Category: Civil Rights

COVID-19 Layoff or Pretext for Age Discrimination?

The recent, unprecedented changes to our country and its workforce due to the COVID-19 pandemic have upended the lives of millions. The economic fallout continues and in many instances, employers simply have no choice but to lay off large swaths of their employees due to the lack of business/revenue. And these employers have legitimate reasons for doing so and view this as a heart-wrenching but necessary step.

At the same time, a small subset of employers may decide that, even though mass layoffs are not necessary, they will still lay off certain, older employees. In this scenario, there is no legitimate business need driving the termination but an opportunity to let go of older employees who often have higher salaries. Or the employer is concerned that older employees may trigger additional costs in terms of insurance or paid time off because of their susceptibility to COVID-19. Similarly, the employer may hold stereotypical views that older employees are less likely to function well in a virtual/remote work setting that requires technological skills.

As such, the employer’s claim that it had to lay off the older employee due to the pandemic could be a pretext for age discrimination. The question is, how do courts make this call? The answer to this question centers on how an employee can prove that the employer’s purported reasons were just a mask for illegal behavior.

Signs That The Layoff May Be Age Discrimination

Each case will be reviewed based on its own facts and merits, so no “one size fits all” approach can apply when analyzing age discrimination and pretext claims. In the context of COVID-19 layoffs, there are some red flags that may suggest that the employer is targeting an employee(s) because of their age rather than a legitimate business need to reduce the workforce. These red flags include:

  • The company institutes a relatively small-scale layoff, which includes a number of more experienced, older, and higher paid employees
  • Younger, less experienced, and less expensive employees are retained and in some cases take over the work of the departed, older workers
  • Comments by decision-makers reference (or had referenced) the experience level, age, higher salaries, nearness to retirement, etc. of the older employees
  • The employer hires new, younger employees within a relatively short period of time after the older employees are let go

Many companies will be required to provide laid off employees with specific, written information about the employees it chose to lay off, including their job titles and ages. This is helpful information to assess whether age discrimination may have motivated the termination decision. But often it will be necessary to dig deeper into the employer’s data about the laid off employees to see if a correlation between the termination decision and their ages emerges.

Legal Standards For Age Discrimination And Pretext Claims

The key federal law that prohibits age discrimination in employment is aptly named the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). It prevents an employer from discharging or otherwise “[discriminating] against any individual… because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).

To win, a plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-178 (2009). Circumstantial evidence, as opposed to direct evidence of discrimination (which is less frequently available to plaintiffs), is analyzed under a three-part test created by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Note that the Supreme Court clarified that federal employees have a less onerous legal burden to prove in age discrimination claims as compared to private sector employees. Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 (2020).

The McDonnell Douglas framework for an ADEA claim for layoff due to age discrimination is as follows:

STEP 1/prima facie case (burden on plaintiff)

  • They belong to a protected class (older than 40 years old)
  • They were qualified for the job and performing in accordance with the expectations of their employer
  • Employer terminated their employment
  • The employer replaced plaintiff with an individual who was comparably qualified to the plaintiff, but substantially younger, or that they were laid off under circumstances that give rise to an inference of age discrimination

STEP 2 (burden on defendant)

  • Employer must produce evidence that its actions were the result of legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons

STEP 3 (burden on plaintiff)

  • Employee must prove that the non-discriminatory reason(s) offered by the employer in Step 2 were not true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination based on age.

The Supreme Court held that “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146-7 (2000). Also, Reeves allows the trier of fact to consider the evidence used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (first prong of McDonnell Douglas) when they are deciding the final prong of McDonnell Douglas framework. How the employer treats similarly situated (but younger) employees plays a key role in age discrimination cases.

How Can Older Employees Protect Their Rights?

For employees in the private sector, a charge of age discrimination must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the discriminatory act (that is the notice of the layoff). The 180 calendar day filing deadline is extended to 300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a state or local law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis.

For age discrimination, however, the filing deadline is only extended to 300 days if there is a state law prohibiting age discrimination in employment and a state agency or authority enforcing that law. The deadline is not extended if only a local law prohibits age discrimination.

Note: federal employees have a different charge filing process. Visit www.eeoc.gov for more information.

 

© 2020 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
For more on discrimination in hiring and firing, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law section.

What Should You Do About D&I Efforts During a Pandemic? Exactly What You Were Doing Before

The tremendous economic uncertainty emerging in the wake of COVID-19 is forcing law firm leaders to contend with challenges they’ve never faced before. People are scared, and for good reason. Given the enormous financial pressure firms feel, it’s understandable that leaders may opt to push diversity and inclusion efforts to the back burner for a while — or is it?

Let’s review what we know about the business case for creating more diverse firms.

In other words, improving law firm diversity is an imperative for any firm hoping to compete in the marketplace. That was true before the pandemic, and it’s still true today, despite how much more difficult it may be to achieve this goal.

