Category: Civil Rights

FTC Proposes New Rules on Children’s Online Privacy Issues

Michelle Cohen of Ifrah Law recently had an article regarding Children’s Online Privacy published in The National Law Review:

On August 1, 2012, the Federal Trade Commission announced that is issuing a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to modify certain of its rules under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). Industry has been waiting on FTC action regarding COPPA, as the agency previously undertook a COPPA rulemaking in September 2011 and proposed modifying certain COPPA rules to account for changes in technology, particularly mobile technology.

The FTC received over 350 comments during that time. After reviewing those comments, the FTC has decided to propose certain additional changes to its COPPA rule definitions.

In summary, COPPA gives parents control over the information websites can collect from their kids. It applies to websites designed for children under 13 – or those that have reason to know they are collecting information from a child. It requires a specific privacy notice and that consent be obtained from parents in many circumstances before children’s information may be collected and/or used.

The FTC has proposed several changes that are of interest. Some are meant to “tighten” the COPPA rule, others are meant to provide some additional flexibility to operators.

  • The proposed change would make clear that an operator that chooses to integrate the services of third parties that collect personal information from visitors (like ad networks or plug-ins) would itself be considered a covered “operator” under the Rule.
  • The FTC is also proposing to allow websites with mixed audiences (e.g., parents and over 13) to age-screen visitors to provide COPPA’s protections only to those under 13. However, kid-directed sites or services that knowingly target under-13s as their primary audience or whose overall content is likely to attract kids under that age could not use that method.
  • Also, the FTC has proposed modifying the definition of what constitutes “personal information” relating to children to make it clear that a persistent identifier falls within that definition if it can be used to recognize a user over time or across different sites or services. The FTC is considering whether activities like site maintenance and analysis, use of persistent identifiers for authenticating users, maintaining user preferences, serving contextual ads, and protecting against fraud and theft should not be considered the collection of “personal information” as long what’s collected is not used or disclosed to contact a specific individual, including through the use of behaviorally-targeted advertising.

Comments on the FTC’s proposed rule changes are due by September 10, 2012.

© 2012 Ifrah PLLC

Illinois Employers Beware: New Law Prohibits Employers from Seeking Social Media Password Information

The National Law Review recently published an article regarding Social Media Passwords and Illinois Employers written by Norma W. Zeitler of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

Employers in Illinois will be prohibited from seeking social networking password information from employees and applicants starting Jan. 1, 2013, now that Illinois Governor Pat Quinn has signed into law Public Act 097-0875, which is an amendment to the Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act, 820 ILCS 55/10.

As we previously reported , the legislation makes it unlawful for an employer to require an employee or applicant to disclose passwords or other related social networking account information in order for the employer to access information that might otherwise be considered private by the employee or applicant. However, employers are not barred from accessing information that is in the public domain

Illinois becomes the second state, after Maryland, to enact such a law, according to a press release from Governor Quinn’s office announcing that he signed the legislation into law on August 1. The new law does not limit an employer’s right to promulgate and maintain otherwise lawful workplace policies regarding the use of the employer’s computer equipment, Internet use, social networking site use, and electronic mail use.

Illinois employers should consider reviewing existing policies and practices with an eye toward ensuring compliance with this new law.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Still Waiting for Guidance on Informed Consent of Decisionally-Impaired Subjects

A July 11, 2012 article by Gina Kolata in the New York Times describes a recent discovery of a rare gene mutation that protects people from Alzheimer’s disease by slowing the production of beta amyloid.  Excessive amounts of beta amyloid in the brain are believed to cause Alzheimer’s.  The discovery bolsters hope that drugs, currently in development, that reduce levels of brain amyloid will prove effective in slowing the progression of Alzheimer’s.

The lack of clear guidelines for enrolling in clinical research decisionally-impaired subjects, or those who may become impaired over the course of a study  may hinder efforts to conduct trials of Alzheimer’s drugs.  In 2010, an Institute of Medicine summary  of a workshop on the state of clinical trials in the United States noted that 27% of investigators in the U.S. failed to enroll any subjects in trials in which they agreed to participate, and 90% of all clinical trials worldwide fail to enroll the target number of subjects on time and must extend their enrollment periods.  Though the federal Office for Human Research Protections and the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections have considered the issue of participation of decisionally-impaired subjects in research in recent years, no guidance has been released.  Further, few states’ laws explicitly address who has authority to consent to research participation on behalf a decisionally-impaired individual.

