Category: Intellectual Property

A Week of Surreal Headlines: A Charging Bull Smashed by Man Wielding Banjo, A Stolen 18-Karat Gold Toilet, and a $20 Million Consignment Decided by a Game of Rock, Paper, Scissors

UNITED STATES

Mercedes-Benz Suit Against Street Artists Allowed to Proceed

Mercedes-Benz brought a declaratory judgment action against four street artists who saw their work prominently displayed on social media as background for the automaker’s G-Class track ads. Mercedes is seeking a declaration that its use of the artworks was not a copyright infringement as it was either fair use or because the claim is precluded by the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (1990).

After a hearing last week, a Detroit court denied the artists’ motions to dismiss Mercedes’s claims. The artists contended, among other things, that Mercedes’s claim was not ripe as the artists have not yet registered their copyrights. Distinguishing the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, this court concluded that copyright registration is not a prerequisite for an action seeking a declaration of non-infringement.

Los Angeles Police Department Seeks to Reunite Recently Discovered Artworks with Their Owners

The LAPD has uncovered a trove of more than 100 antiques and artworks that have been missing since a spree of thefts in 1993, including works by Pablo Picasso and Joan Miró. Two individuals involved in the thefts were captured in 1993, but it was not until this summer that an auctioneer’s tip led to the discoveries.

Charging Bull, a Symbol of Wall Street Power, Damaged by a Man with a Banjo

A man armed with a metal banjo bashed the famous Charging Bull on Wall Street, leaving it with a six-inch gash and several scratches. The attacker, who was arraigned and released without bail, gave no motive for his actions. He is due back in court on October 16. The artwork was installed in December 1989 by sculptor Arturo Di Modica, intended as a symbol of optimism after the Black Monday stock market crash in 1987.

EUROPE

Works of Art from the Collection of Nazi Collaborator Hildebrand Gurlitt to Be Exhibited in Israeli Museum

Artworks amassed by Hildebrand Gurlitt, noted Nazi collaborator, will go on view for the first time at the Israel Museum later this month. The collection includes works by Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Édouard Manet, Otto Dix and Max Ernst, among others. The show will include works declared “degenerate” by the Nazis and acquired by Gurlitt during the war, as well as works that have no red flags that might indicate ties to the Nazis. The exhibition, called “Fateful Choices: Art from the Gurlitt Trove,” reveals the historical circumstances behind the fate of art during the Third Reich and is intended to generate discussion about art and ethics.

Extreme Weather Leads to the Reemergence of a “Spanish Stonehenge”

This summer, an extreme drought in the Extremadura area of Spain has revealed the “Dolmen de Guadalperal,” a series of megalithic stones that were previously submerged. The Dolmen are 7,000 years old and are located in the Valdecañas Reservoir. They were last seen in 1963. A local group is working to move the Dolmen before they submerge again.

Police on the Hunt for Maurizio Cattelan’s 18-Carat Gold Toilet

Maurizio Cattelan’s America (2016), a fully functioning 18-carat gold toilet, was stolen from an exhibition at Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire, UK. Blenheim Palace is the 18th Century home and ancestral seat of the Duke of Marlborough. The burglars caused significant damage and flooding while removing the toilet.

Gagosian Gallery Adds Estate of Simon Hantaï to Its Roster

Gagosian Gallery added the estate of postwar abstractionist Simon Hantaï. Gagosian will host its first Hantaï show in October at its gallery in France. Hantaï, who is well known for his surrealist and abstract expressionist works, died in 2008. He is beloved in France and represented the country at the Venice Biennale in 1982.

Arrests Made in Connection with a String of Forgeries of High-Profile Old Master Paintings

An arrest was made and an additional warrant issued in connection with a high-profile string of suspected forgeries of Old Master paintings uncovered in 2016. The scandal has involved such institutions at the Louvre, London’s National Gallery and the Metropolitan Museum. The forgery ring may have been involved in as much as $255 million in sales of fake Old Masters.

Banksy Gallerist Calls It Quits

Steve Lazarides, who started out as the driver, photographer and later dealer for street artist Banksy, is leaving gallery life. Lazarides said that he entered the art world to “promote a subculture that was being overlooked, and that’s gone now.” His first project post-gallery life is to sort through the 12,000 photographs he took over 11 years with Banksy and publishing a book titled Banksy Captured.

ASIA

Art Recovery International Calls for the Return of a Painting They Allege Was Stolen from a UK Residence in 1984

Art Recovery International seeks intervention from the International Council of Museums (ICOM) in the return on a painting, The Portrait of Miss Mathew, later Lady Elizabeth Mathew, sitting with her dog before a landscape, which was allegedly stolen from the home of Sir Henry and Lady Price in East Sussex in 1984. The painting is currently located at Tokyo’s Fuji Art Museum, an ICOM member. The museum is contesting the claim.

The Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts Will Soon Take Over Russia’s National Centre for Contemporary Arts

Russia’s National Centre for Contemporary Arts (NCCA), which consists of nine branches, has begun merging with the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow as part of Pushkin’s ambition to open a “Pushkin Modern.” Vladimir Medinsky, Russia’s minister of culture, announced the merger in July, saying that NCCA staff had requested the merger after a series of ideological and financial scandals.

How a $20 Million Consignment Was Decided by a Game of Rock, Paper, Scissors

In the spring of 2005, a Japanese electronics giant decided to auction off works from its art collection worth about $20 million. The collection included works by Paul Cézanne, Camille Picasso, Vincent Van Gogh, Paul Gauguin and others. Unable to choose whether to consign with Sotheby’s or Christie’s, the company president decided that representatives from each company would meet at the Tokyo office and compete in a game of rock, paper, scissors. Christie’s chose scissors and Sotheby’s chose paper, and we all know scissors cut paper

© 2019 Wilson Elser

WIPO Launches UDRP for .CN and .中国 ccTLD

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) launched a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) for .CN and .中国 (China) country code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD), the first non-Chinese entity to do so. Previously, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Online Dispute Solution Center (CIETAC ODRC) or the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC) were authorized by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) to handle domain name disputes for these domains. The .CN and .中国ccTLD is among the largest in the world with over 22 million registered domain names.

The WIPO UDRP for .CN and .中国 ccTLD is only applicable to .CN and .中国domain names that have been registered for less than three years.  In contrast to the conventional UDRP, the Chinese UDRP applies to domain names that are identical or confusingly similar, not only to a mark, but to any “name” in which the complainant has civil rights or interests.

The complainant must prove that either registration or use of the disputed domain name is in bad faith, but not both as in the traditional UDRP.  Examples of bath faith provided by WIPO include:

  • The purpose for registering or acquiring the domain name is to sell, rent or otherwise transfer the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the name or mark or to a competitor of that complainant, and to obtain unjustified benefits;
  • The disputed domain name holder, on many occasions, registers domain Names in order to prevent owners of the names or marks from reflecting the names or the marks in corresponding domain names;
  • The disputed domain name holder has registered or acquired the domain name for the purpose of damaging the Complainant’s reputation, disrupting the Complainant’s normal business or creating confusion with the Complainant’s name or mark so as to mislead the public;
  • Other circumstances which may prove the bad faith.

The language of proceedings will be in Chinese unless otherwise agreed by the parties or determined by the Panel.  More information is available at WIPO’s site.

© 2019 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on internet IP concerns, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Trade Mark Re-filing And Bad Faith – Go Directly To Jail. Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200

Hasbro Inc. (Hasbro), owner of the well-loved board game Monopoly, suffered a defeat on 22 July 2019, before the EUIPO Board of Appeal in relation to the MONOPOLY trade mark. The EU registration for the MONOPOLY trade mark was partially invalidated as it was found that Hasbro had acted in bad faith when filing the application as part of a ‘trade mark re-filing’ programme.

Background

Hasbro applied to register the trade mark MONOPOLY for goods and services in Classes 9, 16, 28 and 41 of the Nice Classification. The application was published on 9 August 2010 and the mark was registered on 25 March 2011. Kreativini Dogadaji d.o.o (KD) filed an application for invalidation of the trademark in 2015, arguing that it had been registered in bad faith on the basis that the mark was a repeat filing of three identical earlier trade mark registrations for MONOPOLY.

Acting in bad faith

The EUTM Regulation states that a trade mark shall be declared invalid where the applicant acted in bad faith at the time of filing the application for the trade mark. However, EU trade mark law does not provide a definitive clarification of bad faith and ‘bad faith’ is not defined in the EUTM Directive or Regulation. The most notable case from the CJEU dealing with bad faith is the Lindt Goldhase-case (C-529/07) which sets out three areas of consideration:

  1. the applicant knows that a third party is using, in at least one member state, an identical/similar sign for an identical/similar product or service for which the registration is sought

  2. the applicant’s intention of preventing that third party from using the sign, and

  3. the degree of legal protection enjoyed by the third party’s sign and by the sign for which registration is sought.

Nonetheless, these factors are only examples and are not exhaustive, ‘bad faith’ cannot be restrained to a limited set of circumstances.

Findings of Board of Appeal

The Board of Appeal found that Hasbro had a dishonest intention at the time of filing the contested EUTM on the basis that Hasbro had previously filed and successfully registered MONOPOLY as an EUTM on three previous occasions. This dishonest intention was found because Hasbro had repeated filings in effect to circumvent the legal risk of removal due to non-use after five years. Although Hasbro claimed it had been adding more goods and services with each subsequent re-filing, the Board of Appeal did not deem it an acceptable excuse. The Board therefore invalidated the MONOPOLY mark for all goods and services identical or similar to those covered by the earlier trade marks.