Here’s the good news: expensive, outward-facing diversity and inclusion initiatives that are more about marketing than substance probably are not the best use of constrained law firm resources. Instead, firm leaders should consider simple, effective interventions that will protect the progress they have made in elevating more women and minority attorneys to power, and make it possible for that work to continue:

Help women and minority partners build their profiles remotely. Now that all in-person avenues to developing business are closed, firms are thinking strategically about how their attorneys should move those efforts online. But top-down orders to “leverage LinkedIn” or “keep up with your contacts virtually” are not useful to attorneys who didn’t have robust “old boy” networks to begin with. Online networking is a skill, just like other business development techniques. If your firm was providing coaching support to high-potential attorneys to help them with business development in the real world, that same support is needed now for new kinds of marketing efforts. Attorneys are going to need tutorials that walk them through best practices and provide support by phone or email. Marketing departments can create these resources or contract outside support to do this training work. Then they must oversee the execution to ensure attorneys stay part of the online conversation in their target industries. Is it possible to assign marketing department staff to this task, particular those who typically staff events and may have extra capacity?

Keep the content coming. Social media profiles are only as strong as the content attorneys have to share there. We know that implicit bias can make it more difficult for women and minority attorneys to demonstrate their subject-matter expertise and be considered for the same opportunities as less experienced white men. This makes thought leadership articles and opportunities to be featured as an “expert source” in key media outlets all the more important for building these attorneys’ reputation with prospects. When putting your firm’s experts forward on webinars, thought leadership articles and media pitches, consider who’s being included — and who’s not. If the faces of your firm’s most important expertise are all white men, you’re sending the message that your other attorneys are somehow less qualified to lead in a crisis.

Bear equity in mind when handling award nominations. The earliest and most chaotic weeks of the COVID crisis happened to coincide with an already busy time on many legal marketers’ calendars: award season. Nominations for “rising star” and other programs are typically due in spring, and gathering client testimonials, case examples and other supporting materials can be time consuming and logistically challenging under normal circumstances. And we know that the required effort (which of course comes on top of keeping up with billable work), combined with the often-gendered tendency to be more reticent about self-promotion, means that award nominees can be less than representative of a firm’s diversity anyway. This year, women bearing the brunt of new childcare and homeschooling responsibilities, along with those who care for extended family members, had even less bandwidth and energy to put themselves forward for industry honors. What can your team do to ensure that your award nominees reflect the true diversity of your emerging lawyers, rather than an oversampling of those privileged enough to have more spare time on their hands?

Make evaluations more transparent and consider what “fairness” means right now. In addition to thinking about the intersection of inclusion and business development, firm leaders will need to consider how to evaluate the work attorneys do under these extraordinary circumstances. Obviously it would not be fair to hold attorneys to the standards for billable hours that they would during a normal year, but what should revised standards look like? As noted, women are taking on a greater share of the childcare, homeschooling and household duties under lockdown, which makes it more difficult for them to bill the same number of hours or develop as much new business as men. How can you make sure they won’t be penalized for this when it comes time to make decisions about compensation and promotion? Questions about how to fairly and holistically evaluate attorneys’ work long predate the current crisis, and they are going to become more urgent in the months to come. The current system continues to reward white men above other demographic groups. It’s time for reform.

No question this is a frightening time for firm leaders, and they will want to focus their limited attention on what matters most for the survival of the firm. That shortlist should include a continued commitment to diversity and inclusion. The business case is clear, and hard-won gains for women and minorities are hanging in the balance.

© 2020 Page2 Communications. All rights reserved.

ARTICLE BY Debra Pickett of Page 2 Communications.
For more on continuing normal business operations amid COVID-19, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Virginia Enacts Robust LGBTQ Anti-Discrimination and Civil Rights Legislation

On April 11, 2020, Governor Northam signed the Virginia Values Act (SB 868), monumental anti-discrimination legislation that makes Virginia the first state in the South to enact comprehensive protections for the LGBTQ community.  In particular, Senate Bill 868 1) prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or status as a veteran; 2) prohibits discrimination in credit on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, disability, and veteran status; and 3) prohibits discrimination in housing based on sexual orientation, gender identity, and status as a veteran. The Virginia Values Act will become effective on July 1, 2020.

In a press release, Governor Northam stated, “This legislation sends a strong, clear message—Virginia is a place where all people are welcome to live, work, visit, and raise a family. We are building an inclusive Commonwealth where there is opportunity for everyone, and everyone is treated fairly. No longer will LGBTQ Virginians have to fear being fired, evicted, or denied service in public places because of who they are.”

The Virginia Values Act amends the Virginia Human Rights Act (VA HRA), Va. Code §§ 2.2-3900 et seq., by barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity and creating a private cause of action for employment discrimination.  The amended VA HRA authorizes a victim of discrimination to bring a civil action in district or circuit court after receiving a notice of right to file a civil action from the Division of Human Rights of the Department of Law.  Remedies include uncapped compensatory and punitive damages.

