Category: Environmental Law

United Nations: A Renewed Focus on Climate Change This Week in New York

Covington BUrling Law Firm

Regardless of your perspective on the subject, expect significantly increasing media and public attention around climate change and greenhouse gas emissions this week.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, is convening a Climate Summit on Tuesday in conjunction with the meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York.  More than 120 world leaders are expected to attend this gathering, making it significant and historic to have so much focus on this issue.  The Climate Summit prompted activists to put together a People’s Climate March on Sunday calling for action by the assembled world leaders.  Hundreds of thousands of people reportedly joined the march in New York — creating media and popular momentum– and demonstrations also occurred in cities around the world.

This focus on climate change has come to be known as Climate Week in New York City.  One of the most notable features of it is the role that businesses are playing in promoting private sector innovation for clean energy solutions, accounting for their climate-related activities, and even advocating for clearer governmental climate emissions policies.  The week is filled with dozens of meetings and forums featuring such business approaches.  Today, for example, Apple’s CEO Tim Cook will be joining Climate Week opening day events to discuss his company’s approach, and dozens of CEOs will be attending a Private Sector Forum tomorrow at the UN.  These meetings include financial firms and investors, as well as greenhouse gas emitters.  The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) will be at the New York Stock Exchange on Tuesday to release its annual survey of company reporting on carbon emissions, showing that some 70% of the S&P 500 companies voluntarily report on their carbon emissions.  Several major companies are expected to announce commitments to power 100% of their operations from renewable energy.

The business discussions in New York will increasingly center on a call for companies to put an internal price on carbon, as a complement to efforts to have governments establish regulatory mechanisms — such as emissions limits or trading schemes — that likewise impose such a price.  A carbon price is believed to sharpen the business focus on climate change risks, costs and opportunities.  The UN Global Compact and the World Bank are promoting leadership criteria for companies based on such reporting.  Indeed, a just released report  from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) shows that some 150 companies have developed internal carbon pricing schemes.  It would not be surprising for calls for company pricing policies to increasingly appear in future shareholder resolutions.

This increasing private sector focus complements the accelerating pace of the official UN negotiations.  Interestingly, the Climate Summit is merely an effort by the Secretary General to enhance the focus on the climate treaty negotiations, which are happening elsewhere.  The next step is the annual meeting of the parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Lima, Peru in early December to continue with drafting a framework.  Countries will then submit emissions reduction commitments in the Spring, with an effort  to reach a global agreement at the Paris meeting of the parties in December 2015.  Yesterday, the Major Economies Forum of the largest nations met to tackle these issues and discuss next steps to accomplish such an agreement.  Several observers see this meeting as a demonstration of the increasing importance of this issue, as for the first time that meeting consisted of country Foreign Ministers (Secretary of State Kerry attended) rather than simply energy or environmental officials.  Issues around addressing the growing emissions from rapidly developing economies, such as China and India — which currently sit outside of the existing UN framework — remain central to the ultimate success of this endeavor.

Key to the United States’ position are the significant emissions reductions that would be derived from the Environmental Protection Agency’s recently proposed rules for existing power plants. They are a central piece in fulfilling the President’s international pledge in 2009 that the United States would reduce its carbon emissions by 17% by the year 2020.  The President’s speech this week will be important in setting a trajectory for how much further the United States may be willing to go after 2020.

The UN’s chief climate change official, Christian Figueres, speaking at a small gathering yesterday, regards the week’s activities as an indication that the climate issue may be reaching a tipping point.  She characterizes the public demonstrations as a statement that the nations of the world “must” address climate change, the business actions as a demonstration that governments “can” address climate change, and believes that governmental leaders are now poised to assert that they “will” address it.  While the outcomes may not be fully settled for some time, companies can expect to see a renewed public focus on these issues and will likely find that they present a range of increasing risks and opportunities.

ARTICLE BY

Gary S. Guzy
OF
Covington & Burling LLP
© 2014 Covington & Burling LLP

Report on State Preparedness to Implement EPA Clean Power Plan

Analysis_Group_logo_1200x900px

States are well positioned to implement the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan, according to a new study conducted by Analysis Group Senior Advisor Susan Tierney and Vice Presidents Paul Hibbard and Andrea Okie. The report, “EPA’s Clean Power Plan: States’ Tools for Reducing Costs & Increasing Benefits to Consumers,”is based on a careful analysis of states that already have experience regulating carbon pollution. It finds that those states’ economies have seen net increases in economic output and jobs. “Several states have already put a price on carbon dioxide pollution, and their economies are doing fine. The bottom line: the economy can handle – and actually benefit from – these rules,” said Dr. Tierney.

The EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan would regulate carbon emissions from existing fossil-fueled power plants using EPA’s existing authority under the Clean Air Act. The draft rules, due to be finalized next year, allow a variety of market-based and other approaches states can choose from to cut greenhouse gas emissions from power plants.

