Clash of the Generations – Age Discrimination in the United Kingdom in 2012

The National Law Review recently featured an article by Katie L. Clark of  McDermott Will & Emery regarding Age Discrimination:

In Europe, many employers are currently caught in the middle of a conflict between older and younger employees.  Many older employees want to work longer (whether by choice or necessity), while younger employees feel that an aging workforce is hampering their career progression.  Both feel that that their age is being used against them.  In the United Kingdom, the repeal of default retirement ages in April 2011 has only aggravated the problem.

UK employers may lawfully use age directly or indirectly in decision-making if “justified.”  But where is the line drawn?

Two recent English Supreme Court cases provide some much-needed clarification for employers, particularly with regard to possible justifications for direct age discrimination.

Justifying Age Discrimination

Both direct and indirect age discrimination may be justified, that is, found to be lawful, if the employer can demonstrate that the discriminatory measure is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.  The Supreme Court in the United Kingdom has now ruled that the “legitimate aims” that can justify direct age discrimination are narrower than those that can justify indirect age discrimination.

Legitimate Aims

Indirect age discrimination covers situations in which a workplace provision, criterion or practice puts people in a particular age group (young or old) at a disadvantage.  A requirement of obtaining a degree to gain a promotion, for example, puts older people at a disadvantage because of lesser university access for prior generations.  Keeping such a policy in place will be lawful if justified by individual reasons that are particular to that employer, such as cost reductions or improving competiveness.  This gives employers flexibility to adopt legitimate measures that are appropriate to their individual business needs.

By contrast, the Supreme Court has now stated that direct age discrimination—treating an individual less favourably on grounds of his or her age or age group—may only be justified if an employer is implementing a legitimate public interest.  The Supreme Court, in examining European case law, has identified two legitimate public interests that potentially justify direct age discrimination:

  • Inter-generational fairness—i.e., measures that promote the recruitment and retention of, and the sharing of limited opportunities between, different generations
  • Dignity—i.e., avoiding the need to dismiss older workers on the grounds of incapacity or under-performance, which may be humiliating for the employee or lead to disputes

Absent a legitimate aim that falls within one of those two categories, it is highly unlikely that an employer would be able to justify direct age discrimination, such as a mandatory retirement age forcing an individual out.

Even if an employer can point to a potentially legitimate public interest, it must establish that it is in fact pursuing the relevant interest.  For example, improving the recruitment of young people is potentially a legitimate public aim, but it will not justify discriminating against older employees if the employer, in fact, has no difficulty in recruiting younger employees.

Proportionate Means

Once a legitimate aim has been established for direct or indirect discrimination, an employer will need to demonstrate that the measure adopted is proportionate.  The Supreme Court has confirmed that to be proportionate, a measure must be both an appropriate means of achieving the legitimate aim and (reasonably) necessary in order to do so.

A measure will not be appropriate if it does not achieve the proposed aim, while a measure that goes further than is reasonably necessary to achieve the proposed aim will be disproportionate and impermissible.

It may be more difficult to show proportionality if the stated aim is to preserve the dignity of employees.  Arguably, a retirement age of 65 insinuates that once employees turn 65, they are no longer able to do the jobs that they have been doing up to their 65th birthdays.  If anything, this practice reinforces rather than dispels discriminatory stereotypes, which will make it difficult to justify.

What Does This Mean for Employers?

Direct discrimination claims are harder to defend than indirect discrimination claims.  Managers need to understand that using mandatory retirement ages, while still possible, may lead to tough challenges.

The Supreme Court has provided clarification for employers on how to justify direct age discrimination, but not a definitive one-size-fits-all answer.  The identification of legitimate aims is only half the problem, and questions of proportionality will continue to be difficult to answer.

Consequently, if imposing, continuing, or relying upon age-related criteria such as mandatory retirement ages is important to you as an employer, now is a good time to talk to us about the legitimate aim that will be relied upon and how this can be demonstrated for the particular workplace as a matter of fact.

© 2012 McDermott Will & Emery

“Brogrammers” Giving Silicon Valley a Bad Name?

