Michigan Bill Would Bar Student-Athlete Unionization

Jackson Lewis Law firm

With a National Labor Relations Board decision on whether football players at Northwestern may proceed with their unionization efforts looming, Michigan is considering a bill that would prevent student-athletes from similarly attempting to unionize.

The bill, sponsored by Rep. Al Pscholka, would prevent student-athletes at Michigan’s public universities from exercising collective bargaining rights based on their participation in a university sports team. It states, “a student participating in intercollegiate athletics on behalf of a public university in [Michigan]…is not a public employee entitled to representation or collective bargaining rights….”

Michigan has seven public universities competing at the Division I level. The bill would bar student-athletes at these universities from engaging in unionization efforts similar to the ones undertaken by the football players at Northwestern.

While none of the seven universities has faced a union organizing campaign from any of its student-athletes, prompting one opponent of the bill, Rep. Andy Shor, to describe the bill as a solution to a nonexistent problem.

“I don’t understand the tremendous rush on this,” Shor said. “We’re taking an action that addresses something that’s happening in Evanston, Illinois.”

However, if the Board finds in favor of the football players at Northwestern, universities across the country likely will face similar unionization efforts from other student-athletes. Michigan’s may be an attempt to get out in front of such efforts.

According to Ramogi Huma, the president of the organization spearheading the unionization campaign at Northwestern, the College Athletes Players Association, Michigan’s bill is “backhanded confirmation that student-athletes are state employees by including them in a list of workers who can’t bargain effectively.” However, the bill does not categorize student-athletes as employees and, indeed, it states that “individuals whose position does not have sufficient indicia of an employer-employee relationship” are also prevented under the bill from engaging in collective bargaining.

Huma also warned that if the bill passes, it would have a negative impact on the ability of Michigan’s public universities to recruit student-athletes because prospective student-athletes interested in being part of a union could elect instead to go to either private universities in Michigan or universities in states with no restrictions on their unionization efforts.

Thus far, none of the seven Division I public universities in Michigan have commented publicly on the bill. However, the bill likely is being closely followed by them as well as public universities in other states and major athletic conferences, such as the Big Ten, home to Northwestern, Michigan, Michigan State, and Ohio State.

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Online Presence Management: You Down with OP…M? Yeah, You Should Be!

Morgan Lewis logo

The stakes are higher than ever when it comes to your company’s online presence management (OPM), and you should be proactive in ensuring that your company is best positioned for success.

We are talking about total OPM. Yes, it is a real thing. The soaring growth of online media revenues (over 17%, recently), thesophistication of bad actors responsible for “mega-hacks,” and the ever-expanding social media market are but a few of the headlines that top the news on a daily basis.

Public interest is extremely high. As such, the risks and liabilities to your company are self-evident.

As a responsible lawyer (or, at least, someone interested enough in the law to read this blog), you should take a proactive approach to ensuring your organization is aligned with measures to both capitalize on the enormous opportunities presented by, as well as mitigate the risks associated with, managing your company’s total online presence.

So, where do you begin? What are the first steps? We recommend scheduling an internal discussion with your relevant stakeholders to take inventory of where you are with respect to your company’s OPM. You don’t need to involve outside counsel or be an expert in every nuance of the OPM space. Instead, the goal is to get a discussion between your business team and legal team about the structure and needs of your company. That is, the goal is to get the dialogue started internally so you have the information that you need to provide or to seek artful advice.

Here are the top three agenda items for your initial meeting:

1. Online Contracting Discussion—What agreements do you use, or should you use, on your website? Terms of service? Terms of use? Privacy policies? Codes of conduct? Foreign Corrupt Practices Act policies? Open-source policies? Once the inventory is completed, have a candid discussion with your business/marketing/OPM teams about (1) how each agreement is executed and used within the organization, (2) how updates are communicated, and (3) any pain points experienced by the business team. Special attention should be given to agreements that control services or products that produce revenue or that deal with the handling of important data or information. Understanding the total picture of your company’s online contracting structure allows you to identify risks and install protections to mitigate them.

