Category: Communication Media & Internet

Unprecedented Move: Vox Populi Extends Sunrise Deadline for “.sucks” Domain Registration

In a move that is being interpreted as possible overreaching, Vox Populi, operator of the .sucks domain name, extended the period for registering .sucks during the “sunrise period” without notice. The new deadline to register the .sucks domain name is June 19. Not only is it $2,000 or more to register each .sucks domain name, there is also an annual renewal fee of $2,000.

There is online speculation that Vox’s extension is motivated by a relatively large surge in last minute registrations before the original deadline of May 29. This might indicate that Vox is extending the sunrise period for the purpose of taking additional profits from the registration of this already high priced gTLD.

What is a trademark owner to do?

  • Some businesses are defensively registering .sucks then “parking” the domain name to prevent others from using it.

  • Other trademark owners plan to proactively “own” .sucks as a way to receive and curate criticism. This is seen as a way to allow consumers to vet issues and allow companies to manage legitimate issues.

  • Some trademark owners have decided to not register the domain name.

The decision that is right for individual businesses should take into account a variety of factors uniquely associated with the business and its anticipated future use of the Internet for communicating criticism about goods and/or services.

Vox is promoting the registration of this domain name as being consumer friendly providing a “voice” for the people. Vox retained Ralph Nader and Dr. Martin Luther King (via vintage film clip) as two of their celebrity spokes people to promote .sucks as a “protest word.”

There has been significant controversy regarding the launch of the new domain name .sucks. Foremost is Vox’s pricing strategy. Vox Populi (Voice of the People) is offering the domain name to trademark owners for $2,000 for each registration during the “sunrise period.” The sunrise period is an initial brief period of time, usually about two months, during which a trademark owner has priority to register their trademark with the new gTLD. As an example: “chicagocubs.sucks” could be registered by the Chicago Cubs as the trademark owner during the sunrise period for $2,000. Most new domain names (.coffee, .wedding, .football, .media, etc.) can be registered during their sunrise period for $100 – $200. However, if the Cubs decide to not register .sucks, a party qualifying for a “Consumer Advocate Subsidized” registration (as determined by Vox) can register “chicagocubs.sucks” after the sunrise period for only $9.95.

Many trademark owners are questioning whether Vox’s pricing strategy is an impermissible windfall or free speech. Some parties have already brought this matter to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Competition Bureau Canada for consideration. Although no final decision has been reached by either agency, FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez provided a preliminary response pointedly reminding Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), acting on behalf of the concerned parties, that the FTC weighed in on these and similar issues years ago prior to the launch of the new gTLD program. While Chairwoman Ramirez cannot comment on the existence of pending investigations she left the door open for monitoring the actions of registries and taking action in appropriate cases “if we have reason to believe an entity has engaged in deceptive or unfair practices in violation of [the] consumer protection authority.” Chairwoman Ramirez urged ICANN to address these issues internally since the dramatic growth of gTLDs brought on by ICANN’s program cannot be “feasibly addressed on a case-by-case basis” by the FTC.

Over the first 30 years of the publically accessible Internet approximately 220 gTLDs, including country codes were made available. Between 2011 and 2014 ICANN initiated a program to create new gTLDs. The stated goal of these new gTLDs was to be inclusive of new interest groups, non-Latin script languages and to anticipate the expansion of the Internet. This initiative was wildly successful with 1,930 applications being received by ICANN. After significant review of the applications approximately 1,370 new gTLDs were scheduled for launch. As of May 1, 2015, the launch of these new gTLDs is approximately one quarter completed with approximately 1,000 new gTLDs still to launch.

ARTICLE BY Intellectual Property Department of Barnes & Thornburg LLP
© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Think Your Cellphone Usage is Private? Think Again

In a closely-watched case out of Miami, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals redefined the zone of privacy for cell phone users. As the Tech World was focused on Miami for the second annual eMerge conference, the court issued an opinion permitting prosecutors to obtain records from mobile carriers—without a search warrant—allowing the tracking of an individual’s movements through his or her cell phone’s interaction with cell towers.

