New Legal Framework for Electronic Signatures Coming Soon to the EU

electronic signaturesThe use and acceptance of electronic signatures are becoming more commonplace around the globe. One estimate has the number of transactions using electronic signatures growing from 210 million in 2014 to 700 million in 2017. In our practice, we are seeing more companies implement electronic signature solutions in their commercial contracting practices and procedures.

Given this increased usage of electronic signatures, we think it’s a good time to remind our readers that a new legal framework for electronic signatures is set to take effect in the European Union on July 1.

Adopted almost two years ago on July 23, 2014, the regulation (910/2014/EU) titled “Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market” (the eIDAS regulation) introduces a new framework for electronic signatures, seals, time stamps, and electronic documents. The eIDAS regulation replaces the Directive on Electronic Signatures (1999/93/EC) (the Directive).

The Directive caused issues in the European Union because each member state interpreted and implemented the law in its own way, leading to different electronic signature rules among EU nations. Thus, the eIDAS regulation is designed to establish a uniform framework to recognize electronic signatures, electronic seals, and identification among EU member states through the creation of electronic trust services for the European internal market. The eIDAs regulation defines the requirements for legally valid and mutually recognized electronic signatures (advanced and qualified), electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electronic delivery services, website authentication, and electronic documents.

As of July 1, the Directive and any EU member state laws that conflict with the eIDAS regulation will be replaced or modified. If you are among the many companies that incorporate electronic signatures into commercial contracting practices, remember that this new EU framework is just a month away from taking effect and be sure to brush up on the details.

© 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

European Commission Gives Portugal Two Months To Address Issues With Biofuel Law Compliance

On April 28, 2016, the European Commission (EC) encouraged Portugal to become fully compliant with the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive) through the release of an April infringements fact sheet. The Directive has set the goal of 20 percent of the European Union’s (EU) 2020 energy consumption coming from renewable energy, with each Member State consuming at least ten percent renewable energy. Biofuels used in reaching this goal must meet a set of harmonized sustainability requirements, and must be treated equally by Member States regardless of the country of origin. Portugal has been sent a reasoned opinion urging it to stop favoring biofuels produced in Portugal over those produced in other countries, and to reduce sustainability requirements that are not warranted by the Directive. Portugal has two months to address these concerns, or else it could be sent to the Court of Justice of the EU.

©2016 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

To Brexit or to Bremain? That is the Question on 23 June 2016

A View from BrusselsUK and Europe flag

As the 23 June date for the British referendum about its future in the European Union (EU) comes closer, the EU political leadership in Brussels remains uncertain how best to support the ‘Bremain’ forces in order to avoid the embarrassing and damaging departure of one of its largest and strongest members.

None of the political leaders in Brussels or in other EU capitals want to see the UK leave, but they have learned to be cautious and show restraint when it comes to engaging in EU related discussions in Britain. Often enough they were told to stay neutral (or silent) in order not to make things worse for the pro-EU forces. But they now ask themselves whether their passive stance is a sufficiently supportive strategy for a decision of this magnitude for all partners involved – also because many traditionally pro-EU industry stakeholders in the UK have remained reserved so far, leaving a lot of momentum to the “Leave” side.

Supporting the (B)Remain Camp while Preparing for the Eventuality

The top EU leadership has clearly spoken out in favour of the UK to remain a part of the European family. Already in 2014 European Commission President Juncker has given the financial services dossier to the British EU Commissioner Jonathan Hill, and has recently asked Jonathan Faull, a top level UK EU official in Brussels, to lead the Commission’s high level Brexit task force.

Influential national political leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have clearly spelled out that they want the UK to remain, and have grudgingly accepted UK specific political concessions in an EU summit in February 2016 in order to support David Cameron. They are wary of potential Brexit copycats across Europe.

Behind closed doors, EU institutions such as the European Central Bank and the European Commission are preparing itself for the eventuality of the British voting to “leave” on 23 June. They cannot afford not to, given the enormous impact it would have on Europe – akin to the “Grexit” situation in recent years.

A View from the United States

On 22 April 2016, President Obama visited London and argued that he had a right to respond to the claims of Brexit campaigners that Britain would easily be able to negotiate a fresh trade deal with the US. He said,

“They are voicing an opinion about what the United States is going to do, I figured you might want to hear from the president of the United States what I think the United States is going to do. And on that matter, for example, I think it’s fair to say that maybe some point down the line there might be a UK-US trade agreement, but it’s not going to happen any time soon because our focus is in negotiating with a big bloc, the European Union, to get a trade agreement done. The UK is going to be in the back of the queue.”

The Only Certain Thing is Uncertainty

The overall uncertainty related to a potential Brexit is large and little is known about how the separation process between the UK and the European Union would look like in practice. Many questions remain unanswered, including the political dynamics a Leave decision would trigger within and outside the UK.

What seems certain is that if Britain does leave the EU, a multi-year separation and negotiation process will commence.

When Greenland left the European Economic Community in 1985 it took a full three years to complete – and this even though they only had a few really important political issues to solve. The UK has been part of the European Union since 1973 – thus the social, legal and economic entanglement is much higher.

Article By Wolfgang A. Maschek & Helen Kavanagh of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

© Copyright 2016 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Improved US – Cuba Relations Create Potential FCPA Risks for US Companies Looking to do Business There

The normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba offers potential lucrative business opportunities for companies that are prepared to meet Cuba’s unique corruption risks. On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro announced the restoration of full diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba; an act which President Obama stated was aimed at ending “an outdated approach that for decades has failed to advance our interests” and that would instead begin to “normalize relations between our two countries.” In furtherance of that goal, on January 16, 2015, the U.S. Government eased travel restrictions between the U.S. and Cuba and, perhaps more importantly, reduced certain obstacles that prevented American companies from doing business on the island. For example, U.S. businesses will be allowed to provide financing to Cuban small businesses and sell communications devices, software, and hardware services among other things. Indeed, American companies in the aviation, telecommunications, or financial industries stand to gain a substantial foothold in a burgeoning new – and potentially lucrative – Cuban market.

Before diving in head first, however, American companies must recognize and prepare for the significant Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) risks inherent in doing business in Cuba. But first, a quick refresher on the FCPA. Generally speaking, the FCPA prohibits bribing foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. The term “foreign official” is broadly defined and includes, among other things: (i) officers or employees of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof; or (ii) anyone acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of said foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof.

Doing business in Cuba presents a host of unique FCPA risks, three of which are particularly worth highlighting. First, while the Cuban government has taken steps to permit its citizens to open small businesses, the vast majority of Cuba’s economy remains government-owned and controlled. Former economist for the International Monetary Fund, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata, estimated that the Cuban government, directly and through state-owned businesses, accounts for more than 75% of Cuba’s total economic activity.  Essentially, the state is involved in virtually all of the island’s major businesses, including services typically run by the private sector in the U.S. In other words, American companies will almost certainly deal with foreign officials when doing business in Cuba.

