FDA Flunks Mylan’s India Facilities, Finds cGMP Violations

When we open our medicine cabinet, we take for granted that the drugs we find there are safe and properly labeled. Many physicians privately worry, however, about the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs.

About 85% of the prescription drugs sold in the United States are manufactured offshore. Many of those offshore drugs are made by generic companies, foreign contract manufacturing companies and sometimes, offshore facilities owned by the so-called “big pharma” manufacturers themselves. Wherever manufactured, drugs distributed in the United States must meet certain current good manufacturing practices or cGMP standards.

Recently the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began ramping up inspections of offshore manufacturing facilities and the results are shocking. Although cGMP violations have been found worldwide, experts are particularly worried about drugs made in China and India.

Earlier this month the FDA cited three facilities in Bangalore, India that manufacture drugs for Mylan. Headquartered in the U.K., Mylan is the second largest generic and specialty pharmaceutical company in the world. With approximately 30,000 employees worldwide and revenues of $7.72 billion (USD), Mylan certainly qualifies as big pharma.

The FDA says it inspected three of Mylan’s Indian plants between August of 2014 and February of this year. It found “significant” cGMP violations at all three facilities.

Worse, the FDA says that in all three instances Mylan’s response to the three inspections lacked “sufficient corrective actions.”

cGMP standards are in place throughout the manufacturing process to insure the potency and quality of the finished pharmaceuticals. The FDA wants to insure that there are no contaminants in the finished product as well as insuring the finished product is neither stronger nor weaker than advertised.

As a result of the inspections, the FDA concluded a likelihood that the finished drugs from all three plants were adulterated. Those findings are certainly bad news for consumers. It’s also bad for physicians as well. It’s hard for doctors to get dosages correct or monitor for side effects if a drug has inconsistent potency or the presence of contaminants.

In the case of Mylan’s Bangalore, India facilities, the violations were numerous and included:

  • gloves and sterile gowns for use in aseptic environments had holes and tears

  • personal sanitation violations

  • clean room violations

  • discolored injection vials

  • lots with failed assays or contaminants

At least one of the facilities had similar violations dating back to a 2013 inspection.

Overall, the FDA noted, “These items found at three different sites, together with other deficiencies found by our investigators, raise questions about the ability of your current corporate quality system to achieve overall compliance with CGMP. Furthermore, several violations are recurrent and long-standing.”

The FDA declared that continued noncompliance could result in drugs from these facilities being blocked from importation and distribution within the United States.

Mylan has had previous problems with U.S. regulators. In 2000 Mylan paid a $147 million fine to settle charges that the company raised the price of generic lorazepam by 2,6000% and generic clorazepate by 3,200%. The FTC had charged that the company raised the price of lorazepam, the generic equivalent of the brand name antianxiety medication Ativan, from $7 per bottle to $190. Although Mylan agreed to the payment of the fine, it denied any wrongdoing.

Only the FDA can punish drug companies for cGMP violations but if there is proof of an adulterated product entering the commerce stream, the federal False Claims Act can come into play. That law allows private individuals to file a lawsuit against a wrongdoer and receive a percentage of whatever is recovered by the government. Last year the Justice Department paid $635 million in whistleblower awards under the False Claims Act.

Whistleblowers in cGMP cases have received tens of millions of dollars. Dinesh Thakur, a former Ranbaxy executive, received $48 million for information about adulterated generic drugs.

To qualify for a whistleblower award, one must possess inside, “original source” information about a cGMP violation resulting in an adulterated drug or under / over potency medication being approved for sale by Medicaid, Medicare or Tricare. (Most drugs are approved.)

While we believe that contaminated drugs are relatively rare, industry sources tell us that potency issues are rampant. That means the drugs in your medicine cabinet may have little or no active ingredients.

Article By Brian Mahany of Mahany Law

© Copyright 2015 Mahany Law

Oklahoma and Nebraska Challenge Colorado’s Amendment 64: Legalized Marijuana

In 2012, Colorado was the first state to legalize recreational marijuana with Amendment 64.  While this has made Pizza Franchisors happy and sent snack sales through the roof, it has also created controversy and unintended consequences.  The entire country has watched Colorado sort through these issues, curious to see how things will land, how much people really want to get high, and most of all, exactly how much money is there to be made?  Along with these practical issues and enforcement questions, several legal issues have come into play as marijuana legalization—and its conflict with federal law—has changed the landscape.  Perhaps most significantly are the legal challenges to Colorado’s statute in front of the Supreme Court.

Colorado’s Amendment 64 changed the State Constitution to allow for recreational use of marijuana. According to the law, Adults 21 or older can grow up to six cannabis plants, with 3 being mature at a time, and legally possess all the cannabis from those plants.  Adults may also travel with up to one ounce of marijuana while traveling, and gift up to one ounce to other adults 21 or over.  Consumption is regulated like alcohol.  The sale and growth of marijuana is regulated by the state, with licenses available for both growers and retail outlets.

The Attorney Generals’ of neighboring states Oklahoma and Nebraska, Scott Pruitt and Jon Bruning, respectively, have sued Colorado.  The complaint cites Colorado for creating a “scheme” that “frustrates the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate controlled-substances market, and is particularly burdensome for neighboring states [Oklahoma and Nebraska] . . . States where law enforcement agencies and the citizens have endured the substantial expansion of Colorado marijuana.”  Colorado’s Attorney General, John Suthers, was against marijuana legalization when it was being debated, but now he is tasked with defending the state’s controversial measure.

