Category: finance

Supreme Court Decides to Rule on FTC’s Disgorgement Authority

As previously blogged about here, the Supreme Court recently upheld the SEC’s disgorgement authority but imposed certain limits, including consideration of net profits.  FTC defense practitioners immediately began to consider how the ruling might potentially impact FTC investigations and enforcement actions, including how it might bear upon other judicial challenges to whether Section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to obtain equitable monetary relief.

On July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the AMG Capital Management and Credit Bureau Center matters that should now decide the issues of whether Section 13(b) permits courts to award disgorgement.

In AMG v. FTC, the Ninth Circuit held that courts’ equitable powers include awarding equitable monetary relief, including disgorgement.  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center recently disregard years of precedent when it held that the express terms of Section 13(b) illustrate that Congress only authorized injunctive relief, not equitable monetary relief or disgorgement.

The two matters have been consolidated and with a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.   The importance of these matters cannot be overstated as they conclusively resolve splits of authority relating to whether or in what circumstances FTC lawyers are entitled to seek equitable monetary relief in the form of disgorgement.

© 2020 Hinch Newman LLP

Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Activity Declines Slightly in 2019

Los Angeles—The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) publicly disclosed a combined 81 accounting and auditing enforcement actions during 2019, down slightly from the previous year, according to a Cornerstone Research report released today. Monetary settlements totaled approximately $628 million, $626 million of which was imposed by the SEC.

Cornerstone Research’s report, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Activity—2019 Review and Analysis, examines publicly disclosed SEC and PCAOB enforcement actions that involve accounting and auditing. The most common allegations in 2019 SEC actions involved financial reporting issues, with revenue recognition violations comprising the largest share. The percentage of PCAOB actions involving revenue recognition increased in 2019.

The SEC and PCAOB have highlighted revenue recognition as one of the areas that may present challenges as a result of the economic impact of COVID-19.

Enforcement actions involving announcements of restatements or internal control weaknesses increased by 65%. The percentage of 2019 SEC actions involving announced restatements and/or material weaknesses in internal controls (42%) was nearly double the 2018 percentage (23%).

Highlights

  • In 2019, the SEC initiated 57 enforcement actions involving accounting and auditing allegations, an 11% decline from the 64 actions in 2018, but near the 2014–2018 average. The SEC brought only 5% of accounting and auditing actions as civil actions, the lowest percentage since 2016.

  • The PCAOB publicly disclosed 24 auditing-related enforcement actions in 2019, up 26% compared to 2018, the year in which the PCAOB disclosed its lowest number of actions since 2014.

  • The percentage of SEC and PCAOB actions involving non-U.S. respondents declined, but remained above the 2014–2018 average.

  • At 115, the total number of respondents in 2019 SEC and PCAOB actions was 23% below the 2014–2018 average.

  • The SEC and PCAOB imposed monetary penalties against 84% of firms and 63% of individual respondents. The median penalty the SEC imposed on firms in 2019 was $4.1 million, nearly three times greater than the 2018 median.

 Read Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Activity—2019 Review and Analysis.

Copyright ©2020 Cornerstone Research

For more SEC enforcement actions see the National Law Review Securities Law & SEC news section.

The Federal Government Is Taking Action Against COVID-19 Fraud

The federal government has responded to the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic with legislation to aid individuals and struggling businesses. One of the many laws created was the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), a $2 trillion federal appropriation addressing the economic fallout caused by COVID-19. Many are rightfully concerned about individuals aiming to take advantage of the vulnerability, panic, and available federal dollars during this time. In response, the federal government has vowed to aggressively take action against COVID-19 related fraud.

Fraud Committed Against Individuals

The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced its first enforcement action against COVID-19 fraud in March 2020. A website, coronavirusmedicalkit.com, was offering access to World Health Organization (“WHO”) vaccine kits for a shipping cost of $4.95. However, no vaccine currently exists nor is a vaccine currently being distributed by the WHO. Once alerted of the website’s existence, U.S. District Judge, Robert Pitman immediately issued an injunction preventing any further public access to the site. The site operators are currently facing federal prosecution.

Fraud Committed Against the Federal Government

Opportunists are not only acting to deceive the public but are also acting to defraud the federal government. Recently, Samuel Yates, a Texas native attempted to defraud $5 million in federal funds. The Small Business Association (“SBA”) is providing loans to businesses through a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). The PPP allows employers to continue paying their employees during the pandemic. Yates applied for two loans. In one loan application, he sought $5 million claiming to have 400 employees with a $2 million monthly payroll expense. In another application, he claimed to have only 100 employees. Each application was submitted with a falsified list of employees created by an online name generator, and forged tax records. Yates was able to obtain $500,000 in loan proceeds before his scheme was uncovered. He is currently facing federal prosecution for bank fraud, wire fraud, false statements to a financial institution, and false statements to the SBA.

Christopher Parris, a Georgia resident, also attempted to defraud the federal government by selling millions of non-existent respirator masks. Unlike Yates, Parris was able to make millions on sales orders by misrepresenting himself as a supplier who could quickly obtain scarce protective equipment. His plan was uncovered just a few weeks ago after attempting to sell masks to the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”). The VA became suspicious of the price—which was about 15 times what it was paying amid the shortage, and alerted their Inspector General who brought in Homeland Security. Over $3.2 million was seized from Parris’ bank account related to this scheme, and he is currently facing federal prosecution for wire fraud.

