Category: Labor & Employment

U.S. Supreme Court Finds a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Implications for Employee Benefit Plan Sponsors

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a historic decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require states to allow same-sex marriage and to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.  The decision comes exactly two years to the day from the Court’s decision in Windsor defining “spouse” to include same-sex spouses for purposes of federal law.

As a result of the Court’s decision, the existing 14 state bans on same-sex marriage are invalid, and same-sex spouses are entitled to all of the rights extended to opposite-sex spouses under both federal and state law.

From an employee benefits perspective, it appears thatObergefell may most significantly impact sponsors ofinsured health and welfare plans in states that currently ban same-sex marriage.  Employers and other plan sponsors in those states will be required to offer insured benefits to same-sex spouses because state insurance law will require that the term “spouse” be interpreted to include them.  Based on government guidance issued following the Windsor decision, it seems unlikely that the decision would have retroactive effect, though such claims are possible.

For sponsors of self-insured benefit plans, a question may exist as to whether Obergefell directly impacts a sponsor’s decision not to provide health coverage to same-sex spouses (because state law does not apply to such plans).  However, it would appear that there would be heightened risks under federal and state discrimination laws for plans that define “spouse” in a manner that is inconsistent with the federal and state definitions, particularly since the Court held that marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and an ERISA preemption defense likely would be weaker in this new climate.

It is also noteworthy that, as a result of the Court’s decision, there will no longer be imputed income for state tax purposes with respect to employer-provided health coverage for same-sex spouses, allowing for consistent administration in all states in which an employer operates.  Since Windsor, there have not been federal tax consequences with respect to these benefits, but some states continued to impute income for state tax purposes.

Finally, with respect to federally-regulated benefits such as qualified retirement plans and Code Section 125 benefits (for example, flexible spending accounts), the Court’s decision does not necessarily warrant any change, since those plans have been required, since Windsor, to recognize same-sex spouses.  Of course, plan language should be reviewed for consistency with the decision, and employers in some states may find that there are new spouses seeking benefits under those plans.  There also will be some administrative and enrollment issues, similar to when Windsor was decided.

Employers, particularly those operating in states that currently ban same-sex marriage, should review their benefit plans and policies and consider whether any changes need to be made in light of Obergefell.  Some employers may also reconsider their domestic partner benefits programs now that same-sex couples have the right to marry and have their marriage recognized across the entire country.

We expect that there will be guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service regarding the employee benefit plan issues that emanate from Obergefell, so stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY Roberta K Chevlowe of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

DOL’s Upcoming Proposed Revisions to the FLSA’s White Collar Exemption Regulations

This month the Department of Labor is expected to propose, for the first time since 2004, revised regulations concerning the executive, administrative, professional, outside sales, and computer exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. These revisions were prompted by President Obama’s March 13, 2014 memorandum to the Secretary of Labor, which stated that the exemptions “have not kept up with our modern economy” and which “direct[ed] [the DOL] to propose revisions to modernize and streamline the existing overtime regulations.” After the memorandum was issued, the agency began writing proposed regulations and announced on May 5, 2015, that it had completed drafting them and had submitted them (as required by Executive Order 12866) to the Office of Management and Budget for review.

Procedurally, the “proposed rules” will be published in the Federal Register (an action known as a “Notice of Public Rulemaking” or “NPRM”) for public comment following the OMB’s review, and the DOL has stated that it expects to take this step this month. After the public comment period closes, the DOL will consider the public comments in drafting “final rules;” submit them for a final review by the OMB; and then publish them in the Federal Register with an effective date on which they become law. Although implementation of the final rules may not occur until well into 2016, traditionally the final rules do not differ substantially from the proposed rules. Accordingly, employers should get a sense this month of what the future regulatory landscape will look like.

So what can we expect from these revisions? As an initial matter, it’s almost certain that the DOL will raise the $455 minimum salary requirement, which hasn’t changed since 2004. With regard to the other revisions, however, the DOL’s drafting process has been opaque, and official pronouncements have been largely limited to the Presidential Memorandum and the DOL’s description of the regulatory action on its Spring 2015 agenda, neither of which provide any specific detail. Nonetheless, unofficial pronouncements (including the Secretary of Labor’s remarks before the International Association of Firefighters on March 18, 2014) have repeatedly stressed the DOL’s position that the current regulations result in too many employees falling under the exemptions, particularly retail managers who spend a large portion of their time performing non-exempt duties. Accordingly, there is speculation that the DOL may eliminate the “concurrent duties” provision of 29 CFR 541.106, which provides that simultaneously performing both exempt and nonexempt duties will not automatically disqualify an otherwise exempt employee from the executive exemption. There is also speculation that the regulations may impose a set percentage cap on the amount of time an exempt employee may spend on non-exempt duties, similar to exemption provisions under some state laws (such as California and Connecticut) and to some provisions of the pre-2004 FLSA regulations.