Oklahoma and Nebraska take issue with Colorado’s failure to take steps to prevent the drug from leaving the state.  In particular, the complaint takes issue with Colorado not requiring patrons to smoke or eat the marijuana where they purchase it, or tracking marijuana once it is sold, or requiring a background check on purchasers.  The law, in fact, only requires a driver’s license that says you are 21 to purchase the drug.  Colorado has no effective way, according to the complaint, to stop “criminal enterprises, gangs and cartels from acquiring marijuana inventory directly from retail marijuana stores.”

Concerns about a black market exist, and how the law might be creating gray areas in how pot is sold and cultivated.  A CNBC documentary “Marijuana Country: The Cannabis Boom” examines some of these issues.  Cameras follow two pot dealers as they show how loopholes in the law allow them to profit from their excess marijuana, grown legally, in a gray market heavy with craigslist postings and terminology—he is a caregiver, not a dealer, and he gifts the marijuana and receives gifts of cash in return.  It’s easy to see how this gray area doesn’t stop at the state line.

In fact, law enforcement officials from counties neighboring the Colorado border say they are seeing more Colorado marijuana, some of it still in the retail packaging, flow into their counties.  The strained jail budgets in these counties are a result of the increased enforcement costs—more impounded vehicles, more arrests and higher costs all around because of the pot coming down the highway.  Colorado AG John Suthers says 40 states have contacted his office regarding marijuana seized within their borders, and the Washington Post has gone so far as to call Colorado “the nation’s giant cannabis cookie jar.”

It is for these reasons that Oklahoma and Nebraska have filed their complaint.  Invoking the Constitutional provision that gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction on disputes between the states, basing their complaint on the claim to the right to have federal laws prevail over contradictory state laws under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution.  Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Coloradohas not received permission to be filed by the court.   It should be interesting to see how the case develops.  But with over 130 metric tons of marijuana sold, legally, in Colorado last year, the demand is not going away.

The court documents and the complaint are here.

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Reclassification of Hydrocodone Takes Effect This Week

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The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) published a Final Rule on August 22, 2014, which elevates hydrocodone-combination products (“HCPs”) to a Schedule II category of drugs under the Controlled Substances Act. That rule becomes effective this week – on October 6, 2014. While some hydrocodone products are already listed as Schedule II, some combination products (such as Vicodin, Norco, and Tussionex) were previously listed on the less-restrictive Schedule III. In determining whether rescheduling was necessary, the DEA considered multiple factors including the potential for abuse, likelihood of dependence, and the threat to public health posed by the drug.

How does the new rule affect prescribers?

According to DEA, HCPs prescriptions issued prior to October 6, 2014 and authorized to be filled or refilled may be dispensed if such dispensing occurs before April 8, 2015. In some cases, pharmacy dispensing software products may not be able to process existing refills starting on October 6, or pharmacies may simply choose not to dispense refills after the effective date.

Pursuant to the Final Rule, HCPs prescriptions written on or after October 6, may not be refilled. No refills are allowed by any practitioner for Schedule II controlled substances and Schedule II prescriptions may only be given for maximum of a 30-day supply. Commentators to the proposed rule worried that rescheduling would result in more trips to the doctor to receive appropriate pain control. In response to these concerns, the DEA noted in the Final Rule that prescribers may issue multiple prescriptions authorizing patients to receive up to a 90-day supply, provided certain regulatory requirements (established in 21 CFR 1306.12) are met.

Prescription Bottle of Pills Spilled on Table

In addition, in Kentucky, Schedule II controlled substance prescriptions may not be faxed or called in to a pharmacy except as provided for in 902 KAR 55:095. Schedule II controlled substance prescriptions that are electronically prescribed must use a system that has been audited for compliance with the regulations specified in 21 CFR 1311. Further, Schedule II controlled substance prescriptions are valid for 60 days from the date written and controlled substance prescriptions must be signed and dated on the date issued by the prescriber.

Kentucky prescribers should be aware that restrictions on prescribing existing Schedule II pure hydrocodone products remain under current Kentucky statutes and regulations because these products were not rescheduled to Schedule II.

Midlevel providers who operate under collaborative agreements or are limited in their ability to prescribe certain Schedules of medications may be particularly affected by the Final Rule. In Kentucky, KRS 314.011, Section 8 (a) limits APRN prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances to a 72 hour supply with no refills, except certified psychiatric-mental health nurses are permitted to prescribe up to a 30-day supply of a Schedule II psychostimulant with no refills. KRS 314.011, Section 8 (b) limits APRN prescribing of Schedule III controlled substances to a 30-day supply with no refills. Because KRS 314.011, Section 8 (b) was in effect March 19, 2013, all APRNs will continue to be permitted to prescribe a 30-day supply of Schedule II hydrocodone combination products if allowed under their DEA license.

Even if the Final Rule does not specifically affect a prescriber’s abilities, prescribers should be prepared to work with pharmacies in order to minimize dispensing disruptions after the effective date. They should also identify and inform patients who are currently receiving HCPs about the rescheduling and, if necessary, discuss alternative pain management options. And, as prescribers well know, any new regulatory framework also brings with it the expectation of greater scrutiny and oversight in the future from regulatory authorities and law enforcement agencies.

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First Written Decision Pertaining to Pharmaceuticals

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Practitioners monitoring the use of inter partes review (IPR) proceedings to challenge pharmaceutical patents may want to note what appears to be a pair of first-time events.  The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) recently issued the first Final Written Decision in an IPR proceeding involving a pharmaceutical-related patent. In addition, the first petition for covered business method review challenging an Orange Book-listed patent for a marketed drug was recently filed.

