Intellectual Property Archives - Page 23 of 58

Band Led Zeppelin Says Song Chords Too Common to Copyright

Can you say “Stairway to Heavy Royalties?” You may have imagined the old Led heads, Robert Page and Jimmy Plant, sitting in a grungy garage somewhere back in the seventies striking those iconic four chords for the first time and truly crafting the song “Stairway to Heaven” from whence there was none. Now you may have to change that image and imagine them sitting in the front row of a Spirit concert feverishly jotting chord progressions down on a notepad. That’s what a former member of the band Spirit is claiming in a lawsuit over a song that has allegedly grossed in excess of $525 million.

Have you even heard of the seventies band Spirit? Apparently Led Zeppelin used to tour with them back in the 1960’s and former Spirit band members claim they often saw Page and Plant sitting in the front row at their concerts—with perfect front and center seating to rip off a catchy riff. Robert Wolfe, who wrote the song “Taurus,” which opens with the legendary riff, reportedly thought about suing for copyright infringement as far back as the 1980’s, but his family stated he could not afford it. It’s fun to ponder the type of expert vetting we might do in this case: “Did you attend Woodstock?” “Where were you in proximity to the stage?” “Were you able to grasp a true ‘concept and feel’ for the music?” You may find that comical, but that is the exact question the judge pinpointed as the key issue in this matter—“a subjective assessment of the ‘concept and feel’ of the two works”—a determination he believes he is no more qualified to make than a jury, which is why the case is going to trial.

Another interesting aspect of this case is also the age of the music. In 2016, we’re nearing fifty years since “Stairway to Heaven” was written. Meaning, the case could have wide implications for the music industry as a whole. If a ruling comes back that Led Zeppelin ripped off a copyright, it may embolden many other wayward artists out there who may be carrying a long-time grudge and feel their songs were swiped as well. In short, a ruling in favor of Spirit could potentially boost spirits and spark many copyright suits. Established record labels and big icon artists who have been raking in the royalties for decades have plenty to worry about with this trial.

Led Zeppelin has countered, claiming a descending chromatic four-chord progression is so common in the music industry that it simply cannot be copyrighted. Meaning, it doesn’t matter how obviously similar the songs may be or whether they have the same ‘concept and feel,’ because the riff is too common to copyright. If this argument holds, Spirit has nothing to protect. But if you’re playing the intro to “Stairway to Heaven” in your mind right now, I’ll bet you find it unique enough to try to defend.

If you can’t conjure the song on your own, I’ll bet you’re eager now to hear the two songs side-by-side? So is the jury. Go on. You can jam out on the job as long as it’s still considered “work.” Give it a listen.

ARTICLE BY Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices

Patent Prosecution: “Unclean Hands” Doctrine Erases Merck’s Damage Award

In my last post on the district court’s ruling in Gilead v. Merck, I implied that Gilead had convinced the Judge that Merck had employed inequitable conduct (“IC”) in conducting its negotiations with Pharmasset, the company Gilead later purchased to obtain the rights to the HCV drug, sofosuvir or Solvaldi®. However, I was reading and writing at an usually high speed and missed the fact that the judge’s finding was based on the pre-IC, unclean hands defense.

I skipped over the section on Therasense, a 2011 Fed. Cir. decision that redefined the IC doctrine, and missed the Judge’s comments distinguishing the two doctrines. In both opinions, it was noted that the unclean hands defense originated with three early S. Ct. decisions in which the “guilty parties” employed egregious misconduct to obtain their patents. The remedy in each case was to bar the wrongdoers ability to sue for infringement of the patents.

Gilead probably chose this defense because the IC doctrine has been applied in modern decisions to render patents or entire patent families unenforceable for failure of the patentee to submit relevant prior art to the PTO during prosecution. There is a specific intent requirement and a “hard but for” materiality requirement for unsubmitted art that is difficult for defendants to plead and to meet. Here is the district court’s analysis of the doctrines:

“Therasense addressed the separate defense of IC — a defense that Gilead does not assert in this case — but the Fed. Cir.’s discussions of the differences between IC and unclean hands confirmed that unclean hands remains a viable defense to patent infringement. [649 F.3d at 1285-89]. As the Fed. Cir. explained, the doctrine of IC grew from the older doctrine of unclean hands. Id. at 1287. Whereas unclean hands can involve improper conduct before either the Patent Office or the courts, IC relates solely to conduct before the Patent Office. Id. Additionally, where unclean hands can involve improper conduct before either the Patent Office or the courts, IC relates solely to conduct before the Patent Office.”

