Export Sanctions List: Know Your Customer

If your company sells products to customers or distributors located in foreign countries during this time of sanctions and export controls, you should consider the surprising case of Cobham Holdings Inc. a cautionary tale.

The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) publishes a sanctions list of foreign individuals and entities to which U.S. companies may not sell goods or services without first obtaining an export license. OFAC may fine the U.S. companies that violate these sanction regulations. Prudent companies check the OFAC sanctions list before selling products to foreign customers. In fact, many companies have purchased software that searches the sanctions list for prohibited individuals and entities. If your foreign customer is not found on the sanctions list, your company is free to sell products to that customer.

That’s what Cobham Holdings Inc. thought, but on November 27, 2018 they settled a case with OFAC that involved sales to a foreign customer that was not on the sanctions list. Cobham agreed to pay a fine of $87,507 for exporting approximately $745,000 worth of silicon switches to Almaz Antey Telecommunications LLC in Russia between 2014 and 2015 when that entity was not named on OFAC’s list of “Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons”. Cobham used software to search for OFAC sanctions, the customer came up clean, and Cobham shipped the goods.

Cobham used the software to search for “Almaz Antey Telecom” but not “Almaz Antey.” If it would have searched for the latter, there were numerous hits for entities under the Almaz Antey umbrella, including the entity allegedly responsible for providing the missile that shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014. Upon further investigation, OFAC determined that Almaz Antey owned 51% of Almaz Antey Telecommunications LLC. As a result, OFAC initially informed Cobham that it would face potential fines up to $1.9 million.

Cobham was able to reduce the potential fine by agreeing to utilize new and improved screening software, along with a business intelligence tool and new internal checks for high risk transactions. Given that companies now know (or should know) of the potential pitfalls of using these software solutions as a stand-alone procedure, OFAC may not be so generous to the next company to run afoul of its sanctions and export controls through negligence or inadvertent software errors.

This case highlights not only the dangers of exclusively relying on software solutions to search the combined sanctions list, but the inherent risk of the vast number of related entities and the difficulty of understanding their ownership structure. Even if your customers come up clean on the sanctions search, if they are owned more than 50% by a sanctioned entity, then the transaction is still prohibited. Best efforts must be used to ensure that neither the foreign customer nor its majority owner is on the OFAC sanctions list, and a simple software solution or minimal approach may not be enough. A thorough analysis of all relevant facts and information related to your customers and sanctioned entities is vital to ensure your company will not run into the same snare as Cobham.

 

©2019 von Briesen & Roper, s.c
Read more legal news at the National Law Review.

Japan’s Labor Reform Caps Overtime in a Bid to Curb Karoshi

From low productivity to the death of citizens by overwork, Japan’s labor practices have long maintained a complicated relationship with the country’s workforce. The problem of death by overwork is so prevalent the Japanese have created a word for it: karoshi. On June 29, 2018, Japan passed the “Work Style Reform Law” (the Law) to address some of these issues.

Currently, Japanese law permits employers to enter into special agreements with employees that require them to work an unlimited number of overtime hours. The Law however, generally will limit overtime work to 45 hours per month with a maximum of 360 hours in a year. During busy periods, the overtime limit will be relaxed allowing for up to 100 hours of overtime not to exceed a maximum of 720 hours in a year. In addition, employees may not work, on average, more than 80 hours of overtime per month. This figure will be averaged over a period of two, three, four, five, and six consecutive months. These overtime provisions will go into effect in April 2019 for large employers and April 2020 for small and mid-sized employers. Violation of these provisions will subject employers to financial penalties.

Highly skilled professional workers, however, are exempt from the protection of these overtime provisions. Under the law, highly skilled professional workers must: (i) work a job requiring specialized skills, and; (ii) earn an annual salary of ¥10.75 million or more (roughly $95,000 USD). Labor reform supporters have sharply criticized this exemption as a license to continue the practice of overwork. Meanwhile, supporters of the Law have characterized the exemption as a nod to the working style of professionals where hours and results do not necessarily correlate. Future administrative guidelines will provide employers insight as to what jobs fall into the exemption. The exemption will take effect in April 2019.