In U.S. v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the appeal of Quartavious Davis who was convicted by a Miami jury of participating in seven armed robberies. At trial, the prosecution presented accomplice and eye witness testimony that Davis was involved in seven separate armed robberies in a two-month period. The prosecutors also introduced historical cell tower records obtained from Davis’ mobile carrier for the time period spanning the robberies. The records contained a history of numbers dialed by Davis and the cell tower that connected each call. The prosecutors called a police officer that was able to pinpoint on a map the exact location of each robbery and—using the data obtained from Davis’ mobile carrier—the location of the cell tower that connected Davis’ calls around the time of each robbery. While Davis’ location was not precise, the evidence gave the government a basis to argue that the calls to and from Davis’ cell phone were connected through cell tower locations near the robbery locations. Several witnesses testified that Davis used his cell phone around the time of the robberies. These facts allowed the prosecutors to assert that Davis was necessarily near the locations of the robberies at the times they occurred.

The government acquired Davis’ mobile carrier’s records pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (the “SCA”), under which a governmental entity may require a telephone service provider to disclose “a record … pertaining to a subscriber to or a customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) … if a court of competent jurisdiction” finds “specific and articulable fact showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought are “relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” Importantly, the government is not required to show probable cause—as it would to obtain a search warrant—before a court will issue an order mandating the release of the records.

Following the guilty jury verdict, Davis appealed on the grounds that that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining his mobile carrier’s records without a search warrant and a showing of probable cause.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected Davis’ arguments on two independent grounds. First, the court held that the government’s acquisition of Davis’ mobile carrier’s records did not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that Davis did not have ownership or possession of the records, and, moreover, Davis did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records of the transmissions between his cell phone and his mobile carrier’s cell phone towers—particularly given that it was information captured in the mobile carrier’s records. Second, the court found that even if the government’s acquisition of the mobile carrier’s records did constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the government’s acquisition of the information was nonetheless reasonable because the government relied upon and adhered to the strictures of the SCA.

The full implications of the Davis case still remain to be seen, but the case raises important questions about privacy interests in respect of information transmitted over the airwaves and through the internet. For example—and as several judges concurring with the court’s opinion pointed out—what differentiates a third-party internet site’s tracking of a user’s movements on its site through the use of cookies from a mobile carrier’s tracking of a user’s location? One thing that we can say for certain is that as Miami continues to develop as an incubator for technology, start-ups and innovation, the Davis case certainly will not be the last word from our courts on the intersection of privacy and technology.

ARTICLE BY Naomi R. Alzate & Scott N. Wagner of Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP
© 2015 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

FCC Chairman Proposes New TCPA Rules

The FCC is ready to rule on long-standing petitions seeking clarifications of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and related FCC regulations. On May 27, 2015, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler circulated a proposed regulatory ruling to fellow commissioners, which would address issues raised in more than 20 pending petitions. The fact sheet summarizing the chairman’s proposal foreshadows bad news for legitimate businesses using automatic telephone dialing technology.

FCC_Logo

The fact sheet lumps scammer calls like those from perky “Rachel” of the mysterious and ambiguous “Cardholder Services” with those from legitimate businesses. The fact sheet cites the 214,000 consumer complaints about robocalls. No breakdown is given as to how many of these complaints involved con artists and how many related to businesses calling, for example, to collect debt. The tone of the fact sheet provides no comfort. Its preamble states the plan is to “close loopholes and strengthen consumer protections.”

The FCC will vote on the new proposal during its Open Commission Meeting scheduled for June 18, 2015. In the meantime, companies using automatic telephone dialing technology should plan to take action to comply with whatever comes from the FCC. There will be no notice and comment period and whatever passes at the Open Commission Meeting will become effective immediately upon release.

