Corporate law Archives - Page 27 of 29

In Ninth Circuit, Whistleblowers Not Exempt From Confidentiality Agreements

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney Anthony Navid Moshirnia of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP about blowing the whistle on alleged fraud against the Government does not entitle an employee to loot:

Blowing the whistle on alleged fraud against the Government does not entitle an employee to loot and disclose her employer’s records in violation of a confidentiality agreement – at least not in the Ninth Circuit. In an opinion handed down in March of this year, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt a so-called “public policy exception to confidentiality agreements to protect [qui tam plaintiffs]” who misappropriate documents from their employers ostensibly to buttress claims brought under the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”). U.S. ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2011). Though this opinion has been on the books since Spring, it remains relevant, and worth keeping an eye on, as it provides powerful ammunition against FCA plaintiffs that continue to tout the “public policy” exception as though it were unassailable.

After learning that her job at General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc. (“General Dynamics”) was going to be terminated, but before leaving her employment, Mary Cafasso “copied almost eleven gigabytes of data from [her employer’s] computers in anticipation of bringing a qui tam action” under the FCA. When it discovered what Ms. Cafasso had done, General Dynamics filed suit in Arizona state court, seeking return of its purloined documents through a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Apparently to avoid complying with the TRO, which the state court granted, Ms. Cafasso filed “a conclusory six page complaint . . . alleg[ing] FCA violations and retaliation.” She then used the FCA action to persuade the Arizona court to vacate the TRO and stay General Dynamics’ lawsuit.

When Ms. Cafasso’s FCA complaint was unsealed, General Dynamics counterclaimed alleging, inter alia, breach of contract arising from Ms. Cafasso’s misappropriation of documents in violation of a confidentiality agreement. In opposition to General Dynamics’ motion for summary judgment, Ms. Cafasso argued that General Dynamics had failed to prove contract damages and that, even if it had, her conduct was permissible because “[p]ublic policy grants [a] Relator a privilege in gathering copies of documents as part of an investigation under the FCA and gives [a] Relator immunity from civil liability based on claims against her for so doing.” U.S. ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 2009 WL 1457036, *13 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2009).

The trial court dismissed both of Ms. Cafasso’s arguments. It found that damages were established by the stipulated damages clause in the General Dynamics confidentiality agreement. After reviewing the parties’ competing legal arguments, the trial court also found that “public policy does not immunize Cafasso, [who] confuses protecting whistleblowers from retaliation for lawfully reporting fraud with immunizing whistleblowers for wrongful acts made in the course of looking for evidence of fraud.” The court concluded that “[s]tatutory incentives encouraging investigation of possible fraud under the FCA do not establish a public policy in favor of violating an employer’s contractual confidentiality and nondisclosure rights.”

On appeal, Ms. Cafasso did not dispute that her actions violated her confidentiality agreement with General Dynamics, but nonetheless urged the Court to “adopt a public policy exception to enforcement of such contracts that would allow relators to disclose confidential information in furtherance of an FCA action.” While noting that Ms. Cafasso’s position was not frivolous, and might apply “in particular instances for particular documents,” the Ninth Circuit found that Ms. Cafasso’s data removal was not privileged.

The Ninth Circuit appears to have relied on two factors to reach this conclusion: the scope and volume of the documents Ms. Cafasso took. With respect to scope, the Ninth Circuit faulted Ms. Cafasso’s “indiscriminate appropriation of documents,” referring to it as an “unselective taking [that included] attorney client privileged communications, trade secrets belonging to [General Dynamics] and other contractors, internal research and development information, sensitive government information, and at least one patent application that the Patent Office had placed under a secrecy order.” The Court was also troubled by the fact that Ms. Cafasso had taken over 11 gigabytes of data, noting that “the need to facilitate valid claims does not justify the wholesale stripping of a company’s confidential documents.” In sum, the Ninth Circuit found that an “exception broad enough to protect the scope of Cafasso’s massive document gather in this case would make all confidentiality agreements unenforceable as long as the employee later files a qui tam action” – an unacceptable result.

While Cafasso stopped short of rejecting the public policy defense to data theft as a matter of law, it certainly provides a new avenue to FCA defendants attempting to prevent qui tam relators from benefitting from extrajudicial discovery.

Are Restrictive Covenants Enforceable in California? It Depends.

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by attorneys Alice Y. Chu and Kurt A. Kappes of Greenberg Traurig, LLP regarding the enforeceability of non-competes in California:

In California, it is well established that non-compete provisions are unenforceable, subject to certain statutory exceptions. Nevertheless, some courts have also recognized that non-compete provisions are enforceable if necessary to protect confidential information or trade secrets.