Although enforcement action has been taken against individuals, companies should take note that fraud is being prioritized and aggressively prosecuted against businesses as well. Just last month, the Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) charged two companies with issuing misleading claims to the public. The first represented that it could slow the transmission of COVID-19 through thermal scanning equipment that could quickly detect individuals with fevers and would be immediately released in each state. The other offered a finger-prick test kit that could be used from home to detect whether someone was COVID-19 positive. Both claims were untrue and each company is facing federal charges for violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.

These federal efforts mark the beginning of a shift, holding both individuals and companies accountable for COVID-19 related fraud. The Department of Homeland Security has noted that those taking advantage during this vulnerable time will inevitably increase. Inter-agency efforts, swift enforcement, and emerging legislation will likely follow in an effort to protect the public against all levels of COVID-19 related fraud. As they have during previous economic crises, whistleblowers will play a critical role in aiding these enforcement efforts.

Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP

For more on COVID-19 related fraud, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Excessive Spending During Divorce

Once a divorce is looming, some people change their spending habits.  Some start excessive spending expending money on purchases that they never did before, while others start taking trips or signing up for classes. Is any of this spending appropriate during the time you are going through your divorce?

I often run into clients who have been counseled to spend a lot more, apparently to show what that person’s needs are and to validate the request for more money.  I think it is fair to say that this is an emotional time for everyone, and some people are not acting in the right way.  You shouldn’t be spending any differently during a divorce then you would typically  The law in Illinois-domestic relations division, wants everyone to maintain the status quo.  If you always spent $400 a month getting your hair done, then it is not a problem.  But if you never used to go and now you start, the court is going to look at the reasonableness of what the person is doing.

Spending in Ways Not Beneficial to Your Marriage?

If you believe that the excessive spending your spouse is doing is not beneficial to your marriage, you might have a claim for dissipation.  When the court divides the marital property in your divorce case, dissipation is something that is considered by the court.  What exactly is dissipation?

Is it the Dissipation of Marital Assets?

Dissipation is the spending of marital monies for the benefit of one spouse for purposes unrelated to the marriage while the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. The party alleging dissipation must first demonstrate that dissipation has occurred, and once that hurdle is met, the burden shifts to the other party to prove the money was used for a legitimate purpose.

Illinois law requires that you file a document, called a Notice of Intent to Claim Dissipation.  That document must be filed 30 days after discovery closes and no later than 60 days before the trial.  The notice has to tell the court when the breakdown in your marriage occurred.  This is an important element that many people overlook.  People are allowed to spend money however they like, and just because you did not like it that your spouse spent $45,000 on a race car, does not necessarily mean it is dissipation.

Is the Marriage Irretrievably Broken?

The first question you need to ask is whether your marriage has irretrievably broken down. Although you might not have been happy with the expenditure for the car, were you still a couple?  Were you still going out with friends or going out to dinner together?  I have had a couple of divorce trials that had to examine the sexual nature of the relationship.  Are you still engaging in marital relations?  Share the same bedroom?  These all need to be examined if your spouse indicates that you were still a couple and there was not a breakdown.  Without a break down in the marriage, an irretrievable breakdown, you cannot allege dissipation.

But let us say you can prove that your marriage underwent an irretrievable breakdown.  You can prove that your spouse has been living in the basement for a year, you never go out together, you take separate vacations and you have different friends.  Then you have made it through the first hurdle and an examination of the spouse’s expenses needs to be looked at.

One thing the court always asks is “how long has this been going on?”  I once had a case in trial where the wife claimed that the husband’s weekly bowling was dissipation.  My client testified that he had been bowling weekly for over ten years.  The continuation of his bowling habit continued while they were married and after they separated.  The judge did not find dissipation.

Spouse Commits a Criminal Act?

What about when a person has a spouse who commits a criminal act?  The spouse is arrested and spends money on a lawyer?  Loses his job?  The money the spouse spent on a lawyer could be considered dissipation.

Is There an Extramarital Affiar?

What about a claim for dissipation filed by the wife when she found out her husband had had an affair and was paying child support to the other woman?  Or if the wife found out that her husband had been cheating on her for the past 5 years?  If the family continued to go on vacation and act like a couple, and their marriage had not broken down, then no dissipation.

I remember when golf pro Tiger Woods was going through a divorce and his wife found out about his extramarital affairs and the money spent on them.  There could not be a claim for dissipation because her marriage had not broken down, but you have to wonder if it would have broken down a lot earlier if she knew.  We can speculate as to the answer and it seems unfair that if your spouse hides something from you, that it cannot be dissipation.  If you had known, you would likely have broken up.  But that is not the way our law works — you have to be irretrievably broken in order to claim dissipation.

I have had trials where the parties had been separated for 20 years, but neither had gotten around to filing for divorce. Each side made claims of dissipation going back 10 years or more.  These types of cases resulted in a change to our statute and now you have a time limit on the claim for dissipation.  No dissipation shall be deemed to have occurred prior to 3 years after the party claiming dissipation knew or should have known of the dissipation, but in no event prior to 5 years before the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage.