Second, Cuban government officials are notoriously undercompensated. On average, government officials earn between $20 and $40 per month while, in some cases, being tasked with administering Cuba’s multi-million dollar business ventures. Unsurprisingly, low wages and extensive state involvement in business matters have incentivized some Cuban officials to solicit bribes (and, occasionally, have tempted foreign companies to offer them). For example, in September 2014, Cy Tokmakjian, Claudio Vetere, and Marco Puche, executives at Tokmakjian Group, a Concord, Ontario, Canada-based company,  were convicted of using bribery and other means to avoid paying taxes. They received sentences of 15, 12, and 8 years respectively as part of President Raul Castro’s crack down on graft and other forms of corruption. Tokmakjian, Vetere, and Puche may not be subject to the FCPA, but similar payments by American companies in Cuba would likely expose the companies and employees to FCPA liability.

Third, and finally, Cuba suffers from a widespread lack of transparency. The 2015 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Cuba 56th out of 168 countries surveyed, tied with Ghana.  American companies may find themselves in the dark with respect to Cuban regulations and procurement practices. As a result, companies may not be aware of inconsistent and/or improper application of Cuban regulations. Worse still, American companies may be unaware of the true purposes for certain payments. For example, a company may be informed that a particular payment is required to obtain a specific license but find out that the money was directed to a foreign official.

Note that the FCPA does have a knowledge requirement; however, knowledge may be demonstrated by establishing awareness of a high probability of impropriety, unless the person actually believed that there was nothing improper in that instance. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2). The “high probability” standard was intended to ensure that the FCPA’s “knowledge” requirement included instances of “conscious disregard” and “willful blindness.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 919 (1988) (citing United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1975)); see also United States v. Kozeny, No. 09-cr-4704, 2011 WL 6184494 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2011). Furthermore, the vast majority of FCPA cases settle before trial which means that there is little case law that speaks specifically to the FCPA’s scienter requirement. As a result, the DOJ and SEC have broad discretion to attempt to settle cases based on facts that may be out of tune with a strict interpretation of the FCPA’s scienter requirement.

At a minimum, reducing FCPA risks in any foreign country requires that companies take a few basic, but important, steps: conduct a risk assessment of the country, the industry, and the market; use the assessment to prepare a potent anti-bribery policy aimed at both prevention and remediation; implement the policy and disseminate it to all employees; adequately train employees and company agents; and modify the policy when necessary to ensure adequate protection in a changing market.

More specifically, doing business in Cuba – a market with which few American companies are deeply familiar – requires a thorough risk assessment. The quality of the analysis can mean the difference between a deficient anti-bribery policy and one that adequately shields the company from risk exposure. Accordingly, American companies should seek the advice of counsel before, during, and after the assessment. Counsel with experience in dealing with FCPA issues will be well-equipped to make sure the risk analysis is efficient, comprehensive, and targeted. This information will prove invaluable when designing an anti-bribery policy. Furthermore, experienced counsel can assist in implementing the policy, modifying the policy to ensure ongoing effectiveness, and representing the company should any FCPA-related issues arise.

© 2016 Bracewell LLP

Announcement of "Privacy Shield" Gives Hope for U.S. Companies Who Previously Relied on Safe Harbor

We have previously discussed the EU Court of Justice’s invalidation of the long-standing Safe Harbor program, previously relied on by many organizations as a means of authorizing transfers of EU citizens’ private data to the United States. U.S. companies eagerly awaited news of a replacement for Safe Harbor and kept a close watch as the January 31, 2016, grace period on enforcement announced by the EU Article 29 Working Party expired. News of a new framework  broke in early February and the European Commission released extensive documentation revealing the details of Safe Harbor’s proposed replacement – the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield program (Privacy Shield) – on February 29, 2016.

Privacy Shield encompasses seven principles for assuring adequate protection when transferring and processing personal data originating in the European Union. Similar to Safe Harbor, organizations can self-certify their compliance with these principles, provided they (1) commit to the U.S. Department of Commerce that they will adhere to the Privacy Shield Principles, (2) publicly declare their commitment to the Privacy Shield Principles, and (3) actually implement the Principles. Once compliance is certified, organizations may seek inclusion on the Department of Commerce’s list of certified organizations, effectively authorizing them to transfer the personal data of EU residents to the United States.

Privacy Shield Principles

  1. Notice. Privacy Shield requires organizations to provide notice regarding the type of data collected, the purposes for which it is collected, any third parties to which the data may be transferred, individuals’ right to access their data, and how individuals can limit use and disclosure of personal data. The organization also must provide notice of its participation in Privacy Shield, acknowledge applicable enforcement authorities and describe recourse mechanisms available.

  2. Choice. Organizations must provide clear, conspicuous and readily available mechanisms allowing individuals to opt out of any disclosure of their personal data to third parties, or use of their personal data other than the purpose(s) for which it was initially collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. Certain sensitive information will require individuals to opt in affirmatively.

  3. Security. As under Safe Harbor, participating organizations must take “reasonable and appropriate measures,” based on the risks involved and the nature of the personal data, to protect the data “from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.”

  4. Access. Privacy Shield–certified organizations must provide individuals with access to and the opportunity to correct, amend or delete inaccurate or improperly processed personal data. Individuals also must be allowed to confirm that their personal data is being processed. An organization may restrict access to data “in exceptional circumstances.”

  5. Data Integrity and Purpose Limitation. Privacy Shield requires not only that any data collected be “relevant for the purposes of processing” but also that organizations limit collection to relevant data only. Participating organizations also must “take reasonable steps to ensure that personal data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current.”

  6. Accountability for Onward Transfer. Certified organizations’ contracts with third parties receiving personal data must require that such data “may only be processed for limited and specified purposes” consistent with the level of consent given by the data subject. Third-party transferees also must agree to “provide the same level of protection as the [Principles].” Certified organizations also must “take reasonable and appropriate steps” to ensure third-party agents adhere to the Principles, and are required to stop and remediate any unauthorized processing by third parties, if necessary. Importantly, with limited exceptions, certified organizations remain liable to data subjects for any vendor’s violation of the Principles.

  7. Recourse, Enforcement and Liability. Perhaps Privacy Shield’s most significant new features are its recourse and dispute resolution provisions. Complaint-handling processes must be implemented to obtain Privacy Shield certification. To ensure effective enforcement, Privacy Shield requires (1) procedures for verifying representations made about privacy practices, (2) recourse for data subjects and (3) remedies for failures to comply with the Principles. These newly required “independent recourse mechanisms” are empowered to provide remedies separate from regulators’ enforcement authority.

