law, companies with operations in China should keep in the mind the below major requirements when formulating or executing compliance plans.

Qualification of Staffing Firms

To engage in a staffing business for the provision of secondment services, a company must meet the new law’s requirements, which include a minimum registered capital of at least RMB$2 million. In addition, a company must apply for a special permit before conducting any staffing business. As the law is silent on the qualifications of an applicant to obtain such a permit, the approval authorities have broad discretion. It is possible the Chinese government will control the number of service providers in a particular geographic area by limiting the number of permits issued. In practice, firms without permits may structure their business models as outsourcing businesses by arguing that they are not providing staffing services. However, because the distinction between “secondment” and “outsourcing” is not defined in any law or regulation, the regulatory authorities may treat the outsourcing model as secondment in substance and thus require a permit.

Equal Work, Equal Pay

The new law requires that the recipients of secondment services compensate the secondee for his or her services on the principle of “equal work, equal pay.” Although this concept has been in existence since the promulgation of the PRC Labor Law in 1994, it is not a defined term in any labor regulation, including the new law. Traditionally, benefits and other nonsalary items, such as equity incentive awards, have not been considered when applying the principle of equal work, equal pay. It remains to be seen how the courts and labor arbitration organizations will interpret the principle in the context of the new law.

Limitation on the Role of Secondees

The new law expressly states that, as a general principle, employers should hire employees through signed labor contracts and that secondment can be used only if the position is of a temporary, auxiliary, or replaceable nature. A position will be treated as temporary if it lasts no more than six months, but it is not clear whether the secondment term can be renewed upon expiration. “Auxiliary positions” are defined as noncore business positions without further explanation. In practice, it may often be very difficult to distinguish between core and noncore positions. For instance, while it can be argued that only bankers are core to the banking business, it can also be asserted that in-house lawyers should be core personnel as well because of their role in controlling and managing risks, which is critical to banks. The new law defines “replaceable positions” as those left vacant because the formal employees are on leave for personal or business reason, but it is not clear if replacement positions can be renewed.

Percentage Limitation on the Number of Secondees

The new law requires employers to strictly limit the number of secondees to a certain percentage of the total number of personnel (including secondees). Specific percentages will be announced by the State Council. It is generally understood that the percentage should be within a 10% to 30% range. A literal reading of the language of the new law suggests that any percentage limitation should be in addition to the requirement that the positions for secondees should be of a temporary, auxiliary, or replaceable nature. Thus, an employer may not argue that it complies with the law by limiting the number of secondees below the maximum percentage, regardless of the nature of a secondee’s position. In practice, however, employers or regulatory authorities may take the percentage cap as a safe harbor due to the difficulties of defining the nature of a secondee’s position.

Consequences of Breach

For staffing firms without a permit, the Chinese government may take away all illegal revenue and impose monetary penalties of up to five times the amount of the revenue. If a staffing firm or employer fails to comply with the law, the labor regulatory authority will order it to take corrective measures. A per person penalty ranging from RMB$5,000 to RMB$10,000 will be imposed if no remedial measures are adopted by the employer or staffing service provider. The new law is silent on whether a secondee may request that the employer convert him or her into a formal employee if the employer is found to be noncompliant. If the answer is no, what will happen to the existing secondment? Should the parties terminate the secondment and should the actual user of the employee’s service formally employ someone for the same position? May the secondee have a right of first refusal if the actual user is required to do so? These and other similar questions remain to be answered by further implementing rules from the State Council or judicial interpretation from the Supreme People’s Court.

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Tri-Agencies Release Final Rules on Wellness Programs

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On May 29, 2013, the U. S. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and the Treasury (the Tri-Agencies) issued final regulations (the final rules) implementing the changes that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) made to wellness programs. The final rules apply to both grandfathered and non-grandfathered group health plans and are effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2014.