2. Security Protocol Discussion—What are the processes in place to monitor and respond to potential security threats? What would your company do if it suspected a breach? How long would it react? What reporting systems are in place to alert responsible OPM team members of suspicious activities? Lawyers, like CEOs, can no longer assume that their company’s IT personnel handles these issues. By understanding the lay of the land, in-house lawyers and well-integrated outside counsel can better respond to emergency situations.

3. Data Leverage Discussion—What data is collected by your company’s internal tools? What data is collected by third-party tools and services? How is the data collected from the website (both personally identifiable and commercial) used by the company? Are there any synergies that can be gained by various business teams by gaining access to either of the above? Understanding what data is collected, especially commercial data such as user tendencies and product information, can assist lawyers in understanding the rights to negotiate when dealing with outside vendors and in drafting privacy policies.

As you can probably tell, the “discussions” approach will likely lead to many tangent discussions and identification of issues that you didn’t even realize existed in your organization. This is intentional.

In today’s online environment, you need to be proactive and agile to ensure that your company’s OPM is handled in a responsible, predictable, and measured manner. Having the discussions above will at least give you a starting point to demonstrate a more active approach and likely result in you being able to provide better and more business-focused counsel.

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Not Just Your (Company) Email System Anymore! re: NLRB Purple Communications Ruling

Godfrey Kahn Law Firm

On December 10, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) ruled in Purple Communications, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, thatemployees have a right, protected by the National Labor Relations Act (Act), to use an employer’s email system during non-working time for communications protected by the Act(e.g., to discuss union issues or other protected concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the Act). The Board has thus overruled prior precedent, as set out in Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), that the Act did not give employees the right to use their employer’s email systems for Section 7 purposes.

A copy of the December 10, 2014 Board decision can be found here. The following passage sums up the scope of the Board’s ruling:

First, [this ruling] applies only to employees who have already been granted access to the employer’s email system in the course of their work and does not require employers to provide such access. Second, an employer may justify a total ban on nonwork use of email, including Section 7 use on nonworking time, by demonstrating that special circumstances make the ban necessary to maintain production or dEmail Selection on Computeriscipline. Absent justification for a total ban, the employer may apply uniform and consistently enforced controls over its email system to the extent such controls are necessary to maintain production and discipline. Finally, we do not address email access by nonemployees, nor do we address any other type of electronic communications systems, as neither issue is raised in this case.

The Board’s decision may be appealed by the employer, but even if it is not appealed, the email issue will likely continue to be litigated before the Board. For now, employers should review their electronic communications policies to ensure compliance with the Board’s new standards or to, at a minimum, understand their risk.

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A New Judge is in Town to Rule on I-9 Violation Penalties

Greenberg Traurig Law firm

Last week Stacy Stiffel Paddack was announced as the newest Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Judge Paddack will rule on the proper penalty in immigration compliance (Form I-9 violations) cases brought by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Welcome aboard, Judge Paddack.

The statutory range for I-9 violations is $110 – $1100 per defective Form I-9. In calculating the proposed penalty amount for I-9 violations, ICE divides the number of violations by the number of employees for which a Form I-9 should have been prepared to obtain a violation percentage. This percentage is used as a baseline fine amount, with deviations available depending on factors such as whether or not this is the employer’s first offense, size of the employer, and whether unauthorized aliens were working for the employer. ICE applies a mechanical calculation when determining the penalty amount and there is little discretion exercised benefitting the employer. ICE’s standard fine amounts are listed in the table below:

 

Standard Fine Amount

Substantive Verification Violations 1st Offense
$110 – $1100
2nd Offense
$110 – $1100
3rd Offense +
$110 – $1100

0% – 9%

$110

$550

$1,100

10% – 19%

$275

$650

$1,100

20% – 29%

$440

$750

$1,100

30% – 39%

$605

$850

$1,100

40% – 49%

$770

$950

$1,100

50% or more

$935

$1,100

$1,100

OCAHO is not bound by ICE’s methodology, and ALJs like Judge Paddack can consider factors not included in ICE’s chart when determining the proper penalty amount, such as ability to pay the proposed penalty and any deterrent effect of the proposed penalty, and can weigh the different factors unequally. A review of OCAHO decisions reveals that the final penalty amount ordered by OCAHO is often significantly lower than the figure on the ICE penalty chart.