The Analysis Group team analyzed the carbon-control rules already in place in several states to see what insights they might hold for the success of the national rule. The report was based on states’ existing track records, rather than projecting costs and benefits that might be expected under the Clean Power Plan. The report, funded by the Energy Foundation and the Merck Family Fund, was released at the summer conference of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) in Dallas, Texas.

Read the report

ARTICLE BY

Susan F. Tierney, PhD
Paul J. Hibbard
Andrea Okie
 
OF
Analysis Group, Inc.

Energy and Environmental Law Update: Week of 8/25/2014

Mintz Levin Law Firm

Now that summer is drawing to a close, let’s check in on one important bill that lost momentum just as the summer was beginning. Remember the Senate Finance Committee’s tax extenders package (S. 2260), which the committee marked up on a bipartisan basis in mid-May? The one that was poised to pass the Senate but that surprisingly failed to reach cloture after Senate leadership blocked Republican amendments on the bill? At the time, congressional staff and lobbyists—and even Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) —suggested that the extenders package would come up again in the lame duck session after the November election. The House was not expected to vote on an extenders package before then anyway, so the Senate delay would not really impact the timing of final passage of this two-year extension of more than 50 tax provisions.

Well, that was then. Today, almost two months before the mid-term elections, the future of the clean energy provisions in an extenders package—particularly the production tax credit (PTC) and investment tax credit in lieu of the PTC—depends a great deal on which party wins control of the Senate. Republicans are more confident that they can win the necessary six seats to take back the top chamber; and if they do, they will have more leverage in the lame duck about what the contents of an extenders package would be. The $84 billion EXPIRE Act of 2014 not only extends the PTC by two years but also extends key clean energy depreciation benefits and tax credits, including a $1-per-gallon credit for biodiesel and a 50-cent-per-gallon credit for alternative fuels. Senate Democrats strongly support the clean energy provisions. Certain Republicans, such as Chuck Grassley (R-IA), remain staunch supporters of the PTC and biodiesel credits, but many other Republicans are eager to eliminate or scale back the PTC and other clean energy provisions. If Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) learns he will be chairman of the Finance Committee next year in a Republican chamber, he has less of an incentive to work with current Chairman Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Democrats during the lame duck session. He can simply hold out and put forward his own extenders bill next year with popular provisions like the research and experimentation (R&D) credit and without clean energy incentives.

The extension of a handful of relatively popular and less controversial business and individual extenders such as the R&D credit and bonus depreciation are more assured. House Republicans, as part of a “tax-reform-lite” effort, have passed several bills making select provisions such as these permanent. For clean energy advocates, they have to cling to the more popular parts of the overall package and make sure their provisions are not trimmed away when Congress eventually takes it up. The business community, which wants many of the non-energy provisions in the EXPIRE Act extended, also must be much more vocal if the bill is to rise to the front of the agenda.

If Democrats do manage to hold onto control of the upper chamber, they very likely will be dealing with a reduced majority, and that too will give Republicans more leverage. With all the competing priorities in a very short legislative period, it will be difficult for the package to be enacted before the end of the year. Another retroactive extension in early 2015 could be possible. Congress has let the PTC lapse several times since 1992 before renewing it again. While it’s hard to avoid feeling a feeling of déjà vu when faced with another “will-they-or-won’t-they” end-of-year extension, this time also seems different. Many legislators thought the previous PTC extension would be the last one, so the stakes are high. Anti-PTC campaigns financed by conservative groups and utilities ratchets up the pressure on lawmakers. One possible way to blunt some Republican opposition would be to modify the PTC and either reduce the amount of the credit or include a deadline by which projects must complete construction—or both.

Several scenarios exist where even a change of control in the Senate would not preclude the passage of a tax extenders package. A short-term extension would give lawmakers some breathing room to debate tax reform. Some Republicans from wind-friendly states might prefer the clean energy provisions to pass under a Democratic watch rather than under Republican leadership in the new Congress. In this optimistic scenario, the lame duck session could mirror the productive session of 1980.

Ironically, election results in any one of three bio-energy and wind states–Colorado, South Dakota, and Iowa—could help decide the balance in the Senate and the fate of clean energy tax credits.

ARTICLE BY

Bryan M. Stockton
 
OF 
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

EPA Clarifies Standards for Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Assessments

Covington BUrling Law Firm

In a move designed to provide greater certainty to those purchasing, selling, or evaluating industrial or commercial properties, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)recently proposed to remove any lingering effect of ASTM International’s E1527-05, a nine-year-old industry standard practice for evaluating potentially contaminated sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

As explained in detail in our February 24, 2014 E-Alert, “Amended All Appropriate Inquiries (AAI) Rule Offers New Due Diligence Standard, Focuses on Vapor Releases,” the EPA referenced and countenanced ASTM International’s updated framework, E1527-13, as an alternative due diligence standard to ASTM E1527-05.  Issued on June 16, 2014, the Proposed Rule would clarify Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (ESA) standards by replacing ASTM E1527-05 with ASTM E1527-13.  Yet these requirements still leave significant uncertainty in the absence of more detailed guidance about how to conduct vapor intrusion evaluations.

