Category: Civil Rights

EEOC Unveils Final Rule Implementing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act PWFA

Go-To Guide:
  • Effective June 18, employers covered by the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) are required to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.
  • PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • A preliminary injunction was entered on June 17, which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for purely elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.
  • Covered employers should review the requirements of the PWFA to ensure that their workplace policies and procedures allow for the requisite accommodations under the Act and follow current challenges to accommodations regarding elective abortions under the law.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) final rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) went into effect June 18, 2024, but not without legal challenge.

The final rule, covered in a previous GT Alert, requires employers to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth. The rule includes an exception for employers if the requested accommodation would cause the business an undue hardship.

However, the requirement of a workplace accommodation for “purely elective abortions” has been enjoined from implementation and enforcement in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and against four Catholic organizations. On June 17, 2024, Judge David C. Joseph in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana ruled that the EEOC overstepped its authority by requiring workplace accommodations for “purely elective abortions.”

The motions for preliminary injunction, filed by the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as four entities affiliated with the Catholic Church, sought injunctive relief to the extent that the PWFA requires employers to accommodate purely elective abortions of employees. The court rejected the EEOC argument “that Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted [it] the authority to interpret the scope of the PWFA in a way that imposes a nationwide mandate on both public and private employers – irrespective of applicable abortion-related state laws enacted in the wake of Dobbs – to provide workplace accommodation for the elective abortions of employees.”

Based on its analysis, the court entered a preliminary injunction which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and any agency thereof, any covered entity under the final rule with respect to all employees whose primary duty station is located in Louisiana or Mississippi, and the entities affiliated with the Catholic Church that sought the court’s involvement.1

What should employers know to ensure compliance with the PWFA, given the limited injunctive relief issued? Below is a summary of the law and considerations for implementing the rule, which is now effective.

Application

  • The PWFA applies to employees, which include applicants and former employees where relevant based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
  • The PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • The states of Louisiana and Mississippi; employers located in Louisiana and Mississippi and with employees whose primary duty station is located within the states; and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lake Charles, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette, and the Catholic University of America are not required to provide accommodations for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to the pregnancy.

What Is Considered a ‘Known Limitation’?

  • A limitation is “known” to a covered entity if the employee, or the employee’s representative, has communicated the limitation to the covered entity.
  • The physical or mental condition may be a modest or minor and/or episodic impediment or problem.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions that had a need or a problem related to maintaining their health or the health of the pregnancy. “Pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” includes uncomplicated pregnancies, vaginal deliveries or cesarian sections, miscarriage, postpartum depression, edema, placenta previa, and lactation.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions who sought health care related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition itself.
  • There is possible overlap between the PWFA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because in these situations, the qualified employee may be entitled to an accommodation under either statute, as the protections of both may apply.

What Is an ‘Undue Hardship’?

  • An employer or covered entity does not need to provide a reasonable accommodation if it causes an undue hardship, meaning significant difficulty or expense, to the employer.

The PWFA Prohibits the Following Conduct by Covered Employers

  • Failure to make a reasonable accommodation for the known limitations of an employee or applicant, unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship;
  • Requiring an employee to accept an accommodation other than a reasonable accommodation arrived at through the interactive process;
  • Denying a job or other employment opportunities to a qualified employee or applicant based on the person’s need for a reasonable accommodation;
  • Requiring an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided that would let the employee keep working;
  • Punishing or retaliating against an employee or applicant for requesting or using a reasonable accommodation for a known limitation under the PWFA, reporting or opposing unlawful discrimination under the PWFA, or participating in a PWFA proceeding (such as an investigation); and/or
  • Coercing individuals who are exercising their rights or helping others exercise their rights under the PWFA.

Non-Exhaustive List Of Examples of ‘Reasonable Accommodations’

  • Additional, longer, or more flexible breaks to drink water, eat, rest, or use the restroom;
  • Changing food or drink policies to allow for a water bottle or food;
  • Changing equipment, devices, or workstations, such as providing a stool to sit on, or a way to do work while standing;
  • Changing a uniform or dress code or providing safety equipment that fits;
  • Changing a work schedule, such as having shorter hours, part-time work, or a later start time;
  • Telework;
  • Temporary reassignment;
  • Temporary suspension of one or more essential functions of a job;
  • Leave for health care appointments;
  • Light duty or help with lifting or other manual labor; or
  • Leave to recover from childbirth or other medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.

Employer Training

  • Employers should consider training supervisors on how to respond to requests for accommodation.
  • Unlike requests for accommodation under the ADA, an accommodation pursuant to the PWFA may include a temporary suspension of essential job functions for qualified individuals (barring undue hardship to the employer).
  • Employees do not need to use specific words to request an accommodation to begin the interactive process.
  • Employers may not require that the employee seeking an accommodation be examined by a health care provider selected by the employer.
1 Further efforts to enjoin the implementation of the Rule were thwarted when the U.S. District Court for the District of Arkansas denied a motion for injunctive relief filed by a group of Republican state attorneys general on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the rule.
©2024 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

Navigating the Nuances of LGBTQ+ Divorce in California

The end of a marriage is always challenging for the couple involved, and the impact on family members can be significant. Those in LGBTQ+ marriages are no different. Issues around child custody, property division, spousal support, and the enforcement of prenuptial agreements all apply to same-sex couples.

In California, there is no common-law marriage. In some cases, the LGBTQ+ couple may not have been married long at the time of the divorce, but they may have been together for much longer than the marriage itself. Whether they were registered as a domestic partnership will make a difference. In such cases, the couple will have similar rights and obligations as those married for the same length of time.

For example, in California, if the couple were married four years ago, spousal support—in most cases—would only be for approximately two years. However, if they were registered as domestic partners for 20 years and then had a four-year marriage, spousal support could be until either party’s death or the recipient spouse’s remarriage.

The Unique Challenges Around Parental Rights

Dealing with parental rights is difficult regardless of the orientation of the couple involved. When I advise clients, I try my best to have them focus on the best interests of their children. Divorce is typically the most challenging for the children.

Nuanced complications can arise depending on how the children came into the family. Was it by adoption, surrogacy, or assisted reproductive technology? For LGBTQ+ couples, it is essential that everything is done legally and correctly and that both parents are included in legally binding contracts. In the case of surrogacy or assisted reproductive technology (also known as IVF), mainly when sperm or eggs are donated from someone outside the relationship, it is critically important that the sperm or egg donor has no rights or obligations. Otherwise, things can get murky in a legal sense.

The bottom line is that couples need to secure an excellent lawyer to protect their interests and those of their children. Putting the children first should always be the priority.

Additional Considerations

I have been told that in the LGBTQ+ community, particularly amongst those who identify as men, there can be a preponderance of open relationships. I have been asked if that can complicate a potential divorce. Because California is a no-fault state regarding divorce, it does not matter who sleeps with whom. The only issue is if one person spends community dollars on another person outside the marriage. A relevant factor would be if it were an open marriage and what the understanding of that meant financially and otherwise. Ideally, a couple would document these nuances with their lawyer. Without pre- or post-nuptial agreements addressing such relationship guidelines, spending outside the marriage on another relationship can become a problem during divorce proceedings.

