Category: Intellectual Property

What Start-ups Need to Know About Intellectual Property

As any entrepreneur is well aware, the early stages of a new business venture are an incredibly busy time. Entrepreneurs must focus on building the core team, structuring the company, attracting investors, developing the product/service, and developing key partnerships, sales channels and marketing plans. These tasks are typically all-consuming for the founders, taxing both their financial and time resources.

During this time, it may be a challenge to simultaneously focus on intellectual property issues.  However, this early time period is also a critical time for ensuring that a business takes steps to protect its core intellectual property and avoids the risk of third party intellectual property issues. Today, more than ever, having a solid understanding of intellectual property and developing an IP strategy that aligns with the business is a crucial part of building a new venture on a solid foundation.

This article includes an overview of the different types of intellectual property and provides advice to start-up companies on how to secure their own intellectual property as well as protect against intellectual property risks from others.

The three basic types of intellectual property that startups should understand are:

  • Patents
  • Trademarks
  • Copyrights

Patents

Not every startup business will be best-served by investing its resources in building a patent portfolio, but the question of whether to pursue patent protection warrants a hard and early look. Knowledge of the role of patents is critical for two reasons:

  • To protect your own business and inventions from your competitors
  • To avoid the risk of being exposed to assertions of patent infringement by competitors and other third parties

It is important for startups to understand the different kinds of patent protection and how they fit into their business.

Utility patents can be obtained for processes, machines, articles of manufacture, or compositions of matter that are deemed new, useful and non-obvious. The traditional subject matter of such utility patents covers tangible, technical inventions, such as improvements to client-server systems, motors, radios, computer chips and various technical product features. For example, Boeing’s US Patent No. 6,227,447 is a patent that covers methods of remotely controlling a vehicle. Patents can also be directed at new product features and functions. As another example, Facebook’s US Patent No. 8,171,128, titled “Communicating a newsfeed of media content based on a member’s interactions in a social network environment,” protects its News Feed feature.

A separate category of patent, the design patent, may be sought to protect ornamental (non-functional) designs. Some examples of notable design patents include Apple’s D 604,305 covering the design of its iPhone interface and Lululemon’s design patent covering its yoga pants.

The role of patents

Although patents are the most expensive and time-consuming type of intellectual property to obtain, they also provide the best scope of protection. A patent provides its holder with the exclusive right to make, use or sell an invention.  This means that it can exclude a competitor from making or selling the patented invention, irrespective of whether or not the competitor copied the invention or even previously knew of the patent.  For this reason, a patent that covers an important feature that drives consumer demand and/or distinguishes one’s product or service from that of competitors, can be very valuable.

Benefits of patents for a young business

Patents may provide a number of benefits to young businesses. For example, a robust patent portfolio or a key patent can help attract investors, since it may serve as barrier to entry by competitors. Furthermore, the filing of a patent application will enable the company to advertise “patent pending” along with its product or service.  In addition to potentially attracting investors, the “patented” or “patent pending” labels may deter would-be competitors, or force those competitors to adopt different designs and technologies.

As indicated above, once a patent issues it may be used to stop competitors from entering the field and allows for recovery of damages for infringement. Patents can also help the finances of a business by providing an opportunity to generate revenue from licensing.

How to obtain a patent

A patent is obtained by filing an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The application includes a description of the invention accompanied by drawings, followed by a list of the elements that form the invention, called the patent claims. The patent claims set out the metes and bounds of the invention.  Third-party products or services that practice the elements of a claim infringe the patent.

When a patent application is first filed, an examiner is assigned to it. The examiner will reject or allow claims based on an assessment of their patentability, and the patent applicant will have an opportunity to respond to the examiner’s decisions. This back-and-forth with the Patent Office, known as prosecution, can take a number of years and is best done by an experienced patent attorney who understands the procedures, the legal requirements and the art of drafting strong patent claims.

Impact of the America Invents Act

Changes in the patent law implemented by the America Invents Act (AIA) half a decade ago have impacted the leading practices for businesses looking to file for patent protection. First, the U.S. is a “first inventor to file” system. This incentivizes early disclosure of inventions and early filing of patent applications.

When two people independently come up with the same invention, the first inventor to file for a patent on his or her invention is awarded the patent, regardless of which actually invented first. For this reason, it is important for businesses to streamline operations to reduce the time from invention to filing of patent applications.

Early and cost-effective filing can be achieved through provisional applications, which are essentially invention disclosures that can be converted to full patent applications within one year.

In addition, the AIA also provides for a prioritized examination procedure, which expedites the patent examination process. While the use of prioritized examination is more costly up-front, it may reduce overall legal expenses, since a patent can be obtained within one year.

Avoiding infringement of other patents

A second important aspect that startups should consider with respect to patents is a defensive one, i.e., avoiding infringement of the patents held by others. As a matter of practice, startups should conduct a patent search to verify that their business is free of patents that could be asserted against their product or service. The up-front cost of performing this search and related analysis is relatively minor and is offset by the potential for huge savings, both in terms of litigation costs and wasted investment in an infringing idea. The cautionary tale of Vlingo underscores this point.

Vlingo spent years developing voice recognition technology that led to talk of partnerships with Google and Apple. However, another voice recognition company, Nuance, which held a patent on voice recognition, sued Vlingo for patent infringement. Although Vlingo ultimately won the lawsuit, by then the company had already lost its potential partnerships, and the cost of defending the suit forced Vlingo to sell its business to Nuance. An early patent search could have revealed the Nuance patent and may have allowed Vlingo to take appropriate strategic steps to address the issue. For example, they might have been able to adopt a different design to avoid a run-in with Nuance.

