Amazon Settlement with NLRB a Reminder for Employers — “Confidential” Wage Policies Violate the NLRA

Barnes Thornburg

Last week in a settlement with the NLRB, online retailer Amazon agreed to allow its largely non-union workforce to discuss pay and working conditions with each other without fear of discipline. The settlement, as reported by Bloomberg News which obtained a copy, required Amazon to rescind certain work rules that prohibited workers from sharing information with one another, although Amazon did not admit any violation of the NLRA.

Amazon’s work rule was considered too broad by the NLRB because it prohibited discussion of wages and working conditions, considered quintessential “protected concerted activity” under the NLRA. In Amazon’s case, the NLRB got involved when an employee was disciplined after voicing concerns about security in the employee parking lot. The employee apparently filed a charge with the NLRB protesting his discipline and this led the NLRB to examine not only the circumstances of the employee’s discipline, but to scrutinize Amazon’s policies as well.

This settlement serves as a reminder to all employers, both union and non-union, that policies which prohibit discussion of terms and conditions of employment are on their face unlawful under the NLRA.  It is tempting for employers to require that wages or other benefits be kept “confidential” for a variety of reasons, but enforcing such policies is an easy way to draw unwanted attention from the NLRB, especially given the Board’s current focus on protected concerted activity.

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Employers in Illinois Take Note: Pregnancy Accommodation Amendments Go Into Effect January 1, 2015

Neal Gerber

As of January 1, 2015, the recently enacted pregnancy accommodation amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) will go into effect, requiring many Illinois employers to update or change their policies and practices with regard to the expecting and new mothers in their workforce.  Read below for the highlights of the IHRA’s pregnancy-related amendments, and stay tuned for an announcement from our group about an upcoming breakfast training at which we will discuss the details of the amendments, along with other employment hot topics for 2015.

Which employers are covered by the amendments?  All private, non-religious employers in Illinois, regardless of the number of employees, will be covered by the new pregnancy-related provisions of the IHRA.  Note, most IHRA provisions generally apply only to employers with 15 or more employees in Illinois.  The Act’s pregnancy-related amendments, however, apply to all employers, regardless of size.

Which employees are protected by the amendments?  The amended IHRA prohibits discrimination based on, and requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for, “pregnancy.”  “Pregnancy” is defined broadly under the Act to include “pregnancy, childbirth, or medical or common conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.”  Thus, the amendments generally will apply to applicants and employees who are expecting and who recently gave birth.

What do the amendments require?  Broadly speaking, the amendments impose an affirmative obligation on employers to offer reasonable accommodations for pregnancy and childbirth-related conditions.  Such accommodations may include:  more frequent or longer breaks; providing time and a private, non-bathroom space to express breast milk; physical accommodations such as seating and assistance with manual labor; modified or a part-time work schedule or even “job restructuring”; time off to recover from conditions related to childbirth; and/or leave “necessitated by” pregnancy, childbirth or medical “or common conditions” resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.

Importantly, under the amended IHRA employers may not require expecting or new mothers to just take leave, or to accept an accommodation that the applicant or the employee did not request.  The individual must agree to the form of accommodation being offered.  However, prior to providing the requested accommodation, employers will have the ability to require the requesting employee to submit medical proof of the need for that accommodation, to include a description of the advisable accommodation and its probable duration.

In addition, similar to the provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, the amended IHRA will not require employers to create new positions, discharge or transfer other employees, or to promote an unqualified employee in order to meet the “reasonable accommodation” requirement.  If the requested accommodation would pose an “undue hardship,” it need not be provided.  Employers should note, however, that the amended IHRA (similar to the ADA) places the burden of proving an “undue hardship” squarely on the employer, and meeting that burden is no easy task.  An “undue hardship” will be found to exist only if the requested accommodation is “prohibitively expensive or disruptive” when considered in light of certain specified factors, including the accommodation’s nature and cost, the overall financial resources of and impact on the facility or facilities involved in providing the requested accommodation, the overall financial resources of the employer, and the employer’s general operations.  Importantly, if the employer provides or would be required to provide the kind of accommodation being requested to other similarly-situated, non-pregnant employees, the amended IHRA will impose a “rebuttable presumption” that the requested accommodation would not impose an undue hardship.

Once an employee’s need for reasonable accommodation ceases and she relays an intent to return to her former position, the amended IHRA requires that the employer reinstate her to that former position or an equivalent position with equivalent pay, without loss of seniority or other benefits, unless, again, doing so would impose an undue burden.

The amended IHRA further requires that employers in Illinois post an Illinois Department of Human Rights-prepared or approved notice about the pregnancy accommodation amendments in the workplace, and also include appropriate information regarding employees’ rights under the amendments in their handbooks.

In short…  Considering that women compose nearly 50% of all workers in Illinois, it is important for employers to understand and ensure compliance with the IHRA’s new pregnancy-related amendments.  Any request for an accommodation made by an expecting or new mother must be evaluated thoughtfully, with the new statutory framework in mind.

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President Obama’s Executive Orders on Immigration – Interagency Cooperation and DOL Initiatives

Godfrey Kahn Law Firm

On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced a series of executive actions designed to reduce the strain on the country’s immigration system.  Many of these policies will have a direct effect on employers and the business community and demonstrate that the increased interagency cooperation and enforcement we have seen in recent years will continue.