On June 20, 2014, the PTAB issued Final Written Decisions in four related IPR proceedings (IPR2013-00116IPR2013-00117IPR2013-118; and IPR2013-00119)  involving U.S. Patent Nos.  5,997,915; 6,011,040; 6,673,381; and 7,172,778, respectively. The patents generally disclose compositions for supplementing dietary folate and the challenged claims were directed to compositions comprising natural isomers of reduced folates and corresponding methods of using such compositions.  Petitioner Gnosis SpA initiated the IPR proceedings after it was sued for infringement of the patents by a group of plaintiffs including Merck KGaA (licensee of three of the patents) and Merck & Cie (owner of the remaining patent).  The decision to challenge the patents in an IPR proceeding was a successful one for Gnosis as the PTAB found all of the challenged claims to be unpatentable, holding that certain claims were anticipated and the remaining claims were obvious.

Several days later, on June 24, 2014, Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLCPar Pharmaceutical, Inc., and Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (Petitioners) filed a petition for covered business method of a patent listed in the Food and Drug Administration’s Orange Book for the prescription drug product Xyrem®, which is marketed by Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,895,059, generally discloses methods for controlling the distribution of, and access to, hazardous or abuse-prone drugs and the challenged claims are directed to “[a] computerized method of distributing a prescription drug under the exclusive control of an exclusive central pharmacy.”

Each of the Petitioners had previously filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application with the Food and Drug Administration seeking approval of a generic version of Xylem and been sued by Jazz for infringement of several Orange Book-listed patents including U.S. Patent No. 7,895,059. In their petition for covered business method review, the Petitioners asserted that the challenged method claims involve the verification of an insurance payment for the drug and therefore are related to a “financial product or service” (a requirement for covered business method review). Should the PTAB accept this argument and grant the petition, that determination could potentially encourage others to file petitions for covered business method review of additional Orange Book-listed patents containing similar “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS)”-type claims.

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Making Use of Social Media: FDA Releases Two Draft Guidelines on the Use of Social Media Platforms by Drug and Device Manufacturers

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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has released two long-awaited draft guidance documents for the drug and device industries revolving around the use of social media platforms by drug and device manufacturers — Internet/Social Media Platforms: Correcting Independent Third Party Misinformation About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (“Guidance on Correcting Third Party Misinterpretation”), and Internet/Social Media Platforms with Character Space Limitations – Presenting Risk and Benefit Information for Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (“Guidance on Presenting Risk/Benefit Information”).

As the titles suggest, the purpose of the documents is to clarify how social media may be utilized by drug and medical device companies for the voluntary correction of misinformation provided by independent third parties, as well as for presenting promotional messaging regarding risk/benefit information of products. But while the guidelines provide helpful clarification regarding how such platforms may be utilized, they each also raise considerations that companies should take heed of before beginning to use these outlets, and should be factored into a company’s social media guidelines.

Internet/Social Media Platforms: Correcting Independent Third Party Misinformation About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices

As an initial matter, the Guidance on Correcting Third Party Misinterpretation (“Draft Guidance #1”) establishes two points: first, Draft Guidance #1 only applies to misinformation posted to Internet-based platforms by an independent third party, therefore excluding content provided by the company itself, its employees and agents. Second, Draft Guidance #1 establishes that the exception to a company’s obligation to respond to or correct misinformation only applies to information that is “truly independent,” for example posted by an independent third party to an unaffiliated platform or a platform providing content that is not controlled by the company.

However, Draft Guidance #1 does not completely exclude company-operated sites. In stark contrast with the company’s obligation to correct content when that content is “owned, controlled, created …influenced or affirmatively adopted or endorsed by, or on behalf of, the firm,” where such corrections are obligatory and also carry advertising and labeling regulatory requirements, Draft Guidance #1 does not hold companies responsible for correcting misinformation where a company owns or operates an online platform that allows for user-generated content (chat room, etc.) over which a company does notexert control. However, Draft Guidance #1 cautions that such a site should contain an “overarching and conspicuous statement that the firm did not create or control the [user-generated content].”

If a company chooses to voluntarily respond to truly independent misinformation, Draft Guidance #1 sets parameters on the process for taking correction action, which should either be by (i) providing appropriate truthful corrective information or (ii) providing “a reputable source for correct information, such as the firm’s contact information. In either approach, in order to constitute “appropriate corrective information” a firm’s communication should denote the affiliation of the corrective post with the company, and be:

  • relevant and responsive to the misinformation;
  • limited and tailored to the misinformation;
  • non-promotional in nature, tone, and presentation;
  • accurate;
  • consistent with the FDA-required labeling for the product;
  • supported by sufficient evidence; and
  • posted either in conjunction with or reference the misinformation.

In acknowledgement of the vast nature of the Internet and certain forums and the reality that it may be impractical for a company to attempt to correct all misinformation about its products that may appear, Draft Guidance #1 stipulates that companies do not need to address all incorrect information that may be posted regarding a particular drug or device, even if a company elects to correct a selective portion. When addressing any misinformation, therefore, Draft Guidance #1 recommends that a company create a figurative box around the particular misinformation and portion of the forum it intends to correct, and then revise all the incorrect information within that defined boundary, which should include also correcting positive misinformation or exaggerations. Following corrective action, while Draft Guidance #1 does not hold companies responsible for monitoring the communication, it does recommend that companies keep records that include (i) the date, location, and content of the misinformation; (ii) when the wrongful information was discovered; and (iii) a description of the corrective information provided, including the date it was furnished.

