Category: Civil Rights

U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers

The National Law Review recently published an article, U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers, written by Jennifer Cerven of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

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The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal from Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan on the issue of whether state and local government employees can bypass the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and sue for age discrimination under an equal protection theory. The case is Madigan v. Levin, Docket Number 12-872.

Appellate courts are split on whether the ADEA is the exclusive route for state and local government employees to bring a claim for age discrimination, or whether an equal protection claim via Section 1983 is available. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Plaintiff, a former Assistant Attorney General, could go forward with a Section 1983 age discrimination claim against certain defendants (including Madigan) in their individual capacity.  The Seventh Circuit decided that the ADEA does not preclude a Section 1983 claim, but acknowledged that its decision was contrary to rulings in other circuits holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.

The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that state and local government employees may avoid the ADEA’s remedial regime by bringing age discrimination claims under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1`983.

In the petitioner’s brief asking the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, Madigan noted the circuit split and argued that if the Seventh Circuit’s ruling were to stand, there would be about one million state and local workers in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin who would be able to bypass the ADEA’s administrative dispute resolution process at the EEOC and go straight to court.  Madigan argued that this would undercut the ADEA and would deprive state and local governments of prompt notice of claims.

The outcome of the case will be important not only for state and municipal employers, but also for individual employees.  As a practical matter, the plaintiff could end up with no further opportunity for an age discrimination claim if the Supreme Court decides that the ADEA forecloses age claims under Section 1983.  That is because the lower court decided that the employee fell under the ADEA exclusion of policy-making level employees, 29 U.S.C. §630(f).  Moreover, sovereign immunity applies to protect states from individual suits for monetary damages under the ADEA, under Supreme Court precedent in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S.  62.

The case is likely to proceed to briefing during the current term and may be scheduled for argument in the fall term.

© 2013 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Warning to in-house Counsel: Be Careful When Responding to Demand Letters

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP‘s Jerrold J. Wohlgemuth recently had an article, Warning to in-house Counsel: Be Careful When Responding to Demand Letters, featured in The National Law Review:

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It’s a common occurrence: counsel sends a demand letter to an employer explaining the basis for his/her client’s claim of discrimination or wrongful discharge, and threatening to sue, but offering to discuss settlement in advance of filing a complaint.  In-house counsel responds by explaining why the claim has no merit, but expressing a willingness to discuss settlement, with the understanding that in the event of litigation the correspondence would be inadmissible under Evidence Rule 408 as a communication concerning settlement.  It says so right in the Rule:  “a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim” is inadmissible “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.”  But the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey has reminded us that is not always the case.

In its recent decision in Bourhill v. Sprint Nextel Corp., the District Court affirmed the decision of the magistrate judge allowing the plaintiff in his cross-motion for summary judgment to rely on a portion of in-house counsel’s response to a demand letter.  In that case, the demand letter first described the factual basis for the contention that the employee’s discharge was unlawful under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, and then set forth counsel’s position that while he believed the case had merit, his client was willing to avoid litigation if the matter could be resolved by means of an “adequate compensatory settlement.”  In-house counsel wrote a two paragraph response under the subject line caption “Confidential/For Settlement Purposes Only.”  In the first paragraph in-house counsel denied that the discharge was unlawful and explained in factual detail that it had been made for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons.  The second paragraph expressed an interest in discussing an amicable resolution and requested a specific demand.  In the ensuing litigation, plaintiff’s counsel relied on the letter as an exhibit in his cross-motion for summary judgment, and defense counsel moved to strike.

Before moving on to discuss the decision of the magistrate judge it is important to recognize that in-house counsel responded in the normal, customary fashion when responding to a demand letter of this type.  It is the magistrate judge’s decision, and the subsequent decision of the District Court discussed in the next part, that should give every in-house counsel pause when responding to any demand letter.

The magistrate judge granted the defendant’s motion to strike with respect to the second paragraph inasmuch as it clearly invited plaintiff’s counsel to make an offer to settle, but denied it as to the first.  In this regard, the magistrate judge determined that the two parts of the letter were not “logically connected” and could therefore be evaluated separately because the first was addressed to the merits of the claim articulated in the demand letter while the second concerned the offer to compromise.  The magistrate judge then found that the first paragraph did not implicate Rule 408 because it did not “contain an actual compromise or a suggestion of a genuine willingness to resolve the dispute.”