In any event, one thing is certain – some employees who are properly classified as exempt under the current regulations will no longer be exempt under the new rules. Employers will shortly have a preview of just how drastic these changes will be, and should begin evaluating their compliance with the regulations well in advance of the implementation of the final rules.

ARTICLE BY Dennis M. Mulgrew, Jr. of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
©2015 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

A Look Ahead to The Supreme Court’s 2015-16 Term

As the Supreme Court winds down its 2014-15 term, the Benefits Law Advisor looks ahead to the ERISA cases and issues the Supreme Court may confront in its next terms. The Supreme Court’s recent ERISA jurisprudence has touched on issues such as remedies (CIGNA Corp. v. Amara and US Airways v. McCutchen), retiree entitlement to healthcare benefits (M&G Polymers v. Tackett), time-based defenses to ERISA claims (Tibble v. Edison Int’l and Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins.), and the now-defunct “presumption of prudence” that lower courts had applied to ERISA plans’ decision to offer employer stock as an investment option (Fifth Third Bank v. Dudenhoeffer).

As of this writing, the Court has only granted certiorari in one ERISA case for next year’s term, Montanile v. Board of Trustees, No. 14-723, cert. granted Mar. 30, 2015. The Montanile case arose from the familiar situation where an ERISA plan seeks to recover medical benefits paid to an injured participant, after that participant receives a tort recovery for those injuries. Both lower courts granted summary judgment to the plan, with the additional proviso that the plan could impose an equitable lien (under the terms of the plan) on Montanile’s settlement proceeds, even if those monies have been dissipated.

In granting Montanile’s petition, the Court interprets, once again, the term “equitable relief” in ERISA §502(a)(3) – an issue the Court has addressed has repeatedly revisited. In particular, the Montanile case gives the Court a chance to address an open question from its equitable-remedies jurisprudence: is there an “equitable tracing” requirement that obligates ERISA plaintiffs to identify a specific sum of money that may be the subject of an equitable recovery?

The existence of an equitable-tracing requirement has been hotly debated since at least 2003, when the Court’s decision in Great West Life & Annuity v. Knudson firmly established that equitable relief under ERISA was limited to those forms of relief traditionally available in the courts of equity. Since Knudson, many ERISA defendants have successfully argued that equitable relief was only available where plaintiff could identify a particular asset or sum of money that could be made subject to a restitutionary recovery, constructive trust or equitable lien. As a result, the Court has struggled (in this author’s view) with how to apply traditional “tracing” rules, because the Court’s answer could have far-reaching implications both for plans seeking reimbursement, and for participants invoking ERISA §502(a)(3) for redress in fiduciary-breach claims or other violations of ERISA.

It seems that the Court is ready to answer that question in Montanile, judging from the question presented in the Court’s writ. Another similar case, Elem v. AirTran Airways, No. 14-1061 (cert. pet. filed Feb. 27, 2015). is pending before the Court on the participant’s petition.

Beyond Montanile, the Court has several other writ petitions pending, including three cases where the Court has invited the Solicitor of Labor to weigh in with an amicus brief. These cases include:

  • Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan – In this case, the lower courts dismissed benefits claims on grounds of improper venue. In doing so, the lower courts held that an exclusive-venue provision in the plan required the participant to bring his benefits suit in the specified venue. The Department of Labor (DOL) had submitted an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that venue-selection provisions ran afoul of ERISA’s goal of providing participants with ready access to the courts. The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected DOL’s position and enforced the plan’s venue provision. A Supreme Court decision on this issue would likely be significant, because many plan sponsors are using the plan document to “hard wire” certain defenses to benefits claims – for example, the Court’s recent Heimeshoff decision approved a limitations period established by the plan.
  • Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. – This case presents a pre-emption question – specifically, whether ERISA pre-empts a Vermont law requiring healthcare payors (including ERISA plans) to submit certain claims data to the state. A split panel of the Second Circuit held the Vermont law was pre-empted because it imposed additional reporting requirements on those already imposed by ERISA. At the Court’s invitation, DOL filed an amicus brief opining that ERISA does not pre-empt the Vermont statute because it applies to non-ERISA entities, as well, and does not impose significant reporting burdens. The DOL brief added, however, that the Court’s review was not currently warranted, and suggested that “further percolation” of the issue in the appellate courts would be beneficial. Given that the Court’s last decision on ERISA pre-emption was over 10 years ago, the Court may nevertheless be signaling its readiness to take the case, and to issue further guidance on ERISA’s pre-emptive reach.
  • RJR Pension Inv. Comm. v. Tatum – The Tatum case arose from a dispute over plan fiduciaries’ decision to divert the plan of company stock, at a time when the stock was distressed. After the company stock recovered dramatically, participants asserted ERISA claims that plan fiduciaries had acted imprudently in selling the stock at a time when the price was down significantly. The Fourth Circuit held, among other things, that (1) the burden of proving loss causation shifted to plan fiduciaries, upon a showing that the fiduciaries had breached their duty of prudent investment; and (2) plan fiduciaries must show a hypothetical prudent fiduciary “would have” (as opposed to “could have”) made the same investment decision, where there was no evidence that the plan’s fiduciaries had undertaken robust deliberations before divesting the plan’s holdings in company stock. The Court invited the DOL to brief both issues. If the Court takes the case, its decision could be significant. On the former issue, a decision from the Court would resolve diverging lower-court decisions on whether the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof (including loss causation), or whether the burden-shifting approach of trust law – requiring a trustee, upon a showing of a breach of duty, to demonstrate that the breach did not cause the loss – is more appropriate for ERISA cases. On the latter issue, a decision from the Court could provide much-needed guidance on the proper scope of judicial review of fiduciary decision-making.

Although the Court has taken no action yet on the petition, it may be worth watching to see whether the Court takes up the case of UnitedHealthcare of Arizona, Inc. v. Spinedex Physical Therapy USA, Inc., No. 14-1286 (cert. pet. filed April 24, 2015). There, the Ninth Circuit held that a claims administrator is a proper party defendant in a medical benefits claim, even though it otherwise had no obligation as the benefits payer. Because ERISA §502(a)(1)(B) only authorizes suit for “benefits due … under the terms of his plan,” the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute – which purports to make claims administrators liable for benefits in a manner not contemplated by “the terms of the plan” – clearly seems overbroad. If left unaddressed, the Spinedexdecision could ultimately prove counter-productive, in that it will inevitably raise costs for service providers, which in turn, will be passed along to the plans, and ultimately to the participants in the form of higher premiums, larger deductibles, or less-generous coverage.

The Supreme Court has demonstrated some enthusiasm for ERISA in recent years. The Montanile case represents a significant beginning to the Court’s ERISA work for the next term. Given the cases and issues before it, however, the odds are that the Court will consider more ERISA cases in the next twelve months.

This post was written with contributions from William H. Payne IV.

ARTICLE BY Charles F. Seemann III of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Colorado Employers Can Fire Workers for Off-Duty Medical Marijuana Use

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled on June 15, 2015, that an employee can be fired for using medical marijuana even though the drug is legal in Colorado and the employee was not at work at the time. The unanimous decision upholds lower courts’ opinions that an employer has the right to terminate an employee for violating a company’s zero-tolerance policy for controlled substances, despite a Colorado law protecting employees from being punished for legal, off-duty activities.

This decision is significant because it confirms an employer’s right to terminate an employee who violates a company’s drug policy, notwithstanding Colorado’s legalization of marijuana. Colorado is one of only four states to date to legalize marijuana for both medical and recreational use. The Court’s ruling, which is similar to a California decision, provides support and guidance for non-Colorado employers who may have employees travelling to Colorado for work or recreation. Other states are in various stages of considering legalizing medical and/or recreational marijuana.

At issue before the state’s highest court was a suit filed by Brandon Coats, a former employee of Dish Network, LLC, whose employment had been terminated by Dish after a random drug test revealed the presence of THC, the psychoactive chemical in marijuana, in Coats’ system. Coats was a registered medical marijuana patient who consumed medical marijuana at home, and after work, and in accordance with his license and Colorado state law.

In his suit against Dish for wrongful termination, Coats argued that the company violated Colorado’s “lawful activities statute,” which makes it an unfair and discriminatory labor practice to discharge an employee based on the employee’s “lawful” outside-of-work activities. Dish filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Coats’ medical marijuana use was not lawful for purposes of the statute under either federal or state law. The trial court granted Dish’s motion and dismissed Coats’ claim.