Finally, Draft Guidance #1 suggests that the FDA does not intend to object if a firm voluntarily corrects misinformation and the voluntarily provided corrective information does not satisfy otherwise applicable regulatory labeling or advertising requirements, so long as the corrective information is not non-truthful, misleading, or in a manner other than recommended by Draft Guidance #1. However, companies should take heed that any corrective action that goes beyond merely providing accurate information that is specifically tailored to the misinformation it is addressing (i.e., including slogans or promotional information) must comply with applicable regulatory requirements related to labeling or advertising.

While helpful for establishing clearly both the parameters for correctly responding to misinformation as well as for clearly limiting a company’s obligation to respond to any or all misinformation posted by an independent third party, the Guidance on Correcting Third Party Misinterpretation also reminds companies to take caution when doing so to ensure that their responses are narrowly tailored enough to fall under the purview of the guidance and outside regulatory requirements. That caution includes carefully considering where misinformation clearly constitutes “truly independent” information. Companies should be mindful of the reality that “truly independent” is not a concept that is well defined, and should thus be cautious before asserting that certain misinformation may fall under the purview of Draft Guidance #1 as the FDA advances a broad interpretation of when a company is responsible for taking corrective action.

Internet/Social Media Platforms with Character Space Limitations — Presenting Risk and Benefit Information for Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices

Prepared by the Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, the second guidance issued by the FDA last week, the Guidance on Presenting Risk/Benefit Information (“Draft Guidance #2”), addresses the parameters around presenting benefits and risks information on Internet and social media platforms with character spacing limitations, such as microblogs (e.g., Twitter) and online paid search (e.g., “sponsored links” on search engines such as Google). Draft Guidance #2 clearly establishes that, as a threshold matter, the character restrictions do not eliminate the company’s responsibility to ensure its promotional messaging complies with all applicable regulations related to advertising and labeling, and cautions that such forms of media may not be appropriate for promotion of certain products, such as those with complex indications or risk profiles.

For companies that choose to make product benefit claims on character-space-limited communication sites, while each may reasonably use common abbreviations (including scientific and medical abbreviations), punctuation marks, and other symbols to comply with space constraints, Draft Guidance #2 presents a broad set of rules that must be satisfied by each communication relating to both risk and benefit information.

Benefit Information

  • Benefit information should be accurate, non-misleading, and reveal material facts within each individual message or tweet.
  • Benefit information should be included with risk information in the same message. Do not spread benefit and risk information across multiple messages or tweets.

Risk Information

  • Risk information should be included with benefit information in the same message. Do not spread risk and benefit information across multiple messages or tweets.
  • Risk information should be “comparable in scope” to the benefit information, and should, at minimum, include the most serious risks, e.g., those included in a boxed warning or known to be life-threatening, among others, associated with the product. To determine whether risk information is “comparable in scope” to the benefit information, the FDA weighs (i) whether the risk information “qualifies any representations made about the product,” and (ii) whether the risk information is presented with a “prominence and readability comparable to the benefit claims about the product.” While risk disclosures may be concise when paired with benefit information, a hyperlink to a complete, and exclusive, discussion of risks should be included and appropriately titled and not promotional in nature.
  • Both the proprietary and established (generic) name for the product should be included within the character-space limited communication and on each landing page associated with each hyperlink in that initial communication. Draft Guidance #2 recommends that the landing page be devoted exclusively to the communication of risk information about the product and not to the promotional home page. Such landing page should also prominently display quantitative ingredient and dosing information for prescription drugs.

In light of the restrictions set forth by Draft Guidance #2, while companies should feel comfortable taking advantage of current social media platforms including those with character restrictions, they should also ensure that the parties responsible for drafting any such posts are aware of the parameters placed on such communications. A hypothetical example provided by Draft Guidance #2 exemplifies some of the potential disadvantages of such messaging:

NoFocus (rememberine HCl) for mild to moderate memory loss-May cause seizures in patients with a seizure disorder www.nofocus.com/risk

While the message complies with each of Draft Guidance #2’s directives, the balancing of risk and benefit information in a space restricted communication may have the unintended result of highlighting risk over benefit. Additionally, from a practical standpoint, the space constraints may prevent the inclusion of all necessary information. If a company cannot conclude that “adequate” benefit and risk information (along with other required disclosure) may be communicated in the same message or tweet — particularly at 140 characters — Draft Guidance #2 recommends that the company reconsider whether the use of the particular platform is the appropriate forum for the dissemination of such messaging before making use of such forums, once again in particular for drugs with complex indications or high risk profiles.

As a general conclusion, while the Guidance on Presenting Risk/Benefit Information is self-admittedly limited in scope, and does not address “promotion via product websites, webpages on social networking platforms (e.g., [Facebook, Twitter, YouTube]), and online web banners,” it undeniably provides helpful direction for drug and device companies’ use of social media sites for promotional messaging where communications are restricted to a limited number of characters, as well as highlighting how the FDA may intend to regulate such use. Companies should pay careful attention to the restrictions while taking advantage of the opportunities these social media platforms offer, and should take care to ensure to instill clear policies that comply with Draft Guidance #2 that are available to, and understood by, individuals tasked with producing and monitoring social media content for the company.

The FDA will be accepting comments on both Draft Guidance #1 and Draft Guidance #2 until September 16, 2014.

