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Unlocking India’s Space Potential: India Liberalizes Foreign Direct Investment Regime

The foreign investment policy was ambiguous about space activities beyond satellites, leading to different interpretations.
Some companies made investments basis the view that investments in the activities not listed under the FDI policy in this sector could be made up to 100% without prior government approval.
The proposed FDI Space Policy addresses these concerns and allows 100% foreign investments under the automatic and governmental approval route.
Formal notification is awaited which will make this policy effective as law.

Background

India currently is home to more than 200 space start-ups, and the space sector in India has attracted USD 124.7 million investment in the year 2023. The existing foreign investment policy of India (“FDI Policy”) requires foreign investors to obtain prior government approvals for investing in the space sector, particularly for the establishment of satellites.

Considering the growth of this sector, the Indian government has been periodically releasing policies / notifications, establishing organizations, etc. with the intent to allow more private participation in this sector. This has led to the establishment of an organization to promote the sector called the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre in 2020, as well as the introduction of the National Geospatial Policy, 2022 followed by the Indian Space Policy, 2023.

On February 21, 2024, the Union Cabinet approved amendments to the Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) policy and communicated it in a press release (“FDI Space Policy”) which proposes to liberalize investments in the space sector. However, a formal notification from the relevant authorities is still awaited for the amendments to become enforceable as law.

Existing FDI Policy

Existing foreign investment limits in the space sector are provided under the Schedule I of Foreign Exchange Management Act (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 (“NDI Rules”). The current norms do not recognize “space” as a sector in itself. Instead, the space related activities are primarily captured under the head – “satellites – establishment and operation”. 100% foreign investment is allowed in this sector but the same is subject to approval from the government along with compliance of sectoral guidelines from Department of Space / Indian Space Research Organisation. In essence, all foreign investments in companies undertaking the activities of satellites-establishment and operations require government approval.

Reforms – New FDI Space Policy

The proposed FDI Space Policy allows 100% foreign investment in the space sector and has also created sub-categories, entry route and investment thresholds for various space related activities, which are as follows:

S.no.	Activity	FDI Thresholds
1.	Satellites-manufacturing & operation, satellite data products and ground segment & user segment	Up to 74% under automatic route and beyond 74% (up to 100%) under government route
2.	Launch vehicles and associated systems or subsystems, creation of spaceports for launching and receiving spacecraft	Up to 49% under automatic route and beyond 49% (up to 100%) under government route
3.	Manufacturing of components and systems/ sub-systems for satellites, ground segment and user segment	Up to 100% under automatic route

Analysis

(i) Status of existing investments

The existing FDI policy did not include space sector related activities (other than satellites-establishment and operation) such as launch vehicle business, ground segment, user segment, sub-component / sub-systems manufacturing, data products etc.

Various stakeholders argued that since the existing FDI policy did not specify certain activities such as launch vehicles, data sets, manufacturing of space systems / components etc. under the head of “satellites-establishment and operation”, foreign investments in such cases should be permitted up to 100% under the automatic route. This was based on the interpretation under the FDI policy that sectors / activities not specifically listed or prohibited, are permissible for foreign investment up to 100% under the automatic route, subject to sectoral conditionalities. Relying on the same, foreign investors made investments in space start-ups whose activities were not explicitly listed or regulated under the current FDI regime without obtaining government approval.

Some stakeholders interpreted “satellites” very broadly and took a more conservative view that all space related activities required government approval. Similarly, there were overlaps in activities / interpretation of the FDI policy under the sectors of defence, telecom and manufacturing.

The space liberalization norms under the proposed FDI Space Policy may have actually de-liberalized this sector for certain companies who received investments in allied space activities based on the understanding that sectors / activities not specifically listed or prohibited, should be eligible for foreign investments up to 100% under the automatic route. In such cases where the investment thresholds under the proposed FDI Space Policy may be breached, it would be interesting to see the government’s approach including granting approvals on a post-facto basis.

(ii) Sub- categorizations of activities within the Space Sector

While the government has acknowledged the sub-categories of activities within the space sector, it hasn’t clarified its rationale for providing different foreign investment thresholds for such activities. Relaxed thresholds for satellites (i.e., 74% under the automatic route (up to 100% under government route)) and its sub-components (i.e., 100% under the automatic route) encourage foreign participation in commercial aspects of space activities. In contrast, the 49% cap on foreign investments under the automatic route (up to 100% under government route) on launch vehicles acknowledge their dual-use potential for both civilian and defence purposes. This sensitivity, combined with the launching state’s heightened liability under Article II of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (“Liability Convention”), may be viewed as necessitating greater government oversight.