What law in Virginia bars employment discrimination?

The VA HRA, amended by SB 868, bars discrimination in private employment on the basis of race; color; religion; sex; sexual orientation; gender identity; marital status; age; veteran status; national origin; or pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions including lactation.

How does the amended VA HRA define gender identity and sexual orientation?

The enacted SB 868 defines gender identity as “the gender-related identity, appearance, or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.”  It defines sexual orientation as “a person’s actual or perceived heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality.”

What damages or remedies are available for victims of discrimination in Virginia?

A court or jury may award a prevailing discrimination plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  A court may also grant other equitable relief, such as a permanent or temporary injunction or a temporary restraining or other order, including one enjoining the defendant from engaging in further discriminatory practices.

What is the burden to prevail in a Virginia Human Rights Act case?

To prevail in a VA HRA employment case, plaintiffs must prove only that their protected characteristic was a motivating factor for any employment practice.  This means that a plaintiff can prevail even if other factors also motivated the practice.

How do I bring a discrimination claim in Virginia?

A victim of discrimination in Virginia should file a written complaint with the Division of Human Rights of the Department of Law.  The Division of Human Rights will then issue a charge of discrimination to the offending party and inform all parties of the employee’s rights and the timeline for exercising those rights.  The parties may then agree to go to mediation without waiving any rights.

After issuing a charge of discrimination, the Division of Human Rights will conduct an investigation into the complaint to determine whether there is reason to believe that discrimination occurred, and the Division will issue a report on its findings.

If the Division concludes that there is no reasonable cause to believe that the alleged unlawful discrimination has been committed, then it will dismiss the charge and issue the employee a notice of right to commence civil action.  If the Division concludes that there is reason to believe discrimination occurred, it will attempt to remedy the discrimination through informal methods and discussions with the offending party.  If and when the Division determines that informal methods will not suffice to eliminate the discrimination, it will close the case and give the employee a notice of right to commence civil action.

At any time after the Division issues the charge of discrimination, the complaining party may petition a court with jurisdiction for temporary, equitable relief including for a restraining order or injunction if the circumstances are such that continuing discrimination during the course of the investigation will cause irreparable injury.

An employee may also submit a written request for notice of right to commence civil action, and the Division will issue that notice after either 180 days have passed since the complaint was filed or the Division has determined it will not complete its investigation within 180 days.

After receiving a notice of right to commence civil action from the Division, an employee may file a civil action in a court with jurisdiction over the defending party.

 

© 2020 Zuckerman Law  Posted by: Dallas Hammer , Katherine Krems & Jason Zuckerman

EEOC Issues ADA and Title VII Guidance for Employers on COVID-19

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently hosted a webinar in which the agency answered questions about the applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII to COVID-19-related employment actions.  This Q&A supplemented earlier guidance posted by the EEOC.

This post summarizes the guidance and takeaways from the EEOC webinar.

  • The EEOC updated its previously published guidance entitled “Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace and the Americans With Disabilities Act” to provide information and examples regarding COVID-19. This new guidance confirms that COVID-19 constitutes a “direct threat” and a significant risk of substantial harm would be posed by having someone with COVID-19, or symptoms of it, present in the workplace.
  • Employers should follow the EEOC guidance in conjunction with the guidelines and suggestions made by the CDC and state/local health authorities.
  • The guidance also answers common employer questions about the COVID-19 pandemic, such as:

Q:     How much information may an employer request from an employee who calls in sick in order to protect the rest of its workforce during the COVID-19 pandemic?

A:    ADA-covered employers may ask such employees if they are experiencing symptoms of the pandemic virus such as fever, chills, cough, shortness of breath, or sore throat. Employers must maintain all information about employee illness as a confidential medical record in compliance with the ADA. Employers generally may not ask these questions of employees who are teleworking since they are not entering the workplace and do not pose a threat to others.

We note, however, that if an employee recently started teleworking, employers may want to ask the employee if they exhibited symptoms of COVID-19 before starting telework, so the employer can inform those with whom the employee had been in close contact about the potential exposure.

Q:     What if an employee refuses to answer COVID-19 related questions by the employer?

A:    The ADA allows employers to bar an employee’s physical presence in the workplace if he or she poses a threat to others. Employers should ask for the reason behind the employee’s refusal and reassure the employee if the employee is hesitant to provide this information.

Q:    When may an employer take an employee’s temperature during the COVID-19 pandemic?

A:    Generally, taking an employee’s temperature is a medical examination under the ADA. Because the CDC and state/local health authorities have acknowledged community spread of COVID-19, employers may take employees’ temperature. However, employers should be aware that some people with COVID-19 do not have a fever, while some people with a fever do not have COVID-19.

Employers, however, are well-advised to first consult with counsel to ensure the administration of these tests stays within the guidance and does not otherwise violate applicable law.

Q:    Can an employer ask COVID-19 related questions about an employee’s family members? 

