Category: Consumer Protection

CPSC Sues Amazon to Force Recall of Hazardous Products Sold on Amazon.com

The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) announced on July 14, 2021, that it filed an administrative complaint against Amazon.com, “the world’s largest retailer, to force Amazon to accept responsibility for recalling potentially hazardous products sold on Amazon.com.” CPSC claims that the specified products sold through Amazon’s “fulfilled by Amazon” (FBA) program are defective and pose a risk of serious injury or death to consumers and that Amazon is legally responsible to recall them. According to the complaint, the products include “24,000 faulty carbon monoxide detectors that fail to alarm, numerous children’s sleepwear garments that are in violation of the flammable fabric safety standard risking burn injuries to children, and nearly 400,000 hair dryers sold without the required immersion protection devices that protect consumers against shock and electrocution.”

CPSC filed the complaint under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). According to the complaint, Amazon acts as a “distributor,” as defined by CPSA, of its FBA products by: (a) receiving delivery of FBA consumer products from a merchant with the intent to distribute the product further; (b) holding, storing, sorting, and preparing for shipment FBA products in its warehouses and fulfillment centers; and (c) distributing FBA consumer products into commerce by delivering FBA products directly to consumers or to common carriers for delivery to consumers.

The complaint states that after CPSC notified Amazon about the hazards presented by the specified products, Amazon took “several unilateral actions,” including:

  • Removing the Amazon Standard Identification Numbers (ASIN) for certain of the specified products; and
  • Notifying consumers who purchased certain of the specified products that they could present a hazard. Amazon also offered a refund to these consumers in the form of an Amazon gift card credited to their account.

According to the complaint, these actions “are insufficient to remediate the hazards posed by the Subject Products and do not constitute a fully effectuated Section 15 mandatory corrective action ordered by” CPSC. The complaint states that “[a] Section 15 order requiring Amazon to take additional actions in conjunction with the CPSC as a distributor is necessary for public safety.” The complaint asks CPSC to:

  1. Determine that Amazon is a distributor of consumer products in commerce, as those terms are defined in the CPSA;
  2. Determine that the specified products are substantial product hazards under CPSA Sections 15(a)(1), 15(a)(2), and 15(j);
  3. Determine that public notification in consultation with CPSC is required to protect the public adequately from substantial products hazards created by the specified products, and order Amazon to take actions set out in CPSA Section 15(c)(1), including but not limited to:
    1. Cease distribution of the specified products, including removal of the ASINs and any other listings of the specified products and functionally identical products, from Amazon’s online marketplace and identifying such ASINs to CPSC;
    2. Issue a CPSC-approved direct notice to all consumers who purchased the specified products that includes a particularized description of the hazard presented by each specified product and encourage the return of the specified product;
    3. Issue a CPSC-approved press release, as well as any other public notice documents or postings required by CPSC staff, that inform consumers of the hazard posed by the specified products and encourage the return or destruction of the specified products;
  4. Order that Amazon facilitate the return and destruction of the specified products, at no cost to consumers, to protect the public adequately from the substantial product hazard posed by the specified products, and order Amazon to take actions set out in CPSA Section 15(d)(1), including but not limited to:
    1. Refund the full the purchase price to all consumers who purchased the specified products and, to the extent not already completed, conditioning such refunds on consumers returning the specified products or providing proof of destruction;
    2. Destroy the specified products that are returned to Amazon by consumers or that remain in Amazon’s inventory, with proof of such destruction via a certificate of destruction or other acceptable documentation provided to CPSC staff;
    3. Provide monthly progress reports to reflect, among other things, the number of specified products located in Amazon’s inventory, returned by consumers, and destroyed;
    4. Provide monthly progress reports identifying all functionally equivalent products removed by Amazon from amazon.com pursuant to the CPSC Order, including the ASIN, the number distributed prior to removal, and the platform through which the products were sold;
  5. Provide monthly reports summarizing the incident data submitted to CPSC through the Retailer Reporting Program;
  6. Order that Amazon is prohibited from distributing in commerce the specified products, including any functionally identical products; and
  7. Order that Amazon take other and further actions as CPSC deems necessary to protect the public health and safety and to comply with CPSA and the Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA).

CPSC “urges consumers to visit SaferProducts.gov to check for recalls prior to purchasing products and to report any incidents or injuries to the CPSC.” CPSC published the complaint in the July 21, 2021, Federal Register. 86 Fed. Reg. 38450.

Commentary

In CPSC’s July 14, 2021, press release, Acting Chair Robert Adler states that the decision to file an administrative complaint is “a huge step across a vast desert — we must grapple with how to deal with these massive third-party platforms more efficiently, and how best to protect the American consumers who rely on them.” According to The Washington Post, CPSC issued the administrative complaint “after months of behind-the-scenes negotiations between regulators and Amazon as the agency tried to persuade the company to follow the CPSC’s rules for getting dangerous products off the market, according to a senior agency official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to comment on internal discussions.” This same official stated that “Amazon officials refused to acknowledge that the CPSC has the authority to compel the company to remove unsafe products.”

As reported in our February 16, 2018, blog item, “EPA Settles with Amazon on Distribution of Unregistered Pesticides,” the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Amazon entered into a Consent Agreement and Final Order (CAFO) whereby Amazon agreed to pay $1,215,700 in civil penalties for approximately 4,000 alleged violations under Section 3 of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) for the distribution of unregistered pesticide products. EPA later issued stop sale, use, or removal orders (SSURO) to Amazon and eBay for selling certain pesticide products that EPA claims are unregistered, misbranded, or restricted-use pesticides, and pesticide devices that EPA asserts make false or misleading claims. More information on the SSURO is available in our June 17, 2020, blog item, “EPA Issues Stop Sale, Use, or Removal Orders to Amazon and eBay for Unregistered and Misbranded Pesticides and Devices, Including Products with Claims Related to COVID-19.”

As reported in our October 9, 2020, blog item, Representatives Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), Chair of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce, requested that Amazon Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chair Jeff Bezos launch an investigation into the safety of Amazon’s product line, AmazonBasics, and answer a series of questions pertaining to the company’s product safety and recall practices. The Committee’s October 7, 2020, press release notes that the request comes after a CNN investigation found that many of AmazonBasics’ electronic products “have exploded, caught fire, sparked, melted, or otherwise created hazardous situations at rates well above comparable products.” According to the press release, many of these products were never recalled and continue to be sold.

CPSC’s administrative complaint is just the latest indication of the pressure on Amazon to ensure the safety of the products the platform hosts. These federal agency and Congressional efforts will almost certainly cause more pressure on product manufacturers to ensure the products they offer for sale on Amazon are compliant with the relevant regulations.

©2021 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

Article By Lynn L. Bergeson, Lisa M. Campbell and Carla N. Hutton at Bergeson & Campbell, P.C. For more CPSC news, see the Consumer Protection section of the National Law Review.

CFPB Suit Against Student Loan Trusts Dismissed

On March 26, 2021, Judge Maryellen Noreika of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed a lawsuit brought by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. The National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trusts,1 finding, inter alia, that the CFPB’s suit was constitutionally defective due to the CFPB’s untimely attempt to ratify the prosecution of the litigation in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  This case has been closely watched by many participants in the structured finance industry, because the litigants had disputed over the question of whether the trusts at issue in the litigation are “covered persons” liable under the Consumer Financial Protection Act despite their status as passive securitization trust entities—a question that has important and wide-reaching implications for the structured finance markets.