But what about non-compete provisions that are ambiguous as to their protection of confidential information or trade secrets? Recently, when faced with such a provision, one California federal court narrowly construed the provision to find it enforceable.

The Facts in Richmond

In Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011), a California federal district court evaluated the following provisions included in the parties’ Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (“NDA”):¹

Non–Solicitation. During the Term of this Employment (a[s] hereinafter defined), and for a period of one year thereafter, [defendant] [shall not] directly or indirectly, initiate any contact or communication with, solicit or attempt to solicit the employee of, or enter into any agreement with any employee, consultant, sales representative, or account manager of [plaintiff] unless such person has ceased its relationship with [plaintiff] for a period of not less than six months. Similarly [plaintiff] shall not solicit the employment of, or enter into any agreement with any employee, consultant or representative of [defendant].

Non–Interference. During the Term of this Employment, and for a period of one year thereafter, [defendant] will not initiate any contact or communication with, solicit or attempt to solicit, or enter into any agreement with, any account, acquiring bank, merchant, customer, client, or vendor of [plaintiff] in the products created and serviced by [plaintiff], unless (a) such person has ceased its relationship with [plaintiff] for a period of not less than six months, or (b) [defendant]’s relationship and association with such person both (i) pre-existed the date of this Agreement and (ii) does not directly or indirectly conflict with any of the current or reasonably anticipated future business of [plaintiff].

Non Compete and Non Circumvent. [Defendant] will not compete with [plaintiff] with similar product and or Service using its technology for a period of one year thereafter. [Defendant] will not use any of the [plaintiff]’s technical knowhow or Source Code for the personal benefit other than the employment and to meet the customer needs defined by [plaintiff].²

The NDA also contained a provision that barred the defendant from disclosing or using confidential information used in plaintiff’s business.³ Confidential information was defined to include “Proprietary Data,” such as “know-how,” contract terms and conditions with merchants, technical data, and source code; “Business and Financial Data;” “Marketing and Developing Operations;” and “Customers, Vendors, Contractors, and Employees,” including their names and identities, data provided by customers, and information on the products and services purchased by customers.⁴

The Richmond Court’s Analysis

In evaluating plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, the court assessed plaintiff’s claim that, by teaming up with plaintiff’s former employee to form a competing venture, the defendant had breached the non-compete provisions of the NDA.⁵ Defendants argued that the plaintiff was not likely to prevail on its contract claims because the non-compete provisions in the NDA are unenforceable under California Business and Professions Code § 16600.⁶

Within this context, the court first noted that the California Supreme Court had recently confirmed that “‘[t]oday in California, covenants not to compete are void, subject to several exceptions,” and that the California Supreme Court “‘generally condemns noncompetition agreements.’”⁷

Second, the court also observed that the California Supreme Court had rejected the “narrow-restraints” exception to Section 16600 applied in several Ninth Circuit cases, finding that “‘California courts have been clear in their expression that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat.’”⁸ As the court stated, “Section 16600 stands as a broad prohibition on ‘every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.’”⁹

Third, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that Section 16600 applies only to restrictions on employees, concluding that Section 16600 did apply to the facts of the case.¹⁰

Fourth, the court acknowledged that, even though Section 16600 applied, a number of California courts have also held that former employees may not misappropriate a former employer’s trade secrets to compete unfairly with the former employer.¹¹

Applying these principles, the court held that the non-solicitation and non-interference provisions of the NDA were likely unenforceable under California law because the provisions were more broadly drafted than necessary to protect plaintiff’s trade secrets and “would have the effect of restraining Defendants from pursuing their chosen business and professions if enforced.”¹²

In regards to the non-compete provision, the court reasoned that “the scope of the prohibitions on ‘compet[ing] with [plaintiff] with similar product and or Service using its technology” and using ‘technical knowhow’ is not entirely clear.”¹³ However, the court then concluded that “if the clause is construed to bar only the use of confidential source code, software, or techniques developed for [plaintiff’s] products or clients, it is likely enforceable as necessary to protect [plaintiff]’s trade secrets.”¹⁴

To support this construction, the court specifically cited the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”)’s definition of a “trade secret,” even though plaintiff had not alleged a UTSA claim against the defendants and the UTSA was not briefed.¹⁵ The court also found that the provision prohibiting use of confidential information was likely enforceable to the extent that the claimed confidential information is protectable as a trade secret.¹⁶

Based on these conclusions regarding the enforceability of the provisions, and facts showing that plaintiff had established at least serious questions going to the merits of its claims, the court issued a narrow temporary restraining order.¹⁷