The final rules do not change the basic distinction between “participatory” wellness programs and “health-contingent” wellness programs. The final rules, consistent with the proposed rules, focus largely on revisions to health-contingent wellness programs. The key PPACA changes to the 2006 wellness regulations include:

  • Increases in the maximum allowable rewards under a health-contingent wellness program from 20% of the cost of coverage to 30% for non-smoking related programs and a 50% maximum for smoking related programs;
  • Clarifications of what constitutes a “reasonably designed” health-contingent wellness program; and
  • Additional guidance on reasonable alternatives that must be offered under any health-contingent wellness program so that the program remains non-discriminatory.

Participatory wellness programs are programs that either do not provide a reward or do not require an individual to meet a standard related to a health factor in order to obtain a reward. Participatory wellness programs are presumed to be nondiscriminatory if participation is made available to all similarly situated individuals, regardless of their health status. Examples include programs that reimburse employees for the cost of membership in a fitness center, or reward employees who complete a health risk assessment. These programs are easier to administer and not subject to the more exacting criteria that apply to health-contingent wellness programs.

Health-Contingent wellness programs require an individual to satisfy a health-related standard to obtain a reward. Examples include programs that provide a reward for smoking cessation, or programs that reward achievements for specified health-related goals, such as lowering cholesterol levels or losing weight. The final rules subdivide health-contingent wellness programs into two types: activity-only and outcome-based. An activity-only wellness program requires an individual to perform or complete an activity related to a health factor (e.g., a diet or exercise program), but it does not require the individual to reach or maintain a specific health result. In contrast, an outcome-based wellness program requires an individual to reach or maintain a specific health outcome (such as not smoking or attaining certain results on biometric screenings).

Modification to Maximum Rewards

All health-contingent wellness programs must satisfy five requirements to ensure compliance with the HIPAA non-discrimination rules. The final rules, as noted above, increase the maximum rewards allowed under a health-contingent wellness program. The five requirements are listed below and reflect the PPACA increases in the maximum rewards:

  1. The reward must be available to all similarly situated individuals;
  2. The program must give eligible individuals the opportunity to qualify for the reward at least once a year;
  3. The program must be reasonably designed to promote health and prevent disease;
  4. The reward must not exceed 30% of the cost of coverage (or 50% for programs designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use); and
  5. The program must provide a reasonable alternative standard to an individual who informs the plan that it is unreasonably difficult or medically inadvisable for him or her to achieve the standard for health reasons and therefore will not get the reward.

Clarifications to Reasonable Designs

Consistent with the 2006 regulations, the final rules continue to require that health-contingent wellness programs be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease. A program will meet this standard if it has a reasonable chance of improving health or preventing disease; is not overly burdensome; is not a subterfuge for discrimination based on a health factor; and is not highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease. The rules provide plan sponsors with a great deal of flexibility to design a wellness program.

Guidance on Reasonable Alternatives

The final rules modify the structure of the 2006 requirements with respect to providing reasonable alternatives for those individuals who are unable to attain the health-related goals of a health-contingent wellness program.

First, to satisfy the reasonable alternative requirement, the same full reward must be available to individuals who satisfy the reasonable alternative as is provided to individuals who are able to satisfy the standard program. As noted in the Preamble to the final rules, this means that the reasonable alternative must allow the individual a longer period to complete the program, and the reward earned must be the same as that given under the standard program.

The final rules do not require that the reasonable alternative be determined in advance and, consistent with past practice, allows the alternative to be set on an individual-by-individual basis. The final rules reiterate that, in lieu of providing a reasonable alternative, a plan or issuer may waive the otherwise applicable standard and simply provide the reward. Although in general a doctor’s verification is not needed for an individual to qualify for the reasonable alternative, the final rules do permit a doctor’s verification to be required under the activity-based reasonable alternative.