Watch Your Marital Finances for Excessive Spending

Marriages require some trust between the two, so it is hard when your spouse ruins the trust you placed in them.  But if you do not pay attention to your finances, or what is on the credit card statements, you could be in a position where dissipation cannot be claimed by you for the excessive spending in the event of a divorce.

If you decide to go to trial on the issue, then you will need to establish which expenditures are dissipation.  Is paying the mortgage from the spouse’s retirement account dissipation?  Typically, you would not think so. But each case is fact-specific.

 

 

Anderson & Boback Copyright © 2020 All rights reserved.
This posting is for educational purposes only to give you general information and a general understanding of the law, not to provide specific legal advice. By using this website you understand that there is no attorney-client relationship between you and the National Law Review and/or the author, and the opinions stated herein are the sole opinions of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of the National Law Review or any of its affiliates.

SBA Rulemaking and Guidance Challenged in Federal Lawsuits in Connection with PPP Loan Guidance

The Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”) was signed into law by the President on March 27, 2020. Title I of the CARES Act, named “Keeping American Workers Employed and Paid” by Congress, appropriated $659 billion for loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) under the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”).

Section 1114 of the CARES Act instructs the SBA to issue regulations “to carry out this title and the amendments made by this title” within fifteen days and without regard to the usual notice requirements, which the SBA did in the form of Frequently Asked Questions (the “FAQs”). 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001(1), 9012.

While ostensibly intended to clarify uncertainty in the CARES Act, two recent federal lawsuits challenge certain rulemaking and guidance promulgated by the SBA. The question before the courts is whether such rulemaking and guidance is a lawful interpretation of the CARES Act or, as the plaintiffs argue, amounts to illegal rulemaking.

Agencies are prohibited by the Administrative Procedures Act from taking action “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). The validity of an agency’s interpretation of a statute is reviewed by a court using the two-step framework outlined in the landmark case, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The first question reviewed in the Chevron analysis is, “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

The plaintiffs argue that certain elements of the SBA guidance did not give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and, as a result, are unlawful and unenforceable.

DV Diamond Club of Flint v. SBA

DV Diamond Club of Flint LLC (“DV Diamond”) is a strip club in Flint, Michigan, which feared that it would be denied a PPP loan by lenders as a result of guidance from the SBA that is not consistent with the CARES Act. DV Diamond’s initial complaint, dated April 8, 2020, was amended on April 17, 2020 to add forty-one new co-plaintiffs (collectively with DV Diamond, the “Plaintiffs”), each of which claims to operate a legal sexual oriented business which meets the eligibility requirements under the CARES Act. The Plaintiffs argue that the CARES Act is unambiguous as to what businesses are eligible for PPP loans and the SBA, therefore, has no right to assert additional eligibility requirements or disqualifiers. See DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. SBA, 20-cv-10899, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82213, at *27 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020).

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (the “District Court”) issued an injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs, noting that Congress unambiguously stated that the SBA may not exclude from eligibility for a PPP loan guarantee a business that met the CARES Act’s size standard for eligibility. Id. at *27.

The District Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that, “under step one of Chevron that the PPP Ineligibility Rule conflicts with the PPP and is therefore invalid.” Id. at *42.

“Congress provided temporary paycheck support to all Americans employed by all small businesses that satisfied the two eligibility requirements—even businesses that may have been disfavored during normal times.” Id. at *4-5.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the SBA’s motion for a stay of the injunction, holding that the relevant factors, including the Plaintiff’s likelihood success, weighed in favor of the Plaintiff. DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. SBA, No. 20-1437, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 15822, at *8 (6th Cir. May 15, 2020).

Zumasys, Inc. v. SBA

Zumasys and two affiliated companies (collectively, “Zumasys”) received PPP loans but are concerned that they may subsequently be deemed ineligible as a result of “improper, and legally impermissible, underground regulation” promulgated by the SBA. (Zumasys, Inc. v. U.S. SBA et al., Dkt. No. 20-cv-008511, Dkt. 1 (the Zumasys Complaint) ¶ 58.)

Zumasys claims to have acted in reliance on the CARES Act by obtaining—and spending—what they expected to be forgivable PPP funds under the terms of the CARES Act rather than furloughing or terminating their employees. Subsequently, guidance set forth in questions 31 and 37 of the SBA’s Frequently Asked Questions, according to Zumasys, might require their loans to be repaid. Zumasys claims that being forced to repay their loans will place them in a worse financial position than had it never sought the PPP funds.

The SBA’s “credit elsewhere” test, which requires a borrower to demonstrate that the needed financing is not otherwise available on reasonable terms from non-governmental sources, was expressly excluded as an eligibility requirement to obtain a PPP loan by Congress. Zumasys alleges, however, that the FAQs “purport to re-impose the “credit elsewhere” requirement in contravention of” the CARES Act. (Id. ¶ 66.)

As a result, in an argument similar to that made by DV Diamond and its co-plaintiffs, Zumasys asserts that the FAQs “are not in accordance with the law and exceed Defendants’ authority under the CARES Act,” and asks that the SBA should be enjoined from enforcing them by the court. (Id.)

Subsequent to the filing of the Zumasys lawsuit, on May 13, 2020, the SBA issued guidance in question 46 in the FAQs that any borrower that, together with its affiliates, received PPP loans with an original principal amount of less than $2 million will be deemed to have made the required certification concerning the necessity of the loan request in good faith.