In addition, the Law will require employers to treat regular and fixed-term employees equally. Although further administrative guidelines will be issued regarding this provision, employers should: (i) prepare to provide increased compensation and benefits for fixed-term and other non-regular employees; and (ii) begin reviewing the compensation differences between their regular and fixed-term employees to identify any disparities. Enforcement of this provision will likely involve disclosure requirements for employers. This provision will take effect in April 2020 for large employers and April 2021 for small and mid-sized employers.

The Law also contains provisions mandating the use of paid time off. Japanese labor culture has long led to a chronic and voluntary under-usage of paid time off by employees. The Law addresses this issue by requiring that employees entitled to 10 days of annual paid leave or more use at least five of those days each year.

The use of a work-interval system is also encouraged under the law. The law notes that employers should “make efforts” to ensure that there is a minimum interval between the end of a day’s working hours and the beginning of the next day’s working hours. This provision will take effect in April 2019.

 

© 2018 Proskauer Rose LLP.

United States Imposes Additional Sanctions Against Russian Entities and Individuals

On April 6, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced expanded sanctions against Russian entities and individuals, targeting a number of Russian oligarchs in the energy, banking, and other sectors and companies they own or control, as well as 17 senior Russian government officials. The Treasury Department also issued a detailed press release outlining the rationale for each of these designations. Given the prominence of the targeted oligarchs in Russian business and the extent of their business holdings, as well as the size and importance of the targeted companies in the Russian economy, the action could have a significant impact on companies doing business in Russia.

The OFAC action blocks the property and interests in property of the targeted entities and individuals when it comes into the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person, and also prohibits virtually all dealings or transactions by U.S. persons with the targeted parties, who are now on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”). The sanctions also apply to entities that are owned 50 percent or more by sanctioned persons, including the newly sanctioned parties. Non-U.S. persons also could be impacted by the new designations, through potential exposure to secondary sanctions for undertaking significant transactions with these parties.

The action follows the enactment last year of the Countering Americas Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017 (“CAATSA”), as discussed in our client alert, which imposed certain sanctions on Russia that apply to U.S. and non-U.S. companies, and the release earlier this year of an Administration report to Congress that identified Russian oligarchs, as called for in CAATSA. A number of the individuals sanctioned in today’s action were identified in that report.

At the same time it announced the new designations, OFAC also issued two general licenses. One authorizes U.S. persons doing business with certain of the newly sanctioned entities to wind down their activities between now and June 5, 2018. The other general license authorizes U.S. persons to divest or transfer debt, equity, or other holdings in three of the blocked entities to non-U.S. persons (other than sanctioned parties) between now and May 7, 2018. OFAC also issued related guidance on these actions in the form of responses to new Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”).

Companies and Individuals Targeted by the Sanctions

The new sanctions were imposed under existing Executive Orders, but follow from the enactment last year of CAATSA, which among other things required (in CAATSA Section 241) that the Administration report to Congress on significant “senior political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation.” This report, filed with Congress on January 29, 2018, did not entail the imposition of sanctions against the individuals identified in the report. At the time, however, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin warned that some of the individuals could be later targeted for sanctions, saying that “there will be sanctions that come out of this report.”

Today’s designations target several individuals included in the CAATSA Section 241 report, and others who are closely tied to Russian President Vladimir Putin. In total, 26 individuals and 15 entities were designated today (including several non-Russian parties designated under sanctions authorities related to narcotics trafficking and several Russian parties designated for activities involving Syria).

Among the designated Russian oligarchs are close associates of President Putin who are operating in the energy sector, such as Vladimir Bogdanov, Director General and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Surgutneftegaz; Victor Vekselberg, the founder and

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Renova Group; Oleg Deripaska, the founder of

Russia’s largest industrial group Basic Element, which includes EN+ and Rusal; Igor Rotenberg, the son of previously sanctioned Arkady Rotenberg and owner of the gas drilling company,

Gazprom Burenie; and Kirill Shamalov, who married President Putin’s daughter in 2013 and is a minority shareholder of SIBUR.