On appeal, defense counsel argued that the letter should be read in its entirety as a response to the settlement inquiry, that the first paragraph was designed to make clear that the company did not place a high monetary value on the claim, and that public policy requires that the parties be free to express their positions in settlement communications without fear they will be used to prove liability.  The District Court did not disagree, but affirmed the decision of the magistrate judge based on the conclusion that he had simply made a finding of fact – that the paragraphs were not “logically connected” – which could not be overturned on appeal.

This is not the first time a court has determined that a portion of a communication otherwise covered by Rule 408 may be admitted into evidence because it did not directly address the subject of settlement.  But the decision should serve as a reminder to in-house counsel to be extremely careful when responding to demand letters, to avoid including any facts, statements or admissions that could be difficult to explain in litigation and to make clear in each paragraph that it has been written in response to the demand letter for the limited purpose of exploring the possibility of settlement.

©2013 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Congress Renews Violence Against Women Act, Expands Tribal Court Jurisdiction

The National Law Review recently featured an article by Brian L. Pierson with Godfrey & Kahn S.C., regarding Recent Congressional Actions:

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On February 28, 2013 the House of Representatives approved Senate Bill 47, which reauthorizes and amends the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The Bill, already approved in the Senate, became law when the President signed it on March 7th.

The VAWA is a major legislative achievement for Indian country. The Supreme Court held in 1978 that tribes lack inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. For the first time since that decision, Congress has authorized tribes to exercise such jurisdiction. Title IX of the VAWA amends the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to permit tribes to exercise “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indians who are charged with domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protective orders that occur on their lands. Features of special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction include:

  • either the perpetrator or victim must be Indian
  • the tribe must prove that the defendant has ties to the tribal community
  • tribal jurisdiction is concurrent with state and federal jurisdiction
  • the defendant has the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that –
    • reflect a fair cross section of the community; and
    • do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians
  • In the event that a sentence of imprisonment “may” be imposed, the tribe must guarantee the defendant the enhanced procedural rights added to the ICRA by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, including:
    • effective assistance of counsel, paid for by the tribe if the defendant is indigent
    • a legally trained judge licensed to practice law
    • published laws and rules of criminal procedure
    • recorded proceedings

Copyright © 2013 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Federal Circuit Courts Find No Causal Connection in Employee Retaliation Claims

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Federal Circuit Courts Find No Causal Connection in Employee Retaliation Claims, written by Katherine G. Cisneros of Schiff Hardin LLP:

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As employers know, retaliation cases are notoriously difficult to defend. However, two recent decisions from federal courts of appeal may help employers prevail in such cases. The Sixth and Seventh Circuit U.S. Courts of Appeals recently affirmed summary judgment in two retaliation cases, both courts holding that the employees’ claims did not establish a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action.

Timing Alone Insufficient Where Multi-Year Gap Between Protected Activity and Adverse Action

In Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., No. 2:08-cv-11652 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013), the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Hazel Park School District, finding no causal connection between a coach’s prior lawsuit and her subsequent removal from a coaching position. Fuhr served as the high school girls’ varsity basketball head coach at Hazel Park High. In 1999, Fuhr sued the school district, alleging gender discrimination based on the school district’s failure to hire her as the high school boys’ varsity basketball head coach. At the time, the boys’ and girls’ teams played during different seasons. Fuhr ultimately prevailed and in 2004 became the boys’ basketball coach. Anticipating a federal district court order requiring the basketball seasons be played at the same time, the school district removed Fuhr as the girl’ head coach in 2006 because it would be too difficult to coach two teams in the same season.

Fuhr sued, claiming that her removal as the girls’ coach and other harassing acts were retaliation for prevailing in her previous lawsuit. Fuhr claimed her principal told her that “this is a good old boys network….They are doing this to you to get back at you for winning the lawsuit.” The Sixth Circuit determined that the principal’s statement was too ambiguous to provide direct evidence of unlawful retaliation. The court next found that Fuhr failed to demonstrate a causal connection between her prior lawsuit and removal as the girls’ coach. While a close temporal proximity between events can constitute evidence of a causal connection, here, the “multi-year gap prove[d] fatal” to establishing causality. The court also added that even if Fuhr could prove causation, the school district was able to offer legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any alleged harassing actions. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the school district on Fuhr’s retaliation claim based on the lack of any temporal proximity.