However, industry players have also criticized the differential treatment provided to launch vehicles vis-a-vis satellites. They believe, in essence, both industries have similar sensitivity issues and hence should be treated at par from a foreign investment perspective. Hence, the difference in foreign investment thresholds require more explanation from the government.

(iii) Satellite Data Products

The term ‘satellite data products’ has not been defined under the proposed FDI Space Policy but investments in such activities would be permitted up to 74% under the automatic route (up to 100% under government route). This may lead to some conflict from a satellite imagery / data perspective read along with the liberalized Geospatial Guidelines, 2021. (“Geospatial Guidelines”).

The Geospatial Guidelines largely permit foreign investments up to 100% under the automatic route with limited foreign investment restrictions especially if the activity is for (i) creation / ownership / storage of geospatial data of a certain accuracy (as defined under the Geospatial Guidelines); (ii) terrestrial mobile survey, street view survey and surveying activities in Indian territorial waters. There seems to be no specific restriction on satellite generated data (other than the above) under the Geospatial Guidelines. Thus, the proposed FDI Space Policy may end up limiting foreign investments for activities relating to Satellite Data Products (which would include geo-spatial data) in which otherwise is viewed to be permissible up to 100% under the automatic route.

The government should also define what constitutes satellite data products and to the extent possible it would be recommended that foreign investment up to 100% should be permitted under the automatic route.

Additionally, the rationale for capping investments for satellite data products under the proposed FDI Space Policy seems unclear as these are data sets which could be regulated under the Geospatial Guidelines and the new Indian privacy law.

(iv) Where are sub-components for launch vehicles covered?

The proposed FDI Space Policy explicitly covers the manufacturing of components and systems / sub-systems for the satellite sector, ground & user segment, and permits 100% FDI under automatic route for the same. With the absence of similar language for components in launch vehicles, it could imply its inclusion under the broader launch vehicle category, hence falling under the 49% automatic route (up to 100% under government route). Alternatively, it could also be argued since it is not expressly specified, the same could be covered under the 100% automatic route category. However, considering the critical role of such components in the sector’s development, clarification from the government would provide much-needed comfort especially if the components are dual use (satellite and launch vehicle usage).

(v) What about ground segment and user segment for launch vehicles?

Following the pattern observed with the satellite and ground segment categories, the absence of specific mention for the “ground segment & user segment” in the launch vehicle section raises further questions. This omission could be an oversight or intentional, but the lack of clarity hinders transparency and predictability for potential investors. Further clarity on the inclusion from an industry perspective in the official amendment notification would ensure a comprehensive and consistent policy framework for the entire launch vehicle sector.

(vi) Were any sub-categories / activities missed?

As space activities may expand to include space mining, exploration, international space station construction, space tourism etc., India needs to proactively address these areas. Especially, if these should be interpreted for foreign investments up to 100% under the automatic route, as this would have a bearing on India’s ability to attract foreign investment while safeguarding national interests, technological competitiveness, and responsible stewardship of India in space.

Conclusion

While the proposed FDI Space Policy provides substantial liberalization, further clarity is awaited based on the formal notification which will make this effective as law. Ideally, the Government should provide definitions / explanations for the proposed categorization and sub-categorizations, and further clarity on the inclusions and omissions of activities which may be related to most space sector functions such as user and ground segments.

While the move towards liberalization significantly reduces government control over the space sector, its inherent interconnectedness with other regulated domains like telecommunications / geospatial cannot be ignored. Despite these challenges, the government’s willingness to open the space sector to foreign investments is a positive step offering greater confidence to foreign investors. Relaxation in the existing norms also signifies a supportive stance towards the industry, encouraging both domestic and international participation. Notably, India successfully attracted substantial foreign investment even during the era of full government control. Therefore, with the current reforms, a significant increase in foreign investments is expected.

Footnotes
[1] Rajya Sabha Questions, Department of Space, available at
https://sansad.in/getFile/annex/262/AU621.pdf?source=pqars
[2] Notification, Department of Space, available at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1988864
[3] Notification, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, available at
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2007876
[4] Article II of the Liability Convention provides that a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft flight.

March Visa Bulletin: Priority Date Cutoffs Move Back with Switch to Final Action Dates

The U.S. State Department released the March Visa Bulletin Friday, showing little movement in the employment-based Final Action Dates and Dates for Filing charts. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that in March it will use Final Action Dates to determine filing eligibility.

