USCIS Resumes H-2B Adjudications

Jackson Lewis P.C.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has announced that it will resume adjudications of H-2Bpetitions, even though it will continue to suspend premium processing until further notice.

The March 17, 2015, announcement follows the filing of an unopposed motion on March 16 by DOL to stay until April 15the U.S. District Court ruling in Perez v. Perez. That order vacated DOL’s H-2B regulations on the grounds that DOL had no authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to issue them. DHS suspended H-2B adjudications while it reviewed the decision. As stated in the motion, DHS will resume adjudicating H-2B petitions based on temporary labor certifications issued by DOL.

The DHS announcement follows pressure mounted by stakeholders to resume processing of H-2B petitions already filed, and to accept and process H-2B petitions supported by temporary labor certifications issued prior to March 4, 2015. The court in Perez enjoined DOL from enforcing DOL’s 2008 H-2B regulations. It did not invalidate H-2B temporary labor certifications already issued by the DOL, nor did it direct USCIS to end processing of H-2B petitions supported by previously issued temporary labor certifications. The stakeholders have argued that Perez does not require USCIS to cease processing of their H-2B petitions. They have lamented that the suspension of processing could potentially have a significant impact on a wide range of industries, including resort and hospitality, seafood, landscaping, grounds maintenance, and forestry, to name but a few. Businesses that use the H-2B program to supplement workforce needs will face serious labor shortages, and the potential for significant economic loss across several industries is tremendous.

To fill the regulatory gap occasioned by the court order, DOL and DHS announced on March 13, that they intend to issue a joint interim final rule by April 30, 2015.

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NLRB Issues Critical Guidance On Employer Handbooks, Rules and Policies, Including “Approved” Language

Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

On March 18, 2015, NLRB General Counsel Richard F. Griffin, Jr. issuedGeneral Counsel Memorandum GC 15-04 containing extensive guidance as to the General Counsel’s views as to what types employer polices and rules, in handbooks and otherwise, will be considered by the NLRB investigators and regional offices to be lawful and which are likely to be found to unlawfully interfere with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or the Act”).

This GC Memo is highly relevant to all employers in all industries that are under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, regardless of whether they have union represented employees.

Because the Office of the General Counsel investigates unfair labor practice charges and the NLRB’s Regional Directors act on behalf of the General Counsel when they determine whether a charge has legal merit, the memo is meaningful to all employers and offers important guidance as to what language and policies are likely to be found to interfere with employees’ rights under the Act, and what type of language the NLRB will find does not interfere and may be lawfully maintained, so long as it is consistently and non-discriminatorily applied and enforced.

As explained in the Memorandum, the Board’s legal standard for deciding whether an employer policy unlawfully interferes with employees’ rights under the Act is generally whether “employees would reasonably construe the rules to prohibit Section 7 activity” – that is action of a concerted nature intended to address issues with respect to employees’ terms and conditions of employment. As we have noted previously, this General Counsel and Board have consistently given these terms broad interpretations and have found many employer policies and procedures, in handbooks and elsewhere, that appear neutral and appropriate on their face, to violate the Act and interfere with employee rights.  Many of these cases have involved non-union workplaces where there is not a union present and there is no union activity in progress.

There are two sections to the Memo. Part 1 of the Memorandum, which begins at page 2 and runs to page 20, offers a recap of NLRB decisions concerning 8 broad categories of policies, with summaries of the Board’s holdings and examples of policy language that the NLRB has found to unlawfully interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights and policy language that the Board has found did not unlawfully interfere with employees’ rights.  Section 2 reports on the General Counsel’s settlement with Wendy’s International LLC following an investigation of charges in which the General Counsel found portions of Wendy’s employee handbook unlawfully overbroad, with an explanation as to why the General Counsel found the policies in question to interfere with employees’ rights under the Act and a description of the language Wendy’s adopted to replace the problematic policies as part of its settlement of the charges. Both parts of the Memorandum will be of interest to employers and attorneys who draft, apply and enforce handbooks and other workplace policy documents.