Trademarks

Trademarks take us into the world of branding.  Trademarks serve to build brand awareness and business goodwill. They can impart consumer confidence in a product by its association with a brand the consumer recognizes and trusts. A trademark can be words, symbols, logos, slogans or product packaging and design that identify the source of goods or services. The Coca-Cola logo is one of the more famous trademarks.

Unlike patents, trademark rights are only acquired through use. Even without registration, the symbols “TM” or “SM” may be used to accompany trademarks or service marks to designate products or services. However, only registered marks may be accompanied by the “®” symbol.

Although registration with the US Patent and Trademark Office is not required to gain trademark rights, registration provides certain important benefits to the trademark holder. For example, without a registration, the trademark rights are limited to the geographic area in which the product or service is marketed and sold, and protection begins only after the product or service is available for sale on the market.

In contrast, federally registered marks provide nationwide rights. Registration also creates a prima facie case of validity of the ownership as well as an exclusive right to use the mark for specified goods or services. Once registered, the owner of a mark can stop importation of infringing products through U.S. Customs.

Clearing and registering key trademarks

Just as with patents, when seeking trademarks, businesses should be aware of whether their desired name, logo or domain name is already in use by others. Searching for existing uses is known as trademark clearance, with the goal being to “clear” a desired mark for use. Clearing the name and brand early on will reduce the likelihood of problems down the road.

Startups should look to protect their brand early by clearing and registering key trademarks. Registration is relatively quick and inexpensive, generally a few thousand dollars for a clearance search and subsequent filing for registration. A trademark application must specify the type of mark — i.e., whether the mark consists of just words or includes a stylized design or even an identifying color or sound. The application must also specify the particular goods or services to which the mark will apply.

As the company grows, it will become increasingly important to police infringing uses of its marks. Such efforts will help ensure that the business is not losing customers due to confusion with knock-offs.

Copyrights

Copyright is a form of intellectual property that protects the expression of ideas. Books, music, art, photographs, architecture and even computer software can be protected by copyright.

However, while copyrights protect the expression of ideas, they do not protect ideas or concepts themselves. For example, a copyright can protect a particular photograph of a bird, but others may still create their own photographs of the same type of bird.

Another requirement for copyright eligibility is that the work must be “an original work of authorship.” Facts, titles, phrases, and forms per se cannot be copyrighted.

Exclusive rights to copyright owners

Like trademarks, copyright registration is optional. As soon as a work is written or recorded or otherwise made “tangible”, it is considered to be copyrighted. US law provides various exclusive rights to copyright owners, including the rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works and distribute copies, irrespective of registration.

However, registration provides significant procedural benefits. Critically, registration is necessary in order to file a lawsuit for copyright infringement. It is also necessary to receive certain remedies, such as statutory damages and attorney fees. Registration also provides a presumption of originality and ownership, and it allows US Customs to stop the importation of infringing or counterfeit works.

Businesses should include the “©” symbol or the word “Copyright” on all distributed materials. They should also include the year of first publication, the name of the owner, and the language “All rights reserved.”

Businesses should consider registering any important materials so that the option of filing lawsuits is available to address infringement. Registration can be filed online with the US Copyright Office for a nominal fee.

Startups should also be careful to avoid using third-party photos, music, or writings on their website, marketing materials or products. Such use could lead to a potentially costly infringement dispute with the copyright holder.

Finally, because the author is the copyright owner by default, startups should take steps to ensure that they receive the rights to any copyrightable work created by employees or third-party contractors. The Copyright Act lists specific requirements for works for hire, and employment and third-party contractor agreements should include specific language to address ownership of any copyrightable works.

Conclusion

While intellectual property issues may sometimes get brushed aside during the early stages of a business, developing a diligent and intelligent IP strategy early on is important.

Startups should evaluate the types of intellectual property that can impact their business and strategically consider pursuing patent, trademark and copyright protection as appropriate.

Defensively, startups should also assess the intellectual property landscape of their business. That awareness should include clearance efforts to ensure that the company will not infringe the intellectual property of others, as it develops its products and services.

Learn more about Legal Issues for High-Growth Technology Companies. 

© 1998-2018 Wiggin and Dana LLP

Ohio State and Oklahoma Battle It Out Again (Just Not On The Football Field)

In 2016 and 2017, two storied college football programs – the Ohio State Buckeyes and the University of Oklahoma Sooners – battled it out on the football field.  While Ohio State was victorious in 2016, Oklahoma evened things up with a victory in Columbus in 2017. In 2018, these two universities will battle it out again, but this time not on the football field, but rather before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.

The Ohio State University owns various registrations for a “Block O” mark.  One of the registered marks appears below:
 

 

The University of Oklahoma has applied to register a design mark consisting of a drum major with a block O across the chest of the drum major’s shirt, for use in connection with live performance by a musical band. Oklahoma claims to have used the mark since 2001.  Oklahoma’s mark appears below:

 

 

 On August 29, 2018, Ohio State opposed Oklahoma’s application, alleging a likelihood of confusion.

