Upstream and Affiliate Guaranties in NAV Loans

Guaranties are a common feature in fund finance transactions. Particularly in NAV loans, upstream and affiliate (or “sideways”) guaranties are used. Below we discuss some of the context for the use of these types of guaranties, as well as some of the issues that lenders should consider in relying on them.

Upstream Guaranties

It is not uncommon in NAV loan transactions for the borrower to hold the underwritten assets for the financing (i.e., the fund’s portfolio of investments) through one or more controlled subsidiary holding vehicles (each, a “HoldCo”). Lenders may take a pledge of the management and economic interests in the HoldCos (rather than the underlying investments). In order to get as close to the underlying investments as possible (without taking a pledge), lenders may require that a HoldCo issue a guaranty directly to the lenders (or the administrative agent, on behalf of the lenders), guaranteeing the borrower’s obligations under the NAV loan facility. This “upstream” guaranty provides the lenders a direct claim against the HoldCo for amounts due under the loan, mitigating some of the risk of structural subordination to potential creditors (expected or unexpected) at the level of the HoldCo.[1]

Affiliate Guaranties

It is also common in NAV loan facilities for the borrower’s portfolio of investments to be held by multiple subsidiaries and/or affiliates of the borrower. Each such subsidiary or affiliate may be designated as a guarantor for repayment of the loan. As a result, such entities end up guaranteeing the obligations of their affiliates. The purpose of these affiliate guaranties is the same as the upstream guaranties discussed above – namely, to provide the lenders with a more direct enforcement claim in a default scenario.

Use of Such Guaranties

Motivations for the use of such upstream and affiliate guaranties may include:

a lender’s desire to underwrite a broader portfolio of investments, mitigating concentration risk to the portfolio of a single holding entity;
a lender’s desire to ensure that it is not subordinate to creditors that may arise at the level of the entity that directly owns the investment; or
a borrower’s desire to obtain a higher loan-to-value ratio than the lenders would otherwise provide based on the investments alone.
While upstream and affiliate guaranties can help to address these issues, they may raise nuanced legal issues that should be discussed with counsel in light of the relevant facts and circumstances.

Enforceability Considerations

Guaranties constitute the assumption of the liabilities of another entity and are contingent claims against the guarantor. Under certain insolvency laws, guaranties may be subject to challenge, and payments under guaranties may be subject to avoidance. Upstream or affiliate guaranties may be subject to heightened scrutiny and challenge in a bankruptcy or distress scenario. Below are a few potential issues lenders should bear in mind with respect to upstream and affiliate guaranties.

1. Constructively Fraudulent Transfer Avoidance. Under Bankruptcy Code section 548 and certain state laws, (a) transfers of property (including grants of security interests or liens), or (b) obligations assumed (such as incurring a loan or guaranty obligation) may be avoided as constructively fraudulent if BOTH of the following requirements are satisfied:[2]

  • (i) the transferor/guarantor does not receive reasonably equivalent value; AND
  • (ii) the transferor/guarantor is insolvent or undercapitalized or rendered insolvent, undercapitalized or unable to pay its debts because of the transfer or the assumed liability.

A guaranty by a parent of the obligations of a wholly owned and solvent subsidiary, a so-called downstream guaranty, is generally regarded as providing the parent with reasonably equivalent value through an enhancement of the value of its equity ownership of the subsidiary.

Upstream and affiliate guaranties require more scrutiny than guaranties by a borrower parent to determine whether any potential enforceability issues are present.

a. Reasonably Equivalent Value. The determination of value is not formulaic or mechanical, but rather generally determined by the substance of the transaction. Value or benefits from a transfer may be direct (e.g., receipt of loan proceeds) or indirect. But if indirect, they must be “fairly concrete.”

In each of the above scenarios, we are assuming that the upstream or affiliate guarantor would not use the proceeds of any loans and, consequently, would not be added to the loan facility as a borrower. However, other indirect but tangible benefits or value to the guarantor should be identified, e.g., favorable loan terms or amendments, use of the NAV facility proceeds that may indirectly but materially benefit the guarantor, maintenance of the entire fund group of entities that benefits the guarantor, etc.

b. Financial Condition of Guarantor. The financial condition of the transferor/guarantor is evaluated at the time of the incurrence of the guaranty. The evaluation is made from the debtor/guarantor – in what condition was the guarantor left after giving effect to the transfer or assumption of the obligation. Diligence regarding a guarantor’s financial condition may demonstrate that such guarantor is sufficiently creditworthy to undertake the guaranty and remain solvent and able to conduct its respective businesses. Representations from the guarantor may be sought to confirm its financial condition.

c. Potential Mitigants. In addition to performing diligence with respect to the above points, lenders and their counsel will often include contractual provisions to mitigate the possibility that a guaranty may be found to constitute a fraudulent transfer. Savings clauses, limited recourse guaranties, and net worth guaranties are all tools that can be used to address the issues noted above. The scope and appropriateness of such provisions is beyond the scope of this article and should be discussed with external deal and restructuring counsel.

2. Preference Challenge. Under Bankruptcy Code section 547, a transfer made by a debtor to a creditor, on account of an antecedent debt, that is made while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before the bankruptcy case has been commenced may be subject to avoidance as a preferential transfer. Certain defenses may apply to a potential preferential transfer, including the simultaneous exchange of “new value” by the creditor. However, note that any pre-bankruptcy transfers of value, like payments under a guaranty, may be subject to scrutiny and potential challenge by the guarantor/debtor or a bankruptcy trustee.

Guaranties can be an important element in structuring NAV loan transactions to achieve the terms desired by the parties and to provide necessary protections for the lenders, but consideration needs to be given to the legal issues, such as the ones mentioned here, that their inclusion can present.

[1] Lenders will typically also require the HoldCo to pledge its accounts to which proceeds of the underlying investments are paid, allowing lenders to foreclose on such cash at the HoldCo level, without the need for such cash to first be distributed up to the borrower.

[2] Note that the precise language of certain state fraudulent transfer laws may differ, but conceptually, most state statutes require a showing of (i) insufficient or unreasonably small consideration in exchange for the transfer or liability incurred, and (ii) the transferor/debtor being insolvent at the time of the transfer, or becoming insolvent or subject to financial distress as a result of the transfer.

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Regulatory Update and Recent SEC Actions

REGULATORY UPDATES

Recent SEC Leadership Changes

On January 10, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) announced the appointment of Cristina Martin Firvida as director of the Office of the Investor Advocate, effective January 17, 2023. Ms. Martin Firvida was most recently the vice president of financial security and livable communities for government affairs at the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”). As the investor advocate, Ms. Martin Firvida will lead the office that assists retail investors in interactions with the SEC and with self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), analyzing the impact on investors of proposed rules and regulations, identifying problems that investors have with financial service providers and investment products, and proposing legislative or regulatory changes to promote the interests of investors.

On January 11, 2023, the SEC announced that Paul Munter has been appointed as chief accountant. He has served as acting chief accountant since January 2021. In addition to continuing to lead the Office of the Chief Accountant (“OCA”), he will also assist the SEC in its oversight of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”). Mr. Munter joined the SEC in 2019 as deputy chief accountant in charge of OCA’s international work. Before joining the agency, Mr. Munter was a senior instructor of accounting at the University of Colorado Boulder. He had previously retired from KPMG, where he served as the lead technical partner for the U.S. firm’s international accounting and International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) activities and served on the firm’s panel responsible for establishing firm positions on the application of IFRS.

On January 13, 2023, the SEC announced that Renee Jones, director of the Division of Corporation Finance, departed the agency and was replaced by Erik Gerding, effective February 2, 2023. Mr. Gerding previously served as the Division’s deputy director. Mr. Gerding joined the SEC in October 2021 and led the Legal and Regulatory Policy in the Division of Corporation Finance. He has taught as professor of law and a Wolf-Nichol Fellow at the University of Colorado Law School, where he has focused in the areas of securities law, corporate law, and financial regulation. Mr. Gerding previously taught at the University of New Mexico School of Law. He also practiced in the New York and Washington, D.C., offices of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, representing clients in the financial services and technology industries in an array of financial transactions and regulatory matters.

Boards File Comment Letters Asking SEC to Withdraw Swing Pricing Rule Proposal

Over thirty (30) fund boards have submitted comment letters to the SEC with respect to the controversial swing pricing rule proposal. Industry participants have noted that this level of direct board participation in the comment process for a rule proposal of this type is unprecedented in recent SEC history. Many of the letters call for a withdrawal of the rule proposal, with some arguing that millions of American investors will not get the best price for their trades. Many letters also stated that requiring swing pricing would burden fund complexes and harm mutual fund investors without solving the liquidity problems that the SEC aimed to resolve. A vast majority of the comment letters indicated that swing pricing is not needed and that current tools for managing liquidity worked well, even during the volatile 2020 markets.

The comment letters also noted that investors who hold fund shares through intermediaries may have to place their orders earlier as a result of the proposed hard close requirement, which would put them at a disadvantage over the investors who buy shares directly from a fund. Several commenters also expressed concern that the hard close could cause intermediaries to drop mutual funds from their offerings in favor of less-regulated investment vehicles, such as collective investment trusts (“CITs”). Some letters pointed out that one of the justifications the SEC raises for the new rule is the market volatility during the early part of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on fund liquidity risk management, yet the SEC then goes on to say that it did not have specific data about fund dilution during that period. Letters also alleged that the SEC did not provide an accurate cost benefit analysis, and noted that the SEC states in the rule proposal that it “cannot predict the number of investors that would choose to keep their investments in the mutual fund sector nor the number of investors that would exit mutual funds and instead invest in other fund structures such as ETFs, close-end funds, or CITs.”

SEC Proposes Rule to Prohibit Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations

The SEC issued a proposed rule (the “proposed rule”) to prohibit material conflicts of interest in the sale of asset-backed securities (“ABS”). The proposed rule, Rule 192 under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), was issued on January 25, 2023, to implement Section 27B of the Securities Act, a provision added by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). Specifically, the proposed rule would prohibit securitization participants from engaging in certain transactions that could incentivize a securitization participant to structure an ABS in a way that would put the securitization participant’s interests ahead of those of ABS investors. The SEC originally proposed a rule to implement Section 27B in September 2011. If adopted, the proposed rule would prohibit an underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor of an ABS, including affiliates or subsidiaries of those entities, from engaging, directly or indirectly, in any transaction that would involve or result in any material conflict of interest between the securitization participant and an investor in such ABS. Under the proposed rule, such transactions would be considered “conflicted transactions” and include, for example, a short sale of the ABS or the purchase of a credit default swap or other credit derivative that entitles the securitization participant to receive payments upon the occurrence of specified credit events in respect of the ABS.

The prohibition on conflicted transactions would commence on the date on which a person has reached, or has taken substantial steps to reach, an agreement that such person will become a securitization participant with respect to an ABS, and it would end one year after the date of the first closing of the sale of the relevant ABS. The proposed rule would provide certain exceptions for risk-mitigating hedging activities, bona fide market-making activities, and certain commitments by a securitization participant to provide liquidity for the relevant ABS. The public comment period will remain open for 60 days following publication of the proposing release on the SEC’s website or 30 days following publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register, whichever period is longer.