Because Dates for Filing are generally more progressive, the switch to Final Action Dates means that priority date cutoffs will move back next month—and fewer applicants will be eligible to file for employment-based green cards.

When comparing February’s Dates for Filing chart to March’s Final Action Date chart, the movement of cutoffs for being eligible to file for employment-based green cards is as follows:

EB-1

China EB-1 will move back 5½ months to July 15, 2022.
India EB-1 will move back three months to Oct. 10, 2020.
All other countries under EB-1 will remain current.

EB-2

China EB-2 will move back five months to Jan. 1, 2020.
India EB-2 will move back 2½ months to March 1, 2012.
All other countries under EB-2 will move back nearly three months to Nov. 22, 2022.

EB-3

China EB-3 will move back 10 months to Sept. 1, 2020.
India EB-3 will move back one month to July 1, 2012.
Philippines EB-3 will move back almost four months to Sept. 8, 2022.
All other countries under EB-3 will move back almost five months to Sept. 8, 2022.

Final Action Dates for Employment-Based Preference Cases:

Preference	All Other Countries	China	India	Mexico	Philippines
EB-1	Current	July 15, 2022	Oct. 1, 2020	Current	Current
EB-2	Nov. 22, 2022	Jan. 1, 2020	March 1, 2012	Nov. 22, 2022	Nov. 22, 2022
EB-3	Sept. 8, 2022	Sept. 1, 2020	July 1, 2012	Sept. 8, 2022	Sept. 8, 2022

Additional Information: The March Visa Bulletin and the switch to Final Action Dates come after employment-based priority date cutoffs advanced key categories in January and saw no movement in February. This is the first time this fiscal year that USCIS has used the Final Action Dates to determine filing eligibility for employment-based applicants. USCIS will continue using the Dates for Filing chart to determine family-based filing eligibility next month.

WHO Publishes Guidance for Ethics and Governance of AI for Healthcare Sector

The World Health Organization (WHO) recently published “Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence for Health: Guidance on large multi-modal models” (LMMs), which is designed to provide “guidance to assist Member States in mapping the benefits and challenges associated with the use of for health and in developing policies and practices for appropriate development, provision and use. The guidance includes recommendations for governance within companies, by governments, and through international collaboration, aligned with the guiding principles. The principles and recommendations, which account for the unique ways in which humans can use generative AI for health, are the basis of this guidance.”

The guidance focused on one type of generative AI, large multi-modal models (LMMs), “which can accept one or more type of data input and generate diverse outputs that are not limited to the type of data fed into the algorithm.” According to the report, LMMs have “been adopted faster than any consumer application in history.” The report outlines the benefits and risks of LLMs, particularly the risk of using LLMs in the healthcare sector.

The report proposes solutions to address the risks of using LMMs in health care during development, provision, and deployment of LMMs and ethics and governance of LLMs, “what can be done, and by who.”

In the ever-changing world of AI, this is one report that is timely and provides steps and solutions to follow to tackle the risk of using LMMs.

Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.

Domestic Visa Processing – Application Slots Now Available

On January 29, 2024, the Department of State’s stateside visa pilot renewal program began accepting DS-160s for qualifying individuals seeking to renew their existing H-1B visas while they are in the United States. As discussed in our previous blog post about this new program, the program allows individuals in the United States who are renewing an H-1B visa issued by US consular sections in Canada between 1/1/2020 and 4/1/2023 or one issued by US consular sections in India from 1/2/2021 and 9/30/2023 to do so online through the Department’s CEAC website rather than having to travel outside the US to obtain the visa.

Under the pilot program, each week for five weeks the Department will release 4000 application slots—2000 for applicants whose most recent H-1B visa were issued in Canada, and 2000 for those whose most recent H-1B visas were issued in India. If all designated slots are filled before the next week’s allotment becomes available, the Department will lock the portal until the next group is released. Applications can be submitted online at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/employment/domestic-renewal.html, where you can also find program FAQs published by the Department of State.

The first group of application slots was released on Monday, January 29. Later groups will be released on February 5, February 12, February 19, and February 26. The program will end when all available slots are filled or on April 1, 2024, whichever happens first.