IMPLICATIONS

Richmond demonstrates that at least one California federal court may be willing to narrowly construe an ambiguous non-compete provision and find it enforceable to the extent necessary to protect a party’s trade secrets. In so doing, however, the court invites comparisons to California cases where courts have refused to narrowly construe broad non-compete provisions to be protections of trade secrets.¹⁸ For example, in D’sa v. Playhut, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 927 (2000), a Court of Appeals refused to reform a non-compete provision that broadly prohibited employees from working in connection with a competing product.¹⁹ But D’sa was strictly in the employment context, where courts are more likely to look for over-reaching. Arguably, moreover, the provision at issue in D’Sa was broader than the provision considered inRichmond, which expressly referenced “technology,” “technical knowhow,” and “Source Code” in its language. Nevertheless, even with these references, the Richmond court conceded that the scope of the provision was “not entirely clear,” yet was willing to reform it to find it enforceable.

Furthermore, in enforcing the non-compete provision, the Richmond court also relied on the so-called “trade secret exception” to Section 16600²⁰ — an exception that the California Supreme Court noted but declined to address in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 946 n.4 (2008). This is an exception that other courts, particularly state courts, have questioned.²¹ This reliance suggests that, in the absence of conclusive guidance from the California Supreme Court on the viability of this exception, federal courts may remain willing to apply this exception to non-compete provisions perhaps as a way to harmonize the two statutes. In doing so, it is possible that the same collision between federal jurisprudence and state jurisprudence that gave rise to the Edwards decision may lie ahead. The California Supreme Court will then have an opportunity to address a key issue that the Supreme Court left unaddressed in a footnote in Edwards.

Finally, even with the uncertainty over the viability of the “trade secret exception” and whether courts will narrowly construe a non-compete provision to find it enforceable, companies should ensure non-compete provisions are drafted to clearly and specifically protect trade secrets, thereby increasing the likelihood that such a provision will be enforced.

¹Plaintiff is a company that provides enterprise resource planning software for financial service companies that provide credit card terminals to merchants. Id. at *1. One of the defendants developed and maintained enterprise resource planning software for the plaintiff and, pursuant to this relationship, entered into this NDA with plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest. Id. at *1-2.

²Id. at *16.
³Id. at *16.
⁴Id. at *16.
⁵Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *15-22 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011).
⁶Id. at *16.
⁷Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011)(quoting Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 945-46 (2008)).
⁸Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011)(quoting Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 949 (2008)).
⁹Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011)(quoting Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 16600).
¹⁰Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011).
¹¹Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158 at *18 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011)(quoting Retirement Group v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1237 (2009)(citing Morlife Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1519-20 (1997); American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks, 213 Cal. App. 3d 622, 634 (1989); Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 442–448 (1960); Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690 (1958); Gordon v. Schwartz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 213 (1956); Gordon v. Wasserman, 153 Cal. App. 2d 328 (1957)).
¹²Id. at *18.
¹³Id. at *19.
¹⁴Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011)(citing Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1456 (2002)). Interestingly, there is theoretically no temporal limit to a trade secret, so the one year limit of the non-compete provision actually undercut the plaintiff’s protection!
¹⁵See Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011)(citing Cal. Civ.Code § 3426.1(defining “trade secret” to include programs, methods, and techniques that derive independent economic value from not being generally known to the public, provided they are subject to reasonable efforts to maintain their secrecy)).
¹⁶Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011)
¹⁷Id. at *23.
¹⁸Perhaps this decision also signals a willingness among California federal courts to protect employer’s interests by reforming or severing provisions that may not comply with Section 16600. See also Thomas Weisel Partners LLC v. BNP Paribas, No. C 07–6198 MHP, 2010 WL 1267744 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010)(holding that a former employee’s non-solicitation provision was void to the extent it restricted the former employee’s ability to hire the employer’s employees after the former employee transitioned to another company, but upholding the rest of the employment agreement). These decisions may renew forum shopping, the ill that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937 (2008) was implicitly designed to address.
¹⁹The provision stated: “Employee will not render services, directly or indirectly, for a period of one year after separation of employment with Playhut, Inc. to any person or entity in connection with any Competing Product. A ‘Competing Product’ shall mean any products, processes or services of any person or entity other than Playhut, Inc. in existence or under development, which are substantially the same, may be substituted for, or applied to substantially that same end use as the products, processes or services with which I work during the time of my employment with Playhut, Inc. or about which I work during the time of my employment with Playhut Inc. or about which I acquire Confidential Information through my work with Playhut, Inc. Employee agrees that, upon accepting employment with any organization in competition with the Company or its affiliates during a period of five year(s) following employment separation, Employee shall notify the Company in writing within thirty days of the name and address of such new employer.” D’sa v. Playhut, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 927, 930 -31(2000).
²⁰Richmond Technologies, Inc. v. Aumtech Business Solutions, No. 11–CV–02460–LHK, 2011 WL 2607158 at *18 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011).
²¹As an example of the trend, see, e.g., Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 577 (2009)(“Although we doubt the continued viability of the common law trade secret exception to covenants not to compete, we need not resolve the issue here.”); Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California, Nos. A124070, A124097, A124096, 2010 WL 4113578, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2010)(“the so-called ‘trade secrets’ exception to Business and Professions Code section 16600 . . .rests on shaky legal grounds”)(citing Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 946 n.4 (2008); Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 578 (2009);Retirement Group v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1238 (2009)). When the apparent conflict in this area is addressed, perhaps the California Supreme Court will defuse it entirely, by agreeing with the way the court in Retirement Group v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226 (2009) reconciled it: “the conduct is enjoinable not because it falls within a judicially-created ‘exception’ to section 16600’s ban on contractual nonsolicitation clauses, but is instead enjoinable because it is wrongful independent of any contractual undertaking.” Retirement Group v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 1238.