The Key Takeaways

Hasbro did try to argue that their re-filing tactic was common practice in maintaining ownership of a trade mark, which it is, but the decision highlights that a tactics popularity does not equate to acceptability or legality. Brand owners should carefully consider the risk of invalidation or opposition on the basis of bad faith when filing future trade mark applications for existing brands.

Copyright 2019 K & L Gates
ARTICLE BY Niall J. Lavery and Simon Casinader of K&L Gates.
For more trade mark cases, see the Intellectual Property law page on the National Law Review.

Claim Construction Disputes Must Be Decided Before Applying Alice

On August 16, 2019, the Federal Circuit issued a 2-1 decision holding that a lower court erred by adjudicating patent eligibility without resolving the parties’ claim construction dispute. See MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC et al., Nos. 2018-1758, 2018-1759 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2019).

The patents at issue in MyMail cover methods for modifying toolbars displayed on Internet-connected devices. In response to defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings that the patents claim ineligible subject matter, MyMail raised a legal dispute over the proper construction of “toolbar.” The district court granted defendants’ motions without addressing the parties’ claim construction dispute, and without construing “toolbar.” The Court found in a split decision that the district court erred.

The majority held that “[d]etermining patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter.”  Accordingly, “if the parties raise a claim construction dispute at the Rule 12(c) stage, the district court must either adopt the non-moving party’s constructions or resolve the dispute to whatever extent is needed to conduct the § 101 analysis.”  Because the district court never addressed the parties’ claim construction dispute, or otherwise construed “toolbar,” the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

In his dissent, Judge Lourie argued that the facts of the case demonstrate that the parties’ claim construction dispute is “little more than a mirage,” and the claims at issue are “clearly abstract, regardless of claim construction.”

Implications

This decision provides patentees with another tool to help delay early patent eligibility decisions by raising legal issues over the proper scope of the claims. It is important to note, however, that this decision does not mean that judges must always construe the claims before ruling on patent eligibility—only when the parties raise a dispute. Further, patentees should weigh the relative pros and cons of raising claim construction issues early in a case, as this may come with some risks including putting a stake in the ground without sufficient discovery concerning the accused products.

© 2019 Brinks Gilson Lione. All Rights Reserved.

For more on patent law see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

How to Get a PTAB Decision Designated Precedential

This past year, we have seen the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) designate a number of decisions as precedential and informative more so than in past years. This is directly a result of the USPTO’s revised Standard Operating Procedure 2 (SOP2). On September 20, 2018, the USPTO announced that Board decisions can now be designated as precedential or informative through either one of two tracks: (1) POP Review or (2) a “ratification” process.

Under both tracks, a newly formed Precedential Opinion Panel (POP) comprising of at least three members will decide whether the decision should be designated as precedential or informative. Members of the POP will be selected by the Director and, by default, will comprise the Director, the Commissioner of Patents and the Chief Judge. The three members of the POP may each decide to delegate their authority in certain circumstances.

POP Review

POP Review under the first track is a rehearing of an issue in a pending trial. A party to a proceeding or any other member of the Board may recommend POP review—or a rehearing—of a particular Board decision. The request for POP review should be limited to situations where the Board decides issues of exceptional importance involving policy or procedure. A screening committee will review the recommendations and forward its recommendations to the Director. The Director will then convene with the POP to decide whether to grant rehearing, and if rehearing is granted, to render a decision on rehearing of the case.

If POP review is ordered, the Order will identify the issues the POP intends to resolve, may request additional briefing from the parties and, in some cases, may authorize amicus briefs. The POP may also order, at its discretion, an oral hearing. The decision resulting from POP Review will then be designated precedential, informative, or “routine.”

At this time, only two decisions have been issued by the newly formed POP:

  • Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, Case IPR2018-00914, Paper 38 (Mar. 13, 2019) (designated: Mar. 13, 2019)

  • GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., Case IPR2018-01754, Paper 38 (Aug. 23, 2019) (designated: Aug. 23, 2019)

Please see my latest blog post on the GoPro decision regarding the one-year time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

To request POP review, a party to the proceeding must submit a request by email to Precedential_Opinion_Panel_Request@uspto.gov. The email must identify with particularity the reasons for recommending POP review along with a request for rehearing filed with the Board under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a) or 42.71(d). In addition, counsel must also include a statement that the Board’s decision for which rehearing is requested was contrary to law or is a question of exceptional importance.