Visa Application, Passport

The President has ordered the creation of an interagency working group consisting of U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to identify policies and procedures to promote the consistent enforcement of labor, employment and immigration laws.  Two of the topics the working group will review include 1) promoting worker cooperation with enforcement authorities without fear of retaliation based on immigration status, and 2) ensuring that employers do not use federal agencies to undermine worker protection laws by introducing immigration authorities into labor disputes.  DOL’s interagency working group fact sheet is available here.  This interagency group appears to be ready to continue the DOL-DHS discussions that began with the signing in March 2011 of a Memorandum of Understanding (which has since been revised) between those two agencies governing their coordination with respect to their various civil enforcement activities and avoidance of conflicts.

DOL has also proposed to review the permanent labor certification program (PERM), which is used to certify a shortage of U.S. workers who are able, willing and qualified to fill certain positions.  This certification is a necessary prerequisite for many employment-based legal permanent residence processes.  For example, DOL has reported that employers filed more than 70,000 PERM applications seeking to certify shortages of U.S. workers for specific positions in fiscal year 2014.  Among other key changes, DOL will attempt to modernize the PERM program so that it can identify worker shortages more effectively.  This part of the President’s directives will hopefully have a positive impact on employers trying to fill positions for which the pool of qualified applicants is limited.  DOL’s PERM fact sheet is available here.

Other initiatives flowing from the President’s announcement but whose details are not yet known include improved allocation of immigrant (legal permanent resident) visas; increased portability of work authorization without jeopardizing a pending legal permanent resident process; expanded work authorization for students, recent graduates and the spouses of certain professional-level workers; and efforts to increase the number of investors eligible to enter the country.

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Fifth Circuit Refuses Application of Bright-Line Test in FLSA Seaman Exemption Dispute

Proskauer Law firm

On November 13, 2014, the Fifth Circuit addressed the uncertainty stemming from its decision in Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., 272 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 2001), wherein the Court found that a plaintiff’s unloading and loading of vessels was considered “nonseaman” work subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime requirements. Subsequent to that decision, plaintiffs have advocated for a broad application of Owens’s rule, and district courts struggled with Owens’s  application to what are often fact-driven cases.

The Fifth Circuit provided necessary clarity in Coffin v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc., No. 13-20144, 2014 WL 5904734 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2014), when it reversed the district court on an interlocutory appeal and held that vessel-based crewmembers tasked with loading and unloading vessels are seamen under the FLSA rendering them exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6). In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit limited its prior holding in Owens, by finding that the unloading and loading of vessels is not strictly “nonseaman” work, and that each individual and case must be analyzed under a facts-and-circumstances test. Significantly, in dicta, the Court intimated that the Department of Labor’s “twenty percent rule,” which states that an employee loses his seaman status when “nonseaman” work occupies over twenty percent of his time, is also not a bright-line test.

Plaintiffs are tankermen who lived and worked aboard Defendant’s vessels. Though the parties and the court agreed that most of Plaintiffs’ job duties were “seaman” work exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that their job duties related to the loading and unloading of vessels constituted “nonseaman” work for which overtime pay was owed. Plaintiffs and the district court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s prior holding in Owens, and the district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The district court and the Fifth Circuit granted Defendant’s interlocutory appeal under 29 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Following oral argument, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision, which disagreed with Plaintiffs’ and the district court’s interpretation and application of Owens. Importantly, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Owens and emphasized that the analysis under the FLSA’s seaman exemption is a fact-based and flexible inquiry not subject to bright-line, categorical rules. The Court reasoned that the analysis required the consideration of the character of the work performed and the context in which it is performed and not the consideration of where the work is performed or how it is labelled. Unlike in Owens where the plaintiff was a non-crewmember who was not tied to a vessel and who only sought overtime for land-based loading and unloading, the Plaintiffs in this case lived on Defendant’s towboats, and their loading and unloading duties undisputedly affected the seaworthiness of the vessels and were integrated fully with their other seaman duties. Therefore, considering the character and context of the work performed, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ unloading and loading duties were seaman work, thus exempting Plaintiffs from the FLSA’s overtime requirements.  For these reasons, the Court vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded the matter to enter judgment in favor of Defendant.

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Is Obesity the Next Pivotal Employment Discrimination Issue Within the European Union?

Greenberg Traurig Law firm

Introduction

Obesity is one of the greatest health challenges worldwide. During the last decade, the population that is overweight in the European Union (EU) Member States has increased significantly, which has resulted in more than half of the EU population being overweight or obese.1  According to a recent study published in The Lancet, more than one-third of the population worldwide is overweight or obese, of which 36.9 percent are men and 38 percent are women.2  The aforementioned development has led to a growing discussion on how to deal with obese (severe overweight) employees in the workplace. That discussion includes the question whether obesity is a ground for unlawful discrimination.

In 2013, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked in a preliminary ruling in a Danish case – for the first time – which provisions of EU law, if any, apply to discrimination based on obesity. The ruling of the ECJ is expected at the end of 2014. Meanwhile the Advocate General (AG) delivered his opinion on the matter on 17 July 2014.3  The AG’s opinion basically revolved around two questions:

  • can obesity be considered as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination under EU law?
  • does obesity fall within the scope of the notion of disability as referred to in the Equal Treatment Framework Directive (Directive)?4

The aforementioned Directive has the objective of creating a level playing field, where equality in employment and occupation in both the public and the private sectors are concerned.5  Based on recent case law, the ECJ appears to have adopted, following the approach of the UN Convention, a social and not a (purely) medical model of disability.6

In this respect, it is important to understand that the Directive provides for minimum rules to be implemented by EU Member States with regard to their national laws. Member States are free to implement and execute provisions more favorable than the Directive so long as they are in line with the Directive, specifically and and EU law, in general. As a result, there are a variety of laws in place in the respective EU Member States regarding this topic, among many others, in combination with general EU law.