Legal Safeguards

Because the extent of U.S. government surveillance of personal data was a primary reason why the Safe Harbor program was invalidated, in support of Privacy Shield the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Department of Justice have furnished letters outlining the legal safeguards that will limit U.S. government access to personal data transferred pursuant to Privacy Shield. In addition, the U.S. Secretary of State is set to appoint a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, who will be responsible for handling European complaints regarding whether personal data transferred under Privacy Shield has been accessed by U.S. intelligence activities.

In addition, the Judicial Redress Act of 2015, signed into law on February 24, 2016, allows EU citizens to bring civil actions against U.S. government agencies under the Privacy Act of 1974 to access, amend or correct records about them or seek redress for the unlawful disclosure of those records.

Certification and Compliance

Privacy Shield is expected to be approved by the European Commission later this year and published in the Federal Register shortly thereafter. Organizations that self-certify within the first two months following publication will be given nine months to bring all third-party relationships into compliance. Two months after the effective date, the Principles become binding on an organization immediately upon certification. Privacy Shield will thereafter undergo annual joint reviews by EU and U.S. authorities.

All organizations that intend to become Privacy Shield certified are strongly encouraged to immediately begin updating their policies to meet Privacy Shield’s heightened obligations, including reviewing their third-party agreements to ensure compliance.

© 2016 Wilson Elser

Announcement of “Privacy Shield” Gives Hope for U.S. Companies Who Previously Relied on Safe Harbor

We have previously discussed the EU Court of Justice’s invalidation of the long-standing Safe Harbor program, previously relied on by many organizations as a means of authorizing transfers of EU citizens’ private data to the United States. U.S. companies eagerly awaited news of a replacement for Safe Harbor and kept a close watch as the January 31, 2016, grace period on enforcement announced by the EU Article 29 Working Party expired. News of a new framework  broke in early February and the European Commission released extensive documentation revealing the details of Safe Harbor’s proposed replacement – the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield program (Privacy Shield) – on February 29, 2016.

Privacy Shield encompasses seven principles for assuring adequate protection when transferring and processing personal data originating in the European Union. Similar to Safe Harbor, organizations can self-certify their compliance with these principles, provided they (1) commit to the U.S. Department of Commerce that they will adhere to the Privacy Shield Principles, (2) publicly declare their commitment to the Privacy Shield Principles, and (3) actually implement the Principles. Once compliance is certified, organizations may seek inclusion on the Department of Commerce’s list of certified organizations, effectively authorizing them to transfer the personal data of EU residents to the United States.

Privacy Shield Principles

  1. Notice. Privacy Shield requires organizations to provide notice regarding the type of data collected, the purposes for which it is collected, any third parties to which the data may be transferred, individuals’ right to access their data, and how individuals can limit use and disclosure of personal data. The organization also must provide notice of its participation in Privacy Shield, acknowledge applicable enforcement authorities and describe recourse mechanisms available.

  2. Choice. Organizations must provide clear, conspicuous and readily available mechanisms allowing individuals to opt out of any disclosure of their personal data to third parties, or use of their personal data other than the purpose(s) for which it was initially collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. Certain sensitive information will require individuals to opt in affirmatively.

  3. Security. As under Safe Harbor, participating organizations must take “reasonable and appropriate measures,” based on the risks involved and the nature of the personal data, to protect the data “from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.”

  4. Access. Privacy Shield–certified organizations must provide individuals with access to and the opportunity to correct, amend or delete inaccurate or improperly processed personal data. Individuals also must be allowed to confirm that their personal data is being processed. An organization may restrict access to data “in exceptional circumstances.”

  5. Data Integrity and Purpose Limitation. Privacy Shield requires not only that any data collected be “relevant for the purposes of processing” but also that organizations limit collection to relevant data only. Participating organizations also must “take reasonable steps to ensure that personal data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current.”

  6. Accountability for Onward Transfer. Certified organizations’ contracts with third parties receiving personal data must require that such data “may only be processed for limited and specified purposes” consistent with the level of consent given by the data subject. Third-party transferees also must agree to “provide the same level of protection as the [Principles].” Certified organizations also must “take reasonable and appropriate steps” to ensure third-party agents adhere to the Principles, and are required to stop and remediate any unauthorized processing by third parties, if necessary. Importantly, with limited exceptions, certified organizations remain liable to data subjects for any vendor’s violation of the Principles.

  7. Recourse, Enforcement and Liability. Perhaps Privacy Shield’s most significant new features are its recourse and dispute resolution provisions. Complaint-handling processes must be implemented to obtain Privacy Shield certification. To ensure effective enforcement, Privacy Shield requires (1) procedures for verifying representations made about privacy practices, (2) recourse for data subjects and (3) remedies for failures to comply with the Principles. These newly required “independent recourse mechanisms” are empowered to provide remedies separate from regulators’ enforcement authority.

Legal Safeguards

Because the extent of U.S. government surveillance of personal data was a primary reason why the Safe Harbor program was invalidated, in support of Privacy Shield the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Department of Justice have furnished letters outlining the legal safeguards that will limit U.S. government access to personal data transferred pursuant to Privacy Shield. In addition, the U.S. Secretary of State is set to appoint a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, who will be responsible for handling European complaints regarding whether personal data transferred under Privacy Shield has been accessed by U.S. intelligence activities.

In addition, the Judicial Redress Act of 2015, signed into law on February 24, 2016, allows EU citizens to bring civil actions against U.S. government agencies under the Privacy Act of 1974 to access, amend or correct records about them or seek redress for the unlawful disclosure of those records.

Certification and Compliance

Privacy Shield is expected to be approved by the European Commission later this year and published in the Federal Register shortly thereafter. Organizations that self-certify within the first two months following publication will be given nine months to bring all third-party relationships into compliance. Two months after the effective date, the Principles become binding on an organization immediately upon certification. Privacy Shield will thereafter undergo annual joint reviews by EU and U.S. authorities.

All organizations that intend to become Privacy Shield certified are strongly encouraged to immediately begin updating their policies to meet Privacy Shield’s heightened obligations, including reviewing their third-party agreements to ensure compliance.

© 2016 Wilson Elser

Financial Services Sector Implications of ‘Brexit

Should Britain decide to leave both the EU and EEA as a result of a “Brexit” vote on 23 June 2016, the impact on UK and EU financial services firms could be significant.

The City of London is Europe’s key financial centre and one of the world’s leading financial centres. As such, asset managers, investment banks, retail banks, broker-dealers, corporate finance firms, and insurers choose the United Kingdom to headquarter their businesses, anchoring themselves in a convenient time zone and location from which to access the European and global markets.