Part 1: Examples of Handbook Rules found by the Board to be Lawful and Unlawful in recent decisions

  • Employer Handbooks Rules Regarding Confidentiality – The Memorandum reviews the Board’s precedents holding that “Employees have a Section 7 right to discuss wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with fellow employees, as well as nonemployees such as union representatives.” Interestingly, the Memorandum also states that “broad prohibitions on disclosing ‘confidential’ information are lawful so long as they do not reference information regarding employees or anything that would reasonably be considered a term or condition of employment, because employers have a substantial and legitimate interest in maintaining the privacy of certain business information.”  The Memorandum further “clarifies” by advising that “an otherwise unlawful confidentiality rule will be found lawful if, when viewed in context, employees would not reasonably understand the rule to prohibit Section 7 protected activity.”

  • Employer Handbooks Rules Regarding Employee Conduct toward the Company and Supervisors – As explained in the Memorandum, “Employees also have the Section 7 right to criticize or protest their employer’s labor policies or treatment of employees.”  The Memorandum offers an overview of decisional law, with particular attention to cases involving rules that “prohibit employees “from engaging in ‘disrespectful,’ ’negative,’ ‘inappropriate,’ or ‘rude’ conduct towards the employer or management, absent sufficient clarification or context.”  As further noted, employee criticism of the employer “will not lose the Act’s protection simply because the criticism is false or defamatory.”

  • Employer Handbooks Rules Regulating Conduct Towards Fellow Employees – This section of the Memorandum focusses on language and policies that the Board has found to interfere with the Section 7 right employees have ‘to argue and debate with each other  about unions, management, and their terms and conditions of employment,” which the General Counsel explains the Board has held will not lose their protection under the Act, “even if it includes ‘intemperate, abusive and inaccurate statements.” Of particular interest in this portion of the Memorandum is the examination of policies concerning harassment.  The Memorandum notes that “although employers have a legitimate and substantial interest in maintaining a harassment-free workplace, anti-harassment rules cannot be so broad that employees would reasonably read them as prohibiting vigorous debate or intemperate comments regarding Section 7 protected subjects.”

  • Employer Handbooks Rules Regarding Employee Interaction With Third Parties – This section of the Memorandum focuses on employer policies and provisions that seek to regulate and restrict employee contact with and communications to the media relating to their employment.  The General Counsel notes that “(A)nother right employees have under Section 7 is the right to communicate with the new media, government agencies, and other third parties about wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment,” and that rules “that reasonably would be read to restrict such communications are unlawful.” The General Counsel acknowledges however that “employers may lawfully control who makes official statements for the company,” any such rules must be drafted so as “to ensure that their rules would not reasonably be read to ban employees from speaking to the media or third parties on their own (or other employees”) behalf.

  • Employer Handbooks Rules Restricting Use of Company Logos, Copyrights and Trademarks – The Board has found many employer policies, whether contained in employee handbooks or elsewhere, that broadly prohibit employees from using logos, copyrights and  trademarks to unlawfully interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights.  While the General Counsel acknowledges that “copyright holders have a clear interest in protecting their intellectual property,” the Board has found, with the approval of such courts as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, that “handbook rules cannot prohibit employees’ fair protected use of that property.”  In this regard the General Counsel states in the Memorandum that it is his office’s position that “employees have a right to use the name and logo on picket signs’ leaflets, and other protected materials,” and that “Employers’ proprietary interests are not implicated by employees’ non-commercial use of a name, logo, or other trademark to identify the employer in the course of Section 7 activity.”

  • Employer Handbooks Rules Restricting Photography and Recording – While many handbooks and policies prohibit or seek to restrict employees from taking photographs or making recordings in the workplace and on employer policy, the Memorandum states that “Employees have Section 7 right to photograph and make recordings in furtherance of their protected concerted activity, including the right to use personal devices to take such pictures make recordings.”  The Memorandum further notes that such policies will be found to be overbroad “where they would reasonably be read to prohibit the taking of pictures or recordings on non-work time.”

