Category: Environmental Law

EPA Issues SNPRM Modifying and Supplementing 2021 Proposed TSCA Fees Rule

On November 16, 2022, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a much-anticipated supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to modify and supplement its 2021 proposed rule that would amend the 2018 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) fees rule. 87 Fed. Reg. 68647. EPA states that “[w]ith over five years of experience administering the TSCA amendments of 2016, EPA is publishing this document to ensure that the fees charged accurately reflect the level of effort and resources needed to implement TSCA in the manner envisioned by Congress when it reformed the law.”

What Action Is EPA Taking?

After establishing fees under TSCA Section 26(b), TSCA requires EPA to review and, if necessary, adjust the fees every three years, after consultation with parties potentially subject to fees. The SNPRM describes proposed changes to 40 C.F.R. Part 700, Subpart C as promulgated in the 2018 Fee Rule (83 Fed. Reg. 52694) and explains the methodology by which EPA determined the proposed changes to TSCA fees. The SNPRM adds to and modifies the proposed rulemaking issued on January 11, 2021 (2021 Proposal) (86 Fed. Reg. 1890). EPA proposes to narrow certain proposed exemptions for entities subject to the EPA-initiated risk evaluation fees and proposes exemptions for test rule fee activities; to modify the self-identification and reporting requirements for EPA-initiated risk evaluation and test rule fees; to institute a partial refund of fees for premanufacture notices (PMN) withdrawn at any time after the first ten business days during the assessment period of the chemical; to modify EPA’s proposed methodology for the production volume-based fee allocation for EPA-initiated risk evaluation fees in any scenario where a consortium is not formed; to expand the fee requirements to companies required to submit information for test orders; to modify the fee payment obligations to require payment by processors subject to test orders and enforceable consent agreements (ECA); to extend the timeframe for test order and test rule payments; and to change the fee amounts and the estimate of EPA’s total costs for administering TSCA Sections 4, 5, 6, and 14. More information on the 2018 Fee Rule is available in our September 28, 2018, memorandum, and more information on the 2021 Proposal is available in our December 30, 2020, memorandum.

The SNPRM includes the following summary of proposed changes to TSCA fee amounts:

Fee Category 2018 Fee Rule Current Fees1 2022 SNPRM
Test order $9,8002 $11,650 $25,000
Test rule $29,500 $35,080 $50,000
ECA $22,800 $27,110 $50,000
PMN and consolidated PMN, significant new use notice (SNUN), microbial commercial activity notice (MCAN) and consolidated MCAN $16,000 $19,020 $45,000
Low exposure/low release exemption (LoREX), low volume exemption (LVE), test-marketing exemption (TME), Tier II exemption, TSCA experimental release application (TERA), film article $4,700 $5,590 $13,200
EPA-initiated risk evaluation $1,350,000 Two payments resulting in $2,560,000 Two payments resulting in $5,081,000
Manufacturer-requested risk evaluation on a chemical included in the 2014 TSCA Work Plan Initial payment of $1.25M, with final invoice to recover 50 percent of actual costs Two payments of $945,000, with final invoice to recover 50 percent of actual costs Two payments of $1,497,000, with final invoice to recover 50 percent of actual costs
Manufacturer-requested risk evaluation on a chemical not included in the 2014 TSCA Work Plan Initial payment of $2.5M, with final invoice to recover 100 percent of actual costs Two payments of $1.89M, with final invoice to recover 100 percent of actual costs Two payments of $2,993,000, with final invoice to recover 100 percent of actual costs
1 The current fees reflect an adjustment for inflation required by TSCA. The adjustment went into effect on January 1, 2022.
2 In the 2018 final rule, the fees for TSCA Section 4 test orders and test rules were incorrectly listed as $29,500 for test orders and $9,800 for test rules. The 2021 Proposal proposes to correct this error by changing the fees for TSCA Section 4 test orders to $9,800 and TSCA Section 4 test rules to $29,500.

Why EPA Is Taking the Action

EPA states that the fees collected under TSCA are intended to achieve the goals articulated by Congress by providing a sustainable source of funds for EPA to fulfill its legal obligations under TSCA Sections 4, 5, and 6 and with respect to information management under TSCA Section 14. According to EPA, information management includes collecting, processing, reviewing, and providing access to and protecting from disclosure as appropriate under Section 14 information on chemical substances under TSCA. In 2021, EPA proposed changes to the TSCA fee requirements established in the 2018 Fee Rule based upon TSCA fee implementation experience and proposed to adjust the fee amounts based on changes to program costs and inflation and to address certain issues related to implementation of the fee requirements. According to the SNPRM, EPA consulted and met with stakeholders that were potentially subject to fees, including several meetings with individual stakeholders and a public webinar in February 2021. EPA is hosting a December 6, 2022, webinar to hear from stakeholders on the proposed TSCA fees. This engagement and the previous stakeholder outreach will inform EPA’s final rule.

According to EPA, based on comments received in response to the 2021 Proposal, adjustments to EPA’s cost estimates, and experience implementing the 2018 Fee Rule, EPA is issuing this SNPRM and is requesting comments on the proposed provisions and primary alternative provisions described that would add to or modify the 2021 Proposal. EPA notes that TSCA allows it to collect approximately but not more than 25 percent of its costs for eligible TSCA activities via fees. EPA states that fee revenue has been roughly half of the estimated costs for eligible activities than EPA estimated in the 2018 Fee Rule, however. According to EPA, the shortfall was, in part, due to EPA’s use of cost estimates based on what it had historically spent on implementing TSCA prior to the 2016 amendments, not what it would cost to implement the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (Lautenberg Act). In the first four years following the 2016 Lautenberg Act’s enactment, EPA also did not conduct a comprehensive budget analysis designed to estimate the actual costs of implementing the amended law until spring 2021. In the SNPRM, EPA proposes to revise its cost estimate to account adequately for the anticipated costs of meeting its statutory mandates, which are based on the comprehensive analysis conducted in 2021. EPA states that these proposed revisions are designed to ensure fee amounts capture approximately but not more than 25 percent of the costs of administering certain TSCA activities, fees are distributed equitably among fee payers when multiple fee payers are identified by revising the fee allocation methodology for EPA-initiated risk evaluations, and fee payers are identified via a transparent process.

Estimated Incremental Impacts of the SNPRM

EPA evaluated the potential incremental economic impacts of the 2021 Proposal, as modified by this SNPRM for fiscal year (FY) 2023 through FY 2025. The SNPRM briefly summarizes EPA’s “Economic Analysis of the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule for Fees for the Administration of the Toxic Substances Control Act,” which will be available in the docket:

  • Benefits. The principal benefit of the 2021 Proposal, as modified by this SNPRM, is to provide EPA a sustainable source of funding necessary to administer certain provisions of TSCA.
  • Cost. The annualized fees collected from industry under the proposed cost estimate described in the SNPRM are approximately $45.47 million (at both three percent and seven percent discount rates (EPA notes that the annualized fee collection is independent of the discount rate)), excluding fees collected for manufacturer-requested risk evaluations. EPA calculated total annualized fee collection by multiplying the estimated number of fee-triggering events anticipated each year by the corresponding fees. EPA estimates that total annual fee collection for manufacturer-requested risk evaluations is $3.01 million for chemicals included in the 2014 TSCA Work Plan (based on the assumed potential for two requests over the three-year period) and approximately $2.99 million for chemicals not included in the 2014 TSCA Work Plan (based on the assumed potential for one request over the three-year period). EPA analyzed a three-year period because the statute requires EPA to reevaluate and adjust, as necessary, the fees every three years.
  • Small entity impact. EPA estimates that 29 percent of Section 5 submissions will be from small businesses that are eligible to pay the Section 5 small business fee because they meet the definition of “small business concern.” EPA estimates that the total annualized fee collection from small businesses submitting notices under Section 5 is $666,810. For Sections 4 and 6, reduced fees paid by eligible small businesses and fees paid by non-small businesses may differ because the fee paid by each entity would be dependent on the number of entities identified per fee-triggering event and production volume of that chemical substance. EPA estimates that average annual fee collection from small businesses for fee-triggering events under Section 4 and Section 6 would be approximately $103,574 and $2,896,351, respectively. For each of the three years covered by the SNPRM, EPA estimates that total fee revenue collected from small businesses will account for about six percent of the approximately $52 million total fee collection, for an annual average total of approximately $3 million.
  • Environmental justice. Although not directly impacting environmental justice-related concerns, EPA states that the fees will enable it to protect better human health and the environment, including in helping minority, low-income, Tribal, or indigenous populations in the United States that potentially experience disproportionate environmental harms and risks, and supporting the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies involving TSCA. EPA notes that it “identifies and addresses environmental justice concerns by providing for fair treatment and meaningful involvement in the implementation of the TSCA program and addressing unreasonable risks from chemical substances.”
  • Effects on state, local, and Tribal governments. The SNPRM would not have any significant or unique effects on small governments, or federalism or Tribal implications.