Another question I am often asked is if same-sex couples should seek divorce attorneys who identify as similar to themselves. I can easily see how that might be a comfortable choice. And I do not advocate against it. The most important criterion is the attorney’s skill and if you can relate to them. I know for myself, I am confident I can help my clients, whether they are gay, non-binary, or fluid. My commitment and level of advocacy are always going to be the same.

Concerns over the Future Loom Large

In the past, same-sex couples who married in other states faced the risk that their marriages would not be recognized in another state. The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Obergefell v. Hodges decision in 2015 required that all states, including California, recognize same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions. For those married in California, we are fortunate that LGBTQ+ rights have long been progressive. On the other hand, recent rumbling from the U.S. Supreme Court suggests those protections may be in jeopardy.

I am personally troubled by what some Justices have indicated in dissenting opinions. I remember life before Roe v. Wade and life before Obergfell. I have always been concerned about subsequent elections and the future makeup of our nation’s highest court. Personally, I would hate to see our country go backward on marriage equality.

I have always believed in the institution of marriage. And I am a realist who recognizes that marriages can and do end for a multitude of reasons. It might be surprising to hear a divorce attorney say this, but I would prefer to see couples work things out. But when they cannot, I will be the best advocate for my clients, regardless of how they identify. In the end, divorce is a tricky thing to go through, and whether you are part of a same-sex couple or opposite-sex makes little difference.

© 2024 Blank Rome LLP
For more news on LGBTQ+ Family Law, visit the NLR Family Law / Divorce / Custody section.

HHS Publishes Final Rule to Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy

The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization to eliminate the federal constitutional right to abortion continues to alter the legal landscape across the country. On April 26, 2024, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) published the “HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy” (the “Final Rule”).

The Final Rule—amending the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy Rule”) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), as well as the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act)—strengthens privacy protections related to the use and disclosure of reproductive health care information. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule limits the disclosure of protected health information (PHI) and is part of HHS’s efforts to ensure that patients will not be afraid to seek health care from, or share important information with, health care providers.

The Final Rule:

  • Prohibits the use or disclosure of PHI when it is sought to investigate or impose liability on individuals, health care providers, or others who seek, obtain, provide, or facilitate reproductive health care that is lawful under the circumstances in which such health care is provided, or to identify persons for such activities.
  • Requires covered entities and business associates to obtain a signed attestation that certain requests for PHI potentially related to reproductive health care are not for these prohibited purposes.
  • Requires covered entities to modify their NPPs to support reproductive health care privacy.

“Since the fall of Roe v. Wade, providers have shared concerns that when patients travel to their clinics for lawful care, their patients’ records will be sought, including when the patient goes home,” OCR Director Melanie Fontes Rainer said in a news release. OCR administers the Privacy Rule, which requires most health care providers, health plans, health care clearinghouses (“covered entities”) and business associates to safeguard the privacy of PHI.

Commenters to an earlier notice of proposed rulemaking (“2023 NPRM”) raised concerns that PHI related to reproductive health care would be used and disclosed to expose both patients and providers to investigation and liability under state abortion laws, particularly new and revived laws. This Final Rule is intended to prohibit the disclosure of PHI related to lawful reproductive health care—a change from the current Privacy Rule where an entity is generally permitted, but not required, to disclose relevant and material information in a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.

Key Takeaways

New Category of Protected Health Information. The Final Rule changes the HIPAA Privacy Rule by defining a new category of protected health information and adds a new “prohibited use and disclosure” under the HIPAA Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.502—mandating that a covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose PHI:

  • To conduct a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into any person for the mere act of seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating “reproductive health care”;
  • To impose criminal, civil, or administrative liability on any “person” for the mere act of seeking, obtaining, providing or facilitating “reproductive health care”; and
  • To identify any “person” for any of those above described purposes.

Prohibition. Under the Final Rule, HIPAA-covered entities and business associates who receive requests for protected health information must make a reasonable determination that one or more of the following conditions exists:

  • The reproductive health care is lawful in the state in which such health care is provided under the circumstances in which it is provided (e.g., if a resident of one state traveled to another state to receive reproductive health care, such as an abortion, that is lawful in the state where such health care was provided).
  • The reproductive health care is protected, required, or authorized by federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, regardless of the state in which such health care is provided (e.g., reproductive health care such as contraception is protected by the Constitution).

Presumption. Such care is presumed lawful unless the HIPAA-covered entity or business associate has

  • actual knowledge that the reproductive care was not lawful under the circumstances it was provided; or
  • factual information supplied by the requester demonstrating a substantial factual basis that the reproductive health care was not lawful under the specific circumstances in which it was provided.

Attestation Requirement. The Final Rule adds 45 CFR § 164.509(c) to require a covered entity or business associate, when it receives a request for PHI potentially related to reproductive health care, to obtain a signed attestation from the requester. However, obtaining the attestation does not relieve a covered entity or business associate from its responsibility to determine whether the reproductive health care that may be the subject of the requested information was lawful. An attestation must contain the following elements:

  • A description of the information requested that identifies the information in a specific fashion, including one of the following:
    • The name(s) of any individual(s) whose protected health information is sought, if practicable;
    • If that name is not practicable, the name(s) or other specific identification of the person(s) or class of person(s) who are requested to make the use or disclosure;
  • The name or other specific identification of the person(s) or class of persons to whom the covered entity is to make the requested use or disclosure;
  • A clear statement that the use or disclosure is not for a purpose prohibited under 45 CFR § 164.502(a)(5)(iii)(i.e., identifying any person under the newly added prohibition);
  • A statement that a person may be subject to criminal penalties if they use or disclose the reproductive health information improperly;
  • Must be in plain language and contain the elements set forth in 45 CFR § 164.509(c) (inclusion of other elements not set forth in 45 CFR § 164.509(c) is prohibited); and
  • Must be signed by the person requesting the disclosure (which may take an electronic format).

The Final Rule prohibits the attestation from being “combined with” any other document (yet allows additional supporting information or documentation needed for the request to be submitted with the attestation (for example, a clearly labelled subpoena). While covered entities can develop their own attestation form, to reduce the compliance burden, HHS plans to publish a model attestation form prior to the compliance date.

Notices of Policy Practices. With the new processes for using and disclosing reproductive health information, covered entities must update their Notices of Privacy Practices (NPPs) required under 45 CFR § 164.520. For purposes of this Final Rule, updates to the NPPs must describe among other things the types and uses of disclosures of PHI that are prohibited under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii). The notice should also contain a description of the uses and disclosures for which an attestation is required under the new 45 CFR § 164.509. Further, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs determined that this Final Rule meets the criteria in 5 USC § 804(2) for being a major rule because it is projected to have an annualized impact of more than $100,000,000 based on the number of covered entities and business associates that will have to implement these changes.