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As Three Recent Settlements Demonstrate, Whistleblowers Are the Key to Enforcement of Section 301 Tariffs

The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-made goods—at the time, known as the Trump Tariffs, although President Biden has embraced them as well—were put in place in 2018. Only recently, more than five years later, have enforcement efforts begun to show up publicly. And, as is often the case, whistleblowers are the tip of the enforcement spear. In particular, over the course of two weeks at the end of 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced settlements of three qui tam cases, brought under the False Claims Act, that alleged evasion of Section 301 tariffs. These are the first such settlements to be made public, but likely signal the beginning of a wave of settlements or litigation in the coming years.

Starting in July of 2018, and pursuant to Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301 through 310, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420), titled “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices,” and often collectively referred to as “Section 301,” the United States imposed additional tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured in China. The Section 301 tariffs were rolled out in tranches, but they fairly quickly covered a majority of all Chinese-made products imported into the United States. The Section 301 tariffs imposed an additional 25% customs duty on those products.

As is always the case when high tariffs are imposed on imported goods, the Section 301 tariffs were met with a mix of responses by importers. In some cases, importers simply paid the additional 25% duties. In some cases, the importers found new sources, outside of China, for the products they wished to import. And in many cases, the importers started cheating—evading the tariffs either by lying to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) about what was being imported, or engaging to transshipping schemes to make it appear that the products were actually made in some country other than China.

Evasion of customs duties violates the False Claims Act, a federal law that, among other things, outlaws the making of false statements to avoid payment of money owed to the government. Evasion of customs duties will almost always involve such false statements because when goods are imported into the United States, the importer must provide CBP with a completed form, called an Entry Summary (also known as a Form 7501), in which the importer provides information about the nature, quantity, value, and country-of-origin of the goods being imported. To avoid or reduce the payment of duties, the importer will almost always lie on the Entry Summary about one or more of those, thus exposing the importer to liability under the False Claims Act.

The False Claims Act has a qui tam provision, which means that a private person or company may bring a lawsuit in the name of the government against the importer that has evaded payment of duties. If the qui tam lawsuit is successful, most of the money goes to the government. But the person or company that brought the lawsuit typically referred to as a whistleblower or, more technically, as the “relator”—gets an award that is between 15% and 30% of the amount recovered for the government.

When a qui tam case is first filed, it is put “under seal” by the court, meaning that it is secret and not available to the public. The case stays under seal, often for multiple years, as DOJ investigates the claims made in the case. But once DOJ decides to pursue a case, the seal is lifted, and the case becomes public. Often, this happens almost simultaneously with the announcement of a settlement of the case.

That is what happened with three cases that became public in late 2023. The first announcement came on November 29, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia announced a $1.9 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel Chinapacificarbide Inc. v. King Kong Tools, LLC. In that case, the whistleblower that had brought the qui tam lawsuit was a competitor company which alleged that King Kong Tools was manufacturing cutting tools in a factory in China, shipping them to Germany, and then importing them from Germany into the United States, claiming falsely that the tools were made in Germany. The whistleblowing company received an award of $286,861.

The second such announcement came on December 5, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas announced a $2.5 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel. Reznicek et al. v. Dallco Marketing, Inc. In that case, the whistleblowers were two individuals who alleged that the defendants evaded the Section 301 tariffs by underreporting the value of the products they were importing from China into the United States. The whistleblowers received an award of $500,000.

The third such announcement case on December 13, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announced a settlement of $798,334 in a case captioned United States ex rel. Edwards v. Homestar North America LLC. Like the Dallco Marketing case, the Homestar case was also brought by an individual who alleged that the importer had lied to the government about the value of the goods being imported from China into the United States, in order to avoid payment of Section 301 tariffs. The whistleblower received an award of $151,683.

Accordingly, over the course of just two weeks in late 2023, three Section 301 settlements were publicly announced in quick succession. And notably, all three were whistleblower qui tam cases. This demonstrates the key role that whistleblowers play in the enforcement of customs tariffs and duties. No doubt, many other such cases remain under seal, and will start to become public as DOJ concludes its investigations. And because the Section 301 tariffs remain in place to this day, additional qui tam cases will almost certainly continue to be brought by both individual whistleblowers and competing companies seeking to level the playing field. Accordingly, these three settlements are likely just the early signs of a wave of Section 301 cases that will crest in the coming years.

January 2024 Update: US Department of State Announces Pilot Program for Stateside H-1B Visa Renewals

On January 18, 2024, the Department of State published an online tool that H-1B visa applicants can use to determine if they are eligible for the stateside visa renewal pilot program. Over time, it is likely that the Department of State will expand eligibility. We expect the online tool for the program described below to be updated as the program expands.