The Colorado Court of Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Coats’ lawsuit, but on a different ground. It found that because the use of marijuana is prohibited under the federal Controlled Substances Act, Coats’ conduct was not a “lawful activity” protected by the Colorado statute. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that “lawful” for purposes of Colorado’s “lawful activities statute” means activities that comply with applicable law, including state and federal law. Because Coats’ use of medical marijuana was unlawful under federal law, it was not protected under the Colorado statute.

ARTICLE BY Kimberly A. Smiley, Bradley M. Bakker, John P. Hasman, Jeremy M. Brenner, Shelley I. Ericsson & Bradley S. Byars of Armstrong Teasdale
Eric Walters and Calvin Matthews also contributed to this article.
© Copyright 2015 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved

United Airlines to Pay over $1 Million To Settle EEOC Disability Lawsuit

In a case that garnered nationwide attention, air transportation giant United Airlines Inc. has agreed to pay more than $1 million and implement changes to settle a federal disability lawsuit filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency announced today.U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Seal

The EEOC’s lawsuit charged that United’s competitive transfer policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The law requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee or job applicant with a disability, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship for the employer. By requiring workers with disabilities to compete for vacant positions for which they were qualified and which they needed in order to continue working, the company’s practice frequently prevented employees with disabilities from continuing employment with United, the EEOC said.

The consent decree settling the suit, signed by Hon. Judge Harry Leinenweber and entered today, requires United to pay $1,000,040 to a small class of former United employees with disabilities and to make changes nationally. United will revise its ADA reassignment policy, train employees with supervisory or human resource responsibilities regarding the policy changes, and provide reports to the EEOC regarding disabled employees who were denied a position as part of the ADA reassignment process.

This resolution concludes a lengthy and complicated lawsuit. Although the EEOC originally filed the lawsuit on June 3, 2009 in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California – San Francisco, United successfully moved for a change of venue to the Northern District of Illinois. Bound by an earlier precedent which held that a competitive transfer policy similar to United’s policy did not violate the ADA, the lower court dismissed the EEOC’s case in February 2011.  However, in a decision reviewed by the full court, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the EEOC that EEOC v. Humiston Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000) “did not survive” an intervening Supreme Court decision, U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).  The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal and found that “the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer assign employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to the employer.” The Supreme Court refused United’s subsequent request for review on May 28, 2013. EEOC Appellate Attorney Barbara Sloan handled the appeal and Supreme Court briefing for the agency.

“The appellate court’s decision provided an important clarification regarding an employer’s responsibility under the ADA to provide a reasonable accommodation so qualified employees may lead economically independent lives,” said EEOC General Counsel David Lopez. “I am pleased this major decision also served as a springboard for the strong monetary and non-monetary remedies in today’s resolution.”

EEOC Regional Attorney William Tamayo said, “If a disability prevents an employee from returning to work in his or her current position, an employer must consider reassignment. As the Seventh Circuit’s decision highlights, requiring the employee to compete for positions falls short of the ADA’s requirements. Employers should take note: When all other accommodations fail, consider whether your employee can fill a vacant position for which he or she is qualified.”

EEOC San Francisco Acting District Director Michael Connolly noted, “We commend United for agreeing to make these important companywide changes that will enable employees with disabilities to stay employed at jobs they are qualified to do, as was intended under the ADA’s protections.”

According to the company website, United Airlines has almost 84,000 employees in every U.S. state and in many countries around the world. The air carrier has the world’s most comprehensive route network, including U.S. mainland hubs in Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, New York / Newark, San Francisco and Washington, D.C. and operates an average of nearly 5,000 flights a day to 373 airports across six continents.

The EEOC enforces federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Further information about the EEOC is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.

ARTICLE BY U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
© Copyright U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

New York City Council Passes Ban-the-Box Legislation

Joining many other jurisdictions, the New York City Council has passed the Fair Chance Act, an ordinance restricting when employer inquiries about applicants’ criminal histories may be made during the application process and imposing significant obligations on employers who intend to take action based on such information.

The Council passed the ordinance on June 10, 2015. The ordinance will become effective 120 days after receiving Mayor Bill de Blasio’s signature, which is expected shortly, as the Mayor has expressed support for the legislation.