Practical Implications for HIPAA Covered Entities & Business Associates

Considering the significant changes this Final Rule introduces, there is no time like the present for covered entities and business associates to consider the compliance implications that a new category of PHI will have on existing HIPAA policies and procedures. In addition to developing and/or obtaining new attestation forms, making reasonable determinations of the lawfulness of reproductive health care and updating notices of privacy practices, privacy and security officers will likely need to evaluate the impact these changes will have on the policies that govern data dissemination, and the processes and procedures that may change as well. Covered entities and business associates will also likely want to include these changes into training for employees involved in these activities.

The Final Rule goes into effect on June 25, 2024, with a compliance date of December 23, 2024. The NPP requirements, however, take effect on February 16, 2026—consistent with OCR’s 42 CFR Part 2 Rule of February 16, 2024, so that covered entities regulated under both rules can implement changes to their NPPs at the same time.

HIPAA covered entities and business associates should consider the context and framework of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and these new modifications as they consider third-party requests for any PHI that may include reproductive health information (the current HIPAA Privacy Rule remains in effect until the new rule takes effect). If the new reproductive health prohibition is not applicable, HIPAA covered entities should still consider the fact that HIPAA otherwise permits, but does not require, them to disclose PHI under most of the HIPAA exceptions contained in 45 CFR § 164.512. Therefore, HIPAA affords covered entities the ability to protect the privacy interests of their patients, especially in the current post-Dobbs environment.

Covered entities and business associates now face the challenge of implementing these new requirements and training their workforce members on how to analyze and respond to requests that include reproductive health care information. Questions remain surrounding a covered entity or business associate’s burden of determining that the reproductive health care provided to an individual was in fact lawful. For example, if a complaint follows, does a covered entity have to account for the disclosures that are made? While the Final Rule is gender-neutral, what is the likelihood that it would be applied to men—could it? In any case, we will continue to monitor developments, including questions of how HIPAA and other privacy concerns interact with reproductive health care, in the wake of Dobbs. For more on the subject, please see our past blog on the 2023 proposed rule.

Ann W. Parks contributed to this article.

©2024 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more on Reproductive Health Care, visit the NLR Health Law & Managed Care section.

Payday: Terminated Employee Awarded $78,000 in EEOC Settlement

Employees returning to work following a hospitalization or illness can present legally nuanced issues, particularly if an employer is considering terminating an employee in close proximity to such a leave. A recent case settled by a company with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) highlights some of the legal risks that can come into play.

According to an EEOC press release: “The EEOC charged in [a lawsuit] that, in February 2022, [a company] fired a long-tenured receptionist, despite having recognized the 78-year-old employee as one of its employees of the year in January 2022. The receptionist’s termination came shortly after a brief hospitalization. The EEOC alleged that upon the receptionist’s return to work, [the company’s] general manager asked her how long she planned to continue to work, whether she needed to work, and whether she would prefer to spend her time traveling and seeing family instead of working.

Although the receptionist expressed her desire to continue working, and despite having never previously raised substantial performance concerns to the receptionist, the general manager told the receptionist that [the company] had lost confidence in her ability to work, citing her recent hospitalization. The receptionist was fired the next day and replaced by substantially younger employees.”

The EEOC alleged that these actions violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), noting the alleged statements about “losing confidence” in the employee due to a hospitalization could be viewed as disability discrimination (the ADA defines “disability” very broadly), and the fact the employee was over the age of 40 (i.e., in the protected age group) and replaced with a younger employee could give rise to an inference of age discrimination under the ADEA.

The company elected to settle the allegations. As part of the settlement, the company agreed to pay $78,000 to the terminated employee. In addition, it entered into a two-year consent decree that also requires it to “revise its ADEA and ADA policies, post a notice in the workplace informing employees of the settlement, and train all employees and supervisors on their rights and responsibilities under both the ADEA and the ADA. Moreover, the company agreed to provide the EEOC with periodic reports regarding any future complaints of age or disability discrimination including a description of each employee’s allegations and the company’s response.”

Accordingly, this case serves as an important reminder that employee terminations should be carefully evaluated with respect to legal risks under various employment laws. Vetting such risks on the front end may mitigate pain on the back end.

© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Fourth Circuit Holds Firm Against Expansion of Religion-Based Defenses to Discrimination (US)

What happened in the interim that ended this beloved educator’s decorated teaching career? In 2014, shortly after North Carolina recognized same-sex marriage, Mr. Billard posted on his personal Facebook page that he and his partner of fourteen years were engaged to be married.

Lonnie Billard was a well-loved and decorated drama and English teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS) in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He was named Teacher of the Year in 2012 after serving the Catholic high school’s students for eleven years.

Two years later, CCHS told Mr. Billard he was not welcome back as a teacher.

CCHS has never denied why it fired Mr. Billard: his plans to marry violated the Mecklenburg Diocese’s policy against teachers engaging in conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith. Mr. Billard filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sex discrimination in employment. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. Mr. Billard sued in federal court. He won and was awarded stipulated damages.

If that were the end of the story, although a frustrating one for Mr. Billard and his husband, the case would hardly be newsworthy. Why the case warrants attention is the defense that CCHS did not assert, and why.

The ‘Ministerial Exception’

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a judicially crafted concept known as the “ministerial exception” emerged among federal appellate courts: Religious institutions may discriminate in their treatment of certain employees, notwithstanding Title VII, provided that the employee plays a vital ministerial employment role or is involved in ecclesiastical matters. Indeed, ministerial exception is a misnomer because the exception is not limited to those employees holding titles of independent religious significance (e.g., priest, pastor, rabbi, imam), but also applies to employees holding important positions within churches and other religious institutions. The Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Although the Court refused to answer directly the question of who is and is not a minister, it found on the facts of the case before it that a “called teacher” with the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” fit the bill.

Hosanna-Tabor was binding law when Mr. Billard filed suit in 2017. CCHS’s obvious defense to Mr. Billard’s allegations of sex discrimination was that he, as a Catholic school teacher engaged to teach his students in accordance with diocesan mission, fell within the ministerial exception, but in an unusual turn of events, CCHS waived this argument. In fact, CCHS stipulated with Mr. Billard that it would not argue that his job duties qualified him for the ministerial exception. Why? CCHS claims that it waived the ministerial exception defense because it wanted to avoid the burden of discovery around the issue of whether Mr. Billard’s role was sufficiently ministerial. (More on that below.) Since CCHS waived the best defense available to it and unequivocally admitted why it fired Mr. Billard, it’s no wonder he prevailed.

The Appeal

On appeal, CCHS propounded four affirmative defenses it had advanced without success at the trial court level – none of which included the ministerial exception. First, CCHS asserted two First Amendment-based defenses: the “church autonomy” doctrine and freedom of association. The trial and appellate courts quickly disposed of both theories, concluding that CCHS’s “church autonomy” argument was another way of trying to dress up the ministerial exception and, as to freedom of association, the courts found “no precedent for privileging a right of expressive association over anti-discrimination laws.” CCHS also asserted a statutory defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but the courts made quick work of this too, finding that the RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties.