Employee’s Disagreement with Employer’s Investigation Does Not Prove Retaliation

In Collins v. American Red Cross, No. 08-cv-50160 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the American Red Cross, finding that the employer’s investigation report, albeit possibly incorrect, is not evidence of unlawful retaliation or discrimination. Collins, an African-American woman, worked for the Red Cross. In 2006, Collins filed a racial discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on harassment from her co-workers. Collins received a “right-to-sue” letter, but did not file a suit. In 2007, Collins’s co-workers complained that, among other acts of misconduct, Collins said that the Red Cross was out to get minorities. The human resources officer assigned to investigate found that all of these allegations against Collins were “substantiated,” and Collins was terminated.

Collins sued, claiming that her termination was in retaliation for her filing of the EEOC charge. Collins claimed that the report did not really substantiate the claim that Collins said the Red Cross is out to get minorities, and therefore, the report must have been referring to the EEOC complaint. Although the report was “sloppy, and perhaps it was also mistaken or even unfair,” Title VII only forbids discriminatory or retaliatory terminations. Nothing in the report suggested the Red Cross was concerned with Collins’s EEOC complaint. Collins only provided speculation that the report was incorrect because of the EEOC complaint, and mere speculation is not enough to overcome summary judgment. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Red Cross on Collins’s retaliation claim because she failed to show a causal link between the filing of her EEOC complaint and her subsequent termination.

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed summary judgment on Collins’s race discrimination claim because Collins failed to prove that the Red Cross’ reason for termination was pretextual, emphasizing that “pretext means a lie.” The only piece of evidence Collins offered was that she denied all the allegations raised by her co-worker’s complaints. Denying the allegations is not enough to survive summary judgment because the “fact that a statement is inaccurate does not meant that it is a deliberate lie.” Evidence that an employer reached the wrong conclusion can suggest discrimination if the conclusion were “incredible on its face.” However, here, the court found that the report’s conclusions were not incredible, and there was nothing in the record to suggest racial animus toward Collins. While the Red Cross’s report may have been wrong, that is not enough for Collins’s claim to survive summary judgment.

Sound Employer Practices Remain Key to Successful Defenses

As is clear from the Seventh Circuit case, employer investigations remain a key component of successful defenses of claims. Employers should utilize human resources or other professionals who are trained in both conducting investigations and writing investigation reports to investigate allegations of harassment, discrimination or retaliation. Also keep in mind that, as the Sixth Circuit case suggests, if a long period of time elapses between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse action, it is likely that additional evidence of retaliatory conduct will be required in order for the employee to prevail. To defeat any such evidence, employers should be sure that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the actions taken are well-documented.

© 2013 Schiff Hardin LLP

Service of Process through Social Media

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Service of Process through Social Media, written by Philip H. Cohen with Greenberg Traurig, LLP:

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In the matter of Federal Trade Commission v. PCCare247 Inc., Case No. 12 Civ. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2013) (PCCare247), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sanctioned using social media as a means of circumventing the Hague Service Convention’s standard method of facilitating service among signatory states through designated Central Authorities. Granting the FTC’s motion for leave to effect service of documents by alternative means on defendants located in India, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer’s ruling appears to represent the first time a U.S. court has permitted service of process via Facebook.

In PCCare247, Indian defendants allegedly operated a scheme to convince American consumers that they should spend money to fix non-existent problems with their computers. After the Indian Central Authority was unable to formally serve the Indian defendants pursuant to the Hague Convention, the court granted the FTC’s request to serve process on the defendants by both email and through a Facebook account.

The FTC’s proposed service using Facebook presented the court with a novel issue.  Last year, another court in the Southern District of New York denied a motion to permit a party to effect service using Facebook because the plaintiff had not sufficiently established the credibility of the defendant’s Facebook account.  Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., Case No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (Fortunato).  Fortunato involved a domestic defendant accused of committing credit card fraud.  After several failed attempts at personal service, the court rejected the third-party plaintiff’s “unorthodox” proposal to serve process, including by Facebook, citing concerns about the lack of certainty and authenticity of the defendant’s purported Facebook profile.  The court questioned whether the Facebook profile was in fact operational and accessed by the party to be served, noting that the location listed on the profile was inconsistent with four potential addresses a private investigator had identified. The court opted instead for service by publication pursuant to New York rules.

Distinguishing  PCCare247 from  Fortunato, Judge Engelmayer articulated several considerations supporting his confidence in “service by Facebook.” The court observed that under Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court remains free to order alternative means of service on an individual in a foreign country so long as the means of service are not prohibited by international agreement and comport with due process.  The court acknowledged that although service by email and Facebook is not enumerated in Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention, India has not specifically objected to them. Therefore, under Rule 4(f)(3) the court found that it was free to authorize process by these means provided that doing so would satisfy due process.