Domestic Visa Renewal Eligibility Assessment

In December 2023, the US Department of State announced a pilot program for stateside renewal of certain visas. For the first time in nearly two decades, a limited number of H-1B nonimmigrants will be able to renew their visas from within the United States.

All nonimmigrant visas are currently issued by US Embassy and Consular officials outside of the United States. Beginning on January 29, 2024, the State Department will begin allowing certain nonimmigrants to renew their expired and expiring visas inside the United States. Applicants meeting the requirements of the program may submit an online application between January 29 and April 1, 2024. This is welcome news as visa processing at Consulates and Embassies abroad has become increasingly unpredictable and fraught with delays.

This is a pilot program that will be available on a very limited basis initially. However, the State Department has indicated a desire to expand the program after the pilot allows for the resolution of any operational issues.

This pilot program will allow for limited renewal of nonimmigrant visas in the United States. Eligibility will be limited to applicants who(se):

are renewing H-1B visas (H-4 and other visa classifications are not part of the pilot program);
prior H-1B visa being renewed was issued by either:
Mission Canada (i.e., US Consular posts located in Canada) with an issuance date from January 1, 2020 through April 1, 2023 OR
Mission India (i.e., US Consular posts located in India) with an issuance date of February 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021;
are nationals of countries which are not subject to reciprocity fees for H-1B visas;
are eligible for a waiver of the usual in-person interview requirement;
have submitted ten fingerprints in connection with a previous visa application;
prior H-1B visa does not contain a “clearance received” notation;
does not have an ineligibility basis that requires a waiver prior to visa issuance;
10.has an approved and valid H-1B petition;
11.was most recently admitted to the US in H-1B status;
12.is currently maintaining H-1B status in the US;
13.period of authorized H-1B admission has not expired; and
14.intends to reenter the US in H-1B status after temporary travel abroad.

Beginning January 29, 2024, eligible applicants may submit an application online through the State Department website. The State Department will allow approximately 4,000 applications each week, with 2,000 for applicants whose prior H-1B visas were issued by Mission Canada, and another 2,000 for applicants whose prior H-1B visas were issued by Mission India. Once the application limit has been reached, the application portal will be locked until the next allotment of application slots are released based on the schedule. On each Monday in February, the website will reopen for new submissions. The application period for the program will end the earlier of when all available application slots have been filled, or on April 1, 2024.

Applicants will be asked to complete an online application including:

a self-assessment of eligibility for the pilot program;
a Form DS-160 online visa application;
payment of the $205 non-refundable Machine-Readable Visa (MRV) fee; and
required documents, including:
- a properly completed, electronically filed Form DS-160;
- one photograph meeting Department of State specifications;
- original passport, valid for at least 6 months beyond the visa application date;
- original or copy of current Form I-797 Notice of Action (H-1B approval notice);
- original or copy of the applicant’s Form I-94 (available online here); and
- fee payment confirmation.

Processing time is expected to be approximately 6 to 8 weeks, with visaed passports returned to applicants via US postal service or courier. All documents must be submitted by April 15, 2024. The State Department aims to complete processing of all applications under this pilot program by the program’s conclusion date of May 1, 2024.

Prior to 2004, the State Department ran a similar program, allowing for H, L, O, I, E, and P visas to be renewed by mail through a State Department office in Washington, DC. Visa revalidation in the US was terminated in July 2004 due to the State Department’s inability to collect biometric data in the US as required by post-9/11 security enhancements.

The return of this program, and the ability of participants to secure a needed visa before departing the United States, will help alleviate the uncertainty associated with foreign travel for those who must secure new visas while abroad in order to return to the United States.

February 2024 Visa Bulletin: Advancement of Priority Dates for Employer-Based Petitions Remains Minimal

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of State have not indicated significant advancement in the priority dates for employer-based immigrant petitions, continuing the fiscal year (FY) 2024 trend of long wait times for immigrant visas.

Quick Hits

USCIS and the State Department reported minimal movement in the EB-2 and EB-3 categories for Mexico, the Philippines, and all other chargeability areas except India and China.
USCIS authorized use of the Dates for Filing chart.
Continued limitations on immigrant visas particularly impact chargeability areas of India and China where employers and individuals had hoped to take advantage of shorter wait times in the EB-1 category.