Given these developments, the topic of obesity in the context of employment discrimination is receiving greater scrutiny, and thus, the Danish case being closely watched by the employment law community in Europe. Indeed, obesity might be the next frontier in employment discrimination law.

This article is intended to highlight the most relevant aspects of the Danish case. It is likely that some of the issues will seem surprising to readers in the United States, inasmuch as, since the 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the courts have already begun to rule that severe or morbid obesity is a disability regardless of whether or not it was caused by a psychological disorder.7

Facts

An employee, Mr. Kaltoft, has been employed since 1996 as a childminder (taking care of other peoples´ children in their own homes) in the Municipality of Billund, Denmark. Mr. Kaltoft has been obese during the entirety of his employment. Although he performed his job to everyone’s satisfaction, he was dismissed in 2010. According to the notice of dismissal, the termination was due to a decline in the number of children to be taken care of.

The dismissal followed an internal hearing in which the obesity of Mr. Kaltoft was discussed. The parties disagree as to whether and if so, how, his obesity constituted part of the basis for the dismissal. Mr. Kaltoft argued that his employment was terminated due to his obesity, and that this amounted to discrimination based on obesity.

Obesity as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination?

Mr. Kaltoft basically argued that the open-ended nature of certain provisions in the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR), Protocol 12 of the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) as well as other general EU law principles, requires the conclusion that any form of discrimination should be protected.

The AG disagrees. In his analysis, he asserts that EU legislation prohibiting discrimination addresses specific grounds of discrimination within specific subject areas without an existing general prohibition on discrimination. Thus, since obesity  is not specifically mentioned as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the EU treaties, nor in any EU legislation, it cannot be seen as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination. If at all, according to the AG, obesity discrimination could only be grounded on Article 21 of the EU Charter, which prohibits ‘discrimination based on any ground such as (…).’ On this particular wording (such as) it might be argued that there is a general principle of non-discrimination in EU law covering grounds of discrimination not explicitly mentioned in the Charter. In this respect, the AG refers to an ECJ ruling in a previous case where the ECJ ruled that the discrimination within the scope of Directive 2000/78 should not be extended by analogy beyond those grounds listed- exhaustively – in Article 1 of the Directive.8  Therefore, the AG concludes that there is no general principle of EU law prohibiting discrimination in the labor market that would cover discrimination on grounds of obesity as a self-standing ground of unlawful discrimination.

Disability under Directive 2000/78

According to Article 1 of the Directive, discrimination on the grounds of disability is prohibited. The term ‘disability’ is not defined by the Directive, but a ‘notion’ of disability is being developed via case-law.  This case-law is consistent with the concept of disability as laid down in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (U.N. Convention), which is an evolving concept, and the U.N. Convention’s case-law. The U.N. Convention has been approved by the EU in its Decision 2010/48 and as a result the provisions of the U.N. Convention are an integral part of the European Union legal order.9  This means that EU legislation, such as directives, have to be interpreted, as far as possible, in a manner that is consistent with the U.N. Convention.

According to the ECJ, this notion of disability must be understood as referring to a limitation which results, in particular, from (i) long-term (ii) physical, mental or psychological impairments (iii) which in interaction with various barriers (iv) may hinder (v) the full and effective participation of the person in professional life (vi) on an equal basis with other workers.10

As to the scope of the term “disability,” the ECJ has held that disability cannot be defined by reference to the source of the impairment, because that would run against the very aim of the Directive, which is to implement equal treatment.11  Therefore, the notion of disability does not depend on whether the disability is self-inflicted or not. Disability can also include an illness, if the illness entails a limitation as described in the foregoing paragraph.12  In this respect it should be noted that an illness requiring particular attention, continuous medication and control may be a psychological or psychosocial burden to the person concerned, but that in itself does not necessarily hinder participation on an equal basis in professional life in general.13  Moreover, the protected disability may even be that not of the employee, but of a person in the care of the employee who seeks to rely on the Directive.14  The latter situation is described as ‘associative discrimination.’

According to the AG, it is sufficient that a long term condition causes limitations in full and effective participation in professional life in general on equal terms with persons not having that condition.  No link has to be made between the specific work concerned and the disability in issue as a precondition to application of the Directive.

With regard to the Danish case at issue here, one should note that the Municipality of Billund argued that it cannot be contended that Mr. Kaltoft’s obesity entails a limitation that may hinder his full and effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers because he had already worked for 15 years as a childminder with the Municipality, and had participated in professional life on an equal footing with other childminders in the Municipality’s employ.  In other words, the Municipality asserts, Mr. Kaltoft’s obesity cannot be deemed to have impeded his work as a childminder. On the other hand, in light of the AG’s position, as set forth above, an employee such as Mr. Kaltoft could assert that it does not matter whether he could carry on his work as a childminder before he asserts a claim under the Directive; rather, if the disability, here obesity, causes limitations on his ability to participate in professional life generally, he can assert a claim of disability discrimination pursuant to the Directive.  Further, the notion of disability must be understood as referring to a hindrance to the exercise of professional activity, not only the impossibility of exercising such activity.15

Does obesity amount to a disability?