Like other ban-the-box laws, the ordinance generally prohibits an employer with at least four employees from making an inquiry about an applicant’s pending arrest or criminal conviction record until after a conditional offer of employment has been extended. Limited exceptions are provided.

Under the ordinance’s definition of inquiry, employers are prohibited not only from asking an applicant prohibited questions — verbally or in writing — but also are prohibited from searching publicly available sources to obtain information about an applicant’s criminal history.

Exceptions

The main exception applies when an employer, under applicable federal, state, or local law, is required to conduct criminal background checks for employment purposes or to bar employment in a particular position based on criminal history.

Other exceptions remove prospective police officers, peace officers, and law enforcement agency and other law-enforcement-related employees from coverage. Therefore, these are unlikely to affect positions and employers in the private sector.

Notification Process

Employers who make inquiries into an applicant’s criminal history after a conditional offer of employment has been extended and determine that the information warrants an adverse employment action must follow a rigorous process. Specifically, employers must:

  1. Provide the applicant with a “written copy of the inquiry” which complies with the City’s Commission on Human Right’s required (but not-yet-issued) format;

  2. Perform the analysis required by Article 23(a) of the New York Correction Law, “Licensure and Employment of Persons Previously Convicted of One or More Criminal Offenses”;

  3. Provide the applicant with a copy of its analysis, also in a manner which complies with the Commission’s required format, which includes supporting documents and an explanation of the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action; and

  4. Allow the applicant at least three business days to respond to the written analysis by holding the position open during this time.

Of course, for employers who conduct background checks through consumer reporting agencies, if such information is obtained from a background check, the above process must be integrated with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) pre-adverse action requirements.

Supporters view the ordinance as ending discrimination against applicants with low-level arrests and providing assurance that applicants will be considered solely based on their qualifications. Critics see the ordinance as adding to the already-onerous mandates imposed on employers in New York City by favoring ideology over practicality, sending a bad message to employers doing business — or desiring to do business — in New York City.

The one undeniable fact is that all covered New York City employers must develop measures to ensure compliance with the ordinance.

ARTICLE BY Richard Greenberg, Daniel J. Jacobs, Susan M. Corcoran, Christopher M. Valentino & Ellen Bandel of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Proposed Labor Violation Reporting Rules Target Government Contractors

Proposal makes agency allegations of employment law violations reportable events that could result in denial of federal contracts or termination of existing contracts.

Executive Order 13673 (the Order), signed by US President Barack Obama in July 2014, imposed three new requirements addressing the labor and employment practices of federal contractors and subcontractors: (1) an obligation to report employment law violations, which would be used by contracting officers to determine whether to award a new federal contract or terminate an existing contract; (2) a requirement to provide notices to workers about their Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exemption or independent contractor status; and (3) a requirement that federal contractors agree that claims arising under Title VII or any tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment by their employees and independent contractors will not be arbitrated without the voluntary postdispute consent of an employee or independent contractor, with certain limited exceptions.

E.O. 13673 directed the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council)—which consists of the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, and the Administrator of General Services—to publish implementing regulations through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system. The Order also directed the Department of Labor (DOL) to publish guidelines that address transactions deemed to be reportable employment law violations, as well as how contracting officials should use such reported information to determine whether to award a federal contract (or terminate an existing contract). The Order, while effective upon issuance, expressly applies to all solicitations for contracts only as set forth in any final rule issued by the FAR Council.

On May 28, 2015, the FAR Council published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking implementing E.O 13673.[1] On the same day, the DOL published proposed guidance.[2] The proposed rule and guidelines contain many potentially alarming provisions for employers seeking federal contracts, some of which appear to violate contractors’ due process and Fourth Amendment rights. If adopted, the proposals would impose administrative burdens on contractors, increase the complexity of obtaining and keeping federal contracts, and likely lead to an increase in bid protests and litigation.

The proposals offer employers a 60-day period to submit comments in opposition to these provisions. We strongly encourage employers that have or may seek federal contracts to take advantage of this comment opportunity. If you are interested in sponsoring comments, please contact us in the near future; the period for filing comments only runs through July 27, 2015.

Proposed Implementation of the Employment Violation Reporting Obligations

E.O. 13673 requires employers who are prospective awardees of federal contracts to report certain labor law violations that occurred within the prior three years. Awardees of federal contracts must submit reports of labor law violations every six months during the performance of the contract. The reportable violations include “administrative merits determinations,” “arbitral awards or decisions,” and “civil judgments” involving claims or enforcement actions under many federal employment laws.[3]

The proposed guidelines define “administrative merits determinations” by reference to the specific types of determinations made by a federal enforcement agency, such as the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Reportable determinations also include, broadly, complaints that a federal enforcement agency files and administrative orders issued through agency adjudication. However, complaints that private parties file with enforcement agencies or in court alleging employment law violations would not trigger a reporting obligation.