  • Employer Handbooks Rules Restricting Employees from Leaving Work – With respect to handbook or other policies that restrict employees from leaving the workplace or from failing to report when scheduled, the Memorandum notes that “one of the most fundamental rights employees have under Section 7 of the Act is the right to go on strike,” and therefore “rules that regulate when an employee can leave work are unlawful if employees reasonably would read them to forbid protected strike actions and walkouts.”  Not all rules concerning absences and leaving the workstations are unlawful.  A rule would be lawful if “such a rule makes no mention of ‘strikes,’ ‘walkouts,’ ‘disruptions’ or the like” since employees should “reasonably understand the rule to pertain to employees leaving their posts for reasons unrelated to protected concerted activity.”

  • Employer Conflict of Interest Rules – The Memorandum states that under Section 7 of the Act, employees have the right to engage in concerted activity to improve their terms and conditions of employment, even if that activity is in conflict with the employer’s interests.  It cites as examples of such activities that could arguably be in violation of broad conflict of interest policies as protests outside the employer’s business, organizing a boycott of the employer’s products and services and solicitation of support for a union while on non-work time.  The Memorandum notes that when a conflict of interest policy “includes examples of otherwise clarifies that it limited to legitimate business interests (note: as that term is defined by the General Counsel and the Board) employees will reasonably understand the rule to prohibit only unprotected activity.”

  • Part 2: The Wendy’s International LLC Handbook Cases

    The second part of the Memorandum relates to the Board’s settlement of a series of unfair labor practice charges against Wendy’s International LLC (Wendy’s) alleging that various provisions of the handbook were overbroad and unlawfully interfered with employees’ rights under the NLRA.  The company entered into an “informal, bilateral Board settlement agreement.  In this section, the GC explains why various provisions were found unlawful and then sets forth negotiated replacement policies that the GC found did not violate the Act.  While not a formal “safe harbor” since this is the position of the General Counsel and not the Board, it offers very good advice for employers and attorneys in this area.  The Wendy’s policies that the General Counsel argued violated employees’ Section 7 rights and the replacements that the General Counsel found acceptable concerned the following areas:

    • Handbook Disclosure Provision – The handbook in issue contained a broad prohibition against disclosure of the handbook and the information it contained without the company’s express prior written permission.  The General Counsel found this to be unlawful because it prohibited disclosure of employment practices to third parties such as a union or the NLRB.

    • Social Media Policy – While the General Counsel acknowledged that employers have “a legitimate interest in ensuring that employee communications are not construed as representing the employer’s official position,” the General Counsel found the company’s rule to be overbroad since it prohibited a much broader range of communications that would be protected by Section 7.  This included photography and recording and no retaliation provisions.

    • Conflict of Interest Policy

    • Company Confidential Information Provision

    • Employee Conduct

    • Walking Off the Job Without Authorization

    • No Distribution/No Solicitation Provision

    • Restaurant Telephone; Cell Phone; Camera Phone/Recording Devices Provision

    While Memorandum GC 15-04 arguably does not contain “new” information or changes in policy or case law, it should be useful for employers and practitioners (and employees) in that it provides a concise summary of the General Counsel’s views on this wide range of matters and examples of language that is likely to be found lawful in future proceedings.  OF course it is important to note that each charge is decided on its own facts and the actions and statements of employers and their supervisors in connection with the application and enforcement of the particular provision will almost always be relevant to the determination of whether the Board will issue a complaint on a particular ULP Charge.

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Utah Passes Law Prohibiting LGBT Employment Discrimination

Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP law firm

On March 12, Utah Governor Herbert signed into law S.B. 296, which amends the Utah Antidiscrimination Act to prohibit discrimination in employment by Utah employers on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Notably, and perhaps not surprisingly given that 60% of Utah residents identify as Mormons, although the law had the support of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, it exempts from coverage religious institutions, organizations, and affiliates (as well as the Boy Scouts of America) from its definition of employer.

