Category: Contracts

Chicken Restaurant Case Serves Up A Bucket of Sound Contract Principles for Commercial Leases

vonBriesen

 

In Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality LLC, 2013 WI 62, the Wisconsin Supreme Courthighlighted the importance of including precise language in commercial leases, especially if the lease includes an integration clause. The court confirmed that when dealing with a fully integrated lease, it is guided by the terms of the lease as written rather than by extrinsic evidence or unwritten understandings between the parties. While this may seem obvious, this case serves as a good reminder for those who negotiate commercial leases to always include all specific business and legal terms.

Tufail (“Landlord”) and Midwest Hospitality LLC (“Tenant”) entered into a lease for commercial property that was then being used by Landlord as a “New York Chicken” restaurant. Tenant leased this property with the intent of operating a “Church’s Chicken” restaurant. However, during build-out, Tenant discovered that a special use permit would be required to operate its fast food restaurant with a drive-through. While Tenant was able to obtain the permit it needed, the permit was conditioned upon the restaurant being closed by 9 p.m. (as opposed to the 4 a.m. close time allowed for the prior restaurant).

Tenant terminated the Lease and notified Landlord that it would stop paying rent due to the adverse effect the earlier closing time would have on its profitability. Tenant argued that the permit requirement was contrary to Landlord’s representation that Tenant would not be prevented from using the premises for the permitted uses set forth in the lease. The lease contained the following use clause: “[t]enant may use and occupy the Premises for any lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the retail sales, consumption, and delivery of food and beverages which shall include, but not be limited to, Chicken products, Fish products, bread products, salads, sandwiches, dessert items, promotional items, and any other items sold by any Church’s Chicken store.”

After reviewing the lease’s integration clause and finding it to be complete, the court rejected Tenant’s argument that the general reference to “Church’s Chicken” in the use clause required that a fast food restaurant with a drive-through be allowed because the understanding between the parties was that Church’s Chicken restaurants were in fact drive-through fast food restaurants. The court concluded that the lease did not include a false representation and also limited its review to the specific language used in the use and representation clauses of the lease due to its conclusion that the lease was fully integrated.

The court also concluded that the terms of the representation clause as written required simply that Tenant not be prevented from using the property for the purposes set forth in the use clause. The court stated that there was nothing that prevented Tenant from specifically addressing hours of operation, the requirement that a drive-through be allowed, or other specific requirements it considered to be vital to the successful operation of its restaurant in the lease. However, the court was bound to interpret only the contract to which the parties actually agreed, and these requirements were not included therein.

While this is a misrepresentation case on its face, the case ultimately turned on basic contract principles and is an important reminder of the effects of integration clauses. Not only can these “boilerplate” clauses intensify the scrutiny of the specific language chosen by the parties, but, as shown in this case, they can be used to support the theory that even the smallest of deal points should have been included in the agreement if they were important to the parties. This case demonstrates that it is extremely important to include precise, unambiguous language in leases and to double check that even the seemingly minor deal points are included in the lease if they are necessary to make the deal viable.

Article By:

Chris A. Jenny
William R. West
Megan L.W. Jerabek
Of:
von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

“Dual” Employment Contracts for US Executives Working in the UK

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Background

February 2014

Individuals, whether of British or foreign nationality, who reside in the UK are, in principle, taxable on their worldwide employment income. Many US executives who are “seconded” by their US employer to work in the UK may therefore become UK tax resident.

Such US executives who have not been UK resident in the three previous tax years and are not UK domiciled need not pay UK tax on their overseas earnings if they do not bring the income to the UK. Other US executives resident in the UK over the longer term may incur liability for UK tax on their overseas income unless their employer structures their employment duties under separate employment contracts, one with the UK subsidiary for their UK duties and another with the US parent for their overseas duties. These have become known as “dual contracts”. If the non-UK domiciled executive keeps the income earned under the overseas contract outside the UK, no UK income tax should arise on that income. He or she will pay UK income tax on the income earned in the UK under his or her UK contract.