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Healthcare Fraud Case Results in $491 Million Settlement

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On July 30, 2013, Pfizer Inc., one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, announced its finalized agreement to pay $491 million to the U.S. government in order to resolve accusations that the company and one of its subsidiaries defrauded the U.S. healthcare system.  Under the settlement, Pfizer will pay $257 million in order to resolve civil allegations that Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc., owned by Pfizer, engaged in illegal marketing that led to false claims being brought to Medicare and similar healthcare programs.  Pfizer will pay the other $234 million of the settlement in order to cover criminal fines and penalties.

According to allegations in the lawsuit, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals had illegally marketed a transplant drug named Rapamune for uses that had not been approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA).  Patients use Rapamune in combination with other drugs following kidney transplants.  However, Wyeth’s advertising campaigns advocated the drug for unapproved applications, such as use after liver, lung, heart, pancreas, and islet transplants.  According to a U.S. attorney, this type of off-label marketing endangers patients and erodes the population’s confidence in the FDA.  In 2002, the FDA required Wyeth to place a “black box warning,” the most stringent type of warning required by the agency, on the Rapamune product label.  This warning would advise people of the risks inherent in using Rapamune after liver transplants.  One year later, the FDA required a similar type of warning with regard to the use of Rapamune after lung transplants.  Nevertheless, claims up to 90% of Wyeth’s Rapamune sales were allegedly for “off-label” uses.

The $491 million settlement resulted from two qui tam lawsuits filed against Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc.  Under provisions of the False Claims Act, private citizens with knowledge of fraud committed against the government can file a qui tam lawsuit on behalf of the United States.  The individual filing the lawsuit is known as the relator or whistleblower.  Healthcare whistleblowers, such as the persons who brought the lawsuits against Wyeth, serve an important role in exposing and eradicating healthcare fraud.  Many whistleblowers have personal knowledge of deceptive practices because they work for the companies that submit false claims to the Government.  By relating their knowledge to the appropriate authorities, these individuals can assure that healthcare programs can achieve their intended benefits to Americans with the greatest need of federal assistance.

In the first case, the False Claims Act whistleblowers were Marlene Sandler and Scott Paris.  They jointly filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania that alleged aspects of off-label marketing.  At the time, the Government declined to intervene and the relators commenced to litigate the case on their own.  Two years later, a second qui tam whistleblower, Mark Campbell, came forward.  Mr. Campbell is a former Wyeth sales representative who worked for the company for twenty years.  Throughout the tenure of his employment, he became aware of Wyeth’s off-label marketing practices.  After he filed his lawsuit against Wyeth in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the Department of Justice intervened in the Sandler and Paris action.  The Government then transferred the matter to the Oklahoma court and consolidated the two cases.  The three Medicare fraud whistleblowers have aligned their interests and cooperated to help the investigation into Wyeth’s actions.

Because the whistleblowers took on a personal risk in bringing allegations against their employer and they devoted their time in relaying information vital to the case, they will obtain a significant proportion of the settlement.  False Claims Act whistleblowers typically receive 15% to 25% of settlements.  That means that Ms. Sandler, Mr. Paris, and Mr. Campbell will all potentially receive millions of dollars from Pfizer Inc.

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U.S. Medical Oncology Practice Sentenced for Use and Medicare Billing of Cancer Drugs Intended for Foreign Markets

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In a June 28, 2013 news release by the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Californiain San Diego, it was reported that a La Jolla, California medical oncology practice pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a $500,000 fine, forfeit $1.2 million in gross proceeds received from the Medicare program, and make restitution to Medicare in the amount of $1.7 million for purchasing unapproved foreign cancer drugs and billing the Medicare program as if the drugs were legitimate. Although the drugs contained the same active ingredients as drugs sold in the U.S. under the brand names Abraxane®, Alimta®, Aloxi®, Boniva®, Eloxatin®, Gemzar®, Neulasta®, Rituxan®, Taxotere®, Venofer® and Zometa®), the drugs purchased by the corporation were meant for markets outside the United States, and were not drugs approved by the FDA for use in the United States. Medicare provides reimbursement only for drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in the United States. To conceal the scheme, the oncology practice fraudulently used and billed the Medicare program using reimbursement codes for FDA approved cancer drugs.

In pleading guilty, the practice admitted that from 2007 to 2011 it had purchased $3.4 million of foreign cancer drugs, knowing they had not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for use in the United States. The practice admitted that it was aware that the drugs were intended for markets other than the United States and were not the drugs approved by the FDA for use in the United States because: (a) the packaging and shipping documents indicated that drugs were shipped to the office from outside the United States; (b) many of the invoices identified the origin of the drugs and intended markets for the drugs as countries other than the United States; (c) the labels did not bear the “Rx Only” language required by the FDA; (d) the labels did not bear the National Drug Code (NDC) numbers found on the versions of the drugs intended for the U.S. market; (e) many of the labels had information in foreign languages; (f) the drugs were purchased at a substantial discount; (g) the packing slips indicated that the drugs came from the United Kingdom; and (h) in October, 2008 the practice had received a notice from the FDA that a shipment of drugs had been detained because the drugs were unapproved.

In a related False Claims Act lawsuit filed by the United States, the physician and his medical practice corporation paid in excess of $2.2 million to settle allegations that they submitted false claims to the Medicare program. The corporation was allowed to apply that sum toward the amount owed in the criminal restitution to Medicare. The physician pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of introducing unapproved drugs into interstate commerce, admitting that on July 8, 2010, he purchased the prescription drug MabThera (intended for market in Turkey and shipped from a source in Canada) and administered it to patients. Rituxan®, a product with the same active ingredient, is approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use in the United States.

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Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Publishes Orphan Drug Rule for 340B Program

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Rule requires most manufacturers to change government pricing methodologies, calculations, and systems.