But CCHS’s fourth and final argument, and by far its most controversial, was that the trial court should have exonerated it under Title VII’s religious exemption. This notion, which is different than the First Amendment-inspired ministerial exception and derives from the plain text of Title VII, exempts certain religious organizations from Title VII’s non-discrimination strictures “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). For instance, a Baptist church may favor hiring a Baptist minister or liturgical worship leader over a Methodist or Lutheran candidate, regardless of their respective qualifications. But the religious exemption has only ever been applied as a defense to claims of religious discrimination. Seeking to overturn decades of precedent, CCHS argued in Billard for an unprecedented expansion of the exemption, one that would permit religious organizations to discriminate even on the basis of sex, race or national origin as long as religious belief motivated the employment decision. At oral argument before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, CCHS conceded that its proffered interpretation of the religious exemption would permit discrimination against not only the relatively small number of employees of religious institutions with a claim to ministerial status, but also the hundreds of thousands of groundskeepers, custodians, bus drivers, musicians and administrative personnel that work for such institutions but whose duties are non-ecclesiastical.

An interpretation like that for which CCHS called would seriously erode protections against discrimination. For instance, under CCHS’s interpretation of the religious exemption, if a religious employer asserted as a principle of its faith that women should not work outside the home, it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex. Likewise, under CCHS’s reading of the exemption, a religious employer asserting a faith-based reason for preferring one race over another would be exempt from Title VII consequences. And, to close the loop, if a religious employer held as a religious tenet that being gay or marrying one’s gay partner was a moral lapse, then it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Fourth Circuit balked at CCHS’s statutorily ungrounded argument for an expansion of the religious employer exemption. The text of Title VII is ambiguous and exempts religious organizations “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion”; it does not protect discrimination against individuals because of religion. The appellate court was also unimpressed by CCHS’s attempt to force a determination on these grounds by earlier waiving the ministerial exception. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit set aside the parties’ waiver and found sua sponte (meaning on the Court’s own initiative), that CCHS was not liable for discrimination for terminating Mr. Billard because he was, notwithstanding his secular teaching subjects, “a messenger of CCHS’s faith.”

The Fourth Circuit explained that it was constrained to reach this outcome based on developing jurisprudence interpreting the ministerial exception. In the years since Mr. Billard filed suit, the Supreme Court expanded on Hosanna Tabor in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, finding in 2020 that two secular subject teachers at religious schools were nonetheless ministers within the ministerial exception as they were entrusted with educating and forming students in the school’s faith. (Notably, CCHS was represented by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The Becket Fund was also lead counsel in Our Lady of Guadalupe, a fact which raises a few questions about the plausibility of CCHS’s explanation for waiving the ministerial exception. The Becket Fund claims to be a “leader[ ] in the fight for religious liberty … at home and abroad,” and has fought against COVID-19 mandates, contraception care and LGBT and unmarried parent foster and adoption rights.)

The appellate court’s decision undoubtedly provides little comfort to Mr. Billard, who is now spending his retirement with his husband whom he married in May 2015. But even though the Fourth Circuit reversed judgment in his favor and instructed the trial court to enter judgment in CCHS’s favor on the grounds that the ministerial exception protected the school, it at least rejected CCHS’s request for unfettered license to discriminate on any basis so long as it articulated a faith-based motive for doing so. As CCHS proved victorious and therefore lacks grounds to appeal to the Supreme Court, for now, religious employers remain insulated from civil interference with decisions about the appointment and removal of persons in positions of theological significance—even high school drama teachers—but may not use purported religious beliefs to justify discrimination on other grounds.

© Copyright 2024 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more news on Religious-based Discrimination Defenses, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

EEOC Publishes Long-Awaited Final Guidance on Workplace Harassment

On April 29, 2024, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued the final version of new workplace harassment guidance for employers, formally updating the EEOC’s position on the legal standards and employer liability under federal antidiscrimination laws for the first time in more than two decades.

Quick Hits

  • The EEOC issued a final version of new guidance for employers clarifying its positions on the applications of federal laws prohibiting harassment and retaliation.
  • The new guidance is the first update to the EEOC’s workplace harassment guidance since 1999 and incorporates several new developments in the law and modern workforces.
  • Key to the new guidance is that it recognizes unlawful harassment against LGBTQ+ individuals and addresses workplace protections for “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” including “lactation.”
  • The new guidance took immediate effect upon issuance.

The new guidance, “Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace,” clarifies the EEOC’s position on several key issues following its receipt of nearly 40,000 comments in response to its proposed guidance published on October 2, 2023.

“The EEOC’s updated guidance on harassment is a comprehensive resource that brings together best practices for preventing and remedying harassment and clarifies recent developments in the law,” EEOC Chair Charlotte Burrows said in a statement released with the new guidance.

In that regard, the final guidance aligns with the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia—wherein the prohibition under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against gender discrimination was held to include claims predicated on sexual orientation and gender identification—and recognizes potentially unlawful workplace harassment against LGBTQ+ individuals. The final guidance also addresses another key area of focus, that is, workplace protections for “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” including “lactation” in accordance with the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act), and the EEOC’s final guidance on the PWFA issued on April 15, 2024.

While claims of harassment represented more than a third of all discrimination charges filed with the EEOC between fiscal years 2016 and 2023, the Commission has not updated its guidance on harassment since 1999. The final guidance consolidates and replaces the EEOC’s five guidance documents issued from 1987 through 1999.

Significant for employers, the final guidance provides more than seventy hypothetical examples of potential unlawful harassment, including examples reflective of today’s modern workforce with both hybrid and remote workers and widespread use of electronic communication and social media.

Covered Harassment

The EEOC made several key updates to what it considers covered harassment under Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination laws.

Race and Color

The new guidance expands the EEOC’s explanation on potential harassment based on “color” under Title VII, separating it out into its own section that was not included in the proposed guidance. The guidance states that while discrimination based on color is “sometimes related to harassment based on race or national origin, color-based harassment due to an individual’s pigmentation, complexion, or skin shade or tone is independently covered by Title VII.”

The guidance provides an example of potential color-based harassment where a supervisor harasses Black employees with “darker complexions” and not Black employees with “lighter skin tones,” even though they are all of the same race or national origin.