A central plank of the European Union’s vision for a single market in financial services is that financial services firms authorised by their local member state regulators may carry on business in any other member state by establishing a local branch or by providing services on a cross-border basis without the need for separate authorisation in every host state. UK-based regulated asset managers (e.g., long-only, hedge fund, and private equity), banks, broker-dealers, insurers, Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS) funds, UCITS management companies, and investment managers of non-UCITS (known as alternative investment funds or AIFs) have a passporting right to carry on business in any other state in the European Economic Area (EEA) in which they establish a branch or into which they provide cross-border services, without the need for further local registration. Passporting also facilitates the marketing of UCITS and AIFs established in the EEA (EEA AIFs) into other member states.

Members of the EEA (which comprises the 28 EU member states and Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland) are subject to the benefits and burdens of the financial services single market directives and regulations, including passporting rights. One outcome of a vote to leave the European Union in the UK referendum to be held on 23 June 2016, would be that the UK leaves the EU but decides to remain in the EEA (with a similar status to, say, Norway)—in which case the impact of a “Brexit” on the financial sector would likely be minimal. Another outcome would be that the UK finds it unpalatable politically to leave the EU whilst remaining in the EEA and therefore decides to leave both the EU and the EEA; it is this scenario that would have significant impact on both UK and EU financial services firms.

Effect on Passporting for UK Financial Services Firms

According to figures released by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in December 2015, more than 2,000 UK investment firms carrying on Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) business (e.g., portfolio managers, investment advisers, and broker dealers) benefit from an outbound MiFID passport, and nearly 75% of all MiFID outbound passporting by firms across the EEA is undertaken by UK firms into the EEA. Notably, according to the EBA, 2,079 UK firms use the MiFID passport to access markets in other EEA countries, and the next two highest totals in the EBA list are Cyprus (148 firms) followed by Luxembourg (79 firms). EEA-wide, there are around 6,500 investment firms authorised under MiFID. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are the main jurisdictions for more than 70% of the MiFID investment firm population of the EU; more than 50% are based in the UK.

We consider that these figures suggest that Continental consumers potentially stand to lose more than UK consumers in terms of the cross-border provision of financial services in the event of a Brexit, which could be a driver for the UK being given a special deal to permit access to continue, although this needs to be weighed against the political imperative that the remaining EU countries would likely feel against being seen as being too accommodating to a country leaving the EU.

In the event of a Brexit where the United Kingdom leaves the EEA, unless special arrangements for the UK were to be agreed between the UK and the EU, and subject to the more detailed comments below, UK firms would cease to be eligible for a passport to provide services cross-border into, or establish branches in, the remaining EEA countries (rEEA) and to market UCITS and AIFs across the rEEA. Instead, local licences would be required, and the use of relatively low-cost branches in multiple member states may have to be reassessed. UK-authorised firms no longer able to passport into the rEEA but wishing to do so would need to consider moving sufficient of their main operations to an rEEA jurisdiction in order to qualify for a passport.

Effect on UK Financial Services Regulatory Law

The EU is a major source of UK financial services regulatory law. Recent UK parliamentary research estimates that EU-related law constitutes one-sixth of the UK statute book. That figure does not include the deposit of more than 12,000 EU “regulations” which take direct effect in each member country (including the UK) in contrast to EU “directives” which must be implemented or “transposed” in local law by each country; EU regulations would cease to apply in the UK post-Brexit. In addition, it would be necessary for the UK to renegotiate or reconfirm a series of EU negotiated free-trade deals that would not automatically be inherited by the UK upon Brexit. Post-Brexit, the UK would need to legislate to “renationalise” voluminous laws rooted in the EU and fill any regulatory gaps in UK legislation once the EU treaties ceased to apply.

It would be open to the UK merely to incorporate directly applicable EU regulations into UK law. This might be the easiest course of action, given the volume and breadth of issues which would need to be addressed by the UK government in the event of a vote to leave the EU.

Accordingly, in contrast to the impact that the UK leaving the EEA would have on passporting, the UK regulatory environment for financial services firms may not change dramatically in the event of a Brexit, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, any subsequent changes to the UK regime are more likely than not to be deregulatory in nature and therefore favourable to UK firms. In relation to the AIFMD, to take one example, the UK government would have the option to introduce a more tailored and proportionate regime for fund managers managing AIFs with lower risk profiles.

Pre-Referendum Planning

Planning for a Brexit is difficult without knowing what a post-Brexit landscape would look like (as yet, this is a “known unknown”). However, in the run up to the UK referendum, it seems prudent for UK financial institutions to consider the impact of a Brexit on the terms of any new contracts being entered into and, if relevant, seek to make provision for a Brexit (e.g., by including Brexit in a force majeure provision; providing for termination rights in the event of a Brexit and adapting references to the EEA to continue to cover the UK, if appropriate).

Passporting aside, UK firms will also need to assess the practical issues that would arise in the event of a Brexit. For instance, investment strategies that permit investments in the EEA may need to be amended in order for investments in the UK to continue to be permitted. Similarly, a Brexit may impact the terms of product distribution agreements and other service agreements.

Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)

If the UK were to leave the EEA, then, potentially: UK AIFMs would be treated as non-rEEA AIFMs, marketing by UK AIFMs of AIFs to rEEA investors would have to be undertaken on the basis of member state private placement regimes, and UK AIFMs would no longer be able to manage (from the UK) an AIF established in an rEEA member state without being locally authorised in that member state to do so. Further, UK AIFMs that utilise AIFMD passports for MiFID investment services to provide segregated client portfolio management and/or advisory services on a cross-border basis would cease to be able to use those passports. Conversely, rEEA AIFMs that seek to manage or market AIFs in the UK or provide MiFID investment services to clients in the UK in reliance on AIFMD passports would no longer be able to do so.

However, unlike other single-market directives, the AIFMD provides for its regime to be extended to non-EEA managers, and this offers a potential “third way” should the UK not remain in the EEA. If the UK were to leave its current AIFMD compliant regime in place, it ought to be technically straightforward, following a Brexit, for the AIFMD to be extended to the UK. In this scenario, UK AIFMs could continue to be authorised under the regime and be entitled to use the AIF marketing and management passports (a non-rEEA manager passport). This possibility may influence the UK government to leave the current UK regime unchanged in the event of a vote to leave the EU. However, any such extension of the AIFMD would require a positive opinion from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and a decision by the EU Commission, so there would be a political dimension to it that would likely introduce uncertainty.