“Ratification” process

Under the second track, the public may nominate already issued decisions to be designated precedential or informative. Under this track, the Board is relying on the public to recognize which decisions are valuable to post-grant practice. This is the more traditional path for which a decision may be designated as precedential or informative. In this past year, there have been more than a dozen decisions that have been designated as precedential or informative through this ratification process. As above, a screening committee will review the recommendations and the Director will then convene with the POP to decide whether to designate the decision as precedential or informative.

Nominations should be submitted by email to PTAB_Decision_Nomination@uspto.gov and must set forth with particularity the reasons for the requested designation.

To learn more about the process under either track described above, I recommend reviewing the revised Standard Operating Procedure 2 (SOP2) online which provides the detailed procedural requirements for nominating a decision as precedential or informative.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California
ARTICLE BY Margaux A. Savee of Polsinelli PC.

Celebrity Entertainer Sues Over Video Game Avatar

As real-world celebrities continue to expand the reach of their persona into the digital realm, the potential benefit for advertisers, game developers and esports event promoters is exceedingly high. But with increased opportunity comes increased risk.

A New York Supreme Court recently addressed this risk when it construed the State’s right of publicity statute[1] in a dispute over an NBA 2K18 video game avatar. In Champion v. Take Two Interactive Software, Inc., celebrity basketball entertainer Phillip “Hot Sauce” Champion sued the video game developer, alleging violation of his right to privacy for Take-Two’s use of his name and likeness. The Court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit, but not before it provided a helpful discussion of New York’s publicity statute and its modern application to the esports industry.

A Primer on New York’s Publicity Statute

New York publicity law allows both criminal charges and civil liability for use of a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for advertising or trade purposes without prior written permission. This right to publicity extends to any recognizable likeness that has a “close and purposeful resemblance to reality.” Courts have already held that video game avatars are within the scope of the statute’s reach.

However, while seemingly broad at first pass, this statutory right is actually more narrow than similar rights in other states where the right to publicity is recognized only at common law (i.e., in states that have no black-letter publicity statute). For example, in New York, neither “incidental” use of a person’s name or likeness, nor use that is protected under the First Amendment, are violations.

Further, unlike the words “portrait” and “picture,” the word “name” in the statute is construed literally. In fact, New York courts find liability only for uses involving an individual’s full name, and not just a surname, nickname, or business name. The statute does, however, protect certain “stage names” in limited situations, such as when the individual has become known by a stage name virtually to the exclusion of his or her real name.

The Plaintiff and the Video Game

Phillip Champion is a prominent street basketball entertainer known professionally as “Hot Sauce.” Champion claims that he is widely recognized as both “Hot Sauce” and “Hot Sizzle” in social media, and is regularly depicted on television and in blogs, movies, YouTube videos, sports magazines and live halftime shows. As a result, Champion is able to license his celebrity persona through sponsorships and endorsement deals with prominent consumer brands like AND1.

Photographs of Champion filed with the Court.

Take-Two created the NBA 2K18 basketball simulation video game, which realistically depicts the on-court competition and off-court management of the National Basketball Association. Users can create a custom player avatar, or select from existing player avatars modeled after real-life professional athletes. The game’s “MyCareer” mode allows the user to create a custom basketball player, and then design and play through the character’s entire career, competing in games and participating in off-court activities. The “Neighborhoods” option, which ties to the off-court activities in the MyCareer mode, lets users explore an off-court urban world while interacting with other basketball players—most of which are non-playable characters controlled by the computer—in scenarios like exercising in public gyms and playing casual basketball games on city courts.

Champion’s Claims

Champion’s lawsuit stems from one of the non-playable characters in the game’s Neighborhood mode, who is depicted as a young, African-American male with a mohawk, wearing all-white hi-top sneakers, a tank-top, and black shorts with white piping. On the front and back of the tank-top is the numeral “1,” and on the back are the words “Hot Sizzles.”

Images of the “Hot Sizzles” avatar filed with the Court.

Champion alleged that the look of the “Hot Sizzles” avatar incorporated numerous personal aspects of his life and identity in violation of the New York publicity statute, and further that the avatar’s “Hot Sizzles” name was itself a violation because Champion is “ubiquitously” known as “Hot Sizzle.”  Take-Two responded that its “Hot Sizzles” avatar does not sufficiently resemble Champion, whether in name or image, under New York law.

On Champion’s claims to his likeness, the Court found no physical resemblance between Champion and the “Hot Sizzle” avatar, and determined that the only reasonable commonalities are that “both are male, African-American in appearance, and play basketball.” The Court compared this case to two similar cases (Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.  and Gravano v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. ), both involving Take-Two’s Grand Theft Auto video game, in which the avatars exhibited many closer similarities to the plaintiffs in clothes, hair, poses, voice, and life stories. Finding no similar likenesses in this case, the Court ruled that, at least from a visual perspective, the Hot Sizzles avatar in NBA 2K18 is not recognizable as Champion as a matter of law.