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I-94 Automation and the I-9 Process: Making the Immigration Form I-9 More Complicated

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This spring U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began implementation of a phased in Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, automation process. The Form I-94 is issued to all visitors entering the U.S. and assists CBP in tracking temporary non-immigrants, visa overstays, and other relevant information concerning foreign nationals entering the U.S. The new program created a paperless admission process with the ultimate goal of eliminating the paper I-94 card for foreign travelers. The automation enables CBP to organize admission data for sea and air entries easily and accessibly, saving an estimated $15.5 million per year in related costs (not from a reduction in paper). While the effort to move to an electronic system should be commended, the new system may make life a bit more complicated for employers sponsoring foreign workers due to the requirements of the Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification Form process. Travelers, with the exception of asylees and refugees who will continue to receive paper Form I-94 cards, will now receive an admission stamp together with a tear sheet providing instructions on how they may access and print their electronic Form I-94 by visiting www.cbp.gov/I94.

How will I-94 automation impact the Form I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification process?

For those employees entering the United States to work for a sponsoring employer, current Form I-9 instructions state that the individual must present his/her foreign passport and I-94 card for recording List A document information. With the new system, however, workers will need to go online to retrieve their I-94 numbers and present employers with their foreign passport and I-94 printout from the CBP Website. Based on our conversations with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), it appears that the Service will accept either the paper I-94 card or the printout of the I-94 for Form I-9 purposes in combination with the employee’s foreign passport. Employers collecting an I-94 printout should record it as an “I-94” for Form I-9 purposes, with the issuing authority as “CBP” and the document number and expiration date taken from the printout itself.

In addition, CBP will issue Form I-94 cards to refugees, asylees, and parolees with preprinted numbers on the documents that have been crossed out. CBP officials will hand write the valid admission number on the I-94 card. When completing a Form I-9 for an employee with a paper Form I-94 with a crossed out number, be sure to record the handwritten admission number in Section 2 of the Form I-9 if that employee presents his or her I-94.

Making the process more confusing, the new Form I-9 requires employees to know which government agency issued the I-94 number: USCIS or CBP. If CBP issued the employee’s I-94 number, the employee must complete Section 1 of the Form I-9 with an I-94 number instead of an Alien Registration/USCIS Number and must complete the Form I-9 with their admission number, foreign passport number and country of issuance. Generally, CBP will issue the Form for visitors entering through a land or sea port of entry. However, if USCIS is the government entity that issued the I-94 admission number “N/A” should be entered by the employee for the foreign passport number and country of issuance and the employee should record his/her Form I-94 admission number in Section 1 of the Form I-9. USCIS will issue the Form when there is a change, amendment, or extension of an employee’s status in the United States.

Issues with the Automated System

Some employers have already encountered issues with this new system, as not all new hires have been able to access their I-94 information from the online system. After speaking with CBP officials, it appears that this mainly is occurring when employees enter the country and then begin work almost immediately after entry. CBP is working to correct the problem. In the meantime, employers processing Form I-9 paperwork for new foreign national hires with electronic I-94 documents should use caution when completing the Form and should document the reason for any delays in processing if they are due to errors with the new government system. Completing the Form I-9 paperwork should not be delayed under any circumstance, as late completion could expose a company to liability. In addition, employees with issues accessing their I-94 information should call CBP at 1-877-221-5511 and inquire into their case status and the reason for the delay. Calls to USCIS inquiring into what employers should do in this situation were met with the same response.

If CBP is unable to provide the information for a new hire, the employee may want to consider adding a note to the Form I-9 in Section 1, explaining “No I-94 number available due to a government system issue.” The employee should be reminded to call CBP and continue to check the I-94 website. After the employee’s information is loaded to the system and the employee receives the I-94 number, Section 1 should be amended to include the I-94 number with the appropriate initial and dating. In Section 2 of the Form I-9, the employer should record the foreign passport information and the I-94 stamp information. In the “document number” field, the employer should indicate “I-94 number pending.” Upon receipt of the I-94 printout, the Form should be amended to include the appropriate I-94 number and should be initialed/dated by the employer.

Hopefully the issue of lag time between the entry of data and employee’s first day of work will be remedied by CBP in the coming weeks, but until then be sure that your company has a policy for addressing the situation and that the policy is applied consistently to all foreign national workers.Jennifer Biloshmi also contributed to this article.