OSHA Seeking Comment on SOX Whistleblower Complaint Rules

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney Virginia E. Robinson of Greenberg Traurig regarding OSHA seeking public comment on interim final rules that revise its regulations on the filing and handling of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) whistleblower complaints

The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is seeking public comment on interim final rules that revise its regulations on the filing and handling of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) whistleblower complaints.

OSHA, the entity charged with receiving and investigating SOX whistleblower complaints, issued the interim rules in part to implement the amendments to SOX’s whistleblower protections that were included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Those amendments include an extension of the statute of limitations period for filing a complaint from 90 to 180 days. They also clarify that nationally recognized statistical rating organizations and subsidiaries of publicly traded companies are covered employers under SOX.

In addition to implementing the Dodd-Frank amendments, the interim rules also seek to improve OSHA’s handling of SOX whistleblower complaints, and will permit the filing of oral complaints and complaints in any language.

The planned amendments to those regulations were published in the Nov. 3 Federal Register. Comments must be received by Jan. 3, 2012, and may be submitted online, by mail, or by fax. The Depatment of Labor’s recent news release provides additional details.

Department of Labor Revises Conflict Disclosure Requirements for Labor Union Officials

Barnes & Thornburg LLP‘s Labor and Employment Law Department recently posted in the National Law Review an article about the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards adopted a final rule revising the information that union officials must disclose on Form LM-30, the Labor Organization Office and Employee Report.:

On Oct. 26, 2011, the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards adopted a final rule revising the information that union officials must disclose on Form LM-30, the Labor Organization Office and Employee Report. The new rule reverses the rule published by the agency in 2007 that significantly expanded the financial disclosure requirements of union officials. Effective Nov. 25, 2011, union officials are now required to disclose only payments and interests that involve “actual or likely” conflicts between the official’s personal financial interests and his or her duties to the union. The DOL explains that such conflicts include “payments, interests and transactions involving the employers whose employees the union represents or actively seek to represent, vendors and service providers to such employers, the official’s union or the union’s trust and other employers from which a payment could create a conflict.” The new rule applies to reports required by union officials with fiscal years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2012.

Use of Form LM-30 for reporting purposes began in 1963 pursuant to Section 202 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Although the reporting requirements for Form LM-30 were significantly expanded in 2007, the DOL had issued a non-enforcement policy in 2009 that allowed filers to use either the 2007 expanded version of Form LM-30 or the 1963 version of the Form to disclose potential conflicts.

Second Circuit's Citigroup Decision Endorses Presumption of Prudence, Upholds Dismissal of Disclosure Claims

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP regarding the decision that employer stock in a 401(k) plan is subject to a “presumption of prudence” that a plaintiff alleging fiduciary breach:

In a much-anticipated decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined five other circuits in ruling that employer stock in a 401(k) plan is subject to a “presumption of prudence” that a plaintiff alleging fiduciary breach can overcome only upon a showing that the employer was facing a “dire situation” that was objectively unforeseeable by the plan sponsor. In re Citigroup ERISA Litigation, No. 09-3804, 2011 WL 4950368 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 2011). The appellate court found the plaintiffs had not rebutted the presumption of prudence and so upheld the dismissal of their “stock drop” claims.