Division of Examinations Publishes Risk Alert on Regulation Best Interest

On January 30, 2023, the Division of Examinations published a Risk Alert (the “Risk Alert”) to highlight observations from examinations related to Regulation Best Interest, which had a June 30, 2020, compliance date and to assist broker-dealers in reviewing and enhancing their compliance programs related to Regulation Best Interest. The Risk Alert discusses deficiencies noted during examinations conducted, as well as examples of weak practices that could result in deficiencies. Regulation Best Interest established a new, enhanced standard of conduct under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) for broker-dealers (“broker-dealers” or “firms”) and associated persons that are natural persons (“financial professionals”) of a broker-dealer when making recommendations of securities transactions or investment strategies involving securities (including account recommendations) to retail customers. Regulation Best Interest requires compliance with four component obligations: (1) providing certain prescribed disclosure, before or at the time of the recommendation, about the recommendation and the relationship between the retail customer and the broker-dealer (“Disclosure Obligation”); (2) exercising reasonable diligence, care, and skill in making the recommendation to, among other things, understand the potential risks, rewards, and costs associated with a recommendation, and having a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is in the best interest of a retail customer (“Care Obligation”); (3) establishing, maintaining, and enforcing written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and address conflicts of interest; and (4) establishing, maintaining, and enforcing written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with Regulation Best Interest. The Risk Alert set out specific examples of practices, policies, and procedures that were deficient in complying with requirements under the Regulation, including:

  • Policies and Procedures Relating to the Disclosure Obligation. Some broker-dealers did not have written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the Disclosure Obligation. The SEC noted that examples of policies and procedures that may contain deficiencies or weaknesses include policies and procedures that did not specify when or how disclosures should be created or updated.
  • Policies and Procedures Relating to the Care Obligation. Examples of policies and procedures that may contain deficiencies or weaknesses include policies and procedures that directed financial professionals to consider reasonably available alternatives without providing any guidance as to how to do so; directed financial professionals to consider costs without providing any guidance as to how to do so; or created systems that allowed financial professionals to evaluate costs or reasonably available alternatives but did not mandate their use or, in some instances, could not determine whether or not financial professionals used the systems.
  • Conflict of Interest. The SEC observed a number of deficiencies related to the requirement that broker-dealers have written policies and procedures reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest associated with their recommendations to retail customers. For example: some broker-dealers did not have written policies and procedures reasonably designed to specify how conflicts are to be identified or addressed; some broker-dealers limited the identified conflicts to conflicts associated with prohibited activities (e.g., churning) or used high-level, generic language that did not identify the actual conflict (e.g., “we have conflicts related to compensation differences”) and did not reflect all conflicts of interest associated with the recommendations made by the firm or its financial professionals; and some broker-dealers inappropriately relied on disclosure to “mitigate” conflicts that appeared to create an incentive for the financial professional to place its interest ahead of the interest of the retail customer, and did not establish any mitigation measures.

SEC Releases Staff Guidance on Differential Advisory Fee Waivers

The staff of the Division of Investment Management (“Staff”) issued guidance (“Guidance”) on February 2, 2023, to mutual funds, their boards of directors/trustees (“Boards”), and their legal counsel about the implications under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “Investment Company Act”), regarding fee waiver and expense reimbursement arrangements that result in different advisory fees being charged to different share classes of the same fund. The Guidance noted that Rule 18f-3 permits fee waivers and expense reimbursements provided that such arrangements do not result in cross-subsidization of fees among classes. The Staff stated that whether a differential advisory fee waiver presents a prohibited means of cross-subsidization between classes is a facts-and-circumstances determination that a mutual fund’s board, in consultation with the investment adviser and legal counsel, should consider making and documenting after considering all relevant factors.

For example, a fund’s Board may be able to conclude that a long-term waiver of an advisory fee for one class of shares, but not other classes of shares, does not provide a means for cross subsidization in contravention of Rule 18f-3 if the Board finds that (1) shareholders in the waived class pay fees to the adviser at the investing fund level in a funds-of-funds structure for advisory services, and (2) that such fees, when added to the advisory fees that are paid by the waived class, after giving effect to the waiver, are at least equal to the amount of advisory fees paid by the other classes, such that the waiver for the waived class is demonstrably not being subsidized by other classes. For a fund that already has such differential advisory fee waivers in place, the Staff said the fund’s board may wish to consider, specifically within the context of Rule 18f-3, whether: (i) such waivers present a means for cross-subsidization, (ii) the steps they are taking to monitor such waivers to guard against cross-subsidization are (and continue to be) effective, and/or (iii) alternative fee arrangements may be appropriate. Relatedly, the Staff suggested that a fund should consider the extent to which the Board’s consideration of these issues under Rule 18f-3 should be disclosed to its shareholders.

SEC Division of Examinations Announces 2023 Priorities

On February 7, 2023, the SEC’s Division of Examinations (the “Division”) announced its 2023 examination priorities. The Division publishes its examination priorities annually to provide insights into its risk-based approach, including the areas it believes present potential risks to investors and the integrity of the U.S. capital markets. The following are a selection of the Division’s 2023 priorities:

  • New Investment Adviser and Investment Company Rules:The Division will focus on the new Marketing Rule (Rule 206(4)-1 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act)) and whether registered investment advisers (“RIAs”) have adopted and implemented written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent violations by the advisers and their supervised persons of the new Marketing Rule and whether RIAs have complied with the substantive requirements.

    The Division will also focus on new rules applicable to investment companies (“funds”), including the Derivatives Rule (Rule 18f-4 under the Investment Company Act) and the Fair Valuation Rule (Investment Company Act Rule 2a-5). If a fund relies on the Derivatives Rule, the Division will, among other things: (1) assess whether registered investment companies, including mutual funds (other than money market funds), exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) and closed-end funds, as well as business development companies (“BDCs”), have adopted and implemented policies and procedures reasonably designed to manage the funds’ derivatives risks and to prevent violations of the Derivatives Rule pursuant to Investment Company Act Rule 38a-1; and (2) review for compliance with Rule 18f-4, including the adoption and implementation of a derivatives risk management program, board oversight, and whether disclosures concerning the fund’s use of derivatives are incomplete, inaccurate, or potentially misleading.

    Under the new Fair Valuation Rule, the Division will, among other things: (1) assess funds’ and fund boards’ compliance with the new requirements for determining fair value, implementing board oversight duties, setting recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and permitting the funds’ board to designate valuation designees to perform fair value determinations; and (2) review whether adjustments have been made to valuation methodologies, compliance policies and procedures, governance practices, service provider oversight, and/or reporting and recordkeeping.

  • RIAs to Private Funds – Examinations will include a review of issues under the Advisers Act, including an adviser’s fiduciary duty, and will assess risks, focusing on compliance programs, fees and expenses, custody, the new Marketing Rule, conflicts of interest, and the use of alternative data. The Division will also review private fund advisers’ portfolio strategies, risk management, and investment recommendations and allocations, focusing on conflicts and disclosures around these areas. In addition, the Division will focus on RIAs to private funds with specific risk characteristics, including highly leveraged private funds and private funds managed side-by-side with BDCs.
  • Retail Investors and Working Families – Examinations will focus on how registrants are satisfying their obligations under Regulation Best Interest and the Advisers Act fiduciary standard to act in the best interests of retail investors and not to place their own interests ahead of the interests of retail investors.
  • Registered Investment Companies  ̶  The Division will review compliance programs and governance practices, disclosures to investors, and accuracy of reporting to the SEC of the registered investment companies, including ETFs and mutual funds. The Division will also focus on funds with specific characteristics, such as: (1) turnkey funds, to review their operations and assess effectiveness of their compliance programs; (2) mutual funds that converted to ETFs, to assess governance and disclosures associated with the conversion to an ETF; (3) non-transparent ETFs, to assess compliance with the conditions and other material terms of their exemptive relief; (4) loan-focused funds, such as leveraged loan funds and funds focused on collateralized loan obligations, for liquidity concerns and to review whether the funds have been significantly impacted by, and have adapted to, elevated interest rates; and (5) medium and small fund complexes that have experienced excessive staff attrition, to focus on whether such attrition has affected the funds’ controls and operations. The Division will also monitor the proliferation of volatility-linked and single-stock ETFs, and may review such funds’ disclosures, marketing, conflicts, and compliance with portfolio management disclosures, among other things. In addition, the Division will focus on adviser compensation, practices and processes for assessing and approving advisory and other fund fees, the effectiveness of derivatives risk management and liquidity risk management programs.
  • Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) – The Division will focus on ESG-related advisory services and fund offerings, including whether funds are operating in the manner set forth in their disclosures, whether ESG products are appropriately labeled, and whether recommendations of such products for retail investors are made in the investors’ best interests.
  • Information Security and Operational Resiliency – The Division will review broker-dealers’, RIAs’, and other registrants’ practices to prevent interruptions to mission-critical services and to protect investor information, records, and assets. Reviews of broker-dealers and RIAs will include a focus on the cybersecurity issues associated with the use of third-party vendors, including registrant visibility into the security and integrity of third-party products and services and whether there has been an unauthorized use of third-party providers.
  • Emerging Technologies and Crypto-Assets – The Division will conduct examinations of broker-dealers and RIAs that are using emerging financial technologies or employing new practices, including technological and on-line solutions to meet the demands of compliance and marketing and to service investor accounts. Examinations of registrants will focus on the offer, sale or recommendation of, or advice regarding trading in, crypto or crypto-related assets and include whether the firm (1) met and followed its standard of care when making recommendations, referrals, or providing investment advice; and (2) routinely reviewed, updated, and enhanced its compliance, disclosure, and risk management practices.

As in recent past years, the Division noted that it prioritizes RIAs and investment companies that have never been examined, including recently registered firms or investment companies, and those that have not been examined for a number of years.

“Our priorities reflect the changing landscape and associated risks in the securities market and are the product of a risk-based approach to examination selection that balances our resources across a diverse registrant base. We will emphasize compliance with new SEC rules applicable to investment advisers and investment companies as well as continue our focus on emerging issues and rules aimed at protecting retail investors,” said Division of Examinations’ Director Richard R. Best. “Our examination program continues moving forward and remains committed to furthering investor protection through high-quality examinations and staying abreast of the latest industry trends and emerging risks to investors and the markets.”

SEC Reopens Comment Period for Proposed Cybersecurity Risk Management Rules and Amendments for Registered Investment Advisers and Funds

The SEC reopened the comment period on proposed rules and amendments related to cybersecurity risk management and cybersecurity-related disclosure for registered investment advisers, registered investment companies, and BDCs that were proposed by the SEC on February 9, 2022. The initial comment period ended on April 11, 2022. Per the SEC’s March 15, 2023, announcement, the reopened comment period will allow interested persons additional time to analyze the issues and prepare comments in light of other regulatory developments, including whether there would be any effects of other SEC proposals related to cybersecurity risk management and disclosure that the SEC should consider. The comment period will remain open until 60 days after the date of publication of the reopening release in the Federal Register.

SEC Finalizes Rules to Reduce Broker-Dealer Settlement Cycle from (T+2) to (T+1)

The SEC adopted rule changes to shorten the standard settlement cycle for most broker-dealer transactions in securities from two business days after the trade date (“T+2”) to one (“T+1”). The SEC indicates that the final rules, adopted on February 15, 2023, are designed to reduce the credit, market, and liquidity risks in securities transactions faced by market participants. The final rules will: (i) require a broker-dealer to either enter into written agreements or establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the completion of allocations, confirmations, and affirmations as soon as technologically practicable and no later than the end of the trade date; (ii) require registered investment advisers to make and keep records of the allocations, confirmations, and affirmations for certain securities transactions; (iii) add a new requirement to facilitate straight-through processing, which applies to certain types of clearing agencies that provide central matching services; and (iv) require central matching service providers to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce new policies and procedures reasonably designed to facilitate straight-through processing and require them to submit an annual report to the SEC that describes and quantifies progress with respect to straight-through processing. The final rules will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. The compliance date for the final rules is May 28, 2024.

SEC Proposes Enhanced Custody Rule for Registered Investment Advisers

The SEC proposed rule changes to enhance protections of customer assets managed by registered investment advisers. If adopted, the changes would amend and redesignate rule 206(4)-2, the SEC’s current custody rule (the “custody rule”), as new rule 223-1 under the Advisers Act (the “proposed rule”) and amend certain related recordkeeping and reporting obligations. According to the SEC’s announcement on February 15, 2023, the SEC exercised its authority under the Dodd-Frank Act in broadening the application of the custody rule. The proposed rule would change the current rule’s scope in two important ways. First, it would expand the types of investments covered by the rule. The proposed rule would extend the rule’s coverage beyond client “funds and securities” to client “assets” so as to include additional investments held in a client’s account, e.g. digital assets, including crypto assets. Second, an adviser would be deemed to have “custody” of client assets whenever the adviser has discretionary authority to trade client assets.