Jennifer Biloshmi also contributed to this article.

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Does A Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Attorney Commit An Ethical Violation By Encouraging Whistleblowing Lawyers?

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The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation included a comprehensive post by Lawrence A. West which tackles the question of whether attorneys can be award seeking whistleblowers.  I want to approach the topic from the other direction.  May an SEC attorney actively solicit disclosure of client confidences from an member of the California State Bar?

California lawyers are governed by the State Bar Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6000 et seq.) and the California Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California and approved by the Supreme Court of California pursuant to Sections 6076 and 6077 of the Business and Professions Code.  The federal District Courts located in California have adopted California’s statutes, rules and decisions governing attorney conduct.  Central District Local Rule 83-3.1.2, Eastern District Local Rule 180(e), Northern District Local Rule 11-4, and Southern District Local Rule 83.4(b).

Section 6068(e) provides that members of the California bar must “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client”.   The only statutory exception permits, but does not require, an attorney to ”reveal confidential information relating to the representation of a client to the extent that the attorney reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the attorney reasonably believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual”.

Rule 1-120 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a member “shall not knowingly assist in, solicit, or induce any violation of these rules or the State Bar Act,” including Section 6068(e).   Thus, an SEC attorney who is a member of the California State Bar (or subject to the local rules of the U.S. District Court) could be found to violate Rule 1-120 if she actively induces an attorney to violate of Section 6068(e).

Of course, the SEC has taken the position that its attorney conduct rules (aka “Part 205 Rules”) preempt conflicting state law.  However, there is a real question of whether the SEC acted in excess of its authority in purporting to immunize lawyers.  More importantly, it is questionable whether the SEC can preempt state law in this regard.  In 2004, I co-wrote a law review article for the Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar that considered these questions in detail, Conflicting Currents: The Obligation to Maintain Inviolate Client Confidences and the New SEC Attorney Conduct Rules32 Pepp. L. Rev. 89 (2004).  The other authors were James F. Fotenos, Steven K. Hazen, James R. Walther, and Nancy H. Wojtas.

If you think it is ok to violate your client’s confidences, you may want to reflect on the case of Dimitrious P. Biller.  In 2011, an arbitrator order Mr. Biller to pay his former employer $2.6 million in damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.   According to the arbitrator,Hon. Gary L. Taylor (Ret.), Mr. Biller “did the professionally unthinkable: he betrayed the confidences of his client.”  The arbitration award was confirmed by the trial court and upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2012).  You may also want to consider what Justice Shinn had to say about an attorney who disclosed confidential client information after being ordered to do so by a trial court:

Defendant’s attorney should have chosen to go to jail and take his chances of release by a higher court

People v. Kor, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (emphasis added).

Finally, you may want to put yourself in the position of a client.  How effectively represented would you feel if you knew that your lawyer could be rewarded for violating your confidences?  How would you feel about a government agency that believes it is permissible to encourage lawyers to do the “professionally unthinkable”?

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Tips to Avoid a HR Nightmare: The Top 4 Mistakes Employers Make – Part II

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More than ever, employers are facing serious claims from disgruntled workers.  This two-part series discusses the top four tips for employers to avoid claims from unhappy workers:

1.         Failure to document unsatisfactory job performance. 

2.         Failure to terminate bad workers before it is too late.

3.         Failure to enforce the company’s harassment policy. 

4.         Failure to give a reason for employment termination.

Part I covered why it is important to document bad performance and why it is not a good idea to keep poor performers on your payroll.  In this installment, learn why it is imperative to deal with harassment claims properly and quickly and why employers should provide a reason for termination.

Mistake #3:    Failure to enforce the company’s harassment policy. 