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Amazon Settlement with NLRB a Reminder for Employers — “Confidential” Wage Policies Violate the NLRA

Barnes Thornburg

Last week in a settlement with the NLRB, online retailer Amazon agreed to allow its largely non-union workforce to discuss pay and working conditions with each other without fear of discipline. The settlement, as reported by Bloomberg News which obtained a copy, required Amazon to rescind certain work rules that prohibited workers from sharing information with one another, although Amazon did not admit any violation of the NLRA.

Amazon’s work rule was considered too broad by the NLRB because it prohibited discussion of wages and working conditions, considered quintessential “protected concerted activity” under the NLRA. In Amazon’s case, the NLRB got involved when an employee was disciplined after voicing concerns about security in the employee parking lot. The employee apparently filed a charge with the NLRB protesting his discipline and this led the NLRB to examine not only the circumstances of the employee’s discipline, but to scrutinize Amazon’s policies as well.

This settlement serves as a reminder to all employers, both union and non-union, that policies which prohibit discussion of terms and conditions of employment are on their face unlawful under the NLRA.  It is tempting for employers to require that wages or other benefits be kept “confidential” for a variety of reasons, but enforcing such policies is an easy way to draw unwanted attention from the NLRB, especially given the Board’s current focus on protected concerted activity.

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Employers in Illinois Take Note: Pregnancy Accommodation Amendments Go Into Effect January 1, 2015

Neal Gerber

As of January 1, 2015, the recently enacted pregnancy accommodation amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) will go into effect, requiring many Illinois employers to update or change their policies and practices with regard to the expecting and new mothers in their workforce.  Read below for the highlights of the IHRA’s pregnancy-related amendments, and stay tuned for an announcement from our group about an upcoming breakfast training at which we will discuss the details of the amendments, along with other employment hot topics for 2015.

Which employers are covered by the amendments?  All private, non-religious employers in Illinois, regardless of the number of employees, will be covered by the new pregnancy-related provisions of the IHRA.  Note, most IHRA provisions generally apply only to employers with 15 or more employees in Illinois.  The Act’s pregnancy-related amendments, however, apply to all employers, regardless of size.

Which employees are protected by the amendments?  The amended IHRA prohibits discrimination based on, and requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for, “pregnancy.”  “Pregnancy” is defined broadly under the Act to include “pregnancy, childbirth, or medical or common conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.”  Thus, the amendments generally will apply to applicants and employees who are expecting and who recently gave birth.

What do the amendments require?  Broadly speaking, the amendments impose an affirmative obligation on employers to offer reasonable accommodations for pregnancy and childbirth-related conditions.  Such accommodations may include:  more frequent or longer breaks; providing time and a private, non-bathroom space to express breast milk; physical accommodations such as seating and assistance with manual labor; modified or a part-time work schedule or even “job restructuring”; time off to recover from conditions related to childbirth; and/or leave “necessitated by” pregnancy, childbirth or medical “or common conditions” resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.

Importantly, under the amended IHRA employers may not require expecting or new mothers to just take leave, or to accept an accommodation that the applicant or the employee did not request.  The individual must agree to the form of accommodation being offered.  However, prior to providing the requested accommodation, employers will have the ability to require the requesting employee to submit medical proof of the need for that accommodation, to include a description of the advisable accommodation and its probable duration.

In addition, similar to the provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, the amended IHRA will not require employers to create new positions, discharge or transfer other employees, or to promote an unqualified employee in order to meet the “reasonable accommodation” requirement.  If the requested accommodation would pose an “undue hardship,” it need not be provided.  Employers should note, however, that the amended IHRA (similar to the ADA) places the burden of proving an “undue hardship” squarely on the employer, and meeting that burden is no easy task.  An “undue hardship” will be found to exist only if the requested accommodation is “prohibitively expensive or disruptive” when considered in light of certain specified factors, including the accommodation’s nature and cost, the overall financial resources of and impact on the facility or facilities involved in providing the requested accommodation, the overall financial resources of the employer, and the employer’s general operations.  Importantly, if the employer provides or would be required to provide the kind of accommodation being requested to other similarly-situated, non-pregnant employees, the amended IHRA will impose a “rebuttable presumption” that the requested accommodation would not impose an undue hardship.