An article by Emily Holbrook of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding “Brogrammers” recently appeared in The National Law Review:

According to a recent article, Silicon Valley tech firms are using marketing tactics geared more towards fraternity brothers than programming savants. The problem? Not only is it sexist at times, but it is alienating a large chunk of qualified tech professionals. Here are a few examples:

Of course, this is only a snipet of what’s going on as many of the antics are never publicized. Barbaic events like these may not only cost companies money (several businesses pulled their sponsorship from the Sqoot event), but it alienates those who may be talented programmers, but don’t adhere to the frat boy mentality.

There’s also an audience that feels left out of the joke. Women made up 21% of all programmers in 2010, down from 24% in 2000, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Anything that encourages the perception of tech as being male-dominated is likely to contribute to this decline, says Sara Chipps, founder of Girl Develop It, a series of software development workshops. “This brogramming thing would definitely turn off a lot of women from working” at startups, says Chipps.

But is this really a serious problem in Silicon Valley or just young men being young men? I’ve heard both sides of the argument. Some companies that have taken this seriously, such as Etsy, have decided to do something about it. The e-commerce website is donating $5,000 to at least 10 women in an attempt to lure female coders to New York’s Hacker School this summer.

Whether this is an epidemic that should cause concern or merely programmers acting their age, one thing is for sure — having a working envrionment void of diversity is aiken to siloed idea generation. Silicon Valley should know this.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor

UK Court Decision on Objective Justification for Age Discrimination Claims

Long awaited judgment from the Court of Appeal focuses on the merits of the ‘cost-alone’ argument.

The UK Court of Appeal released the much anticipated decision in Woodcock v. Cumbria Primary Care Trust. The decision centred on objective justification. Unlike other forms of discrimination in the UK, direct age discrimination can be objectively justified.

The objective justification test has two key elements: (i) does the employer have a legitimate aim and (ii) are the means chosen a proportionate way of achieving that aim, bearing in mind the discrimination to which it gives rise?

Whilst various factors can be used to justify age discrimination, the status quo position is that ‘cost alone’ cannot be used to justify otherwise discriminatory conduct and that more is required. This has become known as the ‘cost-plus’approach. ‘Cost’ is anything that has a purely financial consideration, i.e. the motivation is purely to save costs.

The Court of Appeal in Woodcock looked at the possibility of an employer justifying discrimination on a ‘cost-alone’ basis.

Background

Mr Woodcock’s employer (the Trust) was going through a reorganisation which would result in the reduction of chief executives required in the Trust. He was made aware that his role was ‘at risk of redundancy’ in early 2006 and he therefore applied for one of the remaining chief executive roles left in the new structure. Following a selection process, Mr Woodcock was informed in July 2006 that he was not successful in his application. He then entered into informal discussions about finding alternative employment in the Trust, although no formal consultation began.

In 2007, the Trust realised that Mr Woodcock would receive a significant pension windfall if he were still employed by the Trust on his 50th birthday. The windfall amounted to approximately £500,000. Given this potential windfall, the Trust elected to give Mr Woodcock notice of termination on the grounds of redundancy before entering into a consultation process during Mr Woodcock’s 12-month notice period. No suitable alternative roles were found and Mr Woodcock’s employment terminated in May 2007. He received his contractual redundancy pay of £220,000 (well above the cap for unfair dismissal of approximately £70,000).

Mr Woodcock was clearly discriminated against on the grounds of age. He received his dismissal notice prior to consultation because of the pension windfall he would have received at his attainment of age 50. If he had been a year younger, a consultation process would have been followed first. In order to follow a fair process in the UK, an employer should consult with an employee before deciding whether he or she is redundant.

Age Discrimination Justified?

At first glance, it is hard to see how this case turns on anything other than the Trust’s financial considerations.

The lower courts, however, found that the discriminatory treatment was objectively justified using the ‘cost-plus’ approach—the ‘plus’ being the genuine redundancy situation and avoiding the potential windfall.

Although possible to pigeonhole these facts into the ‘cost-plus’ test, the lower courts agreed that it was slightly artificial. One of the questions the Court of Appeal considered was whether age discrimination could be objectively justified on a ‘cost-alone’ basis.

Court of Appeal Decision

Although the Court of Appeal agreed that the current ‘cost-plus’ approach results in a degree of artificiality, it accepted that the current guidance from the European Court of Justice is clear, i.e. an employer cannot justify discriminatory treatment ‘solely’ because of cost.