BACKGROUND

The Citigroup plaintiffs were participants in two 401(k) plans that specifically required the offering of Citigroup stock as an investment option. The plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup’s large subprime mortgage exposure caused the share price of Citigroup stock to decline sharply between January 2007 and January 2008, and that plan fiduciaries breached their duties of prudence and loyalty by not divesting the plans of the stock in the face of the declines. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants breached their duty of disclosure by not providing complete and accurate information to plan participants regarding the risks associated with investing in Citigroup stock in light of the company’s exposure to the subprime market. On a motion to dismiss, the district court found no fiduciary breach because the defendants had “no discretion whatsoever” to eliminate Citigroup stock as an investment option (sometimes referred to as “hardwiring”). Alternatively, the lower court ruled that Citigroup stock was a presumptively prudent investment and the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to overcome the presumption.

SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION

Oral argument in the Citigroup case occurred nearly a year ago, and legal observers have been anxiously awaiting the court’s ruling. In a 2-1 decision, with Judge Chester J. Straub issuing a lengthy dissent, the Second Circuit rejected the “hardwiring” rationale but confirmed the application of the presumption of prudence, which was first articulated by the Third Circuit in Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995). The court also rejected claims that the defendants violated ERISA’s disclosure obligations by failing to provide plan participants with information about the expected future performance of Citigroup stock.

Prudence

Joining the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,[1] the court adopted the presumption of prudence as the “best accommodation between the competing ERISA values of protecting retirement assets and encouraging investment in employer stock.” Under the presumption of prudence, a fiduciary’s decision to continue to offer participants the opportunity to invest in employer stock is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review, which provides that a fiduciary’s conduct will not be second-guessed so long as it is reasonable. The court also ruled that the presumption of prudence applies at the earliest stages of the litigation and is relevant to all defined contribution plans that offer employer stock (not just ESOPs, which are designed to invest primarily in employer securities).

Having announced the relevant legal standard, the court of appeals dispatched the plaintiffs’ prudence claim in relatively short order. The plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup made ill-advised investments in the subprime market and hid the extent of its exposure from plan participants and the public; consequently, Citigroup’s stock price was artificially inflated. These facts alone, the court held, were not enough to plead a breach of fiduciary duty: “[T]hat Citigroup made a bad business decision is insufficient to show that the company was in a ‘dire situation,’ much less that the Investment Committee or the Administrative Committee knew or should have known that the situation was dire.” Nor could the plaintiffs carry their burden by alleging in conclusory fashion that individual fiduciaries “knew or should have known” about Citigroup’s subprime exposure but failed to act. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the court of appeals held these bald assertions were insufficient at the pleadings stage to suggest knowledge of imprudence or to support the inference that the fiduciaries could have foreseen Citigroup’s subprime losses.

Disclosure

The court’s treatment of the disclosure claims was equally instructive. Plaintiffs’ allegations rested on two theories of liability under ERISA: (1) failing to provide complete and accurate information to participants (the “nondisclosure” theory), and (2) conveying materially inaccurate information about Citigroup stock to participants (the “misrepresentation” theory).

As to the nondisclosure theory, the court found that Citigroup adequately disclosed in plan documents made available to participants the risks of investing in Citigroup stock, including the undiversified nature of the investment, its volatility, and the importance of diversification. The court also emphasized that ERISA does not impose an obligation on employers to disclose nonpublic information to participants regarding a specific plan investment option.

Turning to the misrepresentation theory, the court found plaintiffs’ allegations that the fiduciaries “knew or should have known” about Citigroup’s subprime losses, or that they failed to investigate the prudence of the stock, were too threadbare to support a claim for relief. Though plaintiffs claimed that false statements in SEC filings were incorporated by reference into summary plan descriptions (SPDs), the court found no basis to infer that the individual defendants knew the statements were false. It also concluded there were no facts which, if proved, would show (without the benefit of hindsight) that an investigation of Citigroup’s financial condition would have revealed the stock was no longer a prudent investment.

IMPLICATIONS

Coming from the influential Second Circuit, the Citigroup decision represents something of a tipping point in stock-drop jurisprudence, especially with respect to the dozens of companies (including many financial services companies) that have been sued in stock-drop cases based on events surrounding the 2007-08 global financial crisis. The Second Circuit opinion gives the presumption of prudence critical mass among appellate courts and signals a potential shift in how stock-drop claims will be evaluated, including at the motion to dismiss stage.[2]

Under the Citigroup analysis, fiduciaries should not override the plan terms regarding employer stock unless maintaining the stock investment would frustrate the purpose of the plan, such as when the company is facing imminent collapse or some other “dire situation” that threatens its viability. Like other circuits that have adopted the prudence presumption, the Citigroup court emphasized the long-term nature of retirement investing and the need to refrain from acting in response to “mere stock fluctuations, even those that trend downhill significantly.” It also sided with other courts in holding that the presumption of prudence should be applied at the motion to dismiss stage (i.e., not allowing plaintiffs to gather evidence through discovery to show the imprudence of the stock). Taken together, these rulings may make it harder for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss, especially where their allegations of imprudence are based on relatively short-lived declines in stock price.