It is important to follow the company’s harassment policy and procedures for dealing with harassment claims.  Respond quickly and effectively to any complaints of harassment or discrimination, whether by co-workers, customers, or other third parties.  For example, even employers with the best policies and training programs on investigating workplace conduct and harassment can be held liable if they fail to investigate a harassment complaint.  If the employer does not take corrective action when discovering the failure, these types of actions can appear to a jury as “utter indifference” on the part of the employer and consequently lead to an award of punitive damages. It is therefore important to take prompt and effective action.

Mistake #4:    Failure to give a reason for employment termination.

Make sure you follow the company’s rules and be consistent – discipline and treat all employees the same for all infractions.  Be honest and upfront with the employee about the reason(s) you are letting him/her go.  If the employer does not give an explanation when it terminates employment, employees will try to figure out why they were fired and likely will presume the reason was discriminatory.  At the time of termination, have a witness present, such as another supervisor or manager.  If appropriate, you can give the employee a chance to explain his/her side of the story, but you do not need to change your termination decision.

See Part I of this article here.

 

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Social Media & Emerging Employer Issues: Are You Protected?

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On June 13, 2013, Business First of Louisville and McBrayer hosted the second annual Social Media Seminar. The seminar’s precedent, Social Media: Strategy and Implementation, was offered in 2012 and was hugely successful. This year’s proved to be no different. Presented by Amy D. Cubbage and Cynthia L. Effinger, the seminar focused on emerging social media issues for employers. If you missed it, you missed out! But don’t worry, a seminar recap is below and for a copy of the PowerPoint slides click here.

McBrayer: If a business has been designated an entity that must comply with HIPAA, what is the risk of employees using social media?

Cubbage: Employers are generally liable for the acts of their employees which are inconsistent with HIPAA data privacy and security rules. As employees’ use of social networking sites increase, so does the possibility of a privacy or security breach. An employee may be violating HIPAA laws simply by posting something about their workday that is seemingly innocent. For instance, a nurse’s Facebook status that says, “Long day, been dealing with a cranky old man just admitted into the ER” could be considered a HIPAA violation and expose an employer to sanctions and fines.

 

McBrayer: Should businesses avoid using social media so that they will not become the target of social media defamation?

Effinger: In this day and age it is hard, if not impossible, for a business to be successful without some use of social media. There is always the risk that someone will make negative comments about an individual or a business online, especially when anonymity is an option. Employers need to know the difference between negativity and true defamation. Negative comments or reviews are allowed, perhaps even encouraged, on some websites. If a statement is truly defamatory, however, then a business should make efforts to have the commentary reported and removed. The first step should always be to ask the internet service provider for a retraction of the comment, but legal action may sometimes be required.

 

McBrayer: When does a negative statement cross the line and become defamation?

Effinger: It is not always easy to tell. First, a statement must be false. If it is true, no matter how damaging, it is not defamation. The same goes for personal opinions. Second, the statement must cause some kind of injury to an individual or business, such as by negatively impacting a business’s sales, to be defamation.

 

McBrayer: Can employers ever prevent employees from “speaking” on social media?

Effinger: Employers should always have social media policies in place that employees read, sign, and abide by. While it is never really possible to prevent employees from saying what they wish on social media sites, some of their speech may not be protected by the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause.

 

McBrayer: What constitutes “speech” on the internet? Is “liking” a group on Facebook speech? How about posting a YouTube video?

Effinger: This is a problem that courts and governmental employment agencies, like the National Labor Relations Board, are just starting to encounter. There is no bright-line rule for what constitutes “speech,” but it is safe to say that anything an employee does online that is somehow communicated to others (even “liking” a group or posting a video) qualifies.

 

McBrayer: Since a private employer is not bound by the First Amendment, can they terminate employees for social media actions with no repercussions?

Effinger: No! In fact, it could be argued that private employees are afforded more protection for what they say online than public employees. While a private employer has no constitutional duty to allow free speech, the employer is subject to state and federal laws that may prevent them from disciplining an employee’s conduct. As a general rule, private employees have the right to communicate in a “concerted manner” with respect to “terms and conditions” of their employment. Such communication is protected regardless of whether it occurs around the water cooler or, let’s say, on Twitter.