The Court of Appeal, however, agreed with the lower courts and held that the age discrimination in this case was objectively justified on a ‘cost-plus’ analysis because (i) the dismissal notice was served with the aim of giving effect to the Trust’s genuine decision to terminate Mr Woodcock’s employment on the grounds of his redundancy and (ii) it was a legitimate part of that aim for the Trust to ensure that, in giving effect to it, the dismissal also saved the Trust the potential pension fund windfall.

Conclusion

It appears as though the ‘cost-plus’ approach is here to stay. The good news is that the courts appear able to find their way around the problem of having to follow the ‘cost-plus’ approach in most cases.

Despite the courts’ current flexibility, employers should remain hesitant to commit to a ‘cost-alone’ approach and should continue to look for the ‘further factor’.

Copyright © 2012 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Search Warrant Basics

Recently The National Law Review published an article from Risk Management Magazine a publication of the Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding Search Warrants in the Office:

When armed government agents enter your office, seize your computers and talk to your employees, the business day has gotten off to a rough start. It only gets worse when the news shows video of agents in raid jackets carrying your eye-catching, focus group-tested logo. As the days go on, you are busy reassuring customers, vendors and employees that despite early reports and comments made by the government and your competitors, it is all going to be fine and you are going to get back to business as usual.

Presented with this hypothetical situation, many adopt a similar response: it won’t happen to me. But any business that operates in a heavily regulated area or partners with any federal agency needs to appreciate that government inquiries are simply part of operating in that space. The FBI is not the only investigative agency; it is just as likely that the Environmental Protection Agency or the Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General will be at the front desk with a warrant in hand and a team ready to cart away the infrastructure and knowledge of your business. Will you be ready?

Good planning as part of a regular annual review can help settle nerves, avoid costly mistakes, and put you in the best defensive position should that fateful day come when the feds show up at your door. Follow this five-part plan and you will be much better off.

Summon the Team

Just as the agents did the morning before the search, you need to assemble your response team. The government has specialized people with individual roles and you need to have the same type of team. Some people on your team are there because you want them there. Others make the team because they sit at the reception desk or close to the front door. Either way, they are now on the same team.

The point person on the team has to be the in-house counsel. The agent may not let the receptionist place a series of calls, but the receptionist should be permitted to call the in-house counsel to notify her of the situation. From that point on, the command center shifts from the front desk to counsel’s desk.

The next call should be made from the company’s general counsel to outside criminal counsel. A general litigation or M&A background may be well suited for the company’s general needs, but on this day, the needs are quite different. Outside criminal counsel needs to begin the dialogue with the agent and the prosecutor, and should send someone to the scene if possible.

The response team should also include the heads of IT, security and communications. The IT officer must make sure that, as the search is conducted, intrusion into the system can be minimized so that the business may continue operation. If the IT officer is not permitted to assist with the search, it is critical that he observes all actions taken by the government related to any IT matters. This observation may be valuable at some point in the future if computer records are compromised or lost. This is just as important for information that may tend to show some violation of the law as it is for information that may support defense or a claim of actual innocence. The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Criminal Division has produced a manual for the search and seizure of computer records and an expert can help evaluate law enforcement’s compliance with its own approved procedures.

If your company is a manufacturer or scientific production company where the question at issue may be the quality, characteristics or integrity of a product, it is important that you demand an equal sample from the same source and under the same conditions as those taken by the seizing agents. This is important so that your own experts can review a similar sample for your own testing in defense. If this is not possible given the type of product seized, your outside counsel will work with prosecutors and agents to assert your rights to preserve evidence for future testing. Just as the IT expert can be a helpful observer, a technical expert who observes the government sampling can also provide valuable insight into issues related to the sampling that may make a world of difference at some time in the future.

The communications expert is the final member of the team, but no less significant. She can be an important point of contact for media inquiries that will inevitably follow. It is vital to be able to communicate to your customers that you are still performing your daily support and that, as you address this matter, you will never take your eye off the customer’s needs and deadlines. With a disciplined response, many companies will survive a search warrant and government investigation. This process will help ensure that your customers are there for you when you get through this difficult time.

Depending on the size of your company, all of the response team roles may be performed by one or two people. Think of the function of the tasks that need to be accomplished instead of job titles alone. The other factor that you must consider at the outset is what role will these people have in the case going forward. Try and identify people who can perform these tasks but will be outside the case itself. If you know that the company lab has been under investigation, the lab director may be a target of the investigation. If that is the case, you do not want to have that employee serving as your only witness observing the search. Instead, an ideal observer might be the outside counsel’s investigator.