A:    This unnecessarily limits the inquiry. A better question is whether the employee has had contact with anyone diagnosed with COVID-19 or who was showing symptoms of COVID. A general question like this is more sound. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) prohibits employers from asking employees medical questions about an employee’s family members.

Q:    How are employers supposed to keep medical information of employees confidential while teleworking?

A:     The ADA requires that medical information be stored separately away from other personnel files and employee information. A supervisor who receives this information while teleworking should follow normal company procedures to store this information. If they cannot follow the procedures for whatever reason, they should make every effort to safeguard the information from disclosure (for example, do not leave a laptop open or accessible to others; do not leave notepads with information around the home, etc.).

Q:    What are an employer’s ADA obligations when an employee says he has a disability that puts him at a greater risk of severe illness if he contracts COVID and therefore asks for a reasonable accommodation?

A:    The CDC has identified certain conditions (for example, lung disease) that put certain people at a higher risk for severe illness if COVID-19 is contracted. Thus, this is clearly a request for a reasonable accommodation and a request for a change in the workplace. Because employers cannot grant employees reasonable accommodations for disabilities that they do not have, employers may verify that the employee has a disability, what the disability is, and that the reasonable accommodation is necessary because the disability may potentially put the individual at a higher risk for severe illness due to COVID-19.

There may also be a situation in which the employee’s disability is exacerbated by the current situation. The employer may verify this as well. Aside from requesting a doctor’s note, other options to verify an employee’s disability may be to request insurance documents or their prescription. An employer may want to provide a temporary reasonable accommodation pending receipt of the documentation.

Q:    If an employer grants telework to employees with the purpose of slowing down/stopping COVID-19 – after the public health measures are no longer necessary, does the employer automatically have to grant telework as a reasonable accommodation to every employee with a disability who wishes to continue this arrangement?

A:    No. Anytime an employee requests a reasonable accommodation, the employer has the right to understand and evaluate the disability related limitation and make a determination on the request. After the pandemic, a request to telework does not have to be granted if working at the worksite is an essential function of the job in normal circumstances (i.e. not during a pandemic). The ADA never requires an employer to limit the essential functions of a position, and just because an employer did this during the pandemic does not mean an employer has to permanently change the essential functions of a position, and is not an admission that telework is a feasible accommodation or that telework does not place an undue hardship on the employer.

The guidance further addresses common questions related to discrimination and harassment under Title VII, such as:

Q:     May an employer decide to layoff or furlough a pregnant employee who does not have COVID-19 or symptoms solely based on the CDC guidance that pregnant women are more likely to experience severe symptoms and should be monitored?

A:     No, because pregnant employees are protected under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Title VII.

Q:    May an employer exclude from the workplace an employee who is 65 or older and who does not have COVID, solely because he or she is in an age group that is at higher risk for severe illness as a result of COVID?

A:    No, age based actions are not permitted. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits discrimination against those who are 40 or older.

Q:    May an employer single out employees based on national origin and exclude them from the workplace due to concerns about possible COVID-19 transmission? May employers tolerate a hostile work environment based on an employee’s national origin or religion because others link it to the transmission of COVID-19?

A:    No, because Title VII prohibits national origin discrimination. It does not matter that it is linked to COVID-19. Employers should remind employees of anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies and also should ensure that they are not taking employment actions based on an employee’s protected class(es).

  • An employer may make inquiries that are non-disability related to identify potential non-medical reasons for an employee’s absence or future absence. For example, an employer may ask a “yes” or “no” question that asks if the employee or someone in his or her household falls within the categories identified by the CDC for being at higher risk for severe illness if COVID-19 is contracted (such as pregnancy or being over the age of 65).
  • An employer may also screen job applicants for symptoms of COVID-19 after making a conditional job offer, as long as it does so for all entering employees in the same type of job.
  • While employers may require doctors’ notes certifying their fitness for duty before returning to work, as a practical matter, doctors and other health care professionals may be too busy during the pandemic outbreak to provide fitness-for-duty documentation. Therefore, new approaches, such as requesting an employee’s prescription, may be necessary.

This is a challenging time and events are changing rapidly. EEOC guidance and interpretation of what is permissible under the ADA and Title VII is evolving and may change as circumstances develop.

©1994-2020 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

For more employer guidance from Gov’t Agencies amid the COVID-19 pandemic, see the National Law Review dedicated Coronavirus News section.

No Relief in Sight for NJ Employers: Six Newly-Enacted State Employment Laws to Tackle

On January 21, 2020, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed five employee-friendly bills into law, including statutorily mandated requirements that increase penalties on employers that misclassify workers and obligate employers to pay severance to workers impacted by mass layoffs. Also, on December 19, 2019, the Governor signed the “Create a Respectful and Open Workplace for Natural Hair Act” (“CROWN Act”), which clarifies that discrimination based on hair textures and styles violates the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”).