It also allows for employee expression of religious or moral beliefs in the workplace – which would appear to include opposition to LGBT issues or lifestyles – as long as such expression is “reasonable, non-disruptive and non-harassing.” In passing this law, Utah becomes the 18th state (including the District of Columbia) to adopt LGBT anti-discrimination legislation. (LGBT discrimination is also prohibited against federal employees pursuant to Executive Order 13672, signed by President Obama in June 2014.)

Supreme Court: DOL Can Flip-flop on its Interpretation of Its Own Regulations

Godfrey & Kahn S.C. Law firm

In 2010, the United States Department of Labor (DOL) issued an “Administrator’s Interpretation” stating that DOL would no longer consider employees who perform duties typical of mortgage loan officers to be exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime pay requirements.  This particular ruling revolved around the FLSA’s exemption for administrative employees.

Supreme court DOL FLSA

The DOL’s 2010 stance represented a change of course, as DOL had previously issued an “Opinion Letter” in 2006 stating that mortgage loan officers were generally exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements under the administrative exemption.  Litigation ensued following the 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation.  The focus of that litigation was a rather technical issue:  Should DOL have followed the formal rulemaking process before it could flip-flop on its interpretation of its own regulations?  You can read more about the details of the litigation here.

On Monday, March 9, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled that DOL was not required to follow the formal rulemaking process whenever it took a position that was contrary to previous guidance issued by DOL.

Why does this ruling matter to employers of mortgage loan officers?  Those businesses should classify those employees as non-exempt and evaluate their compensation structures immediately to comply with DOL’s interpretation of the administrative exemption.  Otherwise, these employers run the risk of DOL enforcement actions and private litigation.  Of course, these employers can disregard the DOL’s interpretation and rely on individual merits of their classifications, but they would do so at their peril.

Why does this ruling matter to employers generally?  Based on the Court’s ruling, DOL can arguably change its tune about any interpretation of its own interpretive regulations without any warning to employers.  An emboldened DOL could revisit regulatory interpretations that currently favor employers and flip those interpretations on their head, without warning.  More importantly, the Court’s ruling was not limited to the DOL, which means that other federal administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA) could follow suit, leaving employers with little recourse to challenge such changes of heart.

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Oklahoma Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment to Employer on Professor’s Allegations He Was Denied Tenure After Reporting Inappropriate Facebook Posts by Fellow Professors

Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

A federal court in Oklahoma recently denied summary judgment to Northeastern State University, finding that a professor’s discrimination and retaliation claims, among others, could proceed to trial. The professor, Dr. Leslie Hannah, was appointed chair of his department in 2009. The previous assistant chair, Dr. Brian Cowlishaw, was ineligible for the chair position pursuant to the University’s nepotism policy (his wife, Dr. Bridget Cowlishaw, was a professor in the department). During that period, Dr. Brian Cowlishaw posted the following comment on his Facebook page:

“Brian Hammer Cowlishaw /salutes in NSU’s direction / Good luck with that, then! [translation: I won’t be entering the ‘election’ for department chair, because what I offer, no one wants] Good luck! / salute!”

Then in response to a comment, he wrote:

“There will be an ‘election’ the first week of February. They’re making a f*****g indian chair.”

In 2010, Drs. Brian and Bridget Cowlishaw, and another professor, Dr. Donna Shelton, made disparaging comments on Facebook after Dr. Hannah scheduled a department meeting to be held outdoors by the river. In response to a post by Dr. Bridget Cowlishaw about not looking forward to the beginning of the academic year, Dr. Shelton wrote:

“Wonder if they sell body armor for use under regalia…”

In response to a post by Dr. Brian Cowlishaw about the camping trip, Dr. Bridget Cowlishaw wrote:

“Nah, our chair will bring all the handbaskets we need. He’s probably woven them himself.”

In response to a post about whether anyone attended, Dr. Bridget Cowlishaw wrote:

“Maybe they were all eaten by wolves.”