New Provisions

If Chairman Wheeler’s proposals are adopted without changes, the new rules will provide:

  • Wireless and wired telephone consumers will have the right to revoke their consent to receive calls and text messages sent from autodialers in any reasonable way at any time. Many courts have concluded that consumers have a right to revoke consent. Some have said that revocation must be in writing. Some have said consent, once given, cannot be taken back. If this proposal passes, all courts likely will hold that consent may be revoked in any reasonable way at any time. This rule will have consequences beyond TCPA exposure. For example, it is likely to increase the cost of credit because creditors and debt collectors will have to employ more people to manually dial debtors who have failed to meet their obligations and utter the words, “Stop calling me!”

  • To prevent “inheriting” consent for unwanted calls from a previous subscriber, callers will be required to stop calling reassigned wireless and wired telephone numbers after a single request. It is not clear from the fact sheet what the individual on the other end of the line must say to notify the caller that they are not the person they seek to reach.

  • The TCPA currently prohibits the use of automatic telephone dialing systems to call wireless phones and to leave prerecorded telemarketing messages on landlines without consent. The current definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the TCPA is “equipment which has the capacity to (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” A 2003 FCC ruling focused on the use of the word “capacity” in the definition and broadly extended the definition to cover autodialers used to dial specific numbers. This ruling has resulted in inconsistent court decisions over whether a dialer must have a present capacity to so dial or whether a future capacity is sufficient for to trigger TCPA coverage. The new proposal appears to attempt to resolve the ambiguity by amending the definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system” to mean “any technology with the capacity to dial random or sequential numbers.” That is not much help. The industry needs an answer on the present versus future capacity issue. As it stands now, a court could conclude that a smartphone is an automatic telephone dialing system. The tone of the fact sheet suggests that this problem is not going to be solved in a way that is favorable to industry.

Existing Provisions Under TCPA

Chairman Wheeler’s proposal also provides for some very limited and specific exceptions for “urgent circumstances,” which may include free calls or text messages to wireless devices that alert consumers of potential fraud or that remind them of urgent medication refills. Consumers will still have an opportunity to opt-out of these types of calls and texts.

  • The new proposal will also leave many of the existing provisions of the TCPA intact:

  • The FTC will continue to administer the National Do-Not-Call Registry to prevent unwanted telemarketing calls

  • Wireless and home phone subscribers can continue to prevent telemarketing robocalls made without prior written consent

  • Autodialed and prerecorded telemarketing and information calls and text messages to mobile phones will still require prior consent

  • Political calls will still be subject to restrictions on prerecorded, artificial voice, and autodialed calls to wireless phones, but will continue to not be subject to the National Do-Not-Call Registry because they do not contain telephone solicitations as defined by FCC regulations

  • Consumers will still have a private right of action for violations of the TCPA along with statutory penalties

Implications

If adopted, the new regulations may significantly restrict the use of autodialing technologies by business. However, the devil will be in the details. Organizations should review the owners’ manual that came with their dialer. What can it actually do? In other words, what is its present and future capacity? Have those answers ready so you can act when the FCC rules. Companies should also have proper processes and systems in place to meet the consumer opt-out requirements of any new regulations. Policies should address steps to take when a called party claims that the number called no longer belongs to your intended recipient.

One thing is certain about these new rules, they will not stop scammers who use spoofed caller IDs and originate calls from outside of the United States and, therefore, outside of the jurisdiction of the FCC and/or FTC. They will just make to harder and more expensive for legitimate businesses to reach their customers.

ARTICLE BY Chanley T. Howell, Michael C. Lueder & Steven Millendorf of Foley & Lardner LLP

© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP

Three Steps to Leverage LinkedIn for Your Law Firm

I have yet to find an attorney who could not benefit from having their profile on LinkedIn. It’s the number one online network for white-collar professionals.

Whether you want to connect with non-competing attorneys, non-legal professionals, or potential clients, the demographics on LinkedIn speak for themselves:

  • The average age range of a LinkedIn user is 30 to 49

  • 44% of LinkedIn users report an annual income of more than $100,000

  • 50% of members have a college degree

  • 28% have a graduate degree

LinkedIn members are highly educated and affluent. Is this a demographic you would like to reach? For most attorneys, the answer is obvious.