Under the proposed guidance, “administrative merits determinations are not limited to notices and findings issued following adversarial or adjudicative proceedings such as a hearing, nor are they limited to notices and findings that are final and unappealable.” Thus, contractors will be required to report mere agency allegations, such as OSHA citations, WHD investigation finding letters, OFCCP show cause notices, EEOC reasonable cause determinations, and NLRB complaints. These disclosures are required even if a contractor is challenging an allegation through formal proceedings. If, at the time of the required reporting, the enforcement agency allegation is withdrawn or reversed in its entirety through additional proceedings in the matter, then there is no reporting obligation.

The DOL will publish additional proposed guidelines that address administrative determinations that state enforcement agencies make under laws that DOL deems to be equivalent to the above-referenced federal laws.

The proposed DOL guidelines define “civil judgments” as any judgment or order entered by any federal or state court in which the court determined that an employer violated any provision of the above-referenced employment laws or enjoined the employer from committing a violation. Civil judgments include orders or judgments that are not final and are appealable, and the employer must report such judgments even if an appeal is pending. Consent judgments are subject to the reporting obligation if they contain a determination that an employment violation occurred or enjoin the employer from violating any provision of the employment laws. However, a private lawsuit that a court dismissed without a judgment would not be a reportable event.

The proposed DOL guidelines define “arbitral awards and decisions” as any award or order by an arbitrator or arbitral panel in which the arbitrator or panel determined that an employer violated any provision of the above-referenced employment laws or enjoined the employer from committing a violation. Arbitral awards include awards and orders that are not final and are appealable, and the employer must report such judgments even if an appeal is pending. Arbitral awards and orders must be reported even if they are subject to a confidentiality agreement.

Under the proposed DOL guidelines, the same alleged violation may trigger several successive reporting obligations. Each transaction must be reported even if the same alleged violation was the basis for a prior report. For example, where an initial agency allegation was reported, the same allegation must later be reported if it is sustained through an administrative order, and must be reported yet again if a federal court affirms it in a review action. However, if the initial reported transaction is reversed or vacated in its entirety through later proceedings, there is no obligation to continue to report the initial transaction in any future contract bid.

The proposed FAR regulations simply incorporate the DOL guidelines by reference and do not modify or expand on the definitions regarding reportable events.

Mechanics of the Contracting Process Under the Proposed FAR Rule

Prior to awarding a government contract, a contracting officer is required to make an affirmative responsibility determination that includes a determination that the apparent successful offeror or bidder has a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics. The proposed rule requires that the contracting officer consider a prospective contractor’s labor violations in determining whether that contractor has a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics. Under the proposed FAR rule, all employers bidding on a federal contract would initially provide a representation that there have been or have not been reportable employment law violations. Thereafter, once the contracting officer has initiated a responsibility determination for the prospective contractor, if the employer has indicated covered employment law violations, that employer would be required to enter detailed information describing the violations in the System for Award Management (SAM), including (1) the employment law that was allegedly violated; (2) the relevant matter or case number; (3) the date that the determination, judgment, award, or decision was rendered; and (4) the name of the court, arbitrator(s), or agency that rendered the decision. Further, the contracting officer would be required to solicit from the employer additional information that the prospective contractor views as necessary to establish affirmatively its responsibility, such as mitigating circumstances; remedial measures, including labor compliance agreements; and other steps taken to comply with labor laws.

The contracting officer would review the data provided, and, in consultation with agency Labor Contract Advisors, would determine whether the employer is a responsible source eligible to receive the federal contract. The proposals contemplate that most entities would not be deemed nonresponsible, but instead would be required to agree to a “labor compliance agreement” as a condition of award of the federal contract. The proposals provide little discussion or framework for labor compliance agreements, apparently vesting broad authority in enforcement agencies, the DOL, agency Labor Contract Advisors, and contracting officers to develop, negotiate, and monitor such agreements. Employers should pay particular attention to these proposals because they would place powers in the hands of federal regulators to extract extra-legal “remedial actions” by leveraging an award or continuation of federal contracts. The outlook for those prospective offerors found nonresponsible is equally grim; the likelihood of successfully challenging contracting officer responsibility determinations in the procurement process is very low given the high level of deference accorded such determinations by both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Court of Federal Claims (COFC). Moreover, because the proposed regulation’s definition of “administrative merits determinations” effectively includes notices or findings that amount to little more than alleged violations, it is unclear whether GAO or the COFC could readily find a determination of nonresponsibility to be without a rational basis, even if that decision was predicated on alleged violations that, after contract award, may not be proven.