Commentary

Bergeson & Campbell, P.C. (B&C®) has anticipated the public release of the SNPRM for some time and is not surprised by the proposed increases in fees. We recognize, however, that many readers may review these proposed fees and truly feel a sense of “sticker shock,” as Dr. Michal Freedhoff, the current Assistant Administrator of EPA’s Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention (OCSPP), cautioned regulated entities earlier this year. B&C has not evaluated the underlying budgetary analysis, so assumes that EPA’s estimate of its costs is accurate. Given that assumption and EPA’s authority to recover 25 percent of those costs, B&C focuses on other aspects of the proposal.

Taking an optimistic view, the increase may benefit regulated entities. EPA states in the SNPRM that “Collecting additional resources through TSCA fees will enable EPA to significantly improve on-time performance and quality.” The absence of these two metrics, as well as others, has mired EPA’s activities under TSCA Sections 4, 5, and 6 for years. The influx of funding, along with proper leadership, training, and management, will aid EPA with meeting its statutory deadlines under TSCA, and the transparency elements of its Scientific Integrity Policy and the scientific standards under TSCA Section 26. Below, we provide representative examples of how the fees increase will aid EPA with avoiding the repetitious shortcomings that have permeated its decision making under TSCA Sections 4, 5, and 6.

TSCA Section 4

B&C notes that EPA states the following about its intended use of its order authority under TSCA Section 4: “The Agency believes it is reasonable to assume that approximately 75 test orders per year will be initiated between FY 2023 and FY 2025. Approximately 45 of these test orders are expected to be associated with the Agency’s actions on PFAS.” In comparison, EPA has issued 20 TSCA Section 4 test orders on 11 existing chemical substances since March 2020. The issued test orders have, however, suffered from significant lapses in transparency. as well as outcomes that conflict with the scientific standards under TSCA Section 26 and the obligations under Section 4.

These concerns with transparency and EPA’s failure to meet the scientific standards under TSCA Section 26 are likely due in part to EPA’s resource and staffing limitations. Therefore, the increased cost of test orders from $11,650 to $25,000 will enable EPA to develop test orders that are focused on data needs, rather than data gaps, during its prioritization and risk evaluation activities. It will also provide EPA with the requisite funding to ensure that it responds timely to technical inquiries from test order recipients, rather than months and in some cases more than a year later.

TSCA Section 5

B&C has decades of experience reviewing EPA’s assessments on new chemical substances under TSCA Section 5. Of relevance here are our observations since TSCA was amended in 2016. Since this time, we have observed a decrease in transparency in EPA’s risk assessments on new chemical substances. For example, EPA routinely identifies analogs from which it reads across potential hazards for new chemical substances. It is not uncommon, however, for EPA to identify multiple analogs for doing so. What is common is that EPA selects an analog amongst many and does not state the scientific basis for the selected analog. This also applies to analogs identified by submitters that are often dismissed by EPA without a scientific basis for doing so. Furthermore, EPA routinely claims those analogs as confidential business information (CBI) without reviewing whether they are actually still confidential. It is important for EPA to protect legitimate CBI, but the statute also requires disclosure of information that is not actually CBI. Additional resources will allow EPA to update its databases to reflect the current state of CBI claims and to better evaluate whether old CBI claims are still justified.

We also hope that additional resources will enable EPA to rely on fewer “worst-case” shortcuts in its evaluations of PMNs. For example, EPA routinely uses the acute potential dose rate (PDR) as the exposure metric for assessing potential unreasonable risks, even when the hazard is a chronic effect. Evaluating against a PDR is a reasonable first pass calculation — if EPA does not identify risk using a PDR, no further evaluation is necessary. We do not, however, agree with EPA making unreasonable risk determinations on the screening-level assessments without further refinements — it is simply not justifiable scientifically to predict chronic risk using a PDR (as reflected in EPA’s assessments under Section 6). Performing the refined calculation requires additional effort, which the fee rule would help support.

We expect EPA will resolve the above issues with the increased funding that it intends on receiving for new chemical substance notifications (e.g., from $19,020 to $45,000 on PMNs). EPA states that the “Additional funding collected through TSCA section 5 fees will help EPA reduce the backlog of delayed reviews and support additional work for new cases.” These monies will also provide EPA the necessary budget to better justify the selection of analogs. Collectively, we hope these improvements will allow EPA’s risk assessors to exercise their inherently government function of evaluating and approving and/or modifying the contractor-generated work products as EPA-approved work products. This will provide more transparent and timely evaluations on novel chemistries notified to the Agency. This level of transparency will also ensure that EPA is satisfying its requirements under EPA’s Scientific Integrity Policy, which states “At the EPA, promoting a culture of scientific integrity is closely linked to transparency. The Agency remains committed to transparency in its interactions with all members of the public.” In doing so, EPA will additionally be providing risk assessments that clearly document its decision making and how those decisions satisfy the scientific standards under TSCA Section 26. These considerations are critical for submitters, not in the sense that they must agree with EPA’s determinations, but rather that they understand the bases for those determinations.

Unanswered questions about when the increased fees will improve the throughput of new chemicals reviews remain. Hiring and training staff takes time; EPA is currently working to fill open positions and train new staff. Submitters paying substantially higher fees would reasonably expect that EPA improve its performance or, if EPA cannot complete timely its reviews (absent suspensions by the submitter), expect that EPA would refund the submission fee.

TSCA Section 6

B&C views the fee increases for EPA’s administration of TSCA Section 6 as the most controversial, not necessarily because of the intended increased costs, which are substantial (e.g., EPA-initiated risk evaluation from two payments resulting in $2,560,000 to two payments resulting in $5,081,000), but rather because of EPA’s decision making in the risk evaluations and its incorporation of new policy directions into its revised risk determinations. EPA has stated that its revisions to the final risk evaluations on eight of the “first 10” chemical substances and accompanying revised risk determinations are “supported by science and the law.” EPA spent the last year revisiting its risk determinations, with little change other than EPA’s conclusion about the “whole chemical.” EPA has not addressed weakness in the risk evaluations identified by commenters; nor has EPA addressed the weaknesses in EPA’s systematic review process identified by the U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s (NASEM) review of EPA’s “Application of Systematic Review in TSCA Risk Evaluations.” NASEM’s review concluded that “The OPPT approach to systematic review does not adequately meet the state-of-practice [and] OPPT should reevaluate its approach to systematic review methods, addressing the comments and recommendations in this report.” The foregoing issues are troubling and are expected to be contested by regulated entities when EPA proposes its draft risk management rules on the “first 10” chemical substances. EPA did, however, state in the SNPRM that:

Although section 6 cost estimates were informed by risk management and risk evaluation activities for the first 10 chemicals, EPA will not be recovering fees for those chemicals.

Though this may seem like a hollow victory for potentially regulated entities, given EPA’s risk determinations on these substances, the intended fees for the EPA-initiated risk evaluations at least provide a baseline of deferred costs that may be allocated for disputing scientific and legal shortcomings when EPA issues the draft and final risk management rules. Moving forward, we anticipate that EPA will use the intended increased funding from the various risk evaluation costs to ensure that the above issues are addressed in its future risk evaluations on high-priority substances.

Conclusions

B&C recognizes that its position on the proposed fees increase in the SNPRM may not be well received by regulated entities. We note that the increased fees will aid with decreasing uncertainty in EPA’s decision making and its timely completion of evaluations on new and existing chemical substances and improve transparency and documents that meet the scientific standards under TSCA Section 26. There is also no question that EPA has the statutory authority to raise fees to recover 25 percent of its costs. B&C’s view is that commenters should focus on the distribution of the fees among the categories, proposed exemptions, and other aspects of the rule, including when manufacture or import must cease to avoid paying fees, rather than focusing on the magnitude of the fee increase.

We also hope that regulated entities will welcome EPA’s use of the best available science and weight of scientific evidence in its risk evaluations. As we discussed above, these statutory requirements have not been met in the “first 10” risk evaluations. We recognize that the deadlines for risk evaluations are not necessarily the critical issue for regulated entities, rather it is EPA’s unreasonable risk determinations, which are based on risk evaluations that were developed in a manner inconsistent with TSCA Section 6 and the implementing regulations. The increased fees under TSCA Section 6 should aid with addressing these issues.

Finally, B&C is optimistic that the SNPRM will provide EPA with the requisite funding to ensure its successful oversight of activities under TSCA. Despite our optimism, we do recognize that increased funding alone will not improve EPA’s administration of TSCA. To ensure success, EPA’s leadership will have to manage and lead this program properly. These latter components are critical and if the SNPRM is promulgated as, or as close to as proposed, the expectation on this Administration to produce results will be sky high.