In addressing the question of whether obesity amounts to a disability, the AG refers to the Body Mass Index (BMI) classification of the World Health Organization.16  According to that measurement, persons can be divided in three categories: Obese class I (BMI of 30.00-34.99), Obese class II (BMI of 35.00 to 39.99) and Obese class III (BMI over 40.00). The latter category is also called ‘morbid obesity.’17  Although obesity is classified as an illness by the WHO, as set out above, an illness does not per se amount to a ‘disability’ as described in the Directive.18  With these categories in mind, the AG is of the opinion that most probably only WHO class III obesity (referred to by the AG as severe obesity) will create limitations that amount to a disability under the Directive and only when the situation fulfils all of the criteria set out in the ECJ’s case-law on the notion of disability. It is for the national Court to verify whether this is the case with respect to Mr. Kaltoft.19

Will the outcome matter for the Netherlands and the other EU Member States?

The Netherlands

The Directive was implemented in the Netherlands via the Equal Treatment Handicapped and Chronically Ill People Act (Act). According to this Act, discrimination on the grounds of handicap or chronical illness is prohibited. The terms ‘handicap’ and ‘chronical illness’ are not defined in the Act, and review of the legislative documents suggests that this omission was intentional, so as to be consistent with the Directive, which does not provide for a definition of ‘disability.’ Having said this, a handicap is considered to be irreversible and a chronical disease a long-term affliction.

As to the Dutch legal practice, it seems that the Act and the practice developed in the Netherlands are not completely in line with the ‘notion of disability’ in the sense of the Directive. There are elements that point in the direction of a wider scope, but there are also elements that seem to be narrower. The first (that is, a more expansive view) would be, as discussed earlier, permissible, while the latter (a narrower construct) would not. As an example, there are cases that seem to take the underlying (medical) cause into the equation in assessing whether the situation falls within the scope of a handicap or a chronic disease, which would seem to provide for analysis based on the source of the impairment, which, as described above, runs counter to the aim of the Directive.

Severe obesity is being interpreted as a chronic disease under Dutch case-law, by the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) as well as by the few courts that have rendered rulings on this topic so far. They all (directly or indirectly) refer to the aforementioned WHO classification regarding obesity and conclude that because morbid obesity is regarded as a chronical disease by the WHO it also qualifies as a handicap or chronical disease under the Act.20  Having said this, whether the outcome of the Danish case before the ECJ will change current practice will have to be seen, and may well depend on specific wording. If the ECJ rules in line with the AG’s opinion, the Dutch practice with regard to morbid obesity will not be affected; however, if the ECJ goes further, the ruling could broaden the nature of the protection.

Elsewhere in the EU

As described above, the EU Member States all have their own national legislation and in case of ECJ developments in this area, each will need to assess whether or not they fulfil the obligations that arise from the Directive and its case-law. By way of example, in the UK ‘disability’ is one of the protected characteristics under the Equality Act. There has been case-law, which held that while obesity is not a disability in itself, it may lead to an impairment which, if it meets the ‘disability’ test, would amount to a disability. If the ECJ rules that obesity per se amounts to a disability under the Directive, the UK courts may have to interpret ‘disability’ as including obesity or consider whether any changes to legislation are required.

Practical considerations

Just to be clear, the Directive does not impose an obligation to maintain in employment an individual who is not competent to perform the essential functions of the position concerned, notwithstanding the obligation for the employer, as laid down in Article 5 of the Directive, to provide reasonable measures where needed in a particular case to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, unless such measures result in the imposition of a disproportionate burden on the employer.21  This also applies to impairments such as alcoholism and drug addiction where these conditions amount to an illness. An employer may expect employees suffering from obesity to take reasonable steps themselves to ensure that they carry out their work properly. If that is or might become a problem, both the employer and the employee should address this in a timely and adequate manner to improve the situation, which will be a joint responsibility. In this context, looking at EU case-law as it currently stands, it is advisable for employers to consider reasonable adjustments (e.g., ergonomics of the workplace) where obesity leads to an impairment having an impact on an individual’s ability to perform their job. Furthermore, employers may also want to ensure a safe environment, addressing (in)appropriate behaviors toward those who are obese, not only because harassment based on obesity may in the future qualify as discrimination on the grounds of a “disability,” but more importantly to ensure that the employees feel good about themselves and their working environment, which will enhance their commitment to their colleagues and their employer and hence will create better results for all involved. With the latter, and the previously cited statistics in mind, employers might want to consider creating a healthy working environment that goes further than the regular health and safety regulations by, for example providing for healthy (lunch) food, health club arrangements, awareness programs and well-being programs among their workforces.


1 According to: Eurostat, Statistics Explained: Overweight and obesity – BMI statistics (data from November 2011)

2 Global, regional, and national prevalence of overweight and obesity in children and adults during 1980-2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, The Lancet, Vol. 384, Iss. 9945, pages 766 – 781 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60460-8).

3 Karsten Kaltoft v. Municipality of Billund, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen 17 July 2014, Case C-354/13.

4 Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000.

5 ECJ 17 July 2008, Case C-303/06 (Coleman), EU:C:2008:415, par. 38 and 47.

6 ECJ 18 March 2014, Case C-363/12 (Z), EU:C:2014:159, par. 83-85.

7 Federal district courts in Louisiana and Mississippi and the Montana Supreme Court had already held that severe obesity not based on a physiological disorder can be deemed a protected disability (see EEOC v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D.La. 2011); Lowe v. American Eurocoptor, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133345 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010); Feit v. BNSF Ry. Co., Op. 11-0436 (Mont. July 6, 2012).