The proposed rule would also require qualified custodians to provide certain standard custodial protections when maintaining an advisory client’s assets and additional protections for certain securities and physical assets that cannot be maintained by a qualified custodian. The proposed rule would also provide exceptions to the surprise examination requirement in instances in which the adviser’s sole reason for having custody is because it has discretionary authority or because the adviser is acting according to a standing letter of authorization. In addition, the proposed rule would expand the scope of who can satisfy the custody rule’s surprise examination requirement through financial statement audits. Finally, the proposed rule would update related recordkeeping requirements for advisers and amend Form ADV to align reporting obligations with the proposed rule and to improve the accuracy of custody-related data available to the SEC, its staff, and the public. The comment period on the proposal will remain open for 60 days following publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register.

“I support this proposal because, in using important authorities Congress granted us after the financial crisis, it would help ensure that advisers don’t inappropriately use, lose, or abuse investors’ assets,” said SEC Chair Gary Gensler. “In particular, Congress gave us authority to expand the advisers’ custody rule to apply to all assets, not just funds or securities. Further, investors would benefit from the proposal’s changes to enhance the protections that qualified custodians provide. Thus, through this expanded custody rule, investors working with advisers would receive the time-tested protections that they deserve for all of their assets, including crypto assets, consistent with what Congress envisioned.”

Republican Leaders Request Information from Gensler on Climate Disclosure Proposal

On February 22, 2023, the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Patrick McHenry (R-NC); the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Tim Scott (R-SC); and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Bill Huizenga (R-MI), sent a letter to the SEC Chair Gary Gensler demanding records and other information related to the proposed climate disclosure rule, including responses to previous requests by numerous members of both the House and the Senate that Chair Gensler had failed to provide. The Republican leaders argued that the proposed rule exceeds the SEC’s mission, expertise, and authority and—if finalized in any form—will unnecessarily harm consumers, workers, and the U.S. economy. In addition, the Republican members of the House Appropriations subcommittee pushed to cut the agency’s budget and requested that the SEC expand its enforcement efforts, reduce the pace of its rulemaking, and refrain from regulation. According to the opening statement of Steve Womack (R-Ark.), chair of the Financial Services and General Government subcommittee, who opened the March 29, 2023, hearing, the SEC budget is too big, the agency costs too much to run, and it focuses too much on the implementation and enforcement of new regulations rather than on trying to encourage the flow of investment capital into markets.

“The blistering pace of the SEC rulemaking is a cause for concern,” Womack wrote, “especially when the SEC is wading into areas that are not within their expertise and constitutionally questionable, such as requiring public companies to report on greenhouse gas emissions while claiming private enterprises won’t be impacted.”

SEC Fee Rate Advisories

The SEC announced that, starting on February 27, 2023, the fee rates applicable to most securities transactions would be set at $8.00 per million dollars. Per the January 23, 2023, announcement, the then-current rate of $22.90 per million dollars would remain in effect on charge dates through February 26, 2023. The assessment on security futures transactions remained unchanged at $0.0042 for each round-turn transaction. Subsequently, on March 1, 2023, the SEC announced that a mid-year adjustment to the fee rate for fiscal year 2023 was not required. As a result, the fiscal 2023 fee rate will remain at $8.00 per million dollars until September 30, 2023, or 60 days after the enactment of a regular FY 2024 appropriation, whichever occurs later. Similarly, the SEC confirmed that the Section 31 assessment on round-turn transactions in security futures also would remain at $0.0042 per transaction.

SEC Proposes Changes to Reg S-P to Enhance Protection of Customer Information

The SEC proposed amendments to Regulation S-P (“Reg S-P”) that would, among other things, require broker-dealers, investment companies, registered investment advisers, and transfer agents (collectively, “covered institutions”) to provide notice to individuals affected by certain types of data breaches that may put them at risk of identity theft or other harm. Reg S-P currently requires broker-dealers, investment companies, and registered investment advisers to adopt written policies and procedures for the protection of customer records and information (the “safeguards rule”). Reg S-P also requires the proper disposal of consumer report information (the “disposal rule”). If adopted, the SEC’s proposal, which was announced on March 15, 2023, would (i) update current requirements to address the expanded use of technology and corresponding risks since the SEC originally adopted Reg S-P in 2000; (ii) require covered institutions to adopt written policies and procedures for an incident response program to address unauthorized access to or use of customer information; (iii) require, with certain limited exceptions, covered institutions to provide notice to individuals whose sensitive customer information was or is reasonably likely to have been accessed or used without authorization; (iv) require a covered institution to provide such notice as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days after the covered institution becomes aware that an incident involving unauthorized access to or use of customer information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred; and (v) make a number of additional changes to Reg S-P, including:

(a) broadening and aligning the scope of the safeguards rule and disposal rule to cover “customer information,” a new defined term which would extend the protections of the safeguards and disposal rules to both nonpublic personal information that a covered institution collects about its own customers and nonpublic personal information that a covered institution receives about customers of other financial institutions;

(b) extending the safeguards rule to transfer agents registered with the SEC or another appropriate regulatory agency, and expanding the existing scope of the disposal rule to include transfer agents registered with another appropriate regulatory agency rather than only those registered with the SEC; and

(c) conforming Reg S-P’s existing provisions regarding the delivery of an annual privacy notice with a statutory exception created by the U.S. Congress in 2015.

The public comment period for the proposed amendments will remain open until 60 days after the date of publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register.

SEC Proposes New Requirements to Address Cybersecurity Risks to the U.S. Securities Markets

The SEC proposed requirements (the “proposal”) for broker-dealers, clearing agencies, major security-based swap participants, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, national securities associations, national securities exchanges, security-based swap data repositories, security-based swap dealers, and transfer agents (collectively, “Market Entities”) to address their cybersecurity risks. In its March 15, 2023, announcement of the proposal, the SEC noted that Market Entities increasingly rely on information systems to perform their functions and provide their services and that the interconnectedness of Market Entities increases the risk that a significant cybersecurity incident can simultaneously impact multiple Market Entities causing systemic harm to the U.S. securities markets.

Proposed new Rule 10 under the Exchange Act would require all Market Entities to (i) establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to address their cybersecurity risks, (ii) review and assess, at least annually, the design and effectiveness of their cybersecurity policies and procedures, including whether they reflect changes in cybersecurity risk over the time period covered by the review, and (iii) provide the SEC with immediate written electronic notice of a significant cybersecurity incident upon having a reasonable basis to conclude that the significant cybersecurity incident has occurred or is occurring. The proposal includes additional requirements for Market Entities other than certain types of small broker-dealers (collectively, “Covered Entities”), including the requirement that Covered Entities utilize a proposed new Form SCIR to (a) report and update information about any significant cybersecurity incident and (b) publicly disclose summary descriptions of their cybersecurity risks and the significant cybersecurity incidents they experienced during the current or previous calendar year. The public comment period for the proposal will remain open until 60 days after the date of publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register.

SEC Proposes to Expand and Update Regulation SCI

The SEC proposed amendments to expand and update Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (“Regulation SCI”). Regulation SCI requires certain U.S. securities markets entities (“SCI entities”) to take corrective action with respect to systems disruptions, systems compliance issues, and systems intrusions and to notify the SEC of such events. In the SEC’s March 15, 2023, announcement of the proposed amendments, the SEC explained that trading and technology have evolved since Regulation SCI’s adoption in 2014 and that the growth in electronic trading allows ever-increasing volumes of securities transactions in a broader range of asset classes at increasing speed by competing trading platforms, including those offered by broker-dealers that play multiple roles in the markets. The proposed amendments would expand the scope of SCI entities covered by Regulation SCI to include registered security-based swap data repositories, all clearing agencies that are exempt from registration, and certain large broker-dealers (in particular, those that exceed a total assets threshold or a transaction activity threshold in national market system stocks, exchange-listed options contracts, U.S. Treasury Securities, or Agency Securities).

The proposed amendments would require that an SCI entity’s policies and procedures include the maintenance of a written inventory and classification of all SCI systems and a program for life cycle management; a program to prevent unauthorized access to such systems and information therein; and a program to manage and oversee certain third-party providers, including cloud service providers, of covered systems. The proposed amendments would also expand the types of SCI events experienced by an SCI entity that would trigger immediate notification to the SEC, update the rule’s annual SCI review and business continuity and disaster recovery testing requirements, and update certain of the Regulation’s recordkeeping provisions. The public comment period for the proposed amendments will remain open until 60 days after the date of publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register.

The SEC Issues Frequently Asked Questions for Registration of Municipal Advisors

On March 20, 2023, the SEC updated its Registration of Municipal Advisors Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) page which provides general interpretive staff guidance on various aspects of the SEC’s municipal advisor registration rules. The updated page provides answers to questions across several categories, including the following topics: (i) independent registered municipal advisor exemption; (ii) registered investment adviser exclusion; (iii) issuance of municipal securities/post-issuance advice; (iv) completion of Form MA, Form MA-I, and Form MA-NR; (v) withdrawal from municipal advisor registration; and (vi) investment strategies and proceeds of municipal securities.

SEC Issues Statement Regarding Risk Legend Used by Non-Transparent ETFs

Under the terms of the SEC’s exemptive relief granted to actively managed ETFs that do not provide daily portfolio transparency (“non-transparent ETFs”), each non-transparent ETF is required to include in its prospectus, fund website, and any marketing materials a risk legend  highlighting the differences between the non-transparent ETF and fully transparent actively managed ETFs, as well as certain costs and risks unique to non-transparent ETFs. Recognizing that the standardized risk legend required by the exemptive orders may be difficult to place in certain digital advertisements (e.g., banner advertisements) due to space limitations, the SEC issued new disclosure language on March 29, 2023, which may be used in digital advertisements by non-transparent ETFs in place of the standardized risk legend currently provided in the exemptive orders. Requirements relating to placement of the risk legend or new disclosure language in a prominent location remain as prescribed in the exemptive orders.


SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

SEC Charges Former Investment Adviser Managing Director and Co-Portfolio Manager with Undisclosed Conflict of Interest

The SEC charged a former managing director (the “defendant”) of a New York-based investment adviser (the “Adviser”), with failing to disclose a conflict of interest arising from his relationship with a film distribution company in which the fund he managed for the Adviser invested millions of dollars. The SEC’s order, issued on January 5, 2023, found that, from 2015 to 2019, a closed-end publicly traded fund (the “fund”), invested in Aviron Group, LLC subsidiaries by loaning the subsidiaries, which were in the business of funding advertising budgets of motion pictures, as much as $75 million. The defendant, a co-portfolio manager of the fund, had a significant role in recommending and overseeing the fund’s loans to the Aviron subsidiaries. At the same time, the defendant asked Aviron to help advance his daughter’s acting career. Aviron helped defendant’s daughter obtain a small role in a film produced in 2018. The defendant did not disclose to the fund’s board of trustees or the Adviser’s compliance and legal teams that he asked Aviron to help advance his daughter’s acting career or that Aviron helped his daughter obtain a film role. The defendant consented to the entry of the SEC’s order finding that he violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, the defendant agreed to a cease-and-desist order, a censure, and a $250,000 penalty.

SEC Charges Former SPAC CFO for Orchestrating Fraud Scheme

The SEC announced fraud charges against Cooper J. Morgenthau, the former CFO of African Gold Acquisition Corp. (“African Gold”), a special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”), alleging that he stole more than $5 million from African Gold and from investors in two other SPACs that he incorporated. The SEC’s January 3, 2023, complaint alleged that from June 2021 through July 2022, Morgenthau embezzled money from African Gold and stole funds from another SPAC series to pay for his personal expenses and to trade in crypto assets and other securities; concealed unauthorized withdrawals by falsifying African Gold’s bank account statements; and raised money from the other SPAC’s investors based on misrepresentations. The SEC’s complaint alleged that Morgenthau violated antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, lied to African Gold’s auditor and accountants in violation of the Exchange Act, knowingly falsified African Gold’s books and records, and filed false certifications with the SEC. Morgenthau consented to a judgment enjoining him from further federal securities laws violations and barring him from serving as an officer or director of a publicly traded company, with monetary remedies to be determined at a later date. In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, on the same day the SEC issued its complaint, announced criminal charges against Morgenthau.