©2023 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

Lessons We All Should Learn from the Great Salt Lake Crisis

Those of us on the east coast have heard that the Great Salt Lake has receded to the verge of a public health crisis, including because toxins in the sediment that have been underwater for millennia may soon may soon be widely spread air pollutants.   Today I had the opportunity to visit the rapidly shrinking Great Salt Lake and hear from leading experts about what might be done about it.  Much of what I heard surprised me.  More importantly, some of the lessons learned in Utah are generally applicable to our still evolving response to our global climate emergency.

How much has the Great Salt Lake shrunk?   In the modern era it has lost 73 percent of its water and 60 percent of its area.  Of the 120 saline lakes on the planet, 100 are in decline and on average they have shrunk, on average, 60 percent.  That means that as bad as things are at the Great Salt Lake, there are many other places where things are worse.

Contrary to popular belief, while a warming climate is a contributing cause of this decline, it is not the main cause.  The main cause is that water has been diverted from the historic tributaries to the Great Salt Lake for other uses, primarily agriculture which is responsible for 72 percent of Utah’s water consumption.  Those diversions have been occurring since Brigham Young arrived in Utah in the 19th century.

Why does the shrinking of the lake matter?  Well, in addition to the public health threat posed to the southwestern United States by the toxins in the sediment, the increased water salinity that comes with the Great Salt Lake being smaller is toxic to the brine shrimp that are essential to the survival of the tens of millions of migratory birds that make the lake home for part of the year on their way to and from other places in North and South America.  The rapidly receding waters also pose a clear and present danger to other economically important activities including mineral extraction and tourism.  One example of the broad range of negative impacts of the shrinking lake — snow in the mountains has been proven to melt faster as a result of the deposition of dust from the lake, shortening Utah’s economically important ski season.

I was of the prior impression that people in Utah didn’t appreciate the magnitude of the crisis at hand.  I was wrong.  The fact is that the Utah Legislature has taken numerous actions in recent years to reverse more than a century of momentum in the wrong direction.  As a result of these actions there is cause for real optimism that the level of the Great Salt Lake will continue to rise though it will take decades to make lasting improvements.

And that brings me to the lessons of general applicability that I learned.   As one local water law expert said, there is no silver bullet to end the Great Salt Lake crisis but there is silver buckshot.   There is no one law that can be passed or one lawsuit that will be litigated that will immediately void the water rights that have resulted in Utah (and all of the other western states) using much more water than can sustainably be used.  What the people of Utah have learned is that many interventions are necessary, all at the same time.  And they’re implementing that lesson in real time.    We all might consider whether we’re acting with the same ingenuity and urgency respecting our environmental challenges.

And I heard another important thing for the second time in a week.  The biggest challenge in repairing the Great Salt Lake isn’t identifying what needs to be done.  It is getting people to own what it will take to get water into the Great Salt Lake and why that matters.   The necessary messaging is complicated because there is no one size fits all message and even if you’re doing it correctly, it isn’t immediately effective.  I heard The Nature Conservancy’s Chief Scientist, Dr. Katherine Hayhoe, say something similar about decarbonization and resilience when she was in Boston last week.

The Great Salt Lake crisis became too big for the people of Utah to ignore.  But their multifaceted approach to the crisis is impressive and left me wondering what we on the east coast might be able to do about our much different but equally serious environmental challenges, like the need to more quickly build renewable energy infrastructure and improve our resilience to GHG supercharged storm waters, if we acted with the same urgency.

©1994-2023 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
Article by by Jeffrey R. Porter of Mintz
For more articles on the environment, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

EPA Ramps Up Climate Enforcement

Facilities operating across the country need to be prepared for increased climate-driven enforcement at all levels of federal government—especially at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). With EPA’s Climate Enforcement and Compliance Strategy announcement last week, the Agency has gone all-in on enforcement and compliance programs “to address climate change, wherever appropriate, in every matter within their jurisdiction.” This initiative is consistent with President Biden’s Executive Order 14008, which calls for a government-wide approach to tackling the climate crisis. The strategy also underscores the Agency’s announcement of its first-ever National Enforcement and Compliance Initiative (NECI) on climate change, which targets, among others, methane emissions at oil and gas facilities and landfills, as well as illegal importation of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Companies with exposure to high-Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions and related climate risks, both in the Clean Air Act (CAA) and non-CAA context, should be on notice of increased scrutiny moving forward, including climate-focused auditing and inspections by the Agency and GHG-driven injunctive relief.

In the wake of EPA’s announcement of this new enforcement and compliance strategy, watch for the following developments:

  • EPA will increasingly prioritize enforcement and compliance actions to mitigate climate change, including further scrutiny of high-GHG emitters through information requests, inspections, and formal enforcement. Oil and gas facilities and landfills have been specifically targeted, but any facility with high GHG emissions should expect greater enforcement scrutiny.
  • Enforcement demands will likely include higher penalties, compared to other non-GHG-driven cases, more GHG-related injunctive relief, as well as more climate adaptation and resilience requirements. This relief could include more fence-line monitoring or flare gas reductions or recovery, among other priorities.
  • Climate-focused injunctive relief measures will not be limited to CAA. Expect a renewed emphasis on green remediation technologies at Superfund and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act corrective action sites, as well as a push for green infrastructure, resiliency planning, and stormwater management enhancements in Clean Water Act settlements.
  • Plan for EPA to scrutinize GHG emissions reports more closely. Carefully evaluate these submissions to ensure consistency with reporting regulations.
  • EPA will be interested in Supplemental Environmental Projects that reduce GHGs.  Consider clean and renewable energy projects or other GHG mitigation projects as part of any strategy to resolve an enforcement case, particularly if the penalty demand is large.

Facilities located in Environmental Justice (EJ) communities should particularly expect additional climate-related scrutiny, as EPA has indicated that “[t]hese efforts are particularly necessary in overburdened and marginalized communities that are on the frontlines of the climate crisis.” Facilities will need to engage in more extensive consultation with local communities to evaluate remedy selection, including any climate adaptation efforts, as well as more protracted enforcement negotiations to evaluate community-focused injunctive relief (i.e., climate risk reporting, additional community engagement, etc.).

Finally, be prepared to respond to these issues quickly, including the Biden Administration’s broader EPA enforcement agenda, which is expected to increase enforcement dramatically over the coming months and years. Apart from EPA, broader scrutiny of corporate climate reporting will become more common as the Securities and Exchange Commission looks to finalize its proposed Climate Risk Disclosure Rule, requiring public companies to disclose climate-related risks and emissions data, among other requirements. Facilities should review publicly available information and emissions reporting for consistency and accuracy.

© 2023 Beveridge & Diamond PC
Article by: Andrew C. Silton , Allyn L. Stern , Barbara M.R. Marvin of Beveridge & Diamond PC 
For more articles on the EPA, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy and Resources section.

Administration Continues Overhaul of Endangered Species Act Regulations

On June 22, 2023, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) (collectively, the “Services”) published three proposed rules that would significantly revise their regulations implementing several sections of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Primarily, the Services’ proposals focus on amending or reversing several components of the ESA regulations promulgated in 2019 by the prior Administration, including the implementation of Section 4 (listing of species as threatened or endangered and the designation of critical habitat), Section 7 (consultation procedures); and Section 4(d) (application of the “take” prohibitions to threatened species). In addition, and beyond the scope of the 2019 final rules, the Services are proposing revisions to the Section 7 regulations regarding the scope and application of reasonable and prudent measures (“RPM”) and to the Section 4(d) regulations to include certain exceptions for federally recognized Tribes. Comments on the three proposed rules are due by August 21, 2023.

Background

The species and habitat protected under the ESA extend to all aspects of our communities, lands, and waters. There are almost 2,400 species listed as threatened or endangered pursuant to ESA Section 4. Critical habitat for one or more species has been designated in all regions of the U.S. and its territories. Through the Section 7 consultation process and “take” prohibitions under Sections 9 and 4(d), the ESA imposes species and habitat protection measures on the use and management of private, federal, and state lands and waters and, consequently, on governmental and private activities.

These proposed rules reflect the Biden Administration’s continuing efforts to reform and revise the Services’ approach to ESA implementation that was adopted by the prior Administration. Pursuant to President Biden’s Executive Order 13990, the Services reviewed certain agency actions for consistency with the new Administration’s policy objectives. As part of that review, the Services identified five final rules related to ESA implementation that should be reconsidered. Previously, in 2022, the Services rescinded two of those final rules—the regulatory definition of “habitat” for the purpose of designating critical habitat and the regulatory procedures for excluding areas from critical habitat designations. While these proposed rules reflect the consummation of that initial effort, the Services are currently contemplating additional revisions to other ESA regulations and policies.