8 ECJ 11 July 2006, Case C-13/05 (Chacón Navas), EU:C2006:456, par. 56.

9 Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2010/48/EC).

10 ECJ 11 April 2013, Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 (HK Danmark), EU:C:2013:222, par. 38 and 39.

11 HK Danmark, par. 41.

12 Kaltoft, par. 58.

13 Z, par 79 and 80.

14 Coleman, par. 56.

15 Z, par. 159.

16 Kaltoft, par. 50.

17 http://apps.who.int/bmi/index.

18 HK Danmark, par. 44.

19 Kaltoft, par. 56 and 60.

20 See for example NIHR 13 May 2011, 2011-78 (regarding a hiring and selection process).

21 Chacón Navas, par. 49 and 50

Employment Related Lawsuits Are on the Rise. Are You Covered?

Gilbert LLP Law FirmOn September 25, 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed the first two suits in its history challenging transgender discrimination under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  As discrimination litigation evolves, it is important to know whether your insurance coverage is evolving with it.

Coverage for employee-related lawsuits has always been important, but the increase in suits brought by the EEOC over the last several years (and the last several decades) has made employment practices liability (“EPL”) insurance of particular importance to protecting your company.  Last year, the EEOC recovered a record-setting $372.1 million.

Now, the scope of EEOC suits is increasing as a result of the EEOC’s ongoing efforts to implement its Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”), adopted in December of 2012.  As part of its SEP, the EEOC makes “coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions, as they may apply” a “top commission enforcement priority.”

Comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) policies, are a type of commercial third-party liability insurance.  Most businesses in the United States purchase CGL policies in order to protect against the risk of suits by third parties.  If a patron sues you for a slip and fall in your mom-and-pop shop, your CGL policy probably covers the suit.  Likewise, if you distribute across the entire country a product that allegedly causes bodily harm to thousands of people, your CGL policy probably covers the suits.

As broad as CGL coverage is, however, it is only one piece to a balanced insurance portfolio.  CGL policies typically exclude coverage for suits brought by employees of the company.  EPL polices step in to fill one part of the gap in coverage.  Other parts of the gap are filled by workman’s compensation policies and directors and officers liability policies.

A typical EPL policy may list a number of categories of protected classes covered by insurance, and then add coverage for “other protected classes.”  A policy may also protect against claims for “Discrimination,” and define that discrimination broadly to mean “any actual or alleged violation of any employment discrimination law.”  However, some polices offer more limited coverage.  For example, some carriers may restrict coverage to only sexual harassment.

Just as you protect your company from fire by installing sprinklers in your warehouses and doing regular safety inspections, it is imperative that you keep your employment practices up to date.  Educate your employees on proper workplace behavior, and try to think about ways to get ahead of the curve to minimize your liability for alleged workplace discriminations.

Just as discrimination litigation is evolving, other areas of litigation continue to evolve and create new risks for your company.  In addition, coverage law continues to evolve across the United States, on a state-by-state basis.  As coverage law evolves, it has a direct effect on the value of your insurance portfolio.

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Vacation Policy Pitfalls for Illinois Employers

FINAL SW logo wLLP2

The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1, et seq., governs the payment of wages—including vacation pay—in Illinois.  While most employers understand that they must pay their workers on a regular basis for the wages the employees have earned, many do not consider how vacation policies may create a heightened risk of a wage class action lawsuit.

Simply put, employers must pay the wages earned by an employee at least semi-monthly, or no more than 13 days after they are first earned.  Departing employees must be paid all earned wages by the next regular pay period.  The Act defines wages to include vacation pay.  This is where things can get tricky.  An employer is not obliged to provide any vacation time to its employees.  However, once it chooses to provide vacation, the vacation time becomes earned wages that must be paid under the Act to the employee, even if the employee terminates their employment.

Employees receive vacation time in one of two ways.  First, an employer can award vacation time without requiring employees to first work some period of time.  Such a policy is called an “inducement for future service” policy and immediately vests.  Hence, employees may take vacation time under an “inducement for future service” policy without meeting any length of service criteria (and with no obligation to repay the vacation time should the employment end).  Such “inducement for future service” policies are unusual.

The other alternative is where the vacation is earned based on service.  For example, the employer can award two weeks of vacation for each year of employment.  This is considered a “length-of-service” policy and the law requires that employees earn “length-of-service” vacation time on a pro rata basis, even where the employer’s policy says they do not.  In other words, the vacation time vests as the employee works.  Thus, an employee who would earn two weeks of vacation after completing a year of employment is entitled to be paid for one week of vacation wages if he/she leaves the employer six months into the year, regardless of what the employer’s policy says.  Most employers have “length-of-service” policies.

An employer with a “length-of-service” policy must pay a departing employee the vacation wages they earned on a pro rata basis.  This is where a vacation policy can become dangerous.  If the employer has a policy that an employee only gets their vacation if they are employed in the following year, the employer is at risk with regard to every employee who left or, in the future leaves, its employment without getting paid vacation pay on a pro rata basis.  Such policy flaws lend themselves to class action lawsuits because the employer’s liability to the class will usually turn on a single question, such as whether the vacation policy is legal or not.