In a related matter, on February 22, 2023, the SEC announced that it settled charges against African Gold for internal controls, reporting, and recordkeeping violations. Per the SEC, it was due to these failures that Morgenthau was able to embezzle money from the company’s operating bank account as discussed in the above complaint. The SEC noted that African Gold made materially false filings with the SEC and maintained inaccurate books and records. According to the SEC’s order, African Gold’s only liquid asset was the money held in its operating bank account, and thus potential fraud by management posed one of the company’s most significant risks of material misstatements in its financial statements. The SEC’s order alleged that, despite this risk, African Gold gave Morgenthau control over nearly all aspects of its operating bank account and financial reporting process with little to no oversight. The SEC’s order found that African Gold violated Exchange Act provisions relating to internal controls, reporting, and recordkeeping. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, African Gold agreed to a cease-and-desist order and to pay a $103,591 civil monetary penalty.

SEC Settles Charges Against Investment Adviser for Alleged Conflicts of Interest Arising Out of Revenue Sharing and Incentive Arrangements

The SEC issued an order instituting and settling administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Moors & Cabot, Inc. (“Moors & Cabot”), a registered investment adviser and broker-dealer. Per the January 19, 2023, order, between at least February 2017 and September 2021, Moors & Cabot failed to fully and fairly disclose material facts and conflicts of interest associated with certain revenue-sharing payments and financial incentives that Moors & Cabot received from two unaffiliated clearing brokers. According to the order, Moors & Cabot also failed to implement written compliance policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act in connection with the disclosure of revenue sharing, fee markups, financial incentives, and associated conflicts of interest, as well as disciplinary histories. Moors & Cabot is charged with willfully violating Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of the Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-7 thereunder.

Company to Pay $5 Million for Misleading Disclosures About Its Valuation Methodologies for Fixed Income Securities

The SEC announced settled charges against a privately held financial, software, data and media company headquartered in New York (the “Company”) for misleading disclosures relating to its paid subscription service, which provides daily price valuations for fixed income securities to financial services entities. The SEC’s January 23, 2023, order found that from at least 2016 through October 2022, the Company failed to disclose to its subscription service customers that the valuations for certain fixed income securities could be based on a single data input, such as a broker quote, which did not adhere to methodologies it had previously disclosed. The order found that the Company was aware that its customers, including mutual funds, may utilize subscription service prices to determine fund asset valuations, including for valuing fund investments in government, supranational, agency, and corporate bonds, municipal bonds, and securitized products, and that subscription service prices, therefore, can have an impact on the price at which securities are offered or traded. The SEC’s order found that the Company violated section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Without admitting or denying the findings, the Company agreed to cease and desist from future violations and to pay a $5 million penalty. The SEC’s order noted that the Company voluntarily engaged in remedial efforts to improve its subscription service line of business.

Twenty-five States File Lawsuit to Block DOL’s ESG Rule

Twenty-five states are suing the Biden Administration in an attempt to block the Department of Labor (“DOL”) rule that allows fiduciaries to consider ESG factors when choosing retirement investments (“DOL ESG Rule”). According to the lawsuit filed in Texas federal court on January 26, 2023, the attorneys general claim that the DOL ESG Rule violates Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), which requires that retirement plans invest solely for financial gain, and runs afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as arbitrary and capricious because the DOL failed to assess either the harm it poses for plan participants and beneficiaries or the advantage of superseding the 2020 DOL rule effectively banning ESG considerations in plan investment selections. Among the twenty-five states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Idaho, and Iowa. In addition to the states, listed plaintiffs include two energy companies, an energy industry trade group, and an individual participant in an unnamed workplace plan.

The claimants argue that the DOL is deviating from prior policy because its 2020 DOL rule still required that financial factors take precedence. It is argued in the complaint that the DOL justified the 2022 rule by noting that it would cure a “chill” or “confusion” allegedly caused by the 2020 rule. Per the claimants, the DOL never identified who was confused, what the source of confusion was, or whether the alleged confusion caused a reduction in the financial returns for plan participants. Claimants further allege that the DOL did not consider alternatives and failed to consider that the solution to the purported concerns caused by the 2020 rules would be to issue clarifying sub-regulatory guidance. The claimants request the court to postpone the DOL ESG Rule’s effective date and to impose a preliminary injunction and declare the DOL ESG Rule in violation of the APA and ERISA.

SEC Charges Options Clearing Corporation with Rule Failures

The SEC announced that The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) will undertake remedial efforts and pay $17 million in penalties to settle charges that it failed to comply with its own SEC-approved stress testing and clearing fund methodology rule during certain times between October 2019 and May 2021. According to the SEC’s February 16, 2023, order, Chicago-based OCC’s failure to implement and comply with its own rule was the result of its failure to properly establish, implement, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to manage certain operational risks. The SEC’s order further found that OCC failed to modify its comprehensive stress testing system and did not provide timely notification to the SEC of this failure as required by Regulation SCI. The SEC also found that OCC failed to comply with its margin methodology, margin policy, and stress testing and clearing fund methodology relating to specific wrong way risk and holiday margin.

According to the SEC, in addition to the $17 million penalty, OCC has undertaken several remedial measures, including revising its model validation policies and procedures; enhancing its approach to risk data governance; implementing changes to elements of its control environment, including processes, procedures, and controls; and conducting appropriate training on the changes. This is the SEC’s second enforcement action against OCC. In a September 2019 settled action, the SEC charged OCC with failure to establish and enforce policies and procedures involving financial risk management, operational requirements, and information-systems security, and imposed remedial measures and a $15 million penalty.

Republican Attorney-Generals Ask Court to Set Aside SEC Proxy Voting Disclosure Rules

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton and three other Republican attorneys general filed a petition on February 21, 2023, against the SEC in the federal appeals court opposing the new proxy voting disclosure rules. Among other changes, the new rules amend Form N-PX by expanding the number of voting categories to include information about votes in certain standardized categories, including various ESG-related topics such as environment or climate, and diversity, equity and inclusion. Though the petition does not detail the states’ legal arguments against the proxy voting disclosure rules, Attorney General Paxton claimed in a statement that the rules are politically motivated. According to the office of Utah’s attorney general, the rules “will put shareholders at increased risk of loss, encouraging political activism and raising administrative costs.” The SEC’s two Republican commissioners, Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda, both voted against adopting the rules, which the SEC’s three Democrats supported.

SEC Charges a Church and Its Investment Management Company for Disclosure Failures and Misstated Filings

The SEC announced charges against an exempt investment adviser (the “Adviser”), a non-profit entity operated by a religious organization (the “Church”) to manage the Church’s investments, for failing to file forms that would have disclosed the Church’s equity investments, and for instead filing forms for shell companies that obscured the Church’s portfolio and misstated the Adviser’s control over the Church’s investment decisions. The SEC also announced charges against the Church for causing these violations. To settle the charges, the Adviser agreed to pay a $4 million penalty and the Church agreed to pay a $1 million penalty. The SEC’s order, issued on February 21, 2023, found that from 1997 through 2019, the Adviser failed to file Forms 13F. According to the SEC’s order, the Church was concerned that disclosure of its portfolio, which by 2018 had grown to approximately $32 billion, would lead to negative consequences and in order to obscure the amount of the Church’s portfolio, and with the Church’s knowledge and approval, the Adviser filed Forms 13F in the names of shell LLCs which it had created rather than in the Adviser’s name.

The order found that the Adviser maintained investment discretion over all relevant securities, that it controlled the shell LLCs, and that it directed nominee “business managers,” most of whom were employed by the Church, to sign the SEC filings. The SEC found that the shell LLCs’ Forms 13F misstated, among other things, that the LLCs had sole investment and voting discretion over the securities, when in reality the Adviser retained control over all investment and voting decisions. The Adviser agreed to settle the SEC’s allegation that it violated Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13f-1 thereunder by failing to file Forms 13F and by misstating information in these forms. The Church also agreed to settle the SEC’s allegation that it caused the Adviser’s violations through its knowledge and approval of the Adviser’s use of the shell LLCs.

SEC Charges Private Fund Auditor and Audit Engagement Partner with Improper Professional Conduct

The SEC announced settled charges against Spicer Jeffries LLP, an audit firm based in Denver, and an audit engagement partner Sean P. Tafaro, for their improper professional conduct in connection with audits of two private funds. According to the SEC’s March 29, 2023, order, during the audit planning stages, Spicer Jeffries and Tafaro assessed that valuation of investments was a significant fraud risk but did not implement the planned audit approach to respond to the risk. The order further finds that Spicer Jeffries and Tafaro failed to obtain sufficient audit evidence about the method of measuring fair value, the valuation models, and whether alternative valuation assumptions were considered. According to the order, due to these failures and others, Spicer Jeffries and Tafaro did not exercise due care, including professional skepticism. The order also found that Spicer Jeffries’ deficient system of quality control led to failures to adhere to professional auditing standards. Without admitting or denying the findings, Spicer Jeffries and Tafaro consented to the SEC’s order finding that they engaged in improper professional conduct. Spicer Jeffries agreed to be censured and to implement undertakings to retain an independent consultant to review and evaluate certain of its audit, review, and quality control policies and procedures. Tafaro agreed to be suspended from appearing and practicing before the SEC as an accountant. The SEC’s order permits Tafaro to apply for reinstatement after one year.

Cyber Fraud and Crypto Asset Enforcement Actions

The SEC brought charges against various individuals and entities relating to cyber fraud and crypto assets, including blockchain and lending programs. For example, these include:

  1. The SEC charged five individuals and three entities for their involvement in a fraudulent investment scheme named CoinDeal that raised more than $45 million from sales of unregistered securities to tens of thousands of investors worldwide. According to the SEC’s complaint filed on January 4, 2023, the five individuals allegedly disseminated false and misleading statements to investors about extravagant returns from investing in a blockchain technology called CoinDeal; the purported value of CoinDeal; the parties involved in the supposed sale of CoinDeal; and the use of investment proceeds. The complaint further alleged that no sale of CoinDeal ever occurred and no distributions were made to CoinDeal investors, and that the defendants collectively misappropriated millions of dollars of investor funds for personal use. In June 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted one of the individuals on three counts of wire fraud and two counts of monetary transaction in unlawful proceeds for his involvement in CoinDeal. The SEC’s complaint charged each party with different violations of the antifraud and registration provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act; and aiding and abetting under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act; and under the antifraud and registration provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act.
  2. The SEC charged a crypto asset-related financial products and services corporation (the “Corporation”), with failing to register the offer and sale of its retail crypto asset lending product. To settle the SEC’s charges, the Corporation agreed to pay a $22.5 million penalty and cease its unregistered offer and sale of its product to U.S. investors. In parallel actions announced the same day, the Corporation agreed to pay an additional $22.5 million in fines to settle similar charges by state regulatory authorities. The SEC’s January 19, 2023, order found that the Corporation marketed its product as a means for investors to earn interest on their crypto assets, and that the Corporation exercised its discretion to use investors’ crypto assets in various ways to generate income for its own business and to fund interest payments to investors. The order also found that the Corporation’s product is a security and that the offer and sale of the Corporation’s product did not qualify for an exemption from SEC registration. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, the Corporation agreed to a cease-and-desist order prohibiting it from violating the registration provisions of the Securities Act.
  3. The SEC charged Avraham Eisenberg with orchestrating an attack on a crypto asset trading platform, Mango Markets, by manipulating the MNGO token, a so-called governance token that was offered and sold as a security. Eisenberg is facing parallel criminal and civil charges in the Southern District of New York brought by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). The SEC’s complaint alleged that beginning on October 11, 2022, Eisenberg engaged in a scheme to steal approximately $116 million worth of crypto assets from the Mango Markets platform. The SEC’s complaint, filed in federal district court in Manhattan, charged Eisenberg with violating antifraud and market manipulation provisions of the securities laws and sought permanent injunctive relief, a conduct-based injunction, disgorgement with prejudgment interest, and civil penalties.
  4. The SEC charged Singapore-based Terraform Labs PTE Ltd and Do Hyeong Kwon with orchestrating a multibillion-dollar crypto asset securities fraud involving an algorithmic stablecoin and other crypto asset securities. According to the SEC’s complaint filed on February 16, 2023, from April 2018 until the scheme’s collapse in May 2022, Terraform and Kwon raised billions of dollars from investors by offering and selling an inter-connected suite of crypto asset securities, many in unregistered transactions. The complaint charged the defendants with violating the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
  5. The SEC announced charges against former NBA player Paul Pierce for touting EMAX tokens, crypto asset securities offered and sold by EthereumMax, on social media without disclosing the payment he received for the promotion and for making false and misleading promotional statements about the same crypto asset. The SEC’s February 17, 2023, order found that Pierce violated the anti-touting and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Pierce agreed to settle the charges and pay over $1.4 million in penalties, disgorgement, and interest. Pierce also agreed not to promote any crypto asset securities for three years.
  6. The SEC charged the former co-lead engineer (the “defendant”) of an Antigua- and Barbuda-based company that operated a global crypto asset trading platform (the “Company”), for his role in a multiyear scheme to defraud equity investors. According to the SEC’s complaint, issued on February 28, 2023, the defendant created software code that allowed Company customer funds to be diverted to a quantitative trading firm specializing in crypto assets (a “crypto hedge fund”) owned by co-founders and officers of the Company, despite false assurances to investors that the Company was a safe crypto asset trading platform with sophisticated risk mitigation measures to protect customer assets and that the crypto hedge fund was just another customer with no special privileges. The complaint alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that such statements were false and misleading, and that the defendant actively participated in the scheme to deceive the Company’s investors
    The SEC’s complaint charged the defendant with violating the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The defendant consented to a bifurcated settlement, subject to court approval, which would permanently enjoin him from violating the federal securities laws, a conduct-based injunction, and an officer and director bar. In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) announced charges against the defendant on the same day the SEC’s complaint was filed.
  7. The SEC charged the crypto asset trading platform beaxy.com (the “Beaxy Platform”) and its executives for failing to register as a national securities exchange, broker, and clearing agency. The SEC also charged the founder of the platform, Artak Hamazaspyan, and a company he controlled, Beaxy Digital, Ltd., with raising $8 million in an unregistered offering of the Beaxy token (“BXY”) and alleged that Hamazaspyan misappropriated at least $900,000 for personal use, including gambling. Finally, the SEC charged market makers operating on the Beaxy Platform as unregistered dealers. Pursuant to the Consents filed on March 29, 2023, the charged market makers have agreed to perform certain undertakings, including ceasing all activities as an unregistered exchange, clearing agency, broker, and dealer; shutting down the Beaxy Platform; providing an accounting of assets and funds for the benefit of customers; transferring all customer assets and funds to each respective customer; and destroying any and all BXY in possession.

Thomas R. Westle and Stacy H. Louizos would like to thank Margaret M. Murphy and Hiba Hassan for their contributions to this update.

© 2023 Blank Rome LLP
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Multi-Club Ownership – For the Good of the Game?

Alongside the rise of investment from sovereign wealth and private equity funds, sport has also seen an increase in multi-club/franchise ownership groups. These groups, often spanning across different sports, leagues, countries, and continents, allow investors to diversify their portfolios and spread their risks.

However, in football, the rise of the Multi-Club Ownership (MCOs) model poses a challenge for how the sport is governed and has implications on current and future financial regulation. MCOs acquire multiple football clubs, building a network of related teams in the process. This, consequentially, has a knock-on effect on player transfers, commercial opportunities, and the overall competitive balance of football across the globe.

In this article, we discuss the benefits of MCOs for both clubs and owners, the potential competitive advantages clubs can gain through MCOs, and whether the existing financial regulations are fit for purpose given the increasing number of MCOs within the sport.

Governance

One of the key benefits for clubs under an MCO structure is the ability to leverage centralized governance infrastructure and apply lessons learned from across the group. By centralizing key departments at the portfolio level, and incentivizing knowledge sharing within the group, MCOs can apply synergies and implement best practices with each new acquisition, leading to a more effective and efficient operation. Additionally, the centralized governance structure within an MCO brings with it opportunities for financial benefits in the form of cost savings and potentially increased revenues.

Sponsorships and Commercial Deals

Operating under an MCO allows clubs to benefit from sponsorships and other commercial deals negotiated at the group level, while also increasing individual brand awareness for each respective club. For example, an MCO could negotiate a group sponsorship agreement with a kit manufacturer or shirt sponsor covering a number of teams within the group, including the flagship club.

Agreements of this kind would be beneficial for all parties involved. The sponsor increases its own profile by being associated with the flagship club, while also getting instant access to a variety of markets through the other clubs in the agreement. At the group level, the homogeneity created by having clubs within the group playing in similar kits creates a stronger brand identity, whilst also boosting the brand profile for the smaller clubs by further associating them with the flagship club. Additionally, a group agreement would allow the MCO to secure a competitive rate that may have been unattainable for a solitary club.

Player Scouting, Acquisition, and Development

The other major financial benefit for clubs in an MCO structure relates to how players are scouted, acquired, and developed. A common feature of MCOs is the application of a uniform strategy, across all portfolio clubs, set at a group level by a Sporting/Technical Director. When trickled down to each club, this results in a global scouting network, acquiring local talent with the group’s playing style in mind. These players will then be brought into an academy, through which they will be developed to play in the MCO’s preferred playing style.

While this does not represent an immediate cost saving, this network of local scouting and academies at the club level can lead to a significant competitive and financial advantage as players move within the group from smaller clubs to the flagship club. By transferring or loaning players “in-house”, MCOs can ensure that a player’s development is not hampered by being played in an unfavorable position, or by being asked to perform a different role, protecting their value.

Additionally, by acquiring players from within the group, clubs save both time and money on scouting, as players are already a known quantity within the network. Furthermore, the receiving club acquires a player tailor-made to their playing style, reducing the time required to bed them in.

“In-house” Transfer Agreements

As exemplified by the transfer of Hassane Kamara between Pozzo family-owned clubs Watford and Udinese, “in-house” transfers can be leveraged to alleviate financial constraints for clubs within the group. Kamara, initially purchased by Watford in January 2022 for £4m, and who went on to be Watford’s player of the season, was subsequently sold to Udinese in August 2022 for £16m.

However, Kamara was then loaned straight back to Watford for the 2022/23 season. Although prima facie, this transfer does not benefit Udinese, it allowed Watford to recognize an £8m profit on Kamara while retaining his services, and strengthening their cash flow at a time when they were negotiating contracts with other star players. While “in-house” transfers of this kind raise questions regarding their fitness and propriety, they also have implications on competitive balance.

Parent Feeder

The most recognizable transfer strategy within MCOs is the feeder club model. This can be mutually beneficial to both clubs, with the best-performing players transferring to the “parent” clubs” and the “feeder” club receiving transfer income, as well as occasional loan transfers of youth team players to develop while remaining in the MCO structure.

Such a relationship can be seen between Red Bull owned, RB Leipzig (RBL) and FC Red Bull Salzburg (FCS). Since 2015, twelve players have transferred directly from FCS to RBL, with transfer fees totaling £119.75m. Eight of these players, bought for a total of £73.85m have subsequently been sold for a total of £117.50m, generating £43.65 profit RBL. The cumulative market value of the four players still playing for RBL has risen by £26.32m since their relevant transfers. For perspective, there have only been four transfers from RBL to FCS in the same period. [i]

Competition Integrity

Although centralized governance structures provide a wealth of benefits to clubs and owners within MCOs, there is a regulation to limit the effects of centralized governance on the integrity of competition.

UEFA’s regulations on common ownership prohibit teams from competing in the same competition where a single person or entity has a de facto control over both clubs. For clubs under common ownership to compete in the same competition, they must demonstrate that there are disparities within the clubs’ corporate matters, financing, personnel, and sponsorship arrangements.

On only one occasion since 2002 has UEFA’s rule on common ownership been considered. RBL and FCS both qualified for the 2017/18 Champions League and had to make significant structural changes in order for both teams to be admitted to that season’s edition. Therefore, as long as MCOs are willing to sacrifice centralized operations to an extent satisfactory to UEFA regulations, mutual competition is allowed. However, while many smaller clubs within more centralized MCO structures may not have short-term goals of European Football, UEFA regulations do raise questions over the investor’s long-term footballing ambitions for those clubs.

Financial Sustainability Regulations

In addition to the on-field benefits, being part of an MCO also provides opportunities for clubs to improve their financial position, and potentially exploit loopholes in existing financial regulation. UEFA’s recently introduced Financial Sustainability Rules (FSR) are built upon three pillars: solvency, stability, and cost control. The new cost control regulation, known as the squad cost ratio, states that a club’s outlays on wages, agents’ fees, and amortization costs must be less than 70% of club revenues. [ii]

In a scenario where an MCO owned club requires to decrease their squad cost ratio, it is possible that group sponsorship agreements and in-house transfers could be used to achieve this. By selling players within an MCO, and then receiving those players back on loan, clubs will recognize a profit on the sale for the purposes of FSR and bring down their squad cost ratio.

When considering group sponsorship agreements in respect of FSR, it is also possible that the accounting treatment of this contract at the club level could be engineered to assist a club in complying with the squad cost ratio. The allocation of revenue from a group-level sponsorship to each of the clubs under the agreement is not required to be split evenly, which provides MCOs with an opportunity to funnel revenues from group sponsorships to their clubs complying with FSR. With no current guidance or regulation on how group sponsorships should be treated from an accounting perspective, group sponsorships are another tool that can be utilized to improve their squad cost ratio.

Fair Value Regulations

Although MCOs bring opportunities to improve squad cost ratios, the FSR regulations also require all transactions to be made at “fair value”. This means that financial arrangements for sponsorships and player transfers must be accounted for on an “arm’s length” basis. Where there are doubts amongst the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) board, it can request an adjustment of the proceeds resulting from the transfer of a player, or the allocation of sponsorship monies.

However, there is currently no precedent or evidence to indicate how UEFA would view the accounting treatment for a club under a group sponsorship agreement or the transfer of players within MCOs. Furthermore, while there is a clear means to value a sponsorship agreement, this is considerably more difficult with regard to transfers, specifically the valuation of a player.

While age, injury record, marketability, and contract length, are all attributable factors, a player’s worth comes down to how much the selling club desires weighted against how much the buying club is willing to pay. An MCO structure circumvents this issue and allows for “in-house” transfers at an inflated value stipulated by the shared owner/s. Given the regulations, it is unlikely any club would want to pique the interests of the CFCB by hyper-inflating the value of a transfer, but whether MCOs will be deterred from increasing the value of in house transfers by smaller, nominal values remains to be seen.

The Future of MCOs

Recent trends have shown that the existence of MCOs will be sustained over the coming years. Sport has developed alongside the increasingly commercialized world, resulting in significant growth in investor interest across multiple clubs and sports. However, how the governance and regulation of MCOs evolves will define their development in the long term. Another factor that must be considered is whether investors will prefer multi-sport ownership (MSOs), which bring with them their own regulatory considerations, particularly in relation to conflicts of interest. Nonetheless, in the immediate future we expect continued investment in Football, the question is whether they remain satisfied with just one club, or one sport.

[i] All figures have been taken from https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/

[ii] A full copy of UEFA’s new regulations can be found here

Kurun Bhandari (Director) and James Michaels (Associate) at Ankura authored this article.