The February 2024 Visa Bulletin

USCIS will continue to use the Dates for Filing chart in the February 2024 Visa Bulletin in determining eligibility for I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, filings. The Dates for Filing chart reflects priority dates anticipated to become current during the fiscal year, whereas the Final Action Dates chart reflects priority dates considered current and available for the specific month. This means that while an applicant may file the I-485 based on the Dates for Filing chart, the application will not be adjudicated at least until the applicant’s priority date becomes current on the Final Action Dates chart.

In summary, there is no advancement in final action dates for China and India in all employment-based categories except that the Other Workers category for India has advanced by one month. For all other chargeabilities, Mexico, and the Philippines, the EB-1 category remains current, the EB-2 category advances by fifteen days, the EB-3 category advances by one month, and the EB-4 Certain Religious Workers category remain the same.

The Final Action Dates chart is shown below.

Source: U.S. Department of State, February 2024 Visa Bulletin

USCIS has confirmed its continued use of the Dates for Filing chart for adjustment of status filing purposes. However, the dates for filing remain the same as in the January 2024 Visa Bulletin in all categories for all countries.

The Dates for Filing chart for employment-based categories follows below.

Source: U.S. Department of State, February 2024 Visa Bulletin

Impacts of Immigrant Visa Backlogs, Slow Movement, and Retrogression: EB-1 Considerations

In the January 2024 Visa Bulletin, we saw some forward movement in certain employment-based categories, particularly in the EB-1 category. This movement aligned with the hope that all EB categories, including the EB-1 category, would advance significantly or at least steadily. USCIS and the State Department had also indicated holding this hope in the August 2023 Visa Bulletin. However, the Visa Bulletins for October 2023, November 2023, December 2023, and January 2024 showed slow movement, with the Visa Bulletin for February 2024 indicating little to no movement at all.

The lack of advancement in priority dates particularly impacts those chargeable to India and China. While those chargeable to India and China have historically experienced long green card wait times in the common categories of EB-2 and EB-3, many employers and individuals choose to pursue the EB-1 category in hopes to secure the green card in a much shorter time. The benefits to an employer if a sponsored employee receives a green card earlier is that there is a reduction in immigration costs and a reduction in time that an employer would be beholden to immigration regulations. The employer can also rest assured that their talent can be retained beyond the limits of a nonimmigrant visa status.

However, despite the retrogression of the EB-1 categories for China and India, there still stands a benefit that visa availability wait times for the EB-1 category remains much faster than any other category. Employers considering pursuing the EB-1 process for their employees may want to note that the EB-1 holds an extremely high standard. The EB-1 is generally reserved for highly talented individuals who have risen to the top of their field or individuals who will work in a managerial capacity in addition to meeting other narrow criteria.

A Holiday Gift From The State Department: Domestic Visa Revalidation Pilot Program And Visa Interview Waiver Guidance

Kris Kringle bestowed an old friend upon us for the 2023 holiday season, which, if successful, could permanently bring back stateside visa renewal.

Before biometrics were required for U.S. visas, foreign nationals (FN) legally in the U.S. on temporary (nonimmigrant) visas could renew their visa stamps through the Department of State. The process was typically efficient, resulting in a great time and expense saver for both the FN and U.S. employers. Then, biometrics became a requirement in 2002, and the State Department eliminated the program, reasoning that visa applicants’ biometrics were not available in the U.S.

History evolves, new challenges arise, and the State Department finds itself taking steps to resume this old process. The COVID-19 pandemic caused the global closure of U.S. consulates, resulting in an enormous backlog of visa processes. While the State Department has made significant progress in addressing some of these backlogs, the agency continues to struggle with lengthy wait times in many consular jurisdictions, causing considerable difficulty for individuals and businesses.

PILOT PROGRAM DETAILS
The Stateside Visa Revalidation Pilot Program was published in the Federal Register just before the Christmas holiday. However, this pilot holiday gift is limited.

Online applications will begin Jan. 29, 2024. Each week, the State Department will release approximately 2,000 application slots each for individuals whose most recent H-1B visas were issued by Mission Canada and by Mission India (approximately 4,000 combined total each week). The releases will be on Jan. 29; Feb. 5; Feb. 12; Feb. 19; and Feb. 26.

The criteria set out in the program notes:

The foreign national (FN) seeks to renew only an H-1B visa that was previously issued by Mission Canada or Mission India
20,000 renewals will be issued on a staggered schedule
To be eligible, the prior H-1B visa stamp must have been issued by Mission Canada with an issuance date from Jan. 1, 2020, through April 1, 2023, or by Mission India with an issuance date between Feb. 1, 2021, and Sept. 30, 2021
The FN is not subject to the payment of a “reciprocity fee” as part of a nonimmigrant visa issuance fee based on the country of birth
The FN is also eligible for a waiver of the in-person interview requirement based on a recent policy update
The FN submitted 10 fingerprints to the Department of State in connection with a previous visa application
An annotation of “clearance received” was not noted in prior visa stamps; this annotation will disqualify the FN for this program
No visa ineligibility that requires a waiver prior to visa issuance
Possess an approved and unexpired H-1B petition evidenced by an I-797 Notice
Most recently admitted to the United States in H-1B status
Currently maintaining H-1B status in the United States; a person on the 60-day grace period after a lay-off will not qualify
Must be in an unexpired period of authorized admission in H-1B status
Intends to reenter the United States in H-1B status after a temporary period abroad
NEW INTERVIEW WAIVER GUIDANCE
On a separate, but related, note, the State Department also published new Visa Interview Waiver guidance to replace expiring COVID-19 era policies; this guidance goes into effect on Jan. 1, 2024. This guidance applies to those individuals renewing visas abroad at a U.S. Consulate and allows Consular officers to waive interviews in certain instances.

The new interview waiver guidance will also make the following individuals eligible for interview waivers:

First time H-2 visa applicants (temporary agricultural and non-agricultural workers)
Other nonimmigrant visa applicants applying for any nonimmigrant visa classification who:
Were previously issued a nonimmigrant visa in any classification, unless the only prior issued visa was a B visa
Are applying within 48 months of their most recent nonimmigrant visa’s expiration date
This new guidance is indefinite in duration, but the State Department has indicated it will review this waiver guidance annually. This authority expands access to interview waiver eligibility, while also instituting some new restrictions from the 2023 authority. All nonimmigrant categories are considered under this authority. They can be mixed and matched and still be eligible for a waiver of interview, but are no longer eligible if their only prior visa issuance was a B visa. Overall, the population of people who are eligible for the in-person interview waiver will expand.

by: Tejas Shah , M. Mercedes Badia-Tavas of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

For more news on Domestic Visa Revalidation, visit the NLR Immigration section.

All I Want for Christmas is Effective Sports Governance

At the start of this year, following his appointment as Chair of the UK’s Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (“DCMS”), Damian Green MP put sports governance firmly on the agenda.

This commitment came after the publication of the Whyte Review in June 2022 (the “Review“), which was an independent report into allegations of mistreatment in the sport of gymnastics led by Anne Whyte KC.

Sport England’s CEO Tim Hollingsworth and UK Sport’s CEO Sally Munday, the two individuals who commissioned the report, provided a joint statement following the Review, which included a commitment to “not rest until [we] have a sporting system that fully champions and enables participant and athlete wellbeing”.

Sports governance is a multi-faceted issue; systematic failings cannot be solved overnight. Effective and comprehensive investigations are needed to uncover the existing issues before remediation can take place.

As such, this blog will lay out five top tips for ensuring that all goes to plan when conducting a sports investigation.

Tip 1: Have Policies In Place

Terms and conditions, policies and procedures are rarely updated and often overlooked. However, when issues arise, it is these terms and conditions, policies and procedures that are an immediate source of authority for standards of behaviour; they are your “dos” and “don’ts”.

Therefore, first and foremost, it is essential to have robust, fair and proportionate policies and procedures in place to guide the investigative process.

During a recent sport investigation it quickly became apparent that the sport had no definition of “bullying” even though that was the accusation levelled at an athlete. Some of the practical issues with this included uncertainty as to:

whether an imbalance of power was a necessary ingredient of bullying;
whether intent was a requirement of bullying; and
what amounted to a “course of conduct”.

In the end, those investigating the allegations relied on a combination of the athlete code of conduct, analogous previous investigations, and the governing bodies’ social media guidance to piece together a definition.

This investigation into bullying is not an isolated incident and most of the recent complaints raised with Sport Integrity (UK Sport’s confidential reporting line and independent investigation service) relate to bullying, so to not have a universal definition of “bullying” was and is particularly troublesome.

Since this investigation, we have worked with National Governing Bodies (“NGBs”) to devise a uniform definition of “bullying”. Of course, some NGBs will require bespoke definitions to reflect the nature of their sport, but a reference point (and, over time, a precedent bank) will help both individuals and NGBs.