Once an employee’s need for reasonable accommodation ceases and she relays an intent to return to her former position, the amended IHRA requires that the employer reinstate her to that former position or an equivalent position with equivalent pay, without loss of seniority or other benefits, unless, again, doing so would impose an undue burden.

The amended IHRA further requires that employers in Illinois post an Illinois Department of Human Rights-prepared or approved notice about the pregnancy accommodation amendments in the workplace, and also include appropriate information regarding employees’ rights under the amendments in their handbooks.

In short…  Considering that women compose nearly 50% of all workers in Illinois, it is important for employers to understand and ensure compliance with the IHRA’s new pregnancy-related amendments.  Any request for an accommodation made by an expecting or new mother must be evaluated thoughtfully, with the new statutory framework in mind.

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President Obama’s Executive Orders on Immigration – Interagency Cooperation and DOL Initiatives

Godfrey Kahn Law Firm

On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced a series of executive actions designed to reduce the strain on the country’s immigration system.  Many of these policies will have a direct effect on employers and the business community and demonstrate that the increased interagency cooperation and enforcement we have seen in recent years will continue.

Visa Application, Passport

The President has ordered the creation of an interagency working group consisting of U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to identify policies and procedures to promote the consistent enforcement of labor, employment and immigration laws.  Two of the topics the working group will review include 1) promoting worker cooperation with enforcement authorities without fear of retaliation based on immigration status, and 2) ensuring that employers do not use federal agencies to undermine worker protection laws by introducing immigration authorities into labor disputes.  DOL’s interagency working group fact sheet is available here.  This interagency group appears to be ready to continue the DOL-DHS discussions that began with the signing in March 2011 of a Memorandum of Understanding (which has since been revised) between those two agencies governing their coordination with respect to their various civil enforcement activities and avoidance of conflicts.

DOL has also proposed to review the permanent labor certification program (PERM), which is used to certify a shortage of U.S. workers who are able, willing and qualified to fill certain positions.  This certification is a necessary prerequisite for many employment-based legal permanent residence processes.  For example, DOL has reported that employers filed more than 70,000 PERM applications seeking to certify shortages of U.S. workers for specific positions in fiscal year 2014.  Among other key changes, DOL will attempt to modernize the PERM program so that it can identify worker shortages more effectively.  This part of the President’s directives will hopefully have a positive impact on employers trying to fill positions for which the pool of qualified applicants is limited.  DOL’s PERM fact sheet is available here.

Other initiatives flowing from the President’s announcement but whose details are not yet known include improved allocation of immigrant (legal permanent resident) visas; increased portability of work authorization without jeopardizing a pending legal permanent resident process; expanded work authorization for students, recent graduates and the spouses of certain professional-level workers; and efforts to increase the number of investors eligible to enter the country.

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Fifth Circuit Refuses Application of Bright-Line Test in FLSA Seaman Exemption Dispute

Proskauer Law firm

On November 13, 2014, the Fifth Circuit addressed the uncertainty stemming from its decision in Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., 272 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 2001), wherein the Court found that a plaintiff’s unloading and loading of vessels was considered “nonseaman” work subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime requirements. Subsequent to that decision, plaintiffs have advocated for a broad application of Owens’s rule, and district courts struggled with Owens’s  application to what are often fact-driven cases.

The Fifth Circuit provided necessary clarity in Coffin v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc., No. 13-20144, 2014 WL 5904734 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2014), when it reversed the district court on an interlocutory appeal and held that vessel-based crewmembers tasked with loading and unloading vessels are seamen under the FLSA rendering them exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6). In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit limited its prior holding in Owens, by finding that the unloading and loading of vessels is not strictly “nonseaman” work, and that each individual and case must be analyzed under a facts-and-circumstances test. Significantly, in dicta, the Court intimated that the Department of Labor’s “twenty percent rule,” which states that an employee loses his seaman status when “nonseaman” work occupies over twenty percent of his time, is also not a bright-line test.