In the absence of clear guidance, to be in the best position to participate in Alzheimer’s research and other research involving subjects who are or may become decisionally-impaired, institutions and their IRBs should develop their own policies on enrollment of and consent for decisionally-impaired subjects and subjects whose capacity may diminish over the course of a study.  Having policies in place before opportunities to participate in such studies arise will help ensure consistent and efficient review by institutions and IRBs.  Individuals who have a strong interest in participating in Alzheimer’s research studies should complete health care power of attorney documents, record their wishes in writing, and discuss them with their designated health care agents.

©2012 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

NLRB Chills At-Will Acknowledgements of Social Media in Employee Handbooks

The National Law Review recently published an article about the NLRB’s Social Media Rulings written by Jerrold J. Wohlgemuth of  Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP:

 

 

Having warned employers about the legality of their social media policies under theNational Labor Relations Act, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon has apparently turned his attention to at-will employment statements in employer handbooks and manuals.  Employers of union and non-union workforces need to pay careful attention to this development.

Many employers use standard language in their handbooks and manuals in which their employees acknowledge that their employment is at-will; that the employer may terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason; and that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, altered or modified except by a writing signed by a senior member of management.  The Acting General Counsel apparently believes that such at-will disclaimers may interfere with or chill the right of employees to engage in protected concerted activity.

In a case that did not receive extensive publicity, the General Counsel’s Office filed an unfair labor practice charge in February 2012 against Hyatt Hotels (NLRB v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., Case 28 CA-061114) in which it alleged that the at-will disclaimer in the company’s employee handbook violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act to the extent it required employees to acknowledge that their at-will employment status could not be altered except by a writing signed by management.  The charge appears to reflect the Acting General Counsel’s belief that such an acknowledgement will have a chilling effect on the Section 7 right of employees to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of organizing to alter their employment relationship with the employer by choosing union representation.  The Hyatt case was settled before the issue was presented for a hearing.  An Administrative Law Judge issued a similar ruling in a case decided in early February against the American Red Cross; the case was resolved when the Red Cross agreed to modify its at-will disclaimer before the issue could be presented to the Board for review. (NLRB v. Am. Red Cross, 2012 WL 311334, Feb 1, 2012).

This is an important initiative on the part of the Acting General Counsel.  As we have seen in the social media context, in analyzing handbooks and policy manuals the Acting General Counsel will apply Section 7 broadly to find statements unlawful to the extent they could be interpreted in almost any fashion to chill employee rights to engage in protected concerted activity.  Accordingly, employers may want to take proactive steps to avoid NLRB scrutiny by including a disclaimer in the at-will sections of their handbooks to the effect that the at-will acknowledgment does not, and is not intended to, undermine or interfere with the employee’s right to engage in protected concerted organizing activity under Section 7 of the Act.

©2012 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

What Does One Need to ‘Know’ to Commit a Federal Crime?

The National Law Review recently featured an article by Sarah Coffey of Ifrah Law regarding Federal Crimes:

On July 2, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit tackled an interesting question of statutory interpretation that centered on the precise usage by Congress of the word “knowingly” in a federal criminal law that prohibits luring people under 18 years old into prostitution.

In United States v. Daniels, the appeals court was reviewing the conviction of Robert Daniels, a pimp who had induced a 14-year-old girl to become a prostitute. One of Daniels’ arguments was that he didn’t know the girl was under 18 and thus could not be convicted under the wording of the statute.

The statute provides that anyone who “knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense” can be convicted of a federal crime. The question before the court was whether the adverb “knowingly” applies to the age of the person lured into prostitution, or only to the persuading, inducing, enticing or coercing. In other words, in order for someone to be guilty of the crime, does he have to know that the prostitute was under age?