It is important to note, though, that the use by a UK AIFM of a non-rEEA manager passport would be subject to a number of conditions prescribed by the AIFMD that would have material practical implications. In particular,

  • a UK AIFM would need to be authorised by the regulator in its rEEA “member state of reference” (this would be determined in accordance with the AIFMD by reference to where in the rEEA the manager is proposing to manage and/or market funds). This regulator could not be the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), so the use of a non-rEEA manager passport would involve dual regulation and supervision—by the FCA in the UK and by a regulator in an rEEA country in relation to compliance with the directive for funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries (the guidance and approach to application and interpretation of the directive by the regulator and local rules in the member state of reference may well differ from that of the FCA);

  • it would be necessary to establish a legal representative in the member state of reference in order to be the contact point between the manager and rEEA regulators, and the manager and rEEA investors. The legal representative would be required to perform the compliance function relating to funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries; and

  • disputes with rEEA investors in a fund managed/marketed by a manager using a non-rEEA manager passport would need to be “settled in accordance with the law of and subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State”—this would preclude the use of UK courts as a forum for disputes with investors.

UK AIFMs should also note that the AIFMD does not provide for a non-rEEA manager passport to cover the provision of MiFID investment services on a cross-border basis. Accordingly, even if the AIFMD were to be extended to the UK so that UK AIFMs could use a non-rEEA manager passport to manage and/or market AIFs in the rEEA, in the event of the UK not remaining in the EEA, UK AIFMs providing cross-border MiFID investment services within the rEEA (e.g. discretionary management/advisory services for separate account clients) may need to think about where the services are in fact being provided and whether local authorisation would be required to continue the provision of those services. For the provision of MiFID investment services, this would re-establish the position prior to the implementation of the Investment Services Directive (the precursor of MiFID) in the mid-1990s.

Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS)

A UCITS fund must by definition be EEA domiciled, as must its management company. Currently, both UCITS funds and their EEA managers benefit from the passport. UCITS funds are passportable into any other member state for the purposes of being marketed locally to the public and management companies can set up branches and/or provide services cross-border into other member states (e.g., a UK-based management company can provide management services to a UCITS fund based in any other EEA country such as, for example, Ireland or Luxembourg). UK UCITS funds and management companies established pre-Brexit would no longer qualify as UCITS post-Brexit. UK-based UCITS funds would no longer be automatically marketable to the public in the rEEA and would therefore become subject to local private placement regimes. Conversely, a UCITS fund established, say, in Ireland or Luxembourg, would no longer be marketable in the UK to the general public, and a management company based in Ireland or Dublin would no longer be entitled to provide management services to a UK-based UCITS fund.

Accordingly, consideration would need to be given to migrating UK UCITS funds to an rEEA country. Otherwise, UK UCITS funds would become subject to the AIFMD regime instead of the UCITS regime and would be subject to additional restrictions and unavailable to most types of retail investor. UK UCITS management companies would have to migrate to rEEA in order to continue to benefit from the passport.

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)

MiFID gives EEA investment firms authorised in their home EEA country a passport to conduct cross-border business and to establish branches in other EEA countries, free from additional local authorisation requirements. MiFID prohibits member states from imposing any additional requirements in respect of MiFID-scope business on incoming firms that provide cross-border services within their territory, but does allow host territory regulators to regulate passported branches in areas such as conduct of business.

UK-regulated firms that undertake MiFID business would no longer be able to rely on the passport to undertake MiFID business in rEEA and might have to restructure accordingly. Conversely, rEEA firms that seek to undertake MiFID business in the UK would no longer be able to do so and might also have to restructure. However, in contrast to UCITS, that outcome is potentially leavened by the new third-country regime indicated by the recast Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II).

The impact on the provision of cross-border MiFID investment services might be diluted by the regime under MiFID II permitting non-EEA firms to provide investment services to professional clients on a pan-EEA basis upon registration with ESMA, but this would not be an immediate solution, as it would be subject to ESMA making an equivalence determination under MiFID II in relation to the UK, and the timing would be highly uncertain (in particular, MiFID II seems unlikely to come into effect until January 2018, which will be 18 months after the UK referendum). The UK could implement an equivalent regime (in practice, largely by not repealing or amending its EU-generated legislative inheritance and “renationalising” it) to secure its status as an “equivalent” third country with which EEA firms can do business. However, it seems unlikely, given the technical difficulties and delays being experienced generally by ESMA in relation to MiFID II implementation, that an equivalence determination for any non-EEA firms will be high on the agenda until sometime following January 2018.
UK financial institutions would need to consider the regulatory perimeter in each rEEA country in which a financial institution wishes to undertake business. Conversely, rEEA financial institutions would need to consider the UK perimeter to identify what activities by them in the UK would engage a registration requirement locally in the UK.

On the other hand, equivalency considerations aside, the proposals under MiFID II for the unbundling of research and trading fees would fall away in the UK and remain in the rEEA. The unpopular cap on bonuses for systemically important banks and investment firms brought in by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) would also fall away in the UK but remain in the rEEA. Notably, the EBA has recently indicated that the bonus cap should be imposed on all firms subject to the CRD, which would implicate a huge increase in the number of banks and investment firms subject to the cap. On 29 February, it was announced that FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority had decided to reject that advice on the basis of proportionality. Accordingly, even without a Brexit, the UK is already implementing a policy which should put it at a competitive advantage to other EEA countries that decide to follow the EBA’s guidelines.

Under MiFID, EEA countries must permit investment firms from other EEA countries to access regulated markets, clearing and settlement systems established in their country. Post-Brexit, UK investment firms would no longer be able to rely on those provisions, but nor would rEEA firms looking to access the UK. It is precisely this possibility of “mutually assured destruction”—combined with the UK’s status as Europe’s leading financial centre—that could drive some hard bargaining post-Brexit by both sides towards a constructive outcome in favour of continuing integrated financial markets and services.

The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

EMIR applies to undertakings established in the EEA (except in the case of AIFs, wherever established, where it is the regulatory status of the manager under AIFMD which is key) that qualify as “financial counterparties” or “non-financial counterparties.” Since, post-Brexit, a UK undertaking would no longer be established in the EEA, under EMIR, UK undertakings that are currently financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties would become third-country entities (TCEs) for EMIR purposes.

Post-Brexit, UK undertakings—along with other TCEs—would not be able to avoid EMIR altogether, as a number of its provisions have extraterritorial effect, including in relation to key requirements such as margin for uncleared trades and mandatory clearing. The trade reporting obligation, however, does not apply to TCEs. The UK government would need to consider whether to introduce similar reporting requirements domestically, particularly given the size and importance of the UK derivatives market. If UK undertakings became TCEs, they would be required to determine whether they would be financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties if they were established in the rEEA, an exercise which would be straightforward.