 

McBrayer: It seems like the best policy would be for employers to prohibit employees from discussing the company in any negative manner. Is this acceptable?

Effinger: It is crucial for companies to have social media policies and procedures, but crafting them appropriately can be tricky. There have been several instances where the National Labor Relations Board has reviewed a company’s policy and found its overly broad restrictions or blanket prohibitions illegal. Even giant corporations like General Motors and Target have come under scrutiny for their social media policies and been urged to rewrite them so employees are given more leeway.

 

McBrayer: Is social media a company asset?

Cubbage: Yes! Take a moment to consider all of the “followers”, “fans”, or “connections” that your business may have through its social media accounts. These accounts provide a way to constantly interact with and engage clients and customers. Courts have recently dealt with cases where a company has filed suit after a rogue employee stole a business account in some manner, for instance by refusing to turn over an account password. Accounts are “assets,” even if not tangible property.

 

McBrayer: What is the best way for an employer to protect their social media accounts?

Cubbage: Social media accounts should first be addressed in a company’s operating agreement. Who gets the accounts in the event the company splits? There are additional steps every employer should take, such as including a provision in social media policies that all accounts are property of the business. Also, there should always be more than one person with account information, but never more than a few. Treat social media passwords like any other confidential business information – they should only be distributed on a “need to know” basis.

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Supreme Court Ruling on Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Could Lead to Refunds of Federal Taxes

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Employers providing benefits for employees’ same-sex spouses may want to consider the availability of federal payroll tax refunds if the Supreme Court of the United States finds Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional.  Employers currently must impute income to an employee for the fair market value of benefit coverage for a non-dependent same-sex spouse.  Such imputed income is subject to federal income and payroll taxes, as well as state income taxes in the majority of states.

The Supreme Court of the United States is expected to rule in late June on the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).  A ruling that DOMA is unconstitutional will favorably reverse the federal tax treatment of employer-provided benefits for non-dependent same-sex spouses.  Such a reversal may lead to refunds of federal payroll taxes paid by employers and federal income taxes paid by employees on income imputed to employees for same-sex spouse benefit coverage.

Current Law

The Supreme Court is considering the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA in United States v. Windsor.  Windsor is a surviving spouse who was required to pay $350,000 in federal estate taxes after her same-sex spouse died—taxes she would not have had to pay if her same-sex marriage that was legally recognized in her home state of New York was also recognized under federal law.  Section 3 of DOMA provides that for all purposes of federal law, the word “marriage” means “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and the word “spouse” refers “only to a person of the opposite-sex who is a husband or wife.”

Employees who enroll a non-dependent same-sex spouse or partner under an employer-sponsored benefit plan currently must pay federal income taxes on the fair market value of such coverage.  While federal law excludes amounts that an employer pays toward medical, dental or vision benefits for an employee and the employee’s opposite-sex spouse and dependents from the employee’s taxable income, employers that provide these same benefits to employees’ same-sex spouses or partners are required to impute the fair market value of the benefits as income to the employee that is subject to federal income tax, unless the same-sex spouse or partner otherwise qualifies as the employee’s “dependent” as defined for federal income tax purposes.  Employers are required to withhold federal payroll taxes from the imputed amount, including income, Social Security and Medicare taxes.  In addition, employers must pay their share of Social Security and Medicare taxes on the imputed amount, as well as Federal Unemployment Tax Act taxes.  The majority of states follow the federal income tax rules approach and also require employers to impute income on the value of such benefits for state income tax purposes.

Consider Filing a Protective Claim Now

Employers that have imputed income on the fair market value of benefits for employees’ same-sex spouses should consider filing protective FICA tax refund claims and should be poised to change their systems to allow for the future exclusion of benefits provided to same-sex spouses.  Although filing a complete refund claim can be burdensome from an administrative perspective, it is relatively easy for an employer to file a protective claim to preserve the statute of limitations on employment tax refund claims for open years and later file a supplementary claim with necessary employee consents and exact calculations. 