“All Change”

In December 2013 HM Government announced that it would be clamping down on the artificial use of dual contracts for longer-term UK residents and has now published draft legislation that makes offshore employment income in a dual-contract arrangement taxable in the UK in certain cases.

The New Rules

Under the new anti-avoidance rules, which come into force on 6 April 2014, the dual-contract overseas income of US executives resident in the UK will be taxed in the UK if:

  • the executive has a UK employment and one or more foreign employments,
  • the UK employer and the offshore employer either are the same entity or are in the same group,
  • the UK employment and the offshore employment are “related”, and
  • the foreign tax rate that applies to the remuneration from the offshore employment is less than 75 percent of the applicable rate of UK tax. The current top rate of UK income tax is 45 percent, and 75 percent of this rate is 33.75 percent.

The UK employment and the offshore employment will be “related” where, by way of non-exhaustive example:

  • one employment operates by reference to the other employment,
  • the duties performed in both employments are essentially the same (regardless of where those duties are performed),
  • the performance of duties under one contract is dependent on the performance of duties under the other,
  • the executive is a director of either employer, or is otherwise a senior employee or one of the highest earning employees of either employer, or
  • the duties under the dual contracts involve, wholly or partly, the provision of goods or services to the same customers or clients.

Action

US corporations should urgently review the use of dual contracts for their non-UK domiciled executives seconded to their UK subsidiaries before the 6 April 2014 start date. The proposed legislation is widely drafted and has the potential to catch even genuine dual-contract arrangements. If one of the dual contracts is with a group employer in a low-tax jurisdiction, that contract may be especially vulnerable. Dual contracts will not necessarily become extinct, but in the future, careful cross-border tax advice should be sought in their structuring.

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Vedder Price

The “Relocation Costs” Reimbursement Arrangement: A Section 409A Trap for the Unwary

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When an employer requires an employee to move his or her primary residence to work, or continue working, for the employer, oftentimes the employer, as an inducement for the employee to accept the offer employment or continue employment, will agree to pay for some or all of the employee’s “relocation costs.” Employers must be aware of the critical tax implications that can flow from such an arrangement.

Agreements to reimburse the employee for the costs of relocating vary. For example, an employer and employee may agree that the employer will reimburse the employee for moving his or her personal belongings to the new location and perhaps one round-trip airfare for the employee and his or her family; or, the employer may agree to reimburse the employee for all associated relocation costs and related expenses up to a maximum amount. Regardless, if the reimbursement constitutes taxable income for the employee and is subject to Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), but the terms of the arrangement do not comply with the Code’s requirements , the employee may have to pay a whopping 20% excise tax on the reimbursement.

Not all moving or relocation expenses are treated alike for federal income and payroll tax purposes. Generally speaking, for moves within the United States an employee may deduct from his or her gross income the reasonable expenses associated with (1) moving his or her household goods and personal effects, and (2) travelling to his or her new home. However, these categories of expenses are deductible only if all of the following requirements are met: (1) the move is closely related to the start of employment, (2) the new job location is at least 50 miles farther from the prior home than the employee’s prior job location is from the former home, and (3) the employee works full time for at least 39 weeks during the first 12 months of employment at the new location.

If the expenses are of a type that may be deducted and meet the foregoing requirements, then an employer’s reimbursement of those expenses will also not be subject to withholding for income taxes, social security and Medicare taxes, provided that the reimbursement arrangement meets the following additional requirements: (1) the expenses have a business connection, i.e., the expenses were incurred in connection with performing services for that employer, (2) the employer requires that the employee adequately account for the expenses within a reasonable period of time, and (3) any excess reimbursements are returned to the employer within a reasonable period of time.