In any event, UK undertakings subject to the clearing and margin requirements of EMIR pre-Brexit would remain subject to such requirements when entering into derivatives transactions with rEEA firms post-Brexit. Importantly, the exemption from the forthcoming mandatory clearing requirement for UK pension scheme trustees would cease to apply post-Brexit. Accordingly, a UK pension scheme would no longer be able to rely on the EMIR exemption when entering an OTC derivative contract with an rEEA counterparty.

The City of London boasts some of the world’s largest clearing houses, and at least three of them are currently permitted under EMIR to provide clearing services to clearing members and trading venues throughout the EEA in their capacity as ESMA-authorised central counterparties (CCPs). Post-Brexit, however, a UK CCP would become a third-country CCP. Under EMIR, a third-country CCP can only provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the EEA where that CCP is specifically recognised by ESMA. This would require, among other things, clearing houses operating out of London to apply to ESMA for recognition, the European Commission to pass an implementing act on the equivalence of the UK’s regime to EMIR, and relevant cooperation arrangements to be put in place between the rEEA and the UK—a lengthy process overall. Financial institutions based in rEEA will certainly want to continue to access UK regulated markets and CCPs.

Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

The Future of Business Relations in Cuba – Commentary from a Seasoned Customs Attorney

cuba_800_11429Since the December 2014 reopening of diplomatic relations, access to Cuba has been greatly widened, with new changes to regulations taking place as recently as late January.  These developments signal opportunities for legal service providers to assist clients who are seeking advice on business development opportunities in Cuba. However, effective advising requires a thorough understanding of the history of the U.S. embargo on Cuba and the changes in the laws themselves.

Peter Quinter, Chair of the Customs and International Trade Law Group at GrayRobinson P.A., offers a unique perspective regarding U.S. and Cuban relations as a former attorney in the Office of Chief Counsel for U.S. Customs in Miami. As a South Florida resident surrounded by the stories about the 1959 Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro, Peter was fascinated with the unique relationship between the two countries. As an attorney with U.S. Customs, he was also responsible for enforcing the U.S. embargo of Cuba. I recently had the opportunity to discuss his perspective on the progress of reopening relations with Cuba following his participation in a panel discussion at the recent Marketing Partner Forum.1

Since the imposition of the U.S. embargo on Cuba 55 years ago, Cuba’s economy has remained relatively stagnant in growth. I was initially focused on the idea that only the U.S. refused to trade with Cuba, and that despite access to everywhere else in the world, their economy did not grow. Mr. Quinter corrected my assumption, stating “[t]here were multiple embargoes, but they disappeared long ago. Only the U.S. retains the embargo, and it was U.S. policy to punish any country doing business with Cuba.”  In fact, the UN General Assembly has nearly unanimously voted to condemn the embargo every year since 1992. The U.S. only garnered support from one other nation –Israel– in the most recent vote on the embargo in October 2015.

Despite the standing embargo, the U.S. is now poised to begin contributing to the significant growth of the Cuban economy. Although most U.S. companies are still prohibited from doing business in Cuba, the relaxed rules and opening of embassies in D.C. and Havana have allowed a few major companies to start doing business in Cuba including Verizon, Netflix, and AirBNB. Mr. Quinter believes many industries have the opportunity to rapidly develop in Cuba due to the expansion of diplomatic relations: “Logistics, warehousing, hospitality, aviation, travel agents, sports, education..to name a few.” These developments signal new opportunities for U.S. law firms to advise companies in their up-and-coming dealings in Cuba.

Like business dealings in any country, it is imperative to understand and work within the laws of Cuba’s socialist government. Mr. Quinter’s extensive experience in advising clients on OFAC regulations and policies (Office of Foreign Assets Control) for 26 years makes him uniquely positioned to comment on the current state of U.S. law firm involvement in this rapidly evolving area. During the presentation, he stated that few firms are approaching this opportunity in the appropriate manner. In our follow up discussion, he called attention to this error: “Suddenly, numerous law firms are ‘experts’ in this, and are attempting to be business brokers, instead of legal advisors.”

As a legal advisor, Mr. Quinter elaborated that law firms’ focus should remain on advising U.S. persons and companies about the relevant legal requirements that allow these entities to travel to, trade with, or invest in Cuba. A major part of this practice is determining whether a license is required to do any of these things, and if so, obtaining the license from the U.S. Treasury for the client. Once the appropriate license is obtained, then the firm will need to assist the client in working with the Cuban government.

Law firms can add value to their practice by beginning to form new partnerships now so they can be better equipped to help their clients establish businesses down the line. Mr. Quinter advises that traveling to Cuba, experiencing the culture, and introducing themselves to the community is an excellent way for law firms to equip themselves to guide clients who are looking to do business in Cuba. In May 2015, Mr. Quinter, as Chair of the Florida Bar’s International Law Section, led the largest lawyer delegation ever to visit Cuba. While the group was in Cuba, they met with lawyers, journalists, and dissidents to get a better lay of the land and to help move toward opening up business relationships. Mr. Quinter has since returned to Cuba in October 2015 on behalf of a client meeting with government officials.

The upcoming 2016 presidential elections could greatly impact the progress being made in Cuba. Several presidential hopefuls have made their sentiments toward the embargo known: Republican candidate Marco Rubio staunchly for the embargo, and Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton ardently against it. However, Mr. Quinter posited, “What has happened to date is legally reversible, but realistically not.” He believes the embargo will eventually meet its end: “As more investment in and trade with and authorized travel by Americans occur to Cuba, even the few people who support the U.S. embargo (Cubans call it a ‘blockade’) will realize the embargo is counterproductive, and a leftover from the Cold War of the 1950’s and 1960’s.”

At the moment, Mr. Quinter acknowledges that in the short term, OFAC regulations continue to make it difficult to do business in Cuba. However, he is hopeful for the future: “In 10 years, we will look back and wonder why the U.S. did not terminate the U.S. embargo of Cuba decades ago, and we will recognize the leadership of President Obama in having the courage and vision to starting the process.” In fact, President Obama has recently announced that he will be the first sitting U.S. president to visit Cuba in over the 85 years. This is a signal of the U.S.’s overall sentiment toward Cuba, but only time will tell how U.S.-Cuban relations are progressing.

Article By Nicole Cudiamat Minnis of The National Law Review / The National Law Forum LLC

Copyright ©2016 National Law Forum, LLC


 

1 Mr. Quinter was a part of a panel at the Legal Executives Institute 23rd Annual Marketing Partner Forum, held January 20-22nd in Orlando. He was joined by Eddy Arriola, Chairman of the Board & Chief Executive Officer, Apollo Bank for the presentation, “From Swords to Plowshares: Cuba, Legal Business Development and Industrial (R)evolution (Breakout)”.

U.S. President Announces Upcoming Trips to Cuba, Argentina, Vietnam and Laos

Congress Returns to Washington, Faces a Busy Week of Oversight Hearings, Including Testimony from the Secretaries of State and Defense

Early last week, President Barack Obama hosted the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders in California and announced he will travel in May to Vietnam and Laos.  Back in Washington on Wednesday, the President announced another trip in March to Cuba and Argentina.  Congress was in recess last week, in observance of the Presidents’ Day holiday.  Both chambers will reconvene in Washington this week, and a number of congressional hearings are scheduled to examine various Department and Agencies budgets, with Obama Administration officials testifying.

Secretary of State Heads to Capitol Hill

Secretary of State John Kerry is scheduled to testify before select Senate and House committees next week, where he will likely field questions from Members of Congress on Iran’s violations of U.N. Security Resolutions restricting intercontinental ballistic missile tests and the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.  He is also expected to field questions related to other U.S. sanction programs, such as those related to Ukraine and North Korea.

  • On Tuesday, 23 February, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Review of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 State Department Budget Request.”

  • On Wednesday, 24 February, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Budget Hearing – Department of State and Foreign Assistance.”

  • On Wednesday, 24 February, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Hearing to review the Fiscal Year 2017 budget request and funding justification for the U.S. Department of State.”

  • On Thursday, 25 February, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Strengthening U.S. Leadership in a Turbulent World: The FY 2017 Foreign Affairs Budget.”

U.S.-ASEAN Summit

The ASEAN Leaders released a joint statement at the conclusion of the two-day Summit.  Before returning to Washington on Tuesday, President Obama held a press briefing, recapping some of the topics discussed at the Summit.  He announced his intention to travel to Vietnam and Laos in May and two new initiatives for the region:  (1) U.S.-ASEAN Connect, a network of hubs across the region to better coordinate economic engagement and to connect entrepreneurs, investors and businesses with each other; and (2) a new competition – an innovation challenge to encourage students across ASEAN to develop new solutions to boost agriculture.

Presidential Trip to Cuba and Argentina on the Horizon

In March, President Obama is scheduled to hold a bilateral meeting with Cuban President Raul Castro to build on the progress toward normalization of relations.  Preisident Obama also plans to engage with members of civil society, entrepreneurs and Cubans.  This historic visit will be the first by a sitting U.S. President in nearly 90 years.  After his trip to Cuba, the President will travel to Argentina to meet with the new President, Mauricio Macri, to discuss President Macri’s reform agenda.

Zika Virus – House Appropriators Favor Repurposing of Ebola Funds

In a letter to the Office of Management and Budget Director Shaun Donovan, top House Republican appropriators urged the Obama Administration last Thursday to release unobligated Ebola funds to meet immediate needs related to the Zika Virus.  Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announced on Thursday that enhanced screening of travelers for Ebola has come to an end.

  • On Wednesday, 27 February, the Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Zika Virus: Addressing the Growing Public Health Threat.”

Syria

Secretary Kerry announced last week that the United States and Russia reached a “provisional agreement” for a ceasefire in Syria.  However, the Syrian regime and Russia continued their bombing campaign in northern Syria.  ISIL also carried out a series of bomb attacks in Syria that killed nearly 130 people on Sunday.

Russia/Ukraine – Reforms in Ukraine Praised

Vice President Joe Biden welcomed the passage by the Rada last week of anti-corruption legislation sought by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU, and he commended Ukraine President Poroshenko and the Government of Ukraine for the hard work that went into ensuring passage.  He further commended President Poroshenko’s decision to replace Prosecutor General Shokin, saying this paves the way for needed reform of the prosecutorial service.

Vice President Biden condemned the increasing violence in eastern Ukraine and “the continued failure by combined Russian-separatist forces to allow the OSCE full access to the areas under their de facto control.”  He reiterated full implementation of the Minsk agreements, by all sides, remains the best way forward for resolving the conflict.

  • On Wednesday, 24 February, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense is scheduled to hold a closed hearing titled, “United States European Command.”

North Korea Sanctions Bill – Signed into Law

President Obama signed into law the new North Korea sanctions bill (H.R. 757) last week.  Senator Bob Corker (R-Tennessee), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, welcomed the President’s action, noting the legislation “provides a robust set of tools for the U.S. to deter North Korea’s illicit behavior in a more effective manner and promote human rights for the North Korean people.”

TPP – Congressman Levin Says “No”

Michigan Representative Sander Levin, who is the top ranking Democratic on the House Ways and Means Committee, formally announced his opposition last Thursday to the TPP deal, saying:  “[T]he TPP as negotiated is short of an acceptable outcome, and I do not support it.”  He cited shortcomings on:  (1) worker rights, (2) automotive rules of origin, (3) currency manipulation, and (4) investor-state dispute settlement.  Congressman Levin’s opposition to the deal is expected to make it more difficult for the White House to secure congressional approval of TPP before President Obama leaves office.

TTIP Developments

The 12th round of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be held this week in Brussels.  U.S. TTIP Chief Negotiator Dan Mullaney will participate in a joint U.S.-EU press conference at the conclusion of the discussions on Friday.

Cybersecurity Updates

Last Thursday, the Department of Homeland Security published a Federal Registernotice, announcing the availability of interim guidance documents in accordance with the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2015.  CISA authorizes the voluntary sharing and receiving of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for cybersecurity purposes, consistent with certain protections, including privacy and civil liberty protections.  The CISA guidance documents may be found online here.

Last Wednesday, President Obama appointed former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and former IBM CEO Sam Palmisano as the Chair and Vice Chair, respectively, of the new Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, established under an Executive Order executed on 9 February.

Mexico High-Level Summit Ahead

Vice President Biden, accompanied by Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker, will travel to Mexico City for the third annual U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue on Wednesday and Thursday to discuss issues related to borders, regulatory cooperation, energy, workforce development, partnership for regional and global leadership, and stakeholder engagement.

Congressional Hearings This Week

  • On Tuesday, 23 February:

    • The Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Senate Armed Services Committee.”

    • The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Defense Health Care Reform.”

    • The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities and Programs.”

  • On Wednesday, 24 February:

    • Three House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees are scheduled to hold a joint hearing titled, “Establishing Accountability at the World Intellectual Property Organization: Illicit Technology Transfers, Whistleblowing, and Reform.”

    • The House Ways and Means Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “The Global Tax Environment in 2016 and Implications for International Tax Reform.”

    • The House Armed Services Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “The Challenge of Conventional and Hybrid Warfare in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Changing the Nature of the Security Environment and its Effect on Military Planning.”

    • The House Foreign Affairs Committee is scheduled to hold a markup on three legislative measures.

    • The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Hearing to review the Fiscal Year 2017 budget request and funding justification for the U.S. Army.”

    • The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Boko Haram: The Islamist Insurgency in West Africa.”

    • The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Science and Technology Programs: Defense Innovation to Create the Future Military Force.”

    • The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats is scheduled to hold a closed hearing titled, “Iran’s Intelligence and Unconventional Military Capabilities.”

    • The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “U.S. Strategic Forces Posture.”

    • The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Defense Health Agency: Budgeting and Structure.”

    • The Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to hold a confirmation hearing for: (1) Brad Carson, to be Under Secretary Of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; (2) Jennifer O’Connor, to be General Counsel of the Department Of Defense; and (3) Todd Weiler, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

  • On Thursday, 25 February:

    • The House Armed Services Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Full Spectrum Security Challenges in Europe and their Effects on Deterrence and Defense.”

    • The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Budget Hearing – Department of Defense.”   Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter is scheduled to testify.

    • The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Department of the Navy 2017 Budget Request and Seapower and Projection Forces.”

  • On Friday, 26 February:

    • The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Department of the Army 2017 Budget Request and Readiness Posture.”

    • The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Ensuring Medical Readiness in the Future.”

Looking Ahead

Washington is expected to focus on the following upcoming events:

  • 22-26 February: 12th Round of TTIP Negotiations in Brussels

  • 10 March:  President Obama hosts Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

  • 21-22 March: President Obama travels to Cuba

  • 23-24 March: President Obama travels to Argentina

  • 31 March – 1 April: Nuclear Security Summit in Washington

  • Late April: President Obama attends the Hannover Messe in Germany

  • [TBA] May: President Obama travels to Vietnam and Laos

  • 8-9 July: NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland

What Cuba Wants From Investors

American investors have made their way into Cuba. What Cuba Wants From Investors Just this week, the U.S. Treasury Department has approved the first significant U.S. business investment in Cuba since 1959: the Oggun tractor factory. This plant represents a $5 million to $10 million investment by an American company in Cuba.

Both countries seem serious about moving their recently-resurrected commercial relationship forward. The U.S. and Cuba have entered into an agreement to resume commercial flights between the two countries the same week Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Investments, along with other officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cuba’s Central Bank, and the Cuban Chamber of Commerce, have come to meet with the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to discuss how the two countries could further bilateral commercial relations.

While the focus of politicians’ rhetoric and scholars’ analysis has been on either what Americans are allowed to do, or on what Americans should want to do in Cuba, attention should be paid to what Cuba wants from its investors.

Cuba Wants Investors

First, there can be no doubt that Cuba wants investors.

In September 2013, Cuba created a Special Development Zone at Mariel (Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel). This $900 million port was formed in November 2013, 30 miles west of Havana, with the express purpose of attracting foreign investment. Many Americans are already familiar with Mariel, but remember it for the 1980 mass boatlift that carried thousands of Cuban refugees to America’s shores.  Instead of being a point of departure, Mariel is now a destination for foreign capital.

A few months after the creation of the Special Development Zone, Cuba’s National Assembly unanimously passed the Foreign Investment Act (Law 118) on March 29, 2014.  Law 118 promises foreign investors tax breaks and legal protections for their investments.

These far-reaching overtures to potential foreign investors were not made, however, without certain conditions.

Cuba Wants Investments in Particular Sectors

The Foreign Investment Act delineates, among other things, which investment vehicles are permissible, how investment shares may be transferred, who may be hired to work on the investment projects, and how disputes may be resolved.

Cuba has also specified in what it wants foreigners to invest. Last year, Cuba published a Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment detailing 326 projects in twelve sectors ripe for foreign investment:

  1. Tourism – 94 Projects

  2. Oil – 86 Projects

  3. Agriculture and Food – 40 Projects

  4. Renewable Energy – 22 Projects

  5. Industrial – 21 Projects

  6. Mining – 15 Projects

  7. Transportation – 15 Projects

  8. Construction – 14 Projects

  9. Biotechnology and Medicine – 9 Projects

  10. Business – 4 Projects

  11. Health – 3 Projects

  12. Audiovisual – 3 Projects

The highest number of projects was, not surprisingly, in the tourism sector. Cuba’s official policy on tourism investment is to direct foreign capital towards building or reconstructing new hotels and corresponding infrastructures. The President of Cuba’s Chamber of Commerce has noted the need to increase hotel capacities and standards in Havana and other heritage cities. So far, 74 hotel marketing and administration contracts have been signed, and these include almost 20 contracts with foreign firms.

Interestingly, Cuba has expressed a desire to attract foreign chains to its coasts, and is reportedly working on establishing agreements with renowned international chains across 58 facilities. Cuba is also promoting real estate development, including golf courses, marinas, and theme parks. Cuba has predicted that it will be one of the Caribbean’s top golfing destinations, and has already created two joint ventures, with British and Chinese investors, responsible for hotel construction. These projects are said to be worth over $400 million.

Furthering its efforts to attract investment in its tourism sector, Cuba is hosting its 36th International Tourism Fair (FITCUBA 2016) this year, which will be dedicated to Cuba’s culture and will feature Canada as the guest of honor.  Canada represents one of the highest sources of visitors to Cuba each year.

Notably, the Beacon Council, Miami-Dade County’s official economic development partnership, has identified seven target industries Miami’s business leaders should focus on:

  • Aviation

  • Banking and Finance

  • Creative Design

  • Hospitality and Tourism

  • Information Technology

  • Life Sciences and Healthcare

  • Trade and Logistics

The overlap between Cuba’s and Miami’s lists of target industries, along with Miami’s geographical proximity to Cuba and supply of Spanish-speaking professionals make the city an obvious key player in the development of Cuba’s business sector.

There are certain sectors, however, in which Cuba will not allow private ownership.

Cuba Does Not Want Investments in Particular Sectors

Notably, last December, Cuba’s official newspaper, the Granma, published an article titled, “Open Also Your Mind to Foreign Investment,” encouraging the Cuban people to embrace foreign investment. Cuban officials have reiterated that these changes in economic policy will not threaten the country’s socialist regime. Cuba’s policies expressly prohibit investment in sectors that may threaten Cuba’s political landscape.

For example, the Foreign Investment Act makes it illegal for a foreigner to invest in education services for Cubans and in the armed forces. Cuba’s Constitution also states that Cuba’s press, radio, television, film industry, and other mass media can never be privately owned.

These carve-outs are consistent with the Cuban government’s assurances to its people: Cuba is importing only capitalists’ capital, not their ideologies.

While it has been said that profit is apolitical, investors should not ignore the political contours of Cuba’s budding foreign investment regulations, as these may impact their investment opportunities.