Plaintiffs are tankermen who lived and worked aboard Defendant’s vessels. Though the parties and the court agreed that most of Plaintiffs’ job duties were “seaman” work exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that their job duties related to the loading and unloading of vessels constituted “nonseaman” work for which overtime pay was owed. Plaintiffs and the district court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s prior holding in Owens, and the district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The district court and the Fifth Circuit granted Defendant’s interlocutory appeal under 29 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Following oral argument, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision, which disagreed with Plaintiffs’ and the district court’s interpretation and application of Owens. Importantly, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Owens and emphasized that the analysis under the FLSA’s seaman exemption is a fact-based and flexible inquiry not subject to bright-line, categorical rules. The Court reasoned that the analysis required the consideration of the character of the work performed and the context in which it is performed and not the consideration of where the work is performed or how it is labelled. Unlike in Owens where the plaintiff was a non-crewmember who was not tied to a vessel and who only sought overtime for land-based loading and unloading, the Plaintiffs in this case lived on Defendant’s towboats, and their loading and unloading duties undisputedly affected the seaworthiness of the vessels and were integrated fully with their other seaman duties. Therefore, considering the character and context of the work performed, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ unloading and loading duties were seaman work, thus exempting Plaintiffs from the FLSA’s overtime requirements.  For these reasons, the Court vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded the matter to enter judgment in favor of Defendant.

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Is Obesity the Next Pivotal Employment Discrimination Issue Within the European Union?

Greenberg Traurig Law firm

Introduction

Obesity is one of the greatest health challenges worldwide. During the last decade, the population that is overweight in the European Union (EU) Member States has increased significantly, which has resulted in more than half of the EU population being overweight or obese.1  According to a recent study published in The Lancet, more than one-third of the population worldwide is overweight or obese, of which 36.9 percent are men and 38 percent are women.2  The aforementioned development has led to a growing discussion on how to deal with obese (severe overweight) employees in the workplace. That discussion includes the question whether obesity is a ground for unlawful discrimination.

In 2013, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked in a preliminary ruling in a Danish case – for the first time – which provisions of EU law, if any, apply to discrimination based on obesity. The ruling of the ECJ is expected at the end of 2014. Meanwhile the Advocate General (AG) delivered his opinion on the matter on 17 July 2014.3  The AG’s opinion basically revolved around two questions:

  • can obesity be considered as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination under EU law?
  • does obesity fall within the scope of the notion of disability as referred to in the Equal Treatment Framework Directive (Directive)?4

The aforementioned Directive has the objective of creating a level playing field, where equality in employment and occupation in both the public and the private sectors are concerned.5  Based on recent case law, the ECJ appears to have adopted, following the approach of the UN Convention, a social and not a (purely) medical model of disability.6

In this respect, it is important to understand that the Directive provides for minimum rules to be implemented by EU Member States with regard to their national laws. Member States are free to implement and execute provisions more favorable than the Directive so long as they are in line with the Directive, specifically and and EU law, in general. As a result, there are a variety of laws in place in the respective EU Member States regarding this topic, among many others, in combination with general EU law.

Given these developments, the topic of obesity in the context of employment discrimination is receiving greater scrutiny, and thus, the Danish case being closely watched by the employment law community in Europe. Indeed, obesity might be the next frontier in employment discrimination law.

This article is intended to highlight the most relevant aspects of the Danish case. It is likely that some of the issues will seem surprising to readers in the United States, inasmuch as, since the 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the courts have already begun to rule that severe or morbid obesity is a disability regardless of whether or not it was caused by a psychological disorder.7

Facts

An employee, Mr. Kaltoft, has been employed since 1996 as a childminder (taking care of other peoples´ children in their own homes) in the Municipality of Billund, Denmark. Mr. Kaltoft has been obese during the entirety of his employment. Although he performed his job to everyone’s satisfaction, he was dismissed in 2010. According to the notice of dismissal, the termination was due to a decline in the number of children to be taken care of.

The dismissal followed an internal hearing in which the obesity of Mr. Kaltoft was discussed. The parties disagree as to whether and if so, how, his obesity constituted part of the basis for the dismissal. Mr. Kaltoft argued that his employment was terminated due to his obesity, and that this amounted to discrimination based on obesity.

Obesity as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination?