Ohio State claims that it has used its “Block O” mark since at least as early as 1898 and alleges:

“Today, the Block O mark is the heart of the branding and image of Ohio State and is used in connection with all products and services offered and provided by Ohio State, including educational, athletic, recreational, and musical. Indeed, the Block O Mark is permanently displayed in the middle of the football field at Ohio Stadium where millions of viewers have seen in Ohio State Buckeyes football team play its home games and have cheered on Ohio State’s marching band as it performs its famous ‘Script Ohio.’”

Further, Ohio State alleges that the “Block O” mark as it appears across the chest of the shirt of the drum major in the “Drum Major” mark is the dominant portion of the “Drum Major” mark, and consumers will naturally gravitate to the lettering on the chest to identify and falsely believe that there is a connection to Ohio State. Moreover, Ohio State notes that the actual uniform currently worn by Oklahoma’s drum majors is inconsistent with the use of the “Block O” appearing on the applied-for mark, such that the likelihood for confusion as to source is exacerbated.

Oklahoma has until October 8, 2018 to respond to the opposition.

This is not the first time Ohio State has tangled with an Oklahoma university regarding trademarks. Last year, Ohio State and Oklahoma State University, after trading legal blows, came to an agreement with regards to their respective “OSU” trademarks. Both schools agreed not to promote, market, license or sell products or services in a way that would cause confusion.  Notably, both schools also agreed not to use their marks to disparage the other. An example from the parties’ agreement states that Oklahoma State will not make T-shirts calling Ohio State a “wannabe OSU,” and Ohio State will not produce T-shirts dubbing Oklahoma State a “copy-cat OSU.”

Instead of a battle between the Buckeyes and Sooners on the football field, a battle between them at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board will be watched in 2018.   In the words of legendary sports announcer Keith Jackson, “It should be a dandy.”

© Copyright 2018 Brinks, Gilson & Lione

SAS Indirectly Strengthens the Impact of Estoppel

The Supreme Court decision in SAS Institute v. Iancu[i]will likely strengthen a patent owner’s ability to argue in favor of estoppel and keep a petitioner from getting multiple bites at the invalidity apple in parallel PTAB and district court proceedings. At first glance the Supreme Court’s recent decision appears to be another setback to patent owners. Instead of quickly defeating post grant challenges to at least some challenged claims pursuant to a denial of institution, patent owners will now have to fight petitions even if the Board finds merit with only a single ground challenging patentability. Upon closer examination, however, SAS’s implications for estoppel are favorable and may even resolve a split concerning the scope of estoppel.

The Supreme Court Directive in SAS

SAS addressed the PTAB’s “partial institution” policy, under which the PTAB claimed the power to institute an IPR with respect to only some of the claims challenged in a petition. In SAS, the Supreme Court rejected that policy. The Court explained that if the PTAB decides to institute an IPR, 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) provides that PTAB “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” Emphasizing the statute’s use of the phrase “any patent claim,” the Court held that PTAB cannot pick and choose which claims to address, but must instead take the petition as it finds it.[ii] The Court found further support for its interpretation in the structure of the inter partes review process “in which it’s the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding.”[iii]

The Split on Estoppel

The partial institution policy that SAS rejected has created a split in the interpretation of estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). Section 315(e)(2) provides that “[t]he petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision under section 318(a) . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” Congress intended this provision to preclude the same party from re-litigating invalidity in the district court once it had chosen to do so through an IPR. As then-Director of the PTO David Kappos testified, the “estoppel provisions mean that your patent is largely unchallengeable by the same party.”[iv] Similarly, Senator Grassley stated that IPR review “will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the civil litigation.”[v]

Notwithstanding the apparently broad estoppel envisioned by Congress, some courts have interpreted § 315(e) more narrowly. For example, in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit explained that where PTAB partially instituted an IPR, the petitioner was not estopped from raising a ground in district court that it had included in its IPR petition but on which PTAB did not institute. The court reasoned that the non-instituted ground was not raised “during th[e] inter partes review.”[vi] Similarly, in HP Inc. v. MPHJ Technology Investment, LLC, the Federal Circuit explained that “noninstituted grounds do not become a part of the IPR,” and “[a]ccordingly, the noninstituted grounds were not raised and, as review was denied, could not be raised in the IPR.” The court therefore held that “the estoppel provisions of § 315(e)(1) do not apply.”[vii] Other courts have followed suit and even extended that holding.[viii]

A broader interpretation of estoppel tracks what many believe to be the statutory intent, however, as a party should not get two bites at the apple and be able to seek review at both the PTAB and in the district court. Adopting this view, the court in Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. cabined Shaw and HP to their facts, holding that they “exempt an IPR petitioner from § 315(e)’s estoppel provision only if the PTAB precludes the petitioner from raising a ground during the IPR proceeding for purely procedural reasons.”[ix] Thus, the court held that § 315(e) estopped the petitioner from asserting any ground that (1) was included in PTAB’s final written decision, (2) was not instituted for non-procedural reasons, or (3) was not included in the petition.[x] Any other decision would result in needlessly protracted litigation as petitioners would re-litigate arguments similar to those that it had already lost or strategically chose not to include in a petition.[xi] The court in Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Products LLCtook a similar view with respect to non-petitioned grounds, holding that estoppel applies “to grounds not asserted in the IPR petition, so long as they are based on prior art that could have been found by a skilled searcher’s diligent search.”[xii]

SAS Strengthens Patent Owners’ Estoppel Arguments Because a Petitioner is Deemed to be the “Master of its Complaint”

While SAS had nothing to do with estoppel on its face, much of the disagreement regarding the scope of estoppel arose out of the PTAB’s partial institution policy and the effect of estoppel on non-instituted claims. Because the PTAB no longer has discretion as to partial institution, courts will no longer have to struggle with whether a petitioner is estopped from raising non-instituted grounds for unpatentability in a subsequent or parallel district court proceeding. While a few open issues remain, the patent owner will still be able to argue that SAS supports the idea that petitioners should only get one opportunity to challenge patentability—either at the PTAB or before a jury. The Supreme Court directive from SAS, coupled with recent guidance from the PTAB, suggests that the divide between the broad (Biscotti and Douglas Dynamics) and narrow (Shaw and HP) interpretations of estoppel—at least with respect to pre-institution decisions from the PTAB—may be merging.

Moreover, while SAS does not explicitly resolve whether a petitioner is estopped from arguing non-petitionedclaims in a parallel district court case, the premise behind the Supreme Court’s decision—that the petitioner is the master of its own petition—suggests that estoppel should apply. Some commentators have predicted that because PTAB must now choose between full institution and full denial, “petitioners [will] have an incentive to focus their petitions even further—when choosing claims to challenge, grounds to assert, and prior art to cite—in order to ensure that the likelihood of full institution is greater than the likelihood of full denial.”[xiii] But filing a targeted (and therefore stronger) petition may run the risk of estoppel on any non-petitioned claim. As Biscotti and Douglas Dynamics indicate, petitioners should not be permitted to hold arguments in reserve in case of an unfavorable result at the PTAB. Moreover, SAS supports Biscotti’s and Douglas Dynamic’s interpretation of the meaning of “during” the IPR. While Shaw characterized an IPR as not beginning until institution,[xiv]SAS depicts post grant review as a single process that begins with petitioner defining the scope of the proceeding in its petition.[xv]Applying estoppel to non-petitioned claims would not be inconsistent with a courts’ concern “that estoppel applies only to those arguments, or potential arguments, that received (or reasonably could have received) proper judicial attention.”[xvi]

 Further, SAS will still enable patent owners to rely on the same line of cases to argue for procedural estoppel. Before SAS, the PTAB frequently denied institution in view of procedural deficiencies.[xvii] Now, however, the PTAB will be faced with either denying institution for failure to comply with PTAB rules or allowing institution on all grounds even where some of the challenges are procedurally improper. For example, petitioners could present a single procedurally proper argument to open the door to review and evade page limit requirements by packing the remainder of the petition with grounds that must also be instituted under SAS but that are supported only by improper incorporations by reference.[xviii] While denying institution because of procedural failings could preclude the petitioner from filing another (procedurally proper) petition making the same arguments,[xix] the petitioner, as “master of its complaint,” could have drafted its petition correctly from the start.[xx] In short, the petitioner’s failure to follow the rules should not justify a second bite at the validity apple.

 Finally, pending petitions subject to partial institution could have the same consequences depending on the action of the petitioner post-SAS. PTAB guidance indicates that in such cases, “the panel may issue an order supplementing the institution decision to institute on all challenges raised in the petition.”[xxi] If a petitioner fails to seek supplemental institution or fails to appeal the PTAB’s refusal to supplement, estoppel could apply. While some courts might continue following Shaw and HP by holding that non-instituted claims were not raised “during” the IPR, petitioner “could have raised” those claims and arguments “during” the IPR—even under Shaw’s interpretation—given SAS’s holding because the petitioner should have sought to remedy the non-institution.

The Takeaway

While not obvious at first glance, SAS follows recent decisions like General Plastics that tend to protect patent owners’ rights. While the focus of SAS was on institution and the scope of institution, the Court has armed patent owners with another weapon with which they can challenge serial review of the same patent on the same grounds in multiple petitions and district court proceedings.

[i] No. 16-969 (Apr. 24, 2018).

[ii] Id., slip op. at 1, 4-5.

[iii] Id., slip op. at 12.

[iv] Hr’g on H.R. 1249 Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of David Kappos, Dir., USPTO) (“Those estoppel provisions mean that your patent is largely unchallengeable by the same party.”)

[v] 157 Cong. Rec. S1360-94 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (claiming that the estoppel provision “ensures that if aninter partes review is instituted while litigation is pending, that review will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the civil litigation”).

[vi] 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2)).

[vii] 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

[ See, e.g., Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7728, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017); Illumina, Inc. v. Qiagen N.V., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2016).viii]

[ix] 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144164, at *21-22 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017).

[x] Id. at *22.

[xi] Id. at *17-18, *20-21.

[xii] 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58773, at *15.

[xiii] Saurabh Vishnubhakat, First Steps After SAS Institute, Patently-O (Apr. 27, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/first-steps-institute.html

[xiv] 817 F.3d at 1300.

[xv] Slip op. at 6, 9.

[xvi] Verinata, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7728, at *10.

[xvii] See, e.g., Shenzhen Huiding Technology Co., Ltd. v. Synaptics Incorporated, IPR2015-01741, Paper 8 at 29-31 (PTAB Aug. 7, 2015) (partially denying institution due to improper incorporation by reference); Bomtech Elec., Co. Ltd. v. Medium-Tech Medizingeräte GmbH, Case No. IPR2014-00138, Paper No. 8 at 32-33 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2014) (same).

[xviii] See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).

[xix] General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017).

[xx] Id.

[xxi] Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (Apr. 26, 2018) (emphasis added). 

 

© McKool Smith
This post was written by Scott W. Hejny and Chelsea Priest of McKool Smith.

Patent Damages: How Many Essential Features in a Smart Phone?

On March 20, 2018, the public version of Eastern District of Texas Magistrate Judge Roy Payne’s March 7, 2018 order tossing a $75 million jury verdict obtained by Ericsson against TCL Communication was released.  Ericsson Inc., et al, v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd., et al, Case No. 2:15-cv-00011-RSP, Doc. No. 460 (redacted memorandum opinion and order) (E.D. Tex. March 7, 2018) (“Order”).  Judge Payne’s order sheds important light on the damages analysis for infringement of patents covering features of smartphone technology and potentially provides lessons to future litigants seeking damages for smartphone innovations.

After a jury verdict finding infringement, Ericsson also won a damages verdict of $75M due to TCL’s ongoing and willful infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,149,510 (“the ’510 patent”).  Ericsson contended that the ’510 patent covers smartphone functionality that allows a user to grant or deny access to native phone functionality to a third-party application, which is a standard feature in all Android smartphones.  After trial, TCL moved for judgment as a matter of law on infringement and damages, or in the alternative new trials.  Judge Payne indicated that he was going to uphold the infringement verdict, but ordered a new trial on damages.  Order at 1.

Ericsson’s damages case relied on two experts: Dr. Wecker and Mr. Mills.  Dr. Wecker analyzed a consumer survey that attempted to approximate the apportioned value of the patented feature in the accused products.  Mr. Mills determined a royalty rate based both on that apportionment and on a hypothetical negotiation between Ericsson and TCL.  Dr. Wecker determined that 28% of TCL customers would not have purchased a TCL smartphone if the smartphone did not have the patented feature in the ’510 patent.  This would have resulted in a loss of 28% of TCL’s sales and profits.  From this, Mr. Mills determined that the at-risk profit for TCL was $3.42 per device sold by TCL, which is the average profit per device for all accused devices, after a 28% loss rate discount.  Mr. Mills determined that during the hypothetical negotiation Ericsson would have recovered nearly all of the at-risk profit, likely obtaining a rate of $3.41 per device, but in any event would have secured no less than half of the at-risk profits, or $1.72 per product.  These rates would have justified a damages award ranging from $123.6M to $245M for damages across the life of the ’510 patent.  Mr. Mills further determined that the parties would have negotiated a lump sum payment discount for both pre-trial and post-trial infringement rather than a running royalty. Based on this expert testimony, the jury awarded Ericsson a $75M lump sum.

Judge Payne threw out the jury’s award for two reasons.  First, Judge Payne found error in Ericsson’s argument that TCL would have settled up front with a lump sum covering the entire royalty for the projected future sales of 111 million smartphones during the remaining life of the ’510 patent.  According to Judge Payne these products could not be part of the infringement base because they did not exist at the time of trial and could not have been adjudicated to infringe.  These future products could not be part of a damages order.  See Order at 12-14.

But the real meat of Judge Payne’s order is in his other justification for throwing out the damages verdict.  Judge Payne faulted Ericsson for painting the consumers’ choice of whether to buy a TCL phone as a binary decision based on the presence of the accused feature.  Judge Payne noted that the case originally had five patents and consumer surveys were done which noted that if each feature of three of the asserted patents was missing from TCL products, TCL would have lost 64% of its profits due to sales lost due to the absence of those features.  Judge Payne concluded that each of these features individually could not be responsible for a quarter of TCL’s profits per phone, and noted the following:

It is not difficult to see how this lost profit number quickly becomes unrealistic. Subtracting just three features covered by a mere three implementation patents would have allegedly cut TCL’s profit by more than half. The evidence from both sides suggested that there were at least a thousand implementation patents that might cover a TCL phone.  Regardless of the number, there is no dispute that a phone with an Android-operating system has many patented features, and that, according to Dr. Wecker’s survey results, consumers would likely find numerous features essential. According to Mr. Mills, any one of these allegedly essential features could independently be worth more than a quarter of TCL’s profit on the phone. By removing even three additional features covered by an implementation patent, on top of the features allegedly covered by the ’510, ’931, and ’310 patents, TCL would have lost all its profit (conservatively), according to Mr. Mills’ theory.

Order at 10-11 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  Judge Payne faulted Ericsson for not considering that a consumer’s decision to purchase or not purchase a phone would be based on whether numerous features were included, not just the ones covered by the asserted patents, and that Ericsson’s theory would erode all of TCL’s profits.  See Order at 11.  The judge further noted that:

To conclude that any one of these features—simply because it is considered essential to a consumer—could account for as much as a quarter of TCL’s total profit is unreliable and does not consider the facts of the case, particularly the nature of smartphones and the number of patents that cover smartphone features.

Order at 11.  Put simply, Judge Payne found that a single feature could not possibly account for $75M in damages for TCL’s smartphones, particularly in view of the many other features that are subject to patent protection.  Judge Payne noted that both sides agreed that Ericsson possessed potentially at least a thousand patents covering features of TCL phones.  Order at 10.  To Judge Payne, it could not possibly be the case that each of these patents accounted for 25% of the profits made by TCL.

This decision underscores the importance of securing a defensible damages analysis, especially in the context of the multifaceted technology embodied in modern smartphones.  Judge Payne’s concerns in his non-precedential opinion seemed to flow largely from unstated anxiety relating to royalty-stacking that made the logical extrapolation of the experts’ rubric unreasonable and erroneous.  In this context, it will be interesting to see how Ericsson recasts its damages theory in the next round of this litigation. We will continue to follow this case to see the approach, as we fully expect a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit from Ericsson.

 

©1994-2018 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

PTO Releases Revised Guidance on Compliance with Mayo/Alice Rule

On April 19, the USPTO released a Memorandum from Robert Bahr, The Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, that summarized the support required for a finding if a claim directed to a judicial exception to s. 101 eligibility under Step 2A of the Mayo/Alice analysis chart of MPEP 2106 – a natural phenomenon, an abstract idea or a product of nature [ ed. note “PAIN’]– contains an additional inventive concept that, taken alone or in combination, would not represent well-understood, routine, or conventional [“WRC”] activity. The Memorandum was prompted by the recent decision in Berkheimer v. HP, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

At virtually the same time, Director Iancu released a Request for Comments on Determining Whether a claim element is [WRC] for the Purposes of Subject Matter Eligibility, and it pretty much repeats the factors listed in the Bahr Memorandum. For a detailed summary of the factual underpinnings that an examiner must make in order to support a rejection on the basis that a claim directed to a PAIN does not meet the inventive concept requirement because it is WRC, please refer to my post of April 20th.

I criticized the four factors outlined in the Memorandum/Request for using the s. 112 standard that that which is known to the art need not be set forth fully in the specification, as a blaze mark to guide examiners in determining whether the additional elements(s) in the claim are WRC. In other words, if the specification does not give the details of how to measure a biomarker, the examiner can use such facts to support a WRC finding. This relying on material not present in the specification is repeated in Factors 1, 3 and 4. I also criticized Factor 2 as permitting examiners to simply cite to “one or more court decisions discussed in MPEP 2106(5)(d)(2)” as noting the WRC nature of the additional element(s) in the claim, primarily due to the breadth of the summaries of the cases in this section of the MPEP.

The Revised Guidance in the May 8th Presentation (which is available as a slideshow from the PTO) takes these two criticisms to heart. It drops the reference to the value of a s. 112 analysis in Factors relating to the evidence of WRC provided by the specification, the disclosures in the prior art and the ability of the examiner to take official notice of the WRC, which usually will be based upon disclosures in the prior art.

The Revised Guidelines start out by stating that the examiner should conclude that a claim element(s) represents only WRC activity only if he/she can conclude that the element(s) is “widely prevalent or in common use in the relevant industry,” a conclusion that must be supported by factual determinations. Here is a quick run-down of the four “Options” that the examiner can use to demonstrate that a claim directed to PAIN does not contain more than elements that are WRC (These are mostly my words):

  1. Applicant makes a “statement against interest” in the specification or during prosecution that a claim element(s) is conventional, widely prevalent or in common use, or is a commercially available product.

  2. The examiner can cite to one or more court decisions as noting the WRC nature of the additional elements, as reported in MPEP 2106(d)(II). I criticized this as overly broad, especially in view of the fact that there is almost no case law involving diagnostic testing or methods of medical treatment. Interestingly, in Vanda v. West-Ward, the Fed. Cir. stated that the Mayo claims were diagnostic claims. This is a stretch – What condition did they diagnose? The recited patient had been treated with the drug before any sample testing was carried out. However, the revised guidelines make it clear that the additional element in the claim must be the same as the element addressed in the court case, as well as the fact that the case must be on the MPEP list. Vanda v. West-Ward should be added to this list.

  3. The examiner finds prior art publication(s) that demonstrate that the element(s) in questions are WRC, not just in existence at some point in the past. This should come from the prior art located in the search done by the Examiner or disclosed by Applicant.

  4. The examiner is permitted to take official notice of the WRC of the additional element(s) but only to be used when the examiner is certain thereof based upon his/her personal knowledge. For all but the most indisputable WRC, the examiner may be required to provide a declaration under 37 CFR 1.104(d)(2).

If more than one element is present, the examiner must show that the combination of the elements is WRC in the pertinent art. If the examiner cited to a publication not previously of record in response to an argument by applicant, the office action should not be made final.

Comments must be received by Aug. 20, 2018 by submitting them to Eligibilty2018@USPTO.gov.

 

© 2018 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
Read more updates on Mayo/Alice on the National Law Review’s Intellectual Property Page.

Getting Closer to put the UPC into Force

April 26, 2018 is a remarkable date: first it’s World IP Day celebrating IP around the world. Second, and this is unique, the British IP Minister Sam Gyimah MP announced that the UK ratified the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPC Agreement). By doing so the UK agreed to be bound to both the UPC agreement and the UPC’s Protocol on Privileges and Immunities (PPI). The UPC will be a court common to the contracting member states within the EU having exclusive competence in respect of European Patents and European Patents with unitary effect.

In addition to Paris and Munich, London hosts a section of the Court’s central Division dealing with patents in the field of life sciences and pharmaceuticals. The way is now open for discussion about UK’s future within the UPC system after-Brexit. As of today, the UPC Agreement is ratified by 16 countries of the European Union.

To bring the Agreement into force, UK, France and Germany have to ratify the UPC Agreement and the PPI, now everyone is waiting for Germany, as France has already ratified.

Germany’s completion is currently on hold due to a constitutional complaint pending before the German Federal Constitutional Court.  According to rumours abound in the German IP community this complaint might be dismissed and the ratification will be finished during this year.

It’s time to get ready for playing with the new system!

 

Copyright 2018 K & L Gates.
This post was written by Christiane Schweizer of K & L Gates.
Read more on intellectual property on the National Law Review’s Intellectual Property Page.

Are Foreign Lost Profits Really Lost?

On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s lost profits decision in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015), marking the first step toward defining the scope of recovery for damages in the form of lost foreign sales. Under the Patent Act, damages are governed by § 284, which provides:

Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.

While § 284 allows patent owners to recover lost profits and reasonable royalties, the statute is silent as to whether these damages should encompass overseas losses (i.e., from foreign sales or contracts), which could play an important and substantial role in elevating damages – especially for patent holders with international contracts and services.

Background

WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Schlumberger Limited, a worldwide provider of reservoir drilling and processing technology in the oil and gas industry. Relevant to this case, WesternGeco LLC provides reservoir monitoring and imaging services to help perform seismic surveys. ION Geophysical Corp. (“ION”) offers similar services as WesternGeco and is a competitor.

In 2009, WesternGeco sued ION for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2). Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) provides:

  1. Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent . . . shall be liable as an infringer.
  2. Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use . . . knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States . . . shall be liable as an infringer.

The district court found for WesternGeco, awarding it $93,400,000 in lost profits and $12,500,000 in reasonable royalties as damages. On appeal, however, the panel majority reversed the district court’s award of lost profits, observing that the “presumption against extraterritoriality is well-established and undisputed.” Moreover, the Federal Circuit previously stated in Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semiconductor, “[Our patent laws] do not thereby provide compensation for a defendant’s foreign exploitation of a patented invention, which is not infringement at all.” In effect, the majority held that “[u]nder Power Integrations, WesternGeco cannot recover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign service contracts.”

WesternGeco’s Petition

WesternGeco filed two petitions for certiorari. Based on the first petition, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s opinion in light of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). On remand, however, the Federal Circuit reinstated its opinion and judgment as to lost profits. As a result, WesternGeco filed a second petition for certiorari on February 17, 2017, which presented the following question:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).

In its petition, WesternGeco argued that the majority panel “applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in such a duplicative manner [that] defeat[ed] Congress’ intent in enacting § 271(f).” Therefore, the decision “effectively eliminate[d] lost profit damages where infringement is found under § 271(f), limiting patent owners only to a reasonable royalty.” WesternGeco also distinguished its case from Power Integrations, by arguing that “Power Integrations dealt with infringement under § 271(a)” and therefore “reflects no comparable congressional judgment to target certain extraterritorial conduct.”

In an amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General urged the Court to hear this case, stating that the Federal Circuit’s “approach systematically undercompensates prevailing patentees like petitioner, whose transnational business suffered when respondent infringed petitioner’s patents within the United States.”

In addition, WesternGeco argued that allowing patentees to recover lost profits from international sales would be consistent with copyright law, which has been found by several circuits to permit parties to recover foreign damages so long as those damages are directly linked to a domestic predicate act of infringement.

Implications

Although the Supreme Court, in its 2007 opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., previously “[r]ecogniz[ed] [that] § 271(f) is an exception to the general rule that [U.S.] patent law does not apply extraterritorially,” the Court ultimately “resist[ed] giving the language . . . an expansive interpretation.”

Patent holders should be aware that the Supreme Court’s decision in WesternGeco may present an opportunity to expand the scope of damages claims to encompass international losses caused by infringement in the United States.

 

© Copyright 2018 Brinks, Gilson & LioneBrinks, Gilson & Lione.
This post was written by Jeffrey J. Catalono and Judy K. He of Brinks, Gilson & Lione.
Read more Intellectual Property News at the Intellectual Property Page.

IP Litigation: Raising an Ensnarement Defense Defeats the Doctrine of Equivalents

Is the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE) dead, once again? Effectively, yes.

All an alleged infringer needs to do is raise an ensnarement defense (a claim that a DOE enlarged hypothetical claim reads on the prior art), and then show that the equivalent element was known in the prior art. Most equivalent elements (not considering other claim elements) are known in the art, which is why they are equivalent!

Under current CAFC precedent, all an alleged infringer has to do is offer some prior art. There is no burden on the alleged infringer to show that a DOE enlarged claim is either anticipated or obvious in view of the prior art.For example, if the equivalent element is presented in any prior art reference, the burden then shifts to the patent owner to prove patentability. But patentability cannot be proven. To do that, one would have to present all that is known in order to argue that the prior art does not disclose the invention. And, of course, this is impossible. Could one even begin to present all knowledge in order to show the absence of some knowledge? Certainly not.

That is why, outside of a DOE enlarged hypothetical claim, at either the U.S. Patent Office (PTO) or before any court, someone arguing a claim is invalid first has the burden of at least presenting a prima facie case of anticipation or obviousness. The burden then shifts to the one urging claim validity to refute the prima facie case. Outside of ensnarement, the concept of proving patentability simply doesn’t exist, and for good reason.

The CAFC’s current precedent regarding how to consider the validity of a doctrine of equivalents enlarged hypothetical claim (hereafter hypothetical claim) is summarized In JANG v. BOS. SCI. CORP. & SCIMED LIFE SYS., INC., 2016-1275, 2016-1575, decided: September 29, 2017.

The Court stated:

“The first step is “to construct a hypothetical claim that literally covers the accused device.” Next, prior art introduced by the accused infringer is assessed to “determine whether the patentee has carried its burden of persuading the court that the hypothetical claim is patentable over the prior art.” Emphasis added.

“The burden of producing evidence of prior art to challenge a hypothetical claim rests with an accused infringer, but the burden of proving patentability of the hypothetical claim rests with the patentee.” Emphasis added.

This precedent does not require the alleged infringer to do any more than merely present the prior art. It fails to require the alleged infringer to provide a prima facie case of anticipation or obviousness.

Before Jang, there was an acknowledgment that the hypothetical claim should be one that would have been allowed by the USPTO. “The pertinent question then becomes whether that hypothetical claim could have been allowed by the PTO over the prior art. WILSON SPORTING GOODS CO. V. DAVID GEOFFREY & ASSOCIATES, 904 F.2d 677 (1990).” But the CAFC has failed to recognize that this means the alleged infringer must then first provide a prima facie case of claim invalidity, as would be required at the PTO.

Thus, the Doctrine of Equivalents is for all intents and purposes dead.

 

Copyright Davis & Kuelthau, s.c.
This post was written by James E. Lowe, Jr of Davis & Kuelthau, s.c.

Have you ever used a one-click ordering process online? Then you indirectly paid Amazon.

If you purchased anything from a website using a one-click purchase button, you indirectly paid Amazon for that ability, at least up until September 11, 2017 when Amazon’s patent to this technology expired. As a result, one-click purchasing might become the new norm.

In 1997, Amazon filed for a business method patent to one-click purchasing, which allows return shoppers to purchase items with just a single click of a button instead of having to proceed through a prolonged checkout process. The patent issued in 1999, at which point Amazon sued Barnes & Noble for patent infringement based on a similar technology used during Barnes & Noble’s checkout process. After extended litigation, the two companies settled in 2002. Not wanting to face similar litigation, Apple licensed the patent in 2000 to simplify ordering from the Apple Store.

The patent was extremely contentious, causing multiple calls to tighten patent laws or eliminate business method patents entirely. In response to the numerous attacks on the patent, Jeff Bezos called on the US Patent and Trademark Office to reduce the lifespan of patents to only 3 to 5 years, which prompted the US Patent and Trademark Office to issue an action plan to work with e-commerce companies to strengthen issued business method patents. But despite facing numerous challenges over the years, the patent survived. Thus if you have ordered anything online using a one-click purchase process, that company likely paid a licensing fee to Amazon to be able to provide that option.

Since the patent is now expired, one-click purchasing is now open to every online retailer. Large technology companies, such as Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft, are developing standardized one-click checkout procedures that can be applied internet-wide and that follow you from website to website. Google is likewise developing technology to incorporate one-click purchasing into its internet browser, Chrome.

 

©1994-2018 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. 

Aqua Products Sinks PTAB Decision in Bosch v. Matal

The odd title of this post arose from the fact that defendant Autel U.S., Inc. chose not to appeal its IPR win against Bosch that included invalidation of the claims in suit, and the refusal of the Board to enter an amended claim set proposed by Bosch. With Autel out of the picture, the PTO effectively represented the Board and Acting Director Matal was named as the defendant: Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Joseph Matal (Intervenor), Appeal no. 2015-1928 (Fed. Cir., December 22, 2017).

The technology claimed was directed to an improved device for transmitting data from the tire pressure sensor to the receiving unit in the vehicle, that was “universal” in that the user could check the data when working with different types of tires and receivers (U.S. Pat. No. 6,904,796).

In the IPR judgment, the Board found one set of Bosch’s proposed claims to be indefinite and one set to be obvious. The Fed. Cir. affirmed the Board’s ruling that the original claims were obvious but vacated the Board’s denial of Bosch’s contingent motion to substitute the amended claim set and remanded “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Even though the Board had provided some rationale for why the first group of claims proposed by Bosch was indefinite, the Fed. Cir. ruled as to both claim sets that the Board had impermissibly placed the burden of establishing the patentability of both proposed  claim sets on Bosch, in contravention to Aqua Products.

“See Aqua Products, 872 F.3d at 1311 (‘Where the challenger ceases to participate in the IPR and the Board proceeds to final judgment, it is the Board that must justify any finding of unpatentability by reference to evidence of record in the IPR’).”

Although not argued by the parties, the Fed. Cir. ruled that proposed amended claims could be challenged under s. 112.

Perhaps the most important sentence in the opinion is in the Fed. Cir.’s discussion of the Board’s erroneous holding that it was Bosch’s burden to establish the unobviousness of the proposed claims:

“In its final decision, the Board concluded that it was ‘unpersuaded that Bosch has demonstrated that the proposed substitute claims are patentable’  over the prior art… [Citing an earlier Board decision] the Board stated that ‘[t]he patent owner bears the burden of proof in demonstrating patentability of the proposed substitute claims over the prior art in general, and, thus, entitlement to add these claims to its patent.’”

Of course, this suggests that a failure of the Board or of the challenger to meet this burden of proof to demonstrate unpatentability would entitle the patent owner to add the substitute claims. This decision, strongly affirming Aqua Products,  tilts the legal playing field, to favor the patentee, even as it requires more work by the Board.

The Fed. Cir.’s analysis of the original (affirmed) obviousness rejection contains a very thorough discussion of the secondary factors of commercial success, licensing and acclaim by the industry, that I won’t try to summarize, except to note that these remain very difficult to “prove up” in an obviousness dispute, particularly if the patented technology is complex.

© 2017 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.