On July 23, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a regulation[1] increasing the number of entities to which pharmaceutical manufacturers must sell orphan drugs at statutory ceiling prices under the 340B drug discount program, and complicating the determination of eligibility to purchase these drugs at the 340B price. This regulation conditions the ability of certain hospitals to purchase orphan drugs at the 340B price on implementation of costly new systems for tracking drug use and requires virtually every brand drug manufacturer to change its government pricing methodologies, calculations, and systems.

340B Program Background

The 340B drug discount program is a voluntary program created by section 340B of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 256b, and implemented through a pharmaceutical pricing agreement (PPA) between manufacturers and HHS. Manufacturers opt into the program by signing these agreements and assuming the obligations set forth in their terms, which are specified by statute and linked, in many respects, to the terms of the Medicaid drug rebate statute. At the core of the agreement is the obligation to charge covered entities no more than a statutory ceiling price for drugs covered by the statute, which are defined by the term “covered outpatient drug” in the Medicaid statute.

Section 7101 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expanded the categories of hospitals eligible to purchase at the 340B ceiling price to include freestanding cancer hospitals, sole community hospitals, rural referral centers, and critical access hospitals. The ACA, as amended, simultaneously limited these hospitals’ participation in the program by excluding “a drug designated by the Secretary [of HHS] under section [526 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)] for a rare disease or condition”[2] from the definition of “covered outpatient drug.”

Orphan Drug Rule

HRSA’s regulation, codified at 42 C.F.R. part 10, includes a new section 10.21 (the Final Rule or the Orphan Drug Rule), which establishes standards for determining when the statutory exclusion applies, i.e., when a drug designated under section 526 is excluded from the definition of “covered outpatient drug.”[3]

The Final Rule interprets the statutory exclusion from manufacturers’ obligations under their pharmaceutical pricing agreements as being limited to purchases of designated drugs when used by their customers to treat orphan indications. As a result of this regulatory limitation, the Final Rule requires manufacturers to charge the newly added hospitals no more than the statutory ceiling price for drugs designated as orphan drugs when these drugs are used for nonorphan indications. At the same time, the Final Rule allows an affected hospital to purchase drugs at the 340B price only if the hospital has developed a system for tracking outpatient use of a purchased drug that satisfies the requirements of the Final Rule.

HRSA’s regulatory requirements are predicated on an interpretation of congressional intent underlying this provision of the ACA, which ties the definition of “covered outpatient drug” under the 340B drug discount program to the scope of other unrelated benefits of orphan drug designation, such as marketing exclusivity and tax credits. However, there are other indicia that Congress did not intend the orphan drug exclusion to be as narrow as HRSA has now declared through rulemaking. When asked to clarify the scope of the exclusion for all the newly added hospitals, Congress instead removed children’s hospitals (originally subject to the orphan drug exclusion in the ACA) from the provision and restated the exclusion for the rest.[4]

Legislative Rulemaking Authority

Congress has not yet delegated authority to HRSA to promulgate substantive regulations that set standards for determining the scope of manufacturers’ obligations under the statute or that impose new duties on manufacturers not specified in the terms of their agreements. The only authority that Congress has previously delegated to HRSA to promulgate regulations is the limited authority provided in section 7102 of the ACA, which allows HRSA to issue the following: 1) regulatory standards and methodology for calculating ceiling prices; 2) regulations establishing standards for the imposition of civil monetary penalties; and 3) a regulation establishing an administrative process for the resolution of claims.

HRSA has called the Orphan Drug Rule a “clarification” of the statutory exclusion; however, the rule imposes new obligations on all stakeholders. It requires manufacturers to include in the program drugs designated under section 526 of the FFDCA and concurrently allows affected hospitals to purchase them at the 340B price, under certain circumstances, and then establishes standards and requirements for determining those circumstances.

340B Entity Implementation Issues

In order to ensure that drugs used by covered entities for orphan diseases or conditions are excluded, the Final Rule provides that covered entities may not purchase designated orphan drugs for nonorphan indications under the 340B drug discount program unless they provide HRSA with assurances that they have systems capable of identifying and tracking the use of designated drugs in treating their patients and transmitting the data to their purchasing systems. Thus, a sale of a particular drug to a particular affected hospital could be classified as purchased under the 340B program or outside the 340B program, depending on whether the purchaser 1) has informed HRSA that it has a system capable of complying with the rule’s requirements and 2) uses the drug to treat a patient for an orphan disease or condition.

Because the 340B program is an outpatient program only, hospitals must distinguish between drugs purchased for inpatient and outpatient purposes. HRSA allows hospitals to have a single physical inventory and maintain separate accounts for inpatient purchases and outpatient purchases, and many hospitals have split-billing systems that order 340B drugs only as needed under the program. The same rules apply when contract pharmacies order drugs to fill prescriptions of 340B hospital patients and the hospital purchases drugs to replenish the pharmacy’s inventory.

However, hospitals’ existing 340B purchasing systems and pharmacy prescription data do not currently include hospital billing codes or other information from patients’ medical records indicating the diseases or conditions for which drugs are prescribed. Thus, it may be some time before hospitals seeking to purchase orphan drugs for nonorphan indications at 340B prices are able to comply with the requirements of the Orphan Drug Rule. Due to the difficulties in satisfying the requirements, some affected hospitals may choose to purchase all of their orphan drugs outside the 340B program if they cannot or do not wish to develop a compliant tracking system. Alternatively, some hospitals may choose to have certain of their facilities purchase outside the 340B program.