Proposed Revisions to the Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat

Section 4 of the ESA dictates how the Services list species as threatened or endangered, delist or reclassify species, and designate areas as critical habitat. The proposed rule would make several targeted revisions to these procedures. Notable changes would include:

  • Evaluation of the “foreseeable future” for threatened species: The proposed rule would revise the applicable regulatory framework to state that “[t]he term foreseeable future extends as far into the future as the Services can reasonably rely on information about threats to the species and the species’ responses to those threats.” The Services note that this revision is intended to reflect that absolute certainty about utilized information is not necessary, just a reasonable degree of confidence in the prediction. The Services are also considering whether to rescind the framework for interpreting and implementing the “foreseeable future” in its entirety.
  • Designation of unoccupied critical habitat: The proposed rule would revise the two-step process for determining when unoccupied areas may be designated as critical habitat. proposed rule addresses how specific areas that are unoccupied critical habitats are designated. In part, the Services would remove the requirement that they “will only consider” unoccupied areas to be essential when a designation limited to occupied critical habitat would be inadequate for the conservation of the species. The Services also would remove the provision that an unoccupied area is considered essential when there is reasonable certainty both that the area will contribute to the conservation of the species and that it contains one or more physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the species.
  • Not prudent determinations for critical habitat designation: The proposed rule would remove the justification for making a not prudent determination when threats to a species’ habitat are from causes that cannot be addressed through management actions in a Section 7 consultation. The Services note that this is intended to address the misperception that a designation of critical habitat could be declined for species impacted by climate change.
  • Factors for delisting species: The proposed rule would restore language that delisting is appropriate when the species “is recovered.” The Services would also clarify that the delisting analysis is not limited to the same specific factors or threats that led to the listing of the species.
  • Economic impacts in classification process: The proposed rule would restore the regulatory condition that a species listing determination is to be made “without reference to possible economic or other impacts of such determination.”

Proposed Revisions to the Consultation Regulations

The ESA Section 7 consultation requirement applies to discretionary federal agency actions—including federal permits, licenses and authorizations, management of federal lands, and other federal programs. Federal actions that are likely to adversely affect a listed species or designated critical habitat must undergo a formal consultation review and issuance of a biological opinion evaluating whether the action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. The biological opinion also evaluates the extent to which “take” of a listed species may occur as a result of the action and quantifies the level of incidental take that is authorized. The proposed rule would make the following notable changes to the applicable regulations:

  • Expanded scope of reasonable and prudent measures: The proposed rule would revise and expand the scope of RPMs that could be included as part of an incidental take statement in a biological opinion. In a change from their prior interpretation, and in addition to measures that avoid or minimize impacts of take, the Services would have discretion to include measures as an RPM that offset any remaining impacts of incidental take that cannot be avoided (e.g., for certain impacts, offsetting measures could include restoring or protecting suitable habitat). The Services also would allow RPMs, and their implementing terms and conditions, to occur inside or outside of the action area. Any offsetting measures would be subject to the requirement that RPMs may only involve “minor changes” to the action, must be commensurate with the scale of the impact, and must be within the authority and discretion of the action agency or applicant to carry out.
  • Revised definition of “effects of the action”: In an effort to clarify that the consequences to listed species or critical habitat that are included within effects of the action relate to both the proposed action and activities that are caused by the proposed action, the proposed rule would add a phrase to the definition to note that it includes “the consequences of other activities that are caused by the proposed action but that are not part of the action.” In addition, the proposed rule would remove provisions at 50 C.F.R. § 402.17, added in 2019, which provide the factors used to determine whether an activity or a consequence is “reasonably certain to occur.”
  • Revised definition of “environmental baseline”: The proposed rule would revise the definition in an effort to more clearly address the question of a federal agency’s discretion over its own activities and facilities when determining what is included within the environmental baseline. The Services note that it is the federal action agency’s discretion to modify the activity or facility that is the determining factor when deciding which impacts of an action agency’s activity or facility should be included in the environmental baseline, as opposed to the effects of the action. The Services also would remove the term “ongoing” from the definition in an effort to clarify that any continuation of a past and present discretionary practice or operation would be in the environmental baseline.
  • Clarification of obligation to reinitiate consultation: The proposed rule would remove the phrase “or by the Service” to clarify that it is the federal agency, and not the Services, that has the obligation to request reinitiating of consultation when one or more of the triggering criteria have been met (and discretionary involvement or control over the action is retained).

Proposed Reinstatement of Blanket Protections for FWS Species Listed as Threatened

Pursuant to the ESA, threatened and endangered species are treated differently with respect to what are often called the “take” prohibitions of the Act. In part, ESA Section 9(a)(1) prohibits the unauthorized take—which is defined as an act “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect”—of an endangered species. In contrast, under Section 4(d) of the ESA, the Secretary may issue a regulation applying any prohibition set forth in Section 9(a)(1) to a threatened species. Historically, FWS applied a “blanket 4(d) rule” that automatically extended all ESA Section 9(a)(1) prohibitions to a threatened species unless a species-specific rule was otherwise adopted. In 2019, FWS revised its approach to align with NMFS’s long-standing practice, which only applies the ESA prohibitions to threatened species on a species-specific basis. The proposed rule would make the following notable changes to FWS’s approach under Section 4(d):

  • Reinstate blanket 4(d) rule: The proposed rule would reinstate the general application of the “blanket 4(d) rule” to newly listed threatened species. As before, FWS would retain the option to promulgate species-specific rules that revise the scope or application of the prohibitions that would apply to threatened species.
  • New exceptions for Tribes: The proposed rule proposed rule would extend to federally recognized Tribes the ability currently afforded to FWS and other federal and state agencies to aid, salvage, or dispose of threatened species. FWS is also considering an additional revision that would extend exceptions to the prohibitions to certain individuals from a federally recognized Tribe’s natural resource agency for take associated with conservation activities pursuant to an approved cooperative agreement that covers the threatened species.

© 2023 Van Ness Feldman LLP

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European Commission Action on Climate Taxonomy and ESG Rating Provider Regulation

On June 13, 2023, the European Commission published “a new package of measures to build on and strengthen the foundations of the EU sustainable finance framework.” The aim is to ensure that the EU sustainable finance framework continues to support companies and the financial sector in connection with climate transition, including making the framework “easier to use” and providing guidance on climate-related disclosure, while encouraging the private funding of transition projects and technologies. These measures are summarized in a publication, “A sustainable finance framework that works on the ground.” Overall, according to the Commission, the package “is another step towards a globally leading legal framework facilitating the financing of the transition.”

The sustainable finance package includes the following measures:

  • EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act: amendments include (i) new criteria for economic activities that make a substantial contribution to one or more non-climate environmental objectives, namely, sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, transition to a circular economy, pollution prevention and control, and protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems; and (ii) changes expanding on economic activities that contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation “not included so far – in particular in the manufacturing and transport sectors.” The EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act has been operative since January 2022 and includes 107 economic activities that are responsible for 64% of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. In addition, “new economic sectors and activities will be added, and existing ones refined and updated, where needed in line with regulatory and technological developments.” “For large non-financial undertakings, disclosure of the degree of taxonomy alignment regarding climate objectives began in 2023. Disclosures will be phased-in over the coming years for other actors and environmental objectives.”
  • Proposed Regulation of ESG Rating Providers: the Commission adopted a proposed regulation, which was based on 2021 recommendations from the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, aimed at promoting operational integrity and increased transparency in the ESG ratings market through organizational principles and clear rules addressing conflicts of interest. Ratings providers would be authorized and supervised by the European Securities and Markets Authority. The regulation “provides requirements on disclosures around” ratings methodologies and objectives, and “introduces principle-based organizational requirements on” ratings providers activities. The Commission is also seeking advice from ESMA on the presentation of credit ratings, with the aim being to address shortcomings related to “how ESG factors are incorporated into methodologies and disclosures of how ESG factors impact credit ratings.”
  • Enhancing Usability: the Commission set out an overview of the measures and tools aimed at enhancing the usability of relevant rules and providing implementation guidance to stakeholders. The Commission Staff Working Document “Enhancing the usability of the EU Taxonomy and the overall EU sustainable finance framework” summarizes the Commission’s most recent initiatives and measures. The Commission also published a new FAQ document that provides guidance on the interpretation and implementation of certain legal provisions of the EU Taxonomy Regulation and on the interactions between the concepts of “taxonomy-aligned investment” and “sustainable investment” under the SFDR.

Taking the Temperature: As previously discussed, the Commission is increasingly taking steps to achieve the goal of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, known as Fit for 55. Recent initiatives include the adoption of a carbon sinks goal, the launch of the greenwashing-focused Green Claims Directive, and now, the sustainable finance package.