If the relocation cost reimbursement arrangement does not meet the foregoing requirements, or if the employer reimburses the employee for expenses that do not qualify as deductible moving expenses of the type outlined above, the amount of the reimbursement is subject to income taxes, social security and Medicare taxes. For example, employers may agree to pay for return trips to the former residence, pre-move house hunting expenses, temporary housing, storage costs for personal belongings (excluding those incurred in transit), or costs associated with entering into a new rental lease or canceling a prior lease. Reimbursement for any of these costs will be includable in income and subject to social security and Medicare taxes because they do not qualify as the type of expense that may be deductible, even though they may otherwise meet the requirements to be excluded from compensation. Since the reimbursements are taxable, careful consideration must be given in the event that the reimbursement constitutes non-qualified deferred compensation subject to Section 409A.

By way of background, subject to certain exceptions, and generally speaking, Section 409A requires that any compensation promised in one year that could by its terms be paid in a later tax year must be paid only upon certain permissible payment “events,” such as, for example, a fixed date or schedule, or upon termination of employment.

An agreement to reimburse an employee for relocation expenses may or may not cross tax years, but if under the terms of the agreement the reimbursement could be made in a later tax year, then it constitutes deferred compensation subject to Section 409A, and there are important documentary and operational requirements that must be met under Section 409A. If the agreement does not comply with these documentary and operational requirements, the reimbursement amount that the employee receives could be subject to the 20% excise tax.

First, the relocation reimbursement agreement should be written and the written document must provide (1) an objectively determinable non-discretionary definition of the expenses eligible for reimbursement, (2) the reimbursement will be for expenses incurred during an objectively and specifically prescribed period, and (3) that the amount of expenses eligible for reimbursement in one year will not affect the expenses eligible for reimbursement in any other year. (The reason for the rule outlined in number (3) is because the IRS does not want the employee to be able to, indirectly or directly, pick a more favorable tax year by, for example, holding on to the reimbursement request or delaying the incursion of the cost.)

Second, the reimbursement must be made on or before the last day of the employee’s tax year following the year in which the expense was incurred, and the right to the reimbursement cannot be exchanged for another benefit.

For the most part, an employer’s expense reimbursement policy will satisfy the rules regarding the timing of the reimbursement. Unfortunately, employers all too often either provide for a very vague definition of the “relocation costs” that may be reimbursed, or agree to a cap without taking into consideration that the expenses incurred in one year could impact the expenses eligible for reimbursement in the following year. Employers should draft their relocation agreements carefully to provide the desired benefit to the employee while staying within the confines of the limitations of Section 409A. Accordingly, we recommend that whenever an employer or employee agree to a relocation cost reimbursement arrangement, that counsel review the arrangements to ensure that it is either exempt from or otherwise in compliance with Section 409A.

Article by:

Jessica W. Catlow

Of:

Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) New Rules Target Veterans and Individuals with Disabilities

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Familiar with this?  It’s time to update your affirmative action plans.  For the women and minorities plan, you gather your applicant data, prepare spreadsheets and update your written materials to reflect new goals and changes in your recruiting sources.  For the veterans and individuals with disabilities plan, you update a bit and you’re done.  Starting early next year, however, the rules will change making updates more onerous for employers.  On August 27, 2013, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs announced final rules for federal contractors regarding hiring and employment of disabled individuals and protected veterans and imposing new data retention and affirmative action obligations on contractors.  The rules are expected to be published in the Federal Register shortly and will become effective 180 days later.

The key changes include:

  • Benchmarks.  Contractors must establish benchmarks, using one of two methods approved by the OFCCP, to measure progress in hiring veterans.  Likewise, contractors must strive to hire individuals with disabilities to comprise at least seven percent of employees in each job group.  The OFCCP says these are meant to be aspirational, and are not designed to be quotas.
  • Data Analysis and Retention.  Contractors must document and update annually several quantitative comparisons for the number of veterans who apply for jobs and the number of veterans that they hire.  Likewise, for individuals with disabilities, contractors are required to conduct analyses of disabled applicants and those hired.  Such data must be retained for three years.
  • Invitation to Self-Identify.  Contractors must invite applicants to self-identify as protected veterans and as an individual with a disability at both the pre-offer and post-offer phases of the application process, using language to be provided by the OFCCP.  This particular requirement worries employers who know that the less demographic information they have about applicants, the better – especially when the application is denied.  Contractors must also invite their employees to self-identify as individuals with a disability every five years, using language to be provided by the OFCCP.