Well, not exactly. Therasense does not have a lot to say about the unclean hands doctrine, since the facts in Therasense involved a failure to disclose documentary evidence to the Patent Office, but it is clear that the Fed. Cir. did not intend to supplant the unclean hands defense promulgated by the S. Ct. to punish egregious misconduct. In fact, the Fed. Cir. added egregious misconduct to the current IC doctrine, to cover fact situations not involving withholding prior art. How this version of egregious conduct varies from the older unclean hands doctrine is not clear.

The district court judge seems to have erred when she wrote that IC is applicable only to patent prosecution. As set forth in Therasense:

“As the IC doctrine evolved from these unclean hands cases, it came to embrace a broader scope of misconduct, including not only egregious affirmative acts of misconduct intended to deceive both the PTO and the courts but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO. IC also diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by adopting a different and more potent remedy – unenforceability of the entire patent rather than mere dismissal of the instant suit.”[emphasis added]

As the dissenters wrote in Therasense: “[N]othing in this opinion rejects the application of the doctrine of IC (or “unclean hands”) as applied to other forms of misconduct, in litigation or otherwise.”[emphasis added]

So while Gilead’s “unclean hands” arguments prevailed, it appears that Gilead could have pled either doctrine and prevailed, especially since the Court found a specific intent to deceive. It is my guess that since the Gilead decision did not involve the PTO, Gilead chose to go with unclean hands, but this decision may foreshadow a revival of this defense, particularly when most of the wrong-doing involves the litigation work and not the prosecution. Stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

Supreme Court Stryker/Halo Decision Makes it Easier for Courts to Award Enhanced Damages In Patent Infringement Cases

The recent Supreme Court decisions in the Stryker and Halo cases just made it easier for courts to award enhanced damages in patent infringement cases, discarding Seagate’s “objective recklessness” test.

**The Seagate Test**

In 2007, the Federal Circuit announced a test for enhanced damages whereby a plaintiff seeking enhanced damages had to show that the infringement of his patent was “willful.” In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F. 3d, 1360, 1371. The Federal Circuit set forth a two-part test to establish such willfulness: First, “a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent,” without regard to “[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer.” Id., at 1371. This objectively defined risk is to be“determined by the record developed in the infringement proceedings.” Ibid. “Objective recklessness will not be found” at this first step if the accused infringer, during the infringement proceedings, “raised a ‘substantial question’ as to the validity or noninfringement of the patent.” That bar applied even if the defendant was unaware of the arguable defense when he acted.

Second, after establishing objective recklessness, a patentee had to show by clear and convincing evidence the risk of infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”Seagate, 497 F. 3d, at 1371. Only when both steps were satisfied could the district court proceed to consider whether to exercise its discretion to award enhanced damages. Ibid.

Stryker / Halo Decisions Restore Courts’ Discretion to Award Enhanced Damages

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Stryker and Halo cases discarded the Seagate test and restored courts’ discretion to award enhanced damages. The Court held “[t]he Seagate test is not consistent with §284.” The relevant language of § 284 contains “no explicit limit or condition on when enhanced damages are appropriate, and this Court has emphasized that the “word ‘may’ clearly connotes discretion.” So the Court found no explicit requirement for Seagate’s “objective recklessness” test.

The Court also found Seagate unnecessarily required a finding of “objective recklessness” even when wrongdoing was demonstrated by the facts of a case. The Court also disagreed with Seagate’s requirement of a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for showing recklessness, and held that the proper standard for enhanced damages was a “preponderance of the evidence” — the same standard as for patent infringement determinations.

The Court explained that its decision did not contradict § 298, that failure to present advice to the court may not be used to prove willful infringement:

Section 298 provides that “[t]he failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel” or “the failure of the infringer to present such adviceto the court or jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed.” 35 U.S.C. § 298. Respondents contend that the reference to willfulness reflects an endorsement of Seagate’s willfulness test. But willfulness has always been a part of patent law, before and after Seagate. Section 298 does not show that Congress ratifiedSeagate’s particular conception of willfulness. Rather, it simply addressed the fallout from the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F. 2d 1380 (1983), which had imposed an “affirmative duty” to obtain advice of counsel prior to initiating any possible infringing activity, id., at 1389–1390. See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, p. 53 (2011).