Another objective of these regulatory initiatives is to provide increased transparency for investors as they assess sustainability and transition-related claims made by issuers. In this regard, the legislative proposal relating to the regulation of ESG rating agencies is significant. As noted in our longer survey, there is little consistency among ESG ratings providers and few established industry norms relating to disclosure, measurement methodologies, transparency and quality of underlying data. That has led to a number of jurisdictions proposing regulation, including (in addition to the EU) the UK, as well as to government inquiries to ratings providers in the U.S.

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

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Biden Administration Revitalizes and Advances the Federal Government’s Commitment to Environmental Justice

On April 21, 2023, the eve of Earth Day, President Biden continued his Administration’s spotlight on environmental justice issues by signing Executive Order 14096, entitled “Revitalizing Our Nation’s Commitment to Environmental Justice for All.”

This Executive Order prioritizes and expands environmental justice concepts first introduced in President Clinton’s 1994 Executive Order 12898. The 1994 Order directed federal agencies to develop environmental justice strategies to address the disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of federal programs on minority and low-income populations.

One of President Biden’s early actions [covered here], Executive Order 14008, introduced the whole-of-government approach for all executive branch agencies to address climate change, environmental justice, and civil rights. It created the White House Environmental Justice Interagency Council, comprising of 15 federal agencies, including the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Department of Justice. Biden’s new Executive Order expands the whole-of-government approach by: (1) adding more agencies to the Environmental Justice Interagency Council and (2) establishing a new White House Office of Environmental Justice within the White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”). The new Office of Environmental Justice will be led by a Federal Chief Environmental Justice Officer and will coordinate the implementation of environmental justice policies across the federal government.

This new Executive Order emphasizes action over aspiration by directing federal agencies to “address and prevent disproportionate and adverse environmental health and impacts on communities.” It charges federal agencies with assessing their environmental justice efforts and developing, implementing, and periodically updating an environmental justice strategic plan. These new Environmental Justice Strategic Plans and Assessments are to be submitted to the CEQ and made public regularly, including through an Environmental Justice Scorecard, a new government-wide assessment of each federal agency’s efforts to advance environmental justice.

Specifically, defining “environmental justice” is one strategy to make concrete what federal agency efforts will address. Under the Executive Order, “environmental justice” means “the just treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of income, race, color, national origin, Tribal affiliation, or disability, in agency decision-making and other Federal activities that affect human health and the environment so that people: (i) are fully protected from disproportionate and adverse human health and environmental effects (including risks) and hazards, including those related to climate change, the cumulative impacts of environmental and other burdens, and the legacy of racism or other structural or systemic barriers; and (ii) have equitable access to a healthy, sustainable, and resilient environment in which to live, play, work, learn, grow, worship, and engage in cultural and subsistence practices.” This definition adds “Tribal affiliation” and “disability” to the protected categories and expands the scope of effects, risks, and hazards to be protected against. The Fact Sheet accompanying the Executive Order explains that the definition’s use of the phrase “disproportionate and adverse” is a simpler, modernized equivalent of the phrase “disproportionately high and adverse” originally used in Executive Order 12898. Whether this change in language from “disproportionately high” to “disproportionate” will affect agency decision-making is something to watch for in the future.

As part of the government-wide mission to achieve environmental justice, the Executive Order explicitly directs each agency to address and prevent the cumulative impacts of pollution and other burdens like climate change, including carrying out environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), by:

  • Analyzing direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of federal actions on communities with environmental justice concerns;
  • Considering the best available science and information on any disparate health effects (including risks) arising from exposure to pollution and other environmental hazards, such as information related to the race, national origin, socioeconomic status, age, disability, and sex of the individuals exposed; and,
  • Providing opportunities for early and meaningful involvement in the environmental review process by communities with environmental justice concerns potentially affected by a proposed action, including when establishing or revising agency procedures under NEPA.
    The Executive Order also emphasizes transparency by directing agencies to ensure that the public, including members of communities with environmental justice concerns, has adequate access to information on federal activities. These activities include planning, regulatory actions, implementation, permitting, compliance, and enforcement related to human health or the environment when required under the Freedom of Information Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, and any other environmental statutes with public information provisions.

CEQ is expected to issue interim guidance by the end of the year and more long-term guidance by the end of 2024 as to implementing the Executive Order’s directives. It is too early to know whether any directives will go through rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. But with a presidential election looming and ongoing budget negotiations between the White House and Congress that propose modest cuts to NEPA as part of permitting reform, CEQ’s efforts may be limited to guidance for now.

© 2023 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

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Permitting Reform Package Passes as Part of Debt Ceiling Deal

The past year’s long wrangling between Republicans, Democrats, and the White House on permitting reform finally made progress this month when Congress enacted significant reforms to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) as part of the legislation to increase the debt ceiling. Prior to this legislation, the core statutory framework of NEPA had remained relatively unchanged for 50 years. Building from Rep. Garrett Graves’ (R-LA., 6th Dist.) “Building United States Infrastructure through Limited Delays and Efficient Reviews” (“BUILDER”) Act of 2023, the permitting reform title of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (“FRA” or “legislation”) tackles four key areas:

(1) reforming NEPA to make the federal environmental review process simpler and quicker;

(2) directing a study of the existing capacity of our transmission grid to reliably transfer electric energy between distinct regions and subsequent recommendations to improve interregional transfer capabilities within the grid;

(3) streamlining permitting for energy storage projects; and

(4) congressional ratification of the Mountain Valley Pipeline.

Several of the reforms to NEPA codify changes to the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) NEPA implementing regulations made during the Trump Administration.

While these provisions are intended to yield significant benefits for projects requiring federal approvals or funding, the actual impact will depend substantially on how the reforms are implemented, and there remains considerable interest in other aspects of permitting and siting reform making further legislative action likely.

Key NEPA Reforms

The FRA includes numerous changes to NEPA. We have highlighted several key changes here.

Narrowing the Scope of “Major Federal Action”

The term “major Federal action” is the trigger for requiring environmental review under NEPA – federal actions that qualify as a “major Federal action” must be considered under NEPA. The new legislation narrows the definition of what constitutes a “major Federal action” by limiting the term to actions that the lead agency deems are “subject to substantial Federal control and responsibility.” The legislation does not define this phrase, leaving substantial room for agency interpretation. Building on this general concept, the amendments codify the regulatory definition of a “major Federal action,” with modifications. As now defined, certain federal actions will be excluded from the scope of a major federal action, including:

  • non-federal actions (i.e., private or state actions) “with no or minimal Federal funding”;
  • non-federal actions (i.e., private or state actions) “with no or minimal Federal involvement where a Federal agency cannot control the outcome of the project”;
  • funding assistance consisting exclusively of general revenue sharing funds, where the federal agency does not have “compliance or enforcement responsibility” over the use of those funds;
  • “loans, loan guarantees, or other forms of financial assistance where a Federal agency does not exercise sufficient control and responsibility over the subsequent use of such financial assistance or the effect of the action”;
  • Small Business Act business loan guarantees under section 7(a) or (b) of the Small Business Act or title V of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958;
  • federal agency activities or decisions with effects located entirely outside of the jurisdiction of the United States; and
  • non-discretionary activities or decisions that are made in accordance with the agency’s statutory authority.

The meaning and application of these exclusions to specific actions will be subject to interpretation and likely litigation going forward. For example, what constitutes minimal funding—a threshold dollar amount or a percentage of the federal funding contribution in relation to overall project cost—is not clearly identified under the revisions. Resolution of this question will be critical to determining what actions are subject to NEPA review going forward. Given the recent dramatic increase in federal funding opportunities from the Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, determining what actions are subject to NEPA review based on the level of federal funds involved is likely to become a more frequent and important question.

Scope of Review

When an agency action constitutes a “major Federal action,” the FRA also focuses and limits the scope of the NEPA review in two key ways.

First, the legislation modifies the statute’s existing, broad language requiring that “major Federal actions” significantly affecting the quality of the human environment include a detailed statement on the “environmental impact of the proposed action.” The revised language statutorily limits environmental review of environmental effects to those that are “reasonably foreseeable.” This change follows from a provision of the Trump Administration’s 2020 NEPA rule—later removed by the Biden Administration—which sought to eliminate long-used concepts of direct, indirect, and cumulative effects and instead focus on effects that are reasonably foreseeable and that have “a reasonably close causal relationship to” the proposed action or alternatives. Although the new statutory language does not go as far as the Trump Administration’s rule, which required a “close causal relationship,” it does follow the trend in case law to only require evaluation of reasonably foreseeable impacts. What project-specific impacts are “reasonably foreseeable” is still likely to be the subject of litigation.

Second, the FRA also makes changes regarding the alternatives analysis, often considered the heart of NEPA review. The legislation clarifies that agencies are to consider a “reasonable range” of alternatives to the proposed agency action, and that such alternatives must both be “technically and economically feasible” and “meet the purpose and need of the proposal.” This seems to codify long-standing guidance from CEQ contained in its 40 Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s NEPA Regulations. In addition, it directs that, in assessing the no action alternative, agencies must include an analysis of any negative environmental impacts of not implementing the proposed action. Whether an agency has met its obligations under NEPA to consider “alternatives to the proposed action” is a frequent source of controversy and litigation, particularly for the authorization of large infrastructure and energy projects.