In line with states like California and New York, the enactment of these new laws places New Jersey among a handful of states that provide markedly heightened protections for employees. The amalgamation of these new laws dramatically expands employee rights in the workplace.

Increased Employer Fines for Misclassification

Effective immediately, A.B. 5839 authorizes the state’s Department of Labor and Workforce Development to assess fines against employers for misclassifying workers. Under the new law, New Jersey employers or staffing agencies that misclassify workers may be issued up to a $250 fine per employee for the first violation and up to $1,000 per employee for subsequent violations. The amount of the penalty to be assessed will depend on such factors as the history of prior violations, the severity of the violation, the size of the employer’s business and the good faith of the employer. In addition, an employer found to have misclassified a worker may have to pay a fine to the misclassified worker of up to 5% of their gross earnings over the previous year.

New Employer Posting Requirement

Effective March 1, 2020, A.B. 5843 requires employers to post a conspicuous notice regarding employee misclassification. The New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development will issue a form of notice, which will include a prohibition on misclassification, description of what constitutes worker misclassification, employee rights and remedies, and the process for reporting employer misclassifications.

In addition, the newly enacted statute prohibits employer retaliation against workers who make complaints about potential unlawful employee misclassifications. Employer retaliation carries a fine of $100 to $1,000 for each offense, and employees found to be terminated in retaliation for such protected conduct are entitled to reinstatement in addition to back pay and legal fees.

Managers Potentially on the Hook

Effective immediately, A.B. 5840 amends New Jersey’s recently passed Wage Theft Act and provides that employers and labor contractors will be jointly and severally liable for state wage and hour law violations and tax law violations, including with respect to worker misclassifications. The law broadly provides that any person acting on “behalf of an employer,” including an owner, director, officer or manager of the employer, may be held liable as the employer.

Business Shutdowns for Violations

Effective immediately, A.B. 5838 permits state regulators to issue “stop-work orders” upon seven days’ advance notice to sites where employers are found to have violated state wage, benefits, or tax laws, subjecting employers to a steep penalty of $5,000 per day against an employer for each day that it conducts business operations that are in violation of the stop-work order.

The law gives the state’s Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development the authority to issue stop-work orders requiring cessation of all business operations at the specific place of business where any wage, benefit, or employment tax law violation is found. Employers subject to a stop-work order will have 72 hours following receipt of the order to exercise their right to make a written appeal to contest the stop-work order. Importantly, while employers may appeal the finding, that process may take weeks, risking potentially large losses for the implicated business.

Severance for Mass Layoffs

Effective July 19, 2020, S.B. 3170 dramatically amends the New Jersey state WARN Act in several significant respects. In the event of a covered mass layoff or termination or transfer of operations, the amendment increases the advance notice required to affected employees from 60 days to 90 days. New Jersey was previously aligned with the federal WARN Act which requires 60 days in advance of certain mass layoffs or plant closings. With respect to the length of notice now required in New Jersey, the new 90- day prior notice period mirrors New York State’s advance notice requirement, though threshold standards defining when notice must be given under these statutes differ. Upon the effective date, New Jersey employers now will need to consider two different statutory schemes to determine to what extent advance notice is required.

The amendment requires covered employers to provide severance pay to employees when there is a mass layoff or termination/transfer or operations impacting at least 50 full-time workers laid off in a 30-day period. Under the statute, severance is calculated at one week’s pay for each full year the worker has been employed and is required even when the requisite notice has been provided. In addition, when an employer fails to meet its advance notice mandate, the new law requires employers to give affected employees an additional four weeks of severance pay. In contrast, severance is currently a penalty for non-compliance with the New Jersey WARN Act.

Further, the required severance must be paid to the affected employee at the same time as the final paycheck. The severance cannot be used as consideration to negotiate a general release of claims from the terminated employee. Employers can, however, obtain a release of claims where additional consideration is offered to the impacted employee for that specific purpose.

The Crown Act

S.B. 3945 amends the LAD to clarify that race discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of “traits historically associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture, hair type, and protective hairstyles.” Governor Murphy enacted the CROWN Act exactly one year after an incident involving an African-American high school wrestler who was forced to cut off his locks in order to compete in a match. The wrestling incident prompted the introduction of S.B. 3945 and garnered widespread media attention. We reported on the CROWN Act in detail in our October 2019 alert. Effective immediately, the CROWN Act codifies guidance issued by the New Jersey’s Division on Civil Rights (DCR) stating that the DCR considered “hairstyles closely associated with Black people,” such as “twists, braids, cornrows, Afros, locks, Bantu knots, and fades” to be included in the definition of racial characteristics protected under the LAD.