Background

The National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (the “Trusts”) hold more than 800,000 private student loans through 15 different Delaware statutory trusts created between 2001 and 2007, totaling approximately $12 billion.  The loans originally were made to students by private banks.  The Trusts provided financing for the student loans by selling notes to investors in securitization transactions.  The Trusts also provided for the servicing of and collection on those student loans by engaging third-party servicers.  However, the Trusts themselves are passive special purpose entities lacking employees or internal management; instead, to operate, the Trusts relied on various interlocking trust-related agreements with multiple third-party service providers to—among other things—administer each of the Trusts, determine the relative priority of economic interests in the Trusts, and service the Trusts’ loans.

On September 4, 2014, the CPFB issued a civil investigative demand (“CID”) to each of the Trusts for information concerning thousands of allegedly illegal student loan debt collection lawsuits used to collect on defaulted loans held by the Trusts.  On May 9, 2016, the CFPB alerted the Trusts to the fact that the CFPB was considering initiating enforcement proceedings against the Trusts based on the collection lawsuits through a Notice and Opportunity to Respond and Advice (“NORA”).  A few weeks later, the law firm McCarter & English, LLP (“McCarter”), purporting to represent the Trusts, submitted a NORA response to the CFPB.  McCarter and the CFPB then proceeded to negotiate a Proposed Consent Judgment to resolve the CFPB’s investigation of the Trusts.

The Litigation

On September 18, 2017, the CFPB filed suit against the Trusts in Delaware federal court (the “Court”), alleging that the Trusts had violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (the “CFPA”) by engaging in unfair and deceptive practices in connection with their servicing and collection of student loans.  Although the CFPB acknowledged that the Trusts had no employees and that the alleged misconduct resulted from actions taken by the Trusts’ servicers and sub-servicers in the course of their debt collection activities—rather than any actions taken by the Trusts themselves—the CFPB nonetheless named only  the Trusts as defendants.  On the same day, the CFPB also filed a motion to approve the Proposed Consent Judgment negotiated with McCarter.

However, within days of the CFPB’s initiation of the lawsuit, multiple parties associated with the Trusts intervened in the litigation to argue against the entry of the Proposed Consent Judgment.  The intervenors expressed concern that the entry of the Proposed Consent Judgment would impermissibly impair or rewrite their respective contractual obligations as set forth in the agreements underlying the Trusts.  After discovery, on May 31, 2020, the Court denied the CFPB’s motion to approve the Proposed Consent Judgement, holding that McCarter lacked authority to execute the Proposed Consent Judgment pursuant to terms of the agreements governing the Trusts and Delaware law.

On June 29, 2020, in another lawsuit involving the CFPB, the United States Supreme Court held in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that the CFPB’s structure violated the Constitution’s separation of powers.2  Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “an independent agency led by a single Director and vested with significant executive power” has “no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure,”3 and that the statutory restriction on the President’s authority to remove the CFPB’s Director only for “inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance” violated the separation of powers.4  The Supreme Court then concluded that the proper remedy was to sever the removal restriction, and ultimately allowed the CFPB to stand.  The Supreme Court also noted that an enforcement action that the CFPB had filed to enforce a CID while its structure was unconstitutional may nonetheless be enforceable if it was later successfully ratified by an acting director of the CFPB who was removable at will by the President.  If not so ratified, however, the enforcement action must be dismissed.

Around the time the Supreme Court issued its decision in Seila Law, various intervenors were briefing multiple motions to dismiss the CFPB’s complaint against the Trusts.  One subset of intervenors—Ambac Assurance Corporation, the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, and the Wilmington Trust Company5 (collectively, “Ambac”)—argued, inter alia, that: (i) the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law required dismissal of the CFPB’s complaint because the CFPB’s ratification of the litigation against the Trusts was untimely, and (ii) the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over its asserted claims because the Trusts are not “covered persons” as required under the CFPA.  Another intervenor, Transworld Systems, Inc.6 (“TSI”) also argued that the CFPB’s complaint merited dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as well.

The Court’s Holding

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court held that it possessed the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to decide the CFPB’s claims, and rejected the contention that a showing of whether the Trusts are “covered persons” is a jurisdictional requirement under the CFPA.  To determine whether a restriction—such as the term “covered persons”—is jurisdictional, the Court looked to “whether Congress has clearly stated that the rule is jurisdictional.”7  “[A]bsent such a clear statement,” courts “should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.”8

The Court then examined the CFPA, observing that there is no clear statement in the CFPA’s jurisdictional grant that “covered persons” is required.  The Court noted that only one section of the CFPA addresses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and that section granted jurisdiction over “an action or adjudication proceeding brought under Federal consumer law” with no mention of “covered persons” whatsoever.9

While the Court agreed that the term “covered persons” appeared multiple times throughout the CFPA, it pointed out that none of the sections where “covered persons” appeared mentioned jurisdiction.

Enforcement Authority

In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Seila Law, the Court granted Ambac’s motion to dismiss the CFPB’s complaint due to the CFPB’s lack of enforcement authority as a result of its untimely ratification of the litigation.

As an initial matter, the Court observed that there was no question that the CFPB initiated the enforcement action against the Trusts at a time when its structure violated the constitutional separation of powers.  The task facing the Court, then, would be to determine (i) whether that constitutional defect has been cured by ratification, or (ii) whether dismissal of the suit is required.  Under the applicable Third Circuit precedent, there are three general requirements for ratification of previously-unauthorized action by an agency: (1) “the ratifier must, at the time of ratification, still have the authority to take the action to be ratified”; (2) “the ratifier must have full knowledge of the decision to be ratified”; and (3) “the ratifier must make a detached and considered affirmation of the earlier decision.”10  Here, the parties’ dispute centered around the first requirement.

Under the first requirement, the Court noted that “it is essential that the party ratifying should be able not merely to do the act ratified at the time the act was done, but also at the time the ratification was made.”11  On July 9, 2020, the CFPB’s then-Director, Kathy Kraninger, had ratified the decision to initiate the CFPB’s litigation against the Trusts a few weeks after the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law.  The Court held that Director Kraninger’s ratification was ineffective, because (i) an enforcement action arising from alleged CFPA violations must be brought no later than three years after the date of discovery of the violation to which the action relates,12 (ii) ratification is ineffective when it takes place after the relevant statute of limitations has expired, and (iii) the CFPB clearly had discovery of the Trusts’ alleged CFPA violations more than three years before the ratification date, i.e., before July 9, 2017.  Thus, Director Kraninger’s ratification of the CFPB’s decision to file suit against the Trusts failed to cure the constitutional defects raised by Seila Law, and the CFPB’s complaint—initially filed by a CFPB director unconstitutionally insulated from removal—could not be enforced.

In so holding, the Court rejected the CFPB’s argument that the timeliness requirements for ratification were satisfied because the CFPB had brought the original suit within the applicable limitations period.  The Court likewise rejected the CFPB’s request to equitably toll the statute of limitations for ratification, because the CFPB “could not identify a single act that it took to preserve its rights in this case in anticipation of the constitutional challenges that could have reasonably ended with an unfavorable ruling from the Supreme Court.”13

Key Takeaways

The securitization industry has operated for decades on the premise that agreements governing securitization transactions provide that transaction parties are responsible for their own malfeasance and, barring special circumstances, will not be held accountable for the misconduct of other parties to the transaction.  A decision holding that passive securitization entities like the Trusts are “covered persons” under the CFPA—and thus potentially responsible for the actions of their third-party service providers—would undermine the certainty of contract terms that undergirds the success of the structured finance industry, with grave implications for the heathy functioning of the industry.  While the substantive question of whether passive securitization entities like the Trusts could indeed be “covered persons” and held accountable for the actions of their third-party service providers remains to be answered for another day, the Court did observe that it “harbor[ed] some doubt” that the plain language of the CFPA extended to passive statutory trusts,14 and expressed skepticism as to whether the CFPB could successfully replead in a manner that would successfully cure the deficiencies in its original complaint.