The court ruled that in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution does not have to prove that the perpetrator knew the prostitute was under 18.

The court reasoned that although in general, criminal law applies a presumption that a knowledge requirement “applies to every element in a statute,” it is also the case that laws “concerned with the protection of minors are within a special context, where that presumption is rebutted.” The goal, the court wrote, is to honor “the congressional goal of protecting minors victimized by sexual crimes.”

Delicate issues relating to the meaning of a statute are not limited to questions relating to prostitutes and pimps, of course. In statutes defining white-collar crimes such as fraud or illegal gaming, or setting forth the punishments for such crimes, there are often ambiguous terms or complicated sentence structures.

One thing that we can learn from the Daniels opinion in the 11th Circuit is that appeals courts don’t always follow strict rules of interpretation based on the placement of an adverb or of a comma. They often look at the broad purpose of the statute and the goals that Congress sought to achieve in passing it and creating the crime. It will be interesting to see how the Daniels opinion and similar cases will be applied in the white-collar context.

© 2012 Ifrah PLLC

How The White House’s Endorsement of Same-Sex Marriage Affects Employment Law

Recently Anjali Chavan of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP had an article regarding the White House’s Endorsement of Same-Sex Marriage, featured in The National Law Review:

On May 9, 2012, President Barack Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to affirm his belief that same-sex couples should be able to get married. Weeks later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals declared a portion of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) unconstitutional.1 These announcements are just two of many events that have shaped the current landscape in this country with respect to the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) Americans.

As LGBT issues are being placed at the forefront of American politics, employers would do well to pay attention, as these changes may necessitate changing employment policies, educating staff, and potentially defending against employment lawsuits for previously unchartered claims, including discrimination based upon sexual orientation and gender identity or expression.

On June 12, the U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pension Committee (“HELP Committee”) is set to consider the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”). ENDA seeks to expand the protections of Title VII to cover sexual orientation and gender identity and will prohibit discrimination in hiring and employment by nonreligious employers with at least 15 employees.

ENDA will be a federal mandate proscribing any discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity by both public and private employers—thereby bringing employees living in states without such protections like Ohio,2 Kentucky,3Pennsylvania,4 and West Virginia,5 under the umbrella of federal protection.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that Title VII protects transgender employees—holding that discriminating against employees who do not identify with their gender, act like members in their gender, or conform with sexual stereotypes is a form of sex discrimination violates Title VII. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).

Further underscoring the shifting landscape of LGBT rights was the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) recent ruling in Macy v. Holder, expanding the prohibition against sex discrimination of Title VII to cover transgender workers.

In Macy v. Holder, the EEOC held that Mia Macy’s complaint of discrimination based on gender identity, change of sex, and/or transgender status can be brought under Title VII. Macy, a former police detective in Phoenix, Arizona, relocated to San Francisco and applied for an open position at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“Agency”) for which she was qualified. Macy originally applied for the position as a man and interviewed with the Director as a man. Macy asserted that the Director told her on two separate occasions that she would have the position pending completion of a background check. A few months after her original application, Macy informed the Agency that she was beginning the process of transitioning from male to female. After the Agency received notice of Macy’s change of name and gender, the agency contacted Macy and told her the position was no longer available due to lack of funding. Macy later discovered that the Agency filled this position with another person.

The EEOC found that charges of discrimination based on transgender status or gender identity are cognizable under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition and any such claims must be processed by the EEOC.

That Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination proscribes gender discrimination, and not just discrimination based on biological sex, is important. If Title VII proscribed only discrimination on the basis of biological sex, the only prohibited gender-based disparate treatment would be when an employer prefers a man over a woman, or vice versa. But the statute’s protections sweep far broader than that, in part because “gender” encompasses not only a person’s biological sex but also the cultural and social aspects associated with masculinity and femininity.

* * *

[G]ender discrimination occurs any time an employer treats an employee differently for failing to conform to any gender-based expectations or norms.