Recognizing that the reasonableness inquiry is intended to “unshackle[] the federal  courts from anachronistic methods of service and permit[] them entry into the technological renaissance,” quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002), the court concluded that Facebook was “reasonably calculated to provide defendants with notice of future filings” in the case. In support of its conclusion, the court explained that the defendants ran an Internet-based  business and that the email addresses specified for the defendants were those used for various aspects of the  alleged scheme.  For two of the Indian defendants in PCCAre247, their Facebook accounts were registered to the same email addresses to be served. Moreover, the court had “independent confirmation” that one of the email addresses identified was genuine and operated by a defendant, because it had been used to communicate with the court on several occasions.  Additional evidence that the Facebook profiles were authentic included that some of the defendants listed their job titles at the defendant companies and that the defendants were  Facebook “friends” with each other. Additional considerations the court noted were: the FTC had made several good faith efforts to serve the defendants by other means; and defendants had already demonstrated knowledge of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the FTC’s proposal to serve process by both email and Facebook was a combination that satisfied due process as a means of alternative service and was highly likely to be an effective means of reaching and communicating with the defendants.

This decision suggests that under the right circumstances, where a party establishes a reasonable foundation for the authenticity of the accounts, service via email and social media may be an economical and effective option for serving process on foreign parties, or even domestic parties that are otherwise difficult to track down by traditional means.

©2013 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Preservation of Error: Prejudicial or Argumentative Closing Arguments

The National Law Review recently published an article, Preservation of Error: Prejudicial or Argumentative Closing Arguments, written by Jennifer R. Dixon with Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A.:

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The Second District Court of Appeal, last week, issued an opinion that reversed a trial court’s order granting new trial, Carnival Corporation v. Jimenez, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D455a, Case No. 2D11-5482 (2d DCA February 27, 2013).  The order was predicated on the trial judge’s finding that “comments made [by defense] counsel during closing arguments are perceived to have been prejudicial and highly inflammatory in nature because of their cumulative effect and their accusatory undertones.”  Id.

Jimenez was a personal injury case in which a large part of the defense strategy was to discredit the plaintiff’s expert/treating physician, because he had treated the plaintiff under a letter of protection.  According to the order on appeal, defense counsel “argued in closing . . . that plaintiff’s counsel . . . had collaborated or conspired with [the doctor] to conjure a non-injury into this lawsuit.”  While the trial court recognized that it had allowed evidence of the letter of protection, the introduction of such evidence “is to enable defense counsel to suggest that the doctor may have a financial bias, or stake in the outcome of the case.  Not for the impermissible purpose of allowing Defendant’s attorney to suggest a ‘neighborly’ conspiracy between the doctor and Plaintiff’s attorney.”  In sum, the trial court determined that the defense went so far in putting forth the conspiracy theory that the jury could not fairly assess the issues of causation and damages.

While the general rule is that improper comments made during closing argument may provide a basis for granting a new trial (see Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Moreta, 957 So. 2d 1242, 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)), the issue must be properly preserved by contemporaneous objection and a motion for mistrial.  Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006).  If the error has not been properly preserved, a new trial is only warranted when the improper behavior amounts to fundamental error. Companioni v. City of Tampa, 51 So. 3d 452, 456 (Fla. 2010).

The Jimenez court, noted that the plaintiff’s counsel only made two objections relative to the defense counsel’s references to the letter of protection.  Both were sustained, but there was no motion for mistrial.  The court, relying upon the 4-part test articulated in Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 1027-31 (Fla. 2000) determined that while the plaintiff established the first prong of Murphy–that the challenged conduct was improper–she did not establish the remaining three prongs:  that the challenged conduct was harmful, that the challenged conduct was incurable, and that public interest in our system of justice requires a new trial.

Because the application of the Murphy factors did not show that the challenged conduct was so highly prejudicial that it denied the plaintiff her right to a fair trial, the order granting new trial was reversed, and the final judgment was ordered to be reinstated.

Practice tip:  when objecting to prejudicial or argumentative closing arguments: 1) object contemporaneously, 2) request a curative instruction (if appropriate), and 3) move for a mistrial, or be bound by the heightened standard for new trials articulated in Murphy.

© Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA

Can Having Employees Pose for the Camera Pose Problems for You?

The National Law Review recently featured an article regarding Employee Photos written by Amy D. Cubbage with McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie and Kirkland, PLLC:

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Employers have a variety of reasons for using employee photos, including:

  • internal company use (for a company directory or in the break room);
  • external use (such as the company website or a blog post—you’ll find my picture below);
  • for safety precautions (name badges or scan cards); and
  • for commercial use in advertisements or marketing.