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Copyright © 2023 Ankura Consulting Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

SECURE 2.0 Act Brings Slate of Changes to Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans

In December, the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022 (“SECURE 2.0”) was passed, a package of retirement provisions providing comprehensive updates and changes to the SECURE Act of 2019. The legislation includes some key changes that affect employer-sponsored defined contribution plans, such as profit-sharing plans, 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans and stock bonus plans. While some of the changes are effective immediately upon the law’s enactment, most required changes are not effective before the plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2024, so employer sponsors have time to prepare for compliance.

Required Changes

Mandatory automatic enrollment in new plans.

Plan sponsors are currently allowed to provide for automatic enrollment and automatic escalation in 401(k) and 403(b) plans. SECURE 2.0 requires new 401(k) and 403(b) plans to automatically enroll participants at a new default rate, and to escalate participants’ deferral rate each year, up to a maximum of 15%, with some exceptions for new and small businesses. This provision applies to new plans with initial plan years beginning after December 31, 2024.

Changes to long-term part-time employee participation requirements.

The Act currently requires 401(k) plans to permit participation in the deferral part of the plan only by an employee who worked at least 500 hours (but less than 1000 hours) per year for three consecutive years. SECURE 2.0 changes this participation requirement by long-term part-time employees working more than 500, but less than 1000, hours per year to two consecutive years instead of three. However, this two-year provision does not take effect until January 1, 2025, which means the original SECURE Act three-year provision still applies for 2024. Employers should start tracking hours for part-time employees to determine whether they will be eligible in 2024 or 2025 under this provision. For vesting purposes, pre-2021 service is disregarded, just as service is disregarded for eligibility purposes. This provision is applicable to 401(k) plans and 403(b) plans that are subject to ERISA and does not apply to collectively bargained plans. This provision applies to plan years beginning after December 31, 2024.

Changes to catch-up contributions limits.

If a defined contribution plan permits participants who have attained age 50 to make catch-up contributions, the catch-up contributions are now required to be made on a Roth basis for participants who earn at least $145,000 (indexed after 2024) or more in the prior year. This provision is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Changes to the required minimum distribution (RMD) age.

Currently, required minimum distributions must begin at age 72 for participants who have terminated employment. SECURE 2.0 increases the age to age 73 starting on January 1, 2023, and to age 75 starting on January 1, 2033. This means that participants who turn 72 in 2023 are not required to take an RMD for 2023; instead, they will be required to start taking RMDs for calendar year 2024, the year in which they turn 73. This provision is effective for distributions made after December 31, 2022, for individuals who turn 72 after that date.

Early withdrawal tax exemption for emergency withdrawal expenses.

SECURE 2.0 provides for an exception from the 10% early withdrawal tax on emergency expenses, defined as certain unforeseeable or immediate financial needs, on a limited basis (once per year, up to $1000). Plans may allow an optional three-year payback period, and participants are restricted from taking another emergency withdrawal within three years of any unpaid amount on a previous withdrawal. This provision is effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2024.

Changes to automatic enrollment for new plans.

Almost all new defined contribution plans will be required to auto-enroll employees upon hire (existing plans are exempt from this provision). This provision is applicable for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2025.

Optional Changes

Additional catch-up contribution opportunities.

Currently, the catch-up contribution limits for certain plans are indexed for inflation and apply to employees who have reached the age of 50. SECURE 2.0 increases catch-up contribution limits for individuals aged 60-63 to the greater of: (1) $10,000 (indexed for inflation), or (2) 50% more than the regular catch-up amount in effect for 2024. This provision is effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2025.

Additional employer contributions to SIMPLE IRA plans.

Current law requires employers with SIMPLE IRA plans to make employer contributions to employees of either 2% of compensation or 3% of employee elective deferral contributions. SECURE 2.0 allows employers to make additional contributions to each employee of a SIMPLE plan in a uniform manner, provided the contribution does not exceed the lesser of up to 10 percent of compensation or $5,000 (indexed). This provision is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Replacing SIMPLE IRA plans with safe harbor 401(k) plans.

The new law also permits an employer to elect to replace a SIMPLE IRA plan with a safe harbor 401(k) plan at any time during the year, provided certain criteria are met. The current law prohibits the replacement of a SIMPLE IRA plan with a 401(k) plan mid-year. This provision also includes a waiver of the two-year rollover limitation in SIMPLE IRAs converting to a 401(k) or 403(b) plan. This change is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Increasing involuntary cash-out threshold.

Currently plans may automatically cash-out a vested participant’s benefit that is between $1,000 and $5,000 and roll this amount over to an IRA. SECURE 2.0 allows plans to increase the $5,000 involuntary cash-out limit amount to $7,000. This provision of the law is effective for distributions made after December 31, 2023.

Relaxation of discretionary amendment deadline.

Under current law, a discretionary plan amendment must be adopted by the end of the plan year in which it is effective. SECURE 2.0 allows plans to make discretionary plan amendments to increase benefits until the employer’s tax filing deadline for the immediately preceding taxable year in which the amendment is effective. This applies to stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or annuity plans to increase benefits for the preceding plan year. This provision is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Elimination of unnecessary plan notices to unenrolled participants.

SECURE 2.0 eases the administrative burden on plan sponsors by eliminating unnecessary plan notices to unenrolled participants. Under the amended law, plan sponsor notices to unenrolled participants may consist solely of an annual notice of eligibility to participate during the annual enrollment period, as opposed to numerous notices from the plan sponsor. This provision is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2022.

Crediting of student loan payments as elective deferrals for purposes of matching contributions.

Under SECURE 2.0, student loan payments may be treated as elective deferrals for the purposes of matching contributions to a retirement plan. This provision is available for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2024.

Matching contributions designated as Roth contributions.

Previously, employer matching contributions could not be made as Roth contributions. Effective on the date of the enactment of SECURE 2.0, 401(a), 403(b), or governmental 457(b) plans may allow employees the option to designate matching contributions as Roth contributions.

Expansion of the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS).

Currently, EPCRS contains procedures to self-correct certain limited, operational failures that are insignificant and corrected within a three-year period. SECURE 2.0 expands this, generally permitting any inadvertent failure to be self-corrected under EPCRS within a reasonable period after the failure is identified, without a submission to the IRS, subject to some exceptions. This provision went into effect on the date of enactment.

Recoupment of overpayments.

Currently, fiduciaries for plans that have mistakenly overpaid a participant must take reasonable steps to recoup the overpayment (for example, by collecting it from the participant or employer) to maintain the tax-qualified status of the plan and comply with ERISA. Under SECURE 2.0, 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), and governmental plans (not including 457(b) plans) will not lose tax qualification merely because the plan fails to recover an “inadvertent benefit overpayment” or otherwise amends the plan to permit this increased benefit. In certain cases, the overpayment is also treated as an eligible rollover distribution. This provision became effective upon enactment with certain retroactive relief for prior good faith interpretations of existing guidance.

Simplified plan designs for “starter” 401(k) and 403(b) plans.

Effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2023, SECURE 2.0 creates two new plan designs for employers who do not sponsor a retirement plan: a “starter 401(k) deferral-only arrangement” and a “safe harbor 403(b) plan.” These plans would generally require that all employees be enrolled in the plan with a deferral rate of three percent to 15 percent of compensation.

Financial incentives for contributions.

SECURE 2.0 allows participants to receive de minimis financial incentives (not paid for with plan assets) for contributing to a 401(k) or 403(b) plan. Previously, plans were prohibited from offering financial incentives (other than matching contributions) to employees for contributing to a plan. This provision became effective for plan years starting after the date of enactment.

When do employers need to amend their plans for the SECURE Act, CARES Act, and SECURE 2.0 (“the Acts”)?

If a retirement plan operates in accordance with the Acts, plan amendments must be made by the end of the 2025 plan year (or 2027 for governmental and collectively bargained plans). (The amendment deadlines for SECURE and CARES were extended late last year.)

© 2023 Varnum LLP

Who Owns the Crypto, the Customer or the Debtor?

Whose crytpo is it? With the multiple cryptocurrency companies that have recently filed for bankruptcy (FTX, Voyager Digital, BlockFi), and more likely on the way, that simple sounding question is taking on huge significance. Last week, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Chief Judge Martin Glenn) attempted to answer that question in the Celsius Network LLC bankruptcy case.

The Facts of the Case

Celsius and its affiliated debtors (collectively, “Debtors”) ran a cryptocurrency finance platform. Faced with extreme turbulence in the cryptocurrency markets, the Debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions on July 13, 2022. As part of their regular business, the Debtors had allowed customers to both deposit cryptocurrency digital assets on their platform and earn a percentage yield, as well as take out loans by pledging their cryptocurrencies as security. One specific program offered by the Debtors was the “Earn” program, under which customers could transfer certain cryptocurrencies to the Debtors and earn “rewards” in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens. On the petition date, the Earn program accounts (the “Earn Accounts”) held cryptocurrency assets with a market value of approximately $4.2 billion. Included within the Earn Accounts were stablecoins valued at approximately $23 million in September 2022. A stablecoin is a type of cryptocurrency designed to be tied or pegged to another currency, commodity or financial instrument.

Recognizing their emerging need for liquidity, on November 11, 2022, the Debtors filed a motion seeking entry of an order (a) establishing a rebuttable presumption that the Debtors owned the assets in the Earn Accounts and (b) permitting the sale of the stablecoins held in the Earn Accounts under either section 363(c)(1) (sale in the ordinary course of business) or section 363(b)(1) (sale outside the ordinary course of business) of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion generated opposition from the U.S. Trustee, various States and State securities regulators and multiple creditors and creditor groups. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors objected to the sale of the stablecoins under section 363(c)(1) but argued that the sale should be approved under section 363(b)(1) because the Debtors had shown a good business reason for the sale (namely to pay ongoing administrative expenses of the bankruptcy cases). On January 4, 2023, the court issued its forty-five (45) page memorandum opinion granting the Debtors’ motion.

The Court’s Decision

Although the ownership issue may appear complex given the nature of the assets (i.e., cryptocurrency), the bankruptcy court framed the issue into relatively straightforward state law questions of contract formation and interpretation. The court first analyzed whether there was a valid contract governing the parties’ rights to the cryptocurrency assets in the Earn Accounts. Under governing New York law, a valid, enforceable contract requires an offer and acceptance (i.e., mutual assent), consideration and an intent to be bound. The court found that all three elements were satisfied. The Debtors required that all customers agree to and accept “Terms of Use.” The Terms of Use was set up as a “clickwrap” agreement that required customers to agree to the terms and prevented the customers from advancing to the next page and completing their sign up unless they agreed to the Terms of Use. Under New York law, “clickwrap” agreements are sufficient to constitute mutual assent. The court also found that consideration was given by way of allowing the customers to earn a financing fee (i.e., the rewards in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens). Finally, the court noted that no party had presented evidence that either the Debtors or the customers lacked intent to be bound by the contract terms. Accordingly, the court held that the Terms of Use constituted a valid contract, subject to the rights of customers to put forth individual contract formation defenses in the future, including claims of fraudulent inducement based on representations allegedly made by the Debtors’ former CEO, Alex Mashinsky.

Having found a valid contract to presumptively exist, the court turned its attention to what the Terms of Use provided in terms of transfer of ownership. In operative part, the Terms of Use provided:

In consideration for the Rewards payable to you on the Eligible Digital Assets using the Earn Service … and the use of our Services, you grant Celsius … all right and title to such Eligible Digital Assets, including ownership rights, and the right, without further notice to you, to hold such Digital Assets in Celsius’ own Virtual Wallet or elsewhere, and to pledge, re-pledge, hypothecate, rehypothecate, sell, lend or otherwise transfer or use any amount of such Digital Assets, separately or together with other property, with all the attendant rights of ownership, and for any period of time, and without retaining in Celsius’ possession and/or control a like amount of Digital Assets or any other monies or assets, and use or invest such Digital Assets in Celsius’ full discretion. You acknowledge that with respect Digital Assets used by Celsius pursuant to this paragraph:

  1. You will not be able to exercise rights of ownership;
  2. Celsius may receive compensation in connection with lender or otherwise using Digital Assets in its business to which you have no claim or entitlement; and
  3. In the event that Celsius becomes bankrupt, enters liquidation or is otherwise unable to repay its obligations, any Eligible Digital Assets used in the Earn Service or as collateral under the Borrow Service may not be recoverable, and you may not have any legal remedies or rights in connection with Celsius’ obligations to you other than your rights as a creditor of Celsius under any applicable laws.