I.  Background

International standards organization ASTM International modeled E1527-05 on the EPA’s All Appropriate Inquiries (AAI) Rule in 2005.  The AAI Rule is a due diligence standard that allows buyers of potentially contaminated properties who conduct an investigation meeting the rule’s requirements to preserve certain defenses to federal cleanup liability under CERCLA when conducting Phase I ESAs.  See 40 C.F.R. § 312 (2013).  The ASTM E1527-05 framework was developed to provide guidance for such investigations, and instructed would-be purchasers to undertake all appropriate inquiries regarding the condition of a property before completing its sale.  Any buyer who conducted such inquiries in compliance with ASTM E1527-05 could then qualify for certain landowner liability protections under CERCLA, including the innocent landowner, bona fide prospective purchaser, and contiguous property owner defenses.

Last December, the EPA amended the AAI Rule to allow a purchaser to satisfy Phase I ESA requirements by following either ASTM E1527-05 or ASTM E1527-13.  See 78 Fed. Reg. 79319 (Dec. 30, 2013).  As explained in our February 24, 2014 E-Alert, the 2013 framework included new regulatory file review requirements, updated definitions of certain key terms, including “de minimis condition,” “release,” “Recognized Environmental Condition,” and “Historical Recognized Environmental Condition,” and expanded ASTM E1527-05’s definition of “migrate/migration” to include vapor migrations.

II.  Proposed Rule

The EPA amended the AAI Rule through direct final rulemaking, an approach whereby an agency publishes a rule and a notice of proposed rulemaking simultaneously because it expects that the rule will prove non-controversial.  But the move nonetheless introduced confusion because in endorsing both ASTM E1527-05 and ASTM E1527-13, it recognized two distinct standards.

Responding to that criticism, the EPA has now proposed to replace ASTM E1527-05 with ASTM E1527-13 for purposes of the AAI rule so as “to reduce any confusion associated with the regulatory reference to a historical standard” and “promote the use of the standard currently recognized by ASTM International as the consensus-based, good customary business standard.”  Amendment to Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 79 Fed. Reg. 34480 (proposed June 16, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 312), at 11.  Besides removing all references to ASTM E1527-05, the Proposed Rule would not alter the substance of the AAI Rule.

III.  Implications

ASTM E1527-13 incorporates new language about the need to evaluate soil vapor risk when conducting Phase I ESAs.  Soil vapor intrusion is of particular focus with respect to TCE and other volatile organic compounds, but can also involve other contaminants.  The EPA has suggested, however, that a vapor intrusion evaluation may already have been required under ASTM E1527-05.  In its preamble to the rule offering ASTM E1527-13 as a new due diligence standard, the agency stated that it “in its view, vapor migration has always been a relevant potential source of release or threatened release that, depending on site-specific conditions, may warrant identification when conducting all appropriate inquires.”  78 Fed. Reg. 79319 (Dec. 30, 2013).  It is unclear, however, whether the EPA intended this statement to reflect near contemporary Phase I ESAs (conducted after ASTM E1527-13 was developed) or instead intended to suggest that the obligation has always existed.  Consequently, there may be future disputes as to whether a Phase I ESA not describing an evaluation of soil vapor intrusion actually satisfied the AAI Rule.

ASTM E1527-13 leaves open a number of key questions about vapor intrusion evaluations.  Neither ASTM E1527-13 nor the AAI Rule describes, for example, what levels in soil gas or groundwater should lead to concern or what levels would require mitigation.  The EPA and various states are developing guidance in this area to further clarify acceptable levels, how evaluations are to be conducted, whether one can evaluate risk based upon groundwater conditions alone, whether an evaluation must consider multiple lines of evidence, what vapor levels would be deemed acceptable in a residential setting, and what actions are required to mitigate risk.[1]

IV.  Conclusion

Consultants have already been transitioning toward the ASTM E1527-13 standard.  Should the Proposed Rule be adopted, ASTM E1527-05 will still satisfy the AAI Rule for properties acquired between November 1, 2005 and the effective date of the new action.  The EPA also anticipates providing for a delayed effective date of one year following any final action, to give those still using the previous framework time to complete ongoing investigations and become familiar with the updated standard.

However, it is important to recognize the potential that the EPA may claim that a failure to evaluate soil vapor, where otherwise appropriate, is a requirement under ASTM E1527-05 and not only ASTM E1527-13.  It is therefore essential that potentially-affected individuals keep current on EPA developments with respect to the evaluation of soil vapor intrusion, and obtain sound and up to date advice from environmental professionals.

[1]  See http://www.epa.gov/oswer/vaporintrusion/index.html.