Consequently, nine years after Seagate, the Supreme Court has made it easier for courts to make a determination of enhanced damages. Time will tell if this decision will spur additional patent opinion practice, such as prior to the 2007 Seagate decision.

ARTICLE BY Timothy Bianchi of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

Short Samplings of Songs May Not Be Considered Copyright Infringement After All

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals just decided that song sampling without permission does not necessarily infringe the copyright. Many artists have built careers by sampling an old song to create a new work. Until now, courts have told the artist to “get a license or do not sample.”

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2005 that there is no de minimus exception to sampling. The de minimus exception, which applies to the copyright law generally, states that if an artist borrowed an insignificant portion of an existing work, the artist did not infringe. The Sixth Circuit held that this exception did not apply to sampling. This meant that if an artist sampled a portion of a song that lasted a fraction of a second, the artist nonetheless infringed.

Now, the Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul, LLC v Madonna Ciccone (“Salsoul”)took “the unusual step of creating a circuit split” and decided that thede minimus exception does apply to sampling. In Salsoul, Madonna sampled a 0.23-second “horn blast” from a disco song and incorporated the blast into her 1990 song “Vogue.” The Ninth Circuit explained that Madonna did not infringe because “a reasonable juror could not conclude that the average audience would recognize the appropriation of the horn sound.” Therefore, her sampling was de minimus and did not infringe.

This Ninth Circuit decision will impact the music world and likely lead to a U.S. Supreme Court decision that clarifies the legal limits of unauthorized sampling.

ARTICLE BY Todd A. Davidovits of Polsinelli PC
© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Supreme Court Cert: Laches (in Patent Cases) and Copyrightable Subject Matter to Be Reviewed

Laches

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review a patent case on the law of laches. SCA Hygiene Products v. First Quality Baby Products, Case No. 15-927 (Supr. Ct., May 2, 2016).

In its cert petition, SCA argued that the en banc decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (IP Update, Vol. 17, No. 5) that, under the Copyright Act, laches cannot bar damages claims brought within a statutory limitations period, even though the initial violation may have occurred years earlier. SCA also argued that the Federal Circuit observes a presumption in favor of laches that is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.

The question presented is: Can the defense of laches bar a claim for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act’s six-year statutory limitations period (35 USC § 286), and if so, to what extent?

In SCA, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review to determine if the Supreme Court’s Petrella decision required a change to the law of laches in patent cases (IP Update, Vol. 18, No. 10). In a 6–5 decision, the Federal Circuit held that in terms of patent infringement actions, Petrella did not require a change in the laches rule set out by the court in 1992 in A.C. Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Rather, the en banc Court explained that notwithstanding the provisions of § 286, Congress codified the laches defense in § 282 when it included an unenforceability defense in that statute. Thus, the Court found that laches could bar a damages claim even for acts occurring within the six-year period of § 286.

The Federal Circuit also held, however, that Petrella requires a change in the Aukerman rule that only pre-suit damages may be barred by laches. The Court explained that the availability of injunctive relief or ongoing royalties now depends on an analysis of the circumstances of the delay under the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange (IP Update, Vol. 9, No. 5).

Copyrightable Subject Matter

The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in a copyright case arising from the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and presenting the issue of copyrightability of cheerleader uniforms. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., Case No. 15-866 (Supr. Ct., May 2, 2016).

The question presented is: What is the appropriate test to determine when a feature of a useful article is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act?

In Star, a split panel of the Sixth Circuit held that the arrangement of colors, stripes, chevrons, zigzags and other designs on a cheerleading uniform are copyrightable, separate from utilitarian aspects of the uniform itself (IP Update, Vol. 18, No. 9). The Court rejected the argument that the pictorial, graphic or sculptural features are simply performing a decorative function (which is itself a “utilitarian aspect of an article”) and are therefore not separable from the utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uniform. The dissent argued that the case turned on how “function” is defined (i.e., in terms of the decorations in issue), which would determine whether the designs were copyrightable.

Article By Paul Devinsky of McDermott Will & Emery

Google Tries “Pretty Woman” Tactic in Oracle Copyright Suit

I’m not sure Julia Roberts’ use of that blonde wig and eighties cut-out dress when she Google versus Oracle leaned against Richard Gere’s car in Pretty Woman should be considered “fair use,” but perhaps a court might say otherwise. How does Julia’s transformation from wayward to womanly in that iconic 1990 film come into play in a fight between tech giants Google and Oracle over the use of copyrighted java? Because they both hinge on “transformative use.”