Pregnancy, Childbirth, or Related Medical Conditions

The guidance states that harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions “can include issues such as lactation; using or not using contraception; or deciding to have, or not to have, an abortion,” if that harassment “is linked to a targeted individual’s sex.” The new guidance adds multiple hypothetical examples of such harassment not included in the proposed guidance, including a situation where employees make negative comments about a pregnant employee who is allowed to “telework up to three days per week and utilize flexible scheduling” as an accommodation for “pregnancy-related morning sickness.” Another example highlighted a situation where negative comments are directed toward a female worker who expresses milk in the lactation room at work and other inappropriate behavior, namely a male worker knocking on the door of the lactation room and feigning intent to enter the room.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The new guidance explains the EEOC’s view that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is a form of unlawful sex-based discrimination under Title VII, including epithets, physical assault, “outing” (meaning disclosing an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity without permission), or other harassing conduct toward individuals because they do “not present in a manner that would stereotypically be associated with that person’s sex.”

Further, the guidance identifies as potential harassment the “repeated and intentional use of a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s known gender identity (misgendering); or the denial of access to a bathroom or other sex-segregated facility consistent with the individual’s gender identity.” Importantly, the final guidance requires some intentional or knowing behavior, that is “repeated and intentional” misgendering based on an individual’s “known” gender identity. (Emphasis added.)

Genetic Information

The new guidance further clarifies the EEOC’s understanding of unlawful harassment under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) as applying to “harassment based on an individual’s, or an individual’s family member’s, genetic test or on the basis of an individual’s family medical history.” For instance, the guidance states that such harassment could include harassing an employee “because the employee’s mother recently experienced a severe case of norovirus, which resulted in overnight hospitalization.”

Retaliatory Harassment

The final guidance includes a new section that addresses the concept of “retaliatory harassment.” The guidance clarifies the EEOC’s position that “retaliatory harassing conduct” may still be challenged as unlawful retaliation “even if it is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment by creating a hostile work environment.” The EEOC explained that the legal standards for hostile work environment and retaliation are different as the anti-retaliation provisions proscribe a broader range of behaviors, namely, “anything that might deter a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity.”

Intraclass and Intersectional Harassment

The guidance includes examples of “intraclass” harassment where the harasser is in the same protected category as the individual being harassed. One hypothetical involves a fifty-two-year-old supervisor making derogatory comments toward a sixty-five-year-old employee as an example of harassment based on age, even though both individuals are over the age of forty. “Intersectional” harassment refers to situations where individuals are targeted based on their membership in more than one protected category. In one example, the hypothetical raises a situation where a male manager made comments to a female worker about her having a “hot flash” and being menopausal. The EEOC explained that such targeting based on “stereotypes about older women is covered as both age and sex discrimination.”

Reporting Procedures, Complaint Process, and Training

The proposed guidance outlined the “minimum” features of an effective anti-harassment policy, the “minimum” features for an effective complaint process, and the “minimum” features for effective anti-harassment training. The final guidance eliminates the “minimum” language, but the features of each are substantively the same otherwise.

As it concerns remedial measures, the Commission removed language from the proposed guidance that seemingly recognized the “fewer options” available to employers when faced with instances of harassment perpetrated by nonemployees, harassment toward employees working at client locations as is common for temporary staffing agencies, or harassment arising from off-duty conduct. In its place, the final guidance simply provides that employers have an “arsenal of incentives and sanctions” available to them to address harassment, but those options “may vary depending on who engages in the conduct and where it occurs, among other considerations.”

Next Steps

While the final guidance is likely to face legal challenges in the courts, employers may want to review their workplace policies and practices, particularly in light of potential liability for discrimination or harassment against LGBTQ+ employees. Additionally, employers may want to note differing state or local laws and state or local agency guidance that differ from Title VII and other federal laws enforced by the EEOC.

In addition to the new guidance, the EEOC published a “Summary of Key Provisions” document and a fact sheet for small businesses, with more information for employers.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Workplace Harassment, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Final Regulations Released

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released the text of the final regulations and interpretative guidance implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) on April 15, 2024. The final regulations are expected to be formally published in the April 19, 2024, Federal Register and will be effective 60 days later.

The EEOC received more than 100,000 public comments, including comments from Jackson Lewis, in response to the Commission’s notice of the proposed regulations issued on Aug. 11, 2023. Although largely unchanged from the proposed regulations, the final regulations provide important clarifications and insights into how the EEOC will enforce the law. Discussed below are some key points employers need to know about the final regulations.

Key PWFA Requirements

The PWFA, which went into effect on June 27, 2023, requires employers with at least 15 employees and other covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified employee’s or applicant’s known limitations related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, unless the accommodation will cause undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.

Qualified Employee

Under the PWFA, an employee has two ways to establish they are a “qualified employee”:

  1. Like under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), “an employee or applicant who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position” is qualified.
  2. If an employee (or applicant) cannot perform all essential job functions even with reasonable accommodation, the employee can be qualified for accommodations under the PWFA if: (a) the inability to perform an essential job function is for a temporary period; (b) the essential job function(s) could be performed in the near future; and (c) the inability to perform the essential function(s) can be reasonably accommodated. The Act, however, does not define “temporary” or “in the near future.” Several commentors raised concerns about the EEOC’s definition of these terms in the proposed regulations.

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations state that “temporary” means “lasting for a limited time, not permanent, and may extend beyond ‘in the near future.’” Unlike the proposed regulations, however, the final regulations state that assessing whether all essential job functions can be performed in the near future depends on the circumstances:

  • For a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is generally defined as 40 weeks from the start of the temporary suspension of an essential function.
  • For conditions other than a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is not defined as any particular length of time. However, the preamble to the final regulations explains that an employee who needs indefinite leave cannot perform essential job functions “in the near future.”

The final regulations explain that employers should consider whether an employee will be able to perform the essential functions “in the near future” each time an employee asks for an accommodation that requires suspension of an essential job function.

Ultimately, whether an employee is “qualified” involves a fact-sensitive evaluation whether the temporary suspension of essential job functions can be reasonably accommodated by the employer. This is significantly different from the ADA reasonable accommodation obligation and may involve, as the final regulations state, removing essential job functions and other arrangements including, but not limited to, requiring the employee perform the remaining job functions and other functions assigned by the employer, temporarily transferring the employee to another job or assigning the employee to light or modified duty, or allowing the employee to participate in an employer’s light or modified duty program.

Accommodations Only Required for Individual With Limitation

The EEOC explains that the regulations do not require employers to provide accommodations to an employee when an employee’s partner, spouse, or family member — not the employee themselves — has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. For clarity, the EEOC revised the final regulations’ definition of “limited” to state the limitation must be the specific employee.

Known Limitations

Employers are only obligated under the PWFA to accommodate an individual’s “known limitation.”

A “limitation” is defined as a “physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, of the specific employee in question.” The condition may be “modest, minor, and/or episodic, and does not need to meet the definition of “disability” under the ADA.

It becomes “known” to the employer when the employee or the employee’s representative has communicated the limitation to the employer. An employee’s representative may include a family member, friend, healthcare provider, union representative, or other representative.

The limitation may be communicated to a supervisor, a manager, someone who has supervisory authority for the employee or who regularly directs the employee’s tasks (or the equivalent in the case of an applicant), human resources personnel, or other appropriate official or by following the steps in the employer’s policy to request an accommodation.