New Jersey has become the third state to ban discrimination based on natural hair and hairstyles, following New York (effective on July 12, 2019) and California (effective on January 1, 2020). The New York City Commission on Human Rights issued similar guidance in February 2019 that clarifies that the New York City Human Rights Law includes discrimination based on natural hair and hairstyles as a form of race discrimination. Several other states and municipalities have similar legislation pending. Also, Senator Cory Booker introduced federal legislation on December 5, 2019 that would ban discrimination based on hair textures and hairstyles that are commonly associated with a particular race or national origin, and Representative Cedric Richmond introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives.

Takeaways:

New Jersey continues to take steps to dramatically increase employee rights in the workplace. New Jersey employers should take appropriate measures now to ensure that (i) owners, directors, officers, managers, and others involved in the process of classifying workers are mindful of the new employee classification requirements for businesses and their potential exposure based on individual liability for misclassifications, (ii) their businesses are compliant with new posting requirements regarding New Jersey’s recently passed employee misclassification laws, and (iii) managers and supervisors are trained on the new retaliation protections afforded employees who report alleged violations concerning employee misclassification.

New Jersey employers also should review their grooming policies to determine whether they discourage natural hairstyles and hair textures, and determine whether any policies pertaining to appearance or aesthetics implicate any other proxies to race. With similar laws in other states, like New York, and pending elsewhere, employers across the nation should review their policies regarding grooming, appearance and aesthetics.

Lastly, the amendments to the New Jersey WARN Act will require careful analysis to determine an employer’s obligations and to minimize risks in connection with a mass layoff or transfer/termination of operations. The new severance obligations undoubtedly will impose substantial financial burdens on employers who have made the decision to reduce costs and/or operations.

© Copyright 2020 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.

For more on employment laws in New Jersey and elsewhere, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

High School Female Athletes Fail to Score on Class Certification

The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii recently denied female student-athletes’ motion for class certification under Title IX even though it rejected the defendants’ attacks on mootness and standing as well as Rule 23(a)’s requirements for commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Instead, the court found that the proposed class failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement that joinder would be impracticable.

The underlying case centered on Title IX allegations by female athletes at James Campbell High against defendants Hawaii State Department of Education and the Oahu Interscholastic Association. The athletes claimed that the defendants violated Title IX by failing to take remedial actions to meet Title IX’s anti-discrimination provisions and failed to provide Campbell female athletes with equivalent, athletic-participation opportunities. The athletes’ motion proposed the following class: “All present and future James Campbell High School female students and potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or were deterred from participating in athletics at Campbell.” The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ records showed 366 Campbell female student-athletes in the 2018–2019 school year alone.

The court first addressed the issue of mootness after the defendants argued that two of the named plaintiffs had already graduated. The court found, however, that those athletes’ claims fit under the “inherently transitory” exception to mootness, given the necessarily finite duration of a high school student’s time as a student-athlete and the potential for repetition of the claims from similarly situated students.

The court next addressed the defendants’ argument that the named plaintiff — a ninth-grade water polo player — did not have standing because the water polo season had not yet begun at the time the motion was filed, and thus she had yet to experience the alleged discriminatory conduct. The court found that the defendants’ argument was erroneously narrow-focused and that the ninth-grade athletes had allegedly experienced discriminatory events generally suffered by the female student-athlete populations, which would apply even if a particular student’s athletic season had not yet started. Specifically, those student-athletes are forced to make plans around a discriminatory sports schedule or are exposed to a lack of publicity for female athletics programs, which are the types of harm that Title IX was implemented to prevent and remedy.

The court then turned its focus to Rule 23(a)’s requirements. While the court found that the athletes satisfied the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, the court’s decision ultimately depended on the athletes’ inability to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Although the defendants did not appear to challenge numerosity, including that the class exceeded 300 members, the court found that the athletes had failed to demonstrate that joinder was impracticable and that the future members of the proposed class were reasonably identifiable. The court observed that the proposed class members were limited to the female population from a single high school and were geographically tied to one area of Hawaii and identifiable through school and athletic records. Thus, the court held that joinder of the current students within the class in a single lawsuit was not impracticable. The court also found that, with regard to the future and potential students, those subgroups were not reasonably identifiable and, thus, would not be considered in any numerosity determination.

As uncommon as it may be for a class of more than 300 members to fail the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a), any case can offer distinct circumstances that allow a court to reject an otherwise presumed, accepted argument. The unique geographic facts here were sufficient for this court to reject certification. Ultimately, the facts always matter.

A.B. v. Haw. State Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 1:18-cv-00477 (D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2019).

©2011-2020 Carlton Fields, P.A.

For more on Title IX issues, see the National Law Review Public Education & Services section.

How an Entire Class of Prison Guard Trainees Could Have Been Saved by a Simple Bystander Intervention Program

In December 2019, an entire class of West Virginia prison guard trainees was reportedly fired for giving the Nazi salute in their graduation photo.

The incident is not only a chilling display of a detestable symbol of genocide. It is also a crystal-clear example of the problem of the passive bystander. But modern training methods, based on current research on the science of bystandership, can help prevent such abuses before they occur. Such programs are being successfully adopted by law enforcement agencies and other organizations around the country.