Among the sanctioned Russian government officials are top managers of state companies and financial institutions, such as Alexey Miller, the Chairman of the Management Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom; Andrey Akimov, the Chairman of the

Management Board of Gazprombank; and Andrey Kostin, the President, Chairman of the Management Board, and Member of the Supervisory Council of VTB Bank. Additionally, the sanctioned Russian Senator, Suleiman Kerimov, is connected to Russia’s largest gold producer, Polyus, and Duma member Andrei Skoch has ties to USM Holdings.

Notably, Russia’s major state-owned weapons trading company, Rosoboronexport, also was designated for asset-blocking for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the Government of Syria. Previously, Rosoboronexport had been targeted only by U.S. sectoral sanctions that restricted U.S. person dealings in new debt of Rosoboronexport of greater than 30 days’ maturity.

As noted above, the addition of these entities and individuals to OFAC’s SDN List has several important ramifications.

First, U.S. persons are required to block the property and interests in property—as broadly defined—of these parties when it comes into the United States or the possession or control of U.S. persons. A “U.S. person” for these purposes is a U.S. entity and its non-U.S. offices and branches; individual U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (“green-card” holders), no matter where located or by whom employed; and non-U.S. persons when present in or operating from the United States. Funds of SDNs that are blocked must be placed into segregated, “frozen” accounts and reported to OFAC within 10 business days.

Second, U.S. persons are broadly prohibited from transacting or dealing with SDNs, unless authorized by OFAC (such as through the two new general licenses described below or specific licenses issued by OFAC).

As noted above, the above-described restrictions extend not just to listed persons, but also to entities in which those persons own a 50 percent or greater interest, individually or collectively with other SDNs. The application of this long-standing OFAC rule is particularly significant here, where the named individuals have wide-ranging business holdings, since the sanctions on the designated oligarchs also apply to any companies in which they, individually or with other sanctioned parties, own a 50 percent or greater interest.

The designations also can impact non-U.S. persons dealing with the designated parties, as more fully described below.

New General Licenses

To minimize immediate disruptions to U.S. persons from these designations, OFAC issued General License 12,which temporarily authorizes all transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or “wind down” of operations, contracts, or other agreements, including the importation of goods, services, or technology into the United States involving one or more blocked entities identified in the general license.

For those entities listed on General License 12, U.S. persons may, until June 5, 2018, permissibly wind down operations, contracts, or agreements in effect prior to April 6, 2018. This General License also would apply to any entity owned 50 percent or more by entities listed in the General License. In FAQs issued with the new sanctions designations, OFAC explains that the blocked entities listed in General License 12 may, for the duration of the General License, make salary and pension payments, and provide other benefits, to U.S. persons. In addition, U.S. persons may continue to provide services to the listed entities until the License expires. General License 12 also permits U.S. persons to import goods into the United States from blocked entities listed on General License 12.

Significantly, although wind-down activities would include accepting payments from the enumerated entities, General License 12 clarifies that U.S. persons may not make payments to such entities; instead, any payments to, or for the direct or indirect benefit of, a blocked person—whether listed in General License 12 or not—must be deposited in a blocked, interestbearing account located in the United States. Therefore, although the new FAQs explain that U.S. persons may import goods into the United States from blocked entities listed on General License 12 until its expiration, any outstanding payments for such goods must be deposited into a blocked account.

Importantly, the list of blocked persons with whom U.S. persons may conduct wind-down activities is not coextensive with the newly designated individuals and entities. Instead, General License 12 covers only 12 of the 15 newly designated entities. It omits three newly designated entities—Gallistica Diamante, Rosoboronexport, and Russian Financial Corporation, each of which was designated under authorities other than those related to Russia—and all newly designated individuals. Therefore, General License 12 does not permit wind-down activities with these three entities, with any of the newly designated individuals, or with any entity owned 50 percent or more by the designated persons and not separately listed on General License 12.

OFAC also issued General License 13, which authorizes transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to divest or transfer debt, equity, or other holdings in three blocked entities to a non-U.S. person (other than a sanctioned party), or to facilitate the transfer of debt, equity, or other holdings in those same three entities by a non-U.S. person to another non-U.S. person (other than a sanctioned party). General License 13 applies only to three of the newly designated entities:  EN+ Group PLC, GAZ Group, and United Company RUSAL PLC. General License 13 expires on May 7, 2018.