In general, the statute of limitations for tax refund claims is three years.  The due date for the protective claim is three years from April 15 of the calendar year following the year in which the income was imputed to the employee.  For example, for employment taxes paid on income imputed in 2010, a protective claim should be filed by April 15, 2014.  If not filed already, a refund claim cannot be filed with respect to employment taxes paid on income imputed before 2010 as the statute has run for that year.

If an employment tax refund had already been filed and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice of claim disallowance, the taxpayer must either bring suit to contest the disallowance within two years after the issuance of the notice or obtain an extension of the time to file such a suit with the IRS—this process can be initiated by filing IRS Form 907, Agreement to Extend the Time to Bring Suit.

Next Steps

Until the Supreme Court rules on Windsor, employers are advised to continue imputing income on the value of benefit coverage for employees’ non-dependent same-sex spouses and partners and to continue withholding and paying federal payroll taxes on the imputed amount.

View “Supreme Court Oral Arguments on DOMA, Proposition 8: Potential Employee Benefit Plan Implications” for more information on the employee benefit plan implications of the Supreme Court’s possible rulings on the constitutionality of DOMA in Windsor and California’s Proposition 8 in Hollingsworth v. Perry.

Health Care Obligations of Employers Under the Affordable Care Act

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For most employers, the most important part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly referred to as the “ACA” or “Obamacare”) will be the section known as the employer shared responsibility provision.  Many media outlets continue to incorrectly suggest that this provision requires employers to provide health insurance to all of their employees.  This is not actually the case.  Instead, this provision subjects employers to taxes or penalties if they fail to offer “adequate” and “affordable” health insurance to their employees.   Another fact commonly misunderstood is that for now, the only employers who need to be concerned about this issue are those who employ 50 or more “full time” employees (the ACA uses a very specific formula to determine who is considered full time) or those who employ under 25 employees and are looking to take advantage of the small business tax credit.

The employer shared responsibility provision goes into effect on Jan 1, 2014.   In most cases, in order to determine who is a full time employee, the employer reviews each employee’s full time status by “looking back” at a past employment period of between three (3) and twelve (12) months.   As a result, it is critically important that employers start thinking about their obligations under the ACA right now so they can be prepared for January 1, 2014.

Determining who is considered a full time employee under the ACA can be complex.  Under the ACA, a full time employee is someone who works 30 or more hours per week, on average.  Also taken into consideration are full time equivalent employees (“FTE”).  The number FTE employees are determined by adding up the total number of hours worked in a given month by part time employees and dividing than number by 120.  So for example, 10 part time employees working 60 hours per month would be counted as 5 FTE employees (10×60 = 600; 600/120=5).  Special rules also apply for seasonal employees, temporary employees, etc.

For those employers who have 50 or more full time employees under the ACA, the employer shared responsibility provision leaves the employer with several options:

Option 1– Provide health care coverage that is both “adequate” and “affordable” under the ACA.  Determining if coverage meets these requirements requires analysis of the costs of the plan to full time employees and the number of full time employees eligible under the plan.  The employer must also determine if providing coverage is more costly than the fines it would be subject to if it chose not to provide coverage.

Option 2 – Do nothing and provide no coverage to the employees, potentially subjecting the employer to a $2000 fine per employee.  Rather than simply rejecting this option of out of hand, the employer needs to determine the potential fine it faces and whether or not certain exemptions are applicable that could greatly reduce, if not eliminate the fine entirely.

Option 3 – Provide coverage that is not considered “affordable” under the ACA, subjecting the employer to a $3000 fine for each employee who chooses not to partake in the employer offered health plan and who instead purchases coverage through an insurance exchange and receives a tax credit or subsidy.  Before taking this route, an employer must carefully consider whether it believes its employees will seek coverage through an exchange and whether the savings it will gain from not paying its portion of the employee’s health care coverage will offset any potential penalty.

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