Execute a Pre-Established Plan

An important part of this response is that you have a pre-established plan that can be taught and disseminated instantaneously. The first rule of any plan is to not make matters worse. In this case that means, “Let’s not have anyone arrested for obstruction.” If the search team has a signed search warrant for your address, they have a lawful right to make entry.

Challenging the search warrant is for another day and both state and federal laws prohibit interfering with the execution of a search warrant. This is the time to politely object to the search and document what is happening. With a copy of the search warrant in hand, outside legal counsel may be able to challenge the scope of the search, but that is not an area where the novice should dabble.

While your specialized team members perform their tasks, the company is generally at a standstill while the search continues. Let your team members work and have the rest of your employees go home. You are shut down for the time being just as you would be any other time your business is closed. You do not want to allow employees to wander the halls and interact with agents. Off-hand comments that make it into a law enforcement report may distort the facts and be difficult to explain later.

Make sure that company employees understand what is happening and what their rights are in this situation. It is important to avoid interfering with the actual lawful execution of a search warrant; it is also unlawful to tell your employees to not speak to the agents. If they know they have a right to meet with a company-retained counsel of their own and have a right to remain silent at this point, it may go a long way in calming nerves.

Assert Privilege

This is not a difficult matter to explain, but it is critical: if there are documents that are covered by the attorney/client privilege or any other similar privilege, it is critical that you assert that privilege. One reason for the receptionist to be allowed to call company counsel is that there are materials that are covered by the privilege.

It is critical to make privilege claims at this juncture so that the agents are aware of the assertion and that they formally recognize it. This may simply mean that they put those documents in a different box for review by a team subject to judicial review at a time in the near future or it may mean that the team will review the materials for immediate decisions to be made on scene. Whatever procedure the agents have established can be reviewed later, but if you do not assert privilege now, it changes the options available to you as the proceedings go forward

Record the Search

Given the concerns of civil liability, it is not uncommon for agents to make a video recording of their entry and departure from the scene. Their goal is to document any damage that may have been caused by the lawful execution of the warrant. The agents also want to be able to document their professional execution of the warrant in the event that claims are raised at a later point. But that tape is going to stay in their custody and not be available for your team to review as you prepare the defense.

A video record of the search may provide a key piece of support to the defense that could not possibly be understood on the day of the search. However, this process must be handled in a very unassuming manner and with a clear understanding by the agents that you are doing it, and that, in the event there are undercover officers who are masked, that you will make no effort to record them. In some states, recording voice without consent of all parties is a felony, so this is a matter that you must review with outside counsel when you are developing your procedures for search warrant response. Again, you do not want to do anything to make your situation worse.

Collect Your Own Intelligence

Just as the agents are trying to learn about your operations, they will be giving you valuable information about their own operations and the focus of their investigation. Your first tasks are to determine who is in charge, document the names of the agents in attendance and note all the agencies involved in the search. This is information that you can gather directly by politely asking for the names of the agents and observing the insignia of the agents’ uniforms or badges around their necks.

The other opportunity available to you in this unique situation is the opportunity to listen to the language the agents use, the apparent hierarchy of the agents, and the small bits of casual conversation that may give you valuable insight into the goals of the search. As the day wears on, the agents will feel more comfortable around your response team and they will talk more freely. This is not to suggest that your team should attempt to interrogate the agents, however, because that will open a two-way dialogue that may lead to statements that are difficult to explain or put in context. The suggestion is simply that you serve as an active listener.

Help Establish Rapport

Throughout the day, the agents are going to be forming opinions about your company and your employees. Use this time to make a good impression about your company. A professional, disciplined response in a time of crisis sends a very different message than the one sent by yelling obstructionists. Even though the agents have quite a bit of information about you as their target, it may have all been gathered from third parties. This may be your opportunity to impress them and to help them question the veracity of your accusers. Remember that there will be meetings about your company, your executives and their futures, and the only people in those meetings will be the agents and the prosecutors. You want their memories of this day to weigh in your favor.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2012 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc.

Are Bloggers’ Free Speech Rights Under Attack?