Google’s going to trial again? Say it isn’t so. I have to wonder how many lawyers Google, alone, employs. But, if you’re going to stand as one of the front-runners in today’s fast-paced, internet-driven services market, you have to be prepared for lawsuits. Google has been fending off some serious claims by Oracle in a copyright suit filed in San Francisco since 2010, but when the focus of the debate turned to expert witness testimony, we wanted to highlight the matter for discussion and debate. Oracle initially sued Google claiming improper use of copyrighted Java, particularly Google’s use of its application programming interfaces (“APIs”) on its Android platform, to allow developers who are familiar with Java to quickly convert their web apps to Android. Oracle is now reportedly seeking royalty damages in excess of $8 billion.

Initially Google argued, and the trial court agreed, that APIs were not subject to copyright. That ruling, however, was overturned by the Federal Circuit on appeal, which means Google’s remaining defense is whether its use of the APIs was “transformative,” which would make it acceptable under the Fair Use Doctrine. What standard of “transformative use” are the parties looking to? 2 Live Crew and their ripping parody of “Pretty Woman” in their 1989 album, “As Clean As They Wanna Be.” Please tell me you’re envisioning that iconic cover right now. Apparently the Supreme Court in a 1994 ruling, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., found 2 Live Crew’s version of “Pretty Woman” so creative and original that it qualified as “fair use,” not copyright infringement. Oracle is arguing the opposite by claiming Google’s use of the Java APIs did nothing to transform the code. Google simply plugged it into to a larger body of work, but in no way altered it, which does not qualify, according to Oracle, as transformative.

Oracle has sought to exclude the testimony of Google’s computer science expert from opining that Google’s use of the Java code altered it sufficiently to qualify as a transformative use, claiming his opinion “flies in the face” of the Federal Circuit’s finding that Google was wrong in claiming its use was transformative simply because it incorporated other elements in the Android system. Google has fought back, stating the Federal Circuit never decided whether the work was transformative and specifically remanded the case so that issue could be decided by a jury. Are you finding both of those arguments a bit rambling and repetitive? Apparently so did the trial court judge when he lamented his role as the gatekeeper who has to “excise every detail of expert testimony on a granular level.” With reams of lawyers on either side fighting over every detail and every dollar, however, that is probably precisely what he will have to do.

If you feel it may be hard, not being a computer science guru, to make a determination as to whether Google’s use of the Java at issue was “transformative,” imagine how the jury is going to feel. In May, 2012, a jury found Google had infringed Oracle’s copyrights but they could not decide whether use of the code in question was “fair.” This will be the second trial and second jury that attempts to answer this question. It will require an expert with exceptional communication skills, who is as persuasive as Julia, to effectively break this Java jumble down and win over the potentially tech-savvy, but stubborn “Richards” in the jury box. That’s the expert we would find for them, anyway, if Google gave us a call.

ARTICLE BY Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices

The Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act: Impact on Employers

Trade Secrets Confidential Chain.jpg On May 11 2016, President Obama signed The Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA” or the “Act”). Effective immediately, the DTSA creates a federal civil cause of action that allows companies to file civil lawsuits for trade secret theft under the federal Economic Espionage Act. Before the passage and signing of the DTSA, the statute only provided for criminal cases brought by prosecutors. Civil trade secret cases had to be brought under state law. While the DTSA provides an added layer of protection for companies’ trade secrets, its impact on employers is more uncertain.

Federal Cause of Action

Prior to the DTSA, victims of trade secret theft could only bring civil causes of action understate trade secret laws. These laws vary widely despite the fact that many states have passed some formulation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The DTSA provides a federal civil cause of action covering any trade secret “related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” There is a three year statute of limitations which is triggered on the date on which the trade secret misappropriation was discovered or “by the exercise of reasonable due diligence should have been discovered.” The availability of a federal trade secret cause of action could make interstate trade secret disputes more efficient by reducing choice of law disputes that happen when it is uncertain which state’s trade secret law should apply and also provides access to federal courts which are accustomed to addressing sometimes complex issues of formulations and technical information that is often necessary in these cases. However, the DTSA does not preempt state trade secret actions, so forum shopping and choice of law disputes will remain prevalent.