While this development, on its face, would seem to alleviate the concerns of Zumasys, a great deal of uncertainty remains for borrowers in connection with the guidance that has been released by the SBA since the passing of the CARES Act into law. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that subsequent guidance from the SBA will not contradict the guidance currently being relied upon, and in FAQ 39 the SBA noted that it will review all loans in excess of $2 million and in subsequent rulemaking it noted that with respect to a PPP Loan of any size, the “SBA may undertake a review at any time in [the] SBA’s discretion.”

Conclusion

The challenges by DV Diamond, Zumasys and other plaintiffs will hinge on whether or not the applicable courts determine that the guidance issued by the SBA is inconsistent with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.

To the extent that borrowers and applicants continue to believe that problematic discrepancies exist between the law and guidance being delivered by the SBA, and the SBA subsequently determines that a borrower is ineligible for a PPP loan or forgiveness of such loan, the courts may in the future be called upon again to apply the Chevron analysis to the SBA’s actions in connection with the PPP.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.

© Copyright 2020 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.
For more on SBA’s PPP loans, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

FTC Attorney Discusses Regulatory Focus on Payment Processing Industry

The Federal Trade Commission consistently seeks to expand the scope of potential liability for deceptive advertising practices.  From substantial assistance liability under the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule to theories of agency or vicarious liability, ad agencies, ad networks, lead buyers and aggregators, lead purchasers, merchants and payment processors are all potentially accountable for facilitating the actions or omissions of those that they do business with.

Consider the latter and the FTC’s recent assault on the payment processing industry.  It amply highlights third party accountability remedial theories and the imposition of reasonable monitoring duties.

In January 2020, the FTC announced that an overseas payment processor and its former CEO settled allegations that they enabled a deceptive “free trial” offer scheme.  According to the complaint, the company, its principals and related entities marketed supposed “free trial” offers for personal care products and dietary supplements online, but instead billed consumers the full price of the products and enrolled them in negative option continuity plans without their consent.

To further the scheme, the defendants allegedly used dozens of shell companies and straw owners in the United States and the United Kingdom to obtain and maintain the merchant accounts needed to accept consumers’ credit and debit card payments, an illegal practice known as “credit card laundering.”

The FTC subsequently filed an amended complaint adding a Latvian financial institution and its former CEO to the case, alleging that they illegally maintained merchant accounts for the other defendants in the name of shell companies and enabled them to evade credit card chargeback monitoring programs.

In a press release, FTC attorney Andrew Smith, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, stated that “[t]he FTC will continue to aggressively pursue payment processors that are complicit in illegal conduct, whether they operate at home or abroad.”

The FTC also recently announced that a payment processor for an alleged business coaching scheme settled charges that it ignored warning signs its client was operating an unlawful business coaching and investment scheme.  Here, according to the FTC’s complaint, the company for years processed payments for a purported scheme that charged consumers hundreds of millions of dollars for allegedly worthless business coaching products, and that the company ignored numerous signs that the business was allegedly fraudulent.

The red flags listed in the complaint include questions about whether the company was a domestic or international company, the nature of its business model, the company’s purported history of excessive chargebacks, and claims the company allegedly made in its marketing materials.

Notably, the complaint also alleged that the company failed to follow its own internal policies and failed to review its clients’ business practices in detail, which, according to the FTC, would have revealed numerous elements that should have eliminated the client under those policies.

According to the FTC, even after the company took on the client, the client’s processing data immediately raised red flags related to the quantity of charges it processed and the number of refunds and chargebacks associated with those charges.  When the client experienced excessive chargeback rates, instead of adequately investigating the causes of the chargebacks, the company responded by requiring the client to work closely with chargeback prevention companies, according to the FTC.  The FTC alleged that the company failed to monitor the products its client was selling and the claims it was making to sell those products.

Again, the Director of the FTC’s BCP conveyed that “[i]gnoring clear signs that your biggest customer is a bogus online business opportunity is no way to operate a payment processing business.”  “And, it’s a sure-fire way to get the attention of the FTC,” Smith stated.

Most recently, the FTC announced that a payment processor that allegedly helped perpetuate multiple scams has been banned under the terms of a settlement with the agency and the State of Ohio.  Here, the FTC alleged that the defendants used remotely created payment orders and remotely created checks to facilitate payments for unscrupulous merchants, allowing them to draw money from consumer victims’ bank accounts.

Reaffirming the FTC’s focus on the payment processing industry, FTC lawyer Andrew Smith stated that “[p]ayment processors who help scammers steal people’s money are a scourge on the financial system.”  “When we find fraud, we are committed to rooting out payment processors and other companies who actively facilitate and support these fraudulent schemes,” Smith stated.

The FTC is aggressively policing payment processors that bury their heads in the sand or go a step further and help cover up their clients’ wrongdoing.  Either course of conduct could land them in legal hot water.

The settlement terms of the matters above include permanent bans, hefty monetary judgments and the surrender of assets.

© 2020 Hinch Newman LLP

CRA Opportunity, Customer Service Opportunity, or Both?