Additional information, including with respect new requirements such as incorporating the equal opportunity clause into contracts, job listings, and records access, can be found here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/vevraa.htm) and here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm).

Contractors with an Affirmative Action Plan already in place on the effective date of the regulations will have additional time, until they create their next plans, to bring their plan into compliance.  However, whether they have a current Affirmative Action Plan or not, federal contractors should begin looking at these new rules now and take steps to ensure they are in compliance.

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A Federal District Court in Florida Finds Hospital System Properly Terminated a Professional Services Contract for a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Breach

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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida found on June 20, 2013 that defendant Community Health Systems, Inc., and its affiliated hospital, Salem Hospital (collectively, “CHS”) properly terminated a Professional Services Agreement it had with Managed Care Solutions, Inc. (“MCS”) for breach of contract after determining that Nichole Scott, one of MCS’s employees, misappropriated Protected Health Information (“PHI”) from the hospital. Ms. Scott misappropriated PHI from the hospital’s patients including patients’ checks, credit card numbers and social security numbers.

The Business Associate Agreement (“BAA”) between CHS and MCS provided, among other things, that in the event MCS breached its obligations under the BAA, CHS could terminate both the BAA and the Professional Services Agreement. After CHS terminated the Professional Services Agreement with MCS as a result of Ms. Scott’s misappropriation of its patients’ PHI, MCS sued CHS for breach of contract. The Florida District Court granted CHS’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the lawsuit.

The lesson from this case is that healthcare entities should have clear cross-default provisions in their Professional Services Agreements with their business associates and in their Business Associate Agreements that allow them to terminate the Professional Services Agreement or take other appropriate remedial action in the event of a breach by the business associate of its obligations under the Professional Services Agreement and/or under the Business Associate Agreement.

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Does My Email Communication Constitute a Binding Agreement?

GT Law

In an era where the prevalence of email exchanges in the business arena is almost commonplace, clients and attorneys should be aware that a form of identification which could constitute their signature in an email, attesting to the substance of a negotiated settlement, may be considered a binding and enforceable stipulation of settlement under CPLR 2104.  Last month, a unanimous panel of the Appellate Division, Second Department, held, in Forcelli v. Gelco Corporation, 27584/08, that an agent for a vehicle insurer who sent an email message to plaintiff’s counsel, with her name entered at the bottom of the email, summing up the settlement terms in an automobile accident case, constituted “a writing subscribed by [client] or his attorney” as required under the statute.

The Forcelli case was brought by Mr. Forcelli and his wife for injuries Mr. Forcelli allegedly suffered in connection with a three-car accident on the Saw Mill River Parkway.  One of the cars was driven by the defendant Mitchell Maller who was driving a car owned by defendant Gelco Corporation.  In January 2011, Gelco and Maller (the “Gelco Defendants”) moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims.  In March 2011, the Gelco Defendants met with plaintiffs and their counsel for mediation.  Ms. Brenda Greene, a claims adjuster with the insurer of the Gelco Defendants’ vehicle, was also present and she informed Plaintiffs that she had authority to settle the case on behalf of her insured.  Although the mediation did not result in an immediate settlement, the parties continued their discussions and on May 3, 2011, Ms. Greene orally offered to settle the case for $230,000.  Plaintiffs’ counsel orally accepted the offer on behalf of the Plaintiffs.  Ms. Greene then sent an email message to Plaintiffs’ counsel memorializing the terms of the settlement.  On May 4, 2011, Plaintiffs signed a release in exchange for receiving the $230,000.  A few days later, on May 10, 2011, the Supreme Court issued an order granting the Gelco Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against them.  After the Court’s decision, the Gelco Defendants took the position that there was no settlement finalized under CPLR 2104.  Plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement agreement as set forth in Ms. Greene’s email message.

Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge Sandra Sgroi stated that “given the now widespread use of email as a form of written communication in both personal and business affairs, it would be unreasonable to conclude that email messages are incapable of conforming to the criteria of CPLR 2104 simply because they cannot be physically signed in a traditional fashion.”  Specifically, Judge Sgroi noted that the agent ended the email with the expression “Thanks Brenda Greene,” which “indicates that the author purposefully added her name to this particular email message rather than a situation where the sender’s email software has been programmed to automatically generate the name of the email sender….”  Judge Sgroi noted that Ms. Greene’s email message set forth the material terms of the settlement agreement and contained an expression of mutual assent.  Importantly, the settlement was not conditioned on any further occurrence and the record clearly demonstrated that Ms. Greene had apparent authority to settle the case on behalf of the insured.

Judge Sgroi cited to both First and Third Department decisions where those Courts came to the same conclusion.  In Williamson v. Delsener, 59 A.D.3d 291 (2009), the Appellate Division, First Department held that “emails exchanged between counsel, which contained their printed names at the end, constitute signed writings (CPLR 2104) within the meaning of the statute of frauds and entitle plaintiff to judgment.”  The First Department noted that the email communications evidenced that Delsener was aware of and consented to the settlement and there was no indication in the record that counsel was without authority to enter into the settlement.

Likewise, in Newmark & Co. Real Estate Inc. v. 2615 East 17 Street Realty LLC, 80 A.D.3d 476 (2011), which involved payment of a commission under a brokerage agreement, the First Department found that although the defendant did not sign the brokerage agreement sent by the plaintiff, there were several email communications, supported by other documentary evidence, which contained the terms of the brokerage agreement.  The Court stated that “an email sent by a party, under which the sending party’s name is typed, can constitute a writing for the purposes of the statute of frauds.”  The email agreement set forth all relevant terms of the agreement and thus “constituted a meeting of the minds.”

The Appellate Division, Third Department, held in Brighton Investment, LTD. v. Ronen Har-ZVI, 88 A.D.3d 1220 (2011) that “an exchange of emails may constitute an enforceable contract, even if a party subsequently fails to sign implementing documents, when the communications are sufficiently clear and concrete to establish such an intent.”  (internal citations omitted.)

While the law in this area is plainly evolving, clients and attorneys should be careful when setting forth terms of a settlement or conducting any sort of negotiations via email.  One simple suggestion that may reduce the risk that emails with typed signatures (or even a signature block) at the bottom may unintentionally create a binding agreement is to include in the email a form of disclaimer that the email is for negotiation purposes only and does not constitute or give rise to a binding legal agreement.  We certainly have not heard the last word on this subject.  It will be up to the Court of Appeals to render a decision that will hopefully give some degree of finality to the issue of whether name identification on an email constitutes the type of signature required for a binding settlement under CPLR 2104.

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Zappos and It's Effect On "Browswrap" Agreements

Lewis & Roca

Key Takeaways For An Enforceable Terms of Use Agreement

In light of the recent Nevada federal district court decision In re Zappos.com, Inc., ‎Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, companies should review and update their ‎implementation of browsewrap agreements to ensure users are bound to its terms. MDL No. ‎‎2357, 2012 WL 4466660 (D.Nev. Sept. 27, 2012).

A browsewrap agreement refers to the online Terms of Use agreement that binds a web ‎user merely by his continued browsing of the site, even when he is not aware of it. Any ‎somewhat experienced web user is no stranger to the Terms of Use link that leads to the ‎browsewrap agreement. Yet, the users tend to ignore the link’s existence, and rarely think of it ‎as a “contract” with any practical effects. In Zappos, the court questioned the browsewrap ‎agreement’s validity particularly because of this tendency among web users. The court ruled the ‎arbitration clause in Zappos’ browsewrap Terms of Use was unenforceable because the users did ‎not agree to it and Zappos had the right to modify the terms at any time. ‎

Background of the Case

Founded in 1999, Zappos.com is a subsidiary of Amazon.com and one of the nation’s ‎biggest online retailers for footwear and apparel. Currently headquartered in Henderson, ‎Nevada, the company has more than 24 million customer accounts. In mid-January 2012, its ‎computer system experienced a security breach in which hackers attempted to access the ‎company’s customer accounts and personal information.