A class action lawsuit can be filed by one departing employee on behalf of all employees who left the employment without getting vacation pay.  A class action lawsuit is dangerous because it aggregates all employees’ claims into a single lawsuit brought by just the class representative.  In 2010, the Illinois legislature amended the statute of limitations under the Act to allow a class representative to file on behalf of a class that goes back in time up to ten years.  Because of the large number of unnamed, but represented, employees that can be in a class, the situation can create potentially disastrous financial exposure for an employer.  And, if the representative employee prevails, she is entitled to recover from the employer her attorneys’ fees, which are usually substantial.  As if this were not enough, the 2010 amendment also permits employees to collect damages of two percent per month—of 24 percent per annum—on any unpaid wages.  Willful refusals to pay wages can also be criminal.

Even if the class action lawsuit settles for a set amount of money, the employer usually must also pay the class representative’s attorneys’ fees.  Under the 2010 amendment, a prevailing employee is entitled to recover her attorneys’ fees, even she did not file her case as a class action.

Recognizing the risk, some employers have tried to limit their exposure by requiring that employees sign an agreement that they will make any claims within a short period of time—for example, six months.  Importantly, the plaintiffs’ bar and the Illinois Department of Labor take the position that the Act prevents an employee from agreeing to limit any of the rights bestowed on the employee by the Act.  Thus, an employee’s written agreement that they will bring any claims for unpaid wages within six months is unenforceable as a matter of public policy.

Employers should be careful to ensure that their policies comply with each state law in which they have employees, including the 2010 amendments to the Act.  If an employer is unfortunately named in a class action lawsuit, they should promptly seek legal advice from a law firm with experience in defending against class action lawsuits.

Copyright 2014 Schopf & Weiss LLP
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Department of State Releases December 2014 Visa Bulletin

Morgan Lewis

The Bulletin shows that cutoff dates in the EB-2 India category remain severely backlogged, cutoff dates in EB-3 for the Rest of the World and China advance by five months, and EB-3 China is now ahead of EB-2 China.

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has released its December 2014 Visa Bulletin. The Visa Bulletin sets out per-country priority date cutoffs that regulate the flow of adjustment of status (AOS) and consular immigrant visa applications. Foreign nationals may file applications to adjust their statuses to that of permanent residents or to obtain approval of immigrant visas at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad, provided that their priority dates are prior to the respective cutoff dates specified by the DOS.

What Does the December 2014 Visa Bulletin Say?

The December Visa Bulletin shows no change in the cutoff date for the EB-2 India category. EB-3 cutoff dates for the Rest of the World and China will advance by five months.

The cutoff date for F2A applicants from all countries will advance slightly in December.

EB-1: All EB-1 categories will remain current.

EB-2: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India will remain at February 15, 2005. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China will advance to January 1, 2010. The EB-2 category for all other countries will remain current.

EB-3: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to India will advance by seven days to December 1, 2003. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China will advance by five months to June 1, 2010, which is now ahead of the cutoff date for EB-2 China. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the Philippines, Mexico, and the Rest of the World will advance by five months to November 1, 2012.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for foreign nationals in the EB-3 category are as follows:

China: June 1, 2010 (forward movement of 152 days)

India: December 1, 2003 (forward movement of 7 days)

Mexico: November 1, 2012 (forward movement of 153 days)

Philippines: November 1, 2012 (forward movement of 153 days)

Rest of the World: November 1, 2012 (forward movement of 153 days)

Developments Affecting the EB-2 Employment-Based Category

Mexico, the Philippines, and the Rest of the World

The EB-2 category for applicants chargeable to all countries other than China and India has been current since November 2012. The December Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this trend. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to all countries other than China and India may continue to file AOS applications or have applications approved through December 2014.

China

The November Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of December 8, 2009 for EB-2 applicants chargeable to China. The December Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of January 1, 2010, reflecting forward movement of 23 days. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to January 1, 2010 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in December 2014.

India

The cutoff date for EB-2 applicants chargeable to India remains at February 15, 2005. This means that only applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India with a priority date prior to February 15, 2005 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in December 2014.

Developments Affecting the EB-3 Employment-Based Category

China

The November Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of January 1, 2010. The December Visa Bulletin remains unchanged, with a cutoff date of June 1, 2010. This means that applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to June 1, 2010 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in December 2014.

India

The November Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of November 22, 2003. The December Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of December 1, 2003, reflecting forward movement of seven days. This means that EB-3 applicants chargeable to India with a priority date prior to December 1, 2003 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in December 2014.

Rest of the World

The November Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of June 1, 2012 for EB-3 applicants chargeable to the Rest of the World. The December Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of November 1, 2012, reflecting forward movement of 153 days. This means that applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the Rest of the World with a priority date prior to November 1, 2012 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in December 2014.

Developments Affecting the F2A Family-Sponsored Category

The November Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of September 22, 2012 for F2A applicants from Mexico. The December Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of January 1, 2013, reflecting forward movement of 75 days. This means that applicants from Mexico with a priority date prior to January 1, 2013 will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in December 2014.

The November Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of March 1, 2013 for F2A applicants from all other countries. The December Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of March 22, 2013, reflecting forward movement of 21 days. This means that F2A applicants from all other countries with a priority date prior to March 22, 2013 will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in December 2014.

Developments in the Coming Months

As noted in last month’s alert, the DOS Visa Office predicts the following movement in the next three months:

F2A Family-Sponsored Category

  • The cutoff date in the F2A category will likely advance by three to five weeks per month.