Mr. Kaltoft basically argued that the open-ended nature of certain provisions in the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR), Protocol 12 of the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) as well as other general EU law principles, requires the conclusion that any form of discrimination should be protected.

The AG disagrees. In his analysis, he asserts that EU legislation prohibiting discrimination addresses specific grounds of discrimination within specific subject areas without an existing general prohibition on discrimination. Thus, since obesity  is not specifically mentioned as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the EU treaties, nor in any EU legislation, it cannot be seen as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination. If at all, according to the AG, obesity discrimination could only be grounded on Article 21 of the EU Charter, which prohibits ‘discrimination based on any ground such as (…).’ On this particular wording (such as) it might be argued that there is a general principle of non-discrimination in EU law covering grounds of discrimination not explicitly mentioned in the Charter. In this respect, the AG refers to an ECJ ruling in a previous case where the ECJ ruled that the discrimination within the scope of Directive 2000/78 should not be extended by analogy beyond those grounds listed- exhaustively – in Article 1 of the Directive.8  Therefore, the AG concludes that there is no general principle of EU law prohibiting discrimination in the labor market that would cover discrimination on grounds of obesity as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination.

Disability under Directive 2000/78

According to Article 1 of the Directive, discrimination on the grounds of disability is prohibited. The term ‘disability’ is not defined by the Directive, but a ‘notion’ of disability is being developed via case-law.  This case-law is consistent with the concept of disability as laid down in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (U.N. Convention), which is an evolving concept, and the U.N. Convention’s case-law. The U.N. Convention has been approved by the EU in its Decision 2010/48 and as a result the provisions of the U.N. Convention are an integral part of the European Union legal order.9  This means that EU legislation, such as directives, have to be interpreted, as far as possible, in a manner that is consistent with the U.N. Convention.

According to the ECJ, this notion of disability must be understood as referring to a limitation which results, in particular, from (i) long-term (ii) physical, mental or psychological impairments (iii) which in interaction with various barriers (iv) may hinder (v) the full and effective participation of the person in professional life (vi) on an equal basis with other workers.10

As to the scope of the term “disability,” the ECJ has held that disability cannot be defined by reference to the source of the impairment, because that would run against the very aim of the Directive, which is to implement equal treatment.11  Therefore, the notion of disability does not depend on whether the disability is self-inflicted or not. Disability can also include an illness, if the illness entails a limitation as described in the foregoing paragraph.12  In this respect it should be noted that an illness requiring particular attention, continuous medication and control may be a psychological or psychosocial burden to the person concerned, but that in itself does not necessarily hinder participation on an equal basis in professional life in general.13  Moreover, the protected disability may even be that not of the employee, but of a person in the care of the employee who seeks to rely on the Directive.14  The latter situation is described as ‘associative discrimination.’

According to the AG, it is sufficient that a long term condition causes limitations in full and effective participation in professional life in general on equal terms with persons not having that condition.  No link has to be made between the specific work concerned and the disability in issue as a precondition to application of the Directive.

With regard to the Danish case at issue here, one should note that the Municipality of Billund argued that it cannot be contended that Mr. Kaltoft’s obesity entails a limitation that may hinder his full and effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers because he had already worked for 15 years as a childminder with the Municipality, and had participated in professional life on an equal footing with other childminders in the Municipality’s employ.  In other words, the Municipality asserts, Mr. Kaltoft’s obesity cannot be deemed to have impeded his work as a childminder. On the other hand, in light of the AG’s position, as set forth above, an employee such as Mr. Kaltoft could assert that it does not matter whether he could carry on his work as a childminder before he asserts a claim under the Directive; rather, if the disability, here obesity, causes limitations on his ability to participate in professional life generally, he can assert a claim of disability discrimination pursuant to the Directive.  Further, the notion of disability must be understood as referring to a hindrance to the exercise of professional activity, not only the impossibility of exercising such activity.15

Does obesity amount to a disability?