The growing trend in the United States reveals that employment law is changing and adapting to provide a more inclusive environment for LGBT employees. Even though your state or federal circuit court may not recognize certain protections for LGBT individuals, many cities and counties around the country do have such protections in their local ordinances. As employers are navigating these issues in hiring, promoting, and firing, they should be cognizant of the local, state, and federal laws that may be at play. Employers must take the time to recognize and understand these changes, and consider revising their employee manuals and employment policies to comply with these changes.

(1) Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, et al., Case Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, & 10-2214, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10950, (1st Cir. May 31, 2012) (affirming the lower court’s holding finding Section 3 of DOMA which defines marriage for federal purposes as a union between a man and a women, to be an unconstitutional encroachment on the power to define marriage granted to the states by the Tenth Amendment).
(2) Ohio prohibits discrimination by public employers based on sexual orientation.
(3) Kentucky prohibits discrimination by public employers based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
(4) Pennsylvania prohibits discrimination by public employers based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
(5) West Virginia provides no protections for LGBT employees.

© 2012 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP

Ninth Circuit Holds Statistics Alone Can Establish Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination in a RIF

The National Law Review recently published an article about Age Discrimination written by Michael T. Chin of Schiff Hardin LLP:

On May 29, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision clarifying the standard for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie disparate treatment discrimination claim. In Schechner v. KPIX-TV, No. 11-15294, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10766 (9th Cir. May 29, 2012), the court held that a plaintiff’s initial burden of proof is relatively low and can be met by the introduction of statistics showing an adverse impact on a protected category — in this case, older workers. While the plaintiffs met their initial burden here, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the employer’s favor on plaintiffs’ age discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).

In March 2008, like many employers at the time and even now, defendant KPIX-TV (“KPIX”) was faced with the task of having to reduce its annual budget. As part of its cost-cutting measures, KPIX implemented a reduction in force (“RIF”), resulting in the termination of five members of the “on-air” news team, including both plaintiffs. Each member of the RIF group was male and over the age of forty. Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that their terminations were the product of age and gender discrimination in violation of the FEHA. Plaintiffs submitted reports by an expert statistician who concluded that the age disparity between the RIF group and the group of individuals that KPIX decided to retain was “statistically significant” and age “correlated closely” with the decision to terminate.

The Ninth Circuit held that “statistical evidence that shows a stark pattern of age discrimination” is sufficient to establish a prima facie case, even though “it does not address the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the discharge.”Id. at *14-15. The Ninth Circuit proceeded to consider the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the RIF offered by KPIX. Here, KPIX presented evidence of reasons for layoff decisions unrelated to age, such as that news anchors generally would not be subject to termination because they were the “face” of the station, that specialty reporters would not be subject to termination because they were being promoted to push the brand of the station, and that general assignment reporters would be subject to termination based on their respective dates of contract expiration. The Ninth Circuit concluded that KPIX had established non-discriminatory reasons for its RIF decisions, and that the plaintiffs were unable to show pretext.

This case highlights the importance of establishing a set of reasoned, job-related factors to be considered in deciding which employees to include in a RIF. Numbers suggesting an adverse impact on protected classes can be problematic, but not necessarily fatal.

© 2012 Schiff Hardin LLP

Clash of the Generations – Age Discrimination in the United Kingdom in 2012

The National Law Review recently featured an article by Katie L. Clark of  McDermott Will & Emery regarding Age Discrimination:

In Europe, many employers are currently caught in the middle of a conflict between older and younger employees.  Many older employees want to work longer (whether by choice or necessity), while younger employees feel that an aging workforce is hampering their career progression.  Both feel that that their age is being used against them.  In the United Kingdom, the repeal of default retirement ages in April 2011 has only aggravated the problem.

UK employers may lawfully use age directly or indirectly in decision-making if “justified.”  But where is the line drawn?

Two recent English Supreme Court cases provide some much-needed clarification for employers, particularly with regard to possible justifications for direct age discrimination.

Justifying Age Discrimination

Both direct and indirect age discrimination may be justified, that is, found to be lawful, if the employer can demonstrate that the discriminatory measure is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.  The Supreme Court in the United Kingdom has now ruled that the “legitimate aims” that can justify direct age discrimination are narrower than those that can justify indirect age discrimination.