Dr. Hannah reported the posts to the University. The University found that the posts were inappropriate, and reprimanded the professors. Dr. Bridget Cowlishaw entered into a settlement agreement with the University whereby she resigned.

In 2011, Dr. Hannah reported to Human Resources: “I think the time has come for me to leave NSU. This seems to be an unsafe place for American Indians. I will be submitting my resignation . . . ” He then did not resign his position, but he did resign as department chair.

Dr. Hannah ultimately submitted his application for tenure and early promotion when he became eligible in late 2012. The committee that reviewed his application consisted of seven people, including Dr. Brian Cowlishaw and Dr. Shelton. The vote regarding Dr. Hannah was split 3/3 with one abstention, with Dr. Brian Cowlishaw and Dr. Shelton voting to deny the application. Thereafter, in early 2013, the University’s Dean reviewed the committee’s findings and denied Dr. Hannah’s application, stating that Dr. Hannah had “polarized the Department and displayed hostility toward other faculty and staff.” The Dean later stated that, while he was aware of past conflicts in the department, he was unaware of the inappropriate Facebook posts. Dr. Hannah filed a complaint with the University, and the University placed Dr. Hannah on administrative leave with pay for the remainder of his contract.

Dr. Hannah filed suit, including for discrimination and retaliation. The University brought a summary judgment motion. With respect to the discrimination and retaliation claims, the University’s main argument was that there was no causal connection between the Facebook posts in 2009 and 2010 and the denial of Dr. Hannah’s tenure in 2013.

The court was unconvinced that the passage of time between the Facebook posts and the denial of tenure defeated causation, stating: “Two years is not a significant amount of time. It is more than plausible and rather likely that after two years, Dr. Cowlishaw and Dr. Shelton still held some animosity toward Dr. Hannah for his reporting their Facebook posts, which resulted in their reprimands and possibly in the resignation of Dr. Cowlishaw’s wife.”

The Hannah case is another reminder for employers regarding the importance of implementing a good social media policy and training all employees to abide by it. Training employees not to make inappropriate posts in the first place trumps effective corrective action once the employer becomes aware of such posts. Although inHannah, the University’s initial response to the inappropriate posts was sufficient, the fact that the professors had made the posts in the first place played a key role in precluding the University from prevailing on summary judgment during later litigation.

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Still Waiting for ADA and GINA Guidance on Wellness Incentives

Jackson Lewis P.C.

March is here. The EEOC’s perspective on wellness program incentives is not. Yet again.

In its Fall 2014 regulatory agenda, the EEOC stated it would be issuing in February 2015 amended regulations concerning the size of incentives an employer may offer, yet still have a “voluntary” wellness program under the ADA and GINA.  The EEOC listed these same amendments on its Spring 2014 regulatory agenda. The regulatory agenda is a preliminary statement of priorities under consideration and is not a binding commitment to issue the regulations on the stated date.

The EEOC noted on its agenda that these amendments were needed to address whether an employer’s compliance with HIPAA rules concerning wellness program incentives, as amended by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), also complies with the ADA. The EEOC added that an amendment would also address the size of inducements allowed under GINA “to employees’ spouses or other family members who respond to questions about their current or past medical conditions on health risk assessments.”

The allowed size of wellness incentives matters to the growing number of employers with wellness programs. The ACA has a clear compliance standard for such incentives.  Until 2014, the EEOC had stayed on the sidelines of the wellness incentive debate, not offering any guidance beyond its general view that if the incentive was too large, the program was not “voluntary.”

In 2014, the EEOC sued three employers, claiming the size of their wellness incentives (or penalties, depending on your perspective) transformed otherwise voluntary wellness programs into involuntary programs. In the third case, the EEOC sought to enjoin the company from continuing the incentives in its wellness plan. There was no claim that the incentives violated the ACA standard. Our report on that case is here.

At the oral argument on the injunction hearing, the court asked the EEOC numerous times to define the line between a lawful and unlawful incentive under the ADA and GINA. The EEOC declined to define a specific line. The court denied the EEOC’s injunction request.