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) combined to issue four seemingly unrelated letters that, taken together, appear to reopen the ability of a bank to safely reenter the small dollar loan market as well as secure Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit in broadened areas. On May 20, 2020, the Board released the Interagency Lending Principles for Making Responsible Small Dollar Loans. Since the creation of the CFPB, the primary federal bank regulators have frowned upon banks making small loans that were viewed as deposit anticipation loans. Over the past several months, the banking regulators have recognized that consumers have a genuine need for small dollar credit and can benefit more by securing such credit from a bank rather than payday lenders or other nonbank lenders. Shortly thereafter, on May 22, the CFPB released a letter to the Bank Policy Institute containing a no-action letter template that banks with over $10 billion in assets may submit a request for a no-action letter for standardized, small dollar credit products.

On May 21, the Board issued a letter that certain investments in “elevated poverty areas” qualify as investments in low- or moderate-income (LMI) areas. An LMI area is one or more census tracts where the median family income is less than 80% of the median family income of the relevant Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or state, as appropriate. Elevated poverty areas are areas in which the poverty rate is 20% or more and is not based on income relative to the MSA or state in which the area is located. Because the LMI definition is based on relative income, areas with a high absolute poverty rate are sometimes not considered LMI areas because they are located in a state in which median incomes are low in general. In other words, the median income of an area with a high absolute poverty rate may not be significantly less than the generally low median income of the MSA or state as a whole. For this reason, the Board determined that investments in elevated poverty areas will receive the same credit as if the investment had been made in an LMI area, although the area may not be designated as such

Finally, on May 27, the Board, along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (agencies) issued Frequently Asked Questions on CRA Consideration for Activities in Response to the Coronavirus. Under the Q&A, COVID-19 affected states and jurisdictions are considered CRA-designated disaster areas. Therefore, the agencies will grant consideration for activities that revitalize or stabilize areas by protecting public health and safety, particularly for LMI individuals, LMI geographies, distressed or underserved non-metropolitan middle-income geographies, and, as noted before, high poverty areas. Examples include loans, investments, or community development services that support emergency medical care, purchase and distribution of personal protective equipment, provision of emergency food supplies, or assistance to local governments for emergency management. The time frame for this consideration extends six months after the national emergency declaration is has ended. Of particular note, loans, including Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans, in amounts of $1 million or less to for-profit businesses or to nonprofit organizations are reported and considered as small business loans under the applicable CRA retail lending tests. PPP loans will be considered particularly responsive if made to small businesses with gross annual revenues of $1 million or less or to businesses located in LMI geographies or high poverty areas. PPP loans in amounts greater than $1 million may be considered as community development loans if the loans also have a primary purpose of community development as defined under the CRA.

Question 11 relates back to the Interagency Lending Principles for Making Responsible Small Dollar Loans. Answer 11 states that CRA encourages activities that benefit LMI individuals and families, which would include individuals and families who have recently become low- or moderate-income due to loss of jobs, decreased hours, or furloughs that reduce income due to the COVID-19 emergency.

These seemingly unrelated letters work together to give banks both an incentive and a reward to make bankable loans to entities and individuals located in LMI areas or high poverty areas in order to reduce financial stress as individuals return to the workforce and entities reopen, offering employment opportunities to those individuals. Such efforts should be well documented for CRA credit.

© 2020 Jones Walker LLP

For more on Community Reinvestment Act, see the National Law Review Financial Institutions & Banking law section.

Federal Courts Side With Strip Clubs in Opposing the SBA’s Ineligibility Rules for the Paycheck Protection Program, Possibly Signaling a Broader Trend

Recent rulings from federal courts enjoined the US Small Business Administration (SBA) from applying its April 2, 2020 Interim Final Rule (April 2 IFR) to limit the types of businesses that can participate in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). Some of these rulings are expressly limited to the named plaintiffs that had been denied PPP loans and do not directly impact any other businesses that have or might apply for a PPP loan. Irrespective of any limitations in these cases, such decisions may signal a broader trend. In increasing numbers, federal courts are agreeing with arguments made by small businesses facing COVID-19-related challenges that the SBA’s PPP business eligibility limitations are inconsistent with Congress’ intention to help “any business concern” during this unprecedented time.

Financial services businesses that are deemed ineligible under the April 2 IFR need to pay close attention to cases that challenge the SBA’s incorporation of its existing list of “prohibited businesses” into eligibility requirements for a PPP loan. Even without court rulings, it also is possible (although not likely) that Congress or the SBA could suspend or revise the April 2 IFR to broaden PPP eligibility to include some or all of the currently designated “prohibited businesses.”

This advisory will explore:

  • the SBA’s April 2 IFR restricted eligibility in the PPP to certain financial services businesses that were ineligible for SBA-guaranteed loans under existing federal programs;

  • a recent Sixth Circuit ruling challenging the April 2 IFR as well as other federal court cases may signal a trend by federal courts to adhere to the text of the CARES Act; and

  • whether other federal courts will follow the Sixth Circuit’s view, or whether Congress or the SBA will suspend or revise the April 2 IFR to broaden PPP eligibility.