The National Law Review recently published an article by Jesse L. Jenike-Godshalk of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP regarding Blogger’s Free Speech:

A recent legal opinion has some concerned about just how broad free speech rights may be for bloggers who are not associated with institutional media, such as newspapers and television stations. In Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, slip op. (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011), a federal judge ruled that a self-proclaimed “investigative blogger” was not “media” and, therefore, was not entitled to certain First Amendment protections that are reserved for the media.Despite the alarm that this case has generated, it actually is not a major setback for the free speech rights of bloggers.

The Case: Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox

From late 2010 to early 2011, Crystal Cox made numerous blog posts in which she accused Obsidian Finance, LLC and one of the company’s senior principals, Kevin Padrick, of corrupt, fraudulent, and illegal conduct. Obsidian and Padrick subsequently sued Cox for defamation. Rather than hiring an attorney, Cox chose to defend pro se.

In August 2011, before the case went to trial, the judge granted summary judgment to Cox with regard to all but one of her blog posts, because the posts were statements of opinion protected by the First Amendment. See Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, slip op. (D. Or. Aug. 23, 2011). A statement, such as a blog post, can be the basis for a defamation suit only if the statement is a provable assertion of fact. In contrast, statements of opinion are protected by the First Amendment. According to the judge, blog posts, by their very nature, are usually statements of opinion.

Prior to the trial, the judge still had several issues that he needed to resolve. Among these issues was Cox’s claim that she was “media” and therefore, based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the plaintiffs could not recover damages from her for defamation without proof that she was at least negligent in making the allegedly defamatory statements. The judge rejected that Cox was “media,” writing:

Defendant cites no cases indicating that a self-proclaimed “investigative blogger” is considered “media” . . . . Without any . . . authority on the issue, I decline to conclude that defendant in this case is “media” . . . .

Defendant fails to bring forth any evidence suggestive of her status as a journalist. For example, there is no evidence of (1) any education in journalism; (2) any credentials or proof of any affiliation with any recognized news entity; (3) proof of adherence to journalistic standards such as editing, fact-checking, or disclosures of conflicts of interest; (4) keeping notes of conversations and interviews conducted; (5) mutual understanding or agreement of confidentiality between the defendant and his/her sources; (6) creation of an independent product rather than assembling writings and postings of others; or (7) contacting “the other side” to get both sides of a story. Without evidence of this nature, defendant is not “media.”

Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, slip op. at 9 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011). Following this ruling, the case went to trial, and the jury found for the plaintiffs, awarding $2.5 million in damages.

Not a Major Setback

Despite the concern that this case has generated, the case is not a major setback for the free speech rights of bloggers, and it can even be regarded as a pro-free speech case. First, some of the judge’s statements suggest that bloggers enjoy expansive First Amendment rights. In his ruling on summary judgment, the judge stated that blog posts, by their very nature, are usually “opinions” and not provable assertions of fact. Such “opinion posts” are protected under the First Amendment and are not actionable as defamation—regardless of whether the writer is “media.”

Second, the judge established a very low bar for what a blogger must do to enjoy the additional free speech protections that are reserved for “media.” To wit, a blogger must present some evidence that he or she is a journalist. Cox lost this issue because she presented no evidence.

The judge provided her with a list of seven types of evidence that she could have offered. This list does not create an exacting standard of proof for a blogger to meet. To be considered “media,” a blogger would not need to offer all seven types of evidence. In fact, a blogger would not necessarily need to offer any of the seven types of evidence. The list is not exhaustive, but is merely “[f]or example.” A blogger must present “evidence of this nature.” Thus, a blogger could prove that he or she is “media” by presenting types of evidence not on the list. In addition, most bloggers probably would be able to present some evidence of the types that are on the list—e.g., “proof of editing,” “keeping notes of conversations,” or “creation of an independent product rather than assembling writings and postings of others.”

Had Cox hired an attorney, the attorney almost surely would have been able to offer some evidence that Cox was “media.” Actually, had Cox hired an attorney, she might have won the entire case on summary judgment—and she would have entirely avoided the issue of whether she was “media.” Herein lies the real lesson from this case: If you are sued for defamation, get yourself an attorney.

© 2012 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.

High Court: Police Tracking of Suspect Via GPS Requires Warrant

Recently found in The National Law Review an article by Rachel Hirsch of Ifrah Law regarding a recent High Court Decision Requiring a Warrant:

Last November, we discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s oral argument in United States v. Jones, which posed the question of whether police need to obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle during a criminal investigation.