More than a year ago, we posted that waiting for the EEOCs guidance on incentives under wellness programs is like waiting for Beckett’s Godot, where Estragon and Vladimir lament daily that Godot did not come today, he might come tomorrow. The waiting continues.

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DOL Issues Final Rule Amending FMLA Definition of “Spouse” to Include Same-Sex Marriages

The U.S. Department of Labor has issued a final rule amending the regulatory definition of “spouse” under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  We earlier reported on the DOL’s proposed rule to this effect, which is now final and will become effective on March 27, 2015.

The amendment changes the definition of “spouse” to include individuals in same-sex marriages if the marriage was valid in the place it was entered into regardless of where they live.  Before the new rule was issued, the FMLA and its accompanying regulations defined “spouse” as a husband or wife as recognized under the laws of the state in which the employee resides.  The new definition of spouse instead looks to the law of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was entered into and expressly encompasses same-sex married couples.  The final rule thus adopts a “place of celebration” rule rather than a “state of residence” rule for the definition of “spouse” under the FMLA.

According to the DOL, the amended regulatory definition of spouse permits “eligible employees in legal same-sex marriages [to] be able to take FMLA leave to care for their spouse or family member, regardless of where they live.”  The DOL has also suggested that the new rule will reduce the administrative burden on multi-state employers, who no longer have to consider an employee’s state of residence and the laws of that state in determining the employee’s eligibility for FMLA leave.

The new rule was prompted by the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor, which found unconstitutional those provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act that prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages.

Some of the other features of the new rule include:

  • The new rule encompasses an employee in a same-sex marriage entered into abroad as long as the marriage is valid in the place it was entered into and could have been entered into in at least one state in the United States.

  • The new rule encompasses employees in a common law marriage as long as the common law marriage became valid in a state that recognizes such common law marriage.

  • An employee in a legal same-sex marriage can now take FMLA leave to care for his or her stepchild whereas before, an employee in a legal same-sex marriage could only take FMLA leave to care for his or her stepchild for whom the employee stood in loco parentis.

  • Similarly, an employee can now take FMLA to care for his stepparent who is the employee’s parent’s same-sex spouse, even if the stepparent never stood in loco parentisto the employee.

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Statements of Samantha Elauf and David Lopez Following Oral Argument at the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Seal

Samantha Elauf filed the original charge of religious discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that led to today’s argument in the Supreme Court. She has the following statement for the press:

I was born and raised in Tulsa, Oklahoma. When I applied for a position with Abercrombie Kids, I was a teenager who loved fashion.  I had worked in two other retail stores and was excited to work at the Abercrombie store.  No one had ever told me that I could not wear a head scarf and sell clothing.  Then I learned I was not hired by Abercrombie because I wear a head scarf, which is a symbol of modesty in my Muslim faith.  This was shocking to me.

I am grateful to the EEOC for looking into my complaint and taking this religious discrimination case to the courts.  I am not only standing up for myself, but for all people who wish to adhere to their faith while at work. Observance of my faith should not prevent me from getting a job.

David Lopez, General Counsel of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), made the following statement at the conclusion of the Supreme Court argument in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., a case involving religious accommodation.

This year we celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, established as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Title VII prohibits discrimination because of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.  The prohibition against religious discrimination reflects this country’s historical tradition of religious freedom and religious tolerance. Since that time, the Commission has led the effort to enforce laws that prohibit religious discrimination for persons of all faiths. Today’s case is the latest effort to ensure all persons protected by  Title VII are not placed in the difficult position of choosing between adherence to one’s faith and a job.

Finally, I would be remiss not to recognize the courage and tenacity of Samantha Elauf.  Regardless of the outcome of this case, her effort to stand up for the important principles at issue is an inspiration.  Samantha now has a brief prepared statement that will be read by Christine Saah Nazer, EEOC spokesperson.