Seizure Clause

Along with providing a federal cause of action, the DTSA affords victims of trade secret theft an ex parte seizure proceeding to prevent the propagation of misappropriated trade secrets. Such an order can be obtained only under “extraordinary circumstances.” For a seizure order to issue, the trade secret owner must show, inter alia, that the accused party has actual possession of the trade secret and that an immediate and irreparable injury will occur without the seizure.

Companies should exercise caution when invoking the DTSA’s seizure provision because the Act also provides that parties who have been accused of trade secret theft will have a claim for damages as a result of any wrongful seizure and demand the return of any material that was wrongfully seized along with the trade secret information.

Restrictions on Employee Mobility

The DTSA contains provisions related to employee mobility. The Act restricts the availability of injunctive relief to “prevent a person from entering an employment relationship” and provides that if an injunction were to place conditions on a person’s employment, such restrictions must “be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows.” This provision effectively rejects the inevitable disclosure doctrine applicable in certain jurisdictions, whereby an employer can enjoin a former employee from working in a new job that would inevitably result in the use of the employer’s trade secrets. Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, an employer does not have to provide evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets, just the former employee’s knowledge of such trade secrets. This claim will not be available under the DTSA. Lastly, the DTSA prohibits the issuance of an injunction which would “conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade or business,” so employers in states that are more restrictive vis a vis non competes, will still be governed by those state laws.

Whistleblower Immunity

The Act’s most employee friendly clause, provides immunity to employees who disclose trade secrets either to the government for the purpose of reporting or assisting in an investigation of a suspected violation of law, or in a complaint filed in a lawsuit or related proceeding if such a filing is made under seal. Also, an individual who files a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer for reporting a suspected violation of law may reveal the trade secret to his or her attorney and utilize the trade secret information in the proceeding if the person files any document containing the trade secret under seal and does not disclose the trade secret except under court order.

The whistleblower provision contains a notice requirement that applies to any employer that utilizes employment contracts that concern the use of trade secrets. The Act requires employers to “provide notice of the [whistleblower] immunity . . . in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.” The employer may instead, provide in the contract a cross-reference to a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer’s reporting policy for a suspected violation of law. Employers who neglect to comply with the Act’s notice requirements lose the ability to recover exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees under the DTSA in actions brought against employees or independent contractors who were not given the notice. This requirement applies to any new agreements or revisions to agreements made as of May 11, 2016, the date of enactment of the Act.

Employer Tips

The DTSA offers a mixed bag for employers. While the Act provides a federal trade secret cause of action (and the concomitant promise of more uniformity), it does not preempt state trade secret law, so forum shopping and choice of law issues will remain. The Act provides for a robust ex parte seizure proceeding to prevent the dissemination of trade secrets, but also a wrongful seizure cause of action for the accused party which could lead to costly satellite litigation. The Act limits an employer’s ability to restrict a former employee’s subsequent employment by requiring the employer to provide evidence of threatened misappropriation, rather than merely evidence of what the employee knows. Finally, the Act provides immunity for individuals who disclose trade secrets in whistleblowing situations and in retaliation lawsuits, simultaneously requiring employers to notify all employees or independent contractors subject to employment contracts that touch on trade secrets about the whistleblowing immunity. The whistleblowing notice requirements add costly administrative and legal burdens to employers who utilize such contracts.

Article By David I. Rosen, Galit Kierkut & Charles H. Kaplan of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.

Artist Formerly Known as a Trademark: Prince

I’m sure his name came immediately to mind when you read that title: Prince. That was, at least, before he changed it to the unpronounceable, androgynous “Love Symbol.” While many thought this was a marketing stunt, Prince’s “formerly known as” campaign was actually an attempt to skirt a heated legal battle with his record label, Warner Bros., by creating and producing music under a new trademark. Now that the regal record-breaking artist has passed, however, it will be interesting to see where the royalty chips will fall.

Sleepless in Seattle was in, Cheers was out and Haddaway asked the all-important question, “What is Love?” We were all a little Dazed and Confused. It was 1993 when the very public trademark battle began. “Why You Wanna Treat Me So Bad?” Prince asked Warner Bros. when they refused to release his extensive back-log of music. It seemed Warner was more focused on going “Round and Round” the promotion circuit than producing more Prince records, leaving a pile of his hand-crafted gems to sit and collect dust. Finding Warner “Delirious” in this regard and seeing their refusal as a “Sign o’ the Times,” Prince decided to “Kiss” his label goodbye and produce music under a new trademark, the unpronounceable Love Symbol, subsequently copyrighted as “Love Symbol #2.”