We noted that in this case, 21st-century technology had come face to face with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. We were hoping that the high court would uphold the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and hold that this action is a search that requires a warrant, but we took a pass on predicting what the Court would actually do.

On January 23, 2012, the Court decided the case – unanimously against the government and in favor of defendant Antoine Jones. The decision is fairly gratifying for those of us who believe it desirable to curb prosecutors’ power by imposing restrictions upon it, including, where appropriate, the requirement of a judge-issued warrant.

It turns out that both the advocates of the original-intent approach to constitutional interpretation, epitomized here and in general by Justice Antonin Scalia, and those who prefer the doctrine of the “living Constitution,” led here by Justice Samuel Alito, agree that the use of a GPS device by the government constitutes a search and requires a warrant.

Scalia, writing for a majority of the Justices, observed that prosecutors had intruded upon Jones’ property in way that would have been a “trespass” under common law.

Prosecutors “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” Scalia wrote. “We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” And for Scalia, that fact alone was enough to decide the case.

Alito, joined by three Justices who concurred in the result, used quite a different line of reasoning and sharply criticized Scalia’s majority opinion, saying that ironically, it relied upon 18th-century tort law to decide a case involving 21st-century technology.

“This holding, in my judgment, is unwise,” Alito wrote. “It strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.”

Instead, Alito wrote, he “would analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether [Jones’] reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” Alito observed that for decades, the Court has invoked the concept of “reasonable expectations of privacy” in a number of cases to define the nature of a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and to expand the definition of “search” to actions that do not involve a trespass to someone’s property.

Even though Alito is often identified with the pro-prosecution, conservative wing of the Court, he took the defendant’s side in this case. As our blog post last November noted, at oral argument Alito expressed concern about how easy it is these days “to amass an enormous amount of information about people” by the use of today’s technology.

Alito’s opinion followed similar lines. In the absence of legislation about police use of GPS tracking, he wrote, “The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”

This is good news for constitutional rights and for defendants. Whatever approach one takes to the Fourth Amendment, it’s clear that prosecutors can’t attach a GPS to a suspect’s car without a warrant.

© 2012 Ifrah PLLC

Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence: What Must a School Do?

Recently posted in the National Law Review  an article by attorney Stephen A. Mendelsohn of Greenberg Traurig, LLP regarding universities examining their policies and procedures concerning the investigation and resolution of sexual harassment and sexual violence allegations:

GT Law

Recent events at major universities should cause schools to critically examine their policies and procedures concerning the investigation and resolution of sexual harassment and sexual violence allegations. This GT Alert examines what an institution must do to limit its potential exposure to lawsuits alleging sexual harassment or sexual violence by students upon students or by faculty or staff upon students.

TITLE IX

All educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance are subject to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. sections 1681et seq. and the United States Department of Education (DOE) implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. Part 106, which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. Sexual harassment, which includes sexual violence, covers student-student, studentstaff/faculty and faculty-faculty conduct. The DOE’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR), on April 4, 2011, published a “Dear Colleague” letter that reiterates a school’s legal obligations to investigate and resolve sexual harassment and sexual violence complaints and warns schools that they must comply with Title IX and DOE, OCR regulations or face DOE sanctions.

A School’s Obligations to Respond to Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence Complaints

Determining what constitutes sexual harassment and sexual violence is often difficult. Though some instances are seemingly obvious, many cases turn on the issue of consent. Title IX does not prohibit all forms of sexual behavior between consenting adults. Rather, it prohibits sexual acts perpetuated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s abuse of drugs or alcohol. A person may not give consent due to intellectual or other disabilities. Whether proper consent has been given is often a challenging issue.

Where students participate in a school’s education programs and activities, Title IX is applicable. It is also applicable, for example, where student upon student sexual harassment or sexual violence occurs off campus and does not involve school programs or activities.

A school that knows, or reasonably should know, about possible sexual harassment or sexual violence must promptly investigate what may have happened and must also take appropriate steps to resolve the situation. Even if the matter is subject to a law enforcement investigation, the school must conduct its own investigation. If a school has reason to believe that there may have been criminal conduct, the school must immediately notify law enforcement officials.

Schools must also navigate through the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. section 1232g; 34 C.F.R. 99.15. Though FERPA protects student confidentiality, a school may not withhold the identity of the complainant from the alleged harasser.