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Statements of Samantha Elauf and David Lopez Following Oral Argument at the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Seal

Samantha Elauf filed the original charge of religious discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that led to today’s argument in the Supreme Court. She has the following statement for the press:

I was born and raised in Tulsa, Oklahoma. When I applied for a position with Abercrombie Kids, I was a teenager who loved fashion.  I had worked in two other retail stores and was excited to work at the Abercrombie store.  No one had ever told me that I could not wear a head scarf and sell clothing.  Then I learned I was not hired by Abercrombie because I wear a head scarf, which is a symbol of modesty in my Muslim faith.  This was shocking to me.

I am grateful to the EEOC for looking into my complaint and taking this religious discrimination case to the courts.  I am not only standing up for myself, but for all people who wish to adhere to their faith while at work. Observance of my faith should not prevent me from getting a job.

David Lopez, General Counsel of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), made the following statement at the conclusion of the Supreme Court argument in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., a case involving religious accommodation.

This year we celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, established as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Title VII prohibits discrimination because of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.  The prohibition against religious discrimination reflects this country’s historical tradition of religious freedom and religious tolerance. Since that time, the Commission has led the effort to enforce laws that prohibit religious discrimination for persons of all faiths. Today’s case is the latest effort to ensure all persons protected by  Title VII are not placed in the difficult position of choosing between adherence to one’s faith and a job.

Finally, I would be remiss not to recognize the courage and tenacity of Samantha Elauf.  Regardless of the outcome of this case, her effort to stand up for the important principles at issue is an inspiration.  Samantha now has a brief prepared statement that will be read by Christine Saah Nazer, EEOC spokesperson.

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Wal-Mart to Pay $150,000 to Settle EEOC Age and Disability Discrimination Suit

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Seal

Keller Store Manager Was Harassed and Fired Because of His Age and Denied Accommodation for His Diabetes, Federal Agency Charged

Wal-Mart Stores of Texas, L.L.C. (Wal-Mart) has agreed to pay $150,000 and provide other significant relief to settle an age and disability discrimination lawsuit brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency announced today. The EEOC charged in its suit that Wal-Mart discriminated against the manager of the Keller, Texas Walmart store by subjecting him to harassment, discriminatory treatment, and discharge because of his age. The EEOC also charged that Wal-Mart refused to provide a reasonable accommodation for the man’s disability as federal law requires.

According to the EEOC’s suit, David Moorman was ridiculed with frequent taunts from his direct supervisor, including “old man” and “old food guy.” The EEOC further alleged that Wal-Mart ultimately fired Moorman because of his age. Such alleged conduct violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age 40 or older, including age-based harassment.

The EEOC’s suit also alleged that Wal-Mart unlawfully refused Moorman’s request for a reasonable accommodation for his diabetes. Following his diagnosis and on the advice of his doctor, Moorman requested reassignment to a store co-manager or assistant manager position. According to the suit, Wal-Mart refused to engage in the interactive process of discussing Moorman’s requested accommodation, eventually rejecting his request. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Wal-Mart had an obligation to reasonably accommodate Moorman’s disability.

The EEOC filed suit on March 12, 2014, (Case No. 3:14-cv-00908 in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division) after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process.

“Mr. Moorman was subjected to taunts and bullying from his supervisor that made his working conditions intolerable,” said EEOC Senior Trial Attorney Joel Clark. “The EEOC remains committed to prosecuting the rights of workers through litigation in federal court.”

Under the terms of the two-year consent decree settling the case, Wal-Mart will pay $150,000 in relief to Moorman. In addition, Wal-Mart agreed to provide training for employees on the ADA and the ADEA. The training will include an instruction on the kind of conduct that may constitute unlawful discrimination or harassment, as well as an instruction on Wal-Mart’s procedures for handling requests for reasonable accommodations under the ADA. Wal-Mart will also report to the EEOC regarding its compliance with the consent decree and post a notice to employees about the settlement.

“The EEOC is pleased that Wal-Mart recognized the value of resolving this case without any further court action,” said EEOC Dallas District Director Janet Elizondo.

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