1   2021 WL 1169029, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2021).

2   140 S.Ct. 2183, 2197 (June 29, 2020).  For a detailed discussion on Seila Law, please see our July 2, 2020 Clients & Friends Memo, “Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Has the Supreme Court Tamed or Empowered the CFPB?”, available at https://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/seila-law-llc-v-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-has-the-supreme-court-tamed-or-empowered-the-cfpb.

3   Id. at 2201.

4   Id. at 2197.

5   Ambac Assurance Corporation provided financial guarantee insurance with respect to securities in over half of the Trusts.  The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency is the Primary Servicer for the Trusts, while the Wilmington Trust Company is the Trusts’ Owner Trustee.

6   TSI is a sub-servicer responsible for the collection of the Trusts’ delinquent loans.

7   Nat’l Collegiate Master Student Loan Tr. at *3 (citing Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)).

8   Id.

9   See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(1).

10  Nat’l Collegiate Master Student Loan Tr. at *4 (quoting Advanced Disposal Serv. E., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 820 F.3d 592, 602 (3d Cir. 2016)).

11  Id. (quoting Advanced Disposal, 820 F.3d at 603) (emphasis in original).

12  12 U.S.C. § 5564(g)(1).

13  Nat’l Collegiate Master Student Loan Tr. at 7.

14  Id. at 3.

© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

ARTICLE BY Ellen Holloman,  Neil J. Weidner,  Cheryl D. Barnes
Rachel Rodman, Scott A. Cammarn and Ailsa Chau of
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more articles on the CFPB, visit the NLR Financial Institutions & Banking section.

Major Drop In Toy Safety Inspections for Over Six Months Due to COVID-19 Threat

A USA TODAY investigation found that the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) pulled its toy police from ports around the country for over 6 months because of the threat of COVID-19, causing a major drop in safety inspections. This is a follow up from our Most Dangerous Toys of 2020 post, further warning parents, grandparents, and gift-givers to research a toy’s potential hazards before clicking the “buy now” button.

CPSC inspectors are supposed to intercept bad toys and other household products before they reach the market.

“Anything that could potentially harm consumers, my job is to stop it here,”
– CPCS compliance investigator from a video posted on the agency’s website.

The leaders of the federal agency made the decision without warning consumers or full disclosure to Congress. They continued the shutdown at the ports and a government testing laboratory until September, including spring and summer months that were their inspectors’ busiest in 2019.

USA TODAY found an extraordinary lapse in safety surveillance during the pandemic which was hidden from the public. From April to September, during the COVID-19 closures, the agency issued a fourth of the violations it did during the same period a year earlier.

CPSC inspectors performed an average of 3,000 monthly screenings at the ports at the beginning of 2020, according to internal agency data. By May, that number had fallen to about 100 and in August, they only performed 47. As of December 2020, the records show inspectors were still not working in five of the 18 ports they normally patrol, Chicago, New York City, Savannah, Buffalo, New York, and Norfolk, Virginia.

Target, Dollar Tree, Walgreens, Amazon, and UPS were among the large wholesale distributors, shipping companies, and name-brand retailers who brought in products from overseas while the CSPS investigators were away from their posts this year, not screening for hazards that wholesalers and retailers are supposed to test for themselves.

Shoppers of these stores and others that import products will have no way to differentiate good products from any bad items that have slipped in. Experts fear it could take years to discover the dangerous items that have been allowed into American homes.

If you notice any problems, experts say to immediately report them to a CPSC website where such complaints are publicly posted: saferproducts.gov.

© 2020 by Clifford Law Offices PC. All rights reserved.
For more articles on toy safety, visit the National Law Review Consumer Protection section.

Consumer Product Safety Advocates Pen Memorandum to Biden Transition Team Foreshadowing Push for More Active and Aggressive CPSC

For years consumer product safety advocate groups have bemoaned the seeming lack of aggressiveness from the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”). As an example, they complain that the CPSC levied no civil penalties on companies in 2020, 2 in 2019, and only 1 in 2018, penalties being a surrogate in their minds for enforcement. As counsel for many companies, we know that this is not the case and CPSC compliance activity has remained vigorous. But perhaps the ongoing criticisms led Acting Chairman Robert Adler to publicly announce in mid-November the CPSC’s recent vote to refer a case to the DOJ for prosecution of a civil penalty.

With the Commission evenly split 2-2 between Democrats and Republicans, and the incoming Biden administration only one month away, in early November seven industry groups penned a memorandum to the Biden Transition Team to advocate for greater power for, and greater use of existing power, by the agency. This is an important message because these leading advocates may well populate the Commission at high levels in the next few years.

The people who signed the document are capable and well intentioned. We share their goals for a strong, more effective CPSC but we question their proposed remedies. The Agency has a wealth of statutory authorities at its disposal. It just needs the resources, financial and technological, to better use them as well as a greater focus on priority areas. In this post, we will focus on the general, non product-specific proposals except to note that furniture and juvenile products are top of the list.

The memorandum, published on November 11th, was signed by leaders of the American Academy of Pediatrics, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Reports, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, Kids In Danger, Public Citizen, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG). Among the many actions advocated in the memo, the groups included a plea to the Biden Administration to utilize the CPSC to:

  • File more formal administrative or legal complaints to seek recalls (although we note that the  voluntary approach is far more effective and less resource intensive);
  • Make more frequent public preliminary determinations that corrective action will be warranted (without recognizing the legal requirements for findings and due process to justify this commercially devastating action);
  • “[R]everse the current trend and go back to imposing meaningful civil penalties on corporate violations of consumer product safety law” (without recognizing the real world deterrent effect of the threat of any penalties for public-facing companies.)

Section 6(b) still the Misunderstood Villain Subject to Much False News

Perhaps one of the most controversial CPSC-related statutory provisions is Section 6(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”). The section requires the CPSC to take reasonable steps to ensure that disclosure of information identifying a specific product, manufacturer, or private labeler, is accurate, fair in the circumstances, and reasonably related to effectuating the purpose of the CPSA and related laws. Information voluntarily submitted to the Commission under Section 15 (reports of potentially defective or unsafe products) is shielded from disclosure, even from FOIA requests, without the agency first going through procedural mechanisms to ensure release of the information doesn’t run afoul of 6(b). This provision resulted from unfair and devastating harm to companies from unjustified public condemnations and announcements by CPSC.

There is no known evidence to support the claim that the CPSC has been prevented by law from disclosing important information about unsafe products. The law provides for accelerated disclosures where justified. Nevertheless, consumer advocates have for years put forward the rallying cry that manufacturers have a veto over CPSC’s release of information that harms the public. The advocates’ memo calls for Congress to repeal Section 6(b). Absent such a bill, the advocates call for clarification that Section 6(b) does not extend to records released under FOIA, which currently runs contra to Supreme Court precedent from 1980.1

The memorandum also calls for significantly less reliance on consensus standards as both the basis for compliance action and regulatory action. Cost-benefit analysis would be downgraded (even though it is a hallmark of the Clinton and Obama Administrations.) These proposals are fraught with problems and fail to recognize that globally the product safety system has as its essential underpinning consensus standards, which results in a very safe consumer product ecosystem in the United States.

Finally, the advocates state that CPSC is woefully underfunded, given the incredibly important mission of consumer protection. Many CPSC observers share this sentiment. The memo calls for a drastic expansion of the agency, and increased budget for the CPSC.2 In fact, the memo advocates for a doubling of CPSC appropriations, an impractical request.

What This Means: Aggressive Advocacy and Activity Inside and Outside the Agency  

For those regularly following the CPSC, the issues discussed in the advocates’ memorandum with great passion are nothing new. What changes, however, is the context. While Senate Leadership has been unable to confirm a third Republican commissioner nominee or a Chairman nominee with the failed attempts to confirm Ann Marie Buerkle and Nancy Beck (thus far), the Commission sits at a 2-2 position. Bob Adler, an Obama appointee, has been acting Chairman for over one year, allowing for an essentially Democratic-controlled agency under a Republican administration except for the deadlock on most regulatory actions. We will eventually see who gets nominated by the Biden administration and whether eventual new leadership will implement and advocate on the inside for the positions advocated to the Transition Team.

One can safely presume that the CPSC will be far more aggressive in the coming years. Companies would be well-served to protect themselves by ensuring their houses are in order—effective safety procedures in place up and down the supply chain.

1 Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980).

2 CPSC requested a budget of $135 million for FY 2021.

©1994-2020 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles on the CPSC, visit the National Law Review Consumer Protection section.

CPSC Issues COVID-19 Consumer Products Guidance, Further Muddying the Regulatory Waters and Increasing Scrutiny of COVID-19 Products

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, and with an incoming Biden administration that is expected to step up efforts to control the spread of the virus, use of personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and cleaning/disinfectant products has never been more important or widespread among the public.  However, in late October, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) issued guidance on its website asserting that certain consumer protection rules within its jurisdiction apply to PPE, and reminding consumers of the CPSC laws that apply to cleaning/disinfectant products (the “COVID Guidance”).

The CPSC commissioners disagree about the import or official applicability of the COVID Guidance, and questions abound as to how it interplays with FDA regulations issued by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), including Emergency Use Authorizations (“EUA”), as well as EPA regulations on disinfectant products – not to mention how or whether the COVID Guidance impacts the protections afforded by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (the “PREP Act”).  But in any case, the guidance unquestionably heightens scrutiny around COVID-related products, and likely will give consumer plaintiffs’ attorneys additional lawsuit fodder – so manufacturers should understand it.

Broadly, the COVID Guidance covers two broad categories of products: face coverings, gowns, gloves (i.e., PPE), and cleaning/disinfectant products.

Face Coverings, Gowns, and Gloves

Under the COVID Guidance, face coverings, gowns, and gloves designed for consumer use are considered “articles of wearing apparel” and therefore must (1) comply with the flammability requirements of the Flammable Fabrics Act; and (2) be tested to either 16 C.F.R. Part 1610 (Standard for the Flammability of Clothing Textiles) or Part 1611 (Standard for the Flammability of Vinyl Plastic Film), depending on the materials used for construction.  Further, U.S. manufacturers and importers of these products must issue a General Certificate of Conformity (“GCC”) certifying that these clothing articles meet all applicable requirements.

The COVID Guidance imposes additional requirements for PPE apparel designed specifically for children’s use (i.e., ages 12 and under).  Under the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”), all children’s products must bear permanent tracking information, meet total lead content limits, and meet lead in paint or similar surface coating limits (if either a paint or surface coating is present on the product).  Product testing must take place at a CPSC-accepted testing lab, and U.S. manufacturers/importers of these products must also issue a Children’s Product Certificate.

Cleaning Solutions

Household cleaning solutions – for example, hand sanitizers and soaps – are primarily regulated by the FDA, but also fall under the jurisdiction of the CPSC if they constitute a “hazardous substance” under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (“FHSA”).  Generally, the FHSA defines a “hazardous substance” as (1) a substance (or mixture of substances) that may cause substantial personal injury or substantial illness during customary or reasonably foreseeable handling or use, including reasonably foreseeable ingestion by children; and (2) the substance (or mixture of substances) is toxic, corrosive, an irritant, a strong sensitizer, is flammable or combustible, or generates pressure through decomposition, heat, or other means.  The FHSA requires that hazardous substances bear prominent warnings on their labels – for example, “KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN,” “DANGER”, and “HARMFUL OR FATAL IF SWALLOWED,” among others.

© 2020 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more articles on the CPSC, visit the National Law Review Consumer Protection section.

FTC Proposes New Rule Codifying “Made in USA” Policy

On July 16, 2020 the FTC published a notice of proposed rulemaking in which it announced its intention to codify its long-time enforcement policy regarding products labeled as “Made in the USA” (MUSA); these claims are currently enforced through the FTC’s general authority to prevent unfair and deceptive practices.

The proposed rule does not change the substantive criteria on which such claims will be evaluated and rather is primarily intended to (1) strengthen the FTC’s enforcement mechanism by making it easier for the FTC to assess civil penalties against those making unlawful MUSA claims and (2) give marketers more regulatory certainty. Under the proposed rule, a MUSA claim may, as before, only be made where (1) the final processing or assembly occurs in the USA, (2) all significant processing that goes in the product occurs in the USA, and (3) all or virtually all of the ingredients or components of the product are made and sourced in the U.S. While the proposed rule would apply to a broad range of product labels, it would also apply to MUSA claims found outside of the product label such as mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials defined to include “any materials, used in the direct sale or direct offering for sale of any product or service, that are disseminated in print or by electronic means, and that solicit the purchase of such product or service by mail, telephone, electronic mail, or some other method without examining the actual product purchased.”  The proposed rule would not apply to qualified MUSA claims.

Comments to the proposed rule are due by September 14, 2020.

© 2020 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more on labeling regulation, see the National Law Review Administrative & Regulatory law section.

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Has the Supreme Court Tamed or Empowered the CFPB?

On June 26, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,1 finally resolving the question that has dogged the new agency since its inception:  Is the leadership structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) constitutional?  Writing for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice John Roberts ruled that the CFPB structure—“an independent agency that wields significant executive power and is run by a single individual who cannot be removed by the President unless certain statutory criteria are met”—violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.2  

For financial services companies regulated by the CFPB, the most important aspect of Seila Law is not the headline constitutional defect, but the remedy.  Choosing “a scalpel rather than a bulldozer,”3 the Court did not invalidate the CFPB.  The Court held 7-2 that the Director’s constitutionally offensive removal protection could be severed from the CFPB’s other authorities, thus bringing the Director (and with her, the CFPB) under Presidential control, while leaving the CFPB’s other powers in place.4

While Seila Law  is an important case in the evolving doctrine of separation of powers as applied to independent agencies, the case has three immediate consequences for financial services companies.  First, the CFPB is here to stay, and its broad authorities and other controversial aspects (such as its insulation from Congressional appropriations) remain intact.  Second, the CFPB’s Director is now directly accountable to the President, significantly raising the stakes in the 2020 election for the agency’s regulatory and enforcement agenda.  Third, the Court left one important question unanswered:  it declined to address the effect of its ruling on prior CFPB rules and enforcement actions.  While we believe the agency will attempt to cure the constitutional defect, we expect continued litigation—and uncertainty—on this issue.

Background

In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), creating the CFPB as an independent financial regulator within the Federal Reserve System.5  The CFPB has expansive authority to “implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law,” which includes 19 enumerated federal consumer-protection statutes and the Dodd-Frank Act’s broad prohibition on unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices.6  The CFPB’s authority over consumer financial products and services includes rulemaking authority with respect to the enumerated statutes, the ability to issue orders, including orders prohibiting products and services which it concludes are “abusive” or substantively unfair, as well as the power to impose significant financial penalties on financial services companies.  The CFPB is funded through the Federal Reserve System, and thus is not subject to Congressional constraint through the appropriations process.  Although technically housed within the Federal Reserve System, the CFPB also is not subject to oversight or control by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  As a result, the CFPB was created to be an independent agency, largely unconstrained by Congress or the Federal Reserve System.  The CFPB is headed by a single Director appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a five-year term.7  The Director may be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”8  

In 2017, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law LLC, a California-based law firm that provides debt-related legal services to consumers.  Seila Law refused to comply, objecting that concentrating the CFPB’s authority in a single Director with for-cause removal protection violated the separation of powers doctrine.  The CFPB filed a petition to enforce its demand in federal district court.  The district court rejected Seila Law’s constitutional objection and ordered the law firm to comply with the demand.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.9

Case Analysis: Seila Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single-Director structure.  That decision was telling in and of itself, given that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was in accord with PHH Corporation v. CFPB, the D.C. Circuit’s en banc opinion upholding the Director’s removal protection.10  As many had expected, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Congress’s restriction on the President’s power to remove the CFPB’s Director violated the separation of powers doctrine. 

The Court began its analysis from the premise that Article II of the Constitution gives the entire executive power to the President alone, “who must ‘take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”11  Lesser officers who aid the President in his or her duties “must remain accountable to the President, whose authority they wield.”12  The President’s power to remove these lesser officers at will is foundational to the President’s executive function and “has long been confirmed by history and precedent.”13  The Court held that “[w]hile we have previously upheld limits on the President’s removal authority in certain contexts, we decline to do so when it comes to principal officers who, acting alone, wield significant executive power.”14  The Court found that the CFPB’s Director fit that bill.  In creating the CFPB, Congress “vest[ed] significant governmental power in the hands of a single individual accountable to no one.”15  Such an agency “has no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure.”16 

Next, the Court turned to the remedy.  Seila Law argued that the Director’s unconstitutional removal protection rendered the “entire agency … unconstitutional and powerless to act.”17  The Court disagreed.  Relying on the Dodd-Frank Act’s severability clause, the Court’s severability precedent, and the proposition that “Congress would have preferred a dependent CFPB to no agency at all,” the Court ruled that the Director’s removal protection is severable from the CFPB’s other statutory authorities.18  “The agency may therefore continue to operate, but its Director, in light of our decision, must be removable by the President at will.”19  

Finally, the Court expressly declined to address how its holding affects prior CFPB regulatory and enforcement actions.  The government had argued that the Court need not reach the constitutional question because the CFPB’s demand to Seila Law had since been ratified by an Acting Director accountable to the President.20  The Court remanded the question of ratification to the lower courts, noting that it “turns on case-specific factual and legal questions not addressed below and not briefed here.”21

Implications

Seila Law is an important case for the canons of administrative law and the separation of powers doctrine.  But for financial services companies regulated by the CFPB, it has meaningful (and immediate) practical consequences.

First, the CFPB has escaped Supreme Court review with its authorities basically untouched.  Absent Congressional action, the CFPB will (i) continue to be run by a single Director, (ii) continue to wield expansive rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement authority over the multi-trillion dollar market for consumer financial products and services, and (iii) continue to be insulated from Congressional control via the appropriations process.

Second, the CFPB’s Director is now directly accountable to the President—whoever that person may be.  Typically, financial regulators have a measure of insulation from the political process to provide consistency and certainty to financial markets.  With this decision, the election of the next President—and the prospect of a Democratic administration—could result in significant and immediate changes to the CFPB’s regulatory and enforcement agenda.

Third, while Seila Law secured the CFPB’s future, the Court left in place significant uncertainty as to its past.  This past includes major enforcement actions and rulemakings that have reshaped the market for consumer financial products and services over the last nine years.  Of course, it remains to be seen what appetite financial services companies have to challenge the CFPB’s prior rules and enforcement orders.  And, we expect the CFPB will attempt to remedy the constitutional defect by ratifying the agency’s past actions or perhaps invoking the de facto officer doctrine.22  Yet, the availability of either remedy is an open question.  Ratification in particular is a live dispute in both Seila Law and a pending en banc appeal before the Fifth Circuit, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. All American Check Cashing.23  Ratification of prior agency actions was also left unresolved in another thread of the Supreme Court’s recent separation of powers jurisprudence.  In Lucia v. SEC, the Court found that the SEC hired administrative law judges (ALJs) in violation of the Appointments Clause, but offered limited remedial guidance aside from instructions that Lucia was entitled to a “new hearing before a properly appointed” ALJ.24  While litigating Lucia’s challenge, the SEC issued an order purporting to ratify its past ALJ appointments by approval of the Commission itself.  The Court acknowledged that order, but declined to address its validity.25

1   Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ____ (2020) (June 26, 2020).

2   Id., Slip Op. at 2–3.

3   Id., at 35.

4   Id.,  at 3. 

5   Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq., created the CFPB and defines its authorities. 

6   12 U.S.C. § 5511 (defining CFPB’s purpose); 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14) (defining “Federal consumer financial law”). 

7   Id. § 5491(b)(2), (c).

8   Id. § 5491(c)(3).  For a detailed discussion of the CFPB and its powers, see our Clients & Friends Memo, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: The New, Powerful Regulator of Financial Products and Services (March 06, 2012).

9   Seila Law, Slip Op. at 6–8 (discussing procedural history).

10 PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F. 3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (en banc).  Tellingly, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote the D.C. Circuit panel decision holding that the CFPB’s structure violated the separation of powers doctrine.  839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The en banc court vacated that decision, but now-Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority in Seila, reiterating his separation of powers analysis from the D.C. Circuit.    For further analysis of the PHH decision, see our Client & Friends Memo Federal Appeals Court Rules That CFPB Structure is Constitutional  (Jan. 31, 2018) (discussing the en banc decision); D.C. Circuit Brings CFPB under Presidential Control  (Oct. 13, 2016) (discussing the initial panel decision of the D.C. Circuit).

11 Seila Law, Slip Op. at 11 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1).

12 Id. at 12.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 36.  Specifically, the Court wrote that it has recognized two limited exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal power.  Seila Law, Slip Op. at 15–16.  First, in Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court upheld removal restrictions for Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission, which Roberts characterized as “a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.”  Seila Law, Slip Op. at 15.  Second, in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Court permitted removal protections for certain inferior officers with narrow duties, such as an independent counsel appointed to investigate and prosecute specific crimes.

15 Seila Law, Slip Op. at 23.

16 Id. at 18.

17 Id. at 31.

18 Id. at 32–36 (emphasis in original).

19 Id. at 3.

20 Id. at 30.

21 Id. at 31. Justice Thomas viewed this theory as irrelevant, since the Acting Director could not have ratified the continuance of the action by Director Kraninger. Justice Kagan did not address this theory specifically.

22 See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995) (the de facto officer doctrine “confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.”).

23 No. 18-60302 (5th Cir.).

24 Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).

25 Id. at 2055 n.6.

© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

ARTICLE BY Rachel Rodman and Scott A. Cammarn and Nihal S. Patel at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.

For more on the CPFB, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law section.

Sellers Beware – The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Opened the “Price-Gouging” Pandora’s Box

As the Covid-19 emergency goes on, both federal and New Jersey authorities have begun to enforce anti-price gouging and anti-hoarding provisions of federal and state law. A wide range of businesses, including but going beyond the sellers of medical equipment, should be aware of the limits imposed by these statutes and the dangers posed by enforcement.

A.        The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

As has been widely reported in the media, the State of New Jersey is aggressively enforcing the anti-price gouging provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-107 through 109, during the current coronavirus emergency. Enforcement of the statute by the Division of Consumer Affairs or by private civil action under the Consumer Fraud Act poses a risk to the sellers of a broad variety of goods. However, it also poses a potential remedy for business purchasers for end use whose ordinary supply chain has been disrupted by the emergency.

During a state of emergency declared by the Governor, N.J.S.A. 56:8-109 declares it to be an “unlawful commercial practice” for any person to sell or offer for sale “any merchandise which is consumed or used as a direct result of an emergency or which is consumed or used to preserve, protect, or sustain the life, health, safety or comfort of persons or their property for a price that constitutes an excessive price increase.”  In turn N.J.S.A. 56:8-108 defines an “excessive price increase” as more than 10 percent greater than the seller’s price in the usual course of business immediately before the declaration of emergency, unless the price increase is attributable either to the seller passing through increased prices from its supplier or costs imposed by the emergency. In that case, the statute defines an excess price increase as an increase of more than 10 percent beyond the seller’s customary pre-emergency markup.

The statutory language sweeps broadly and may be applied to price increases of almost any product where demand has increased or the supply chain has been disrupted by the coronavirus emergency. A recent news story reports that more than 3,600 complaints of alleged price-gouging have been made to the Attorney General’s Division of Consumer Affairs, against more than 2,100 business, involving not only medical supplies but food and commodities in short supply like toilet paper and disinfectants. The Division is urging the public to remain “vigilant” and is actively soliciting complaints on its website. As it investigates complaints, the Division is issuing subpoenas for the seller’s pre-emergency and current cost, price and markup information. The defense of passing through increased costs requires the seller to document both higher charges from suppliers and other costs, such as hazard pay for employees, imposed by the emergency.

Penalties for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act include civil penalties of up to $10,000 for a first offense. There are additional penalties if the violation was directed against senior citizens or persons with disabilities. In addition, the Attorney General may obtain an injunction against future violations. The courts may order restitution to consumers of money obtained in violation of the Act, and twice the amount obtained in the case of senior citizens. Failure to make restitution as ordered is punishable as contempt of court.

In addition to the enforcement powers of the Attorney General, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 gives any person who has suffered an “ascertainable loss of moneys or property . . . as a result of any practice declared unlawful” under the Consumer Fraud Act as amended or supplemented a private right of action to recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees, either directly or as a counterclaim in a suit by the seller. No reported decision decides whether this private right of action would apply to a violation of the Act’s anti-price gouging provisions, but it is reasonable to anticipate that creative counsel are contemplating private class actions on behalf of retail purchasers.

The private right of action under the Consumer Fraud Act extends not only to individual consumers but to businesses that purchase supplies or equipment for use in the business. Hospitals, medical practices and other large scale purchasers of supplies and equipment affected by the coronavirus emergency may wish to explore that possibility.

B.        The Federal Defense Production Act

The Korean War vintage Defense Production Act (“DPA”) gives the President broad powers to direct the production of essential goods and to prioritize their distribution during periods of declared national emergency. Section 101 of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. § 4511, authorizes the President or his delegate to designate goods as scarce materials critical to the national defense. Section 102 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.§ 4512, the anti-hoarding provision, prohibits any person from accumulating “1) in excess of the reasonable demands of business, personal, or home consumption, or (2) for the purpose of resale at prices in excess of prevailing market prices, materials which have been designated by the President as scarce materials or materials the supply of which would be threatened by such accumulation.”  Designations are required to be published in the Federal Register. Section 103 of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. § 4513 makes the violation of § 102 a federal crime subject to a $10,000 fine and one year imprisonment. In addition § 706, 50 U.S.C. § 4556, authorizes the federal courts to enjoin violations of the DPA at the suit of the government. Other provisions, not relevant here, authorize the government to provide incentives and subsidies to increase production of essential goods.

The DPA is based on the War Powers Acts of World War II. It is designed to authorize the kind of command economy in place during that war, in which the armed forces were the sole end user, the government controlled production by placing contracts, fixing priorities and allocating raw materials, and the government directly controlled prices in the civilian market. It empowers the federal government to become the sole buyer and allocator of materials critical to the national defense. However, the President has chosen not to take the responsibility for centralized purchasing and allocation of critical medical supplies. Instead, the federal government has decided to allow states and other end users to compete for limited resources while using the DPA’s criminal provisions to try to curb the more egregious examples of exploitation.

On March 23, 2020, the President issued Executive Orders 13909 and 13910, which invoke his authority under DPA § 101 to declare ventilators and medical personal protective equipment as scarce materials critical to the national defense. Under authority designated by the Executive Orders, on March 25, 2020 the Secretary of Health and Human Services designated a variety of masks, gloves, gowns, face shields and other personal protective equipment, as well as respirators, sterilization materials, and ventilators as scarce materials subject to the anti-hoarding section of the DPA.  The designation was published in the Federal Register at 85 FR 17592 (Mar. 30, 2020). It enumerates the types of short-supply equipment but does not provide guidance as to what constitutes accumulation in excess of reasonable demand for consumption or what prices are considered in excess of the prevailing market price.

The Department of Justice has created a joint federal-state anti-hoarding task force under the leadership of the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, and several criminal prosecutions of alleged hoarders have been instituted. However, the prohibitions in DPA § 102 of accumulation “in excess of reasonable demands” for the holder’s consumption or for resale at a price “in excess of prevailing market prices” appear to impose a rather vague standard of criminal liability, and there do not appear to be any reported decisions interpreting them. Unlike the New Jersey statute, there is no definite markup that would be allowed.

DPA § 104, 50 U.S.C. §4514, prohibits the President from imposing wage or price controls without Congressional authorization. Perhaps for that reason, the government has not set permissible prices for short-supply equipment at any time since the HHS designation. Instead, the government is taking the position that prevailing prices are either prices in effect in January and February of 2020, before the coronavirus crisis began in the United States, or that they are “benchmark” prices of a major private manufacturer. Whether either of those standards provides fair advance notice sufficient to support criminal liability is, to say the least, contestable.

In addition, the government’s position appears to criminalize what may be entirely legitimate economic activity. Experience has shown that there were large amounts of masks and other designated short-supply medical equipment scattered in pockets of inventory around the United States and abroad. Middlemen perform the valuable service of finding these supplies, marshaling them and making them available to end users. That takes effort, which will not be undertaken without the prospect of compensation. Unlike the New Jersey statute, the DPA does not on its face recognize the costs incurred by accumulators to obtain otherwise unavailable goods, either those passed through from upstream sellers, the expenses of search, or reasonable compensation for the effort involved.

In conclusion, the government has not used the Defense Production Act to set prices directly. Its criminal anti-hoarding provisions  are a very blunt instrument for regulating economic activity in a time of shortage, especially because the federal government is not acting as the sole buyer or allocator of goods or fixing prices but is instead requiring end users of short-supply equipment to compete against each other. These criminal provisions have never been tested in court, and they leave open the possibility of vigorous defense based on the lack of a clear standard of criminal liability, on the need to attract scarce goods into the market, and on the pass-through of legitimate costs incurred to do so, including a reasonable profit.

© Copyright 2020 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.

For more on COVID-19 related price issues, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News legal section.

Price Gouging and Deceptive Advertising Practices Amidst COVID-19 Pandemic

The Federal Trade Commission, the Food and Drug Administration and state Attorneys General have bumped the protection of consumers in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis to the top of their respective lists, including, but not limited to, price gouging and unsubstantiated product efficacy claims.  The U.S. Department of Justice has also issued a broad mandate regarding criminal enforcement of deceptive, fraudulent and predatory practices.

 State Attorneys General

State Attorney General have actively been policing the advertising of claims related to products that purport to cure, treat or prevent COVID-19.  This includes both express and implied claims (e.g., immunity-based claims).

Currently are no vaccines, pills, potions, lotions, lozenges or other prescription or over-the-counter products to treat or cure.

By way of example, a group of thirty-two state attorneys general recently sent letters to executives at prominent online retailers, urging them to help police price gouging.  Additionally, the New York Attorney General has asked GoDaddy and other online registrars to halt and de-list domain names used for Coronavirus-related scams and fake remedies designed to unlawfully and fraudulently profit off consumers’ fears around the coronavirus disease.

The NY AG has also recently contacted Craigslist.com, calling on the company to immediately remove posts that attempt to price gouge users, or otherwise purport to sell items that provide “immunity” to the coronavirus or allow individuals to test for the disease.  For example, the AG’s letter referred to posts that promoted an “immunity pack,” a fake coronavirus testing kit, and face masks that are not even proven to provide coronavirus-related protection.  The AG also asked Craigslist to remove an advertisement for a bottle of Purell that was priced at over $200.

Price gouging on disinfectant products is also a priority.

State AGs and other federal agencies are actively investigating potential price gouging violations, filing enforcement lawsuits, issuing civil investigative demands (CIDs), and serving cease-and-desist warnings.  The NYC Department of Consumer and Worker Protection (DCWP) – formerly the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) – has also been policing local business that it believes are selling necessary products (e.g., cleaning products, diagnostic products and services, disinfectants [wipes, liquids, sprays], face masks, gloves, hand sanitizers, medicines, paper towels, rubbing alcohol, soap, tissues and basic food supplies).

The State of New York’s price gouging statute prohibits the sale of goods and services necessary for the health, safety and welfare of consumers at unconscionably excessive prices during any abnormal disruption of the market.  During any abnormal disruption of the market for consumer goods and services vital and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of consumers, no party within the chain of distribution of such consumer goods or services or both shall sell or offer to sell any such goods or services or both for an amount which represents an unconscionably excessive price.

In the State of New York, whether a price is unconscionably excessive is a question of law for the court.  The court’s determination that a violation has occurred shall be based on any of the following factors:  (i) that the amount of the excess in price is unconscionably extreme;  or (ii) that there was an exercise of unfair leverage or unconscionable means;  or (iii) a combination of both factors in subparagraphs (i) and (ii).

Proof that a violation of has occurred can include, for example, evidence that:  (i) the amount charged represents a gross disparity between the price of the goods or services which were the subject of the transaction and their value measured by the price at which such consumer goods or services were sold or offered for sale by the defendant in the usual course of business immediately prior to the onset of the abnormal disruption of the market; or (ii) the amount charged grossly exceeded the price at which the same or similar goods or services were readily obtainable by other consumers in the trade area.  A defendant may be able to rebut such evidence by establishing that additional costs not within its control were imposed on the defendant for the goods or services.

Where a violation is alleged to have occurred, the AG may seek an injunctions, civil penalties and restitution.

Under the Rules of the City of New York, stores are prohibited from selling items that have been declared in short supply at excessively increased prices.  NYC has recently issued an emergency rule prohibiting price increases above 10% on various products necessary to combat the coronavirus.  New York State has now proposed legislation concerning medical supplies that includes a presumption that a price exceeding 10% of its price immediately prior to a public health emergency is to be considered unconscionably excessive.

Other states also utilize percentage-drive formulas when assessing excessive or unconscionable price increases, such as, without limitation, Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Some states impose liability upon manufacturers and distributors.  Some states also impose civil fines and penalties for violations, in addition to potential criminal liability.

Any entity charged with price gouging during a public health emergency would be entitled to rebut an alleged violation of this new law with evidence that the additional costs not within the control of the defendant were imposed on the defendant for the consumer medical supplies.

FTC and FDA

The Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration recently announced that it has issued joint warning letters to companies that allegedly had been disseminating unsubstantiated product advertising claims related to the coronavirus.  The letters cite efficacy claims that are not supported by competent and reliable scientific evidence, as well as issues relating to unapproved and misbranded drugs.

On March 26, 2020, FTC lawyer and Chairman Joe Simons issued a statement setting forth the agency’s enforcement efforts to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive commercial practices and to educate the public.  The FTC “will not tolerate businesses seeking to take advantage of consumers’ concerns and fears regarding coronavirus disease, exigent circumstances, or financial distress,” FTC lawyer Simons stated.

The FTC has also issued a press release calling attention to business-to-business scams that seek to exploit companies’ concerns about COVID-19, and sent letters to VoIP service providers and other companies warning them that “assisting and facilitating” illegal telemarketing or robocalls related to the coronavirus or COVID-19 pandemic is against the law.

“It’s never good business for VoIP providers and others to help telemarketers make illegal robocalls that scam people,” said FTC attorney Andrew Smith, Bureau of Consumer Protection Director.  “But it’s especially bad when your company is helping telemarketers exploiting fears about the coronavirus to spread disinformation and perpetrate scams,” Smith stated.

Department of Justice

The U.S. DoJ has issued a broad mandate with respect coronavirus-related fraud, price gouging and product hoarding.  In fact, it recently filed a number of federal criminal actions to combat fraud and other offenses related to the coronavirus pandemic.

Two of the actions were filed in California.  One involving allegations that an individual solicited investments in a company he claimed would be used to market pills that would prevent coronavirus infections, as well as market an injectable cure for those who had already contracted the virus.  The other, involving allegations that an individual mislabeled drugs that were purported to be a miracle cure for COVID-19.

Another two actions were filed in New Jersey.  One involving charges of violating the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and conspiracy to commit health care fraud.  The other, involving allegations of assault resulting from an individual who represented to have tested positive for COVID-19 that coughed on FBI agents, lied to them about his accumulation and sale of surgical masks, medical gowns and other medical supplies, and selling supplies to doctors and nurses at inflated prices.           .

The DoJ also recently filed a civil wire fraud lawsuit in a Texas federal district court against a website (coronavirusmedicalkit.com) that was purportedly offering access to bogus World Health Organization vaccines.

Digital marketers, consumer-facing businesses and others in the supply chain should consider consulting with experienced FTC defense counsel to avoid unsupported efficacy claims and inadvertently charging unlawful prices for goods and services necessary for the health, safety and welfare of consumers.

© 2020 Hinch Newman LLP

For more on FTC COVID-Actions, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Clash of Consumer Protection Goals: Does the Text of the TCPA Frustrate the Purposes of the CPSA?

“Hello.  This is an automated call from Acme Manufacturing. Our records indicate that you purchased Product X between December 2019 and January 2020. We wanted to let you know that we are recalling Product X because of a potential fire risk. Please call us or visit our website for important information on how to participate in this recall.”

When companies recall products, they do so to protect consumers.  In fact, various federal laws, including the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and National Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), encourage (and may require) recalls. And the agencies that enforce these statutes would likely approve of the hypothetical automated call above because direct notification is the best way to motivate consumer responses to recalls.[1]

But automated calls to protect consumers can run into a problem: the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

Are Recall Calls a Nuisance or an Emergency?

The TCPA seeks to protect consumers from the “nuisance and privacy invasion” of unwanted automated marketing calls.[2] The TCPA prohibits any person from making marketing calls to landlines, or any non-emergency calls or text messages[3] to wireless lines, using automated dialers or recorded messages unless the recipient has given prior written consent. The Act includes a private right of action and statutory per-violation damages – $500, trebled to $1,500 if a court finds the violation willful and knowing.[4] These penalties can add up quickly: In one case, a jury found that a company violated the TCPA nearly two million times, exposing the company to minimum statutory damages totaling almost $1,000,000,000.[5]

There is an important exception to the TCPA’s prohibition on automated calls. The TCPA allows autodialed calls for emergency purposes,[6] but the Act does not define that phrase. While the FCC has interpreted emergency purposes to mean “calls made necessary in any situation affecting the health and safety of consumers,”[7] recalls are not explicitly identified within this definition. As a result, aggressive plaintiffs have demanded millions in damages from companies that use automatic dialers to disseminate recall messages.[8]

For example, a grocery chain – Kroger – made automated calls to some purchasers of ground beef as part of a recall stemming from salmonella concerns. A plaintiff responded with a purported class action that did not mention the recall [9] but was based on consumers alleging that they had received “annoying” “automated call[s] from Kroger.”

Moving to dismiss, Kroger observed that the plaintiff – who had not listened to the call beyond its initial greeting[10] and thus could not comment on the call’s text – had “cherry-picked”[11] portions of consumers’ online comments to support the case, omitting text that clearly demonstrated that the calls were made for health and safety purposes.[12] Kroger argued that the online comments did not support the plaintiff’s allegations that Kroger had made any marketing calls.

The court granted Kroger’s motion and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. Even so, Kroger was compelled to spend time and money defending the claim.

In light of this type of lawsuit, one communications firm involved in automotive recalls has petitioned the FCC to “clarify . . . that motor vehicle safety recall-related calls and texts are ‘made for emergency purposes.’”[13] The Association of Global Automakers and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers commented in support of the petition, arguing that the “[l]ack of clarity regarding TCPA liability for vehicle safety recall messages has had a chilling effect on these important communications.”[14] The Settlement Special Administrator for the Takata airbag settlements also wrote in support, commenting that automated “recall-related calls and texts serve an easily recognizable public safety purpose.”[15]

The TCPA’s emergency exception offers protection in litigation. The FCC’s definition – “calls made necessary in any situation affecting the health and safety of consumers” – neatly encapsulates the entire function of a recall, namely acting to protect consumers’ health and safety. Moreover, in developing the emergency exception, Congress broadened initial language that excepted calls made by a “public school or other governmental entity” to the enacted “emergency purposes” phrasing precisely to ensure the exception encompassed automated emergency calls by private entities.[16] One of the seminal emergency purposes for which a private entity might seek to make automated calls is a product recall.

Even with such sound arguments that TCPA claims related to recall calls are without merit within the statute, however, aggressive plaintiffs have brought such claims. These efforts compel companies to spend finite resources defending claims that should not be brought in the first place. An express statutory or regulatory statement that recalls are squarely within the definition of emergency purposes would give companies greater confidence that not only would they be able to successfully defend against any effort to pit the TCPA against consumer-protection values, but that the claims are so unlikely to be brought that the companies need not even fear to have to defend.

Protecting Against Recall-Call Complaints

Until the FCC or Congress expressly instructs plaintiff’s counsel not to try to litigate against automated recall calls, there are steps companies that want to use automated dialers to drive recall responses can take to minimize any risk of a court misinterpreting their calls or finding TCPA liability where it should not attach.

For example, companies may (as some already do) ask for customers’ consent to be autodialed in connection with the products they have purchased – e.g., by including consent language on product warranty cards or registration forms. In fact, the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA)[17] already requires manufacturers of durable infant and toddler products to include registration cards for recall-communication purposes.[18] Companies in some other industries (like the on- and off-road motor vehicle industries) typically have robust registration systems that can incorporate auto dialing consent, and more companies in other spaces may want to consider using registration to facilitate recalls.

Further, automated recall calls should focus on the recall. If calls extend to marketing messaging, that could undermine both a future TCPA defense and the efficacy of that and future recall communications.

Optimally, companies would be less likely to need these defenses if the statute more clearly signaled to would-be litigants that they should not even bother. If the FCC grants the pending petition and plainly states that product recalls are emergencies for TCPA purposes, courts’ deference to agency interpretations might deter at least some complaints. A statutory amendment would be the surest guarantee, though, and manufacturers may wish to ask Congress to amend the TCPA to clarify that recall messages are emergency messages.

[1] See, e.g., Joseph F. Williams, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Recall Effectiveness Workshop Report, 5 (Feb. 22, 2018).

[2] Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(12), 105 Stat. 2394, 2395 (Dec. 20, 1991).

[3] Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014, 14115, para. 165 (2003)

[4] TCPA at § 3(a), 105 Stat. at 2399 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)).

[5] Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1857-SI (D. Or.).

[6] See, e.g., TCPA at § 3(a), 105 Stat. at 2395-96 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)).

[7] 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4).

[8] See, e.g., Compl., Ibrahim v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-04294, Dkt. #1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2016).

[9] Compl., Brooks v. Kroger Co., No. 3:19-cv-00106-AJB-MDD, Dkt. #1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2019) (“Brooks”).

[10] Pl. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 5, Brooks, Dkt. #9 (Apr. 4, 2019).

[11] Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Brooks, Dkt. #10 (Apr. 11, 2019).

[12] The plaintiff quoted one complaint as “Automated call from Kroger.” Compl. at 3-4, Brooks. As the defense noted, that complaint continued, “requesting that you return ground beef . . . due to the threat of salmonella.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 6, Brooks Dkt. #7 (Mar. 21, 2019).

[13] IHS Markit Ltd. Petition for Emergency Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, Petition, ii (Sept. 21, 2018).

[14] IHS Markit Ltd. Petition for Emergency Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, Comments of Association of Global Automakers, Inc. and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, 9 (Nov. 5, 2018).

[15] IHS Markit Ltd. Petition for Emergency Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, Comments of Patrick A. Juneau, 3 (Nov. 5, 2018).

[16] S. Rep. No. 102-178, 5 (Oct. 8, 1991).

[17] Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (Aug. 14, 2008) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2056a).

[18] 15 U.S.C. § 2056a(d).

© 2020 Schiff Hardin LLP

For more on CPSA, FDCA, MVSA & other recalls, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law section.