The activities permitted by General License 13 include facilitating, clearing, and settling transactions to divest to a non-U.S. person debt, equity, or other holdings in the blocked persons, including on behalf of U.S. persons. The License does not authorize unblocking any property other than as described above, or for U.S. persons to sell debt, equity, or other holdings to, or to invest in the debt, equity, or other holdings in, any blocked person, including those listed on General License 13. (It also prohibits facilitating any such transactions.)

With respect to both General License 12 and General License 13, U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by the licenses must file detailed reports with OFAC within 10 days of the applicable General License’s expiration. Those reports must include the names and addresses of the parties involved, the type and scope of activities conducted, and the dates on which the activities occurred. Reports under General License 12 are due on June 15, 2018, and reports under General License 13 are due on May 17, 2018.

Secondary Sanctions under CAATSA Sections 226 and 228

In addition to the direct implications for U.S. persons associated with the new SDN

designations, there are certain secondary sanctions risks for non-U.S. parties that have dealings with these parties.

Section 228 of CAATSA, in amending earlier legislation, requires that asset-blocking sanctions be imposed against non-U.S. persons that knowingly “facilitate a significant transaction…, including deceptive or structured transactions, for or on behalf of…any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation.” This would include any of the newly added SDNs or parties owned 50 percent or more, individually or collectively, by SDNs. And Section 226 of CAATSA, again amending earlier legislation, requires the imposition of mandatory secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions if the Treasury Department determines that they have knowingly facilitated “significant financial transactions” on behalf of any Russian person added to OFAC’s SDN List pursuant to existing Ukrainerelated authorities. In particular, foreign financial institutions can lose the ability to maintain or open U.S. correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts as a consequence of certain dealings with the individuals or entities designated today.

OFAC’s FAQ guidance clarifies the scope of these secondary sanctions authorities. Among other things, FAQ 545 provides that “facilitating” a transaction for or on behalf of a sanctioned person means “providing assistance for a transaction from which the person in question derives a particular benefit of any kind,” and sets out factors OFAC will consider in evaluating whether a transaction is “significant.” It also provides that a transaction is not “significant” if a U.S. person would not require a specific license from OFAC to conduct the transaction.

FAQ 542 provides guidance on the term “significant financial transaction” in the context of secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions. It confirms, among other things, that “OFAC will generally interpret the term ‘financial transaction’ broadly to encompass any transfer of value involving a financial institution.” This would include, but is not limited to, the receipt or origination of wire transfers; the acceptance or clearance of commercial paper; the receipt or origination of ACH or ATM transactions; the holding of nostro, vostro, or loro accounts; the provision of trade finance or letter of credit services; the provision of guarantees or similar instruments; the provision of investment products or instruments or participation in investment; and any other transactions for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person serving as a correspondent, respondent, or beneficiary. FAQ 542 also provides that a transaction is not “significant” if a U.S. person would not require a specific license from OFAC to conduct the transaction.

In this regard, new FAQ 547 confirms that activity authorized by new General Licenses 12 and 13, if occurring within the time period authorized in these general licenses, would not be considered “significant” for purposes of a secondary sanctions determination. The new FAQ guidance also emphasizes that the “intent” of the new designations is to “impose costs on Russia for its malign behavior.” It indicates that the U.S. government “remains committed to coordination with our allies and partners in order to mitigate adverse and unintended consequences of these designations.”

© 2018 Covington & Burling LLP

Peter FlanaganCorrine GoldsteinPeter LichtenbaumKimberly StrosniderDavid Addis, Stephen Rademaker, Elena Postnikova, and Blake Hulnick of Covington & Burling LLP

White House Issues Presidential Proclamations Imposing Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports

President Trump, on March 8, 2018, issued two presidential proclamations imposing global tariffs of 25 percent on steel imports and 10 percent on aluminum imports in connection with the Section 232 investigations recently concluded by the Department of Commerce. The effective date of the tariffs for both Section 232 actions is March 23, 2018; their duration has not been specified at this time.