Employees are usually amendable to having their picture taken. But, there may be a few who express their genuine disinterest in being photographed. Such employees could simply be camera shy; others may have a more serious reason to refuse to have an image published.  Some may need to protect anonymity for personal reasons, such as past domestic abuse.  Others may adhere to religions forbidding taking pictures.

There are generally no legal ramifications for using employee photos, unless it is for commercial purposes.  Most states, including Kentucky, have laws that require permission before using an individual or their “likeness” for commercial purposes. This is due to the commonly held notion that a person has property rights in his or her name and likeness and those rights should be shielded from exploitation. Kentucky’s law is codified in KRS 391.170.

If you need to use employee photos for a commercial use, there is a simple solution. Have employees sign releases in which they acknowledge that their picture may be used in a company advertisement and they will receive no compensation for the use of their photo. Keep these releases on file.

Even in a state where consent is not required, it is always a smart approach to use a release so that employees will not be surprised when they see their face plastered on a promotional piece. If minors appear in the commercial materials always use extra caution. Use a consent form, whether required or not, to be signed by the child’s parents.

A warning about taking photos of potential employees: if you take photographs of applicants applying for a job (to help remember who’s who), it may put you at risk for a discrimination claim. A photograph creates a record of certain protected characteristics (i.e., sex, race, or the presence of a disability) that employers generally cannot use in hiring considerations. If this information is collected and a discrimination claim arises, the burden will be on the employer to prove the photographs were not used to make a discriminatory employment decision.

I will leave you with a little common sense about employee photos. Always remember to publicize when the office picture day will be; no one likes showing up ill-prepared. Offer a “redo day” for those who are truly unhappy about how their picture turned out. If all else fails, resort to photoshopping. A little lighting adjustment or cropping can work wonders for a shutterbug humbug.

© 2013 by McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC

Federal Court Rejects Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Suit Over Random Alcohol Testing of Probationary Plant Employees

The National Law Review recently published an article regarding Random Alcohol Testing written by Robert S. Nichols, Robert E. Sheeder, and Amy Karff Halevy with Bracewell & Giuliani LLP:

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A federal judge in Pennsylvania has dismissed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenge to U.S. Steel Corporation’s random alcohol testing of probationary employees at one of the company’s most safety sensitive facilities. The Court’s ruling in this carefully watched suit is significant for employers because it represents a forceful rejection of one of the more extreme positions the EEOC has taken in interpreting how the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regulates workplaces.

EEOC’s Restrictive Interpretation of Employer Rights

The EEOC has adopted a very restrictive view of an employer’s right to conduct across-the-board medical examinations or inquiries of current employees even when the examination or inquiry is plainly motivated by workplace safety concerns. According to the EEOC, employers are prohibited in most circumstances from conducting generalized medical examinations, including random alcohol testing or periodic physical examinations of current employees.

The EEOC has pointed to a provision of the ADA that provides that an employer may not “require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Conducting random testing for the unlawful use of drugs, as opposed to testing for the use of alcohol, does not create the same legal impediments because a test for the unlawful use of drugs is generally not regarded as a “medical examination” under the ADA.

The very limited exceptions to this prohibition on across-the-board medical examinations or inquiries of current employees that the EEOC has recognized include examinations of certain public safety employees in police and firefighter positions as well as, of course, examinations or inquiries that are required by other federal agencies, such as the Department of Transportation.

EEOC Lawsuit Against U.S. Steel

In the U.S. Steel suit, the EEOC argued that across-the-board medical examination or inquiries, including random or other generalized alcohol testing, could not be justified by the business necessity defense even in a highly safety sensitive work environment. Rather, the EEOC has taken the position that alcohol testing can only be justified based upon individualized suspicion that the particular employee to be tested was under the influence of alcohol at work.

U.S. Steel argued in a motion for summary judgment that given the highly safety sensitive nature of the plant at issue, where employees work with materials that are at temperatures of more than 2,100 degrees, random testing was justified as a matter of business necessity.

The judge in the case granted U.S. Steel’s motion and dismissed the EEOC’s claims finding that the random alcohol testing of probationary employees was justified by the business necessity defense. The Court first pointed out that there was no disputing that safety in and of itself can be a matter of business necessity. As a result, according to the Court, the only question remaining was whether the policy of random alcohol testing served that asserted business necessity. After analyzing the facts at issue, the judge found that the alcohol testing policy plainly served the business necessity of workplace safety.