These changes should both help focus environmental reviews and reduce costs and delays associated with challenges to agencies’ alternative analyses and emphasize the importance of properly defining the “purpose and need” of a proposed action.

Data Standards and Requirements

The FRA includes several provisions related to data. First, it clarifies that in making a determination on the appropriate level of review (Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), Environmental Assessment (“EA”), or categorical exclusion), the lead agency can make use of any reliable data source—and that “new scientific or technical research [is not required] unless the new scientific or technical research is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives, and the overall costs and time frame of obtaining it are not unreasonable.” It is unclear whether this will be applied beyond the determination of what level of review is required. This change has the potential to limit delays due to agencies undertaking or requesting additional studies from project proponents. What is deemed “essential” and what costs and timeframe are “not unreasonable,” however, remain undefined.

Second, the legislation requires that the action agency “ensure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussion and analysis in an environmental document.” The practical implications and scope of this scientific integrity mandate are unclear—and is likely to be a subject of agency guidance and, potentially, future litigation.

Efficiency Measures

The FRA further codifies several less controversial changes from the Trump Administration 2020 NEPA rule, which the recent Biden rulemaking had left in place. These changes include expressly recognizing and establishing regulations for EAs. Additionally, these changes include setting page limits for EISs—150 pages generally and 300 pages for agency actions “of extraordinary complexity”—and EAs—75 pages—excluding citations and appendices. Additionally, the changes codify the regulatory presumptive deadlines for completion of NEPA reviews—two years for EISs and one year for EAs. The legislation goes beyond existing regulations by creating the right to judicial review when an agency fails to meet a deadline. Under the new legislation, if an agency misses the deadline, the delayed project’s sponsor may seek a court order requiring the agency to act as soon as practicable, which is not to exceed 90 days from the date on which the order was issued unless the court determines that additional time is needed to comply with applicable law.

Further, the legislation clarifies the role of the NEPA lead agency, specifying that the lead agency must develop a schedule, in cooperation with each cooperating agency, the applicant, and other appropriate entities, for the completion of the environmental review and any permit or authorization required to carry out the proposed agency action. This mirrors provisions previously adopted as part of Title 41 of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (“FAST-41”) in 2015, which has demonstrated success in requiring coordination and improving the permitting and authorization processes for certain large infrastructure projects. Although the FRA expressly contemplates extensions to the schedule, just having a schedule in place can be a helpful tool in the timely completion of NEPA reviews.

In addition, the legislation authorizes project applicants to hire independent consultants to prepare EISs and EAs, subject to the independent review of the lead agency. This provision can provide project applicants with a path to minimize delays caused by a lack of staff and resources at federal agencies.

Programmatic Reviews and Categorical Exclusions

The FRA also codifies the current agency practice of preparing and relying on programmatic environmental documents to streamline the review process for subsequent actions that implement the evaluated program. The legislation provides that programmatic review can be relied on for five years without additional review, and after five years if the agency reevaluates the analysis. Although this change promotes further use of programmatic reviews, the five-year period presumption and reevaluation process could present challenges in certain cases given the extensive resources and time required to undertake a programmatic review and tiered reviews.

The FRA also seeks to facilitate the use of categorical exclusions in the NEPA process by authorizing agencies to adopt a categorical exclusion established by another agency. The legislation lays out a process for consulting with the agency that established the exclusion to determine whether adoption is appropriate, notifying the public of the plan to use the categorical exclusion, and documenting adoption of the categorical exclusion. Though dependent upon agencies taking advantage of this new flexibility, this could have the effect of enabling some types of projects to forgo detailed environmental review.

Other Provisions

In addition to the NEPA reforms, the FRA includes several other important permitting provisions. The legislation seeks to streamline and accelerate permitting for “energy storage” projects by adding energy storage to the list of “covered projects” under FAST-41.

Additionally, the legislation provides a clear path for the completion of the much-delayed Mountain Valley Pipeline project. The legislation finds the timely completion of the project is in the national interest, and congressionally approves and ratifies the various federal authorizations required for the project. Further, the legislation bars judicial review of federal agency actions with respect to the project.

Finally, the legislation requires the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC,” the entity responsible for setting reliability standards for the nation’s electric grid) to undertake a study within a year and a half on whether more transfer capacity is needed between existing transmission planning regions—including recommendations on measures to increase the amount of energy that can be reliably moved between the studied regions. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will thereafter have a year to seek and consider public comments on the study and file a report with Congress detailing any recommendations for statutory changes. This study provision was in lieu of a larger set of transmission-related actions that are of key interest to Democratic lawmakers that will be the subject of future legislative efforts.

Implications

Although the provisions in FRA are not a silver bullet to solve every NEPA woe experienced by project applicants, it is a significant step in the right direction. The codification of key concepts within the NEPA statute itself (rather than regulation, guidance, or case law) will have a durable, long-lasting impact on implementation of environmental reviews because it limits the regulation issuance/withdrawal cycle that we have witnessed with the recent administration changes.

Looking forward, we can expect a rulemaking by CEQ to align the existing regulations with the revised statutory language, as well as additional rulemakings by other agencies to harmonize their NEPA implementing regulations with the revised law. For the last year, we have awaited the Phase 2 NEPA rulemaking from CEQ, as explained in our previous alert. With this new legislation, it seems likely that CEQ will pause and further revise its proposed regulations to capture these new reforms before issuing additional regulations. We can also expect future guidance—and eventual litigation—on several ambiguous provisions in the new legislation as agencies begin to implement them.

While the intention behind the legislation is to speed and ease what has become a very lengthy, expensive, and perilous environmental review process—far exceeding the original intent of NEPA—whether these goals are achieved will depend on whether federal agencies embrace them or look for ways to interpret the reforms to continue “business as usual.”

For example, to meet the new timelines, it is possible that federal agencies will require applicants to provide all documentation needed for the environmental review before starting the clock. This approach would have the effect of undermining the statutory timeframes as well as the efficacy of the public engagement process. Similarly, while the legislation seeks to curtail the extent of the analysis through page limits, it is foreseeable that relatively short EISs and EAs could be weighed down with thousands of pages of analysis contained in the appendices.

It also remains to be seen how courts will interpret these reforms. The “hard look” standard developed by courts to evaluate the adequacy of environmental review documents may have the effect of ballooning the analyses again despite Congress’ intent to streamline the process.

Finally, while these reforms are substantial, Congress continues to discuss and debate additional reforms to address unresolved federal siting and permitting concerns—particularly with respect to energy infrastructure projects. Notably absent from the legislation was transmission permitting reform language of interest to Democratic lawmakers as well as provisions to support oil and gas leasing on federal lands and to facilitate the siting and permitting of mining projects to boost domestic supplies of critical minerals essential for existing and developing clean energy technologies.

© 2023 Van Ness Feldman LLP

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Is Biodiversity Emerging As A Unifying Concept That Can Help Ease The Political Polarization Surrounding ESG?

Highlights

    • In addition to global initiatives by the United Nations, G7, and the U.S., the need for protection against biodiversity loss has become a central focus of the business and investment communities
    • Biodiversity protection is emerging worldwide as a unifying concept that can mitigate the political polarization surrounding ESG and promote constructive dialogue about sustainability
    • A number of steps can be taken to capitalize on the unique attributes and appeal of biodiversity and leverage its potential to serve as a unifying concept

International Biodiversity Day, May 22, 2023, with its theme “From Agreement to Action: Build Back Biodiversity” was a powerful reminder that momentum for biodiversity conservation is accelerating globally. Biodiversity is increasingly being recognized as a potential unifying concept that can help alleviate some of the extreme political divergence over the term ESG.

ESG, which encompasses a broad range of environmental, social, and governance factors, has become politically charged and the subject of intense debate and varying interpretations. Biodiversity, on the other hand, is widely recognized as a critical aspect of environmental sustainability and it is increasingly acknowledged as a pressing issue by virtually all stakeholders, including scientists, policymakers, businesses, and communities.

Biodiversity represents the variety of life on Earth, including ecosystems, species, and genetic diversity. It is a tangible and universally valued concept that resonates with people from various backgrounds and ideologies. The preservation, protection and conservation of biodiversity are essential for the health and resilience of ecosystems, as well as for addressing climate change and ensuring the well-being of future generations.

By emphasizing biodiversity within sustainability discussions, stakeholders can find common ground and rally around a shared objective: protecting and restoring the Earth’s natural diversity. Biodiversity provides a unifying language and focus that transcends political divisions, as it highlights the interconnectedness of all life forms. It allows for a more tangible and universally valued point of reference, which can facilitate collaboration and drive collective action towards conservation efforts.