Some had predicted the Second Circuit would endorse the “hardwiring” argument and allow employers to remove fiduciary discretion by designating stock as a mandatory investment in the plan document. The Citigroup court was unwilling to go that far, but it did adopt a “sliding scale” under which judicial scrutiny will increase with the degree of discretion a plan gives its fiduciaries to offer company stock as an investment. This is similar to the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit inQuan and consistent with the heightened deference that courts generally give to fiduciaries when employer stock is hardwired into the plan. Thus, through careful plan drafting, employers should be able to secure the desired standard of review. Language in the plan document and trust agreement (as well as other documents) confirming that employer stock is a required investment option should result in the most deferential standard and provide fiduciaries the greatest protection.

Also noteworthy was the court’s treatment of the disclosure claims. Many stock-drop complaints piggyback on allegations of securities fraud, creating an inevitable tension between disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws and disclosure obligations under ERISA. The Second Circuit did not resolve this tension, but it construed ERISA fiduciary disclosure requirements narrowly and rejected the notion that fiduciaries have a general duty to tell participants about adverse corporate developments. The court made this ruling in the context of SPD disclosures under the 401(k) plan that identified specific risks of investing in Citigroup stock. Plan sponsors should review their SPDs and other participant communications to make sure company stock descriptions are sufficiently explicit about issues such as the volatility of a single-stock investment and the importance of diversification. These disclosures may go beyond what is already required under Department of Labor regulations.

[1]. See Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 552, 568 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 2011 WL 4530151 (2011); Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010); Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 254 (5th Cir. 2008); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459-60 (6th Cir. 1995).

[2]. That said, plan sponsors and fiduciaries should continue to monitor future developments in Citigroup in light of Judge Straub’s dissenting opinion and the likelihood of a petition for rehearing (or rehearing en banc), which the Citigroup plaintiffs have indicated they intend to seek. In his dissent, Judge Straub rejected the Moench presumption in favor of plenary review of fiduciary decisions regarding employer stock. He also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of ERISA disclosure duties.

The U.S. Has a New Patent Law

Posted in the National Law Review on October 27, 2011 an article regarding the Patent Reform Act of 2011 by Taylor P. Evans of Andrews Kurth LLP:

President Obama signed the Patent Reform Act of 2011 into law on September 16, 2011. Below is a summary of selected provisions of the Act.

First to File

Effective March 2013, the U.S. patent system will change from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system. This means that if two people make the same invention and there has been no public disclosure of the invention, and both describe and claim that invention in separate patent applications, the inventor that filed his patent application first gets the patent. Thus, filing early will be more critical than ever before. Companies should consider filing a provisional application for an invention as early as possible, possibly followed by additional provisional applications as the technology of an invention develops, with a non-provisional application within a year of the first provisional application. The first-to-file provision will have no effect on existing patents or applications filed before March 2013.

Post-Grant Challenges

Effective September 2012, third parties will be able to challenge the validity of patents within nine months of issuance in the Patent Office in a Post-Grant Opposition Review proceeding. Any basis for a validity challenge will be entertained, including questions of novelty and obviousness, as well as challenges based on non-patentable subject matter or an improper written description or other formalities. After nine months, third parties may challenge patents through Inter Partes Review, which will replace existing Inter Partes Reexamination proceedings. In an Inter Partes Review, invalidity challenges must be based only on prior patents and printed publications.

In view of these changes, companies planning to initiate Inter Partes Reexamination proceedings should do so prior to September 2012. In addition, companies should arrange a monitoring program to identify patents that relate to the company’s product line for possible challenge in a Post-Grant Opposition Review proceeding upon issuance. Similarly, patentees should be aware that a significant challenge against their patents in the patent office may develop, and they should be prepared to defend against challenges from competitors when their own patents issue.

False Marking

The new Act severely limits false marking lawsuits. Only the federal government and direct competitors that have been damaged can sue for false marking. Furthermore, non-government litigants will no longer be able to collect five hundred dollars in damages per item. In addition, it is no longer actionable not to remove expired patent numbers from products. The new law also provides for “virtual marking,” by which a company marks its product with “Patent” or “Pat.,” followed by a web address. The corresponding website displays the patent marking information and must be available to the public at no charge. These changes apply retroactively to existing cases.