Employment-Based Second Preference Category

  • The worldwide category will likely remain current.
  • The cutoff date in the EB-2 China category will likely advance by three to five weeks per month.
  • The cutoff date in the EB-2 India category will likely remain unchanged.

Employment-Based Third Preference Category

  • The cutoff date in the EB-3 worldwide category will continue to advance rapidly for the next several months. Demand is expected to increase significantly, at which point, the cutoff dates will be adjusted accordingly.
  • The cutoff date in the EB-3 China category is expected to advance rapidly in the next few months. Demand is expected to increase and may result in adjustments to the cutoff date by February 2015.
  • The cutoff date in the EB-3 India category will advance little, if at all.
  • The cutoff date in the EB-3 Mexico category will remain at the worldwide date.
  • The cutoff date in the EB-3 Philippines category will remain at the worldwide date. Increased demand in this category may result in adjustments to the cutoff date later in the fiscal year.

How This Affects You

Priority date cutoffs are assessed on a monthly basis by the DOS, based on anticipated demand. Cutoff dates can move forward or backward or remain static. Employers and employees should take the immigrant visa backlogs into account in their long-term planning and take measures to mitigate their effects. To see the December 2014 Visa Bulletin in its entirety, please visit the DOS website.

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Risks of Running a Brewery & How to Avoid Them

Poyner Spruill Law firm

Beware of These Risks

Underage Drinkers, Intoxicated Patrons & Employee Restrictions

Restrictions on Employees

  • Employees are prohibited from drinking while on the job.

  • Employees who sell or serve alcoholic beverages must be at least 18 years old.

  • Employees under 21 years old are not permitted to mix drinks containing liquor.

  • Minors who are 16 or 17 years old are permitted to work at the brewery only if they do   not serve or sell any alcoholic beverages.

Sales to Underage Drinkers

It is unlawful to sell or serve alcohol to persons under 21 years old.

What should you do to protect yourself?

  • Train employees to request proper identification from customers.

  • Create a written policy for checking identification and have employees acknowledge that they have read and understand the policy.

  • Diligently supervise employees and their age verification practices.

How much might it cost you?

  • There is a cap on damages of $500,000 per occurrence.

Sales to Intoxicated Patrons

It is unlawful for a brewery or an employee of the brewery to knowingly sell alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person.

What should you do to protect yourself?

  • Train employees on warning signs that a customer may have had too much to drink.

  • Be cautious in your assessment of a customer’s condition.

How much might it cost you?

  • There is no cap on damages for sales to intoxicated persons.

  • A court may even impose punitive damages against you.

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© 2014 Poyner Spruill LLP. All rights reserved.

What ERISA Plans Should Know about Money Market Reform

Drinker Biddle Law Firm

Most U.S. money market funds will begin restructuring their operations beginning in 2014 and throughout 2015 and 2016 as a result of the SEC’s adoption of wide ranging changes to the rules regulating these funds.  Since many plan participants invest in money market funds, ERISA plan sponsors, recordkeepers and investment consultants and other advisers will need to plan for operational, contractual, disclosure and other changes in connection with these new rules.

Floating and Stable NAV Funds

One of the biggest rule changes involves how money market funds will be allowed to value their shares.  Currently, money market funds generally offer shares at a stable net asset value (“NAV’) of $1.00.  Under the SEC’s new money market rules, only government and “retail” money market funds can offer their shares at a stable NAV.  Government money market funds are those funds that hold at least 99.5% of their investments in government securities, cash or repurchase agreements collateralized by government securities.  Money market funds that don’t qualify to offer shares at a stable NAV because of the nature of their shareholder base (i.e., institutional money market funds) will have to float their NAVs, meaning the share price will fluctuate from day to day.

Retail money market funds are funds that restrict investors only to beneficial owners that are natural persons.  A beneficial owner is any person who has direct or indirect, sole or shared voting and/or investment power.  Under the new rules, retail money market funds will be required to reasonably conclude that beneficial owners of intermediaries are natural persons.  The SEC stated that tax-advantaged savings accounts and trusts, such as (i) participant-directed defined contribution plans; (ii) individual retirement accounts; (iii) simplified employee pension arrangements, and other similar types of arrangements, would qualify for the natural person test.  On the other hand, defined benefit plans, endowments and small businesses are not considered “natural persons” and would not be eligible to invest in a retail money market fund.

It is widely expected that the SEC’s new money market rules will result in many changes in fund offerings.  For example:

  • Money market funds that currently have both institutional and natural persons as holders may spin off the institutional holders into separate floating NAV funds;

  • Some institutional funds may decide to liquidate or merge with other funds;

  • Some advisers may begin offering new money fund-“like” products that only hold short term securities (60 days or less maturity) and therefore value fund holdings at amortized cost; and

  • Some prime money market funds may change their investment strategies to operate as a government money market fund in order to steer clear of the floating NAV and liquidity fee and gate rules (discussed below).

Effect on ERISA Plans.  The SEC provided examples of how funds could satisfy the natural person definition with intermediaries, including through: contractual arrangements, periodic certifications and representations or other verification methods.  Accordingly, ERISA service providers who hold fund shares in omnibus accounts may expect to be contacted by retail money market funds to provide these certifications or representations and/or to enter into new agreements with funds for this purpose.

ERISA plan sponsors and investment consultants and advisers will also need to be alert to potential changes to existing money market funds currently offered in plans to which they provide services and/or new fund offerings that may be appealing to and/or better serve the best interests of participants.