On Champion’s claim to the name “Hot Sizzles,” the Court recognized that the use of a person’s celebrity or “stage” name with a video game avatar could aid in recognition of the avatar as that person’s likeness. However, the Court determined that Champion’s “primary performance persona” is actually “Hot Sauce,” which is entirely distinct from the NBA 2K18 avatar’s name, “Hot Sizzles.” Champion was not able to show that he is widely known as “Hot Sizzle” to the public at large—as opposed to just in the sporting or gaming circles—so the Court ruled that, without this level of connection between Champion and the name “Hot Sizzle,” Take-Two’s use of “Hot Sizzles” does not aid in the visual recognition of the NBA 2K18 avatar as Champion.[2]

Incidental Use and the First Amendment

Take-Two also defended against Champion’s claims by alleging that the “Hot Sizzles” character falls within the “incidental use” exception to liability under New York’s statute. After reviewing the NBA 2K18 game content and related advertising, the Court seemed to agree that the avatar “is a peripheral non-controllable character” that “adds nothing of true substance to a user’s experience in the game.” However, the Court declined to make an affirmative ruling on this component of the lawsuit.

Finally, Take-Two argued that its NBA 2K18 game is protected speech under the First Amendment, and as such, it does not constitute “advertising or trade” under New York’s law. In response, the Court declared that, while video games may conceptually qualify for free speech protection, not every video game constitutes “free speech” fiction or satire. In comparing NBA 2K18 to games that contain a detailed story with pre-defined characters, dialogue and unique environments created entirely by the game designers, the Court determined that here, the users create their own basketball career and completely define their character. Accordingly, the Court found that categorizing NBA 2K18 as “protected fiction or satire” under the First Amendment is “untenable.”

What it Means

As novel sponsorship and endorsement opportunities are created through the advent of esports, advertisers, game developers, and event promoters must be certain they have the appropriate content and publicity licenses in place. However, because publicity laws, in particular, are enforced at the state level, doing this without expert guidance can be daunting. Using the right tools and a proactive licensing and review strategy, brands and marketing agencies can capture (and keep) a broader share of the esports industry’s revenues, and keep the competition on the court, not in it.

[1] New York Civil Rights Law, §§ 50-51.

[2] The Court determined that “Hot Sizzle” is, at best, Champion’s secondary “nickname.”

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Not So Fast And Furious – Executive Indicted for Stealing Self-Driving Car Trade Secrets

Back in March, 2017, we posted about a civil lawsuit against Anthony Levandowski, who allegedly sped off with a trove of trade secrets after resigning from Waymo LLC, Google’s self-driving technology company. Waymo not only sued Levandowski, but also his new employer, Uber, and another co-conspirator, Lior Ron. Since our initial post, things have gotten progressively worse for the Not So Fast and Furious trio: (1) Levandowski was fired in May, 2017; (2) Uber settled, giving up 5% of its stock, which totaled $245 million dollar;  and (3) the case against Levandowski and Ron was sent to arbitration, where the arbitration panel reportedly issued a $128 million interim award to Waymo.

Just when things couldn’t seem to get any worse, they did.

On August 15, 2019, a federal grand jury indicted Levandowski on 33 counts relating to trade secret theft. Levandowski has pled not guilty, has been released on $2 million dollars bail, and  is currently wearing an ankle monitor.

This legal saga is a reminder that trade secret theft is serious… it not only has civil consequences, but also criminal ones.  Unfortunately, trade secret theft happens every day.  And regardless of whether your company has trade secrets regarding self-driving car technology, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, or customer information worth less than a hundred thousand dollars, it’s important to make sure your company’s information is protected.

Equally important is knowing how to investigate potential trade secret theft. Some helpful tips as you launch your investigation:

1. Secure and preserve all relevant computing devices and email/file-sharing accounts.

2. Consider enlisting the help of outside computer forensic experts.

3. Analyze the employee’s computing activities on company computers and accounts.

4. Determine whether there is any abnormal file access, including during non-business hours.

5. Examine the employee’s use of external storage devices and whether those devices have been returned.

6. Review text message and call history from the employee’s company issued cell phone (and never instruct anyone to factory reset cell phones).

7. Enlist the help of outside counsel to set the parameters of the investigation.

© 2019 Jones Walker LLP
For more on trade secret law, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Bronze, Shape, Glow: A Copyright Tale Destined For Broadway

Stores like Aldi are increasingly popular with UK consumers as a result of offering “copycat” products of well-known brands at drastically lower prices. However, with this rise in popularity, brand owners and creatives are being increasingly frustrated by finding their products and ideas at the mercy of imitation products.