Disjoinder

The new law bars plaintiffs from suing multiple defendants in the same suit if the only thing that the defendants have in common is that they are alleged to infringe the same patent(s). Courts will also be barred from consolidating cases involving different defendants according to the same criteria, except that unrelated parties may still be joined for purposes of discovery. This provision applies to all suits filed on or after September 16, 2011.

Supplemental Examination

Supplemental examination is a new post-grant procedure that will allow a patentee to cure possible inequitable conduct by presenting previously withheld information to the Patent Office after issuance of a patent. After the previously withheld information is presented, and if the claims are allowed again, that information cannot be used in later court proceedings. Supplemental examination proceedings cannot be commenced or continue once an infringement action has been brought.

Assignee Filing

Under the new Act, a company can file a patent application on behalf of an inventor where the inventor is under obligation to assign its rights to the company and refuses to sign the oath or declaration. This provision will become effective in September 2012.

Fees

Effective September 26, 2011, all Patent Office fees will be subject to a 15% surcharge.

Other Changes

There are numerous other changes to the patent system under the Patent Reform Act of 2011, including, for example, elimination of the “best mode” requirement, and changes unique to specific types of inventions, such as business methods or computers. For additional information or to discuss all the new changes in more detail, please call us.

IRS Announces Retirement Plan Limitations for 2012 Tax Year – Most Limits Increased

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article written by Alyssa D. Dowse of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding the cost of living adjustments for the 2012 tax year:

The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has announced the cost of living adjustments for the 2012 tax year, which affect various dollar limitations for retirement plans. The IRS increased many of these limitations for the first time since 2009. Some limitations remain unchanged. The following chart highlights many of the noteworthy limitations for the 2012 tax year.

Plan Limit	2011	2012
Social Security Taxable Wage Base	$106,800	$110,100
Annual Compensation (Code Section 401(a)(17))	$245,000	$250,000
Elective Deferral (Contribution) Limit for Employees who Participate in 401(k), 403(b) and most 457(b) Plans (Code Sections 402(g), 457(e)(15))	$16,500	$17,000
Age 50 Catch-Up Contribution Limit (Code Section 414(v)(2)(B)(i))	$5,500	$5,500
Highly Compensated Employee Threshold (Code Section 414(q)(1)(B))	$110,000	$115,000
Defined Contribution Plan Limitation on Annual Additions (Code Section 415(c)(1)(A))	$49,000	$50,000
Defined Benefit Plan Limitation on Annual Benefit (Code Section 415(b)(1)(A))	$195,000	$200,000
ESOP Distribution Period Rules—Payouts in Excess of Five Years (Code Section 409(o)(1)(C))	$985,000 $195,000	$1,015,000 $200,000
Key Employee Compensation Threshold for Officers (Code Section (416(i)(1)(A)(i))	$160,000	$165,000

Plan sponsors should review employee communications and update such communications as appropriate based on the 2012 cost of living adjustments. Other cost of living adjustments can be found on the IRS website: http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0,,id=96461,00.html.

Hooters Sues Competitor over Alleged Trade Secrets Theft after Top Executives Fly Away

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Eric H. Rumbaugh, Luis I. Arroyo and Steven A. Nigh of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP regarding misappropriating its trade secrets and other confidential business information following the departure of several Hooters executives:

Hooters of America LLC has sued a competitor in Georgia Federal Court for allegedly misappropriating its trade secrets and other confidential business information following the departure of several Hooters executives to Twin Peaks Restaurants.

Hooters’ complaint alleges that former vice president of operations and purchasing, Joseph Hummel, gained unauthorized access to Hooters’ computers and took trade secrets and other confidential information. Specifically, Hooters claims that around the time of his departure, Hummel downloaded and transferred confidential sales figures, employee training and retention strategies and purchasing information to his personal e-mail account. The suit also accuses Hummel of additional unauthorized access of private business information following the termination of his employment.

Hummel, as well as Hooters’ former Chief Executive Officer and its general counsel, left the beach-themed restaurant franchise to join up with Twin Peaks, which operates a mountain lodge-themed restaurant chain featuring an all-female wait staff. Hooters contends that Hummel’s alleged theft has allowed Twin Peaks to hit the ground running in its efforts to open 35 restaurants in the next decade, several of which are planned for markets with Hooters restaurants.