ARTICLE BY

Kamila Lis
E. Donald Elliott
Theodore L. Garrett
Gary S. Guzy
Lawr
ence A. Hobel
 
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

What 2014’s Continued IPO Surge Means for Clean Tech and Renewable Energy Companies

Mintz Levin Law Firm

The year 2014 is on track to be the most active IPO marketin the United States since 2000, with the mid-year total number of IPOs topping last year’s mid-year total by more than 60%.[1] There were 222 US IPOs in 2013, with a total of $55 billion raised, and 2014 has already seen 151 US IPOs, for a total of $32 billion, completed by the mid-year mark. The year 2000 (over 400 IPOs) was the last year of a 10-year boom in US IPOs that reached its peak in 1996 (over 700 IPOs).

What does this mean for emerging energy technology andrenewables companies that might be looking to the capital markets? As of mid-year 2014, there have been six cleantech/renewables IPOs, while there were a total of seven in all of 2013. In both years, these deals have represented a relatively small percentage of total IPOs and still do not match the level of activity in the more traditional energy and oil & gas sector.  In 2014, IPOs were completed by a range of innovative companies, including Aspen Aerogels, TCP International and Opower.

Two unambiguously positive developments for clean energy in 2013 and the first half of 2014 have been the strong market for follow-on offerings and YieldCo IPOs. As was the case in 2013, several larger energy tech companies that are already public completed follow-on offerings to bolster cash for growth in 2014. Following in the footsteps of Tesla, SunEdison, First Solar, and other companies who completed secondary offerings in 2013, Jinko Solar (January 2014), Pattern NRG (May 2014), Plug Power (January and April 2014), Trina Solar (June 2014), and several other public companies capitalized on the continued receptiveness of clean-tech capital markets.

Following on successful YieldCo IPOs in 2013 (NRG Yield, Pattern Energy), there have already been three YieldCo IPOs in 2014: Abengoa Yield, NextEra Energy Partners, and, most recently, Terraform Power. The continued growth of YieldCo deals as well as the growing dollar amount of such offerings is an extremely encouraging sign for the energy and clean-tech sector as a whole, signaling a longer-term market acceptance of the ongoing changes in domestic and global energy consumption. The successful public market financings of these companies – whose strategy typically involves the purchase and operation of existing clean, energy-generating assets – should result in increased access to capital for renewable energy generation assets, as well as related technologies and services across the sector.

If the first half of this year is any indication, 2014 should prove to be a strong year for clean-tech and renewable energy companies opting to pursue the IPO path. The IPOs, follow-on offerings, and YieldCo successes that we’ve seen so far should improve the prospects for forthcoming clean-energy IPOs in the second half of 2014 and beyond.  I expect to see more renewable/clean energy companies follow the IPO route and make the most of the market’s continued receptiveness.

[1]  Please note that there will be some variance in the statistics for IPOs generally. This is because most data sets exclude extremely small initial public offerings and uniquely structured offerings that don’t match up with the more commonly understood public offering for operating companies. The data above is based on information from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2012Statistics.pdf and Renaissance Capital www.renaissancecapital.com.

ARTICLE BY:

Sahir Surmeli
OF:
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C

New Supreme Court Ruling On EPA Authority Over Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) – Little Clarification on the 111(d) Regulations

Lewis Roca Rothgerber

Last week, the United States Supreme Court issued a significant decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, that substantially restricts the authority of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permitting programs. The Supreme Court’s decision holds that EPA may not impose permitting requirements on facilities based solely on their emissions of GHGs, but may regulate GHG emissions under the PSD and Title V programs, only if a facility is otherwise subject to major source permitting requirements.

Background

EPA interpreted the Clean Air Act to require stationary sources to obtain construction and operating permits under the PSD and Title V programs whenever a facility emits GHGs above certain threshold levels. The threshold levels EPA chose were different than the levels established by Congress in the Clean Air Act, because the statutory levels when applied to GHGs were too low (as compared to criteria pollutant thresholds), and applying those levels to GHG emissions would lead to “absurd results” by subjecting millions of small sources such as shopping malls, hospitals and churches to major source permitting requirements. These thresholds were established in what is known as the “Tailoring Rule.”

The Tailoring Rule triggered regulatory review for two different source categories (for purposes of GHG emissions): sources that were already subject to major source review under the Clean Air Act because of emissions of criteria pollutants in excess of the major source thresholds (so-called “anyway” sources) and those sources that would trigger major source review for the first time based solely on emissions of GHGs in excess of the “tailored” thresholds set by EPA.

Holding

The Supreme Court’s divided 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Scalia, held that EPA’s rulemakings setting “tailored” thresholds for GHGs were invalid. The Court, however, stopped short of holding that GHGs could not be regulated at all under the PSD and Title V programs.

Specifically, the Supreme Court upheld EPA’s approach of requiring “best available control technology” (BACT) standards for GHGs for those sources otherwise required to obtain a PSD permit (the “anyway” sources). The Court emphasized, though, that it was not approving EPA’s current approach to BACT regulation of GHGs, or of any future approach that EPA might adopt. The Supreme Court categorized this aspect of the holding as having only a small impact on the regulated community, stating that 85 percent of all GHG major sources are “anyway” sources, while only an additional 3 percent would be major sources under the GHG tailoring trigger.