We would caution that, in an attempt ‘do the right thing’, sporting governing bodies can sometimes overcommit, leading to policies that are too onerous. An example includes allowing an automatic right to appeal if the complainant is not satisfied with the outcome, rather than requiring them to establish a basis for appeal. It comes from a good intention but can often be costly and time consuming.

Tip 2: Identifying the Right People to Handle the Investigation

A key issue to consider at the start of an investigation is not only (i) who is going to undertake the investigation; but also (ii) who will advise the governing body in respect of the investigation report.

In determining issue (i), thought must be given to whether the investigator has appropriate experience and whether they are, of course, truly independent.

But once the investigation has ended, the commissioning governing body does not just put the report into the top drawer, the recommendations within the report will need to be actioned. But often those recommendations may have legal consequences such as employment issues, data protection considerations, and defamations risks, to name but a few. We believe it is advisable for a governing body to instruct an external law firm from the outset so that they are able to receive independent advice while remaining separate from the investigation.

Tip 3: Nail the Terms of Reference

The terms of reference (“ToR”) set out the parameters of an investigation and provide something of a roadmap. Investigations often uncover facts or events which were not in contemplation at the outset, and so it is crucial that the ToR provides for such eventualities.

For an international rugby referee, it is standard practice to consider the “what if” situations. What if there is a thunderstorm? What if the crossbar falls down? What if the ball is stolen by a streaker? Referees want to be as prepared as possible when people turn to them for an answer – the same is true in an investigative setting.

Essential features of the ToR include:

what will be investigated and what won’t;
what happens if you discover something that isn’t covered;
how do you amend the ToR; and
who will provide what material and when.

Some less obvious matters for inclusion:

how many times do you email someone before concluding that they have refused to comply;
what are acceptable methods of contact;
who is allowed to attend the meeting with the individual being interviewed;
will you produce transcripts of meetings; and
who will see the report.

Doing the legwork beforehand saves time, stress, and distress down the track.

Tip 4: Specialist Support to the Investigating Team

During one of our sporting investigations, it became clear that athletes in that particular sport liked technical jargon even more than lawyers. To ensure that key information is not hidden in opaque terminology, we have found it useful to involve people with relevant experience who can put factual sporting matters in layman’s terms.

Contact sports is a good example of this. Physical intimidation during training sessions seems at odds with most places of work, but when athletes are competing for a single spot at the Olympic Games, this can be part and parcel of their world.

Interviewing ex-athletes as part of the initial stages of an investigation not only allow us to understand the jargon, but also to understand the realities of the sport, the difference between male and female athletes, and when aggression transgresses into bullying.

Tip 5: Involve Data Privacy Experts

Data Privacy is a fast-moving area of law which requires careful consideration in the context of sports investigations. The approach to data is two-fold: how and what can I collect, and with who and how can I share it.

You must have a clearly identified purpose and an appropriate lawful basis for processing personal data, or be able to show that your processing fits within one of the narrowly defined statutory exceptions. Be aware that sharing personal data is a form of “processing”, so ensure that you have a clear purpose and lawful basis for sharing, and that the recipient (for example an expert) has a clearly stated purpose and lawful basis for receiving that data.

From a UK perspective, you (or someone with the relevant expertise) will need to be familiar with the relevant provisions of the UK General Data Protection Regulation 2018 and the Data Privacy Act 2018 to ensure compliance. Reference should also be made to any policies which may set out how employee data may be processed. In the first instance, you will need to ensure that you have a lawful basis for collecting and processing data. Additional care should be taken when you are processing criminal offences data – as is often the case in investigations – or any “special category” data revealing factors such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, health, sex life or sexual orientation.

Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) and Legitimate Interests Assessments (LIA) are now a reality of sporting investigations that should not be overlooked. Helpfully, in relation to “special category” and criminal offence data, UK data protection laws make express provision for processing where it is necessary to protect the integrity of a sport or a sporting event against dishonesty, malpractice or other seriously improper conduct, or failure by a person participating in the sport or event in any capacity to comply with standards of behaviour set by a body or association with responsibility for that sport or event. However, in each case it is essential that you involve experts to check that the factual situation justifies reliance on those provisions.

Summary

Sports organisations would be well served to address the issues highlighted above, particularly as their feet are often held to the fire by governments, sponsors, participants, and the general public on whether they have done enough to identify or remedy high profile matters.

This article was co-authored by Molly Mckenna.