The first step to using LinkedIn is to create a comprehensive profile. Use your entire bio in your profile and be sure to include your keywords in it. In other words, use the exact keywords that you believe prospects or potential referral sources would use to find an attorney with your skill sets.

For example, if you are a business attorney in Omaha it might sound like this:

“John Doe is a Omaha business attorney who works with small business owners and CEOs of mid-sized companies to create comprehensive operating agreements, buy-sell agreements and employment agreements. His Omaha business clients appreciate the fact that John is an attorney who has a strong business background, having owned and operated two different companies, including a high tech company with 25 employees.”

Next, go to the See Who You Already Know on LinkedIn page and import your email contact list. This makes it super simple to connect with people you already know who are also on LinkedIn. In addition, based on your contacts, LinkedIn will suggest relevant contacts for you to connect with on the site.

Then search LinkedIn Groups and join those where your clients and prospects are. Create content — blog posts, free reports, articles, etc. — that will attract their attention. You can also start your own group and invite contacts to join.

The key to utilizing LinkedIn effectively is to be involved and be consistent. You need to commit to investing at least 30-45 minutes every week to log in, post an update or a link to your blog, reach out to your contacts, answer any questions that are sent to you, and make yourself visible. Simply setting up a profile on LinkedIn will not lead to more referrals any more than a having a business card will automatically get you new business.

ARTICLE BY Stephen Fairley of The Rainmaker Institute
© The Rainmaker Institute, All Rights Reserved

Executive Order Provides Sanctions Aimed at Fighting Cyberattacks

On April 1, the president signed Executive Order 13694, which created a new sanctions regime for fighting cyberattacks. This creates opportunities for companies that are facing or may face cyberattacks. The Executive Order provides additional tools for victims of cyberattacks to punish the perpetrators by working with the government. The Executive Order creates framework to allow the government to take action in response to attacks on private companies and take all measures necessary to punish co-conspirators. The Executive Order also creates several issues that individuals and companies with international dealings should consider taking into consideration to avoid potential liability.

The Executive Order grants the Secretary of the Treasury authority to “block” the assets of anyone who conducts or aids “cyber-enabled activities . . . reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States . . . .” The Executive Order also grants the power to sanction any individual or entity that gives support to, assists in anyway, or sponsors such a cyber-attacker. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will work in coordination with other U.S. government agencies to identify individuals and entities that engage in prohibited cyber activities and designate them for sanctions. Persons designated under this Executive Order will be added to OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in most all transactions with designated individuals and entities named on the SDN List or entities owned by such designated persons. Additionally, designated persons sanctioned under the Executive Order will be blocked from entering the United States.

Given the growing nature of cyberattacks and the Executive Order’s potentially broad reach, individuals and companies with international business should consider taking steps to ensure their business partners do not meet the criteria of cyberattackers. For example, payments from persons designated as cyberattackers will be blocked by U.S. financial institutions and U.S. persons that engage in transactions with such persons could be subject to substantial penalties. Accordingly, U.S. businesses engaged in international transactions should consider updating their compliance programs and screening procedures to ensure they are not dealing with any persons designated on the SDN List, or that are owned 50 percent or more by such designated persons.

The Executive Order represents a turning point for the administration. It signals that the administration will take a more active role in fighting attacks that are often diffuse and difficult to investigate. Barnes & Thornburg has worked with the government to track down hackers who have levied corporate cyberattacks. In light of the Executive Order, there can be little doubt that the government will redouble its efforts to help victim companies, presenting opportunities for companies to work with the government in its efforts to track down and stop the perpetrators. This is good news for fighting cyberattacks.

ARTICLE BY

Scott N. Godes & Karen A. McGee of Barnes & Thornburg LLP
© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

 

Department of Justice Settles Virtual Currency Enforcement Action

The US Attorney’s Office in the Northern District of California recently settled an enforcement action against Ripple Labs Inc., a Delaware corporation providing virtual currency exchange services. According to the settlement agreement, Ripple Labs was not registered with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) as a money services business (MSB) pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 while engaged in currency trading, and lacked required anti-money laundering controls.