The Supreme Court also reaffirmed its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that GHGs qualify as an “air pollutant” for purposes of the term’s general definition in the Clean Air Act.

Takeaways and Import of This Case on 111(d) Regulations:

1)      GHG Emissions Alone Do Not Trigger Major Source Permitting Obligations – The principal legal holding of the decision is also considered the most significant from a practical perspective. Stationary sources cannot, under the Court’s ruling, be subject to permitting requirements based solely on their emissions of GHGs. The Court’s math on the number of sources impacted by this core aspect of the decision is questionable, and there is suspicion that many potentially major sources were specifically planning facilities to avoid major source permitting review by designing facilities to avoid the tailoring trigger for GHGs. In short, the impact of this decision is potentially very significant for the regulated community.

2)      Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are an “Air Pollutant” Subject to Regulation under the Clean Air Act. While the decision holds that GHGs are not an “air pollutant” for purposes of triggering PSD and Title V permitting requirements, it stops short of holding that GHGs are not an “air pollutant” for other purposes. To the contrary, the Court affirmed its prior holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, that the term “air pollutant,” as generally defined in the Clean Air Act, includes GHGs.

3)      Mixed Signals About EPA’s Authority to Issue NSPS Regulations Under 111(d). The Supreme Court was careful to note that EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions under the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)  were not at issue and did not need to be addressed (that is, the Court specifically did not address the proposed 111(d) rules).

a)      As noted above, the Supreme Court reinforced that GHGs may be regulated as an air pollutant under other aspects of the Clean Air Act (just not PSD or Title V). Though the Supreme Court found that EPA was right to determine that the statutory thresholds for major source review would lead to “absurd results” in the PSD and Title V context for major source triggers, the Court said nothing about EPA’s authority to regulate under the NSPS provisions of Section 111(d). One way to interpret the decision is that it cloaks EPA with apparent authority to address GHGs as an “air pollutant” under Section 111(d).

b)      On the other hand, the Supreme Court took a stern tone in admonishing EPA for over-stepping its bounds. As an example, the Court warns EPA: “[W]hen an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.” That statement was directed at EPA’s attempt to regulate GHGs in the PSD and Title V programs, but the same argument might be made in the 111(d) context.

Conclusion

There are still many questions to be answered surrounding the 111(d) regulations proposed by EPA. This decision clarifies the overall picture of GHG regulation slightly, but does little to provide a clear boundary on EPA’s authority over GHGs. No doubt, this decision will be cited by both those in favor and those against the 111(d) regulations.

Article By:

Adam DeVoe
Of:
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP

Threatened and Endangered Species Listings Likely to Increase Under New U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Policy

Beveridge Diamond National Law Review

On July 1, 2014, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service (both referred to herein as “FWS”) published a “Notice of Final Policy” interpreting the phrase “significant portion of its range” (“SPR”) in making listing decisions under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  79 Fed. Reg. 37578 (July 1, 2014).  Beginning on July 31, 2014, FWS will use the new SPR Policy to list entire species as “endangered” or “threatened” when the species has experienced impacts in only a fraction of its range.  Though FWS avers that new listings based on the SPR policy will be “relatively uncommon,” in practice this significantly broadened agency discretion will have far-reaching impacts for project proponents and other regulated individuals.  For example:

  • A FWS finding of threatened or endangered status in one particular area now may result in listing nationwide.  This will create new delays and restrictions for activities, ironically even more so in areas where the species is more abundant.
  • FWS has lowered its threshold for determining that a portion of range is “significant.”  No minimum percentage is specified; rather, FWS relies on any of several “biological” factors or perceived risks which are undefined and thus difficult to challenge.  In turn, FWS may find that more activities on or near newly “significant” areas present a risk warranting listing of the species in its entirety.  Conservation efforts throughout much of a species’ range also may not obviate an ESA listing if FWS finds that a single portion is significant and remains unaddressed.
  • The species’ “range” includes any area used anytime in the species’ life, even if not used regularly.  While lost historical range itself cannot be SPR, it may increase the likelihood that FWS will deem a portion of the reduced range as SPR.
  • Increased listings under the SPR Policy may result in even broader application of the FWS’ pending proposals to expand its “critical habitat” jurisdiction.

This new avenue for ESA listings comes on the heels of two recent proposals and a draft guidance document on designation of critical habitat and a court-entered settlement for FWS to remedy a backlog of hundreds of species listing determinations.  Individually or collectively, these actions demonstrate FWS’s current trajectory towards more species listings and greater species protection, with consequently increased restrictions for surrounding projects, large or small, on either public or private lands.  As a result, entities in various sectors should ensure they are actively involved in these administrative proceedings, fully understand the proposed changes, and plan their projects accordingly.

Background

FWS must list a species as “endangered” if it is found to be “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”  16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), 1533(a).   Similarly, it must list a species as “threatened” if it is “likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”  Id. §§ 1532(20), 1533(a).  But neither the statute nor regulations define what constitutes a “significant portion of [a species’] range.”  As a result, for years FWS simply interpreted that phrase on a case-by-case basis, resulting in inconsistent interpretations, confusion for the agency and the regulated community, and ultimately litigation.