Liquidity Fees and Redemption Gates

All money market funds, except government money market funds, will be subject to the SEC’s new rules with respect to the imposition of liquidity (or redemption) fees and redemption gates during periods when a money market fund’s weekly liquid assets dip below certain thresholds.  Under these new rules a fund board may impose up to a 2% liquidity fee and a gate on fund redemptions if weekly liquid assets fall below 30% of total assets.  The fund board must impose a 1% liquidity fee if weekly liquid assets fall below 10% of total assets, unless the board decides otherwise.  Of course, if 10% of a money market fund’s assets are below 10% of a fund’s total assets, it would be unlikely that a board would not impose liquidity fees and redemption gates.  The redemption gates can last no longer than 10 days and cannot be imposed more than once in a 90-day period.

Effect on ERISA Plans.  The liquidity fee and gate requirements will usually only be triggered in times of extreme market stress.  But they are features that many ERISA participants and ERISA service providers will not find appealing.  For that reason, there may be more demand from participants for government money market funds, which may, but are not required to, comply with the fee and gate rules.  It is not expected that government money market funds will opt to become subject to these fee and gate rules.

The liquidity fee and redemption gate rules will require recordkeepers to make technical changes in their operations.  These operational changes could be expensive and time consuming to implement especially for smaller plans.  In particular, it should be noted that liquidity fees may vary in amount depending on a fund board’s determination and redemption gates may vary in the amount of days and will need to be removed quickly upon notice by a fund board.  Additionally, there may be contractual impediments to implementation of liquidity fees and gates, which are discussed below.

Many commenters on the proposed money market rules raised questions with the SEC regarding possible conflicts caused by the application of the fee and gate rules to funds in ERISA and other tax-exempt plans.  Specifically, commenters mentioned the following issues with the fee and/or gate rules:

  • possible violations of certain minimum distribution rules that could be interfered with by the gate rule;

  • potential taxation as a result of the inability to process certain mandatory refunds on a timely basis;

  • delays in plan conversions or rollovers;

  • possible conflicts with the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) qualified default investment (“QDIA”) rules; and

  • conflicts with plan fiduciaries’ duties regarding maintenance of adequate liquidity in their plans.

The SEC’s response generally was that these concerns either were unlikely to materialize or could be mitigated by ERISA plan sponsors or service providers.  For example, with respect to QDIAs, the SEC suggested that a plan sponsor or service provider could (i) loan funds to a plan for operating expenses to avoid the effects of a gate, or (ii) pay a liquidity fee on behalf of a redeeming participant.  In connection with rollovers or conversions, the SEC likewise pointed out that if the liquidity fee caused a hardship on a participant, then the ERISA fiduciary or its affiliate could simply pay the liquidity fee; failing that, the SEC suggested that the fiduciary consider a government money market fund for investment purposes, which is not required to comply with the fee and gate rules.

The SEC continues to work with the DOL on these and other ERISA-and tax exempt specific issues but thus far has not provided any relief from its fee and gate rules for these types of plans and accounts.  Thus, ERISA fiduciaries and plan sponsors may need to consider money market fund offerings in their plans in light of these issues.

Contractual Issues

As noted above, the “natural person” requirements for retail money market funds will require these funds to ascertain information regarding beneficial ownership of fund shares from ERISA intermediaries.  Retail money market funds may ask ERISA intermediaries to make representations about their customers through revised service agreements containing representations about the nature of the intermediaries’ customers.  These funds may also use periodic certifications or questionnaires to obtain this information.

In addition, many existing contracts between money market funds and intermediaries have restrictions in them regarding the imposition of redemption fees and may restrict a fund’s right to delay effecting redemptions thereby putting them in conflict with the new liquidity fee and redemption gate rules.  Recordkeepers who contract with retail or institutional money market funds may therefore be asked by these funds to amend or otherwise revise their servicing agreements with the funds to provide for liquidity fees and redemption gates.

Pricing Changes

The new money market rules will require all floating NAV money market funds to price their shares to four decimal places (e.g., $1.0000).  Recordkeepers will need to adjust their systems to accommodate the four-decimal place pricing system.

Disclosure and Education/Training

ERISA service providers will need to train and educate their personnel on the new money market rules and fund options so that they can answer participants’ questions.  ERISA service providers will need to develop disclosure for ERISA participants that clearly describes the risks and differences in money market funds and new fund options.

Compliance Dates

The new money market rules take effect in various stages over the next two years.  Importantly, the floating NAV, decimal pricing, and liquidity fee and gate rules become effective on October 14, 2016.  That said, the mutual fund industry appears to be moving quickly to prepare to comply, and it is probable that investment advisers to money market funds will begin to make some changes, for example, creating new funds and separating retail and institutional shareholders into different funds well ahead of the 2016 compliance date.  Therefore, ERISA service providers will need to be alert to the possibility that their operations may need to be adjusted as these changes occur.

The SEC’s new money market rules will usher in many changes to money market funds over the next 18-24 months that will affect ERISA and tax-exempt participants who invest in these vehicles and ERISA service providers.  ERISA service providers should begin preparing for these changes by assessing their systems, as applicable, to evaluate whether they can comply with the new rules and, if not, what other investment options might be available to address participants’ short-term investment needs.  ERISA service providers may also want to consider whether non-government money market funds or other short-term liquidity vehicles should be offered to ERISA participants in light of the new fee and gate rules.

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