Ripple Labs is a virtual currency exchange service dealing in XRP, the second-largest cryptocurrency by market capitalization after Bitcoin. Between at least March and April 2013, Ripple Labs sold XRP in its exchange. During the time of the sales, Ripple Labs was not registered with FinCEN. In March 2013, FinCEN’s released guidance clarifying the applicability of registration requirements to certain participants in the virtual currency arena. Ripple Labs also lacked an adequate anti-money laundering program, and did not have a compliance officer to assure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.

The settlement agreement reached by Ripple Labs and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) called for a $450,000 forfeiture to the DOJ, as well as a civil money penalty of $700,000 to FinCEN. Ripple Labs agreed to cooperate with any DOJ or regulatory request for information. In addition, Ripple Labs agreed to operate its XRP exchange as an MSB registered with FinCEN and to maintain all necessary registrations. Ripple Labs also agreed to implement and maintain an effective anti-money laundering program, complete with a compliance officer and training program. Finally, Ripple Labs agreed to conduct a review of prior transactions for evidence of illegal activity, as well as monitor transactions in the future to avoid potential money laundering or illegal transfer activity.

U.S. Department of Justice Settlement Agreement (May 5, 2015)

ARTICLE BY

Michael M. Rosensaft & Zachary D. Denver of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
©2015 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Supreme Court to Decide Who Can Sue Under Privacy Law

Does a consumer, as an individual, have standing to sue a consumer reporting agency for a “knowing violation” of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), even if the individual may not have suffered any “actual damages”?

The question will be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 2947 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015) (No. 13-1339). The Court’s decision will have far-reaching implications for suits under the FCRA and other statutes that regulate privacy and consumer credit information.

FCRA

Enacted in 1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act obligates consumer reporting agencies to maintain procedures to assure the “maximum possible accuracy” of any consumer report it creates. Under the statute, consumer reporting agencies are persons who regularly engage “in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” Information about a consumer is considered to be a consumer report when a consumer reporting agency has communicated that information to another party and “is used or expected to be used or collected” for certain purposes, such as extending credit, underwriting insurance, or considering an applicant for employment. The information in a consumer report must relate to a “consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.”

Under the FCRA, consumers may bring a private cause of action for alleged violations of their FCRA rights resulting from a consumer reporting agency’s negligent or willful actions. For a negligent violation, the consumer may recover the actual damages he or she may have sustained. For a “willful” or “knowing” violation, a consumer may recover either actual damages or statutory monetary damages of $100 to $1,000.

Background

Spokeo is a website that aggregates personal data from public records that it sells for many purposes, including employment screening. The information provided on the site may include an individual’s contact information, age, address, income, credit status, ethnicity, religion, photographs, and social media use.

Spokeo, Inc., has the dubious distinction of receiving the first fine ($800,000) from the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) for FCRA violations involving the sale of Internet and social media data in the employment screening context. The FTC alleged that the company was a consumer reporting agency and that it failed to comply with the FCRA’s requirements when it marketed consumer information to companies in the human resources, background screening, and recruiting industries.

Conflict in Circuit Courts

In Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., Thomas Robins had alleged several FCRA violations, including the reckless production of false information to potential employers. Robins did not allege he had suffered or was about to suffer any actual or imminent harm resulting from the information that was produced, raising only the possibility of a future injury.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, based in San Francisco, held that allegations of willful FCRA violations are sufficient to confer Article III standing to sue upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of the statute. In other words, the consumer need not allege any resulting damage caused by a violation; the “knowing violation” of a consumer’s FCRA rights alone, the Ninth Circuit held, injures the consumer. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is consistent with other circuits that have addressed the issue. See e.g., Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 705-07 (6th Cir. 2009). It refused to follow the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in finding that one “reasonable reading of the [FCRA] could still require proof of actual damages but simply substitute statutory rather than actual damages for the purpose of calculating the damage award.” Dowell v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 517 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2008).