The April 2 IFR and Subsequent SBA Rules and Guidance

The PPP was one of several measures enacted by Congress under the CARES Act to provide small businesses with support to cover payroll and certain other expenses for an eight-week period due to the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in a prior Katten Financial Markets and Funds advisory, the SBA published the April 2 IFR on the evening before lenders could accept PPP applications, determining that various businesses, including some financial services business, were ineligible to apply for PPP loans under the CARES Act.1

The April 2 IFR limited the types of businesses eligible for the PPP by specifically incorporating an existing SBA regulation and guidance document that lists the types of businesses that are ineligible from applying for Section 7(a) SBA loans. In particular, the April 2 IFR provides, in part, that: “Businesses that are not eligible for PPP loans are identified in 13 CFR 120.110 and described further in SBA’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 50 10, Subpart B, Chapter 2.”2

Some of the ineligible financial services businesses listed in the SBA’s Standard Operating Procedure 50 10 (SOP) include, without limitation:

  • banks;
  • life insurance companies (but not independent agents);
  • finance companies;
  • investment companies;
  • certain passive businesses owned by developers and landlords, which do not actively use or occupy the assets acquired or improved with the loan proceeds, and/or which are primarily engaged in owning or purchasing real estate and leasing it for any purpose; and
  • speculative businesses that primarily “purchas[e] and hold[ ] an item until the market price increases” or “engag[e] in a risky business for the chance of an unusually large profit.”

With respect to last category in this list, the SBA provided further clarity regarding certain investment businesses and speculative businesses that were applying for PPP loans. In an April 24, 2020 Interim Final Rule (April 24 IFR), the SBA expressly clarified that hedge funds and private equity firms are investment and speculative businesses and, therefore, are ineligible to receive PPP loans.3 However, the April 24 IFR created an exception for portfolio companies of private equity firms, which were deemed eligible for PPP loans if the entities met the requirements for affiliated borrowers under the April 2 IFR.4

Recent Sixth Circuit Case

As noted above, the SBA’s SOP did not only deem financial services businesses ineligible to receive PPP loans. Other types of businesses, including without limitation, legal gambling businesses, lobbying firms, businesses promoting religion and businesses providing “prurient sexual material” also were deemed ineligible. Believing that these limitations were inconsistent with a plain reading of the text of the CARES Act, some of these businesses have challenged the SBA’s restrictions imposed pursuant to the April 2 IFR.

On May 11, 2020, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan preliminarily enjoined the SBA from enforcing the April 2 IFR to preclude sexually oriented businesses from PPP loans under the CARES Act.5 Plaintiffs were primarily businesses that provided lawful “clothed, semi-nude, and/or nude performance entertainment,” which were considered ineligible businesses for the PPP under the April 2 IFR due to their “prurient” nature.6 The district court found that the CARES Act specifically broadened the class of businesses that are PPP eligible,7 determining that it was clear from the text of the statute that Congress provided “support to all Americans employed by all small businesses.”8 The district court, however, limited the injunction to the plaintiffs and intervenors in the case, noting that it was “not a ‘nationwide injunction’ and did not restrict any future action the SBA may take in connection with applications for PPP loans.”9 The SBA appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and requested a stay of the injunction.10

The Sixth Circuit ultimately denied the SBA’s stay, and agreed with the district court’s interpretation of the CARES Act’s eligibility requirements.11 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held on May 15 that the CARES Act conferred eligibility to “any business concern,” which aligned with Congress’s intent to provide support to as many displaced American workers as possible. The SBA pointed out that the CARES Act explicitly listed “nonprofit organizations” as eligible for PPP loans, even though “they are ineligible for ordinary SBA loans.”12 The SBA argued that if Congress wanted to include previously ineligible businesses for PPP loans, like sexually oriented businesses, the CARES Act would have listed such entities.13 The Sixth Circuit stated that it was “necessary to specify non-profits because they are not businesses,” which further supported the district court’s expansive interpretation of the CARES Act.14

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion only requires the SBA to issue loans to the businesses that were a party to the underlying lawsuit. The ruling does not require the SBA to make PPP loans to any other businesses that are defined as ineligible in its April 2 IFR. However, as a practical matter, this opinion could be used to support a small business located in Ohio, Pennsylvania or Michigan (i.e., the states within the jurisdictional reach of the Sixth Circuit) in a federal court proceeding initiated prior to the submission of a PPP application requiring the SBA to defend its eligibility criteria in connection with such small business’s specific facts. (Note that an application should not be made without first obtaining a similar legal result as the small business applicant would not otherwise be able to make the certifications necessary to apply for a PPP loan.)

Cases in Other Circuits

In addition to the Sixth Circuit, several other federal courts have struck down the SBA’s imposition of its ineligibility criteria on PPP applicants engaged in sexually oriented businesses. For example, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on May 1 preliminarily enjoined the SBA from enforcing the April 2 IFR to preclude “erotic dance entertainment” companies from obtaining a PPP loan.15 The SBA argued that because Congress removed some conditions that would ordinarily apply to Section 7(a) SBA loans (such as the PPP eligibility for non-profits), “it must have intended for the SBA to enforce all other conditions.”16 Similar to the Sixth Circuit, the district court found the SBA’s interpretation “highly unlikely” given “Congress’s clear intent to extend PPP loans to all small businesses affected by the pandemic.”17 Additionally, the SBA failed to identify any purpose of either the CARES Act or Section 7(a) that is furthered by the SBA’s exclusion of sexually oriented businesses.18 The SBA appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and requested a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the request for a stay on May 20, 2020, but has yet to rule on the merits of the appeal.19

Implications

As of May 21, 2020, roughly $100 billion PPP funds are still available.20 In its recent statutory amendments to the PPP, Congress decided not to address PPP eligibility issues.21 Notwithstanding Congress’s decision not to take action on these issues more recently, financial services businesses deemed ineligible under SBA regulations for PPP loans under the CARES Act should still pay close attention to these cases and whether federal court rulings influence Congress or the SBA to revisit the April 2 IFR.22

1 See US Small Business Administration, Interim Final Rule: Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, (Apr. 15, 2020).