Based on this language, the court held that the Terms of Use unambiguously transferred ownership of the assets in the Earn Accounts to the Debtors. Central to the court’s decision was that under the Terms of Use customers had granted the Debtors “all right and title to such Digital Assets, including ownership rights.” Based on this language, the court found that title and ownership of the cryptocurrency held in the Earn Accounts was “unequivocally transferred to the Debtors and became property of the Estate on the Petition Date.”

Finally, the court found that the Debtors had shown that they needed to generate liquidity to fund the bankruptcy cases, and that additional liquidity would be needed early this year. Accordingly, the court held that the Debtors had shown sufficient cause to permit the sale of the stablecoins outside of the ordinary course of business in accordance with section 363(b)(1).

Implications

Given the turbulent nature of the cryptocurrency market and the likelihood of further cryptocurrency bankruptcy filings, the court’s ruling is sure to have significant implications. First, unless it is reversed on appeal, the opinion means that the Debtors’ Earn program customers do not own the funds in their digital accounts and will instead be relegated to the status of unsecured creditors with a highly uncertain recovery. Second, the opinion underscores the Wild West nature of crypto and the fact that unlike deposits at a federally insured financial institution, deposits at cryptocurrency exchanges are not similarly insured and may be at risk. Third, customers or account holders in other cryptocurrency exchanges or businesses should carefully review the applicable terms of use to determine if those terms transferred ownership of their digital assets to their cryptocurrency counterparty. It is likely a fair assumption that such other terms of use transferred ownership in the same way that the Celsius Terms of Use did, in which case customers must remain vigilant of the financial health of their cryptocurrency counterparty. Finally, all parties engaging in on-line business transactions, including those outside of cryptocurrency, are on notice that clickwrap agreements commonly found in such transactions are, at least under New York law, enforceable. In short, those agreements mean something, and the fact that a party did not read the terms before agreeing to them through a “click” is likely not going to be a viable defense to the enforcement of those terms.

For more Bankruptcy Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2023 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Caremark Liability Following the SEC’s New ESG Reporting Requirements

Recent developments in the Court of Chancery concerning a corporate board’s duty to monitor and provide oversight over a corporation’s operations, so-called Caremark claims, are likely to intersect with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) proposed new ESG disclosure obligations to create a new category of corporate risk.  In this article, we discuss the recent trends in Delaware law that have led to a revitalization of Caremark and the SEC’s current proposals for enhanced ESG disclosure, the intersection of which can be expected to result in litigation and other corporate risk, and some commonsense steps corporations can take to mitigate this potential new category of risk.

The “Caremark” Doctrine

One of the more notable developments in Delaware case law in recent years has been the revitalization of “Caremark duty” claims.  Caremark actions traditionally were notoriously difficult to plead—in explaining the doctrine, the Chancery Court famously called it “the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). In recent years, however, the Delaware courts have breathed new life into the Caremark doctrine by allowing these types of claims to proceed to discovery.

Specifically, the Caremark doctrine was returned to potency in 2019 following the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).  Although Marchand did not change the Caremark standard, it demonstrated the Delaware courts’ greater willingness to permit Caremark claims to pass the motion to dismiss phase if they could be plausibly pled.  Marchand ultimately laid the groundwork for a number of subsequent rulings demonstrating the renewed vitality of Caremark claims—not only have at least four Caremark suits survived a motion to dismiss since Marchand, but there are also several ongoing Caremark suits in Delaware.

Under Caremark, there are two distinct types of claims.  The first type concern a board’s failure to implement a system of controls to prevent some unlawful misconduct that occurred.  The second type of claims concern a failure to monitor by the directors.  It is imperative, therefore, that boards focus on:  (1) establishing adequate information and reporting systems to monitor “mission critical” aspects of their company’s business; and (2) monitoring those systems once in place.

The SEC’s Proposed New Climate-Related Disclosures

On March 21, 2022, the SEC proposed new rules requiring companies to report extensive line-item disclosures on climate-related ESG issues, entitled: “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.”  If implemented as written, the proposed rules would require registrants to make significant additional disclosures regarding the impact of climate-related risks on their business.

Among other things, under the proposed rules, registrants would be required to disclose:

  1. Greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, regardless as to whether those emissions are deemed material by the company.  Emissions would now be reported by “scope” or type.

  2. “Climate-related risks” that are “reasonably likely to have a material impact,” including climate-related conditions and events that impact financial statements, business operations, or value chains.

  3. Governance disclosures related to climate risk, including how the board and management assess and manage these climate-related risks.

  4. Any targets or goals related to the reduction of GHG emissions.

These proposed new rules are part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to “advance consistent, clear, intelligible, comparable, and accurate disclosure of climate-related financial risk.”  Yet the sheer breadth, specificity, and complexity of the proposed rules would result in one of the most profound changes to public companies’ disclosure obligations in the history of the SEC.

Additional Caremark Exposure

The SEC’s climate-related disclosure rules will likely fuel ESG-related Caremark claims.  In particular, heightened disclosure requirements will provide ammunition for derivative or class action lawsuits and may expose companies to specific indirect risks, including heightened exposure to pre-suit discovery and proxy contests.

Direct Litigation Risk

The SEC’s new reporting requirements are likely to create new grounds for investors to assert liability claims against corporations and their boards of directors and management. Shareholders can be expected to leverage the new disclosures to seek to hold companies accountable for failing to properly oversee, mitigate or eliminate climate-related risk.  The revitalized Caremark doctrine is likely to be employed to allege boards and managers failed to oversee so-called “mission-critical” aspects of their business that generate climate-related risk.

In this vein, plaintiffs may choose to use disclosures required by the SEC’s proposed rules as the basis for a breach of duty to monitor or Caremark claim through either a derivative suit, brought on behalf of the company against its directors and officers, or a class action suit, brought on behalf of a class of injured shareholders or investors.  Caremark claims will likely arise if and when a board fails to exercise proper oversight with respect to climate-related risks or to consider proper mitigating steps. This new threat will be amplified for companies that (i) have yet to fully examine how ESG issues factor into their mission-critical operations or (ii) have yet to devote resources and personnel to measuring (using consistent, comparable and reliable data) and analyzing their own ESG-related risks. Companies need to be able to ascertain and address their most pressing ESG-related risks to avoid future Caremark liability.

Indirect Risks

Indirect risks from the proposed new disclosure regime may manifest in a variety of ways..  They can result in the disclosure of embarrassing or harmful information about a company, its board, or managers, and lead to the replacement of key company executives or directors by aggrieved shareholders.  Moreover, they give rise to issues that are expensive and resource-intensive to address.  While these risks are indirect to companies, they pose a direct threat to board members and managers.

Pre-Suit Discovery.  Boards can expect new disclosure requirements to enable shareholders to gain greater access to pre-suit discovery.  Section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporate Law provides shareholders with a qualified right to inspect a company’s books and records for suspected corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement, and need only demonstrate a “credible basis” to proceed.  The new ESG reporting requirements will likely provide shareholders with even more information as ammunition to fuel Section 220 demands.  Opening a company’s books to pre-suit discovery could expose boards, management, or companies to serious reputational harm, as well as provide fodder for future lawsuits against the current board.

Proxy Contests.  New ESG-related disclosures are also likely to generate greater turmoil in the form of proxy battles at the board level.  Historically, shareholder activists have been focused on addressing short-term profit, stock price and total shareholder return.  Yet activist campaigns containing an environmental or social objective have doubled as a proportion of campaigns overall during the five years between 2016 and 2021, including a successful campaign against Exxon to place directors on its board.  The proliferation of new ESG reporting requirements is expected to further fuel these contests, particularly with respect to companies that are perceived to be lagging on ESG commitments or expectations.

Avoiding Environmental-Caremark Claims

Companies should take several steps in preparation for the increased pressure expected to arise from the need to address ESG issues.

First, companies should be aware of the obligations and risks they face with regard to ESG issues.  That means determining what ESG-related risks could detrimentally impact a “mission-critical” aspect of a company’s business.  What is determined to be “mission-critical” will necessarily vary by company.

Second, once companies are cognizant of the ESG-related risks they face, they will need to start implementing appropriate governance structures so that they are aware of, and can take steps to address, ESG risks.  Directors should establish responsible committees and internal information and reporting procedures to ensure board members have proper oversight of these efforts.  This will allow boards to demonstrate their engagement in response to potential Caremark claims, as well as to respond to any ESG risks arising in the company’s operations.

Third, with these governance structures in place, companies must focus on generating, collecting, and analyzing consistent and comparable data on the ESG-related risks they face.  These data should be actively monitored by managers and board members so they can identify and address ESG risks before they result in catastrophic situations and resulting litigation.  And, if Caremark claims ensue, boards will be able to use these governance structures and reporting regimes to demonstrate that they have satisfied their oversight obligations.

Finally, once these systems are in place, companies should take steps to prepare for the adoption of the SEC’s new climate-related disclosure requirements.  The development of governance and reporting structures will undoubtedly aid in the collection of information for these purposes.  While taking these steps, it is advisable that corporate executives and boards seek input from subject matter experts and experienced legal counsel to help design and implement robust compliance and monitoring regimes that can help to discourage or forestall future litigation in the form of Caremark or other claims related to ESG issues.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more Securities Law coverage, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Are Loans Securities?

We have been following a case that has been winding its way through New York federal courts for some time that players in the syndicated loan market have described as everything from “a potential game changer” to an “existential threat” to the syndicated loan market.

The case in question is Kirschner v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., which is before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In this case, the Court will consider an appeal of a 2020 decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York which held that the syndicated term loan in question was not a security. Significantly, this ruling indicated that because syndicated term loans are not securities, they are therefore not subject to securities laws and regulations.

The consequence of a determination that syndicated loans are securities would be significant. It would mean, among other things, that the syndicated loan market would have to comply with various state and federal securities laws. This would significantly change the cost of these transactions as well as the means by which syndication and loan trading take place. The Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) filed an amicus brief in this case in May of this year, which we covered here. The LSTA argued in its brief, among other things, that beyond the increased cost, regulating syndicated loans as securities would fundamentally change other aspects of the syndicated loan market. Specifically, the LSTA pointed to the importance of a borrower’s ability to have veto rights and other control in determining which entities will hold its debt. The LSTA also noted the importance of quick access to funding on flexible terms specific to the borrower in question – something we know is at the heart of so many fund finance transactions – which would be greatly compromised within a securities regulatory regime. The LSTA brief also discusses potential negative impacts on the CLO market.

Those in favor of a change in regulation point to features such as nonbank lender participation in the market, the fact that the test to determine whether a loan is a security may be outdated, and the overall size of the syndicated loan market – at $1.4 trillion – which could be a risk to the larger global financial system potentially warranting more stringent regulation.

Most experts believe that the Second Circuit will not overturn the decision issued in the lower court, but the issue in question is significant enough that market players should keep an eye on this one. Oral arguments will take place early next year. We will continue to watch as this case develops and update you here.