The constitutional question before the U.S. Supreme Court is the scope of Congress’ authority to confer Article III standing, particularly, whether a violation of consumers’ statutory rights under the FCRA are the type of injury for which Congress may create a private cause of action to redress. In Beaudry, the Sixth Circuit identified two limitations on Congress’ ability to confer standing:

  1. the plaintiff must be “among the injured,” and

  2. the statutory right must protect against harm to an individual rather than a collective.

The defendant companies in Beaudry provided check-verification services. They had failed to account for a change in the numbering system for Tennessee driver’s licenses. This led to reports incorrectly identifying consumers as first-time check-writers.

The Sixth Circuit did not require the plaintiffs in Beaudry to allege the consequential damages resulting from the incorrect information. Instead, it held that the FCRA “does not require a consumer to wait for consequential harm” (such as the denial of credit) before bringing suit under FCRA for failure to implement reasonable procedures in the preparation of consumer reports. The Ninth Circuit endorsed this position, holding that the other standing requirements of causation and redressability are satisfied “[w]hen the injury in fact is the violation of a statutory right that [is] inferred from the existence of a private cause of action.”

Authored by: Jason C. Gavejian and Tyler Philippi of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Last Week Tonight’ Host John Oliver Ignores the Last Three Years of Patent Reform

Have you seen John Oliver’s piece about abuses in the patent system? The ‘Last Week Tonight’ host has quite a bit of fun at the expense of the patent system.  He tossed out three primary complaints:

(A) patent owners that don’t practice their patents shouldn’t be able to assert them;

(B) patent owners enforcing their patents are extorting parties, including small businesses and end users, that lack the funds or capability to litigate; and

(C) patents, especially software patents, are too vague, resulting in uncertainty as to what products or actions are encompassed.

John Oliver is witty, dry, and often downright silly – and it is for those reasons that millions of people are drawn to his humor and his show.  For those of us inclined to think that America’s tradition of strong patent protection has led us to be the most innovative country in the world, this particular story drew our attention for different reasons. His reporting posited the idea that the Innovation Act, H.R. 9, working its way through the House of Representatives, would solve most of the problems he identified in our patent system.  Far from providing the solutions its proponents claim, that legislation would do little or nothing to limit the sending of bogus demand letters to unsophisticated targets in hopes of extracting nuisance value settlements – a practice that many decry as the most egregious example of patent abuse.  Further, Mr. Oliver seems unaware that the last several years have seen judicial action and legislation that address the costs of patent litigation and the vagueness of software patents.  Whether these measures are sufficient without additional legislation is up for debate, but John Oliver’s hypothesis is weakened by his reliance on outdated and largely irrelevant facts and data.

In the interest of making sure truth isn’t sacrificed for the sake of a few good laughs, there are several points we would like to raise.

  • Not every patent owner that licenses its patents rather than practicing them is a “patent troll” deserving of punishment or deterrence.

  • Patent litigation is decreasing, and its costs are overstated.

  • With the America Invents Act of 2011, Congress has already taken steps to reduce the cost of patent litigation.

  • The Supreme Court has also recently addressed the costs of litigation.

  • The Supreme Court addressed vague software patents as well.

Authored by: Michael T. Renaud, Robert J. Moore and Jack C. Schecter of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

©1994-2015 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Reference Searches Through Social Media Do Not Create FCRA Claims

In their recruitment efforts, many employers will utilize social media to find suitable candidates for job openings. And, often employers will use the social media tools available to perform reference checks and/or verify a candidate’s employment history, experience and education history. Recently in California, a group of individuals challenged these social media background searches by suing the professional social media website, LinkedIn Corporation, because the information gleaned about these persons allegedly violated their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

In Sweet v. LinkedIn Corp., Tracee Sweet, one of the named plaintiffs for the class, alleged she had applied for a position through LinkedIn. Sweet claimed the potential employer advised she had been hired following a telephone interview. A week after, the potential employer rescinded the offer and this decision was based on the employer’s review of Sweet’s references through LinkedIn.