FWS largely had not interpreted the SPR language in the ESA as independently operative.  The real inquiry was whether a species should be listed as endangered or threatened due to its status “throughout all” of its range.  Analysis of certain portions of a species’ range informed the agency’s broader analysis of the species’ status nationwide.  The Ninth Circuit rejected this so-called “clarification” interpretation in Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (2001), prompting FWS to reconsider its approach.

In 2011, FWS issued a draft policy to standardize its interpretation of SPR.  76 Fed. Reg. 76987 (Dec. 9, 2011).  Under the draft policy, FWS said it would consider a species threatened or endangered if it meets those respective criteria throughout either “all of its range” or only “a significant portion of its range.”  FWS took public comment on the draft and instituted it as an interim policy while it worked to develop a final policy.  Nearly three years later, FWS has issued its SPR Policy which it deems “legally binding.”

Final SPR Policy

FWS asserts that the final SPR Policy merely clarifies its interpretation of “significant portion of its range” by elaborating on the key concepts of what constitutes a species’ “range” and what portions of that range are considered “significant,” as well as explaining how application of the SPR Policy will affect the Service’s listing determinations.  Each of these “clarifications” represents a significant policy interpretation under the ESA.

Species’ “Range”

The final SPR Policy defines “range” as the general geographical area within which the species can be found at the time FWS makes a status determination for listing the species.  Thus, “range” means those areas that a species uses at some point during its life, including areas that the species does not use on a regular basis.  While historical range areas now unoccupied cannot directly be SPR to prompt a listing, the reduced range, or the causes thereof, may affect the likelihood that FWS would find remaining range portions to constitute SPR.  Id. at 37583-84.  Moreover, once a species is listed under the SPR Policy, the geographical areas effectively subject to ESA protections may grow even larger via the FWS’ proposed expansion of designated “critical habitat” for that listed species.

“Significant” Portion of Range

The SPR Policy considers a portion of a species’ range as “significant” if the species is not currently endangered or threatened throughout all of its range, but the portion’s contribution to the viability of the species is so important that, without the members in that portion, the species would be in danger of extinction, or likely to become so in the foreseeable future throughout all of its range.  This substantially lowers the threshold for “significant” compared to the draft policy, which had looked only to whether the species would be in danger of extinction without that portion of its range.  In essence, FWS now may list a species based on SPR not only when FWS finds the species is “endangered” in that SPR, but also when the species is “threatened” in that SPR.  Id. at 37578-79.

FWS will assess the “biological” significance of the portion of the species’ range using viability factors from conservation biology.  Id. at 37592.  FWS will assess whether, without the portion of range in question, the species would have an increased vulnerability to threats to the point that the overall species would become endangered  or threatened.  Id.  In that event, the portion of the range is significant and the analysis moves on to consider the threats to the species absent that range to determine whether the entire species should be listed as endangered or threatened.  Id.  FWS offers the following examples of scenarios in which it might find that a portion of a species’ range is “significant.”  Id. at 37583.

  • If the population in the remainder of the range without the SPR might not be large enough to be resilient to environmental catastrophes or random variations in conditions;
  • If the viability of the species depends on the productivity of the population in the SPR, and the population in the remainder of the range might not be able to maintain a high-enough growth rate to persist in the face of threats without that portion;
  • If without the population in the SPR, the spatial structure of the entire species could be disrupted, resulting in fragmentation that could preclude individuals from moving from degraded habitat to better habitat; or
  • If the population in the SPR contains important elements of genetic diversity without which the remaining population may not be genetically diverse enough to adapt to changing environmental conditions.

How the SPR Analysis Works

FWS provides examples and flow charts within its SPR Policy to illustrate how the analysis will work within the listing decision process.  The first inquiry is whether a species is endangered or threatened throughout its entire range; if so, the entire species is listed, and SPR is irrelevant.  Otherwise, if “substantial information” exists warranting further consideration, FWS examines whether there are any portions of the species’ range that are significant and whether the species is endangered or threatened within that area.  The two inquiries may proceed in either order.  If both conditions are met, again the entire species is listed as endangered or threatened, as appropriate.  If not, the species would not be listed at all.  FWS states that it will continue to list a valid Distinct Population Segment (“DPS”) of the species as a DPS rather than list the entire taxonomic species or subspecies based on SPR.  Id. at 37585-87.

Consequences of SPR Listing

Once FWS decides that a portion of a species’ range is significant and lists the species as endangered or threatened, ESA protections fully apply to all individuals of that species, wherever they are found – not just to the individuals of the species found within the SPR.  Therefore, questions of total range or SPR are relevant only to whether FWS decides to list the species.  Additionally, federal protection extends to all populations and individuals regardless of how the species’ range changes over time.  Thus, in effect, the SPR analysis simply provides another avenue for species listing.  Once listed, all other aspects of the Act, such as designation of critical habitat, promulgation of § 4(d) rules, the § 7 consultation process, the § 9 “take” prohibition, and recovery planning and implementation apply in the same manner that they would for species listed prior to the SPR Policy based on total range.  Id. at 37583.