After Zappos notified its customers about the incident, customers from across the country ‎filed lawsuits against Zappos, seeking relief for damages arising from the breach. The cases were ‎transferred to and consolidated in Nevada. Zappos then sought to enforce the arbitration clause ‎contained in its Terms of Use, which would stay the litigation in federal court and compel the ‎case for arbitration. The court denied Zappos’ motion on two grounds: there was no valid ‎agreement to arbitrate due to the lack of assent by the plaintiffs and the contract was ‎unenforceable because it reserved to Zappos the right to modify the terms at any time and ‎without notice to its users.

Lessons Learned from the Browsewrap

Mutual Assent Must Be Clear 

Arbitration provisions are a matter of contract law, and the traditional elements of a ‎contract must be met even though Zappos’ Terms of Use was presented in electronic, ‎browsewrap form on the website. An essential element of contract formation is mutual assent by ‎the parties to the contract, which the court found was missing in this case as there was no ‎evidence of the plaintiffs’ assent.

The court compared the browsewrap agreement with another popular form of online terms ‎of use agreement, the “clickwrap” agreement. Clickwrap agreements require users to take ‎affirmative actions, such as clicking on an “I Accept” button, to expressly manifest their assent to ‎the terms and conditions.‎

Since Zappos’ browsewrap agreement did not require its users to take similar affirmative ‎action to show their assent to the terms and conditions, there was no direct evidence showing ‎that the plaintiffs consented to or even had actual knowledge of the agreement, including the ‎arbitration clause.‎

Link It Front and Center 

Furthermore, the court found Zappos’ Terms of Use hyperlink was inconspicuous and ‎thus did not provide reasonable notice to its users. The link was a) “buried” in the middle or ‎bottom of each page and became visible when a user scrolls down, b) appeared “in the same size, ‎font, and color as most other non-significant links,” and c) the website did not “direct a user to ‎the Terms of Use when creating an account, logging in to an existing account, or making a ‎purchase.” The court concluded that under ordinary circumstances, users would have no reason ‎to click on the link.‎

Unilateral Right to Modify or Terminate Won’t Work

Another problem with Zappos’ browsewrap agreement was that it was illusory and thus ‎unenforceable. In the agreement, the company “retain[ed] the unilateral, unrestricted right to ‎terminate the arbitration agreement” and had “no obligation to receive consent from, or even ‎notify, the other parties to the contract.” Users would unsuspectingly agree to the changes by ‎continuing to use the site. Under this provision, Zappos could seek to enforce the arbitration ‎clause, as it did here, or not enforce it by modifying the clause without notice to its users when it ‎was no longer in its interest to arbitrate. In either circumstance, the users would still be bound to ‎the agreement.

Implications for Companies

As a result of this decision, companies should carefully reassess the display and content ‎of the online terms of use they adopt to ensure their enforceability. In a narrow sense, the ‎decision means an arbitration clause in a browsewrap agreement similar to Zappos’ may be ‎deemed unenforceable. More broadly, this decision threatens the validity and enforceability of ‎other terms and conditions contained in a browsewrap agreement, which may deprive the ‎company of the agreement’s protection and favorable terms. ‎

Clickwrap agreements seem to provide the solution to Zappos’ problem. The court ‎suggested a clickwrap agreement could obtain a user’s assent to the terms and conditions. A ‎company may implement the clickwrap agreement through account registration or purchase ‎check-out, tailored to the nature of the company’s business and user interaction. The system may ‎require a user to click “I Accept” to secure the user’s assent to be bound by the agreement before ‎he can proceed further on the website. ‎

On the other hand, the court did not conclude that browsewrap agreements are never ‎enforceable. Other courts have held that browsewrap agreements are generally enforceable. ‎Enforceability largely depends on how the company presents the link and terms to the users such ‎that the users would have reasonable notice of the information. Accordingly, a browsewrap ‎agreement may be enforceable if the hyperlink is conspicuously located and displayed. ‎