In addition to global initiatives by the United Nations, the Group of Seven (G7), and the U.S., the need for protection against biodiversity loss has also become a central focus of business and investment communities, and appears to be receiving a more favorable reception in the U.S. than the broader concepts associated with and motives attributed to ESG investing. This increased attention has, in turn, opened up a number of practical opportunities for action to leverage the potential of biodiversity as a unifying concept.

International Support for Biodiversity Protection

The United Nations formed the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to promote nature and human well-being. The first draft was proposed on May 22, 1992, which was then designated as International Biodiversity Day. Since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, nearly 200 countries have signed onto this treaty, which is a legally binding commitment to conserve biological diversity, to sustainably use its components and to share equitably the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.

In December 2022, at the 15th UN Biodiversity Conference (COP15), the CBD adopted the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework that calls for protecting 30 percent of the planet’s land, ocean, and inland waters and includes 23 other targets to help restore and protect ecosystems and endangered species worldwide, and ensure that big businesses disclose biodiversity risks and impacts from their operations. The Kunming-Montreal framework also focused on increasing funding for biodiversity by at least $200 billion per year (with at least $30 billion per year to developing countries by 2030).

The U.S. is one of just a few countries worldwide that has not yet formally approved the CBD. While President Clinton signed the CBD in 1993, the Senate did not ratify it. Although the U.S. was on the sidelines at COP15 in late 2022, in parallel with the CBD approval of the Kunming-Montreal framework, the U.S. reiterated its support for an ambitious and transformative Global Diversity Framework, outlined in this State Department press release.

In addition to committing to conserve at least 30 percent of U.S. lands and waters by 2030, other U.S. leadership initiatives to mainstream and conserve nature that were announced or reaffirmed at that time include:

    • Conserving forests and combatting global deforestation
    • Prioritizing nature-based solutions to address climate change, nature loss, and inequity
    • Incorporating nature into national economic statistics and accounts to support decision-making
    • Recognizing and including indigenous knowledge in federal research, policy, and decision-making, including protections for the knowledge holder
    • Knowing nature with a national nature assessment that will build on the wealth of existing data, scientific evidence, and Indigenous Knowledge to create a holistic picture of America’s lands, waters, wildlife, ecosystems and the benefits they provide
    • Strengthening action for nature deprived communities by expanding access to local parks, tree canopy cover, conservation areas, open space and water-based recreation, public gardens, beaches, and waterways
    • Conserving arctic ecosystems through increased research on marine ecosystems, fisheries, and wildlife, including through co-production and co-management with Indigenous Peoples

The U.S. also spearheaded efforts to reverse the decline in biodiversity globally by advancing land and water conservation, combating drivers of nature loss, protecting species, and supporting sustainable use, while also enabling healthy and prosperous communities through sustainable development. The U.S. also affirmed its financial commitment to and support for international development assistance to protect biodiversity. Additionally, the U.S. made major policy and financial commitments to protect oceans and advance marine conservation and a sustainable ocean economy.

Of particular importance, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to advancing science-based decision making and its support for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.

Most recently, the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communique issued at the close of their meeting on May 20 on the cusp of International Biodiversity Day, affirmed that G7 leadership (including the U.S.) welcomed “the adoption of the historic Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, which is fundamental to human well-being, a healthy planet and economic prosperity, and commit to its swift and full implementation and to achievement of each of its goals and targets.”
G7 leadership also reaffirmed their commitment “to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025,” and “to supporting and advancing a transition to nature positive economies.” Notably, they also pressed companies to do so as well while at the same time voicing support for TNFD’s market framework for corporate nature related disclosures:

“We call on businesses to progressively reduce negative and increase positive impacts on biodiversity. We look forward to the publication of the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures’ (TNFD’s) market framework and urge market participants, governments and regulators to support its development.”

Similarly, multilateral development banks (MDBs) were urged by the leaders of G7 to increase their support for biodiversity by leveraging financial resources from all sources and “deploying a full suite of instruments.”

Increasing Focus On Biodiversity By The Financial Sector

The financial sector has taken note of the growing international support for biodiversity conservation and protection. A 2023 study by PwC found that “55% of global GDP—equivalent to about US $58 trillion—is moderately or highly dependent on nature.” In its report The Economic Case for Nature, the World Bank found that a partial collapse of ecosystem services would cost 2.3 percent of global GDP ($2.7 trillion) in 2030. Conversely, the report found that implementing policies beneficial to nature and biodiversity conservation (including achieving the “30×30” goal subsequently approved by the CBD in the Kunming-Montreal framework and by Executive Order in the U.S.) could result in a substantial increase in global real GDP by 2030.

According to a 2020 report by the World Economic Forum, protecting nature and increasing biodiversity could generate business opportunities of $10 trillion a year and create nearly 400 million new jobs by 2030. Given this economic potential, it comes as no surprise that a growing number of investors are focusing on deploying capital for nature-based opportunities, and trying to assess whether and to what extent companies are susceptible to biodiversity related risks.

Toward those ends, the financial sector has been monitoring and supporting the development of TNFD’s market framework for nature related disclosures that was most recently endorsed by G7. That private global effort was launched in 2021 in response to the growing need to factor nature into financial and business decisions. The fourth and final beta version was issued in March 2023:

“The TNFD is a market-led, science-based and government supported initiative to help respond to this imperative. The Taskforce is nearing the end of its two-year framework design and development phase to provide market participants with a risk management and disclosure framework to identify, assess, respond and, where appropriate, disclose their nature-related issues. The TNFD framework, including TCFD-aligned recommended disclosures, will be published in September 2023 ready for market adoption.”

While the TNFD framework is not legally binding, the final version will be coming on line just in time for use as a guide for compliance with the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which was effective in April 2023. It will require a substantial number of European companies and others operating in the EU, to start making disclosures regarding biodiversity and nature in coming years.

One of the more significant catalysts for investment in the protection of biodiversity and nature was the establishment of the Natural Capital Investment Alliance as part of the United Kingdom’s Sustainable Markets Initiative announced in 2020 and the Terra Carta sustainability charter launched by King Charles a year later. The Alliance is a public/private venture that aims to invest $10 billion in natural capital assets. Speaking at the One Planet Summit on biodiversity where the Alliance was announced in January 2021, King Charles stated “… I have created a Natural Capital Investment Alliance to help us arrive at a common language on Natural Capital Investment so that we can start putting money to work and improve the flow of capital.”

According to research by Environmental Finance, total assets held in thematic biodiversity funds more than tripled in 2022, and it is anticipated that momentum and growth will accelerate in response to COP 15 in December 2023, and approval of the Kunming-Montreal framework.

Positioning Biodiversity As A Unifying Concept

While biodiversity is not replacing ESG, it is gaining more attention within the broader ESG framework. Biodiversity conservation is supported by a vast body of scientific research and has a broad consensus among stakeholders. Many companies are incorporating biodiversity considerations into their sustainability strategies, and setting goals for conservation, habitat restoration, and responsible land use. Investors are also factoring biodiversity into their decision-making processes, looking for companies that demonstrate strong biodiversity conservation efforts.

Given the universal importance of biodiversity, it can serve as a focal point for mutual understanding for stakeholders with varying perspectives. Biodiversity conservation provides a unifying language that encourages collaborative efforts towards shared goals of environmental stewardship and the preservation of natural resources. Protection against biodiversity loss is not an ideological issue. To the contrary, it is fundamental, practical, and existential: the need to preserve the natural systems that support life on Earth. Emphasizing the importance of biodiversity shifts the focus to concrete and tangible actions required globally and locally, such as species preservation, and ecosystem protection, which can garner broader support and participation and help bridge political divides.