On one hand, FWS attempts to minimize the impact of its SPR Policy, estimating that it “may list a few more species with important populations that are facing substantial threats.”  Id. at 37579.  FWS opines that the SPR Policy will tend to result in the same status determinations as would have been made without it, except for a few, limited situations.  Id. at 37609.  These effects may be understated.  The policy gives FWS greater latitude to make nationwide listing decisions based on individual portions of a species’ range, which are likely to lead to more targeted, case-by-case protections not otherwise available absent this Policy.  Indeed, FWS acknowledges that threats, population trends, and relative importance of species recovery often vary across the range of species, especially as recovery efforts progress.  Id. at 37610.  Yet, FWS may now make a sweeping listing decision based on a narrower look at a particular area.

At the same time, FWS affirmatively claims its SPR Policy will result in positive changes and improve conservation of species.  According to FWS, listing a species when it is endangered or threatened throughout a SPR before it is at risk throughout all of its range may allow FWS to protect and conserve species and ecosystems upon which they depend before large-scale decline occurs.  Id. at 37609.  FWS further believes the Policy will result in greater consistency, saving the agency time, money, and resources.  Id. at 37581.  Whether these benefits occur, as opposed to simply more listings, remains to be seen.

The SPR Policy will officially take effect on July 31, 2014, 30 days after its publication.

Article By:

James M. Auslander
W. Parker Moore
Sara L. Vink
Of:
Beveridge & Diamond PC

What Does Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions as Described by EPA in the “Tailoring Rule” have to do with the Clean Air Act?

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UARG v. EPA: Tailoring Rule Litigation

On June 23, 2014 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether EPA motor vehicle greenhouse gas regulations necessarily automatically triggers permitting requirements under the CAA for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases. The statements in the opinion concerning EPA’s assertions of power are quite provoking. If read carefully, this opinion launches a warning to EPA about its future regulatory actions relative to greenhouse gases. The text of the opinion can be found here. The following quotes are offered as examples of that warning.

“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the American economy,” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159, we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast “economic and political significance.” Id., at 160; See Also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); Industrial Union Dept., APL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 645-646 (1980) (plurality opinion). Slip op at 19.

“. . . in EPA’s assertion of that authority, we confront a singular situation: an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy while at the same time strenuously asserting that the authority claimed would render the statute “unrecognizable to the Congress that designed” it. “ Slip op at 20.

“We are not willing to stand on the dock and wave goodbye as EPA embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery. We reaffirm the core administrative-law principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.” Slip op at 23.

In a step wise fashion the opinion presents and answers the following:

1.  The question before the Court was “. . .whether it was permissible for EPA to determine that it motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.” Slip op at 2.

First we decide whether EPA permissibly interpreted the statute to provide that a source may be required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emissions. Slip op at 10.

“It is plain as day that the Act does not envision an elaborate, burdensome permitting process for major emitters of steam, oxygen, or other harmless airborne substances. It takes some cheek for EPA to insist that it cannot possibly give “air pollutant” a reasonable, context-appropriate meaning in the PSD and Title V context when it has been doing precisely that for decades.” Slip op at 12.

“Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.” Slip op at 14.

“In sum, there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting “any air pollutant” in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as written.” Slip op at 16.

2.  . . . we next consider the Agency’s alternative position that its interpretation was justified as an exercise of its “discretion” to adopt “a reasonable construction of the statute.” Tailoring Rule 31517. We conclude that EPA’s interpretation is not permissible.” Slip op at 16.

“EPA itself has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with – in fact, would overthrow – the Act’s structure and design.” Slip op at 17.

“A brief review of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” Slip op at 18.

3.  “We now consider whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require those sources to comply with “best available control technology” emission standards for greenhouse gases.” Slip op at 25.

“EPA argues that carbon capture is reasonably comparable to more traditional, end-of-stack BACT technologies, . . . and petitioners do not dispute that.” Slip op at 26. “. . . it has long been held that BACT cannot be used to order a fundamental redesign of the facility.” “. . . EPA has long interpreted BACT as required only for pollutants that the source itself emits; accordingly, EPA acknowledges that BACT may not be used to require “reductions in a facility’s demand for energy from the electric grid.” Slip op at 27.

“The question before us is whether EPA’s decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of the statute under Chevron. We conclude that it is.” Slip op at 27.

“We acknowledge the potential for greenhouse-gas BACT to lead to an unreasonable and unanticipated degree of regulation, and our decision should not be taken as an endorsement of all aspects of EPA’s current approach, nor as free rein for any future regulatory application of BACT in this distinct context. Our narrow holding is that nothing in the statute categorically prohibits EPA from interpreting the BACT provision to apply to greenhouse gases emitted by “anyway” sources.” Slip op at 28.