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

“Red Flags in the Mind Set”: SEC Sanctions Three Broker/Dealers for Identity Theft Deficiencies

In 1975, around the time of “May Day” (1 May 1975), which brought the end of fixed commission rates and the birth of registered clearing agencies for securities trading (1976), the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) created a designated unit to deal with the growth of trading and the oversight of broker/dealers. That unit, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (the “OCIE”), evolved and grew over time. It regularly issued Risk Alerts on specific topics aimed at Broker/Dealers and/or Investment Advisers, expecting that those addressees would take appropriate steps to prevent the occurrence of the identified risk, or at least mitigate its impact on customers. On Sept. 15, 2020, the OCIE issued a Risk Alert entitled “Cybersecurity: Safeguarding Client Accounts against Credential Compromise,” which emphasized the importance of compliance with SEC Regulation S-ID, the “Identity Theft Red Flags Rule,” adopted May 20, 2013, under Sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “34 Act”) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “40 Act”). See, in that connection, the discussion of this and related SEC cyber regulations in my Nov. 19, 2020, Blog “Credential Stuffing: Cyber Intrusions into Client Accounts of Broker/Dealers and Investment Advisors.”

The SEC was required to adopt Regulation S-ID by a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which amended a provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”) to add both the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the federal agencies that must have “red flag” rules. That “red flag” requirement for the seven federal prudential bank regulators and the Federal Trade Commission was made part of the FCRA by a 2003 amendment. Until Wednesday, July 27, 2022, the SEC had (despite the Sept. 15, 2020, Risk Alert) brought only one enforcement action for violating the “Red Flag” Rule (in 2018 when customers of the firm involved suffered harm from the identity thefts). In 2017, however, the Commission created a new unit in its Division of Enforcement to better address the growing risks of cyber intrusion in the U.S. capital markets, the Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit (“CACU”). That unit almost doubled in size recently with the addition of 20 newly assigned persons, as reported in an SEC Press Release of May 3, 2022. There the Commission stated the Unit “will continue to tackle the omnipresent cyber-related threats in the nation’s [capital] markets.” Also, underscoring the ever-increasing role played by the SEC in overseeing the operations of broker/dealers and investment advisers, the OCIE was renamed the Division of Examinations (“Exams”) on Dec. 17, 2020, elevating an “Office” of the SEC to a “Division.”

Examinations of three broker/dealers by personnel from Exams led the CACU to investigate all three, resulting in the institution of Administrative and Cease-and Desist Proceedings against each of the respondents for violations of Regulation S-ID. In those proceedings, the Commission alleged that the Identity Theft Protection Program (“ITPP”), which each respondent was required to have, was deficient. Regulation S-ID, including its Appendix A, sets forth both the requirements for an ITPP and types of red flags the Program should consider, and in Supplement A to Appendix A, includes examples of red flags from each category of possible risks. An ITPP must be in writing and should contain the following:

  1. Reasonable policies and procedures to identify, detect and respond appropriately to relevant red flags of the types likely to arise considering the firm’s business and the scope of its brokerage and/or advisory activities; and those policies and procedures should specify the responsive steps to be taken; broad generalizations will not suffice. Those policies and procedures should also describe the firm’s practices with respect to theft identification, prevention, and response, and direct that the firm document the steps to be taken in each case.
  2.  Requirements for periodic updates of the Program, including updates reflecting the firm’s experience with both a) identity theft; and b) changes in the firm’s business. In addition, the updates should address changes in the types and mechanisms of cybersecurity risks the firm might plausibly encounter.
  3. Requirements for periodic review of the types of accounts offered and the risks associated with each type.
  4. Provisions directing at least annual reports to the firm’s board of directors, and/or senior management, addressing the program’s effectiveness, including identity theft-related incidents and management responses to them.
  5. Provisions for training of staff in identity theft and the responses required by the firm’s ITPP.
  6. Requirements for monitoring third party service providers for compliance with identity theft provisions that meet those of the firm’s program.

The ITPP of each of the three broker/dealers was, as noted, found deficient. The first, J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC (“MORGAN”), organized under Delaware law and headquartered in New York, New York, is a wholly owned subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (described by the Commission as “a global financial services firm” in its July 27, 2022, Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings [the “Morgan Order”]). Morgan is registered with the Commission as both a broker/dealer (since Dec. 13, 1985) and an investment adviser (since April 3, 1965). As recited in the Morgan Order, the SEC found Morgan offered and maintained customer accounts “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes that involve or are designed to permit multiple payments or transactions.” The order further notes that from Jan. 1, 2017, through Dec. 31, 2019, Morgan’s ITPP did not meet the requirements of Regulation S-ID because it “merely restated the general legal requirements” and did not specify how Morgan would identify a red flag or direct how to respond to it. The Morgan Order notes that although Morgan did take action to detect and respond to incidents of identity theft, the procedures followed were not in Morgan’s Program. Further, Morgan did not periodically update its program, even as both the types of accounts offered, and the extent of cybersecurity risks changed. The SEC also found Morgan did not adequately monitor its third-party service providers, and it failed to provide any identity theft-specific training to its staff. As a result, Morgan had violated Regulation S-ID. The order noted that Morgan “has undertaken substantial remedial acts, including auditing and revising … [its Program].” Nonetheless, Morgan was ordered to cease and desist from violating Regulation S-ID, was censured, and was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $1.2 million.

The second broker/dealer charged was UBS Financial Services Inc.(“UFS”), a Delaware corporation dually registered with the Commission as both a broker/dealer and an investment adviser since 1971. UFS, headquartered in Weehawken, New Jersey, is a subsidiary of UBS Group AG, a publicly traded major financial institution incorporated in Switzerland. In 2008, UBF adopted an ITPP (the “UBF Program”) pursuant to the 2003 amendments to the FCRA. The program applied both to UBF and to other affiliated entities and branch offices in the U.S. and Puerto Rico “which offered private and retail banking, mortgage, and private investment services that operated under UBS Group AG’s Wealth Management Americas’ line of business.” See my blog published on Aug. 22, 2022, “Only Sell What You Know: Swiss Bank Negligence is a Fraud on Clients,” for information about the origins and history of UBS Group AG.

The July 27, 2022, SEC Order instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings against UBF (the “UBF Order”) stated that UBF made no change to the UBF Program when, in 2013, it became subject to Regulation S-ID, or thereafter from Jan. 1, 2017, to Dec. 31, 2019, other than to revise the list of entities and branches it covered. The Commission found UBF failed to update the UBF Program even as the accounts it offered changed, and without considering if some accounts offered by affiliated entities and branches are not “covered accounts” within regulation S-ID. The UBF Program did not have reasonable policies and procedures to identify red flags, taking into consideration account types and attendant risks, and did not specify what responses were required. The SEC also found the program wanting for not providing for periodic updates, especially addressing changes in accounts and/or in cybersecurity risks. The annual reports to the board of directors “did not provide sufficient information” to assess the UBF Program’s effectiveness or the adequacy of UBF’s monitoring of third-party service providers; indeed, the UBF Order notes the “board minutes do not reflect any discussion of compliance with Regulation S-ID.” In addition, UBF “did not conduct any training of its staff specific” to the UBF Program, including how to detect and respond to red flags.  As a result, the Commission found UBF in violation of Regulation S-ID. Although the Commission again noted the “substantial remedial acts” undertaken by UBF, including retaining “an outside consulting firm to review its Program” and to recommend change, the SEC nonetheless ordered UBF to cease and desist from violating the Regulation, censured UBF, and ordered it to pay a civil penalty of $925,000.

The third member of this broker/dealer trio is TradeStation Securities, Inc. (“TSS”), a Florida corporation headquartered in Plantation, Florida, that, according to the July 27, 2022, SEC Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (the “TSS Order”), “provides primarily commission-free, directed online brokerage services to retail and institutional customers.” TSS has been registered with the SEC as a broker/dealer since January 1996. Their ITPP, too, was found deficient. The ITPP implemented by TSS (the “TSS Program”) essentially ignored the reality of TSS’s business as an online operation. For instance, the TSS Program cited only the red flags offered as “non-comprehensive examples in Supplement A to Appendix A” and not any “relevant to its business and the nature and scope of its brokerage activities.” Hence, the TSS Program cited the need to confirm the physical appearance of customers to make certain it was consistent with photographs or physical descriptions in the file. But an online broker/dealer would have scant opportunity to see a customer or a new customer in person, even when opening an account. Nor did TSS check the Supplement A red flag examples cited in the TSS Program when opening new customer accounts. The TSS Program directed only that “additional due diligence” should be performed if a red flag were identified, rather than directing specific responsive steps to be taken, such as not opening an account in a questionable situation. There were no requirements for periodic updates of the TSS Program. Indeed, “there were no material changes to the Program” after May 20, 2013, “despite significant changes in external cybersecurity risks related to identity theft.” At this point in the TSS Order, the Commission cited a finding in the Federal Register that “[a]dvancements in technology … have led to increasing threats to the integrity … of personal information.” The SEC found that TSS did not provide reports about the TSS Program and compliance with Regulation S-ID either to the TSS board or to a designated member of senior management, and that TSS had no adequate policies and procedures in place to monitor third-party service providers for compliance with detecting and preventing identity theft. The order is silent on the extent of TSS’s training of staff to deal with identity threats, but considering the other shortcomings, presumably such training was at best haphazard. The Commission found that TSS violated Regulation S-ID. Although the TSS Order noted (as with the other Proceedings) the “substantial remedial acts” undertaken by TSS, including retaining “an outside consulting firm” to aid compliance, the Commission nonetheless ordered TSS to cease-and-desist from violating the Regulation, censured TSS, and ordered it to pay a civil penalty of $425,000.

These three enforcement actions on the same day, especially ones involving two of the world’s leading financial institutions, signal a new level of attention by the Commission to cybersecurity risks to customers of broker/dealers and investment advisers, with a focus on the risks inherent in identity theft. As one leading law firm writing about these three actions advised, “[f]irms should review their ITPPs placing particular emphasis on identifying red flags tailored to their business and on conducting regular compliance reviews to update those red flags and related policies and procedures to reflect changes in business practices and risk.” That sound advice should be followed NOW, before the CACU comes calling.

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©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

SEC Ramps Up Enforcement against Public Companies and Subsidiaries in FY 2022

The SEC imposed $2.8 billion in monetary settlements, the largest total in any fiscal year recorded in the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database.

New YorkThe U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 68 enforcement actions against public companies and subsidiaries in the first full fiscal year of Chair Gary Gensler’s tenure. Monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary actions reached $2.8 billion, according to a report released today by the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business and Cornerstone Research.

The report, SEC Enforcement Activity: Public Companies and Subsidiaries—Fiscal Year 2022 Update, analyzes information from the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). The 68 enforcement actions in FY 2022, which ended September 30, reflected a 28% increase from the previous fiscal year.

The SEC imposed monetary settlements on 97% of the 75 public company and subsidiary defendants that settled in FY 2022. Both the dollar amount and the percentage were the largest of any fiscal year recorded in SEED, which covers actions beginning in FY 2010.

“The number of defendants that settled in FY 2022 with admissions of guilt increased substantially from the previous fiscal year. This was driven by actions involving Broker Dealer allegations brought by the SEC in September,” said Stephen Choi, the Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business at New York University School of Law and director of the Pollack Center for Law & Business. “The 16 defendants admitting guilt was double the largest number in any previous fiscal year in SEED.”

The $2.8 billion in monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary enforcement actions in FY 2022 was $921 million more than in FY 2021 and $321 million more than in any other fiscal year in SEED. The median monetary settlement in FY 2022 was $9 million, the largest in SEED. The average settlement was $42 million.

“The increase in monetary settlements is consistent with the SEC’s public statements that ‘robust remedies’ are an enforcement priority,” said report coauthor Sara Gilley, a Cornerstone Research vice president. “The $1.2 billion in monetary settlements with 16 public broker-dealer subsidiaries for recordkeeping failures represents 44% of total monetary settlements in the fiscal year.”

Issuer Reporting and Disclosure continued to be the most common allegation type in FY 2022, accounting for 38% of actions. Allegations in the SEC’s Broker Dealer classification were the second most common for the first time since FY 2018. Nearly 70% of the 16 Broker Dealer actions were filed against financial institutions for recordkeeping failures.

Click here to read the full report from Cornerstone Research.

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