This communication need not be in any specific format and may also be oral.

Pregnancy, Childbirth, Related Medical Conditions

Although the EEOC acknowledged receiving many comments on the scope of the proposed definition of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,” it made no substantive changes to the definition in the final regulations.

“Pregnancy” and “childbirth” are still defined as including current pregnancy, past pregnancy, potential or intended pregnancy (which can include infertility, fertility treatments and the use of contraception), labor, and childbirth (including vaginal and cesarean delivery).

The term “related medical conditions” continues to be defined as conditions that are “related to, are affected by, or arise out of pregnancy or childbirth.” The regulations provide the following non-exhaustive list of examples: termination of pregnancy, including by miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion; lactation and conditions related to lactation; menstruation; postpartum depression, anxiety or psychosis; vaginal bleeding; preeclampsia; pelvic prolapse; preterm labor; ectopic pregnancy; gestational diabetes; cesarean or perineal wound infection; maternal cardiometabolic disease; endometriosis; changes in hormone levels; and many other conditions.

The final regulations also reference related medical conditions that are not unique to pregnancy or childbirth, such as chronic migraine headaches, nausea or vomiting, high blood pressure, incontinence, carpal tunnel syndrome, and many other medical conditions. These conditions are covered by the PWFA only if the condition relates to pregnancy or childbirth or are exacerbated by pregnancy or childbirth, although the ADA or other civil rights statutes may apply.

Documentation

The final PWFA regulations continue to provide for a “reasonableness” standard in evaluating the circumstances under which an employer may request documentation from an employee. The final regulations, however, modify the definition of “reasonable documentation.” An employer may only request the “minimum documentation” necessary to confirm the employee has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions (a limitation) and describe the adjustment or change at work due to the limitation.

In addition to stating when an employer can ask for documentation, the PWFA regulations add a paragraph regarding an employee’s self-confirmation of their pregnancy status. It provides that an employer must accept as sufficient an employee’s self-confirmation when: (1) the pregnancy is obvious; or (2) an employee seeks one of the “predictable assessment” accommodation requests set forth in the regulations (discussed below).

The final PWFA regulations make clear the circumstances where it is not reasonable to seek supporting documentation. These circumstances include when: (1) the limitation and adjustment or change needed is obvious and the employee provides self-confirmation; (2) the employer has sufficient information to determine whether the employee has a qualifying limitation and needs an adjustment or change due to the limitation; (3) when the employee is pregnant a “predictable assessment”; (4) the reasonable accommodation relates to a time and/or place to pump or to nurse during work hours, and the employee provides self-confirmation; or (5) the requested accommodation is available to employees without known limitations under the PWFA pursuant to a policy or practice without submitting supporting documentation.

Importantly, the same prohibitions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations as well as the protection of medical information enforced under the ADA apply with equal force to documentation collected under the PWFA. Employers should ensure they continue to limit inquiries to only those that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Employers should also treat all documentation relating to a PWFA accommodation request like they treat ADA documentation — maintain it confidentially and separate from an employee’s personnel file.

Reasonable Accommodations

The PFWA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, which the final regulations define to be generally consistently with the ADA except for temporarily excusing or eliminating the performance of an essential job function. Otherwise, the rule provides that a reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment that is “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases” if it appears to be “feasible” or “plausible.” An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the qualified employee’s needs to remove a work-related barrier and provide an employee with equal employment opportunity to benefit from all privileges of employment.

The final regulations include examples of requests that may be reasonable. These include schedule changes due to morning sickness or to treat medical issues following delivery, adjustments to accommodate restrictions for lifting or requests for light duty, time and/or space to pump or nurse during work hours, or time off to recover from childbirth.

Lactation Accommodations

The EEOC’s final regulations require reasonable accommodation for lactation beyond what may be required under the Providing Urgent Maternal Protection for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act). The PUMP Act generally requires reasonable break time and space shielded from view and free from intrusion for a nursing mother to express breast milk. The final PWFA regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of accommodations relating to lactation, including space for pumping that is in reasonable proximity to a sink, running water, and refrigeration for storing milk.

The final regulations add nursing during working hours (as distinct from pumping) to the list of potentially reasonable accommodations. In the comments explaining this addition, the EEOC cautioned that accommodations for nursing mothers during work hours address situations where the employee and child are in close proximity in the normal course of business, such as where the employee works from home or where the employer offers on-site daycare. The EEOC stated this is not intended to create a right to proximity to nurse because of an employee’s preference.

Predictable Assessments

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations recognize four “predictable assessments” that will not impose an undue hardship in “virtually all cases”:

  1. Allowing an employee to carry or keep water near to enable them to drink;
  2. Permitting an employee to take additional restroom breaks as needed;
  3. Allowing an employee whose work requires standing to sit and whose work requires sitting to stand as needed; and
  4. Allowing an employee to take breaks to eat and drink as needed.

Despite stating the predictable assessments above will not “in virtually all cases” impose an undue hardship, the EEOC clarified this does not mean such requests are reasonable per se. The EEOC recognized that in certain industries, these predictable assessments may cause an undue hardship. Accordingly, employers may still conduct an individualized assessment of a predictable assessment accommodation request. However, the final regulations make clear that any such individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

Many individuals and organizations that submitted comments on the proposed regulations suggested the addition of other types of predictable assessment accommodations, including dress code modifications, minor workstation modifications, proximity to a restroom, permitting eating and drinking at a workstation, rest breaks, and personal protective equipment. Although noting agreement with the commenters and stating that employers should be able to provide such requests with “little difficulty,” the EEOC declined to expand the list of predictable assessments beyond the four originally listed that in “virtually all cases” will be considered reasonable and will not pose an undue hardship. In response to comments objecting to predictable assessments based on different challenges by industry, the EEOC guidance recognizes that an employer in certain industries may assert an accommodation request otherwise deemed to be a predictable assessment causes the employer an undue hardship and may deny the request.

Undue Hardship

The EEOC adopted the same standard for undue hardship in the final regulations as was in the proposed regulations. When an employee can perform all their essential job functions, the EEOC stated that undue hardship has the same meaning as under the ADA and generally means significant difficulty or expense for the employer’s operation. If an employee cannot perform all essential functions and the accommodation is temporary suspension of an essential job function, the employer needs to consider the ADA definition of undue hardship and the following relevant factors: (1) the length of time the employee or applicant will be unable to perform the essential function(s); (2) whether there is work for the employee to accomplish by allowing the employee to perform all the other functions of the job, transferring the employee to a different position, or otherwise; (3) the nature of the essential function, including its frequency; (4) whether the covered entity has temporarily suspended the performance of essential job functions for other employees in similar positions; (5) whether there are other employees, temporary employees, or third parties who can perform or be temporarily hired to perform the essential function(s); and (6) whether the essential function(s) can be postponed or remain unperformed for any length of time and for how long.