Procedural Requirements for Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence Investigations

Under Title IX, schools must, at a minimum, take three procedural steps in investigating sexual harassment and sexual violence complaints. These include:

  • Disseminating a Notice of Discrimination;
  • Designating at least one employee to serve as a Title IX coordinator;
  • Adopting and publishing grievance procedures for prompt and fair resolution of student and employee sex discrimination complaints.

Whether a school’s Notice of Discrimination complies with Title IX requires the application of the DOE, OCR’s regulations. A Title IX coordinator must have adequate training in Title IX’s policies and procedures.

Title IX requires that grievance procedures be published and that they provide a prompt and fair process. Though the grievance procedures need not be separate from normal student disciplinary procedures, they must include:

  • Notice to students and employees of the procedures and where complaints may be filed;
  • Adequate and impartial investigations carried out by employees where both parties have the right to present witnesses and evidence;
  • Designated and reasonably prompt time frames for the process;
  • Notice to the parties of the outcome;
  • Steps taken to prevent recurrence and correct discriminating effects.

Risk Management

Victims of sexual harassment and sexual violence have the right to seek monetary damages against schools for student upon student and faculty/staff conduct where the school is deliberately indifferent to the victim’s complaints. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed, 119 S. Ct. 1661(1999). Compliance with Title IX and the DOE, OCR’s regulations, along with a full and fair investigation and grievance process, provides a defense to a lawsuit. In the absence of Title IX and DOE regulatory compliance, or the failure to apply existing school policies and procedures, schools will invite Title IX actions.

A thorough review and assessment of Title IX, DOE, OCR regulations and existing policies and procedures is key to avoiding monetary liability for sexual harassment and sexual violence and in aiding victims.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

"The Sins of the Father": Third Party Retaliation Claims Allowed to Proceed

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article written by Ralph A. Morris of Schiff Hardin LLP about third-party retaliation claims :

A recent Texas federal court decision has further expanded the bases for Title VII retaliation claims against employers. In Zamora v. City of Houston, Christopher Zamora, a Houston police officer, alleged that the Houston Police Department demoted him in retaliation for the filing of a charge with the U.S. EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In this case, however, the charge was not filed by Christopher Zamora, but by his father, Manuel Zamora, alleging that he, Manuel Zamora, had been discriminated against by the Department.

Earlier this year, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the United States Supreme Court permitted an employee’s Title VII retaliation claim to proceed where the employee’s fiancee had earlier filed an EEOC charge. The Court held that a Title VII retaliation claim could stand where the employee is subject to an adverse employment action because a co-worker to whom the employee is “closely related” engaged in protected activity.

The Supreme Court decided Thompson while the Zamora case was pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. After the Thompson decision was issued, the Zamora court reversed its prior determination that dismissed Christopher Zamora’s claim. The court concluded that under Thompson, Mr. Zamora’s retaliation claim could proceed based on his father’s filing of an EEOC charge. Thus, under Zamora, in addition to a fiancee, a parent-child relationship satisfies the “closely related” test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Thompson.

Retaliation charges and lawsuits typically are more challenging to defend because the employee’s burden of proof is not as difficult to meet, as compared with a charge of discrimination. Thompson and Zamora now place an additional burden on employers by holding that employees themselves do not necessarily need to engage in the protected activity to have standing to sue for retaliation. These decisions may have a greater impact on employers that make it a practice to hire family members and friends of existing employees than on those with anti-nepotism policies.

The Supreme Court refrained from identifying a fixed class of relationships for which third-party retaliation claims are viable. Future cases will have to decide how far retaliation claims will be expanded: whether, for example, partners involved in a romantic relationship but who are not engaged, or familial relationships more distant than parent and child, are sufficiently close so as to fall within the zone of protection. Employers can help reduce the risk for these types of claims by reviewing their EEOC and anti-retaliation policies and ensuring that managers are trained and educated on compliance.

© 2011 Schiff Hardin LLP

EEOC and Cracker Barrel Sign National Mediation Agreement

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding Cracker Barrel Old Country Store signing of a National Universal Agreement to Mediate:

WASHINGTON – Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) today announced the signing of a National Universal Agreement to Mediate (NUAM) to streamline the handling of employment discrimination claims.