In addition, companies should communicate and secure a user’s assent to any ‎modification when the user has previously accepted the terms and conditions. The user may ‎consent through another clickwrap agreement showing the modified terms. With a browsewrap ‎agreement, notice of the changes should, at the minimum, be conspicuously displayed on the ‎webpage. ‎

What This Means 

The Zappos decision reflects a change in the public policy on web activities, and users ‎who do not affirmatively agree to the online Terms of Use may no longer be bound. Consumers ‎are increasingly turning to the web for goods and services. In reaction, courts are beginning to ‎look closer into the transactions and resulting issues that occur online. In this process, courts are ‎testing and requiring new standards for these Terms of Use agreements. Companies should be ‎aware of the court’s evolving attitude towards the different types of agreements. You are ‎encouraged to seek legal guidance to properly adapt your implementation of Terms of Use ‎agreements. Failure to update your Terms of Use agreements may leave you exposed to ‎unfavorable terms that the Terms of Use is designed to prevent.‎

Doing Business In Latin America: Does Your Local Supplier Have Best Practices In Place So That Your Company Can Avoid Liability Under The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)?

Sheppard Mullin 2012

Imagine yourself the CEO of a successful multinational company. In the past few years, you have overseen ACME’s expansion into Latin America – a market whose demographic profile holds the promise of mouthwatering profits for your company, particularly with the upcoming holiday season. As they say, la vida es buena!

In planning for the Latin America expansion, you knew about the rules and prohibitions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and implemented measures to ensure your employees do not run afoul of the law. However, you may not have known that the company can incur FCPA liability for payments made by third parties, such as such as suppliers, logistics providers, and sales agents, with whom your company works. In fact, a company can be held liable if it knows or should know that a third-party intends to make a corrupt payment on behalf of or for the benefit of the company. Because a company can be responsible for conduct of which it should have known, a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of the facts will not establish a defense.

To protect your company from third party liability, it is essential to perform due diligence on potential business partners. This is not to say that you cannot consider the recommendations of local employees in selecting business partners. Relying on those recommendations alone, however, could expose the company to FCPA liability if that company does not conduct itself with the same level of integrity that you do. The amount of diligence necessary varies from one potential business partner to the next and can include an anti-corruption questionnaire, document review, reference interviews, or local media review, among other things.

That’s all well and good, but what about companies with whom you are already doing business and whom you now realize you may not have adequately investigated? Asking to review those companies’ FCPA compliance policies is a good first step. If you determine that a policy is inadequate, you may ask the company to provide FCPA training to its employees. You should also carefully monitor the company’s contract performance to ensure compliance. In particular, you should consider evidence of unusual payment patterns, extraordinary “commissions,” or a lack of transparency. The key question is: how is the company spending your money?

When in doubt, experienced legal counsel can assist you in navigating these and other FCPA issues. For example, Sheppard Mullin offers Spanish language training on the provisions of the FCPA and advice for successfully implementing internal safeguards and controls to protect against FCPA liability.

With a solid FCPA plan in place, your thoughts wander back to the upcoming holiday season and your company’s projected profits for the new Latin America division and you smile to yourself. La vida es buena.

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Complete Your Non-Compete Agreement: Helpful Drafting Tips

McBrayer NEW logo 1-10-13

Perhaps you consider your non-compete agreement just one form in a stack of many? When it is time to use it there is not much to the process: you retrieve it from the HR office, briefly discuss it with the employee, and he willingly signs it. But such a practice is a perilous one because non-compete agreements are not meant to be “one-size-fits-all.” Rather, they should be thoughtfully tweaked to each specific employee and situation. By relying on boilerplate language and fill-in-the-blank forms, you are risking the chance that a court will find your agreement unenforceable.