EEOC Interpretative Guidance

The EEOC’s final regulations include an appendix entitled “Appendix A to Part 1636—Interpretative Guidance on the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act” (Interpretative Guidance). The Interpretative Guidance, which becomes part of the final regulations, has the same force and effect as the final regulations.

The Interpretative Guidance addresses the major provisions of the PWFA and its regulations and explains the main concepts pertaining to an employer’s legal requirements under the PWFA to make reasonable accommodations for known limitations (physical or mental conditions related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions). It represents the EEOC’s interpretation of the PWFA and, as stated in comments to the final regulations, the EEOC will be guided by the Interpretive Guidance when enforcing the PWFA. The Interpretative Guidance includes many examples and other practical guidance illustrating common workplace scenarios and how the PWFA applies.

Remedies, Enforcement

The final regulations’ remedies and enforcement are the same as proposed. Remedies under the PWFA mirror those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and include injunctive and other equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Employers that demonstrate good faith efforts to work with employees to identify and make reasonable accommodations have an affirmative defense to money damages.

PWFA’s Relationship to Other Federal, State, Local Laws

The final regulations provide that the PWFA does not invalidate or limit the powers, remedies, or procedures available under any federal, state, or local law that provides greater or equal protection for individuals affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. About 40 states and cities have laws protecting employees and applicants from discrimination due to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. Accordingly, employers should evaluate whether state and/or local law may provide greater rights and obligations than the PWFA. To the extent such laws provide greater obligations, the PWFA final regulations require employers to comply with both the PWFA and analogous state and local law.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024
For more news on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

White House Publishes Revisions to Federal Agency Race and Ethnicity Reporting Categories

On March 28, 2024, the White House unveiled revisions to the federal statistical standards for race and ethnicity data collection for federal agencies, adding a new category and requiring a combined race and ethnicity question that allows respondents to select multiple categories with which they identify.

Quick Hits

  • The White House published an updated SPD 15 with revisions to the race and ethnicity data collection standards for federal agencies.
  • The revisions change the race and ethnicity inquiry by making it one question and encouraging respondents to identify under multiple categories.
  • Federal agencies have eighteen months to submit an agency action plan for compliance and must bring all of their data collections and programs into compliance within five years.
  • The race and ethnicity categories are widely used across federal agencies and serve as a model for employers for their own data collection and required diversity reporting.

The White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published updates to its Statistical Policy Directive No. 15: Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (SPD 15) with major revisions, the first since 1997. The revisions took immediate effect and were formally published in the Federal Register on March 29, 2024.

OMB stated that the revisions—which come after a two-year review process that included input from more than 20,000 comments, ninety-four listening sessions, three virtual town halls, and a Tribal consultation—are “intended to result in more accurate and useful race and ethnicity data across the federal government.”

Background

In 2022, OMB convened the Federal Interagency Technical Working Group on Race and Ethnicity Standard (Working Group) to review the race and ethnicity standards in the 1997 SPD 15 with the goal of “improving the quality and usefulness of Federal race and ethnicity data.” The race and ethnicity standards are used by federal contractors and subcontractors for affirmative action programs (AAPs) and by employers for federal EEO-1 reporting and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) surveys. Many employers further use the race and ethnicity categories for their own recordkeeping purposes, and federal agencies use the categories for various surveys and federal forms.

In January 2023, OMB published the Working Group’s proposals, observing that the 1997 SPD 15 standards might no longer accurately reflect the growing diversity across the United States and evolving understandings of racial and ethnic identities. During the pendency of the review process, several justices of the Supreme Court of the United States criticized the imprecision of the 1997 race and ethnicity categories throughout the Court’s 237-page opinion in the June 2023 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard College (SFFA decision) case, in which the Court struck down certain race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.

Revisions to SPD 15

The updated standards closely follow the Working Group’s final recommendations and revise SPD 15 to require that data collection:

  • combine the race and ethnicity inquiry into one question that allows respondents to select multiple categories with which they identify,
  • add “Middle Eastern or North African” (MENA) as a “minimum reporting category” that is “separate and distinct from the White’ category,” and
  • “require the collection of more detailed data as a default.”

Under the 1997 standards, respondents were required to first select an ethnicity (i.e., “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino”), and second, select a race category (i.e., “American Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian,” “Black or African American,” “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” or “White”).

The revised race and ethnicity categories for minimum reporting are:

  • “American Indian or Alaska Native”
  • “Asian”
  • “Black or African American”
  • “Hispanic or Latino”
  • “Middle Eastern or North African”
  • “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander”
  • “White”

The updated SPD 15 further revises some terminology and definitions used and provides agencies with guidance on the collection and presentation of race and ethnicity data pursuant to SPD 15. Additionally, the update instructs federal agencies to begin updating their surveys and forms immediately and to complete and submit an AAP, which will be made publicly available, to comply with the updated SPD 15 within eighteen months. Federal agencies will have five years to bring all data collections and programs into compliance.

OMB noted that “the revised SPD 15 maintains the long-standing position that the race and/or ethnicity categories are not to be used as determinants of eligibility for participation in any Federal program.”

Looking Ahead

The new race and ethnicity categories have implications for employers as they use these categories for federal reporting compliance and their own recordkeeping purposes, including potentially influencing their own diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Covered federal contractors and subcontractors must also use the categories in meeting their affirmative action obligations.

Still, the updated SPD 15 adds only one new minimum category. OMB recognized the tension with attempting to “facilitate individual identity to the greatest extent possible while still enabling the creation of consistent and comparable data.” One of the issues OMB identified as needing further research is “[h]ow to encourage respondents to select multiple race and/or ethnicity categories when appropriate by enhancing question design and inclusive language.” The agency is also establishing an Interagency Committee on Race and Ethnicity Statistical Standards that will conduct further research and regular reviews of the categories every ten years, though OMB may decide to review SPD 15 again at any time.

Employers may want to take note of the revisions to SPD 15 as these changes will directly impact many employers’ compliance and recordkeeping obligations. They may also want to be on the lookout for additional guidance from federal agencies, such as the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and the EEOC, on when and how to implement the standards. Relevant agencies will have to take action before employers will be required to implement the new standards. In the meantime, employers may want to consider whether to use the government’s new or existing categories when shaping their DEI initiatives, as racial and ethnic identities and terminology continue to evolve.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Race and Ethnicity Reporting, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

It’s Protected: NLRB Finds “Black Lives Matter” Insignia on Employee Uniform Constitutes Protected Activity Under Circumstances

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), in a 3-1 decision, held that an employee’s display on their work uniform of “BLM,” an acronym for Black Lives Matter, constituted protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”). Accordingly, the NLRB reversed an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision, and found that the employer (Home Depot) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by directing the employee to remove the BLM insignia because it violated the company’s uniform policy. The employee resigned instead of removing the insignia from their uniform.