“The first step I have taken toward the ultimate goal of emancipation from the chains that bind me to Warner Bros. was to change my name from Prince to the Love Symbol. Prince is the name that my mother gave me at birth. Warner Bros. took the name, trademarked it, and used it as the main marketing tool to promote all of the music that I wrote. The company owns the name Prince and all related music marketed under Prince. I became merely a pawn used to produce more money for Warner Bros.”

Prince claimed in a public statement about the trademark dispute, boldly sporting the word “SLAVE” on his cheek.

While the Love Symbol album didn’t really earn him “Diamonds and Pearls,” it did garner some attention, selling millions of copies worldwide, and laid down some heavy “Purple Rain” on Warner’s Prince promo-party. Prince was waiting for the sun to set on “1999” when his contract with Warner Bros. would expire so he could begin producing music once again under his rightful, trademarked name—Prince—in 2000. Post-“Emancipation,” Prince embarked on a long and lustrous music-making career, earning world-wide critical acclaim and induction into the Rock Star Hall of Fame when he was first eligible in 2004.

With the royal Prince’s passing and his songs playing on every satellite station right now, we couldn’t help but mull over this old trademark tango and wonder what you thought? Was Prince’s bold Love Symbol move successful? Do you predict any royalty fall-out, now that he has passed, over royalties that were earned under the “Love Symbol” trademark as opposed to “Prince?”

Article By Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices

Artist Formerly Known as a Trademark: Prince

Prince claimed in a public statement about the trademark dispute, boldly sporting the word “SLAVE” on his cheek.

Article By Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices

Defend Trade Secrets Act. It’s Coming: What You Need to Know

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) is headed to President Barack Obama for his signature, and there is little doubt that President Obama will sign it into law. Below is a summary of what you need to know about this soon-to-be law, including what you should be talking to your employment law counsel about in terms of modifying employment contracts and agreements.

What is the DTSA?

The DTSA will effectively “federalize” trade secrets law and allow companies or individuals with trade secrets to file private civil lawsuits under the Federal Economic Espionage Act (the Espionage Act).

What does “federalizing” trade secrets law mean?

The federalization of trade secrets law is a game changer. Pre-DTSA, trade secrets law was a state law issue. While most states dealt with trade secrets by adopting some versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the laws (and court’s interpretation of them) varied significantly from state to state. The variations led to many hotly contested procedural issues for example forum, venue and choice-of-law.

What is the purpose of the DTSA?

The DTSA’s specified purpose is to create a nationwide law that tightens trade secrets protections to align them with those given to patents, copyrights, and trademarks. It makes the issue a federal one so that federal law and courts can control the subject area, which will provide more certainty for litigants in trade secrets cases.

What will the DTSA protect?

Federal law regarding intellectual property has been fought on three fronts: copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Now, trade secrets will enter the federal protection arena.

The DTSA will allow “[a]n owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated [to] bring a civil action…if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” Oddly enough, however, the DTSA itself does not define “trade secret.” The Espionage Act, however, does.

How will the DTSA protect trade secrets? (Hint: Seizure provision)

As set forth above, the DTSA will allow trade secret owners whose trade secrets have been misappropriated to file civil actions in federal court. It also provides for theft protections abroad, but much of this part of the law is yet to be determined.

In addition to allowing victims to be awarded damages for wrongful takings, the DTSA contains a seizure provision that allows for the seizure of stolen trade secrets in “extraordinary circumstances” upon an “ex parte application,” and “affidavit or verified complaint.” This seizure provision is something completely new in the trade secrets context, as no state law has ever provided a plaintiff with this remedy.

Although it is unclear what situations courts will eventually qualify as “extraordinary circumstances,” the threshold appears to be slightly higher than that required to obtain a temporary restraining order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, the first requirement for a court issuing a seizure order is the determination that “an order issued pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other form of equitable relief…[would] be inadequate…because the party to which the order would be issued would evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply with such an order.” These additional requirements must also be met before the court will grant a seizure:

an immediate and irreparable injury;
the harm to the applicant outweighs the harm to the legitimate interest;
a showing that the person misappropriated the trade secrets by improper means or conspired to misappropriate through improper means;
a description (with reasonable particularity) of the matter to be seized and the location of the matter to be seized (if reasonable under the circumstance); and
the person(s) against whom seizure would be ordered would destroy, move, hide or make the trade secrets inaccessible if they were provided notice of the application.