Unfortunately, there are no bright-line rules that employers can abide by to ensure the legality of agreements, but there are some factors that you should consider when drafting these agreements that should assist employers in enforcing their agreements when the time comes to do so, including:

1) The nature of the industry

The higher the competition in the industry, the more likely a non-compete will be upheld. If the industry is such where an individual may gain sensitive or secretive data, strategies, or business models, then a strict non-compete makes much more sense. On the other hand, if succeeding in the industry primarily results from people relying on their own strengths (good service, knowledge, etc.), then there is less of a reason to restrict them from competing against their former employer because they will not be relying on what was gained at their previous employment. Compare the industry of a Silicon Valley technology start-up versus that of a general family physician; a non-compete agreement makes much more sense in the former rather than the latter. Lesson – explain clearly the reason why the agreement is necessary. 

2) The relevant characteristics of the employer

Is the business local or global? Are there a handful of employees or thousands? Does the employer dominate the industry or is competition fierce? As a general rule, the larger the employer’s geographical reach, the larger the geographical restriction can be. Yet, the geographic reach of the employer is just one of many considerations and must be viewed in light of the entire non-compete. For example, a court may uphold a one-year restriction of competing nationally, if the business is global. On the other hand, if the business is unique to one state (say, breeding racing thoroughbreds) then a five-year, state-wide restriction could be held unenforceable. Take time to understand your business and catalogue its characteristics. Lesson –limit the geographic and durational scope of the restriction as much as is reasonable – and explain the reasons for each.

There are some additional tips worth sharing; check back on Wednesday and I’ll discuss what else you can do to improve your non-compete agreements.

Employment as Consideration in Employee Non-Competes: Less than Two Years is Not Enough

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The Illinois Appellate court very recently clarified a budding dispute among practitioners regarding what type of consideration is necessary to enforce a non-compete or non-solicitation agreement. In Fifield v. Premier Dealer Services, Inc., in which our firm represented the employee and his new employer, the First District Illinois Appellate Court set forth this bright line rule — if the only consideration for a restrictive covenant is employment, then an employee has to work at least two years after signing the agreement before the non-compete or non-solicitation agreement can be enforced. This is true even if the restriction meets all other requirements (e.g., legitimate interest, reasonable scope).

This rule applies whether or not the agreement is signed at the beginning of employment or during, whether the employee quits or is fired. It simply doesn’t matter. Unless the employee has worked two years, the company will not be able to enforce that agreement unless some other adequate consideration is given for the restrictive covenant.

What does this mean to you? It means that if you hire a new employee and require her to sign a non-compete and that employee leaves a year after being hired, you will not be able to enforce that non-compete agreement no matter what. Indeed, based on the Fifield case, if the employee works one year and eleven months and then leaves, the agreement would still not be enforceable.

The same rule would apply if you ask an employee to sign a non-compete during his or her employment. After that agreement is signed, the employee has to work an additional two years for the agreement to be enforceable, provided that the only consideration for the agreement is employment.

And that is the loophole that the court has left employers: providing some other consideration besides employment. For example, if a company gives a real (not an illusory or nominal) signing bonus, the employer would have a fairly good argument that it has provided adequate consideration to enforce the agreement. Perhaps a promotion would work as well, although that is more problematic since a promotion is still basically employment. After promoting its employee, nothing prevents the company from then firing the employee, if employment is at will. If, on the other hand, the employee was hired for a particular amount of time (at least two years) during which he or she could not be fired without cause, that could itself be sufficient consideration since it would arguably constitute two years of employment even if the employee quit early.

Another, albeit untested possibility would be to draft the restrictive covenant in such a way that the post-employment restriction would be equal to the length of time that the employee actually works. So if the employee leaves after one year, then she or he is restricted for one year. To be enforceable, the restriction would likely have to have some maximum period of time. Probably two to three years at the most.

As you can see, this new ruling has significant implications. At the very least, every company should carefully review its non-compete and non-solicitation agreements to see if they are supported by adequate consideration. If they don’t, then you should discuss with your attorneys how best to rectify the situation. You certainly do not want your former employees going to competitors singing, “I can’t get no consideration.”

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