The Orphan Drug Rule provides for acceptable “alternate” tracking systems if HRSA approves such systems, but the rule does not provide hospitals with the standards for what would be acceptable to ensure compliance. It also does not appear that manufacturers will have any advance insight into the systems or an opportunity to comment on them. Additionally, the Final Rule does not offer assistance to stakeholders on how contract pharmacies can ascertain from prescription information whether a patient of a 340B hospital has been prescribed a drug to treat an orphan indication or some other indication.

Alternatives for Hospitals 

Hospitals affected by the Orphan Drug Rule, such as rural referral centers, may also qualify for 340B participation as disproportionate share hospitals, which are not subject to the rule. In that case, they may choose not to satisfy the requirements of the rule (applicable to rural referral centers) but would be prohibited from purchasing outpatient drugs outside the program, such as those carved out for Medicaid, through group purchasing organization (GPO) agreements (applicable to disproportionate share hospitals).

For most of the new categories of hospitals, individual entities may purchase orphan drugs outside the program under GPO agreements and benefit from the discounts available through those agreements. Thus, they are not disadvantaged by the 340B drug discount program if they cannot or are unwilling to satisfy the requirements to purchase orphan drugs under the program. However, for freestanding cancer hospitals, the Final Rule maintains the statutory prohibition against purchasing covered outpatient drugs through GPO arrangements. If these hospitals do not comply with the regulatory requirements, they must purchase orphan drugs in the open market or negotiate contracts with manufacturers.

Manufacturer Government Pricing System Issues

Based on the Final Rule, the classification of a manufacturer’s sale as a 340B program sale for purposes of the manufacturer’s drug price reporting obligations depends on each eligible hospital’s compliance with the rule’s requirements. That means a manufacturer’s operations must code each affected hospital and, in some cases, facilities within a medical center to determine whether the purchase of an orphan drug for a nonorphan indication is under the program or outside the program. These codings can change quarter to quarter as 340B hospital entities elect either to start or stop using the required tracking systems. Likewise, wholesalers processing invoices must be provided with information that allows them to know when a hospital is eligible to order an orphan drug under the 340B agreement at statutory ceiling prices (as opposed to under a GPO agreement, other contract, or open market), and the manufacturer’s chargeback validation system must be able to differentiate as well. Otherwise, a manufacturer could easily and inadvertently provide 340B pricing outside the program, which could trigger a best price under the Medicaid drug rebate program and simultaneously drive down the quarterly 340B statutory ceiling price. Many manufacturers’ current government pricing systems seek to identify best price-eligible sales at the class-of-trade level, with sales of orphan drugs to 340B entities coded for inclusion in best price, while sales of nonorphan drugs to these same entities are excluded from best price. Manufacturers of orphan drugs must now develop solutions that permit identification of the eligible and ineligible price points necessitated by the Final Rule.

Since the inception of the Medicaid drug rebate program, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has refused to consider all transactions with covered entities to be exempt from best price and—in the absence of a clear statutory provision, such as the exemption of inpatient drug prices paid by disproportionate share hospitals—it is risky for manufacturers to assume all outpatient sales of orphan drugs to 340B eligible hospitals will be exempt from best price. Currently, for example, CMS’s proposed government pricing rule excludes from best price only “[p]rices charged under the 340B drug pricing program to a covered entity described in section 1927(a)(5)(B) of the Act.”[5]

Off-Label Use

The Final Rule does not answer comments about concerns with off-label use. The Final Rule states that a drug must be approved by the Food and Drug Administration for marketing to be in the program; however, it does not answer the question of whether a drug should be excluded if it is designated for an orphan indication, approved only for a nonorphan indication, but used by a covered entity off-label for the designated orphan indication. The Final Rule also does not indicate whether a manufacturer with a product approved only for an orphan indication will be deemed to be selling the product to a hospital for off-label use if it provides the 340B price for that off-label nonorphan use.

Implications

Hospitals added to the 340B program by the ACA (other than children’s hospitals) need to review their existing systems and modify them to satisfy their obligations under the Final Rule before they can purchase orphan drugs under the program. Manufacturers need to review their drug price reporting systems to ensure they are able to identify when a covered hospital is purchasing orphan drugs outside the program to avoid inadvertently setting their best price at the 340B price.


[1]. Exclusion of Orphan Drugs for Certain Covered Entities Under 340B Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,016 (July 23, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 10), available here.

[2]. 42 U.S.C. § 256b(e).

[3]. Exclusion of Orphan Drugs, supra note 1.

[4]See Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-309, § 204.

[5]. Medicaid Program; Covered Outpatient Drugs 77 Fed. Reg. 5318, 5363 (Feb. 2, 2012) (emphasis added), available here.

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A Short-Lived Victory for Generic Drug Manufacturers?

Sheppard Mullin 2012

On June 24, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. ____ (2013), finding that design-defect claims against generic drug companies are pre-empted where federal law prohibits an action required by state law. The Supreme Court had previously held in Pliva v. Mensing, 564 U.S. ____ (2011) that failure to warn claims against generic drug manufacturers are pre-empted by the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act since generic drug makers must copy innovator drug labeling precisely in order to obtain approval of their products by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). The Court in Mutual rejected the argument of lower courts that the generic manufacturer could comply with both federal and state law by choosing not to make and distribute the product at all.