2 See Interim Final Rule at 8, citing 13 C.F.R. § 120.110 and Small Business Administration Standard Operating Procedure 50 10 Subpart B, Chapter 2.

3 See US Small Business Administration, Interim Final Rule: Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program – Requirements – Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility, __ Fed. Reg.___, available.

4 According to the April 24 interim final rule, the affiliation requirements are waived if “the borrower receives financial assistance from an SBA-licensed Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) in any amount. This includes any type of financing listed in 13 CFR 107.50, such as loans, debt with equity features, equity, and guarantees. Affiliation is waived even if the borrower has investment from other non-SBIC investors.” Id.

5 DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC, et al. v. SBA, et al., No. 20-1437 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020).

6 Id. at 2.

7 DV Diamond Club of Flint LLC v. SBA, No. 20-cv-10899 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020), at 2. The district court stated that 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D) of the CARES Act specifically “broadened the class of businesses that are eligible to receive SBA financial assistance.” Id. at 9. This section provides, in relevant part, that “‘[d]uring the covered period, in addition to small business concerns, any business concern . . . shall be eligible to receive a covered [i.e., SBA-guaranteed] loan’ if the business employs less than 500 employees or if the business employs less than the size standard in number of employees for the industry,” which is established by the SBA. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(I)-(II).

8 DV Diamond Club, No. 20-cv-10899 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020), at 2.

9 Id. at 45.

10 DV Diamond Club, No. 20-1437 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020), at 1.

11 Id. at 4. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the CARES Act under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that if a federal statute can be facially interpreted, “the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

12 DV Diamond Club, No. 20-1437 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020), at 5.

13 Id.

14 Id. US Circuit Judge Eugene E. Siler Jr. dissented, stating that the CARES Act was ambiguous and the district court’s injunction should be stayed to give time to decide on the merits. Id. at 6. He noted that the CARES Act requires “PPP loans to be administered ‘under the same terms, conditions and processes’” as the SBA’s section 7(a) loans, which would exclude sexually oriented businesses from PPP eligibility. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(B).

15 Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc., et al. v. SBA, et al., No. 20-C-061 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2020), at 27-28. A similar case, filed early May 2020, is currently pending in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See Admiral Theatre Inc. v. SBA et al., No. 1:20-cv-02807 (N.D. Ill May 8, 2020).

16 Camelot Banquet Rooms, No. 20-C-061 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2010), at 15.

17 Id. at 16. In contrast to the Eastern District of Michigan, the Wisconsin federal court did not explicitly limit its injunction to the parties. In light of the potentially serious penalties for ineligible applicants, businesses that are ineligible for the PPP under the April 2 IFR should be cautious about applying for a PPP loan without exploring all options and consequences with counsel.

18 Id.

19Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc., et al. v. SBA, et al., No. 20-1729 (7th Cir. May 20, 2020). In contrast to the Sixth and Seventh Circuit rulings, the US District Court for the District of Columbia denied an injunction to enjoin the SBA from making an eligibility determination for the PPP under the CARES Act. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants v. SBA, No. 20-970 (D.D.C. April 21, 2020). Plaintiffs, a trade association of political consultants and lobbyists, argued that the denial of PPP loans under the SBA’s April 2 IFR due to the political nature of their businesses violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Id. at 1-2. The district court ruled that it was constitutionally valid for the SBA to decide “what industries to stimulate” with PPP loans. Id. at 11. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on April 22, 2020. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 22 (D.D.C. April 22, 2020).

20 Kate Rogers, More than half of small businesses are looking to have PPP funds forgiven, survey says, CNBC News (May 21, 2020), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/21/more-than-half-of-small-businesses-are-looking-for-ppp-forgiveness.html.

21 On June 3, 2020, Congress passed the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act (“PPP Flexibility Act”), which modified certain provisions of the PPP. H.R. 7010, 116th Cong. (2020), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7010/text?r=12&s=1. At a high level, the PPP Flexibility Act: 1) extends the PPP to December 31, 2020; 2) extends the covered period for purposes of loan forgiveness from 8 weeks to the earlier of 24 weeks or December 31, 2020; 3) extends the covered period for purposes of loan forgiveness from 8 weeks to the earlier of 24 weeks or December 31, 2020; 4) increases the current limit on non-payroll expenses from 25% to 40%; 5) extends the maturity date on the portion of a PPP loan that is not forgiven from 2 years to 5 years; and 6) defers payroll taxes for businesses that take PPP loans.

22 IFRs are subject to public comment under the Administrative Procedures Act. The particular comment period of the April 2 IFR expired on May 15, 2020.

©2020 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

For more on business’ PPP loan eligibility, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020 – Changes To The CARES Act

On Wednesday, June 3, 2020, the U.S. Senate passed the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020 (“Act”) by voice vote.  The bill had passed the U.S. House on May 28 nearly unanimously.  It now heads to the President’s desk for signature.