Steel

Product Scope

The presidential proclamation covers steel imports entered under HTSUS 7206.10 through 7216.50, 7216.99 through 7301.10, 7302.10, 7302.40 through 7302.90, and 7304.10 through 7306.90, including any subsequent revisions to these HTS classifications.

Remedy

This trade action imposes a 25 percent tariff on steel imports from all countries, with the exception of Canada and Mexico.

Aluminum

Product Scope

The presidential proclamation covers the following aluminum imports: (a) unwrought aluminum (HTS 7601); (b) aluminum bars, rods, and profiles (HTS 7604); (c) aluminum wire (HTS 7605); (d) aluminum plate, sheet, strip, and foil (flat rolled products) (HTS 7606 and 7607); (e) aluminum tubes and pipes and tube and pipe fitting (HTS 7608 and 7609); and (f) aluminum castings and forgings (HTS 7616.99.51.60 and 7616.99.51.70), including any subsequent revisions to these HTS classifications.

Remedy

This trade action imposes a 10 percent tariff on aluminum imports from all countries, with the exception of Canada and Mexico.

Product Exclusions

There will also be a mechanism for U.S. parties to apply for the exclusion of specific products based on unmet demand or specific national security considerations. The Secretary of Commerce shall issue procedures for exclusion requests within 10 days of March 8, 2018.

Country Exclusions

Canada and Mexico will be temporarily exempt from these measures due to their security relationship with the United States. Other countries may be able to qualify for a modification or removal of the tariffs if they come up with “alternate ways to address the threatened impairment of national security caused by imports.” The United States Trade Representative will be responsible for negotiations regarding such alternative arrangements. According to a White House official, the tariff rate for other countries may increase if Canada and Mexico secure a permanent exemption.

 

©2018 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved
This post was written by Nate BolinDouglas J. Heffner and Richard P. Ferrin of Drinker Biddle.
Check out the National Law Review’s Global Page for more insights.

U.S. Restrictions on Travel to and Trade With Cuba Return

Effective November 9, 2017, new regulations took effect limiting U.S. travel and trade with Cuba. 

Decades ago, the United States imposed a commercial embargo on Cuba. The embargo existed in one form or another until 2015, when the United States eased some of its restrictions on trade and travel. Then, on June 16, 2017, President Trump signed the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba. In accordance with the NSPM, the U.S. Department of State has now published a list of restricted entities associated with Cuba. The list names entities with which direct financial transactions will “generally be prohibited” under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. The entities on the list are those that are “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.” Numerous hotels and tourism agencies, as well as retail shops popular with tourists, are included on the list. As a result, U.S. citizens will again have to travel as part of a group that is accompanied by a group representative and licensed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The new restrictions will not impact certain existing transactions. Contracts that were in place and travel arrangements that were made prior to the new rule taking effect may move forward.

This post was written by Natalie L. McEwan of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.,© 2017
For more Antitrust Law legal analysis, go to The National Law Review 

U.S. Implements President Trump’s Cuba Policy

On Nov. 8, 2017, the U.S. Government announced new regulations in furtherance of the Trump Administration’s policy regarding Cuba.

In June 2017, President Trump published his National Security Presidential Memorandum “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba” (NSPM), which announced modification of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba to target the Cuban military, intelligence, and security agencies.  In the NSPM, President Trump emphasized the need to promote the flow of economic benefits to the Cuban people, rather than to its military.  The NSPM further directed the Commerce, State, and Treasury Departments to take various actions implementing the new policy.

Accordingly, regulations were released this week by the U.S. Department of State, Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to implement the NSPM, and clarify the limitations imposed on U.S. persons wishing to travel to or do business in Cuba.

This post was written by Sonali Dohale, Kara M. BombachYosbel A. Ibarra & Carl A. Fornaris of Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.,©2017
For more Antitrust legal analysis, go to The National Law Review 

EU Adopts New Sanctions on North Korea

On 16 October, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted new EU autonomous measures reinforcing the sanctions on North Korea imposed by the UN Security Council, effective immediately. They include a total ban on EU investment in North Korea across all sectors, whereas previously the ban related to certain sectors, such as the arms industry and chemical industries. Also, there is a total ban on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil. The amount of personal remittances to North Korea has been lowered from €15,000 to €5,000 in light of suspicions that they are being used in support of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, three persons and six entities were added to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel restrictions.

This post was written by International Trade Practice at Squire Patton Boggs of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP., © Copyright 2017
For more Antitrust Law legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Brexit: Limiting the Damage

It is one of the ironies of history that the EU as it is today, starting with the single market, was largely made in Britain, the achievement, above all, of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher and her right-hand man in Brussels, the then Commissioner (Lord) Arthur Cockfield. The single market has long been viewed by observers in countries with less of a free market tradition as a typically British liberal invention. And yet it is this market, as well as the EU itself, that another Conservative government is now seeking to leave.

Britain has also left its stamp on key EU initiatives from regional policy to development assistance and fisheries. The EU’s interest in a common foreign and security policy originally stemmed from Britain. The EU’s comparatively transparent and accountable administrative rules date from the reforms introduced by former British Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock when he was Vice-President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004. Thus, representatives of Britain’s two major parties have helped to make the EU what it is today.

If British prime ministers had explained to public opinion earlier the extent of their country’s influence on the EU, something that other Europeans never doubted, the referendum of 23 June 2016 might never have occurred.

A “Smooth and Sensible” Brexit

Be that as it may, Europeans on both sides of the English Channel are now grappling with the consequences of that vote. If reason and economic interest prevail, a “smooth and sensible” Brexit, as evoked by the British prime minister in Florence in September, might yet emerge.

This would involve a broad agreement, in 2017, on the principal aspects of the divorce settlement. This concerns mainly Britain’s financial commitments to the EU, the residence, professional and health rights of citizens living on both sides of the Channel after Brexit, and the need to maintain the Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland and to avoid a hard border across the island of Ireland after Brexit. While Brussels, London and Dublin have affirmed their intention of achieving these goals, there are many practical and political issues to resolve.

If sufficient confidence and trust between EU and UK negotiators is established, it should also be possible to agree to the general terms of a future political and economic agreement between London and Brussels by the end of the year and to broach the question of transitional arrangements to smooth the way for government and business. The British government wishes to ensure that business need adjust to Brexit only once, hence the need for a smooth transition to a well-defined future relationship.

If good progress is made next year, the separation agreement and transitional arrangements could be drawn up by October 2018, allowing enough time for approval by EU and British institutions ahead of Britain’s exit from the EU at midnight between 29 and 30 October 2019. Little, except Britain’s lost vote in EU institutions, would then change for the next two to three years, as the UK continued to make payments to the EU budget, respect judgements of the European Court of Justice and accept the free movement of labour.

The breathing space would be used to negotiate, sign and ratify a two-part long-term agreement. The first part would cover trade and economic issues; it could take effect provisionally relatively quickly after agreement had been reached. The second part, though, would be a wide-ranging political agreement, involving security and even aspects of defence. Both sides have an interest in cooperation on armaments production and unconventional forms of conflict, as well as police and judicial affairs. This would involve the member states’ legal responsibilities and require ratification by all twenty-eight countries concerned. It might not come into effect before the mid-late 2020s.

This relatively benign sequence of events assumes that the British government is unified behind its negotiator, David Davies, and that the political situation in Britain and the EU remains generally stable. It also assumes that the EU can move beyond its rigid two-stage sequencing of the negotiations.

However, there may well be political upsets, involving a leadership competition in the Conservative Party and, perhaps, an early general election. The opposition Labour Party may come to power bringing a change in priorities but also differences of opinion in its own ranks. The British economy will be damaged by Brexit, according to leading economists, and public opinion is likely to react when this is widely felt.[1]Until now, the main impact has been a decline in sterling and rising inflation, raising the prospect of higher interest rates.

The “Cliff Edge” Scenario

Such uncertainties, as well as the divergent political agendas of London and Brussels, may make the smooth and sensible Brexit impossible to achieve during the limited time available. This opens the way to a second scenario, widely described in Britain as the cliff edge. Under this hypothesis, the December 2017 goal for achieving a breakthrough in the separation talks is missed. This further postpones discussion of transitional arrangements and a future long-term agreement.

Negotiations continue fitfully during 2018 but the two sides are too far apart to reach agreement by October 2018, which the EU chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has designated as the effective deadline. If October passes without an overall agreement, it will probably be too late to secure the agreement of the European Parliament before 29 March 2019, when the two-year negotiating period initiated by the British government’s notification of withdrawal expires. Nonetheless, negotiations might well go down to the wire.

Unless all twenty-eight countries “stop the clock” at midnight, an old Brussels ruse, the UK would then leave the EU without an agreement. Business leaders have warned of the chaos this will bring. There will be an unmanageable fivefold increase in work at British, Irish and mainland European ports checking consignments, the suspension of air travel between the UK and the EU, pending the conclusion of a new air transport agreement, and other major disruptions.

Health, safety, veterinary and phytosanitary inspections, as well as the assessment of customs duties, would lead to long queues of lorries at ports on both sides of the channel. Neither side can build the necessary infrastructure and linked IT systems or recruit sufficient qualified staff in time to cope with dramatically increased requirements after a hard Brexit. Supply chains would be disrupted and many foreign-owned companies, which had not already relocated to remaining EU countries, would seek to do so rapidly.

The political and economic damage of going over the cliff edge would last for years and embitter the UK’s relations with the EU and third countries. Many would question the value of Britain’s WTO commitments in the absence of appropriate trading arrangements between Britain and the EU.

This then is a sketch of the cliff edge. Those who admire Britain for its pragmatism, fairness and common sense find it hard to believe that such a scenario might become reality. Surely, they say, Britain and the EU are involved in preliminary skirmishing of the type that precedes any negotiation. They are sure to come to their senses as the decisive deadlines approach. Nothing is less than certain.

A Tale of “Downside” Risks

The outcome may well diverge from either the optimistic or the pessimistic scenarios delineated above. However, the risks are mainly “downside” as the economists put it. British negotiators have not yet grasped the fundamentally asymmetric nature of negotiations between twenty-seven countries backed by European institutions on the one side and a single country seeking to leave the club on the other. It would be better for government, business and the public, if this reality were more widely recognized, leading to realistic negotiating targets. Indeed, Brexit is not really a negotiation at all in the usual sense. It is rather an effort by the leaving country to secure some exceptions from the club’s rules at the time of its departure. This is much akin to the efforts of a candidate (joining) country to achieve some, temporary, transitional exceptions to the EU’s rules.

The Brexit talks are essentially an exercise in damage limitation, mainly through transitional arrangements. When the divorce and transitional arrangements have been agreed, Britain and the EU can concentrate on negotiating a long-term partnership which will be in their mutual interest.

This post was written by Michael Leigh of Covington & Burling LLP., © 2017
For more Global legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

US Attorney General Jefferson Sessions Issues New Guidance On Transgender Employees

Yesterday, U.S. Attorney General Jefferson Sessions issued new guidance reversing the federal government’s former position that gender identity is protected under Title VII.

In a memo sent to the heads of all federal agencies and the U.S. attorneys, the attorney general stated that as a matter of law, “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se.” The memorandum further stated the DOJ will take the position in all pending and future matters that Title VII does not protect against discrimination on the basis of gender identity or transgender status.

Sessions’ memo explains Title VII expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex but makes no reference to gender, and that courts have interpreted “sex” to mean biologically male or female. Sessions concluded employers may differentiate on the basis of sex in employment practices, so long as the practices do not expose members of one sex to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which the other sex is not exposed. The memo highlighted sex-specific bathrooms as such an example. Sessions explained while Title VII prohibits “sex-stereotypes,” insofar as that sort of sex-based consideration causes disparate treatment between men and women, Title VII is not properly construed to proscribe employment practices that take into account the sex of employees, but do not impose different burdens on similarly situated members of each sex.