Procedural History

In June 2022, an ALJ found that the employer did not violate the Act by requiring the employee to remove the BLM messaging, because the insignia lacked “an objective, and sufficiently direct, relationship to terms and conditions of employment.” The ALJ concluded that the BLM messaging was “primarily used, and generally understood, to address the unjustified killings of Black individuals by law enforcement and vigilantes … [and] while a matter of profound societal importance, is not directly relevant to the terms, conditions, or lot of Home Depot’s employees as employees.” (emphasis in original).

Further, the ALJ determined that the employee’s motivation for displaying the BLM message (i.e., their dissatisfaction with their treatment as employees) was not relevant. The petitioner sought review before the NLRB.

NLRB Finds Wearing BLM Insignia at Work Constitutes Protected Activity

On review, the NLRB concluded that the employee’s refusal to remove the BLM insignia was protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act because the activity was for “mutual aid or protection,” as it was a “logical outgrowth” of the employee’s and other employees’ complaints about race discrimination in the workplace that allegedly occurred over the preceding months.

According to the NLRB, an individual employee’s actions are a “logical outgrowth” of the concerns expressed by the group where “the record shows the existence of a group complaint,” even though “the employees acted individually and without coordination.” In this case, the fact that the group complaints post-dated the employee’s initial display of the BLM insignia was not dispositive. Instead, and contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the NLRB focused on whether the employee’s subsequent refusal to remove the BLM insignia was a “logical outgrowth” of the prior protected concerted activity.

Additionally, the NLRB found that no special circumstances existed, such that there was a sufficient justification for the company to preclude their employees from wearing such insignia. For instance, this was not a situation where display of the insignia might jeopardize employee safety, exacerbate employee dissention, or unreasonably interfere with the company’s public image. In this regard, the NLRB concluded that the company’s public image was not at issue because it encourages employees to customize their uniforms. Likewise, the NLRB held that the company failed to put forth evidence of any non-speculative imminent risks to employee safety from the public and/or any violent or disruptive acts or threats thereof by other employees connected to the BLM insignia.

The NLRB ordered the employer to, among other things, (1) cease and desist from prohibiting employees from taking part in “protected concerted activities,” such as displaying “Black Lives Matter” insignia on their uniform aprons; (2) reinstate the employee without prejudice and compensate him for lost back pay and any adverse tax consequences; and (3) post notice of the decision for 60 days at the store where the dispute arose. The company may still appeal the Board’s decision to a federal appeals court.

Significantly, the NLRB declined to adopt a broader objective advanced by the NLRB General Counsel that protesting civil rights issues on the job is “inherently concerted” activity that is protected by Section 7 of the Act. The fact-intensive reasoning behind the NLRB’s decision here reflects that the underlying circumstances in each situation will play a significant role in the legal outcome as to whether the conduct at issue is protected, and it is not advisable to adopt a broad, one-size fits all rule from this decision.

© 2024 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more news on Protected Concerted Activity under the NLRA, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Form I-9 Software: Avoiding Unlawful Discrimination When Selecting and Using I-9 and E-Verify Software Systems

A recent employer fact sheet from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides guidance for avoiding unlawful discrimination and other violations when using private software products to complete Forms I-9 and E-Verify cases.

Quick Hits

  • Employers are responsible for selecting and using software products that avoid unlawful discrimination and comply with Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements.
  • Employers must not use software products that violate Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements or involve system limitations that unlawfully discriminate among workers.
  • DOJ and DHS advise employers to train staff on Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements, and to provide access to published government guidance on Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements.

Employer Compliance With Form I-9 Software Products

The fact sheet reminds employers to use the current Form I-9 and properly complete the Form I-9 for each new hire after November 6, 1986, with any acceptable employee documents. Form I-9 systems must comply with requirements for electronic signatures and document storage including the ability to provide Form I-9 summary files containing all information fields on electronically stored Forms I-9. The fact sheet confirms required software capabilities and employer practices to properly complete the Form I-9 and avoid unlawful discrimination.

Employers must ensure that any software:

  • allows employees to leave form fields blank, if they’re not required fields (such as Social Security numbers, if not required on E-Verify cases);
  • allows workers with only one name to record “Unknown” in the first name field and to enter their names in the last name field on the Form I-9;
  • uniquely identifies “each person accessing, correcting, or changing a Form I-9”;
  • permits Form I-9 corrections in Section 1 and does not complete Section 1 corrections for workers, unless completing preparer/translator certifications in Supplement A;
  • retains all employee information and documents presented for form completion; and
  • permits Form I-9 corrections in Section 2 and allows completion of Supplement B reverifications with any acceptable employee documents.

Employer Compliance With E-Verify Software Products

The fact sheet reminds employers to comply with E-Verify program requirements when using software interfaces for E-Verify case completion. The fact sheet confirms required software capabilities and employer practices for completing E-Verify cases. Employers must still:

  • provide employees with current versions of Further Action Notices and Referral Date Confirmation letters in resolving Tentative Nonconfirmations (mismatches) in the E-Verify system;
  • provide English and non-English Further Action Notices and Referral Date Confirmation letters to employees with limited English proficiency;
  • display E-Verify notices confirming employer use of E-Verify;
  • “promptly notify employees in private” of E-Verify mismatches and provide Further Action Notices. If an employee who has been notified of a mismatch takes action to resolve the mismatch, provide the Referral Date Confirmation letter with case-specific information;
  • delay E-Verify case creation, when required. For example, when workers are awaiting Social Security numbers or have presented acceptable receipts for Form I-9 completion, employers must be able to delay E-Verify case creation; and
  • allow employees to resolve E-Verify mismatches prior to taking any adverse action, including suspensions or withholding pay.

Prohibited Employer Activity When Using Form I-9 Software

The fact sheet notes that an employer that uses private software products for Form I-9 or E-Verify compliance is prohibited from:

  • completing the Form I-9 on an employee’s behalf unless the employer is helping an employee complete Section 1 as a preparer or translator;
  • prepopulating employee information from other sources, providing auto-correct on employee inputs, or using predictive language for form completion;
  • requiring more or less information from employees for Form I-9 completion or preventing workers from using preparers/translators for form completion;
  • improperly correcting the Form I-9, improperly creating E-Verify cases, or failing to report corrections in the Form I-9 audit trail;
  • requesting more or different documentation than needed for Form I-9 completion, or failing to complete reverification in Supplement B of the Form I-9; and
  • imposing “unnecessary obstacles” in starting work or receiving pay, “such as by requiring a Social Security number to onboard or by not paying an employee who can complete the Form I-9 and is waiting for a Social Security number.” (Emphasis in the original.)

Staff Training and Technical Support

The fact sheet warns employers against using software products that do not provide technical support to workers, and it notes that employers are required to provide training to staff on Form I-9 and E-Verify compliance. Resources for staff members using software products for Form I-9 and E-Verify case completion include I-9 Central, the Handbook for Employers M-274, the M-775, E-Verify User Manual, and DOJ publications.

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For more on Form I-9, visit the NLR Immigration section.