Summary of Key Provisions

The Act provides important new flexibility to borrowers in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) in a number of key respects:

Loan Maturity Date: The Act extends the maturity date of the PPP loans (i.e. any portion of a PPP loan that is not forgiven) from 2 years to 5 years.  This provision of the Act only affects borrowers whose PPP loans are disbursed after its enactment.  With respect to already existing PPP loans, the Act states specifically that nothing in the Act will “prohibit lenders and borrowers from mutually agreeing to modify the maturity terms of a covered loan.”

Deadline to Use the Loan Proceeds: The Act extends the “covered period” with respect to loan forgiveness from the original 8 week period after the loan is disbursed to the earlier of 24 weeks after the loan is disbursed or December 31, 2020.  Current borrowers who have received their loans prior to the enactment of the Act may nevertheless elect the shorter 8 week period.

Forgivable Uses of the Loan Proceeds: The Act raises the cap on the amount of forgivable loan proceeds that borrowers may use on non-payroll expenses from 25% to 40%.  The Act does not affect the PPP’s existing restrictions on borrowers’ use of the loan proceeds to eligible expenses: payroll and benefits; interest (but not principal) on mortgages or other existing debt; rent; and utilities.

Safe Harbor for Rehiring Workers: Loan forgiveness under the PPP remains subject to reduction in proportion to any reduction in a borrower’s full-time equivalent employees (“FTEs”) against prior staffing level benchmarks.  The Act extends the PPP’s existing safe harbor deadline to December 31, 2020: borrowers who furloughed or laid-off workers will not be subject to a loan forgiveness reduction due to reduced FTE count as long as they restore their FTEs by the deadline.

New Exemptions from Rehiring Workers: The Act also adds two exemptions to the PPP’s loan forgiveness reduction penalties.  Firstly, the forgiveness amount will not be reduced due to a reduced FTE count if the borrower can document that they attempted, but were unable, to rehire individuals who had been employees on February 15, 2020 (this codifies a PPP FAQ answer discussed on a previous post) and have been unable to hire “similarly qualified employees” before December 31, 2020.  Secondly, the forgiveness will not be reduced due to a reduced FTE count if the borrower, in good faith, can document an inability to return to the “same level of business activity” as prior to February 15, 2020 due to sanitation, social distancing, and worker or customer safety requirements.

Loan Deferral Period: The Act extends the loan deferral period to (a) whenever the amount of loan forgiveness is remitted to the lender or (b) 10 months after the applicable forgiveness covered period if a borrower does not apply for forgiveness during that 10 month period.  Under the unamended PPP, a borrower’s deferral period was to be between 6 and 12 months.

Payroll Tax Deferral: The Act lifts the ban on borrowers whose loans were partially or completely forgiven from deferring payment of payroll taxes.  The payroll tax deferral is now open to all PPP borrowers.

Summary

The Act provides much-needed flexibility to businesses who needed to spend PPP loan proceeds but could not open in order to do so.  As with the initial rollout of the PPP, it will be up to the Department of the Treasury and the Small Business Administration to provide regulations with respect to the Act.

© 2020 SHERIN AND LODGEN LLP

For more on the PPP, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Guide to Federal Reserve Main Street Loan Facilities and Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility

The Federal Reserve has created a number of programs to provide loans and other credit facilities to support the economy in response to COVID-19.  Several of these programs provide for new extensions of credit for small, medium and large businesses, including the Main Street Lending Program and the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility.  The Main Street Lending Program creates three separate facilities (“MSLFs”):  (1) the Main Street New Loan Facility, (2) the Main Street Expanded Loan Facility and (3) the Main Street Priority Loan Facility.  Each of these facilities contemplates banks and other financial institutions making “new money” loans to eligible borrowers, and in turn selling participation interests in the loans to a Fed / Treasury special purpose vehicle.  The Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (“PMCCF”) i contemplates a Fed / Treasury special purpose vehicle that will make new money extensions of credit to eligible borrowers by directly purchasing bonds issued by them, or by making loans to such eligible borrowers, whether as a direct lender or by purchasing loans to such borrowers under syndicated loan facilities.

The Federal Reserve released and then updated term sheets for the MSLFs and PMCCF in March and April 2020 and circulated an FAQ for the MSLFs in April 2020, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York released and circulated FAQs for the PMCCF in April and May 2020.  The term sheets and FAQs provide a number of material terms and conditions for the facilities, but many questions and issues remain in terms of structuring and implementing these facilities generally and for agents, lenders, trustees, borrowers, issuers and other parties satisfying eligibility requirements for and participating in transactions under these facilities.

The MSLFs and PMCCF, which collectively represent hundreds of billions of dollars of new money financing for borrowers and issuers, are expected to launch by the end of May 2020.

A comprehensive summary of the MSLFs and PMCCF based on the term sheets and FAQs issued to date, market reconnaissance and strategic planning and considerations around these facilities can be accessed here.  We will periodically update and supplement the MSLF/PMCCF summary and separately provide additional alerts and guidance regarding these facilities generally and the parties qualifying for and participating in transactions under these facilities.

© 2020 Bracewell LLP

For more on Federal Reserve Main Street Loans, see the National Law Review Financial Institutions and Banking law section.