Legitimate Aims

Indirect age discrimination covers situations in which a workplace provision, criterion or practice puts people in a particular age group (young or old) at a disadvantage.  A requirement of obtaining a degree to gain a promotion, for example, puts older people at a disadvantage because of lesser university access for prior generations.  Keeping such a policy in place will be lawful if justified by individual reasons that are particular to that employer, such as cost reductions or improving competiveness.  This gives employers flexibility to adopt legitimate measures that are appropriate to their individual business needs.

By contrast, the Supreme Court has now stated that direct age discrimination—treating an individual less favourably on grounds of his or her age or age group—may only be justified if an employer is implementing a legitimate public interest.  The Supreme Court, in examining European case law, has identified two legitimate public interests that potentially justify direct age discrimination:

  • Inter-generational fairness—i.e., measures that promote the recruitment and retention of, and the sharing of limited opportunities between, different generations
  • Dignity—i.e., avoiding the need to dismiss older workers on the grounds of incapacity or under-performance, which may be humiliating for the employee or lead to disputes

Absent a legitimate aim that falls within one of those two categories, it is highly unlikely that an employer would be able to justify direct age discrimination, such as a mandatory retirement age forcing an individual out.

Even if an employer can point to a potentially legitimate public interest, it must establish that it is in fact pursuing the relevant interest.  For example, improving the recruitment of young people is potentially a legitimate public aim, but it will not justify discriminating against older employees if the employer, in fact, has no difficulty in recruiting younger employees.

Proportionate Means

Once a legitimate aim has been established for direct or indirect discrimination, an employer will need to demonstrate that the measure adopted is proportionate.  The Supreme Court has confirmed that to be proportionate, a measure must be both an appropriate means of achieving the legitimate aim and (reasonably) necessary in order to do so.

A measure will not be appropriate if it does not achieve the proposed aim, while a measure that goes further than is reasonably necessary to achieve the proposed aim will be disproportionate and impermissible.

It may be more difficult to show proportionality if the stated aim is to preserve the dignity of employees.  Arguably, a retirement age of 65 insinuates that once employees turn 65, they are no longer able to do the jobs that they have been doing up to their 65th birthdays.  If anything, this practice reinforces rather than dispels discriminatory stereotypes, which will make it difficult to justify.

What Does This Mean for Employers?

Direct discrimination claims are harder to defend than indirect discrimination claims.  Managers need to understand that using mandatory retirement ages, while still possible, may lead to tough challenges.

The Supreme Court has provided clarification for employers on how to justify direct age discrimination, but not a definitive one-size-fits-all answer.  The identification of legitimate aims is only half the problem, and questions of proportionality will continue to be difficult to answer.

Consequently, if imposing, continuing, or relying upon age-related criteria such as mandatory retirement ages is important to you as an employer, now is a good time to talk to us about the legitimate aim that will be relied upon and how this can be demonstrated for the particular workplace as a matter of fact.

© 2012 McDermott Will & Emery

“Brogrammers” Giving Silicon Valley a Bad Name?

An article by Emily Holbrook of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding “Brogrammers” recently appeared in The National Law Review:

According to a recent article, Silicon Valley tech firms are using marketing tactics geared more towards fraternity brothers than programming savants. The problem? Not only is it sexist at times, but it is alienating a large chunk of qualified tech professionals. Here are a few examples:

Of course, this is only a snipet of what’s going on as many of the antics are never publicized. Barbaic events like these may not only cost companies money (several businesses pulled their sponsorship from the Sqoot event), but it alienates those who may be talented programmers, but don’t adhere to the frat boy mentality.

There’s also an audience that feels left out of the joke. Women made up 21% of all programmers in 2010, down from 24% in 2000, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Anything that encourages the perception of tech as being male-dominated is likely to contribute to this decline, says Sara Chipps, founder of Girl Develop It, a series of software development workshops. “This brogramming thing would definitely turn off a lot of women from working” at startups, says Chipps.

But is this really a serious problem in Silicon Valley or just young men being young men? I’ve heard both sides of the argument. Some companies that have taken this seriously, such as Etsy, have decided to do something about it. The e-commerce website is donating $5,000 to at least 10 women in an attempt to lure female coders to New York’s Hacker School this summer.