The case illustrates the potential damage that departing employees, particularly those with access to sensitive information, can wreak on an employer. Hooters has already taken one step towards protecting itself; before Hummel left, he signed a confidentiality agreement requiring him to return all confidential and proprietary information to Hooters. In addition to confidentiality agreements, employers should consider having their top executives or other employees with access to sensitive information sign non-competition agreements. Moreover, most states’ trade secret statutes require businesses to take steps that are reasonable under the circumstances to protect their confidential information in order to preserve the trade secret status of that information. Accordingly, employers should consider implementing electronic security measures beyond just login credentials; limiting the number of employees who are authorized to access confidential information; and regulating employees’ ability to take information off company premises.

Next, when key employees depart, and especially when they depart for a competitor, businesses should consult with counsel immediately, and before examining (and arguably damaging) electronic evidence. Departing employees who take information often leave a shockingly obvious electronic trail; but that trail can be lost quickly if not preserved, or inadvertently destroyed if improperly accessed.

Lastly, businesses engaging talent, and especially talent that comes from a competitor, cannot be too careful or too forceful in making sure that the incoming talent does not make, retain or transfer any copies of information from their previous employer. Businesses engaging talent that acted improperly on the way out can quickly embroil their new employers in costly and risky litigation.

Creating a Social Media Policy

Posted on October 18, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by Brian J. Moore of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP regarding the importance of employers having a social media policy:

It is essential for employers to develop a social networking policy, especially in light of the many legal issues that may arise. Employers must consider the many goals that the policy intends to cover, such as:

Protecting the company’s trade secrets, confidential, proprietary and/or privileged information;
Protecting the company’s reputation;
Protecting the privacy of employees; and
Establishing guidelines for whether use of social networking sites during working hours is permitted, and if so, under what circumstances.

Employers must also consider the parameters in developing a new policy, such as:

Urging employees to go to human resources with work-related issues and complaints before blogging about them;
Setting forth the potential for discipline, up to and including termination, if an employee misuses social networking sites relating to employment;
Establishing a reporting procedure for suspected violations of the policy;
Enforcing the policy consistently and with regard to all employees;
Reiterating that company policies, including harassment and discrimination policies, apply with equal force to employees’ communications on social networking sites;
Reminding employees that the computers and email system are company property intended for business use only, and that the company may monitor computer and email usage; and
Arranging for employees to sign a written acknowledgment that they have read, understand and will abide by the policy.

As seen is the October 14th issue of Business Lexington

Second Circuit Finds that Employers May be Obligated to Accommodate a Disabled Employee's Commute

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorneys James R. Hays, Jonathan Sokolowski and James R. Hays of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding disabled employees and employers requirements to assist them:

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, employers may be required to assist disabled employees with their commute.

In Nixon-Tinkelman v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 10-3317-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16569 (2d Cir. N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011), plaintiff Barbara Nixon-Tinkelman (“Plaintiff”), who has cancer, heart problems, asthma, and is hearing impaired, brought suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act alleging that the New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (“Defendant” or “DOHMH”) failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. Specifically, following her transfer from Queens to Manhattan, Plaintiff requested that DOHMH accommodate her commute by transferring her back to an office location closer to her home in Queens. DOHMH ultimately denied Plaintiff’s request.

The Southern District of New York dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that activities which “fall outside the scope of the job, like commuting to and from the workplace, are not within the province of an employer’s obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” However, on appeal, the Second Circuit faulted the district court’s holding, explaining that certain circumstances may require an employer to provide commuting assistance to a disabled employee, and furthermore, that providing such assistance is not “inherently unreasonable.” Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court, and tasked it with engaging in the “fact-specific inquiry” necessary to determine whether it would have been reasonable to provide Plaintiff with a commuting accommodation. On remand, the Second Circuit directed the district court to consider the following factors: (a) Defendant’s total number of employees; (b) the number and location of Defendant’s offices; (c) whether other positions exist for which Plaintiff was qualified; (d) whether Plaintiff could have been transferred to a more convenient office without unduly burdening Defendant’s operations; and (e) the reasonableness of allowing Plaintiff to work from home without on-site supervision.

In addition to the above-listed factors, the Second Circuit also noted that the district court should have contemplated whether transferring Plaintiff “back to Queens or another closer location, allowing her to work from home, or providing a car or parking permit” would have accommodated her needs.

Nixon-Tinkelman serves as a reminder to employers that they must carefully assess all requests for reasonable accommodations from disabled employees. Although employers are not required to provide the specific accommodations employees may request, they must nevertheless work with employees to determine what reasonable accommodations, if any, can be made.

Category: Corporate law

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