The employer had used the Reference Searches function on LinkedIn, which allows employers to find people with whom an applicant may have worked previously. According to the class plaintiffs, this search engine allows employers to “[g]et the real story on any candidate” and to “[f]ind references who can give real, honest feedback” about job candidates. The Reference Searches function produces two types of information for paid subscribers: (1) the name and list of the search target’s current and former employers; and (2) a list of other LinkedIn members who are in the same professional network of the search initiator and “who may have worked at the same company during the same time period as the search target.” The Referencence Searches then produces results which include for each possible reference, “the name of the employer in common between the reference and the job applicant, and the reference’s position and years employed at that common employer.”

According to the complaint, each member of the class had a similar experience as Sweet. Each plaintiff believed that LinkedIn’s Reference Searches function caused them to lose employment opportunities in violation of the FCRA. The U.S. District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed the action. The court explained that FCRA did not apply to the social media site and, instead, only to “consumer reporting agencies” that provide “consumer reports.”

Under the FCRA, a “consumer report” is:

[A]ny written, oral or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part of the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . . (B) employment purposes.

The district court stated that the publication of the plaintiffs’ employment histories were not consumer reports because that information came solely from LinkedIn’s transactions or experiences with the plaintiffs as members of the social media website. In other words, the information that was subsequently shared to a third-party occurred solely as a result of the plaintiffs’ voluntary provision of such information. As a result, that information is excluded from the protections of the FCRA. As the district court noted, the subsequent information sharing is precisely the reason why consumers such as the plaintiffs provide such information to LinkedIn.

Additionally, the district court found that LinkedIn was not a consumer reporting agency, as defined under the FCRA. The court explained that LinkedIn did not become a consumer reporting agency “solely because it conveys, with the consumer’s consent, information about the consumer to a third party to provide a specific product or service that the consumer has requested.”

Finally, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the list of names and information about the references included in the Reference Searches bear on the “character, general reputation, mode of living” and other relevant characteristics of the consumers who are the subjects of these searches. Instead, the court found that the results from Reference Searches are those in the search initiator’s network and not in the target’s network. Therefore, the results only communicate whether the search initiator (not the target) have the characteristics protected under the FCRA (e.g., character, general reputation, mode of living).

Written by Tina A. Syring of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Junk Fax Act Compliance: One Week Left to Request a Waiver for Non-Compliance

McDermott Will & Emery

Thursday, April 30, 2015, marks the last day a business can request a retroactive waiver for failing to comply with certain fax advertising requirements promulgated by theFederal Communications Commission (FCC). The scope of these requirements was clarified on October 30, 2014, when the FCC issued an Order (2014 Order) under the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (Junk Fax Act). The 2014 Order confirms that senders of all advertising faxes must include information that allows recipients to opt out of receiving future faxes from that sender.

The 2014 Order clarifies certain aspects of the FCC’s 2006 Order under the Junk Fax Act (the Junk Fax Order). Among other requirements, the Junk Fax Order established the requirement that the sender of an advertising fax provide notice and contact information that allows a recipient to “opt out” of any future fax advertising transmissions.

Following the FCC’s publication of the Junk Fax Order, some businesses interpreted the opt-out requirements as not applying to advertising faxes sent with the recipient’s prior express permission (based on footnote 154 in the Junk Fax Order). The 2014 Order provided a six-month period for senders to comply with the opt-out requirements of the Junk Fax Order for faxes sent with the recipient’s prior express permission and to request retroactive relief for failing to comply. The six-month period ends on April 30, 2015. Without a waiver, the FCC noted that “any past or future failure to comply could subject entities to enforcement sanctions, including potential fines and forfeitures, and to private litigation.”

ARTICLE BY

Julia Jacobson
Matthew R. Turnell
McDermott Will & Emery