What happened in West Virginia: Several news outlets have published the November graduation photo showing a class of over 30 prison guard cadets displaying the Nazi salute. According to published reports, the gesture was one cadet’s idea of a tribute to the group’s training officer. An internal investigation of the incident found that the training officer, Karrie Byrd, “saw nothing wrong with the gesture and allowed it to continue.” Several class members objected to the gesture, but went along out of fear of retaliation. Two other instructors saw the gesture and spoke out, thinking their duty to object was fulfilled. A corrections department Captain, Annette Daniels-Watts, reportedly recognized that the picture would cause the Department embarrassment, but allowed the photo to be printed and distributed with graduation materials. The Department’s subsequent internal investigation concluded that the entire class (and several of the instructors) should be fired. Acting on the recommendation, West Virginia Governor Jim Justice fired the entire class on New Year’s Eve.

Multiple opportunities to intervene: As goes the adage often attributed to Edmund Burke, the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is that good people do nothing. We don’t know if there were any actual Nazis in the West Virginia cadet class, but it is safe to assume not all were. Many participants in the incident had opportunities to intervene, but none did. The instigator of the incident reportedly said he was honoring the instructor with the gesture. To classmates who objected, he assured them that since there was no racial motivation behind it, the gesture was acceptable. Two other instructors witnessed the gesture being made during training exercises and informed the class of the inappropriateness of the gesture. Those instructors reportedly thought their comments stopped the inappropriate behavior. Yet multiple instructors later saw the graduation photograph and did nothing to stop its publication. And the Captain in charge of cadet basic training, when shown the photograph by a secretary responsible for assembling the graduation materials, reportedly told the secretary, “oh, I should just pull it, but since you have them all already printed you might as well go ahead and stuff them into the packets.” At each of these moments, a bystander could have helped stop the activity. But the bystanders didn’t have the tools they needed to act effectively.

Inhibitors to action: Why do people fail to effectively intervene against a behavior they know is wrong? We all do it. The answer is that the tactics and strategies for successful intervention are not innate. We need to be trained to overcome factors that inhibit action in the face of bad behavior. The West Virginia investigation report concludes as follows:

  1. There is “no dispute” that the gesture and photograph were highly offensive.
  2. The investigation did not reveal any overt motivation or intent of discrimination “towards any racial, religious, or ethnic group.”
  3. Rather, the report identifies the factors behind the incident as “poor judgment, ignorance, peer pressure, and fear of reprisal.”

All the factors identified in the report are well-documented inhibitors to active bystandership. Importantly, good peer intervention techniques are proven to address such inhibitors. The program instituted by the New Orleans Police Department is one such program. The program is known as “Ethical Policing is Courageous,” or EPIC. It was implemented by the men and women of the NOPD with the support and guidance of several outside experts, including the Department’s judicially-appointed monitors. Since then, the EPIC program has been brought to other municipal police departments, and at least one university police department.

In law enforcement organizations, one of the main inhibitors to intervention is peer pressure, particularly when officers fear ostracism or retaliation from fellow officers. This effect is sometimes referred to as the “blue wall of silence.” That wall of silence is rooted in the value of protecting fellow officers from harm, but becomes pernicious when it suppresses intervention against bad acts.

Some corrective actions may miss the mark. According to some reports, West Virginia plans to begin training its corrections department staff about the Holocaust as a result of the cadet graduation photo incident. Surely a better understanding of the Holocaust would help the cadets see that the Nazi gesture is offensive. But it might not be a complete solution. It doesn’t address the inhibitors to intervention that are present in all such situations, and which are especially pervasive in law enforcement environments.

Active bystandership makes us all better. Good peer intervention training programs work precisely because they can break the wall of silence. For example, the EPIC program ties positive, early intervention to the value of protecting fellow officers. Instead of relying on ethics training, discipline, or negative reinforcement, the program emphasizes that stepping in to prevent misconduct can help save a fellow officer’s life, safety, or career. Intervention skills are taught as a learnable skill, on the same level as learning to operate the radio, use a firearm, or apply handcuffs. When active intervention skills become pervasive, problems can be prevented before a crisis occurs. The EPIC program has garnered positive reviews from many quarters.

The West Virginia government has rightly been praised for its transparent and thorough response to this incident, but crisis management is difficult and traumatic. If objectionable behavior can be stopped earlier, the need for an expensive crisis response can be avoided. More importantly, officers can learn to be better through the intervention of a peer. Aronie reports that “many officers will recount with gratitude” throughout their careers the story of a partner or sergeant who prevented a mistake or misconduct through active and early intervention.