In addressing the question of whether obesity amounts to a disability, the AG refers to the Body Mass Index (BMI) classification of the World Health Organization.16  According to that measurement, persons can be divided in three categories: Obese class I (BMI of 30.00-34.99), Obese class II (BMI of 35.00 to 39.99) and Obese class III (BMI over 40.00). The latter category is also called ‘morbid obesity.’17  Although obesity is classified as an illness by the WHO, as set out above, an illness does not per se amount to a ‘disability’ as described in the Directive.18  With these categories in mind, the AG is of the opinion that most probably only WHO class III obesity (referred to by the AG as severe obesity) will create limitations that amount to a disability under the Directive and only when the situation fulfils all of the criteria set out in the ECJ’s case-law on the notion of disability. It is for the national Court to verify whether this is the case with respect to Mr. Kaltoft.19

Will the outcome matter for the Netherlands and the other EU Member States?

The Netherlands

The Directive was implemented in the Netherlands via the Equal Treatment Handicapped and Chronically Ill People Act (Act). According to this Act, discrimination on the grounds of handicap or chronical illness is prohibited. The terms ‘handicap’ and ‘chronical illness’ are not defined in the Act, and review of the legislative documents suggests that this omission was intentional, so as to be consistent with the Directive, which does not provide for a definition of ‘disability.’ Having said this, a handicap is considered to be irreversible and a chronical disease a long-term affliction.

As to the Dutch legal practice, it seems that the Act and the practice developed in the Netherlands are not completely in line with the ‘notion of disability’ in the sense of the Directive. There are elements that point in the direction of a wider scope, but there are also elements that seem to be narrower. The first (that is, a more expansive view) would be, as discussed earlier, permissible, while the latter (a narrower construct) would not. As an example, there are cases that seem to take the underlying (medical) cause into the equation in assessing whether the situation falls within the scope of a handicap or a chronic disease, which would seem to provide for analysis based on the source of the impairment, which, as described above, runs counter to the aim of the Directive.

Severe obesity is being interpreted as a chronic disease under Dutch case-law, by the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) as well as by the few courts that have rendered rulings on this topic so far. They all (directly or indirectly) refer to the aforementioned WHO classification regarding obesity and conclude that because morbid obesity is regarded as a chronical disease by the WHO it also qualifies as a handicap or chronical disease under the Act.20  Having said this, whether the outcome of the Danish case before the ECJ will change current practice will have to be seen, and may well depend on specific wording. If the ECJ rules in line with the AG’s opinion, the Dutch practice with regard to morbid obesity will not be affected; however, if the ECJ goes further, the ruling could broaden the nature of the protection.

Elsewhere in the EU

As described above, the EU Member States all have their own national legislation and in case of ECJ developments in this area, each will need to assess whether or not they fulfil the obligations that arise from the Directive and its case-law. By way of example, in the UK ‘disability’ is one of the protected characteristics under the Equality Act. There has been case-law, which held that while obesity is not a disability in itself, it may lead to an impairment which, if it meets the ‘disability’ test, would amount to a disability. If the ECJ rules that obesity per se amounts to a disability under the Directive, the UK courts may have to interpret ‘disability’ as including obesity or consider whether any changes to legislation are required.

Practical considerations

Just to be clear, the Directive does not impose an obligation to maintain in employment an individual who is not competent to perform the essential functions of the position concerned, notwithstanding the obligation for the employer, as laid down in Article 5 of the Directive, to provide reasonable measures where needed in a particular case to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, unless such measures result in the imposition of a disproportionate burden on the employer.21  This also applies to impairments such as alcoholism and drug addiction where these conditions amount to an illness. An employer may expect employees suffering from obesity to take reasonable steps themselves to ensure that they carry out their work properly. If that is or might become a problem, both the employer and the employee should address this in a timely and adequate manner to improve the situation, which will be a joint responsibility. In this context, looking at EU case-law as it currently stands, it is advisable for employers to consider reasonable adjustments (e.g., ergonomics of the workplace) where obesity leads to an impairment having an impact on an individual’s ability to perform their job. Furthermore, employers may also want to ensure a safe environment, addressing (in)appropriate behaviors toward those who are obese, not only because harassment based on obesity may in the future qualify as discrimination on the grounds of a “disability,” but more importantly to ensure that the employees feel good about themselves and their working environment, which will enhance their commitment to their colleagues and their employer and hence will create better results for all involved. With the latter, and the previously cited statistics in mind, employers might want to consider creating a healthy working environment that goes further than the regular health and safety regulations by, for example providing for healthy (lunch) food, health club arrangements, awareness programs and well-being programs among their workforces.