One such aggrieved party was well-known makeup brand Charlotte Tilbury (Tilbury), who found their “Starburst” lid design and the “Powder Design” of their “Filmstar Bronze and Glow” set had provided the ‘inspiration’ for Aldi’s own “Broadway Shape and Glow” set. Tilbury filled a UK High Court claim for copyright infringement over the products shown below, with Aldi adamantly rejecting that any copyright had been infringed in their ‘inspired’ makeup set.

The main difficulty Tilbury faced was the fact that it is notoriously hard to claim copyright in mass produced 3D products as English Courts have historically been reticent to consider them “sculptures” or “works of artistic craftsmanship”.

However, Tilbury was successful in arguing that the “Starburst” lid design and the “Powder Design” on their product were original artistic works and as such the product was protected by copyright. Tilbury were able to establish their artistic copyright as “a work need only be ‘original’ in the limited sense that the author originated it by his efforts rather than slavishly copying it from the work produced by the efforts of another person.” Once establishing the existence of copyright in the artistic work the Court had little difficulty in finding that it had been substantially copied by Aldi for its “Broadway Shape and Glow” set and summary judgement was granted in Tilbury’s favour.

This case not only marks a success for the aggrieved brands and creatives who feel short changed by “Like brand inspiration” products but also provides some interesting learning opportunities for brand owners in the quest to protect their designs. Tilbury was successful in arguing copyright infringement due to the original artistic “starburst” element in its product design, the elements where the copyright lay. Brand owners may consider incorporating similar artistic elements into their products to act as a form of protection against imitators or at least provide ammunition for a copyright infringement claim should they need it.

Click here for the Judgement.

Copyright 2019 K & L Gates

Article by Serena Totino and  Daniel R. Cartmell of K&L Gates.
For more copyright cases see the Intellectual Property law page of the National Law Review.

Genotyping Patent Claims Do Not Escape The Reach of s. 101

In Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. Laboklin GMBH & Co., the University of Berlin, App. No. 2018-1565 (Fed. Cir., Aug. 9, 2019), a Fed. Cir. panel affirmed the district court’s JMOL ruling that the claims of the University’s U.S. Pat. No. 9,157,114 were patent-ineligible because they merely involved the discovery of a natural phenomenon. Interestingly, the Judges on the panel were Wallach, Hughes and Stoll, all of whom dissented from the refusal of the Fed. Cir. to rehear the Athena decision en banc. However, Athena was a straightforward “If A, then B” diagnostic test, while the claims of the ‘114 patent were not written as diagnostic claims, but as “method of genotyping” claims:

An in vivo method for genotyping a Labrador Retriever comprising:

  1. obtaining a biological sample from the Labrador Retriever,
  2. genotyping a SUV39H2 gene encoding the polypeptide of SEQ ID NO:1[;] and
  3. detecting the presence of a replacement of a nucleotide T with a nucleotide G at position 972 of SEQ ID NO:2.

This “genotyping method” detected a single point mutation in the gene that confirms the presence of a skin condition, HNPK, in the dog, that is heritable if both parents possess the mutation. It can also be used to confirm whether or not a skin condition present in the dog is HNPK.  However, the absence in the claim of a step directed to drawing a diagnostic conclusion from the presence of the mutation, while in accord with the PTO’s 2014 101 Guidance, did not save this claim from the judicial exception prohibiting claiming a law of nature. Rather, the claim jumped from a legal frying pan of Athena into the legal fire of Ariosa, that bars patenting the mere discovery or observation of a natural phenomenon:

“Similarly [to Ariosa], In re BRCA1 – & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation, we concluded that the claims were directed to a patent ineligible law of nature because the claims’ “methods, directed to identification of alterations of the gene, require[d] merely comparing the patient’s gene with the wild–type gene and identifying any differences that ar[o]se”. 774 Fed.. Cir.755, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In each of these cases, the end result of the process, the essence of the whole, [Ed. note: Is this some new poetic legal standard?] was a patent-ineligible concept”. [Ed. note: “concept” seems to be veering into abstract idea-land.]…Taken together, the plain language of claim 1 demonstrates that it is directed to nothing more than ‘observing or identifying’ the natural phenomenon of a mutation in the SUV39H2 gene….Thus the asserted claims are directed to a natural phenomenon at Alice step 1.”

Since the next section of the opinion is entitled “The Asserted Claims Do Not Recite an Inventive Concept”, you know this opinion is going to end badly for Labokin, the exclusive licensee of the university patent. Given that this opinion was written by the dissenters in the Athena petition for rehearing in banc, might this case turned out differently? Could the existence of the mutation in some of the SUV39H2 genes have been part of a public data base but its significance be unknown until the inventor discovered that the mutation could be correlated to the presence of HPNK? In other words, could the panel have begun by giving weight to the fact that one could observe the mutation without knowing what it means?