Whether this is an epidemic that should cause concern or merely programmers acting their age, one thing is for sure — having a working envrionment void of diversity is aiken to siloed idea generation. Silicon Valley should know this.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor

UK Court Decision on Objective Justification for Age Discrimination Claims

Long awaited judgment from the Court of Appeal focuses on the merits of the ‘cost-alone’ argument.

The UK Court of Appeal released the much anticipated decision in Woodcock v. Cumbria Primary Care Trust. The decision centred on objective justification. Unlike other forms of discrimination in the UK, direct age discrimination can be objectively justified.

The objective justification test has two key elements: (i) does the employer have a legitimate aim and (ii) are the means chosen a proportionate way of achieving that aim, bearing in mind the discrimination to which it gives rise?

Whilst various factors can be used to justify age discrimination, the status quo position is that ‘cost alone’ cannot be used to justify otherwise discriminatory conduct and that more is required. This has become known as the ‘cost-plus’approach. ‘Cost’ is anything that has a purely financial consideration, i.e. the motivation is purely to save costs.

The Court of Appeal in Woodcock looked at the possibility of an employer justifying discrimination on a ‘cost-alone’ basis.

Background

Mr Woodcock’s employer (the Trust) was going through a reorganisation which would result in the reduction of chief executives required in the Trust. He was made aware that his role was ‘at risk of redundancy’ in early 2006 and he therefore applied for one of the remaining chief executive roles left in the new structure. Following a selection process, Mr Woodcock was informed in July 2006 that he was not successful in his application. He then entered into informal discussions about finding alternative employment in the Trust, although no formal consultation began.

In 2007, the Trust realised that Mr Woodcock would receive a significant pension windfall if he were still employed by the Trust on his 50th birthday. The windfall amounted to approximately £500,000. Given this potential windfall, the Trust elected to give Mr Woodcock notice of termination on the grounds of redundancy before entering into a consultation process during Mr Woodcock’s 12-month notice period. No suitable alternative roles were found and Mr Woodcock’s employment terminated in May 2007. He received his contractual redundancy pay of £220,000 (well above the cap for unfair dismissal of approximately £70,000).

Mr Woodcock was clearly discriminated against on the grounds of age. He received his dismissal notice prior to consultation because of the pension windfall he would have received at his attainment of age 50. If he had been a year younger, a consultation process would have been followed first. In order to follow a fair process in the UK, an employer should consult with an employee before deciding whether he or she is redundant.

Age Discrimination Justified?

At first glance, it is hard to see how this case turns on anything other than the Trust’s financial considerations.

The lower courts, however, found that the discriminatory treatment was objectively justified using the ‘cost-plus’ approach—the ‘plus’ being the genuine redundancy situation and avoiding the potential windfall.

Although possible to pigeonhole these facts into the ‘cost-plus’ test, the lower courts agreed that it was slightly artificial. One of the questions the Court of Appeal considered was whether age discrimination could be objectively justified on a ‘cost-alone’ basis.

Court of Appeal Decision

Although the Court of Appeal agreed that the current ‘cost-plus’ approach results in a degree of artificiality, it accepted that the current guidance from the European Court of Justice is clear, i.e. an employer cannot justify discriminatory treatment ‘solely’ because of cost.

The Court of Appeal, however, agreed with the lower courts and held that the age discrimination in this case was objectively justified on a ‘cost-plus’ analysis because (i) the dismissal notice was served with the aim of giving effect to the Trust’s genuine decision to terminate Mr Woodcock’s employment on the grounds of his redundancy and (ii) it was a legitimate part of that aim for the Trust to ensure that, in giving effect to it, the dismissal also saved the Trust the potential pension fund windfall.

Conclusion

It appears as though the ‘cost-plus’ approach is here to stay. The good news is that the courts appear able to find their way around the problem of having to follow the ‘cost-plus’ approach in most cases.

Despite the courts’ current flexibility, employers should remain hesitant to commit to a ‘cost-alone’ approach and should continue to look for the ‘further factor’.

Copyright © 2012 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP