Financial Services Law Archives - Page 38 of 38

Can a 401(k) Plan Member Recover Damages to His Individual Account Caused By a Plan Administrator’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty?

Recently posted at the National Law Review by guest blogger David B. Cosgrove – a question many unhappy 401(k) plans members may have pondered:

An ERISA Plaintiff cannot seek individual monetary damages for a Plan Administrator’s breach of fiduciary duty to the plan. Importantly, however, seeking damages on behalf of the 401(k) Plan as a result of a Plaintiff’s losses in his individual account is explicitly permitted under LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008), which held that ERISA Section 502(a)(2) authorizes recovery by a plan participant for fiduciary breaches “that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account.” 522 U.S. at 256. The Supreme Court in LaRue made clear its reasoning for this holding:

Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409. Id. at 256.

For instance, a Plaintiff may rely upon ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) for a Defendant’s failure to provide the Plaintiff with the full 401(k) benefits owed to him under the 401(k) Plan at issue. And the Plaintiff may also rely upon ERISA Section 502(a)(2) for a Defendant’s breaches of fiduciary duties. A plain reading of Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2) establishes that the two sections provide for different relief. Indeed, as the 9th Circuit explicitly noted in Harris v. Amgen, Inc.:

Section 502(a)(1)(B) allows a plan participant “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” By contrast, Section 502(a)(2) encompasses claims based on breach of fiduciary duty and allows for the more expansive recovery of “appropriate relief,” including disgorgement of profits and equitable remedies. 573 F.3d 728, 734, n. 4 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

Regardless, some defendants incorrectly assert that “the Eighth Circuit and other courts alike have repeatedly held that participants cannot state claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA Section 502(a) when they are also seeking to recover the same benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B).” The falsity of this assertion is clear upon a review of the federal caselaw. Indeed, the cases usually cited are inapplicable in that each is either irrelevant or is limited in scope to claims brought under ERISA Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3), not Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2). See Geissal ex rel. Estate of Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp., 338 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2003) (narrowly holding that a beneficiary cannot bring a claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B) and Section 502(a)(3)(B));Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 176 F.3d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Wald v. Southwestern Bell Corporation Customcare Medical Plan, 83 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1996) in holding that “where a plaintiff is ‘provided adequate relief by [the] right to bring a claim for benefits under [Section 502(a)(1)(B)],’ the plaintiff does not have a cause of action to seek the same remedy under [Section 502(a)(3)(B)]”). Some defendants also cite Coyne & Delaney Co. v. BCBS of Va., Inc., 102 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 1996). However, Coyne is not relevant in that it analyses whether aplan fiduciary can bring a claim for benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). 102 F.3d at 713.

Some plan defendants also rely upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008) for the proposition that duplicative claims under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2) are inappropriate. Specifically, defendants may rely upon commentary by Chief Justice Roberts in that case, without revealing that Justice Roberts wrote the concurring opinion rather than the opinion of the Court. Accordingly, his analysis is not binding. Id. at 249. In fact, at the conclusion of his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts acknowledged that his analysis is not binding on the issue: “In any event, other courts in other cases remain free to consider what we have not—what effect the availability of relief under § 502(a)(1)(B) may have on a plan participant’s ability to proceed under § 502(a)(2).” Id. at 260.

Indeed, in Crider v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2008 WL 2782871 (W.D. Ky. 2008), the Western District of Kentucky acknowledged that Justice Roberts’ analysis inLaRue is not binding, and therefore noted that in deciding whether to allow a claim under both ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) and Section 502(a)(2), the question for the court is whether the facts the plaintiff alleges “state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Section 502(a)(2) which is separate from her claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B).” Id. at *2. The court further noted that in deciding this question, the Sixth Circuit has on at least three occasions “allowed plaintiffs to pursue both a claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1) and also to attempt to hold a plan responsible for breaches of fiduciary duty under a separate Section 502(a) action.” Id. Finally, In Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., the Sixth Circuit observed that plan-wide claims are distinct from claims seeking to correct the denial of individual benefits. 409 F.3d 710, 718 (6th Cir. 2005).

Finally, it is well-established that “[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”Guarantee Co. of North America, USA v. Middleton Bros., Inc., 2010 WL 2553693, at *2 (E.D. Mo. June 23, 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim need only be facially plausible, “meaning that the factual content…allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”Id. (quoting Cole v. Homier Dist. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010)).

Beware of Fiduciary Duties to Creditors Different for Corporations and LLCs

Posted yesterday at the National Law Review by Jennifer Feldsher, Robb Tretter and Jonathan P. Gill of Bracewell and Giuliani details about a recent ruling in Delaware concerning creditors of LLC’s which contradicts widespread assumptions and runs contrary to common commercial practice:

In a recent decision, CML V, LLC v. Bax, et al., C.A. No 5373-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2010), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, unlike Delaware corporations, creditors of an insolvent Delaware limited liability company cannot bring derivative actions against the members or managers of the company unless they specifically contract for such rights. The decision effectively precludes creditors of insolvent limited liability companies from suing members and managers for breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the company, unless they amend the company’s limited liability operating agreement to provide directly that such duties are owed to creditors.

The Chancery Court noted that the ruling contradicts widespread assumptions held by both academics and the Delaware courts themselves. In fact, this ruling runs contrary to common commercial practice, in which the form of an entity, whether a corporation, limited liability company or limited partnership, is most often selected for tax or corporate control reasons, with the expectation that the general tenets of the Delaware corporate law apply.

Background

According to the decision, JetDirect Aviation Holdings, LLC was highly leveraged and had volatile cash flows and internal control deficiencies. In April 2007, CML V, LLC loaned JetDirect approximately $34 million. Subsequently, in late 2007, JetDirect’s board of managers undertook four major acquisitions allegedly without the benefit of current information on the company’s financial condition. JetDirect defaulted on its loan obligations to CML in June 2007 and was insolvent by January 2008, at which time JetDirect’s managers began liquidating some of JetDirect’s assets, including selling certain assets to manager controlled entities. CML alleges that such sales were approved by JetDirect’s board without an adequate review of the fairness of such transactions and, thus, breached fiduciary duties owed indirectly to CML. Such duties are indirect because at the juncture of insolvency creditors, rather than the company’s equity holders, become the residual stakeholders.

Each of JetDirect’s operating subsidiaries eventually commenced bankruptcy cases and CML brought claims both directly against JetDirect on account of JetDirect’s defaults under the loan and derivatively against JetDirect’s mangers for breach of fiduciary duties owed to CML. The derivative claims were based on allegations that JetDirect was either in the zone of insolvency or insolvent by April 2007, thus, the managers owed fiduciary duties to its creditors, including CML, and the managers breached those duties. The alleged fiduciary duties breached by the managers were (i) their duty of care, by approving the 2007 acquisitions while “lacking critical information relating to JetDirect’s financial condition,” (ii) their duty of loyalty, by acting in bad faith when “failing to implement and monitor an adequate system of internal controls” and (iii) their duty of loyalty by “benefiting from self interested asset sales.” JetDirect’s mangers moved to dismiss CML’s derivative claims against them, arguing that CML lacks standing to bring derivative suits under the LLC Act.

The Chancery Court’s Decision

In ruling that the creditors of a limited liability company lack standing to bring an action in right of the limited liability company against its members and managers for breaches of fiduciary duties or otherwise, the Chancery Court held that the plain language of Section 18-1002 of the LLC Act, entitled “Proper Plaintiff,” only allows a member or an assignee of an interest in such limited liability company to bring a derivative claim.

The Chancery Court went on to distinguish the rights of creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations from the rights of creditors of insolvent limited liability companies. The Court acknowledged that a combination of Section 327 of the DGCL and case law have provided creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations with standing to bring derivative claims against directors on behalf of the corporations for breaches of fiduciary duties.¹ However, in CML, the Court determined that no such right exists for a creditor of a limited liability company given that the language of Section 18-1002 of the LLC Act is exclusive to “a member or assignee of a limited liability company interest,” while the language of Section 327 of the DGCL is not exclusive to shareholders of the corporation, but simply dictates the qualifications required to be met by shareholders instituting derivative suits.

In support of its decision, the Chancery Court recognized that the LLC Act provides flexibility so that creditors may negotiate certain rights and protections for themselves. Consistent with other recent cases, the Court notes that “LLCs are creatures of contract, designed to afford the maximum amount of freedom of contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved.”² Creditors can protect themselves through the covenants, asset liens, and other negotiated contractual protections customarily contained in a loan agreement and can also bargain for express contractual rights in the borrower’s LLC agreement. Such rights may include, among other things, (i) penalties and other consequences for members triggered by the occurrence of specific events, (ii) personal liability of members for the debts of the limited liability company, and (iii) creation or expansion of fiduciary duties of members and managers to preserve assets for creditors, which would be triggered by insolvency.

Take-Aways for Creditors of LLCs

Unlike rights afforded to creditors of Delaware corporations, creditors of Delaware limited liability companies are barred from bringing claims based upon breaches of fiduciary duties by the members or mangers of such companies unless, among other things, they amend the LLC agreement to directly provide for them. Thus, in order to fully protect themselves, creditors of limited liability companies will need to bargain for specific rights in the loan agreement or demand amendments to the borrower’s LLC agreement as a pre-condition to extending credit or making a loan.

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¹See CML V, 6 A.3d at 240, citing N. AM. Catholic Educ. Programming Found, Inc. V. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007); see also § 320 DGCL

²CML V, 6 A.3d at 249 (quoting Travel Centers of Am., LLC v. Brog, 2008 WL 176987, at *1 (Del.Ch. Apr. 3, 2008) (quoting In re Grupo Dos Chiles, LLC, 2006 WL 668443, at *2 (Del.Ch. Mar. 10, 2006)); see also Kelly v. Blum, 2010 WL 629850 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010).

Milestone or Millstone? Financing, that is.

The National Law Review included a great post this week about the challenges for Milestone Financing from Paul A. Jones of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP:

As a lawyer, I’ve counseled many an entrepreneur, and even an occasional angel or venture investor, who thought so-called milestone-based financing rounds might bridge an especially irksome entrepreneur-investor gulf on valuation. And, indeed, if you’ve been around the high-impact startup game awhile, you are bound to have seen some of these deals done. You might even have seen some of them work out. But as attractive as the idea of punting on valuation and/or funding timing pending the future achievement (or not) of some pre-defined milestone can be, more than a few words of caution are in order.

The kind of milestone financing I am talking about typically looks something like the following. An investor agrees to put in some money up front, with the valuation thereof, and/or the provision of an additional sum of money, determined at some later time, when the company has (or has not) accomplished some defined milestone(s). In theory, this structure can be a good mechanism for bridging otherwise intractable differences about valuation and funding requirements between entrepreneurs and investors. In practice, though, this approach can be quite problematic.

The problems with milestone funding are basically as follows. First, the parties too often leave the definition of what constitutes achieving the milestone subject to interpretation. Some milestones are in fact hard to define with precision. Beyond that, precision itself in terms of defining a milestone can be problematic if, as is often the case, success or failure in achieving a milestone can take forms not contemplated at the beginning of the enterprise. Second, and particularly where the milestone is more distant in time, market conditions can change so that one party or the other inevitably ends up feeling like they are being held to a deal that no longer makes sense. Finally – and this, for me, is the biggest issue with milestone funding – is that what seem like the best/most pressing milestones today might be overtaken by events before they are achieved. Most technology-based startups evolve rapidly: what looks like the best use of limited resources at, say, the first closing of a milestone financing, might look like a less than optimal use of resources a day, week, month or quarter later. But with a milestone financing clock ticking, the various parties – founders, managers and investors – can find themselves with confused and conflicting priorities. At best, in this situation, you will have a serious management distraction on your hands.

Milestone financing structures can be good tools in the right situations. Considering the real world risks, however, they should be considered as if not last at least late-in-the-day resorts. And, when used, both sides should be careful to pick milestones that can be achieved sooner, rather than later, and defined, appropriately, with precision. And then everyone should still cross their respective fingers that the business – technology, markets, competition, etc. – stays reasonably stable at least until the milestone is achieved.

Lender Liability and the Exception to CERCLA

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Joanne M. Schreiner and Matthew A. Whitlow of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP – explain possible liability under CERCLA for lenders in certain situations:

Lenders are making loans again. Lenders are much more cautious about the loans they are making and much more thorough with their due diligence on every piece of property. Perhaps the biggest concern for a lender (aside from whether its borrower will default) is the environmental condition of the property. Now more than ever, lenders are fearful (and rightfully so) of exposure to liability for violations of environmental laws following foreclosure and transfer of possession of a commercial property. Generally, Lenders are insulated from such liability; however, they must be careful not to overstep the boundaries of the protections afforded them.

What is CERCLA?

It is mentioned in many commercial real estate loan documents, typically in connection with a representation by a borrower that they are in material compliance with it. “CERCLA” is an acronym for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. This is the primary piece of federal legislation governing events related to the exposure of real estate to hazardous materials in the United States. Most state environmental laws are based on this law. When it comes to commercial real estate (or any real estate for that matter), the last place anyone wants to be is on the wrong side of CERCLA because CERCLA imposes strict liability upon “owners and operators” of real property for penalties and costs related to hazardous waste contamination and clean up. A lender can become an “owner and operator” of real property under CERCLA in several ways, with potential exposure to CERCLA strict liability. There are three exceptions to CERCLA strict liability: (i) an Act of God; (ii) an Act of War; or (iii) Secured Creditor Safe Harbor.

Initially, the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor allowed that a lender who owned or possessed real property for the sole purpose of protecting its security interest in the real property, and who did not “participate in the management of the real property,” was excluded from strict liability under CERCLA. Unfortunately, courts disagreed on how to interpret the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor (specifically, when did a lender “own or possess” the real property and what constituted “participating in the management” of the real property?). The Secured Creditor Safe Harbor was later narrowed and more clearly defined.

The U.S. EPA adopted guidelines (which were later codified in CERCLA) to test whether a lender and a lender’s actions were protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor. These guidelines attempted to clarify what “participating in the management” of a property means. A two-part test was established to determine whether lenders met this factor:

Did the lender exercise control over the management of the borrower’s environmental compliance program? In other words, did the lender tell the borrower what to do to comply with applicable environmental laws?
Did the lender participate in the Borrower’s day-to-day decision-making process with respect to environmental compliance and other business operations? Simply collecting rent from tenants or advising the borrower on financial matters related to the property is not considered “participation in management.” Other lender activities that do not satisfy this second part include: (i) pre-loan investigations; (ii) loan servicing; (iii) loan workouts; and (iv) foreclosures.

If a lender can prove that: (i) it holds a security interest in real property to secure repayment of money or some other obligation; and (ii) it did not actually participate in management of the property, then the lender is protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor.

What happens after a lender forecloses and becomes the actual owner of the property?

Under CERCLA, a lender must establish it has made commercially reasonable efforts to divest itself of the real property in a commercially reasonable time and on commercially reasonable terms, taking into account market conditions and legal and regulatory requirements. CERCLA does not define “commercially reasonable;” however, lenders can look to the EPA for guidance. The EPA provides that a lender makes “commercially reasonable” efforts to divest the property when the lender lists the property with a broker or advertises the property for sale in an “appropriate publication” (publication of general circulation) within 12 months of foreclosure. It is important to note that lenders who were not protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor pre-foreclosure cannot be protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor after foreclosure. A lender’s own acts or omissions during ownership or control of the real property are not protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor provision.

A lender considering making a commercial real estate loan should consider the following “best practices” to avoid CERCLA liability:

document everything;
avoid active participation in the operational affairs of the Borrower and the property;
if practical, have a receiver appointed to manage the property during default and foreclosure;
conduct pre-foreclosure environmental due diligence;
ensure good environmental management post-repossession or post-foreclosure; and
carefully document efforts to market the property for sale

Rise in Foreclosures + An Increase in Mortgage Fraud = More Homeowner Fires

A recent posting at the National Law Review by Rick Hammond of Johnson & Bell Ltd. highlights some of many problems related to mortgage fraud.

According to recent reports, many insurers have experienced an increase in the number of fire claims since the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis. Allegedly, many of these fires were intentionally set by homeowners facing foreclosure. Not surprisingly, when homeowners’ monthly mortgage payments increase after their low introductory rates expire or when falling home values and stricter lending practices reduce the possibility of restructuring or refinancing loans, the natural result is an increase in the number of foreclosures and an increase in homeowner fires.

That’s not the only problem facing the insurance industry. Insurers are also experiencing an increase in fires associated with the rise in mortgage fraud, which is also running rampant across the United States. Mortgage fraud is generally defined as the intentional misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission by an applicant or other interested party relied on by a lender or underwriter to provide funding for a mortgage loan.

Victims of mortgage fraud include borrowers, mortgage industry entities, and those living in the neighborhoods affected by mortgage fraud. As properties affected by mortgage fraud are sold at artificially inflated prices, properties in surrounding neighborhoods also become artificially inflated. When property values are inflated, property taxes increase as well. Legitimate homeowners also find it difficult to sell their homes. When properties foreclose as a result of mortgage fraud, neighborhoods deteriorate and surrounding properties depreciate.

Legal Issues and Developing Law

Insurable Interest by the Insured

The threshold question in many cases involving mortgage fraud and its effect on insurance coverage is whether the insured has an insurable interest in the property at the time of a loss. An insurable interest at the time of loss is essential to the validity of an insurance policy. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill. App. 3d 352, 470 N.E.2d 1103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever he or she would profit or gain some advantage by a property’s continued existence, and suffer loss or disadvantage by its destruction. Lieberman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 6 Ill.App.3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).

To determine whether an individual has an insurable interest in property, a court will usually examine whether an economic benefit or detriment inures to the named insured under any set of circumstances. In cases involving a straw person, a close examination of the facts might reveal that in every conceivable manner an insured did not contribute a single cent towards the purchase of the insured property or its maintenance. That is, an investigation might reveal that every payment towards the purchase or maintenance of the insured premises was made by a straw person, that is, the property’s unidentified buyer-in-fact.

Therefore, a proper investigation would seek to determine whether a buyer-in-fact paid for the insurance, paid the initial down payment, the mortgage payments, and for all upkeep and necessary expenses, and whether he or she paid for every attendant cost for the property. In these cases, the actual insured will likely not incur economic loss due to the damage suffered by the insured premises, nor gain economically from any recoverable insurance proceeds. Simply put, the primary question is whether there was an actual relationship between the insured and the insured premises, or whether the insured’s relationship to the insured premises is illusory.

Mortgagee’s Duty to Notify Insurer of Foreclosure Proceedings

An insurer is often unaware of a pending foreclosure on property that it insures until after a fire has occurred. Must a mortgagee, as a condition to receiving coverage, give notice to the insurer when that mortgagee initiates foreclosure? A recent case in Tennessee is instructive in analyzing this question (See: U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WL 4463959).

In this case, a homeowner and insured fell behind on her monthly mortgage payments and the mortgagee, U. S. Bank, N.A., initiated foreclosure. The bank sent a letter to the homeowner stating that it started foreclosure, but the bank neglected to give notice of the foreclosure to the property insurer, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. Before the foreclosure process was completed, the homeowner and her husband filed for bankruptcy, which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. Shortly thereafter, the house was destroyed by fire.

U.S. Bank filed a claim with the insurers, Tennessee Farmers, for the fire loss, but the insurer denied the claim because the bank had failed to notify Tennessee Farmers that a foreclosure had been initiated. Tennessee Farmers stated that the foreclosure filing constituted an increase in hazard and, as such, the bank was required to notify the insurance company, and the bank’s failure to provide this notice was a breach of the policy’s mortgage clause, which stated:

We will:

(a) protect the mortgagee’s interest in the insured building. This protection will not be invalidated by any act or neglect of any insured person, breach of warranty, increase in hazard, change of ownership, or foreclosure if the mortgagee has no knowledge of these conditions

The trial court denied Tennessee Farmers’ motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the bank. The insurance company then filed an appeal. On appeal, Tennessee Farmers argued that the foreclosure proceedings was an “increase in hazard” under the terms of the policy of insurance, and contended that the bank’s bad faith claim was unfounded. On the other hand, U.S. Bank argued that commencing foreclosure proceedings did not constitute an increase in hazard, and asked the court to adopt the Kentucky’s court’s opinion in Anderson v. Kentucky Growers Ins. Co., Inc., 105 S.W.3d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

In Anderson, the policy’s mortgage clause stated that the insurance company’s denial of the insured’s claim would not apply to a mortgagee’s claim if the mortgagee had notified the insurer of a “substantial change in risk of which the mortgagee becomes aware.” In that case, the house was destroyed by fire, and the insurance company argued that the filing of foreclosure proceedings constituted a “substantial change in risk of which the mortgagee became aware.”

The court in Anderson ruled against the insurer, noting that insurance contracts are liberally construed in favor of the insured: “While we agree that the filing of foreclosure proceedings constitutes a ‘change of risk,’ we do not agree that such a change is necessarily ‘substantial.” The court then concluded that the policy did not “clearly and unambiguously” require the mortgagee to give the insurer notice when foreclosure was initiated. The court in Anderson further held that commencing foreclosure proceedings, while certainly a “change of risk,” did not constitute a “substantial change of risk” within the meaning of the mortgage clause.

The Tennessee Farmers’ court rejected the Anderson court’s analysis, noting that the mortgage clause in the Tennessee Farmer’s policy required notification of “any” increases in hazard, not just a “substantial” increase in hazard. However, this issue remains a moving target. Thus, after the Tennessee Court of Appeals agreed with the insurance company and reversed the trial court’s decision, U.S. Bank then appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The state’s high court held that the bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings was not an increase of hazard requiring notification to insurance company under the standard mortgage clause in a fire insurance policy, and the bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings was not an increase of hazard requiring statutory notification to insurance company.

Mortgage Fraud and the Insurer’s Right of Rescission

By its very nature, mortgage fraud involves the intentional misstatement and misrepresentation of material information to a mortgagee. Often, the same misrepresentations made to the mortgagee are also made to an insurer on an insurance application and give rise to a rescission action. For an insurer to rescind a policy due to misrepresentation, the insured’s statement must be false, and the false statement must have been made with the intent to deceive ormaterially affect the acceptance of the risk or hazard by the insurer. Illinois State Bar Assn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 335 Ill. App. 156, 821 N.E.2d 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). In such circumstances, an insurance policy becomes voidable, not void ab initio, and an insurer can waive its right to void if it does not invoke it promptly.

However, in some states an insurer has no general duty to investigate the truthfulness of answers to questions asked on an insurance application. Those states have recognized that “an insurance company has the right to rely on the truthfulness of the answers given by an insurance applicant, and the insured has the corresponding duty to supply complete and accurate information to the insurer.” Commercial Life Insurance v. Lone Star Life Insurance, 727 F. Supp. 467, 471 (N.D. Ill. 1989).

However, an insurer is generally estopped from voiding a policy for untrue representations in the application if the insured discloses facts to the agent and the agent, in filling out the application, does not state the facts as disclosed to him, but instead inserts conclusions of his own or answers inconsistent with the facts. See Boyles v. Freeman, 21 Ill. App. 3d 535, 539, 315 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). Typically, an insurer cannot rely on incorrectly recorded answers, even when the insured knows that the agent has entered answers different from the ones he or she provided, if the incorrect answers are entered under the agent’s advice, suggestion, or interpretation. Loganv. Allstate Life Insurance Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 656, 660, 312 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).

Thus, the agent’s knowledge of the truthfulness of the statements is imputed to the insurer. Generally, only when an applicant has acted in bad faith, either on his or her own or in collusion with the insurer’s agent, will a court refuse to impute the agent’s knowledge to the insurance company.

Most laws that are enacted to regulate rescission actions are designed to prevent insurance companies from rescinding policies based on cursory or unintended misstatements by an insured. However, in cases involving straw persons, an argument can be made that the buyers-in-fact act as puppet masters and typically arrange to have the insureds’ names placed on the mortgage and the insurance policies to shield him or herself from exposure, while still enjoying potential profits from sales or insurance proceeds. In these cases, a court will likely recognize this deceptive arrangement, and that the buyer-in-fact elicited an insurance policy using the purported insured as a front. Arguably, a court should order rescission of the insurance policy in these types of cases.

Rescission of the Mortgagee’s Right of Recovery

Most policies’ mortgage clause does not address rescission of the contract, nor does it describe the mortgagee’s rights in the context of rescission, because these rights are, in fact, extinguished by rescission. Therefore, a novel approach in cases involving fraud in the application for insurance is to file a declaratory judgment action seeking rescission and voiding of the policy, which will possibly render the mortgage clause inapplicable, and asking a court to bar the mortgagee from receiving any benefits of that clause. Thus, rescission could potentially wipe the entire policy away, and the insurer would owe no contractual duties to either the insured or the mortgagee. Assuming rescission is granted, in effect, the policy will have never legally existed, and all parties that had any putative rights under that policy would have none.

Importantly, some courts have held that an insurer’s right to rescind or deny coverage on the basis of fraud only applies to the claims of the insured, not to claims of innocent third-parties that are injured by the insured’s tortuous acts. However, this argument is inapplicable here, since a mortgagee is not a third party but is tantamount to a first-party insured. Moreover, contract law governs the alleged wrongful acts of the insured rather than tort law.

Increasing the Effectiveness of an Insurance Claims Investigation

To conduct a more effective investigation when faced with mortgage fraud and foreclosure issues, the author encourages insurers, as part of their investigations, to check the sales history of the insured premises because several sales within a short period of time could indicate false, inflated values. Also, it is advisable to conduct a title search, checking with the local tax assessment office or recorder of deeds, to analyze the property’s ownership history and to ensure that the insured owns the property. Interviewing and completing background checks on the appraisers and real-estate brokers that were involved in a transaction are also advisable.

Finally, review information regarding recent comparable sales in the area, and other documents, such as tax assessments, to verify the property’s value. Reviewing a title history can help determine if a property has been sold multiple times within a short period, which could indicate that the property has been “flipped” and that the value is falsely inflated.

Time to Retire the ESOP from the 401k: Assessing the Liabilities of KSOP Structures in Light of ERISA Fiduciary Duties and Modern Alternatives

The National Law Review would like to congratulate Adam Dominic Kielich of Texas Wesleyan University School of Law as one of our 2010 Fall Student Legal Writing Contest Winners !!!

I. Introduction

401k plans represent the most common employer-sponsored retirement plans for employees of private employers. They have replaced defined benefit pension plans, as well as less flexible vehicles (such as ESOPs) as the primary retirement plan.¹ However; some of these plan models have continued their legacy through 401ks through structures that tie the two together or place one inside the other. A very common and notable example is the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). ESOPs are frequently offered by companies as an investment vehicle within 401ks that allow participants to invest in the employer’s stock as an alternative to the standard fund offerings that are pooled investments (e.g. mutual funds or institutional funds). Participants may be unaware that the company stock option in their 401k is a plan within a plan. These combination plans are sometimes referred to as KSOPs.²

Although this investment vehicle seems innocuous, KSOPs generate considerable risk to both participants and sponsors that warrants serious consideration in favor of abandoning the ESOP option. Participants face additional exposure in their retirement savings when they invest in a single company, rather than diversified investment vehicles that spread risk across many underlying investments. They may lack the necessary resources to determine the quality of this investment and invest beyond an appropriate risk level. Moreover, sponsors face substantial financial (and legal) risk by converting their plan participants into stockholders within the strict protections of ERISA.³ The risk is magnified by participant litigation driven by the two market downturns of the last decade. Given the growing risk, sponsors may best find themselves avoiding the risks of KSOPs by adopting a brokerage window feature (sometimes labeled self-directed brokerage accounts) following the decision in Hecker.⁴

II. Overview and History of ESOPs

A. ESOP Overview

ESOPs are employer-sponsored retirement plans that allow the employee to invest in company stock, often unitized, on a tax-deferred basis. They are qualified defined contribution plans under ERISA. As a standalone plan, ESOPs take tax deferred payroll contributions from employees to purchase shares in the ESOP, which in turn owns shares of the employer’s stock. That indirect ownership through the ESOP coverts participants into shareholders, which gives them shareholder rights and creates liabilities to the participants both as shareholders and as participants in an ERISA-protected plan. They may receive dividends, may have the option to reinvest dividends into the plan, and may be able to receive distributions of vested assets in cash or in-kind, dependent upon plan rules.⁵

ESOPs offer employers financial benefits: they create a way to add to employee benefit packages in a manner that is tax-advantaged while providing a vehicle to keep company stock in friendly hands – employees – and away from the hands of parties that may seek to take over the company or influence it through voting. Additionally, ESOPs create a consistent flow of stock periodically drawn out of the market, reducing supply and cushioning prices. Moreover, with those shares in the hands of employees, who tend to support their employer, there are fewer shares likely to vote against the company’s decision-makers or engage in shareholder activism.⁶

B. Brief Relevant History of ESOPs

ESOPs are generally less flexible and less advantageous to employees than 401ks. ESOPs lack loan options, offer a single investment option, typically lack a hardship or in-service distribution scheme and most importantly, lack diversification opportunities. Individual plans may adopt more restrictive rules to maintain funds within the plan as long as possible, as long as it is ERISA-compliant. Perhaps the most important consequence of that lack of diversity is that it necessarily ties retirement savings to the value of the company. If the company becomes insolvent or the share price declines without recovery, employees lose their retirement savings in the plan, and likely at least some of the pension benefits funded by the employer. The uneven distribution of benefits to employees helped pave the way for ERISA in 1974.⁷

C. Current State of Law on ESOPs

1. ESOPs Within 401k Plans

After the ERISA regulatory regime paved the way for 401k plans, employers began folding their ESOPs and other company stock offerings into the 401ks. For decades employers could mandate at least some plan assets had to be held in company stock. When corporate scandals and the dot com bubble burst in 2001, it evaporated significant retirement savings of participants heavily invested in their employer’s stock, often without their choice. Congress responded by including in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) by eliminating or severely restricting several permissible plan rules that require 401k assets in any company stock investment within 401k plans.⁸

2. ERISA Litigation of the 2000s

Participants who saw their 401k assets in company stock vehicles disappear with the stock price had difficulty recovering under ERISA until recent litigation changed how ERISA is construed for 401k plans. ERISA was largely written with defined benefit plans in mind. Defined benefit plans hold assets collectively in trust for the entire plan. Participants may have hypothetical individual accounts in some plan models, but they do not have actual individual accounts. ERISA required that suits brought by participants against the plan (or the sponsor, trust, or other agent of the plan) for negligence or malfeasance would represent claims for losses to the plan collectively for all participants, so any monetary damages would be awarded to the plan to benefit the participants collectively, similar to the shareholder derivative suit model. Damages were not paid to participants or used to increase the benefits payable under the plan.

Defined contribution plans with individual participant accounts, such as 401k plans and ESOPs, were grafted onto those rules. Therefore, any suit arising from an issue with the company stock in one of these plans meant participants could not be credited in their individual accounts relative to injuries sustained. It rendered participant suits meaningless in most cases because the likelihood of recovery was suspect at best.⁹

The Supreme Court affirmed this view in 1985 in Russell, and courts have consistently held that individual participants could not individually benefit from participant suits. Participants owning company stock through the plan could take part separately in suits as shareholders against the company, but these are distinguished from suits under ERISA. In 2008, the Supreme Court revisedRussell in LaRue and held that Russell only applied to defined benefit plans. Defined contribution plan participants could now bring claims individually or as a class and receive individual awards as participants. This shift represented new risks to sponsors that immediately arose with the market crash in 2007.¹⁰

III. Risks to Employees

The primary risk to employees is financial; a significant component of employee financial risk is the investment risk. 401k sponsors are required to select investments that are prudent for participant retirement accounts. This is why 401k plans typically include pooled investments; diversified investment options spread risk. ESOPs are accepted investments within 401k plans, although they are not diversified.¹¹ This increases the risk, and profit potential, participants can expose themselves to within their accounts. While added risk can be exponentially profitable to participants when the employer has rising stock prices or a bull market is present, the downside can also be significantly disastrous when the company fails to meet analyst expectations or the bears take over the markets.

Moreover, employees may be more inclined to invest in the employer’s stock than an independent investor would. Employees tend to be bullish about their employer for two reasons.¹² First, employees are inundated with positive comments from management while typically negative information is not disclosed or is given a positive spin. This commentary arises in an area not covered by ERISA, SEC, or FINRA regulations. This commentary is not treated as statements to shareholders; they arise strictly from the employment relationship. This removes much of the accountability and standards that otherwise are related to comments from the company to participants and shareholders. Management can, and should, seek to motivate its employees to perform as well as possible. While the merit of misleading employees about the quality of operations may be debatable, the ability to be positive to such an end is not.

Second, employees tend to believe in the quality of their employer, even if they espouse otherwise. They tend to believe the company is run by experienced professionals who are leading the company to long term success. Going to work each day, seeing the company operating and producing for its customers encourages belief that the company must be doing well. It can even develop into a belief that the employee has the inside edge on knowing how great the company is, although this belief is likely formed with little or no knowledge of the financial health of the company. The product of the internal and external pressures is a strong likelihood employees will invest in an ESOP over other investment options for ephemeral, rather than financial, reasons.¹³

Additionally, participants may have greater exposure to the volatility of company stock over other shareholders due to 401k plan restrictions. While some plans are liberally constructed to give participants more freedom and choice, some plans conversely allow participants few options. This is particularly relevant to the investment activity within participant accounts. Participants may be limited to a certain number of investment transfers per period (e.g. quarterly or annually), may be subject to excessive trade restrictions, or may even find themselves exposed to company stock through repayment of a loan that originated in whole or in part from assets in the ESOP. Additionally, the ESOP may have periodic windows that restrict when purchases or redemptions can occur. While a regular shareholder can trade in and out of a stock in seconds in an after-tax brokerage account, ESOP shareholders may find themselves hung out to dry by either the ESOP or 401k plan rules. These restrictions are not penal; they represent administrative decisions on behalf of the sponsor to avoid the added expense generally associated with more liberal rules.

Although employees take notable risk to their retirement savings portfolio by investing in ESOPs within their 401k plans, it can add up to a tremendous financial risk when viewed in the bigger picture of an employee’s overall financial picture. Employees absorb the biggest source of financial risk by nature of employment through the company because it is the major, if not sole, income stream during an employee’s working years. This risk increases if the employer is also the primary source of retirement assets or provides health insurance. The employee’s present and future financial well being is inherently tied directly to the employer’s financial well being. This risk is compounded if the employee also has stock grants, stock options, or other stock plans that keep assets solely tied to the value of the company stock. If the employee is fortunate enough to have a defined benefit plan (not withstanding PBGC coverage) or retirement health benefits through the company, then that will further tie the long term success of the company to the financial well being of the employee. Adding diversification in the retirement portfolio may be a worthwhile venture when those other factors are considered in a holistic fashion.

IV. Risks to the Sponsor

ERISA litigation is a serious risk and concern to sponsors. Although there is exposure in other areas related to participants as stockholders, ERISA establishes higher standards towards participants than companies otherwise have towards shareholders. Sponsors once were able to protect themselves under ERISA but since LaRue participants have an open door to reach the sponsor to recover losses related to the administration of the plan.¹⁴ ERISA requires sponsors to make available investment options that are prudent for 401k plans. The dormant side of that rule requires sponsors to remove investment options that have fallen below the prudent standard. Company stock is not excluded from this requirement.¹⁵

Any time the market value of the stock declines, the sponsor is at risk for participant losses for failure to remove the ESOP (or other company stock investment option) as an imprudent investment within the plan. Participants are enticed to indemnify losses through the sponsor. Such a suit is unlikely to succeed when the loss is short term and negligible, or the value declined in a market-wide downturn. However, as prior market downturns indicate, investors look to all possible avenues to indemnify their losses by bringing suits against brokers, advisors, fund companies, and issuers of their devalued assets. There is no reason to believe that participants would not be enticed to try this route; LaRuewas born out of the downturn in the early 2000s.¹⁶

The exposure for sponsors runs from additional costs to mount a defense to massive monetary awards to indemnify participants for losses. In cases where participants are unlikely to recover, sponsors still must finance the defense against what often turns into expensive, class action litigation or a long serious of suits. However, there is a serious risk of sponsors having to pay damages, or settle, cases where events have led to a unique loss in share value. Participants have filed suit under the theory that the sponsor failed to remove imprudent investment options in a timely fashion. BP 401k participants filed suit following the gulf oil leak under a similar theory that the sponsor failed to remove the company stock investment option from the plan, knowing that it would have to pay clean up costs and settlements. While it remains to be seen if these participants will be successful, they surely will not the last to try.¹⁷

Sponsors should take a good, long look at the ESOP to determine whether the sponsor receives more reward than risk – particularly future risk – from its inclusion. The risk to a company does not have as severe as the situation BP faced this year. Even bankruptcy or mismanagement that results in serious stock decline can merit suit when the sponsor fails to immediately withdraw the ESOP, since it has prior knowledge of the bankruptcy or mismanagement prior to any public release.

To hedge these risks, sponsors can adopt several options. First, sponsors may limit the percentage of any account that may be held in company stock. This is easily justified as the sponsor taking a position in favor of diversification and responsible execution of fiduciary duties. While this may not completely absolve the sponsor of the duty to remove imprudent investment options, it does act as a limit on liability. Although it does provide some protection against risk, it is an imperfect solution.

Second, ESOP plans can adopt pricing structures to discourage holding large positions of company stock for the purpose of day trading. Some 401k plans allow participants to trade between company stock and cash equivalents without restraint. When the ESOP determines share pricing based on the closing price of the underlying stock, it creates a window where participants can play the company stock very differently than the constraints of most 401k investment options.

It is a very alluring reason to take advantage of the plan structure by taking an oversized position in company stock. Add the possibility to indemnify losses in court and it becomes even more desirable. The process is simple: participants can check the trading price minutes before the market closes. If the stock price is higher than the basis, they sell and net profit. If it is below, they hold the stock and try against each day until the sale is profitable. They will then buy back into the ESOP on a dip and repeat the process. This is distinguishable from the standard diversified fund options in 401k plans, where ignorance of the underlying investments preempts the ability to game closing prices. Funds generally discourage day trading – and may even carry redemption fees to penalize it – and encourage long term investing strategies more consistent with the objective of retirement accounts.

Available solutions are directly tied to the cause of the problem; changing the ESOP pricing scheme can eliminate gaming closing prices. ESOPs can adopt other pricing schemes such as average weighted pricing and next day order fulfillment. Average weighted pricing gives participants the average weighted prices of all transactions in the stock, executed that day, by a given entity. For example, if the ESOP is held with Broker X as the trustee, it may rely upon Broker X to provide the prices and volumes of all of its executed orders that day in the stock, which is used to determine the average weighted price participants will receive that day. Alternately, participants could be required to place orders on one day and have the order fulfilled on the following day’s closing with that day’s closing price. Both of these pricing schemes introduce some mystery into the price that diminishes gaming the closing price. This is also an imperfect solution, even if combined with the first option, because it maintains the risks of the ESOP.

Sponsors may also take advantage of brokerage windows to expand employee investment options, including company stock, without the risks afforded to ESOPs. Brokerage windows create brokerage accounts within 401k plans. The brokerage window is not an investment in itself; it is a shell that allows employees to reach through the window to access other investments. Sponsors found good reason to be suspicious of brokerage windows, seeing it as liability for all the available investments that could be deemed imprudent for retirement accounts. A minute minority of participants saw it as a way to have their cake and eat it too during the last rise and fall of the markets; they could invest more aggressively within their 401ks and then demand sponsors indemnify their losses when the markets gave up years of gains on the basis of sponsor failure to review the available contents of the window under the prudence standard.

However, in Deere the court handed down a critcal decision: sponsors could not be responsible for the choices made by participants within brokerage windows. InDeere, several Deere & Co. (John Deere) employees sued the company for making available investments that were imprudent for 401k accounts that caused substantial losses in the 2007 market downturn. John Deere had not reviewed the thousands of available options under the ERISA prudence standard. Although the plaintiffs’ theory was a compelling interpretation of ERISA duties, the court rejected the theory on two grounds. First, it would be impossible for any sponsor to review every investment available through the window. Second, participants had taken ownership of the responsibility to review their investment decisions by choosing to invest through the window.¹⁸

Following the court’s decision in Deere, brokerage windows gained new life as a means for sponsors to expand investment availability at less risk. Rather than having to review a menu of funds and company stock for prudence under ERISA, sponsors can justifiably limit the fund selection directly offered through the plan and leave the rest of the options to the brokerage window. Importantly, this includes offering company stock in the window. By utilizing the brokerage window, sponsors allow access to the company stock without the liabilities of offering an ESOP through the plan. The sponsor will likely lose out on any benefits received from the ESOP, although for most established employers ESOPs are likely more of a convenience factor and a legacy offering rooted in the history of employer-sponsored plans.

Although Deere foreclosed participant abuse of brokerage windows, this option is not without its own negative aspects. Future litigation may reestablish some liability upon the sponsor for the brokerage link. Sponsors may face alternate liability under ERISA for selecting a brokerage window with excessive commissions or fees, similar to requirements for funds under ERISA.¹⁹ Given the flurry of awareness brought to 401k management fees and revenue sharing agreements between sponsors and fund providers following the market crash in 2007, it is likely that brokerage windows will be the hot ticket for participants in the next market crash. Therefore, sponsors should preemptively guard against future litigation by reviewing available brokerage window options to make sure any fees or commissions are reasonable and the categories of investment options are reasonable (even if specific investments in those categories are not).

Perhaps a lesser concern, sponsors need to consider overall plan operation and any negative impacts that may arise from shifting to a brokerage window-based investment offering. These concerns may be less of a legal risk issue than a risk of participant discontent and dealing with those effects. There are primarily two areas that brokerage windows can create discontent. First, when participants want to move from a fund to the brokerage window, they must wait for the sale to settle from the fund and transfer to the window, which generally makes the money available in the window the day after the fund processes the order. Conversely, selling investments in the window may delay transferring money into plan funds because of settlement periods and the added delay of settlement with the fund once the funds are available to move out of the window. Additionally, the settlement periods within the window may frustrate participants, although the plan has no control over those timeframes. Those natural delays in processing the movement of money may create discontent, especially for those participants trying to invest based upon short term market conditions.

Second, those same processes and delays can negatively affect plan distributions. Many plans offer loans and withdrawal schemes, and while sponsors may have their own reasons for making those options available, participants often use those offerings to finance emergency financial needs. Brokerage windows can complicate and delay releasing money to participants. Settlement periods will create delays; if money has to be transferred out of the window to another investment to make those funds available for a distribution that will add at least one more day before money can be released. If participants find themselves in illiquid investments, the money may not be able to move for a distribution at all. Although these issues may not be of legal significance but they will be significant to the people responsible for absorbing participant complaints and there may be additional expenses created in handling those issues.

An additional concern is that the Department of Labor (DOL) is still fleshing out several requirements surrounding brokerage windows and how they relate to ERISA requirements. For example, the DOL October 2010 modification of 401k disclosure rules affects plans as a whole, but it leaves open several areas of ambiguity around the specific effects on brokerage windows. Sponsors may face continuing financial costs complying and determining how to comply with DOL requirements. Future changes in the regulations may negatively affect plans that rely heavily on brokerage windows to provide access to a greater range of investment options.²⁰

These considerations are not exhaustive to the benefits or risks of either ESOPs or brokerage windows, they merely highlight some of the more salient points as they relate generally to the legal and significant financial benefits and risks to sponsors. There may be additional concerns equally salient to sponsors given their particular situation, such as participant suspicion of the removal of the ESOP or unwillingness at the executive level to retire the ESOP.

V. Conclusion

Although brokerage windows may open the door to some new liabilities, it closes the door to the risks of ESOPs, for both participants and sponsors. Sponsor diligence in administering retirement plans will always be the most successful method of checking liability; however, as discussed ESOPs risk putting sponsors in an unwinnable position. Removing the company stock option may not be the most beneficial option in all cases but it may be time for sponsors to consider retiring the ESOP from the 401k in light of the current regulatory regime. A brokerage window option is well suited to take advantage of participant ownership of the employer’s stock, as well as other investment opportunities, while limiting the risk that normally accompanies that ownership. Ultimately, sponsors must consider what is best for the plan and its participants over both the short term and the long term.

Endnotes.

1. Chris Farrell, The 401(k) Turns Thirty Years Old, Bloomberg Businessweek Special Report, Mar. 15, 2010,http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/mar2010/pi20100312_874138.htm.

2. National Center for Employee Ownership401(k) Plans as Employee Ownership Vehicles, Alone and in Combination with ESOPs, (no date provided),http://www.nceo.org/main/article.php/id/15/.

3. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2010); the term “sponsor” can be used interchangeably with “employer” for purposes of this discussion, however there are some situations where the employer is not the sponsor, such as union plans, or the employer is not the sole sponsor in the case of multi-employer plans. This discussion relates to KSOPs where the sponsor is the employer. Different rules and different liability may apply to other plan structures.

4. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 590 (7^th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).

5. Todd S. Snyder, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs): Legislative History, Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2003.

6. William N. Pugh et al. The Effect of ESOP Adoptions on Corporate Performance: Are There Really Performance Changes?, 21Managerial & Decision Econ., 167, 167-180 (2000).

7. Supra note 5.

8. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 901, 29 U.S.C. 401 (2010).

9. LaRue v. DeWitt, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 254-55 (2008).

10. Id. at 255-56.

11. Shlomo Benartzi et al., The Law and Economic of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J.L. & Econ. 45, 45-79 (2007).

12. Id.

13. Id.

14. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 254-55.

15. § 1104.

16. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51.

17. E.g., In Re: BP P.L.C. Securities Litigation, MDL No. 2185, 2010 WL 3238321 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010).

18. Hecker, 556 F.3dat 590.

19. §1104.

20. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (2010).

An Overview of the Hedge Fund Industry and What’s Coming Next for Hedge Funds

The National Law Review‘s winner of the Fall Student Legal Writing Contest is Karol C. Sierra-Yanez of Suffolk University Law School. Karol’s article provides some background on the hedge fund industry and where experts think regulation of this industry may be going. Read on:

This paper aims to provide the reader with a better understanding of what the term hedge fund means, their history and development, and how hedge funds differ from traditional investment vehicles, such as mutual funds. It will focus on the future of the hedge fund industry, specifically, the changes proposed in the Hedge Fund Transparency Act. While some critics and experts in the financial industry see this Act as a way to regulate an investment vehicle capable of affecting the economy, others see it as an invasion into the freedom of hedge fund advisers to develop creative strategies to hedge the risks of their investments and enhance returns.

I. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND?

To begin with, there is no universally accepted definition of hedge funds. The various definitions refer to hedge funds as private investment vehicles that are subject to less regulation in comparison with more traditional forms of investment, such as mutual funds.[1] Hedge funds are not defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in fact, there is no regulatory or statutory definition of hedge funds.[2]

While the first hedge fund was started in 1949 when Alfred W. Jones developed a system to protect investments against market risk[3] that incorporated various techniques including the use of leverage[4] and short selling[5], other financially creative hedge fund managers also came along and developed new hedging strategies such as the use of futures and options, strategies that did not exist when Jones developed his fund.[6] With the use of these new strategies, hedge funds started to generate favorable returns again and increasingly grew in popularity, to the point that by 2002, there were an estimated 6,500 hedge funds operating in the United States, managing approximately $600 billion in capital.[7]

II. HOW DO HEDGE FUNDS DIFFER FROM TRADITIONAL INVESTMENTS?

To begin, a major characteristic difference between hedge funds and mutual funds is that mutual funds and their managers are required to register with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), whereas hedge funds are unregistered investment vehicles. [8] Mutual funds must register as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and their managers must register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940[9]; these funds are considered to be “public” investment funds, meaning they are open to the general public and any investor possessing the required capital may invest, regardless of their net worth or level of sophistication. [10] Hedge funds, on the other hand, are considered “private” investment funds, and are not registered with any government body, and are only open to qualified or accredited investors, including high-net-worth investors, institutions, endowments, family offices and pension programs.[11]

From a sales and marketing standpoint, mutual funds can be purchased in any number of ways, with common examples including directly through a fund management company (e.g. Fidelity), through a mutual fund ‘supermarket’ (e.g. Charles Schwab) or through a broker or financial planner (e.g. Ameriprise Financial).[12] Advertisements for mutual funds can often be found in a variety of published sources, including magazines, newspapers, and on the internet.[13]Hedge funds, meanwhile, are much different in terms of sales and marketing; to be free from certain restrictions, “hedge funds limit access to investors who regulators deem rich and savvy enough to handle the risk.”[14] This is closely related to the fact that hedge funds are referred to as “private placement” vehicles, which refers to the offer and sale of a security not involving a public offering and therefore not subject to filing a registration statement with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933.[15]

From the standpoint of fees and expenses, mutual funds have what is called an “expense ratio”, which is the percentage of fees paid by investors to the company to cover the costs of managing and operating the fund, as well as marketing and distribution costs. [16] The expense ratio is the total fee that the investor will pay, besides any transaction costs that are incurred at the time of purchase or sale of the shares.[17] The average equity mutual fund charges an expense ratio somewhere between 1.3% and 1.5%. [18] Hedge funds, meanwhile, in addition to a management fee (similar to the expense ratio of mutual funds), also charge a percentage of profits earned by the fund. [19]The popular fee arrangement in the hedge fund industry, commonly referred to as “2 & 20”, is to charge 2% of assets under management (the management fee) as well as 20% of profits over a stated benchmark (the performance or incentive fee). [20]

Any person who possesses the required capital is generally allowed to invest in the mutual fund of their choice, and most funds have a minimum investment of $1000, making them a relatively accessible investment for most people.[21] In addition, mutual funds stand ready to redeem an investor’s shares at any point in time, a concept called liquidity, making it relatively easy for an investor to get their money back when they would like.[22] Minimum investments for hedge funds are quite steep, and vary from fund to fund, ranging from $100,000 to $1,000,000 or more. [23] Liquidity, or the ability of an asset to be converted into cash quickly,[24]is quite different between hedge funds and mutual funds. With mutual funds, a net asset value (or “NAV”) is computed every single business day, and investors can redeem their shares at the NAV on a daily basis. [25] Based on a review of several articles, with hedge funds, like mutual funds, the liquidity depends on the frequency with which they issue and redeem shares, but just much less frequently. Most hedge funds have monthly liquidity with a 35-day notice period, but some are much less liquid, depending on the type of assets invested in and the strategies employed by the fund.[26] Hedge funds are also subject to a “lock-up period”[27], which is the time period that an investor must hold their assets within a fund before they can be removed. In other words, mutual fund shares have a readily ascertainable market and a fair price, while hedge fund investors have a contract with the manager that essentially allows the manager to dictate the frequency and manner of redemption.[28]

Traditional mutual funds are generally segmented into a few basic categories, such as stock (growth, value, blend), bond (municipal, corporate, government), and money market (cash, t-bills),[29] according to the types of investments they will make as outlined in their prospectus. They do not deviate from their prescribed investment approach, and are generally limited to the types of investments they can make. Hedge funds, however, generally employ sophisticated trading methods, including short selling (when the investor sells borrowed securities), options (financial contracts between two parties), and leverage (the use of borrowed capital to purchase additional assets with the objective of increasing returns). [30]

According to a Morningstar Methodology Paper published in 2007 titled “The Morningstar Category Classifications for Hedge Funds”, hedge fund managers typically focus on specific areas of the market and/or specific trading strategies. Morningstar states, as an example, “that some hedge funds buy stocks based on broad economic trends, while others search for arbitrage profits by pairing long and short positions in related securities.”[31]

III. PRESENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

As discussed briefly in the section outlining the key differences between hedge funds and more traditional investment vehicles, regulatory differences, most of which stem from the fact that participation in hedge funds is mainly the “preserve of sophisticated investors who possess the required knowledge to assess the risks associated with investing in this asset class”[32] are of the utmost importance. Under this sophistication premise, it is maintained that wealthy investors can better fend for themselves[33] and are thus more suited for hedge fund investments, whereas the everyday, less sophisticated investor may not be.

Two of the primary statutory exclusions for hedge funds from the definition of “Investment Company” come from the Investment Company Act of 1940: §3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7).[34] The §3(c)(1) exemption is satisfied when the issuer sells their securities to no more than 100 persons and does not make or will not plan to make a public offering of those securities;[35] the §3(c)(7) exemption, meanwhile, is satisfied when the securities are being sold only to “qualified purchasers” and also like §3(c)(1) the issuer does not make or does not plan to make a public offering of those securities. As one may note, §3(c)(7) makes no reference to the number of investors in a fund in the manner that §3(c)(1) does, and this is where the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 comes into play. Under §12(g) of the Exchange Act, it states that an issuer must “register, disclose information and submit periodic reporting” if the issuer has $10 million or more in assets under management and 500 or more investors.[36] Due to this fact, it comes as no surprise that many hedge funds elect to issue securities to less than 500 investors in order to avoid triggering this requirement.[37] Similarly, those fund managers that operate as Commodity Pool Operators (“CPO”) are able to rely on regulations contained in the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) that “provide an exemption from registration to CPOs that engage in limited commodity futures activities and sell interests solely to certain qualified individuals and that sell interests to highly sophisticated pool participants.[38]

Finally, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (not to be confused with the Investment Company Act of 1940), which regulates the activities of investment advisers, also contains one registration exemption that hedge funds commonly rely upon. The registration exemption is called the “private adviser exemption” and is found under §203(b) of the Advisers Act and states that the exemption is satisfied if the adviser “1) has fewer than fifteen clients during the preceding twelve months; 2) [nor] holds himself out to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company.”[39] This exemption at first may seem rather difficult to achieve, as it would seem that most hedge funds would have 15 or more investors, but there is a catch. Under the law, hedge fund advisers are able to meet this exemption by satisfying a safe harbor whereby they treat each legal entity (e.g. a single fund, limited partnership, etc) as a single client and are able to invoke the small adviser exemption.[40] As such, many hedge fund advisers avoid registering with the SEC by relying on this de minimis exemption and have fewer than 15 “clients” during the preceding 12 months and do not hold themselves out to the public as investment advisers.[41] This specific exemption will be touched upon further in the paper as it has been the focal point of recent regulation changes affecting the hedge fund industry.

IV. PAST PROPOSED HEDGE FUND REGULATIONS

While hedge funds themselves have been around for decades, they did not grow to such prominence until much more recently. For example, during the post-technology bear market era around 2000 through late 2002 the popularity of hedge funds grew very quickly, and by 2006 there were approximately 8,000 hedge funds globally with assets under management in excess of $1 trillion compared to 1990 when there were only 600 hedge funds with under $40 billion in combined assets under management.[42]

This tremendous outgrowth, which directly results in a significant amount of power and influence within the capital markets, is one of the factors often cited by the SEC as rationale for regulatory action against the hedge fund industry. Other factors include the fact that government agencies generally lack meaningful and reliable data and information about the hedge fund industry as well as the increased “retailization” of hedge funds.[43] An example of such “retailization” would be the fact that U.S. hedge fund of funds that do not meet the aforementioned exemptions and are registered with the SEC do not need to require that all investors be accredited and may accept investments for as little as $25,000.[44] Pension plans, university endowments, and charitable organizations have been investing money in hedge funds, sometimes exposing unsophisticated investors to risky investment strategies.[45] This has led to concerns that unsophisticated investors have invested in vehicles they do not understand.[46]Besides, some hedge funds have been using television commercials to advertise their investment services to unsophisticated investors.[47]

In response to these factors, a 2003 SEC Staff Report investigated the hedge fund industry and concluded that the SEC should require hedge fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act.[48] The SEC had concluded that a number of existing hedge funds were using the private adviser exemption in contradiction of its intended purpose and that a change of the interpretation of the term “client” was justified.[49] Accordingly, in 2004, the SEC, by a vote of 3-2, adopted regulation 203(b)(3)-2, which was an amendment to §203(b)(2) of the Advisers Act, which would require many hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC for the first time.[50] This amendment is referred to as the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, and defined each investor within a private hedge fund as a “client” for the purpose of determining whether the adviser satisfied the previously discussed private adviser exemption.[51] This Rule applied a “look-through” to hedge funds (in contrast to the previously mentioned safe harbor rule which counted each fund or legal entity as a “client”), whereby each individual investor would be counted as one client, thereby many hedge fund advisers were no longer able to satisfy the private adviser exemption under the Advisors Act and were legally required to register with the SEC.[52] Not surprisingly, the SEC, in support of the passing of this amendment, argued that the registration of hedge fund advisers is necessary “to protect investors in hedge funds and to enhance the Commission’s ability to protect our nation’s securities markets.”[53]

It seemed, however, that from the very beginning there were those who felt the passing of the “Hedge Fund Rule” would do little to no good in actually improving the hedge fund industry. One of the articles used for this research states that “the implementation of this mandatory disclosure will probably have little or no impact in practice” and even continues by saying that “the implementation of this rule might ultimately be counterproductive to the SEC’s goal of the abolishment of the “retailization” of hedge funds.[54]

Unfortunately for the SEC, their efforts aimed at hedge fund regulation were short-lived, as in 2004 hedge fund manager Philip Goldstein, his firm Opportunity Partners LLC, and their general partner Kimball & Winthrop filed suit against the SEC, arguing that the “Commission lacked any power to regulate the hedge fund advisor industry and that only Congress may change the Advisers Act.[55] In doing so, Goldstein et al challenged the enforcement of the recently passed Hedge Fund Rule, arguing that Congress “unambiguously intended the term “client” to mean the fund, and not the investors in the fund.[56] The challenge also claimed that the SEC “drastically exceeded the term’s “probability of meaning” and the SEC’s adoption of the rule was arbitrary and capricious.[57] A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard arguments in the case of Goldstein v. SEC, and in 2006 they vacated and remanded the Hedge Fund Rule and held that the SEC’s interpretation of the word “client” was “outside the founds of reasonableness”, “arbitrary” and “inconsistent with Congressional intent.”[58] Adding insult to injury, the court even went as far as to say that “the Hedge Fund Rule came close to violating the plain language of the Advisers Act.”[59]

V. RECENTLY PROPOSED HEDGE FUND REGULATIONS

Despite a lack of early success, the U.S Government did not give up on the subject of hedge fund industry regulation. Looking back at the many concerns related to the hedge fund industry and the financial industry overall, the use of the term “systemic risk” has become rather commonplace when describing the perceived risk inherent in hedge funds. In a paper entitled “Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies With and Alternatives to SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds”, author Evan M. Gilbert defines systemic risk as “the potential for a modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility in asset prices, significant reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and efficiency losses.”[60] Many including regulators are concerned that the sudden and powerful downfall of large and influential investment funds and/or firms could have drastic and far-reaching effects throughout the entire financial system.

As such, and particularly in the wake of the financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2008, regulators sprung into action in 2009 and quickly introduced new measures aimed at the hedge fund industry. The first came on January 29, 2009, when two United States politicians, Senators Chuck Grassley of Iowa and Carl Levin of Michigan, introduced the “Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009.” This act would amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 and aim to regulate hedge funds in two specific ways: first, it would require any funds with assets equal to or greater than $50 million to register with the SEC and second it would impose more stringent anti-money laundering obligations.[61] The Act would encompass all §3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7) exempted funds, not just “hedge funds” per se; as such, all privately-held investment funds ranging from hedge funds to venture capital and private equity funds would be affected.[62]

As mentioned, all “large” funds with $50 million or more in assets would be required to register with the SEC; in addition, they would be required to maintain books and records with the SEC, and also comply with any requests for information or examination by the SEC.[63] Finally, periodic electronic reporting (minimum once per year) to the SEC would also be required of all funds.

Besides the Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009, other regulatory developments were underway in 2009. In a paper published in March, 2010 entitled “New Developments in Securities Litigation”, author Elizabeth P. Gray, a partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, states that “financial regulation of advisers to hedge funds and other private funds is expected to increase substantially during 2010.”[64] She goes on to add that “financial reform bills that would require the registration of advisers to hedge funds as investment advisers with the SEC under the Advisers Act appear to have significant momentum behind them.”[65] Of particular interest is a bill that was sponsored by Congressman Paul Kanjorski of Pennsylvania and approved by the U.S. House of Representatives in December, 2009 which would, if enacted, effectively eliminate the private adviser exemption from registration under §203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act.[66] This particular bill is clearly reminiscent of the previously discussed, and unsuccessful, Hedge Fund Rule of 2004 in that it seeks to amend the meaning of “client” under the Advisers Act and forcibly require advisers with 15 or more clients to require with the SEC. In doing so, these changes in regulation would have many effects similar to those proposed within the Hedge Fund Transparency Act as well as those presently in place for funds abiding by §3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7) of the Advisers Act. Such regulatory requirements would include, among other things, extensive record-keeping requirements, disclosure requirements, rules of conduct, subjectivity to examination processes, and standing ready to provide information to the SEC about the adviser themselves and the funds they manage.[67]

VI. THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION

While it is difficult to say with any real certainty at this time exactly what the future holds for the hedge fund industry, no less trying to predict what future regulations may or may not be enacted, it can certainly be said that many experts and academics alike favor some degree of regulation or another. Long before the term ‘systemic risk’ became everyday vernacular from Wall Street to Main Street, progressive minds felt new regulation would be done. If and when it was done, most would likely agree that future regulation “must reduce the likelihood and potential costs of the failure of systemically important hedge funds whilst at the same time preserving the wider market benefits of hedge funds’ ongoing activities.”[68] It is important that any regulation that is enacted in the years ahead should somehow provide additional transparency, awareness, protection and overall risk management while at the same time allowing hedge fund companies and managers to invest and operate with the degree of anonymity which they deserve and to contribute to overall market efficiency. While some feel that new hedge fund regulations would “create a stable regulatory environment, bring parts of the industry in from the cold, and help lift the veil of secrecy that currently surrounds hedge funds,” others still maintain their rightful concerns.[69]Take for example former US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. With his traditionally “laissez-faire” approach to financial markets, he for one might be more inclined to believe that “hedge funds should not be regulated at all because of the efficiency they provide to the financial system.”[70]In a paper he published recently for The Brookings Institute entitled “The Crisis”, Greenspan continues down the “less is more” path, adding that “regulation by its nature imposes restraints on competitive markets. The elusive point of balance between growth and stability has always been a point of contention, especially when it comes to financial regulation.[71] Others, while cognizant of the systemic implications associated with the failure of one or more large hedge funds, agree, too, that the benefits hedge funds provide to the financial system are substantial and that “the trading behavior of hedge funds can improve market efficiency, price discovery and consumer choice.[72] Going even further, and somewhat contrary to what others may say or feel, some believe that “hedge funds may help in alleviating financial crisis.[73]

Others, meanwhile, are taking a much more middle-of-the-road approach, with beliefs that hedge fund regulations can and will help both sides. David Langguth, of EACM Advisors, LLC, a leading investment advisory firm and subsidiary of BNY Mellon Corporation, was quoted in a hedge fund roundtable as saying that “while regulatory initiatives such as increased transparency or registration may affect hedge funds, we do not anticipate measures that will significantly limit most managers’ ability to implement their strategies. Clearly, well designed measures intended to limit potential market abuses generally will be positive for market participants, including hedge funds.”[74]

Looking back again at the failed 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, some feel that “it would be an understatement to say that the Goldstein ruling was a setback for the SEC,”[75] and I cannot say that I disagree. Author Joshua Hess, in a paper entitled “How Arbitrary Really Was the SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule?” argues that the Goldstein decision resulted in a regulatory black hole to which the SEC found itself inadequately able to regulate a financial industry whose continuing growth will have a substantial impact on U.S. financial markets.[76] And, following the series of recent events that have roiled global financial markets, including the outright collapse of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of Merrill Lynch, countless lending institution bankruptcies, and bailout after bailout by central government banks, it feels to many that something, anything, needs to be done. Furthermore, Evan Gilbert, in his paper entitled “Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies With and Alternatives to SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds” writes that “there appears to be a strong emotional component behind the calls for subjecting hedge funds to SEC registration and disclosure requirements…this fear-based response is understandable, especially in light of the growing number of established institutions either on the brink of collapse, or in some cases actually failing.[77]Once again, something, anything, needs to be done.

Two main ideas that I have come across in my research that stand out as possible solutions include: First, to establish legal limits and/or regulations related to the amount of credit that can be extended to hedge funds by financial institutions. Previously mentioned author Gilbert in his “Unnecessary Reform” paper states, “one of the more straight-forward solutions would be to limit the amount of credit public financial institutions are permitted to extend to hedge funds. Perhaps the most significant concern expressed by those critical of the hedge fund industry is systemic risk…one of the principal causes of systemic failure is failure amongst credit institutions, or more specifically, banks…if banks are limited in the credit they are permitted to extend to hedge funds, any failure of such funds would be less likely to instigate a liquidity crisis.”[78] As previously discussed in the earlier stages of this paper, financial leverage is something specifically available to hedge funds, and a variety of the well-known hedge fund collapses have been attributed to excess amounts of leverage. Therefore, some believe that limiting the amount of credit extended to hedge funds, which is then used to achieve leverage, could help stem systemic risk.

The second recommendation I have come across that I also agree with would be to impose more strict requirements for so-called “accredited investors”. Author David Schneider in his papered titled “If at First You Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to Regulate Hedge Fund Advisors” argues that the SEC could discourage hedge funds from allowing investors to invest in the hedge fund by changing the definition of an accredited investor.[79] By definition under the Securities Act, an accredited investor is any individual with a net worth that exceeds $1 million or any person with an income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years. Amazingly, however, Schneider points out an almost unbelievable fact, which is that this net worth/income benchmark has not changed since 1982, and that due to the presence of inflation (rising prices, incomes, etc) and increasing net worth, more and more investors have been satisfying the accredited investor benchmark.[80] It seems to me that it would be worthwhile to adjust the “accredited investor” threshold every year based on inflation rates, so that as incomes and net worth levels continue to rise, more and more individuals do not suddenly qualify as potential hedge fund investors. The income and net worth thresholds should be increased each and every year, so that it remains equally difficult with each passing year for individuals to become qualified as hedge fund investors.

Apart from the aforementioned recommendations, there is one additional point that continues to stand out as something that the government, at least it would appear, should tend to be more concerned with. As I have come to recognize through my research, hedge funds were originally an activity generally for the ultra rich – those with upper-tier income levels, high net worth, and money to spare, and lose. It was the last condition – the fact that they could essentially bare to lose some part of their net worth – that made them suitable hedge fund investors. But yet, over time, so-called institutional investors, such as pension plans, endowments, foundations, schools, hospitals, and so on, have all started to gradually wade further and further into the hedge fund waters. Institutional investors have pensioners and retirees to take care of, and if hedge fund investments go too far and returns go too astray, then those depending on the long-term benefits their retirement assets will provide are the ones who will lose. As such, I believe it is the government’s responsibility and duty to make sure that pension plans and other institutional investors, both public and private, have a strong handle on their investment choices and that they are fully informed as to the possible risks that hedge funds can present.

VII. CONCLUSION

Hedge funds have enjoyed almost complete anonymity for a number of years, and it has become very evident over the past few years that while hedge funds are not to blame for the various problems our financial system has been dealing with, they certainly do play a very large part. Having more information about them, their actions, their clients, their assets, and so forth, will only help to add a much needed layer of transparency within our fragile financial system. There is also a need to let the financial system be a free flowing system, one that is not encumbered by over-bearing rules and regulations.

[1]Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, Regulation, Vol. 30, No.1, Spring 2007, at 36, 41.

[2] Mark J. P. Anson, CAIA Level I: An Introduction to Core Topics in Alternative Investments 119 (John Wiley & Sons 2009).

[3]Id. at 2. See also James E. McWhinney, A Brief History of the Hedge Fund,http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/HedgeFundHist.asp.

[4]Financial leverage is essentially the borrowing of capital in order to invest additional assets in a company, hoping that the company’s return is higher than the loan’s interest rate, thus generating excess return on equity. Gabelli, supra, at 2. See also, The Layman’s Finance crisis Glossary,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7620678.stm(last updated Sept. 19, 2008).

[5]After reading about short selling and put in rather simple words, short selling is the act of borrowing assets (such as securities) from a third party after which point they are sold in the hope that the value of the assets will go down before repurchasing them again after which point they are then returned to the third party, thus making a profit on the price difference. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-235.htm(last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (Statements of the SEC regarding short selling and issuer stock repurchases. The SEC was explaining the implication of short selling in the light of the current financial crisis and actions taken to control operation).

[6]Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Sep. 2003,http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.

[7]Id. at 11.

[8]Slutz, supra, at 179.

[9]Craig T. Callahan, Hedge Funds vs. Mutual Funds (2009), http://www.iconadvisers.com/WebContent/Public/PDFDocuments/Hedge_vs_Mutual_Funds.pdf.

[10]Id. at 2.

[11]EurekaHedge.com, http://www.eurekahedge.com/database/faq.asp(last visited Apr. 5, 2010).

[12]WSJ.com, http://guides.wsj.com/personal-finance/investing/how-to-buy-a-mutual-fund/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[13]Id.

[14]Alistair Barr, How to Buy…Hedge Funds, Sept.11, 2007,http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-to-buy-hedge-funds.

[15]Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to Private Placements,http://www.seclaw.com/docs/pplace.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[16]Lee McGowan, What is a Mutual Fund Expense Ratio?,http://mutualfunds.about.com/od/mutualfundglossary/g/expense_ratio.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[17]Id.

[18]Investopedia.com,http://www.investopedia.com/university/mutualfunds/mutualfunds2.asp(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[19]Mark Hulbert, 2+ 20, and Other Hedge Fund Math, Mar. 4, 2007,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/business/yourmoney/04stra.html?_r=1.

[20]Id.

[21]Sec.State.MA.Us, http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctprs/prsamf/amfidx.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[22]Sec.gov, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[23]Ben McClure, Taking a Look Behind Hedge Funds,http://www.investopedia.com/articles/02/111302.asp(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[24]Investorwords.com, http://www.investorwords.com/2837/liquidity.html(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[25]Callahan, supra, at 2.

[26]Maintlandgroup.com, http://www.maitlandgroup.com/default.aspx?pid=53(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[27]Lock-up period is basically the time period that you must hold your assets (“lock-up” your money) within a fund before they can be removed. What is a Lock-Up Period?, http://www.eurekahedge.com/database/faq.asp#16(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[28]Callahan, supra, at 2.

[29]Richard Loth, Mutual Fund Categories,http://www.investopedia.com/university/quality-mutual-fund/chp3-invest-obj/mf-categories.asp(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[30]Slutz, supra, at 194.

[31]Morningstar.com,http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/MorningstarHedgeFundCategories_Methodology.pdf(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[32]Vikrant Singh Negi, Legal Framework for Hedge Fund Regulation,http://www.hedgefund-index.com/Legal%20Framework%20for%20Hedge%20Fund%20Regulation.pdf(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[33]Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39 Rutgers L.J., 657, 661 (2008).

[34]Negi, supra, at 3.

[35]David Schneider, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to Regulate Hedge Fund Advisers, 9 J. Bus. & Sec. L. 261, 276 (2009).

[36]Id. at 273-274.

[37]Id.

[38]Negi, supra, at 5.

[39]Schneider, supra, at 277-278.

[40]Thierry Olivier Desmet, Understanding Hedge Fund Adviser Regulation, 4 Hastings Bus. L.J. 1, 15 (2008).

[41]Id.

[42]Id. at 8.

[43]Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s Approach to Hedge Fund Regulation, 32 Ohio N.U. L.Rev. 169, 177 (2006).

[44]Desmet, supra, at 9.

[45]Id.

[46]Id.

[47]Id. at 10.

[48]Schneider, supra, at 280.

[49]Id.

[50]Janie Casello Bouges, Why the SEC’s First Attempt at Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Failed, J. of Alternative Investments, Vol. 9, No.3, 89 (2006).

[51]Schneider, supra, at 280.

[52]Id. at 281.

[53]Franklin R. Edwards, New Proposals to Regulate Hedge Funds: SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2, http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/fedwards/papers/New%20Prop%20to%20Reg%20Hedge%20Funds%2001.pdf(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).

[54]Dillmore, supra, at 182.

[55]Desmet, supra, at 22.

[56]Schneider, supra, at 281.

[57]Id.

[58]Desmet, supra, at 22.

[59]Id.

[60]Evan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The fallacies with and Alternatives to SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 2 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 319, 328 (2009).

[61]Proposed Hedge Fund and Private Equity Fund Regulation,http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/1633.pdf(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).

[62]Id.

[63]Anita K. Krug, The Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009,http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Hedge_Fund_Transparency_Act_Comments_A.Krug.pdf(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).

[64]Elizabeth P. Gray, Heightened Government Prosecution and Anticipated Regulation of Private Hedge Funds, 2010 WL 894714 (aspatore).

[65]Id. at 2.

[66]Id.

[67]Id.

[68]Ashley Taylor, et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds be Regulated? A Survey, http://www.ashleytaylor.org/hf_jfs2005.pdf(last visited May 13, 2010).

[69] The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: Q & A with Ezra Zask and Gaurav Jetley of Analysis Group,http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/News/AnalysisGroup_Release_Zask_Jetley_HedgeFunds_2009-07-16.pdf((last visited May 13, 2010).

[70]Taylor, supra, at 7.

[71] Alan Greenspan, The Crisis,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_spring_bpea_papers/spring2010_greenspan.pdf(last visited May 13, 2010).

[72]Taylor, supra, at 2.

[73] Id.at 3.

[74]Hedge Fund Roundtable,https://privatewealth.mellon.com/en_US/public_content/Resources/documents/CIONewsHedgeFundArticle.pdf(last visited May 13, 2010).

[75]Joshua Hess, How Arbitrary really was the SEC’s “Hedge Fund Rule”? The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation in Light of Goldstein, Amaranth Advisors, and Beyond, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 913, 940 (2008).

[76] Id.

[77] Gilbert, supra, at 343.

[78]Id. at 345.

[79] Schneider, supra, at 308.

[80]Id.

ABA 13th Annual National Institute of Banking Law Basics Oct 27 -29 Boston, MA

The National Law Review is proud to support the American Bar Association Business Law Section, the ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education, and the Morin Center for Banking and Financial Law of Boston University School of Law‘s two-and-one-half day primer on banking law. If you need the basics, you can’t afford to miss this program. Attendance is limited.

Attend this program and learn what you need to know about:

· Who regulates whom, why and how

· The structure and intent of bank regulation

· The impact of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank

· The role of capital

· Prudential limitations

· Permitted investments and activities of banks, bank holding companies and financial holding companies

· Insurance, securities and capital market activities of banks and bank affiliates

· Geographic expansion and mergers and acquisitions

· Supervision and enforcement

· Failing banks and actions against affiliated persons

This fundamental banking law course was developed to provide practitioners with an understanding of the basic laws and regulations governing banks and bank holding companies. This course is a comprehensive introduction to banking law regulation for attorneys, consultants, and bank professionals who intend to work in the field. It is also a refresher course for experienced banking law practitioners whose practice has not provided an opportunity for the broad exposure that this course offers. This course includes a two-hour segment on ethical considerations in the representation of banking organizations.

Date:	October 27 — 29 2010
Location:	Boston University School of Management Fl 4 – Executive Leadership Ctr 595 Commonwealth Ave Boston, MA 02215-1704 USA
Requested CLE Credit:	18.50

For More Information and to Register: Click Here.

ABA Investment Management Basics Boston Univ. Oct. 13 – 15

The National Law Review is proud to support – t he American Bar Association Business Law Section, the ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education, and the Morin Center for Banking and Financial Law of Boston University School of Law present the 3rd presentation of a two-and-one-half day introduction to the regulation of investment companies (mutual funds) and functionally similar entities.

Attend This Program And Learn What You Need To Know About …

The structure of the investment management industry
The anatomy of an investment company “family” of funds
The regulatory scheme imposed on investment companies and related service providers
The mechanics of the two “40 Acts: Investment Company Act and Investment Advisors Act”
Modern governance standards for investment companies
Distribution of fund shares and the fiduciary and regulatory issues raised
Contrasting regulation of hedge funds and private equity funds
“Hot issues” in the industry

Who Should Attend This National Institute?

Lawyers at all levels of experience (including regulators) who are involved or expect to become involved in issues surrounding the investment company industry
Private practitioners who advise corporate clients on related matters
Consultants, accountants, and bank executives seeking a more comprehensive understanding of this changing industry

MCLE

Mandatory continuing legal education (MCLE) accreditation has been requested from all states that require continuing legal education. 17.50 hours of CLE credit, including 1.00 hours of Ethics credit, have been requested from those states recognizing a 60-minute credit hour and 21.00 hours of CLE credit, including 1.00 hours of Ethics credit, have been requested from those states recognizing a 50-minute credit hour. For NY-licensed attorneys: This transitional CLE program has been approved for all NY-licensed attorneys in accordance with the requirements of the New York State CLE Board (17.50 including 1.00

hours of Ethics total NY transitional MCLE credits).

For more information and to register go to the ABA CLE Website.

ABA Consumer Financial Services Law Basics -Sept 20 – 21 Boston, MA

Hey Boston – the National Law Review wants to bring to your attention — The American Bar Association Business Law Section, the ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education, and the Morin Center for Banking and Financial Law of Boston University School of Law will host the 1st presentation of a one-and-a-half day introduction to the regulation of consumer financial services (“CFS”) products and the financial institutions that provide them. If you need a primer or a refresher on the law governing consumer loans and deposits, the program will provide a jump start. 11.75 hours of CLE have been applied for.

Program Focus

The program will explain each of the major sources of regulation of consumer financial products in the context of the regulatory techniques and policies that are the common threads in a complex pattern, including:

Price regulation and federal preemption of state price limitations
Disclosure and transparency serving consumer understanding and market operation
Regulating the “fairness” of financial institution conduct
Privacy and security of consumer data and the problem of ID theft
Fair access to financial services
Remedies: regulators and private plaintiffs
Regulatory reform: CFPA and beyond

Rapid change is occurring in CFS law on several fronts. First, Congress and the Administration have proposed significant changes in CFS law, with the Credit CARD Act and other changes going into effect almost immediately and proposed new regulators on the horizon. At the same time, the long-time federal CFS regulators (FRB, HUD, and FTC) have promulgated new regulations of the CFS industry and its products at an unprecedented pace, in response to a financial crisis that began with toxic consumer assets and the perceived failure to regulate adequately in the past. Finally, states continue to impose their individual, local solutions on CFS industry problems. This multi-pronged approach results in, among other things, constitutional issues of federalism that the Supreme Court and Congress are currently tackling in the area of federal preemption of state CFS laws.

This program presents these new developments in the context of the complex, overlapping and often inconsistent federal laws and regulations that have developed over the past 40 years. September 20 -21 Boston University School of Management For More Information and to Register Click on: http://dld.bz/vCjC

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Background

The Chancery Court’s Decision

Take-Aways for Creditors of LLCs

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What is CERCLA?

What happens after a lender forecloses and becomes the actual owner of the property?

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Legal Issues and Developing Law

Insurable Interest by the Insured

Mortgagee’s Duty to Notify Insurer of Foreclosure Proceedings

Mortgage Fraud and the Insurer’s Right of Rescission

Rescission of the Mortgagee’s Right of Recovery

Increasing the Effectiveness of an Insurance Claims Investigation

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I. Introduction

II. Overview and History of ESOPs

A. ESOP Overview

B. Brief Relevant History of ESOPs

C. Current State of Law on ESOPs

1. ESOPs Within 401k Plans

2. ERISA Litigation of the 2000s

III. Risks to Employees

IV. Risks to the Sponsor

V. Conclusion

Endnotes.

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I. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND?

II. HOW DO HEDGE FUNDS DIFFER FROM TRADITIONAL INVESTMENTS?

IV. PAST PROPOSED HEDGE FUND REGULATIONS

VII. CONCLUSION

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