This guidance reverses and withdraws previous guidance by Attorney General Eric Holder in a December 15, 2014 memorandum in which Holder stated Title VII prohibits employers from using “sex-based considerations,” such as gender identity, in employment decisions. Sessions’ memo also runs contrary to the current position of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which treats discrimination against an employee on the basis of gender identity, including transgender status and sexual orientation, as violations of Title VII.

Currently, there is a split of authority in the courts on whether sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex stereotyping, and thus prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court will likely have to resolve the issue in the future, but may issue some relevant guidance this term in the Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. case (involving issues of a school district’s obligations to a transgender student).

While it is now the position of the Department of Justice that Title VII protections do not extend to transgender individuals, employers should still be careful to avoid discrimination on the basis of gender identity, as the law is still unsettled. As Attorney General Sessions’ memorandum notes, there are still federal statutes that prohibit discrimination against transgender persons, and states and localities may have additional protections. Moreover, the EEOC could still bring suit against employers who engage in transgender discrimination.

This post was written by Allison L. Goico & Hayley Geiler of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved., © 2017
For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

President Trump Shifts the U.S. Policy Towards Cuba

As we have previously reported on the growing fear that the Trump Administration would roll back President Barack Obama’s plan to normalize relations with Cuba. Then-candidate Donald Trump was calling President Obama’s deals with Cuba “one-sided” and beneficial “only [to] the Castro regime.” Last week Friday, at an event at the Manuel Artime Theater in Miami, President Trump officially announced his Administration’s new public policy towards Cuba and fulfilled a campaign promise.

Cuban FlagPresident Trump’s speech culminated in the issuance of a National Security Presidential Memorandum and an accompanying White House Fact Sheet on the U.S. Policy toward Cuba.  In sum, President Trump’s directive:

(a)  Ends economic practices that “benefit the Cuban government” by prohibiting most economic activities with the Cuban military conglomerate, Grupo de Administración Empresarial (“GAESA”). This change is most likely to affect the hotel and tourism industry sectors, since these are the industries said to be largely controlled by GAESA. A list of companies that will be on the “blacklist” will be issued by the State Department at a later date.

(b)   Adheres “to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba,” by amending regulations related to educational travel (i.e., by ending individual people-to-people travel) and enforcing the strict record keeping requirements related to travel to Cuba.

(c)   Opposes any efforts in the United Nations or other international forums to lift the embargo on Cuba.

(d)   Supports the expansion of internet services and free press in Cuba by convening a task force that will work with non-governmental organizations and private sector entities to examine the challenges and opportunities in those areas.

(e)  Keeps in place the Obama Administration’s elimination of the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy.

(f)  Ensures that engagement with Cuba in general is advancing the interests of the United States.

As explained in the new FAQs issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the policy changes will not go into effect until the Treasury Department and the U.S. Department of Commerce have finalized their new regulations. Importantly, the new Cuba policy changes will not have retro-active effect. Those travel arrangements and commercial engagements that were in place prior to the issuance of the upcoming regulations will not be affected.

Al Cardenas, who heads the Latin America practice group at Squire Patton Boggs and previously served as the former Chairman of American Conservative Union and former Chairman of the Florida GOP, explains:  “Despite the emotional setting and rightful remembrance of the struggles of the Cuban people found in President Trump’s speech, which was focused on a Cuban exile audience, President Trump’s executive action preserves many of the changes made during President Obama’s Administration (some of which were outlined in President Obama’s 2014 Speech). For example, the respective embassies in Washington and Havana will remain open, the U.S. licenses issued to airlines and cruise line companies have been kept, efforts to expand direct telecommunications and internet access will continue, and the additional categories for travel to Cuba for the most part remain in place. While one-step back is the prohibition on U.S. travelers from staying at government-owed facilities, this should be a boon to the family-owned B&B’s and other rentals on the island. It remains to be seen whether there will be a significant drop off in tourist travel to the island.”

Viewed as a whole, President Trump is tightening some areas where improved economic relations with the United States could have benefitted some auspices of the Cuban Government.

This post was written by Beatriz E. Jaramillo and  Stacy A. Swanson of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.