Opinion of Breyer, with whom Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Rather than exempting certain air pollutants like greenhouse gas emissions from the statute, it makes more sense to read into the statute an exemption for certain sources that were never intended to be subject to PSD.

Opinion of Alito, with whom Thomas joins, comments that Massachusetts v. EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaw with that decision.

 

The Supreme Court’s Greenhouse Gas Permitting Decision – What Does It Mean?

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The U.S. Supreme Court today partly upheld and partly rejected the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s federal Clean Air Act permitting regulations governing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from stationary sources.  The decision is mostly a victory for EPA, and its narrow scope means that it will almost certainly not disrupt, let alone invalidate, EPA’s ongoing Section 111(d) rulemaking to set GHG emission limits for existing power plants.  At the same time, the decision does not necessarily mean that EPA’s 111(d) proposal is free from legal challenge.  That is because the decision does not address 111(d).

Today’s decision concerns the Clean Air Act’s two stationary source permitting programs – the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program and the Title V program.  In 2010, EPA announced that it was including GHG emissions within the scope of both programs.  Various states and industry groups challenged that announcement, and today, the Supreme Court partly agreed and partly disagreed with the challengers.

First, five justices (Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Alito and Thomas) held that a source’s GHG emissions, standing alone, cannot trigger the obligation to undergo PSD and Title V permitting.  That part of the decision is a loss for EPA.  But the second part of the decision is a victory for the agency.  Seven justices (Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Beyer, Sotomayor and Kagan) held that EPA canrequire sources that are subject to PSD “anyway,” because they emit other types of pollutants in significantly large quantities, to control their GHG emissions.  In sum, GHG emissions cannot trigger the obligation to undergo PSD permitting, but EPA can use the PSD permitting process to impose source-specific GHG emission limits on facilities that trigger the process for other reasons.

The decision does not address EPA’s authority to impose substantive limits on GHG emissions using other statutory provisions such as Clean Air Act Section 111(d).

Article By:

Jacob Hollinger
Of:
McDermott Will & Emery

Supreme Court Decides CTS Corp. v. Waldburger Evaluating Whether CERCLA Precludes State-Law Statutes of Repose

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On June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court decided CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, holding that a North Carolina statute of repose was not preempted by Section 9658 of theComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

From 1959 until 1985, CTS Corporation manufactured electronics on a piece of property in North Carolina.  CTS sold the property in 1987.  Owners of both the former CTS property and adjacent property filed state-law nuisance claims in 2011, alleging that they had learned from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) in 2009 that their groundwater was contaminated.  A district court relied on N. C. Gen. Stat. §1-52(16), a North Carolina statute which bars property damage claims made “more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action,” to dismiss the claims, finding that CTS’s last act occurred in 1987, when the property was sold.  Relying on CERCLA Section 9658, the Fourth Circuit re-instated the nuisance claims because it concluded that CERCLA pre-empted the North Carolina statute.

The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that the North Carolina statute was not pre-empted and that CERCLA Section 9658 was limited to “statutes of limitations.”  While noting that there is common ground between “statutes of limitations,” which create “time limit[s] for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued,” and “statutes of repose,” which “put[] an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action,” “each has a distinct purpose and each is targeted at a different actor.”  The Court found that, when Congress passed Section 9658, the language it chose limited the provision to statutes of limitations.  Additionally, the Court found that CERCLA expressed neither any intent to provide “a general cause of action for all harm caused by toxic contamination” nor a clear intent to supersede traditional police powers of the states.

Two points are worth mention:

First, the CTS decision is not the “usual” CERCLA decision.  The decision does not alter the mechanism under which federal or state agencies investigate, characterize, and remediate properties.  Indeed, based on the case history, the groundwater contamination alleged in the CTS litigation was discovered by EPA in 2009, two years before CTS suit was filed.  In 2012, the involved property was added to EPA’s National Priorities List, a designation reserved for sites EPA has identified as being among its priorities.  Similarly, it does not alter the federal causes of action parties may use to recover costs related to their remediation activities.

Second, the CTS decision appears to be based on a straightforward reading of CERCLA.  The Court held that CERCLA does not preclude a state’s choice to have legislative statutes of repose which apply to certain categories of tort cases.  While a few states have these, the majority of states do not.[1]  Each of the federal environmental statutes – to a degree – seeks to shape state action.  There is no indication in CERCLA that it intended to “trump” state ability to form independent tort-related law for any situation related to contamination.  Had it been Congress’s intent to supersede all state statutes of repose related to actions related to contamination, Congress could have done so.  In the Court’s view anyway, the language Congress chose did not do so here.

Article By:

J. Michael Showalter
Of:
Schiff Hardin LLP

[1] States with statutes of repose which were identified in the course of the CTS litigation include Connecticut, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584; Kansas, see Kan. Stat. § 60-513(b); North Carolinia, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); and Oregon, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115(1).  Alabama has a 20-year common-law statute of repose.  See, e.g., Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1225) (S.D. Ala. 2009).