While biodiversity protection is by no means a panacea, there are further steps that can be taken to capitalize on its unique attributes and appeal that can improve the potential for biodiversity to serve as a unifying concept that can help reduce the current political polarization in the U.S. over ESG and promote more constructive dialogue around sustainability:

    • Universal concern – Biodiversity loss affects every individual and society, regardless of political affiliation. It is a shared concern that is oblivious to political boundaries, as the preservation of nature’s diversity is vital for the well-being of all life on Earth. By emphasizing biodiversity as a unifying concept, stakeholders can find mutuality and work together towards its conservation.
    • Inclusivity – Biodiversity requires inclusive engagement by diverse stakeholders and technical and scientific support from local communities, indigenous groups, governments, businesses, civil society organizations and the public. Such engagement fosters dialogue, understanding, and collaboration, breaking down political barriers.
    • Tangible and relatable – Biodiversity is a concrete and tangible concept that people can relate to, unlike some of the more complex ESG concepts, like Scope 3 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and Net Zero. It encompasses the variety of species, ecosystems, and genetic diversity, which are easily understandable and relatable to everyday experiences. This relatability can bridge political divides and foster broader support for conservation efforts.
    • Interconnectedness – Biodiversity underscores the interconnectedness of ecosystems and species emphasizing that actions in one area can have cascading far-reaching consequences on others, including ecological, social, and economic effects. Recognizing this interconnectedness can encourage stakeholders to collaborate across sectors and ideologies to address biodiversity loss collectively.
    • Co-benefits and shared values – Biodiversity conservation often aligns with other societal values and goals, such as climate change mitigation, sustainable development, and human well-being. By emphasizing the co-benefits that arise from biodiversity conservation, such as ecosystem services and resilience, stakeholders can rally around shared values and work towards a common vision.
    • Economic implications – Biodiversity loss can have significant economic implications for industries like agriculture, tourism, and pharmaceuticals. It can also have impacts on supply chains and market access. Recognizing the economic value of biodiversity and the potential risks associated with its decline can bring together diverse stakeholders, including businesses and investors, who recognize the importance of integrating biodiversity considerations into their strategies and decision-making processes.
    • Science-based approach – Biodiversity conservation relies on scientific knowledge and research. Emphasizing the scientific evidence on the importance of biodiversity helps build consensus and transcends political biases, providing a foundation for constructive discussions.
    • Local and global perspectives – Biodiversity conservation is relevant at both local and global scales. It allows for discussions that incorporate local knowledge, values, and practices, while recognizing the need for global cooperation to address biodiversity loss and protect shared resources.

To leverage biodiversity as a unifying concept, it is crucial to promote open dialogue, knowledge sharing, and collaboration. Stakeholders should engage in inclusive decision-making processes that respect diverse perspectives and prioritize equitable and sustainable outcomes.

Takeaways

Biodiversity is emerging as a potential unifying concept that can help mitigate the political polarization surrounding the term ESG. While ESG has become a politically charged and debated topic, biodiversity is widely recognized as a critical aspect of environmental sustainability and has broad support across different stakeholders.

By focusing on biodiversity, stakeholders can find common ground in recognizing the importance of preserving nature’s diversity and ensuring the long-term sustainability of ecosystems. Biodiversity loss is a global challenge that affects everyone, irrespective of political affiliation, and it is increasingly acknowledged as a pressing issue by scientists, policymakers, businesses, and communities.

It is important to note that while biodiversity can be a unifying concept, there will still be debates and differing opinions on specific approaches and trade-offs involved in biodiversity conservation. Different stakeholders may have differing priorities, perspectives, and proposed means and methods to address biodiversity loss. The complexity of biodiversity issues, such as balancing conservation with economic development or navigating conflicts between different stakeholder interests, requires careful consideration and dialogue.

© 2023 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

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Biden Administration Initiates Ocean Justice Strategy

On June 8, 2023, the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), on behalf of the Ocean Policy Committee (OPC), announced the development of a new “Ocean Justice Strategy.” This federal government-wide initiative marks the latest in a long series of Biden administration efforts to promote environmental justice (EJ). The first step is a request for public input through July 24, 2023.

Overview

    • Per CEQ, the Ocean Justice Strategy aims to identify barriers and opportunities to incorporate environmental justice principles into the federal government’s ocean-related activities. It will encompass all recent Biden administration Executive Orders and policies relating to environmental justice, including the Ocean Climate Action Plan. The Strategy will serve as a guide to the federal government’s objectives for guiding “ocean justice” activities. It will propose “equitable and just practices to advance safety, health, and prosperity for communities residing near the ocean, the coasts, and the Great Lakes.”
    • The OPC, a Congressionally-created office dedicated to developing federal ocean policy, will draft the Ocean Justice Strategy with input from stakeholders, including Tribes, state and local governments, the private sector, and the public.
    • The Biden Administration previewed its support for ocean justice last year when it announced a commitment to extending environmental justice efforts to coastal and marine contexts. NOAA Fisheries followed suit by releasing its first-ever Equity and Environmental Justice Strategy, which puts equity and environmental justice at the forefront of their effort to steward the nation’s ocean resources and habitats.
    • The Strategy and its underlying EJ-based principles could lead to future policy changes, including for industries such as offshore energy, real estate, shipping, ports, and fisheries. This new effort is somewhat unique among EJ initiatives in that it targets activities that inherently occur along the nation’s coasts or far away from communities. The Strategy could emerge in a variety of directions, from identifying favored or disfavored ocean-based activities to layering additional processes for certain types of proposed projects.

Request for Public Input

OPC seeks public input on the following topics to develop the Ocean Justice Policy:

    • Definitions (namely, what is “ocean justice”)
    • Barriers to ocean justice
    • Opportunities for ocean justice
    • Research and knowledge gaps
    • Tools and practices (e.g., how to use existing tools such as CEJST, EJScreen, and EnviroAtla, in addition to developing new tools)
    • Partnerships and collaboration with external stakeholders
    • Any additional considerations

In addition to these comments, OPC will consider comments submitted in response to its previous request for information on the Ocean Climate Action Plan to inform the development of the Ocean Justice Strategy.

© 2023 Beveridge & Diamond PC

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Investigation Spurs Launch of Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recently announced the launch of a new Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force. The DOJ’s announcement, on May 11, 2023, coincided with its announcement of the grand jury indictments of two individuals in Puerto Rico who are accused of committing environmental crimes between 2020 and 2022.

As noted by the DOJ, its formation of the Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force also comes one year after the Department’s formation of an Office of Environmental Justice within its Environment and Natural Resources Division. This suggests that the DOJ is engaging in a long-term strategy to combat environmental crime, with particular emphasis on combating environmental crime in Puerto Rico and the USVI.

For companies and individuals doing business in Puerto Rico and the USVI, this is cause for concern. Even compliance won’t necessarily prevent an investigation; and, in the event of an investigation, insufficient documentation of compliance can present risks regardless of the underlying facts at hand. As a result, companies and individuals doing business on the islands need to prioritize environmental compliance (and adequately documenting their compliance), and they need to have strategies in place to deal effectively with the DOJ’s Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force if necessary.

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. By announcing the formation of its new task force on the same date that it announced two grand jury indictments, it is also sending a clear message that it will not hesitate to pursue criminal charges when warranted.

The DOJ’s Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force: An Overview

To be prepared to deal with the DOJ’s Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force, companies and individuals doing business on the islands need to have a clear understanding of the task force’s composition and law enforcement priorities. Here is an overview of what we know so far:

Federal Agencies with Personnel on the DOJ’s Task Force

While the Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force falls under the DOJ’s law enforcement umbrella, it includes personnel from several federal agencies. Each of these agencies is likely to have its own set of enforcement priorities—setting the stage for wide-ranging investigations in Puerto Rico and the USVI.

As identified by the DOJ, the federal agencies with personnel on the Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force include:

  • Army Criminal Investigation Division (Army CID)
  • Army Corps of Engineers
  • Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General (DOA OIG)
  • Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General (DOC OIG)
  • Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Investigations (DHS HSI)
  • Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG)
  • Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division (EPA CID)
  • Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General (EPA OIG)
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  • Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigations (FDA OCI)
  • Housing and Urban Development Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG)
  • IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS CI)
  • National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Law Enforcement (NOAA OLE)
  • U.S. Coast Guard – Sector San Juan (USCG San Juan)
  • U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service (USCG IS)
  • U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)

The DOJ’s press release announcing the formation of the task force also notes that its personnel will work closely with local authorities on both islands. This includes the Puerto Rico Department of Natural Resources, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, U.S. Virgin Islands Department of Planning and Natural Resources, and U.S. Virgin Islands Attorney General’s Office.

The Task Force’s Enforcement Priorities in Puerto Rico and the USVI

The DOJ’s press release also identifies several areas of enforcement that are priorities for the Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Environmental Crimes Task Force. As of the date of its launch, the task force’s priorities will include:

  • Air and water quality violations involving agriculture, construction, transportation, and other industries
  • Fraud, waste, and abuse affecting government programs (including, but not limited to, EPA programs)
  • Harm to wetlands, navigable waters, and wildlife (including harm caused by pesticide misuse)
  • Hazardous material spills and transportation violations
  • Marine environmental violations and harm to federal marine resources
  • Public corruption involving environmental compliance and risks
  • Violations involving medications, foods, cosmetics, and other biological products
  • Violations involving workplace and housing conditions affecting residents working in the islands’ protected environments

As you can see, not all of these violations are strictly related to environmental compliance. This reflects the task force’s composition as well as the DOJ’s general disposition to investigate and prosecute all crimes, regardless of the impetus for a particular inquiry. Environmental crime investigations in Puerto Rico and the USVI will present risks for conspiracy, money laundering, tax evasion, wire fraud, and other federal criminal charges as well—and targeted companies and individuals could potentially face these charges even if they are ultimately cleared of any alleged environmental law violations.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2023
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