To get “credit” for the discovery of the utility of the mutation, claim 1, at the least, would need a mental process step that draws a diagnostic conclusion, a la Athena. Now the Athena dissenters would argue that the discovery of the utility of the correlation should provide the “inventive step” required by Alice step 2. But the Fed. Cir.’s Meriel decision precludes that outcome, since that panel ruled that the discovery of the utility of a correlation cannot meet the “inventive step” requirement. (Genetics Techs. v. Meriel is cited at page 25 of the slip opinion, but only as supporting a finding a lack of inventive step when the laboratory techniques employed to carry out the diagnostic procedure are routine, conventional, etc.)

So to get this claim past the “inventive concept” gatekeepers, it would also need to recite a positive action step of some sort. Here, the panel cites and distinguishes Vanda because it taught “a specific method of treatment for specific patients, using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.” Remember, the claims of Vanda recited a first genotyping step, and then drawing a conclusion from that step, but didn’t stop there. This case did not give the dissenters much to work with, so they wrote a decision that Siri could have come up with. This case could at least have taken a swing at the failure of the Alice test to consider the claim elements in ordered combination. Judge Newman may yet get to write for a panel that has the nerve to distinguish Mayo and to find that an “If A, then B” diagnostic claim based on the discovery if the utility of a natural correlation is patent eligible because the steps, considered as a whole, are not conventional or well-known to the art.

© 2019 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on patent eligibility see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Will the Supreme Court Weigh in on the Copyright Lawsuit of the Decade?

When two tech titans clash in court, the outcome can reverberate widely. In what has been dubbed the “copyright lawsuit of the decade,” Oracle sued Google in 2010 for infringing its copyrights in 37 Java Application Programming Interface (API) packages used in Google’s Android software platform for mobile devices (as explained further below, API packages consist of pre-written computer programs that perform specified functions).

At the first trial in 2012, a jury found that Google infringed Oracle’s copyrights. The judge, however, concluded that the Java API packages were not copyrightable as a matter of law. In 2014, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for a second jury trial on Google’s fair use defense. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court denied Google’s cert petition.

In 2016, a second jury found in favor of Google on its fair use defense, and the trial court denied Oracle’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In 2018, the Federal Circuit overturned the jury’s verdict, concluding that Google’s use of the 37 Java API packages was not fair use as a matter of law. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

On January 24, 2019, Google petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. It identified the issues presented as:

(i) whether copyright protection extends to a software interface; and

(ii) whether Google’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair use.

The Federal Circuit’s rulings sent shockwaves through the software industry, and fifteen parties—ranging from corporations like Microsoft to software-related associations, and intellectual property scholars—filed amicus briefs in support of Google’s petition. Microsoft warned that the Federal Circuit’s approach “threatens disastrous consequences for innovation” in the software industry by depriving third parties of access to and reuse of functional code used to “facilitate interoperability across myriad software platforms and hardware devices.” An association representing over 70,000 software developers worldwide asserted that the Federal Circuit’s conclusions had spawned confusion concerning whether longstanding practices such as sharing libraries of common software functions constitute copyright infringement. Likewise, Professor Peter S. Menell and Professor David Nimmer (the editor of Nimmer on Copyright) maintained that the Federal Circuit had “upended nearly three decades of sound, well-settled, and critically important decisions of multiple regional circuits on the scope of copyright protection for computer software.”

On March 27, 2019, Oracle filed its opposition to the petition. The tech giant identified the issues as:

(i) Whether the Copyright Act protects Oracle’s computer source code that Google concedes was original and creative, and that Oracle could have written in any number of ways to perform the same function?

(ii) Whether the Federal Circuit correctly held that it is not fair use as a matter of law for Google to copy Oracle’s code into a competing commercial platform for the purpose of appealing to Oracle’s fanbase, where Google could have written its own software platform without copying, and Google’s copying substantially harmed the actual and potential markets for Oracle’s copyrighted works?

After Google filed its reply, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States. This is where the case presently stands.

The Java Programming Language

Oracle’s predecessor, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) developed the Java programming language to allow programmers to write programs that run on different types of computing devices without having to rewrite the programs from scratch for each type of device. To that end, Java’s motto is “write once, run anywhere.”

To provide programmers with shortcuts for executing specific functions, Sun created the Java API, which consists of packages (akin to a bookshelf in a library), classes (akin to books on the shelves), and methods (akin to “how-to” chapters in each book). See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d and remanded, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Each method performs a specific programming function (for example, choosing between the greater of two integers). The key components of a method are: the “declaring code” that defines the package, class and method names, form of inputs and outputs, and the “implementing code” that provides instructions to the computer concerning how to carry out the declared function using the relevant inputs.