With the signing of this agreement, Cracker Barrel joins more than 200 national and regional private sector employers, including several Fortune 500 companies, who have made similar arrangements with the EEOC. This agreement provides the framework for both organizations to informally resolve any workplace issues that may arise from time to time through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) rather than through a traditional lengthy, formal EEOC investigation or potential litigation. The NUAM includes all Cracker Barrel locations.

“Nationwide mediation agreements like this are a classic win-win,” said Nicholas Inzeo, Director of the EEOC’s Office of Field Programs. “NUAMs are a non-adversarial and efficient way for companies to handle discrimination charges using the EEOC as a partner and advisor. EEOC mediation encourages a positive work environment, and the company saves time and money. Everyone benefits. We are gratified that a major employer such as Cracker Barrel has joined the growing ranks of companies that are making use of this innovative system.”

Cracker Barrel Vice President and General Counsel Michael J. Zylstra said, “Cracker Barrel is committed to providing a fully inclusive workplace, where diversity is welcomed and everyone is treated with courtesy and respect. This innovative agreement builds upon our existing policies and procedures to effectively and fairly resolve employee concerns and demonstrates our shared goal to create a bias-free workplace. We look forward to developing an even stronger relationship with the EEOC.”

Under the terms of the NUAM, any eligible charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC in which Cracker Barrel is named as an employer/respondent will be referred to the EEOC’s mediation unit. The company will designate a corporate representative to handle all inquiries and other logistical matters related to potential charges in order to facilitate a prompt scheduling of the matter for EEOC mediation.

Expanding mediation is a key component of the EEOC’s efforts to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness. The EEOC has entered into 233 national and regional Universal Agreements to Mediate (UAMs) with private sector employers, including several Fortune 500 companies. Additionally, EEOC district offices have entered into 1,743 mediation agreements with employers at the local levels within their respective jurisdictions. Since the full implementation of the EEOC’s National Mediation Program in April 1999, more than 136,000 charges of employment discrimination have been mediated, with nearly 70 percent being successfully resolved.

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (Nasdaq: CBRL) was established in 1969 in Lebanon, Tenn., and operates 604 company-owned locations in 42 states. For more information, visit www.crackerbarrel.com.

The EEOC enforces federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Further information about the EEOC and its mediation program is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.

Second Circuit Finds that Employers May be Obligated to Accommodate a Disabled Employee's Commute

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorneys James R. HaysJonathan Sokolowski and James R. Hays of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding disabled employees and employers requirements to assist them:

 

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, employers may be required to assist disabled employees with their commute.

In Nixon-Tinkelman v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 10-3317-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16569 (2d Cir. N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011), plaintiff Barbara Nixon-Tinkelman (“Plaintiff”), who has cancer, heart problems, asthma, and is hearing impaired, brought suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act alleging that the New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (“Defendant” or “DOHMH”) failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. Specifically, following her transfer from Queens to Manhattan, Plaintiff requested that DOHMH accommodate her commute by transferring her back to an office location closer to her home in Queens. DOHMH ultimately denied Plaintiff’s request.

The Southern District of New York dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that activities which “fall outside the scope of the job, like commuting to and from the workplace, are not within the province of an employer’s obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” However, on appeal, the Second Circuit faulted the district court’s holding, explaining that certain circumstances may require an employer to provide commuting assistance to a disabled employee, and furthermore, that providing such assistance is not “inherently unreasonable.” Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court, and tasked it with engaging in the “fact-specific inquiry” necessary to determine whether it would have been reasonable to provide Plaintiff with a commuting accommodation. On remand, the Second Circuit directed the district court to consider the following factors: (a) Defendant’s total number of employees; (b) the number and location of Defendant’s offices; (c) whether other positions exist for which Plaintiff was qualified; (d) whether Plaintiff could have been transferred to a more convenient office without unduly burdening Defendant’s operations; and (e) the reasonableness of allowing Plaintiff to work from home without on-site supervision.

In addition to the above-listed factors, the Second Circuit also noted that the district court should have contemplated whether transferring Plaintiff “back to Queens or another closer location, allowing her to work from home, or providing a car or parking permit” would have accommodated her needs.

Nixon-Tinkelman serves as a reminder to employers that they must carefully assess all requests for reasonable accommodations from disabled employees. Although employers are not required to provide the specific accommodations employees may request, they must nevertheless work with employees to determine what reasonable accommodations, if any, can be made.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.