A seizure order is enforceable by federal law enforcement officials and the materials seized are to be deposited to the custody of the court.

While such seizures may be difficult when dealing with small bits of data or data that can be easily copied or disseminated, the DTSA provides something else no other trade secrets law offers: it allows the moving party to request that the seized information is encrypted in the custody of the court.

Is there anything else interesting about the DTSA? (Hint: Whistleblower protection)

Yes. It has an immunity protection for whistleblowers. That provision essentially provides that an individual, who reveals the disclosure of a trade secret in confidence to a federal, state, or local government official, or to an attorney, may not be held criminally or civilly liable under any federal or state trade secrets law.

Also, an individual who files a lawsuit for retaliation by an employee for reporting a suspected violation of law may disclose the trade secret to his or her attorney and use the trade secret information in the court proceeding.

What are the pros?

The advantage of the DTSA is that, for companies that operate across state and national borders and that have their trade secrets threatened by competitors across the world, state laws were previously insufficient to properly protect those companies. The DTSA will help shore up the protection of trade secrets, likely reduce jurisdictional court battles that are typical at the outset of trade secret litigation in state court, and provide litigants with federal jurisdiction.

What are the cons?

The DTSA does not preempt state trade secret laws. As such, while a litigant may bring a federal trade secrets lawsuit, that same litigant may also be able to bring a claim under state law as well. While it adds uniformity of trade secrets law at the federal level, it does nothing for the myriad of trade secrets laws at the state level. In reality, this means that a litigant is more likely to face a federal trade secrets misappropriations claim and similar state law claims. While this provides uniformity at the federal level, it does not to clarify the patchwork of state laws, and makes trade secret litigation more complex by providing more litigation options to trade secret holders. While some may see this as a good thing, because it provides multiple avenues for recovery, others prefer uniformity.

While it is not necessarily true that companies should expect to see more litigation, they should be prepared to litigate these cases on the federal stage, as well as remain up-to-date on all relevant state laws.

What should my company’s next steps be to ensure compliance and corporate readiness?

Internal Controls

Companies should check their internal controls to ensure they are properly protecting their trade secrets. Some beginning action items should include the following:

Audit and Identify: Perform an audit of corporate assets to identify and designate trade secrets and determine where trade secrets are maintained and who has access to them.
Protect: Take steps to properly and adequately protect trade secrets. For electronically available or accessible information, ensure trade secrets are username and password protected and only made available or accessible to those who need access. Encrypting electronic information will also reduce the chance that it can be taken, opened, read, and disseminated outside the company’s information systems. For tangible trade secrets, ensure trade secrets are physically locked or that physical access to them is password, keycard or otherwise protected and that only those who need access have it.
Revise Agreements: Many companies allow third-parties access to the property, premises, data, networks, etc. Companies should review their vendor agreements, non-disclosure agreements, and other confidentiality and other non-disclosure-type agreements to ensure they are sufficient to identify and protect corporate trade secrets.
Revise Policies: Companies should review their privacy policies, including corporate security and electronic use policies to ensure they are sufficient to identify and protect their corporate trade secrets. This includes reviewing non-compete, non-disclosure, and other privacy-related agreements and policies the company may have with its employees.

Dealing with Employees

The DTSA requires that employers provide notice of the DTSA’s immunity “in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of trade secret or other confidential information.” Companies can comply with this requirement by cross-referencing a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer’s internal mechanism for reporting a suspected violation of law. If the employer fails to do this, the employer cannot be awarded exemplary damages or attorneys’ fees in an action against an employee to whom notice was not provided. This is required for all contracts and agreements that are entered into or updated after the DTSA’s enactment date.

The takeaway for this requirement is that companies with employees should sharpen their pencils because they have contracts and agreements to modify.

Dealing with Competitors

Companies can now act swiftly against a competitor attempting to misappropriate trade secrets. Under the appropriate “extraordinary circumstances,” the ability to file an ex parte motion in federal court for the seizure of any misappropriated property provides companies with a way to actually keep these trade secrets, well, secret. In addition, the automatic access to federal courts provides companies with a forum that is often better suited to handle complex interstate and international litigation, not to mention complicated technical issues, and decreases initial costs related to procedural battles.

Article By Sara H. Jodka & Emma R. Wolfe

Category: Intellectual Property

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