The case in question involved the drug sulindac, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug product marketed by the innovator as Clinoril®. The plaintiff in the case had been prescribed sulindac for treatment of shoulder pain. She subsequently developed a case of toxic epidermal necrolysis following taking an FDA approved generic product equivalent to Clinoril®, which resulted in significant and permanent disability (including blindness) and disfigurement. Subsequent to the event, the FDA required a more specific warning as to this possible side effect on sulindac products. A jury found the generic manufacturer liable under a theory that there was a design defect with the product, and the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the generic manufacturer could have complied with both federal and state law by not manufacturing and distributing the product. This was the method by which the lower courts overcame prior precedent that a state law may be impliedly pre-empted when it is not possible to comply with both federal and state law.

The Supreme Court in Mutual noted that the generic manufacturer could not comply with the state law, since federal law requires that the active ingredient, the amount of the active ingredient, the dosage form, and the labeling had to be identical to the innovator product. In this case, it was not possible to redesign the product, and the only way, under New Hampshire law, to remedy the design defect would have been to strengthen the product’s warnings. That too could not be done, as FDA rules require the labeling of the generic to be identical to that of the innovator. The Court ruled that in such a case the state law is without effect, and relevant New Hampshire warning-based design defect cause of action was pre-empted with respect to FDA-approved generic drugs sold in interstate commerce.

The scope of the Mutual decision may be limited to those states where design-defect claims allow for a risk-utility approach such as that the New Hampshire requires. The New Hampshire standard requires, among other things in determining whether there is a valid cause of action for a design defect, a determination as to whether there is a possible warning to avoid unreasonable risk of harm from the design defect and the efficacy of such warning. So not every design-defect claim may be pre-empted, depending on each state’s laws are interpreted. But given the Court’s reasoning, even state laws that do not take into effect the presence of and efficacy of a warning, may be pre-empted, as the generic must copy the formula of the innovator in all respects, except for the inactive ingredients in the product. (It should be noted that generics of some dosage forms – ophthalmic products and injectable products – must, in most cases, contain the same inactive ingredients as in the innovator product in the same amounts).

Furthermore, the FDA may amend its rules to permit ANDA holders to make changes in labeling. See “FDA Rule Could Open Generic Drug Makers to Suits,” The New York Times, Business, July 4, 2013, at B2. As stated in the posting on the OMB website (RIN 0910-A694):

Abstract: This proposed rule would amend the regulations regarding new drug applications (NDAs), abbreviated new drug applications (NDAs), abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs), and biologics license applications (BLAs) to revise and clarify procedures for changes to the labeling of an approved drug to reflect certain types of newly acquired information in advance of FDA’s review of such change. The proposed rule would describe the process by which information regarding a “changes being effected” (CBE) labeling supplement submitted by an NDA or ANDA holder would be made publicly available during FDA’s review of the labeling change. The proposed rule also would clarify requirements for the NDA holder for the reference listed drug and all ANDA holders to submit conforming labeling revisions after FDA has taken an action on the NDA and/or ANDA holder’s CBE labeling supplement. These proposed revisions to FDA’s regulations would create parity between NDA holders and ANDA holders with respect to submission of CBE labeling supplements.

The expected date for a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is September 2013. It could, of course, take FDA quite some time to propose a rule, and put it into effect, given the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. And Congressional action is also a possibility.

For the present, however, generic drug manufacturers appear to be shielded from liability under the doctrine of pre-emption from most, if not all, failure to warn and design defect claims under state law. Whether that victory is short-lived or not remains to be seen.

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Final Rule for Physician Payments Sunshine Act Recently Released

McBrayer

The long-awaited final regulations for the Physician Payments Sunshine Act (“Sunshine Act” or “Act”) were finally released on February 1, 2013. I previously discussed the Sunshine Act (see Here Comes the Sun, Are you Prepared?,10/18/2012), but with the final rule now implemented, providers should take a second look at it and reconsider its implications.

The Act requires applicable manufacturers of drugs, devices, biological, or medical supplies covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) to report payments or transfers of value provided to physicians or teaching hospitals. Additionally, applicable manufacturers and group purchasing organizations (“GPOs”) must annually report to CMS certain information regarding ownership or investment interests held by physicians (or their immediate family members).

The Act was proposed in December 2011 and CMS had expected to issue the final rule by the end of 2012. However, due to the overwhelming number of remarks received during the comments period from concerned providers, manufacturers, and GPOs, the Act took considerably more time to become final.

The final rule addresses some of the concerns raised through the comments period, but certainly not all. One of the biggest revisions is to exempt speaker fees for accredited and certified CME programs from the reporting requirements. There are several other exemptions from the reporting requirements, including, but not limited to:

  • over-the-counter drugs and class I and II medical devices (such as elastic bandages and suture materials)
  • incidental items worth less than $10 (e.g., pens and note pads) as well as general food and drinks offered to all participants at conferences or large-scale events
  • gifts or payments valued at less than $10 — unless the aggregate amount paid to the physician exceeds $100 annually
  • educational materials and items intended for use by or with patients

Additionally, the final rule makes numerous changes to definitions included in the proposed rule and adds several new terms.

The estimated costs, as stated by CMS, for the manufacturers and GPOs to comply with the Act is $269 million for the first year, with costs thereafter estimated to be $180 million.  CMS estimates physicians will expend $250 during the first year for compliance, but many stakeholders have expressed the opinion that this is grossly underestimated.

The applicable manufacturers and group purchasing organizations are required to start collecting data on August 1, 2013. This data must be formalized in a report to CMS by March 31, 2014. The data is set to appear on a public website by September 30, 2014.

The final rule still creates a great deal of uncertainty. It is highly recommended that providers consider their existing relationships and revisit the Act when creating new ones. They should take time to review internal policies and examine all contacts for conflicts of interest.

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