Post-Award Implications of Labor Violations

Employers awarded contracts would be required to enter current information regarding labor violations in SAM on a semi-annual basis. If, based on this information, the Labor Contract Advisor determines that further consideration or action is warranted… click to continue reading Proposed Labor Violation Reporting Rules Target Government Contractors

ARTICLE BY

William E. Doyle, Jr. & E. Ruscus of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

WTF? NLRB’s OK with “Cut the Crap?” – Protected Speech Under the NLRA

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has yet again undercut employers’ efforts to limit profane and vulgar language by workers finding vulgar buttons and stickers to be protected speech under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

NLRB

In Pacific Bell Telephone Company and Nevada Bell Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T and Communication Workers of America, Case # 20–CA–080400, the board ruled that the two companies violated the NLRA when they attempted to block workers from wearing buttons and stickers containing the phrase “Cut the Crap” and the abbreviation “WTF.”

The buttons and stickers read “WTF Where’s the Fairness,” “FTW Fight to Win” and “Cut the Crap! Not My Healthcare.” In overturning an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) prior ruling and holding 2-1 that the buttons and stickers were protected speech, the board majority found the language not to be so profane as to lose protection of the Act, particularly where the “WTF” and “FTW” buttons and stickers “provided a nonprofane, nonoffensive interpretation on their face.”

The board’s final order in the case barred the two companies from maintaining and enforcing an overbroad rule which banned these employees from wearing the union-provided pins and stickers. The companies were further ordered to cease and desist from refusing to let employees work unless they removed this union insignia.

The case is the latest in a series of cases in which the board is making it very clear that a wide variety of foul, vulgar and otherwise offensive language remains protected speech and does not lose its protection under the Act when the language is used in the context of concerted activity. In the Plaza Auto Center, Inc., Hooters, and Starbucks cases, the Board also condoned extremely offensive language and overturned decisions to terminate employees.

Employers who are considering discipline or termination of employees for foul, vulgar and/or offensive language must step carefully given this series of decisions. You must first make certain that the language used could not be considered to have been part of a discussion or interchange with the employee that could be viewed as concerted activity.

ARTICLE BY Gerald F. Lutkus of Barnes & Thornburg LLP
© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

U.S. Supreme Court: Request for Religious Accommodation Not Necessary to Trigger Discrimination Liability

The U.S. Supreme Court decided the widely publicized case filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Abercrombie & Fitch (Abercrombie), in which a Muslim female applicant who wore a headscarf was denied employment with Abercrombie based on the company’s dress code policy. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, U.S. Supreme Court, No.14-86 (June 1, 2015).

Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for employment with Abercrombie. She came to the interview wearing a headscarf. The assistant store manager rated Elauf as qualified for the position, but expressed concern to her superiors that Elauf’s headscarf would violate Abercrombie’s Look Policy, which prohibits the wearing of “caps.” The term “caps” is not defined in the policy. The assistant manager also informed her superiors that she believed Elauf’s headscarf was worn pursuant to her religion. The district manager directed that Elauf be denied employment, because the headscarf would violate the Look Policy, just as any other headgear would, whether worn for religious reasons or not.

The EEOC filed suit against Abercrombie. The district court entered judgment in favor of Elauf, and a trial on damages resulted in a $20,000 award to Elauf. Abercrombie appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which reversed the district court and entered summary judgment in favor of Abercrombie. Elauf appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to deny employment to an applicant because the employer desires to avoid extending reasonable accommodation based on the applicant’s religious beliefs. In this case, Abercrombie argued that this prohibition applies only when the applicant requests a religious accommodation or otherwise notifies the employer of the need for an accommodation. In this case, Elauf did not at any time make a request for reasonable accommodation, and therefore, argued Abercrombie, she cannot prove that Abercrombie had knowledge of the need for accommodation, which should be a prerequisite to proving religious discrimination.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that an applicant or employee need not necessarily show that the employer had actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation, only that the need for an accommodation was a “motivating factor” in the employment decision. The Court drew a distinction between the statutory language of the Americans with Disabilities Act’s accommodation provisions, which discusses an employer’s obligations with respect to “known physical or mental limitations” (emphasis added), and with the language of Title VII’s religious accommodation provision, which is silent on the knowledge requirement. According to the Court, the rule for a failure to accommodate claim under Title VII’s religious discrimination provision is “straightforward”: an employer may not consider an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, as a factor in employment decisions. The Court’s opinion offers an example of an employer who assumes that an orthodox Jew who applies for employment will need Saturdays off for the Sabbath. If the employer acts on this assumption and denies the applicant employment because of it, Title VII would be violated, regardless of whether the applicant ever make a request for Saturdays off or otherwise stated a request for accommodation.

