Illinois Bans Employment Application Questions About Criminal Convictions

Vedder Price Law Firm

On July 21, 2014, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed into law the Job Opportunities for Qualified Applicants Act (HB 5701), which generally prohibits private-sector employers from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal history on a job application. When this law goes into effect on January 1, 2015, Illinois will join Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Rhode Island as the fifth state to enact a “ban the box” law applicable to private-sector employers. A number of municipalities, including Philadelphia and San Francisco, have passed similar laws prohibiting the use of check-this-box questions on employment applications inquiring about an applicant’s criminal history.

The new Illinois law applies to private-sector employers with 15 or more employees and to employment agencies. The law prohibits covered employers from asking about an applicant’s criminal record or criminal history until after the employer has deemed the applicant qualified for the position and scheduled an interview. If hiring decisions are made without an interview, then the employer may not inquire about an applicant’s criminal record or history until it has made a conditional offer of employment to the applicant.

These restrictions do not apply to positions (a) for which federal or state law prohibits the employment of individuals who have been convicted of certain crimes or (b) for which individuals are licensed under the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act. In addition, a more limited exception applies to positions requiring a fidelity bond.

Employers with Illinois operations should plan to review the employment application forms they use and make necessary changes this fall in advance of the law’s effective date of January 1, 2015. For most covered employers, this will involve postponing until later in the hiring process the time at which questions are asked about prior criminal convictions.

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EEOC Expands Reach of Pregnancy Discrimination Act

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On July 14, 2014 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued its first “enforcement guidance” on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) since 1983.  One of the more significant aspects of the Guidance is the EEOC’s view of an employer’s duty to accommodate pregnant workers under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The EEOC now takes the position that employers must accommodate a pregnant employee’s work restrictions to the same extent it accommodates non-pregnant employees with similar restrictions.

This means, in the EEOC’s view, that employers who offer light duty work to individuals injured on the job must also offer light duty work to pregnant employees with work restrictions, regardless of the fact that the light duty policy only applies, by its terms, to those employees who have restrictions stemming from a work related injury.

The EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance is quite extensive.  The entire Guidance document can be found here.

The EEOC also issued a “Questions & Answers” document, found here.

As if that wasn’t enough summer reading, the EEOC also issued a “Fact Sheet” that summarizes the PDA’s requirements here.

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Executive Order Extends Workplace Anti-Discrimination Protections to LGBT Workers of Federal Contractors

Jackson Lewis Law firm

Though it took longer than expected, President Barack Obama has signed an Executive Order extending protections against workplace discrimination to members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) community. Signed July 21, 2014, the Executive Order prohibits discrimination by federal contractors on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, adding to the list of protected categories. It does not contain any exemptions for religiously affiliated federal contractors, as some had hoped. Religiously affiliated federal contractors still may favor individuals of a particular religion when making employment decisions.

The President directed the Secretary of Labor to prepare regulations within 90 days (by October 19, 2014) implementing the new requirements as they relate to federal contractors under Executive Order 11246, which requires covered government contractors and subcontractors to undertake affirmative action to ensure that equal employment opportunity is afforded in all aspects of their employment processes. Executive Order 11246 is enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP).

The Executive Order will apply to federal contracts entered into on or after the effective date of the forthcoming regulations. OFCCP likely will be charged with enforcement authority.

We recommend that employers who will be impacted by this Executive Order review their equal employment opportunity and harassment policies for compliance with the Executive Order. For example, employers who are government contractors should add both sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories under these policies and ensure that mechanisms are put in place to ensure that discrimination is not tolerated against LGBT employees.

We will provide additional information and insights into the proposed regulations when they are available.

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Attention Tenants! Grow-NJ Tax Credits Without Prevailing Wage

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A little known regulation makes a big difference for tenants taking less than 55% of a leased facility. Namely, these tenants may be eligible to receive millions of dollars of monetizable corporate income tax credits under New Jersey’s Grow-NJ Program, without having to comply with that program’s prevailing wage mandate. For many, especially suburban tenants, that equates to a great deal of free money.

Grow-NJ is economic incentive program born out of the New Jersey Economic Opportunity Act of 2013 (L. 2013, c. 161) (“EOA”) and administered by the New Jersey Economic Development Agency (“NJEDA”). The goal of the program is to encourage businesses to either stay in or relocate to New Jersey. The program does this by offering tax credits for each job created or retained that range from $500 to $5000 per job, depending on the scope, location, and industry of the project.

However, the EOA specifies that each Grow-NJ recipient must agree to pay the “prevailing wage” to its contractors. The “prevailing wage” is that wage and fringe benefit rate based on collective bargaining agreements established for a particular craft or trade in the locality where the project is taking place. In New Jersey, prevailing wage rates vary by county and statewide and by the type of work performed.

Paying the “prevailing wage” can increase the cost of tenant work by 20% to 30% over non-prevailing wage. Though less of a concern in urban areas where tenants are likely to use union workers, in suburban areas, paying the “prevailing wage” may add substantial costs to the project. Depending on size of the award, this added cost may negate the value of the tenant’s Grow-NJ tax credits.

However, the NJEDA’s regulations provide an important exception to Grow-NJ’s prevailing wage requirements. Under the N.J.A.C. 19:30-4.2, the prevailing wage need not be paid on any project where:

(1) It is performed on a facility owned by a landlord of the entity receiving the assistance;

(2) The landlord is a party to the construction contract; and

(3) Less than 55 percent of the facility is leased by the entity at the time of the contract and under any agreement to subsequently lease the facility.

Because of this regulation, tenants taking less than 55% of a leased facility may be able to benefit from Grow-NJ’s tax credits, without paying “prevailing wage” for their fit-out.

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College Football Players As Employees ? – Illegal Formation!

Godfrey Kahn Law Firm

Members of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee filed an amicus brief on July 10 that opposed unionization of college athletes. A case involving athletes at Northwestern University is pending before the National Labor Relations Board. Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359

Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) and fellow committee members Senator Richard Burr (R-N.C.) and Senator Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.) along with members of several House Committees signed the amicus brief in support of Northwestern University in the case. The brief stated:

“Congress never intended for college athletes to be considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and doing so is incompatible with the student-university relationship,” the senators said. “The profound and inherent differences between the student-university and employee-employer relationship makes employee status unworkable both as a matter of law and in practice.”

The complete brief can be found here.

The American Council on Education also filed an amicus brief on July 3. That brief can be found here.

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Hostile Work Environment Case Gets Additional Fourth Circuit Scrutiny

Poyner Spruill Law firm

​The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed to an en banc rehearing (in which all judges on the court will hear the case) of Boyer-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp. after a three-judge panel of the court ruled in May 2014 that the factual allegations in the case did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. The three-judge panel ruled that because a racial slur used inh the workplace was limited to two occasions arising from a single incident, the plaintiff had not been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her race.

Ms. Boyer-Liberto based her EEOC Charge of Discrimination and subsequent lawsuit against her former employer on two conversations she had with a coworker about an incident that occurred on September 14, 2010. During those conversations, which were on two consecutive days, the coworker twice directed a racial slur at Ms. Boyer-Liberto. One week after the incident, Ms. Boyer-Liberto was terminated from her job. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the former employer, holding the offensive conduct was too isolated to support the plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation, and the three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision. Although the appeals court agreed the term used was “derogatory and highly offensive,” it held “a co-worker’s use of that term twice in a period of two days in discussions about a single incident was not, as a matter of law, so severe or pervasive as to change the terms and conditions of Liberto’s employment so as to be legally discriminatory.”

The Fourth Circuit has agreed to rehear the case, but it is not clear Ms. Boyer-Liberto will fare better on the rehearing although she argued in her petition for rehearing that the three-judge panel’s decision was inconsistent with other court rulings. That panel had specifically addressed the other cases Ms. Boyer-Liberto argued supported her claim and distinguished each as involving a greater number of incidents occurring over a longer time period or involving conduct having long-term, ongoing consequences.

As the panel noted in this case, a hostile work environment exists when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” The Fourth Circuit’s upcoming decision in this case bears watching to see if the court takes the opportunity to expand what has been a relatively narrow definition of hostile work environment. Regardless, employers should promptly investigate any claims of harassment or discrimination, document those investigations, and act quickly to address any harassment or discrimination uncovered in the investigations.

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Department of State Releases August 2014 Visa Bulletin

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The bulletin shows minor advancement in the EB-2 category for applicants chargeable to India and China as well as significant advancement in the EB-3 category for applicants chargeable to China and the Philippines, minor advancement for applicants chargeable to India, and no change for applicants chargeable to Mexico or the Rest of the World.

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has released its August 2014 Visa Bulletin. The Visa Bulletin sets out per country priority date cutoffs that regulate the flow of adjustment of status (AOS) and consular immigrant visa applications. Foreign nationals may file applications to adjust their statuses to that of permanent residents or to obtain approval of immigrant visas at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad, provided that their priority dates are prior to the respective cutoff dates specified by the DOS.

What Does the August 2014 Visa Bulletin Say?

In August, the cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 India category will advance by a little more than four months, while the cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 China category will advance by a little more than three months. Meanwhile, the cutoff date in the EB-3 China category will advance by slightly more than two years, while the cutoff date in the EB-3 Philippines category will advance by 17 months. The EB-3 India category will advance by one week, while the cutoff date for EB-3 Mexico and the Rest of the World will remain unchanged. The cutoff date in the F2A category for applicants from all countries will also remain unchanged.

EB-1: All EB-1 categories will remain current.

EB-2: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India will advance by a little more than four months to January 22, 2009. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China will advance by slightly more than three months to October 8, 2009. The EB-2 category for all other countries will remain current.

EB-3: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to India will advance by one week to November 8, 2003. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China will advance by a little more than two years to November 1, 2008. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the Philippines will advance by one year and five months to June 1, 2010. The cutoff date for applicants chargeable to Mexico and all other countries will remain unchanged at April 1, 2011.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for foreign nationals in the EB-3 category are as follows:

China: November 1, 2008 (forward movement of two years and one month)
India: November 8, 2003 (forward movement of one week)
Mexico: April 1, 2011 (no movement)
Philippines: June 1, 2010 (forward movement of one year and five months)
Rest of the World: April 1, 2011 (no movement)

Developments Affecting the EB-2 Employment-Based Category

Mexico, the Philippines, and the Rest of the World

The EB-2 category for applicants chargeable to all countries other than China and India has been current since November 2012. The August Visa Bulletin indicates no change, meaning that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to all countries other than China and India may continue to file AOS applications or have applications approved through August 2014.

China

The July Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of July 1, 2009 for EB-2 applicants chargeable to China. The August Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of October 8, 2009, reflecting forward movement of three months and one week. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to October 8, 2009 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in August 2014.

India

In December 2013, the cutoff date for EB-2 applicants chargeable to India retrogressed significantly to November 15, 2004 because of unprecedented demand in this category. This cutoff date remained constant through June. There was significant movement forward of nearly four years in the July Visa Bulletin. The August Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of January 22, 2009, reflecting forward movement of another four months and three weeks. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India with a priority date prior to January 22, 2009 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in August 2014.

Developments Affecting the EB-3 Employment-Based Category

China

In late 2013 and early 2014, the cutoff date for EB-3 applicants chargeable to China advanced significantly to generate demand in this category. In June, to regulate demand, this cutoff date retrogressed by six years to October 1, 2006 and remained the same for July. The August Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of November 1, 2008, reflecting forward movement of two years and one month. This means that only applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to November 1, 2008 may continue to file AOS applications or have applications approved in August 2014.

India

The July Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of November 1, 2003 for EB-3 applicants chargeable to India. The August Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of November 8, 2003, reflecting forward movement of one week. This means that only EB-3 applicants chargeable to India with a priority date prior to November 8, 2003 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in August 2014.

Rest of the World

From September 2013 through April 2014, the cutoff date for EB-3 applicants in the worldwide category advanced by 3.75 years. In June, to regulate high demand, the cutoff date in this category retrogressed by 549 days to April 1, 2011. The August Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this cutoff date. This means that only applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the Rest of the World with a priority date prior to April 1, 2011 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in August 2014.

Developments Affecting the F2A Family-Sponsored Category

In March, as a result of heavy demand in the F2A category from applicants chargeable to Mexico, the cutoff date in this category retrogressed significantly to April 15, 2012. In June, this cutoff date retrogressed again to March 15, 2011 and remained the same in July. The August Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this cutoff date. This means that only those applicants from Mexico with a priority date prior toMarch 15, 2011 will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in August 2014.

During fiscal year 2013, in an effort to generate demand in the F2A category from applicants from all countries other than Mexico, the cutoff date in this category advanced significantly. This advance resulted in a dramatic increase in demand, followed in June by a further retrogression of the cutoff date to May 1, 2012. The August Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this cutoff date. This means that only those F2A applicants from countries other than Mexico with a priority date prior to May 1, 2012will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in August 2014. Further retrogression of the worldwide F2A category should not be ruled out.

How This Affects You

Priority date cutoffs are assessed on a monthly basis by the DOS, based on anticipated demand. Cutoff dates can move forward or backward or remain static. Employers and employees should take the immigrant visa backlogs into account in their long-term planning and take measures to mitigate their effects. To see the August 2014 Visa Bulletin in its entirety, please visit the DOS website.

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Paid Sick Leave: Connecticut Tweaks and Newark Speaks

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The Connecticut Paid Sick Leave Law has been tweaked in three respects: (1) to allow employers to determine the 50-employee applicability threshold in the same manner as under the state’s Family and Medical Leave Act, i.e., by determining whether the employer has at least 50 employees on its payroll for the week containing October 1; (2) to allow accrual of paid sick leave hours on any annual basis, not just a calendar year, and (3) to add one additional job title—radiologic technologists—to the list of “service worker” titles that are eligible for paid sick leave. The law adopting the tweaks— An Act Creating Parity between Paid Sick Leave Benefits and Other Employer-Provided Benefits (Public Act 14-128)—is effective January 1, 2015.

Newark, N,J. whose  Paid Sick Leave Ordinance became effective on June 21, 2014, has issued FAQs about the ordinance. There are 24 FAQs–a dozen directed to employers and a dozen directed to employees. The FAQs address a myriad of questions on topics such as employee eligibility, accrual of paid sick leave, employer notice obligations, appropriate uses of paid sick leave and the law’s integration with collective bargaining agreements.

Also on the paid sick leave issue, the Massachusetts Secretary of State announced last week that voters in November will be asked whether to approve a mandatory earned sick time law. If the issue passes, Massachusetts would become the second state and ninth jurisdiction to adopt a paid sick time law.

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The Supreme Court of the United States Holds that ESOP Fiduciaries are not Entitled to a Presumption of Prudence, Clarifies Standards for Stock Drop Claims

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On June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that there is no special presumption of prudence for fiduciaries of employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”). Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2014) (slip op.).

Background

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”) imposes legal duties on fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, including ESOPs.[1] Specifically, ERISA requires the fiduciary of an employee benefit plan to act prudently in managing the plan’s assets.[2] In addition, ERISA requires the fiduciary to diversify plan assets.[3]

ESOPs are designed to be invested primarily in employer securities.[4] ERISA exempts ESOP fiduciaries from the duty of diversify plan assets and from the duty to prudently manage plan assets, but only to the extent that prudence requires diversification of plan assets.[5]

The recent financial crisis generated a wave of ERISA “stock drop” cases, which were filed after a precipitous drop in the value of employer securities held in an ESOP. Generally, the plaintiff alleged that the ESOP fiduciary breached its duty of prudence by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative. Defendant fiduciaries defended on the ground that the plaintiff failed to rebut the legal presumption that the fiduciary acted prudently by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.

The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals that had considered the issue adopted the rebuttable presumption of prudence but split on the issues of (1) whether the legal presumption applied at the pleadings stage of litigation or whether the legal presumption was evidentiary in nature and did not apply at the pleadings stage of litigation and (2) the rebuttal standard that the plaintiff of a stock drop action must satisfy.[6]

Dudenhoeffer held that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to a legal presumption that they acted prudently by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.[7]

The Dudenhoeffer Case

Fifth Third Bancorp maintained a defined contribution plan, which offered participants a number of investment alternatives, including the company’s ESOP. The terms of the ESOP required that its assets be “invested primarily in shares of common stock of Fifth Third [Bancorp].”[8] The company offered a matching contribution that was initially invested in the ESOP. In addition, participants could make elective deferrals to the ESOP.

ESOP participants alleged that the ESOP fiduciaries knew or should have known on the basis of public information that the employer securities were overvalued and an excessively risky investment. In addition, the ESOP fiduciaries knew or should have known on the basis of non-public information that the employer securities were overvalued. Plaintiffs contended that a prudent ESOP fiduciary would have responded to this public and non-public information by (1) divesting the ESOP of employer securities, (2) refraining from investing in employer securities, (3) cancelling the ESOP investment alternative, and (4) disclosing non-public information to adjust the market price of the employer securities.

Procedural Posture

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that ESOP fiduciaries were entitled to a presumption of prudence with respect to their collective decisions to invest in employer securities and continue to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.[9] The District Court concluded that presumption of prudence applied at the pleadings stage of litigation and that the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption.[10]

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court judgment, holding that the presumption of prudence is evidentiary in nature and does not apply at the pleadings stage of litigation.[11] The Sixth Circuit concluded that the complaint stated a claim for a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence.[12]

ESOP Fiduciaries Not Entitled to Presumption of Prudence

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to a presumption of prudence with regard to their decisions to invest in employer securities and continue to offer employer securities as an investment alternative; rather, ESOP fiduciaries are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to other ERISA fiduciaries, except that ESOP fiduciaries need not diversify plan assets.[13]

The Court began its analysis b
y acknowledging a tension within the statutory framework of ERISA. On the one hand, ERISA imposes a duty on all fiduciaries to discharge their duties prudently, which includes an obligation to diversify plan assets. On the other hand, ERISA recognizes that ESOPs are designed to invest primarily in employer securities and are not intended to hold diversified assets. The Court concluded that an ESOP fiduciary is not subject to the duty of prudence to the extent that the legal obligation requires the ESOP fiduciary to diversify plan assets. The Court found no special legal presumption favoring ESOP fiduciaries.

New Standards for Stock Drop Claims

Although the Court rejected the presumption of prudence, it vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (which held that the complaint properly stated a claim) and announced new standards for lower courts to observe in evaluating whether a complaint properly pleads a claim that an ESOP fiduciary breached its fiduciary duty of prudence by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.

Public Information

First, the Court concluded that “where a stock is publicly traded, allegations that a fiduciary should have recognized from publicly available information alone that the market was over- or undervaluing the stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of special circumstances.”[14] In other words, a plaintiff generally cannot state a plausible claim of imprudence based solely on publicly available information. An ESOP fiduciary does not necessarily act imprudently by observing the efficient market theory, which holds that a major stock market provides the best estimate of the value of employer securities. To be clear, the Court did not rule out the possibility that a plaintiff could properly plead imprudence based on publicly available information indicating special circumstances affecting the reliability of the market price.

Non-Public Information

Second, the Court concluded that “[t]o state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis of inside information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an alternative action that the [fiduciary] could have taken that would have been consistent with [applicable Federal and state securities laws] and that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the [ESOP] than to help it.”[15]

The Court reasoned that where a complaint alleges imprudence based on an ESOP fiduciary’s failure to act on non-public information, a lower court’s analysis should be guided by three considerations. First, ERISA does not require a fiduciary to violate applicable Federal and state securities laws. In other words, an ESOP fiduciary does not act imprudently by declining to divest the ESOP of employer securities or by prohibiting investments in employer securities on the basis of non-public information. Second, where a complaint faults fiduciaries for failing to decide, on the basis of non-public information, to refrain from making additional investments in employer securities or for failing to disclose non-public information to correct the valuation of the employer securities, lower courts should consider the extent to which the duty of prudence conflicts with complex insider trading and corporate disclosure requirements imposed by Federal securities laws or the objectives of such laws. Third, lower courts should consider whether the complaint has plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that discontinuing investments in employer securities or disclosing adverse, non-public information to the public, or taking any other action suggested by the plaintiff would result in more harm than good to the ESOP by causing a drop in the value of the employer securities.

Quantifying the Unknowns

Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer will undoubtedly reshape the landscape of ERISA litigation and, specifically, stock drop litigation. To fully understand the decision’s impact, a number of questions must still be answered, including the correct application of the standards espoused by the Court. In addition, Dudenhoeffer involved a publicly-traded company; it is unclear what application, if any, the decision will have in the context of employer securities of a privately held company.

 
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[1] See generally, ERISA § 404(a).

[2] ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).

[3] ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).

[4] Code § 4975(e)(7)(A).

[5] ERISA § 404(a)(2).

[6] See e.g. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2011); Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 254 (5th Cir. 2008); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995); White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., Case No. 11-2660, 2013 WL 1688918 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2013); Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010);Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2012).

[7] No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ____ at 1-2.

[8] Id.

[9] Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (S.D. Ohio 2010).

[10] Id. At 762.

[11] Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F. 3d 410, 418-19 (2012).

[12] Id. At 423.

[13] Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ___ at 1-2.

[14] Id. At 16.

[15] Id. At 18.

EEOC Sues Wal-Mart for Disability Discrimination – Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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Retailer Rescinded Accommodation, Then Fired Intellectually Disabled Employee, Federal Agency Charges

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit here yesterday against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., alleging that the giant retailer fired an intellectually disabled employee at a Rockford Walmart store after it rescinded his workplace accommodation.

“What our investigation indicated,” said John Rowe, the EEOC district director in Chicago, who managed the federal agency’s pre-suit administrative investigation, “is that Wal-Mart rescinded a long-standing practice of giving written job assignments to the employee, William Clark. That accommodation had been the key to permitting Clark to successfully perform his job during an 18 year career at Wal-Mart and to his meeting the company’s performance expectations. We determined that shortly after rescinding the accommodation, Wal-Mart began disciplining Mr. Clark for supposed performance issues, and that ultimately lead to his termination.”

The Wal-Mart where Clark was working at the time of his termination is located at 7219 Walton in Rockford, on the south side of the East State Street commercial corridor and between Interstate 90 and South Perryville Road.

The EEOC brought the suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits disability discrimination in employment, after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process. The case (EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-cv-50145) was filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division on July 1, 2014. It has been assigned to U.S. District Judge Philip G. Reinhard.

John Hendrickson, regional attorney of the EEOC’s Chicago District Office, said, “The EEOC’s position in this case is that Wal-Mart just took away — with no good reason — an effective workplace accommodation of an intellectually disabled employee. That reversal fatally compromised the employee’s ability to continue doing a job he had done so well for many, many years, and ended up with him being fired.”

Hendrickson added, “It’s hard to fathom what drove Wal-Mart to this course of action, but the EEOC response will definitely not be a mystery. We intend to show that the company’s action was a particularly senseless violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act — an especially hurtful injustice — that Mr. Clark is entitled to full make whole relief and to punitive damages, and that the public interest requires strong injunctive measures to correct Wal-Mart’s practices.”

In March of this year, Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. agreed to pay $363,419 to settle an EEOC sexual harassment and retaliation lawsuit. According to that suit, Wal-Mart violated federal law by allowing a co-worker to sexually harass an intellectually disabled employee at an Akron, Ohio Walmart store.

The EEOC’s Chicago District Office is responsible for processing charges of employment discrimination, administrative enforcement, and the conduct of agency litigation in Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and North and South Dakota, with Area Offices in Milwaukee and Minneapolis.