Google began negotiating with Sun in 2005 to license and adapt Java for its emerging Android software platform for mobile devices. After those negotiations failed, Google decided to use Java anyway, and copied verbatim the declaring code in 37 Java API packages (consisting of 11,500 lines of code), as well as the structure and organization of the packages (referred to as the SSO). However, Google wrote its own implementing code for the relevant methods.

In 2007, Google began licensing the Android platform free of charge to smartphone manufacturers. It earned revenue—$42 billion from 2007 through 2016—from advertising on the phones. In 2010, Oracle acquired Sun, and promptly sued Google for infringement.

The Copyright Question

In 2014, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that the declaring code and SSO were not entitled to copyright protection. Importantly, while the Federal Circuit only has jurisdiction over patent-related matters, it handled the appeal because Oracle’s complaint had also included patent claims (which the jury rejected). The Federal Circuit, however, applied Ninth Circuit law to the copyright questions presented.

The Federal Circuit began by noting that “copyright protection extends only to the expression of an idea—not to the underlying idea itself.” Moreover, to the extent the particular form of expression is necessary to the use of the idea, then using the expression to that extent is not copyright infringement. This is known as the “merger doctrine” which states that if there are a limited number of ways to express an idea, the idea is said to “merge” with its expression—and the expression becomes unprotected. Further, the “scenes a faire doctrine,” bars certain standard, stock, or common expressions from copyright protection.

Thus, to use a simple example, while a book on arithmetic can be copyrighted, the idea of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing cannot be. Moreover, if using symbols like “+” and “x” are necessary or commonly used to express the concepts of adding and multiplying, those expressions are not copyrightable.

Applying these principles, the Federal Circuit first observed that copyright protection extends to expressive elements of a computer program. It then rejected Google’s argument that Oracle’s expression merged with unprotectable ideas, noting that Oracle had unlimited options as to the selection and arrangement of the declaring code that Google copied. The Federal Circuit also rejected Google’s reliance on the scenes a faire doctrine. Because at the time the code was written, its composition was not dictated by external factors like “mechanical specifications of the computer” or “widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry.”

The Fair Use Question

After determining that Oracle’s declaring code and SSO were subject to copyright protection, the Federal Circuit remanded for a jury trial on Google’s fair use defense. As noted, the jury found that Google had established the defense, but the Federal Circuit overturned that verdict.

The fair use defense is a judge-made doctrine that has been incorporated into the federal copyright statute as Section 107, which provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted work…for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” To determine whether particular copying constitutes fair use, the statute identifies the following factors as:

(1) “The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”

(2) “The nature of the copyrighted work.”

(3) “The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”

(4) “The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”

The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that because Google’s copying was for a highly commercial purpose, was not qualitatively insignificant, and substantially harmed Oracle’s own licensing efforts; the copying was not fair use as a matter of law, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary.

Because APIs are key to broad acceptance of standardized software functions, IMS computer and software expert Dr. John Levy believes that were the Supreme Court to affirm the Federal Court’s ruling, it may severely limit the spread of useful API’s to important code bases. As an example, Dr. Levy notes that a small company will usually want to make its declaring code available to all users and developers, so that the underlying application code will get the broadest possible use and market share. The developer counts on having a competitive set of implementing code to make money.

According to Dr. Levy, the Federal Circuit may have been influenced by the fact that Google made so much money using the copied declaring code. But as evidenced by the large number of amicus briefs, the broader software industry cares more about defending a broad reading of “fair use” than assessing damages against companies who make money from copied declaring code.

Dr. Levy sees the issues in the Oracle case as similar to those in a case he worked on as an expert back in the 80386 chip days. In that case, Intel owned the instruction set of the 386 chip. But because Intel customers didn’t want to be limited to a single source for these Intel-compatible processors, Intel licensed the instruction set to other chip manufacturers.

“One licensee produced chips that performed the Intel-owned instruction set. Intel sued that licensee for copyright infringement of the underlying microcode (the implementation of the instruction set in the chip designed by the licensee company),” recalled Dr. Levy.

A federal court ruled that the microcode (firmware) was indeed copyrightable, but that there was no infringement under the “limited expression” doctrine explained above. There simply were not many ways to implement the licensed instructions in microcode, and therefore the licensee’s implementation did not infringe Intel’s own implementation. In the Oracle case, however, the Federal Circuit concluded that there were many ways for a programmer to select and arrange the declaring code that Google copied.

© Copyright 2002-2019 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

This article was written by Joshua Fruchter of IMS ExpertServices.
For more copyright cases, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.