1 According to: Eurostat, Statistics Explained: Overweight and obesity – BMI statistics (data from November 2011)

2 Global, regional, and national prevalence of overweight and obesity in children and adults during 1980-2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, The Lancet, Vol. 384, Iss. 9945, pages 766 – 781 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60460-8).

3 Karsten Kaltoft v. Municipality of Billund, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen 17 July 2014, Case C-354/13.

4 Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000.

5 ECJ 17 July 2008, Case C-303/06 (Coleman), EU:C:2008:415, par. 38 and 47.

6 ECJ 18 March 2014, Case C-363/12 (Z), EU:C:2014:159, par. 83-85.

7 Federal district courts in Louisiana and Mississippi and the Montana Supreme Court had already held that severe obesity not based on a physiological disorder can be deemed a protected disability (see EEOC v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D.La. 2011); Lowe v. American Eurocoptor, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133345 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010); Feit v. BNSF Ry. Co., Op. 11-0436 (Mont. July 6, 2012).

8 ECJ 11 July 2006, Case C-13/05 (Chacón Navas), EU:C2006:456, par. 56.

9 Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2010/48/EC).

10 ECJ 11 April 2013, Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 (HK Danmark), EU:C:2013:222, par. 38 and 39.

11 HK Danmark, par. 41.

12 Kaltoft, par. 58.

13 Z, par 79 and 80.

14 Coleman, par. 56.

15 Z, par. 159.

16 Kaltoft, par. 50.

17 http://apps.who.int/bmi/index.

18 HK Danmark, par. 44.

19 Kaltoft, par. 56 and 60.

20 See for example NIHR 13 May 2011, 2011-78 (regarding a hiring and selection process).

21 Chacón Navas, par. 49 and 50

Employment Related Lawsuits Are on the Rise. Are You Covered?

Gilbert LLP Law FirmOn September 25, 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed the first two suits in its history challenging transgender discrimination under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  As discrimination litigation evolves, it is important to know whether your insurance coverage is evolving with it.

Coverage for employee-related lawsuits has always been important, but the increase in suits brought by the EEOC over the last several years (and the last several decades) has made employment practices liability (“EPL”) insurance of particular importance to protecting your company.  Last year, the EEOC recovered a record-setting $372.1 million.

Now, the scope of EEOC suits is increasing as a result of the EEOC’s ongoing efforts to implement its Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”), adopted in December of 2012.  As part of its SEP, the EEOC makes “coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions, as they may apply” a “top commission enforcement priority.”

Comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) policies, are a type of commercial third-party liability insurance.  Most businesses in the United States purchase CGL policies in order to protect against the risk of suits by third parties.  If a patron sues you for a slip and fall in your mom-and-pop shop, your CGL policy probably covers the suit.  Likewise, if you distribute across the entire country a product that allegedly causes bodily harm to thousands of people, your CGL policy probably covers the suits.

As broad as CGL coverage is, however, it is only one piece to a balanced insurance portfolio.  CGL policies typically exclude coverage for suits brought by employees of the company.  EPL polices step in to fill one part of the gap in coverage.  Other parts of the gap are filled by workman’s compensation policies and directors and officers liability policies.

A typical EPL policy may list a number of categories of protected classes covered by insurance, and then add coverage for “other protected classes.”  A policy may also protect against claims for “Discrimination,” and define that discrimination broadly to mean “any actual or alleged violation of any employment discrimination law.”  However, some polices offer more limited coverage.  For example, some carriers may restrict coverage to only sexual harassment.

Just as you protect your company from fire by installing sprinklers in your warehouses and doing regular safety inspections, it is imperative that you keep your employment practices up to date.  Educate your employees on proper workplace behavior, and try to think about ways to get ahead of the curve to minimize your liability for alleged workplace discriminations.

Just as discrimination litigation is evolving, other areas of litigation continue to evolve and create new risks for your company.  In addition, coverage law continues to evolve across the United States, on a state-by-state basis.  As coverage law evolves, it has a direct effect on the value of your insurance portfolio.

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