While the Court noted that an employee’s request for religious accommodation may make it easier to prove it was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, it is not a necessary component to the claim. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision awarding summary judgment to Abercrombie, despite the fact that Elauf never made a request for an accommodation.

Speculation About Accommodation May Be Enough

This decision has potentially far reaching effects. The Supreme Court has made clear that an individual need not use specific words or terminology relating to the need for religious accommodation, or even make a request at all, in order for liability for failure to accommodate to arise. Whether the need for accommodation is actually known, or merely speculated, assumed, or otherwise factored into an adverse employment decision, liability can arise — even if the need has not been expressed or substantiated at the time of the employment decision.

ARTICLE BY Julie Furer Stahr of Schiff Hardin LLP
© 2015 Schiff Hardin LLP

Employer’s Use of DNA Test to Catch Employee Engaging in Inappropriate Workplace Behavior Violates Federal Law

If someone continually, yet anonymously, defecated on the floor of your workplace, you’d probably want to use any and all legal means at your disposal to identify and discipline the perpetrator.  Your methods might include surveillance or perhaps some form of forensic or other testing to link the offensive conduct to a specific individual.  You would probably not be overly concerned that your efforts to rid the workplace of this malefactor might give rise to a discrimination claim, but is that really a safe assumption?

Background

In a case exemplifying the gentility of labor-management relations, a Georgia federal court grappled with how far an employer may go in this situation.  In Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services, LLC, (N.D.Ga. May 5, 2015), the employer, Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services (Atlanta), LLC, which provides long-haul transportation and storage services for the grocery industry, discovered in 2012 that one or more employees had been using a common area in one of its warehouses as a lavatory.  As part of its investigation into this matter, the company retained the services of a DNA testing lab and requested cheek swabs from two employees it considered suspects so that it could compare their DNA with that of the mystery defecator.  After Atlas determined that neither employee was responsible for the unwelcome contributions to its workplace, the employees filed a lawsuit alleging that the company violated the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) by requesting and requiring them to provide genetic information.

GINA prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics and makes it unlawful for an employer to request, require or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee.

The Court Finds Atlas Violated GINA

The court held that Atlas’ argument that GINA only prohibited genetic testing that revealed an individual’s propensity for disease – which the test in this case did not do – was inconsistent with the statute’s text and legislative history as well as the applicable EEOC regulation.  In the court’s view, this argument “render[ed] other language in GINA superfluous.”  In particular, the court noted that the statute contained specific exceptions permitting certain testing that did not involve an individual’s propensity for disease, and if testing revealing a propensity for disease were the only prohibited testing, then those exceptions would not have been necessary.  The court further rejected Atlas’ argument that GINA’s legislative history demonstrated an intent to limit violations to testing that revealed a propensity for disease, explaining that although a group of senators favored this interpretation during the legislative debate, all of the evidence indicated that Congress chose to reject this view in favor of a broad construction.  Finally, the court held that an EEOC regulation listing eight examples of “genetic tests” did not support Atlas’ narrow definition of that term because the list included testing that also did not relate to one’s propensity for disease and, therefore, “would go beyond the scope of the statute” if the law were as narrow as Atlas claimed.

Conclusion

This case’s distasteful facts, which will undoubtedly remind many human resource specialists how coarse employee relations challenges often are in practice, should not distract employers that currently perform DNA tests from the fact that GINA may apply more broadly than some initially believed.  Although the decision should not have a significant impact on the narrow range of situations where workplace DNA testing is a legitimate practice, such as those involving health and safety concerns, it should serve as notice to employers investigating misconduct that they should find methods other than DNA testing to identify culpable employees.

ARTICLE BY George M. Patterson of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
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