Peer intervention can help prevent officer misconduct, but it can also have other positive effects, including to increase the effectiveness of enforcement methods, improve officer and inmate safety, increase community engagement, and prevent excessive use of force. There are some indications that it may also help reduce officer suicides. More broadly, active bystandership has the potential to make us all better in the face of evil. Ervin Staub is a prominent scholar of the psychology of peace and violence. In the preface to his book on bystander intervention, The Roots of Goodness and Resistance to Evil, Staub recounts stories of bystanders who resisted the Nazi persecution of Jews during WWII. In some cases, resistance changed the behavior of the perpetrators, and lives were saved. Among the lives saved were those of Staub and his family, who were protected by Christian bystanders in Hungary in the summer of 1944.

In the end, not all offensive conduct can be stopped. But we can do better with proper awareness, and we will be better for it. The West Virginia incident provides an excellent example of how better intervention could have helped a whole community. As New Orleans civil rights attorney Mary Howell has said, Staub’s work on peer intervention challenges us “to think about how to be better people and how to not be silent.”

Copyright © 2020, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

See the National Law Review Civil Rights law page for similar topics.

What Do Colleges and Universities Need to Know About the Executive Order and Title VI?

On Dec. 11, 2019 President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) stating that, “It shall be the policy of the executive branch to enforce Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] against prohibited forms of discrimination rooted in anti-Semitism as vigorously as against all other forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VI.”

This has created a good bit of confusion, with media outlets reporting that the EO “redefines” Judaism as a nationality or ethnicity. Not so. So what does the EO do? What, if anything, is new about it? And how will it affect U.S. colleges and universities that receive federal funding?

Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color and national origin in programs and activities that receive federal funding. Applying Title VI to Jewish students is not new. National origin discrimination has been interpreted for years to include discrimination against those who have shared ancestry or ethnicity, to protect religious groups such as Jews, Sikhs and Muslims.

What is new is that the EO directs executive branch agencies and departments charged with enforcing Title VI to consider the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism when investigating allegations of anti-Jewish discrimination (i.e., when they review an Office of Civil Rights (OCR) complaint).

The IHRA definition, which has been adopted by the U.S. State Department, provides that:

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities[.]

The definition includes a list of non-exhaustive examples of anti-Semitism, which the EO also directs agencies to consider. For example: “[m]aking mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective—such as . . . the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.”

Examples also include discrimination against Jewish individuals who support Israel, e.g., “[a]ccusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations” or “[d]enying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor[.]”

In other words, discriminatory conduct directed at Jewish students who support Israel may constitute anti-Semitism.

Some argue the EO conflicts with the First Amendment, although the EO expressly states that agencies “shall not diminish or infringe upon any right protected under Federal law or under the First Amendment.” Simply put, neither Title VI nor the EO limits speech (or even hate speech); it limits conduct. The perpetrator’s speech may be used as evidence of discriminatory intent.

Universities and colleges will need to carefully consider the impact of the EO in reviewing student complaints.

© 2020 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

For more on Title VI, see the National Law Review Civil Rights type-of-law section.

Sexual Harassment Training Becomes Mandatory for All Professionals Licensed by IDFPR

All professionals licensed by the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) whose licenses come up for renewal after January 1, 2020 and who must satisfy continuing education requirements need to complete one hour of sexual harassment and prevention training under a law that Governor J.B. Pritzker recently signed.

Health care companies that employ registered nurses, pharmacists, doctors and other health care professionals licensed by IDFPR should start making plans to conduct sexual harassment training to help their employees avoid license renewal issues next year.

Most large and medium-sized corporations have conducted in-house harassment and discrimination training for years. More than 20 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that companies may have an affirmative defense against lawsuits alleging that a supervisor sexually harassed a subordinate if the employer adopted and annually trained its employees on policies that:

  • define the different forms of sexual harassment,

  • detail to whom to report harassment complaints,

  • detail how the company will investigate such complaints, and

  • prohibit retaliation for good-faith reporting of such complaints

After those Supreme Court decisions, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission adopted a similar standard for all forms of illegal discrimination.

The new Illinois law, an outgrowth of the #MeToo movement, governs only sexual harassment, not other forms of discrimination. But smart employers will protect their employees and themselves by combining sexual harassment training with training on other types of discrimination. That approach allows employees to obtain the needed continuing education credits under the new law while simultaneously ensuring that employees understand what constitutes harassment and discrimination, to whom employees can report complaints and how their employers will investigate such complaints.

The new state statute is short on details. It simply says that all professionals who have continuing education requirements and are renewing their licenses after January 1, 2020 need one hour of continuing education credits on sexual harassment. The statute authorizes IDFPR to provide detailed regulations on such training, which IDFPR has not yet done.

© 2019 Much Shelist, P.C.

For more states requiring sexual harassment training, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Third Thursdays with Ruthie: The Intersection of Religion and Labor Law [PODCAST]

In this episode of the Third Thursdays podcast, Ruthie Goodboe examines how religious discrimination and accommodation intersect with traditional labor law. She will cover religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, best practices for handling requests for religious accommodation when an employee is governed by a collective bargaining agreement, and how Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act comes into play with religious accommodation.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

For more labor law developments see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.