In doing so, the Court specifically rejected the EEOC’s position that across-the-board medical examinations or inquiries of current employees could only be justified in the case of law enforcement or firefighting employees. The Court explained that there was no legitimate basis for not extending the same rationale to employees in other highly safety sensitive positions. Also, the Court noted that in this instance selecting employees for testing based on individualized suspicion would not work effectively because personal protective equipment obscures the U.S. Steel employees’ faces and speech.

Additionally, the Court concluded that the random alcohol testing approach was not inconsistent with the ADA’s goal of preventing employers from targeting specific employees with disabilities based upon stereotypes and misconceptions. The Court pointed out that, after all, random testing, as opposed to individualized suspicion testing, was not potentially based upon conclusions about particular individuals with disabilities.

The Court also noted that the testing program at issue was the product of negotiations with the union representing plant employees and not a process unilaterally imposed by the employer.

Takeaways

The decision in the U.S. Steel case offers employers new hope that more federal courts will reject the EEOC’s very restrictive view of the right to conduct across-the-board medical examinations or inquiries, including, across-the-board random alcohol testing of employees in certain safety sensitive positions. While this decision is encouraging, employers need to recognize that the EEOC continues to adhere to its position regarding this issue and other federal courts may ultimately side with the EEOC. Nonetheless, the Court’s decision in the U.S. Steel suit is an encouraging sign for employers that courts, recognizing the importance of workplace safety, may adopt a far more reasonable and pragmatic view than the EEOC on this question of across-the-board medical examinations and inquiries of current employees.

© 2013 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Recommends Privacy Practices for Mobile Apps

The National Law Review recently published an article, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Recommends Privacy Practices for Mobile Apps, written by Daniel F. Gottlieb, Randall J. Ortman, and Heather Egan Sussman with McDermott Will & Emery:

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On February 1, 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a report entitled “Mobile Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency” (Report), which urges mobile device application (app) platforms and developers to improve the privacy policies for their apps to better inform consumers about their privacy practices.  This report follows other recent publications from the FTC concerning mobile apps—including “Mobile Apps for Kids: Disclosures Still Not Making the Grade,” released December 2012 (December 2012 Report), and “Mobile Apps for Kids: Current Privacy Disclosures are Disappointing,” released February 2012 (February 2012 Report)—and the adoption of the amended Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Rule on December 19, 2012.  (See “FTC Updates Rule for Children’s Online Privacy Protection” for more information regarding the recent COPPA amendments.

Among other things, the Report offers recommendations to key stakeholders in the mobile device application marketplace, particularly operating system providers (e.g., Apple and Microsoft), application developers, advertising networks and related trade associations.  Such recommendations reflect the FTC’s enforcement and policy experience with mobile applications and public comment on the matter; however, where the Report goes beyond existing legal requirements, “it is not intended to serve as a template for law enforcement actions or regulations under laws currently enforced by the FTC.”  Nevertheless, such key stakeholders should take the FTC’s recommendations into account when determining how they will collect, use and transfer personal information about consumers and preparing privacy policies to describe their information practices because they reflect the FTC’s expectations under its consumer protection authorities.

At a minimum, operating system providers and application developers should review their existing privacy policies and make revisions, as necessary, to comply with the recommendations included within the Report.  However, all key stakeholders should consider the implications of recommendations specific to their industry segment, as summarized below.

Operating System Providers

Characterized within the Report as “gatekeepers to the app marketplace,” the FTC states that operating system providers have the “greatest ability to effectuate change with respect to improving mobile privacy disclosures.”  Operating system providers, which create and maintain the platform upon which mobile apps run, promulgate rules that app developers must follow in order to access the platform and facilitate interactions between developers and consumers.  Given their prominent role within the app marketplace, it is not surprising that the FTC directs numerous recommendations toward operating system providers, including:

  • Just-In-Time Disclosures.  The Report urges operating system providers to display just-in-time disclosures to consumers and obtain express, opt-in (rather than implied) consent before allowing apps to access sensitive information like geolocation (i.e., the real world physical location of a mobile device), and other information that consumers may find sensitive, such as contacts, photos, calendar entries or recorded audio or video.  Thus, operating system providers and mobile app developers should carefully consider the types of personal information practices that require an opt-in rather than mere use of the app to evidence consent.
  • Privacy Dashboard.  The Report suggests that operating system providers should consider developing a privacy “dashboard” that would centralize privacy settings for various apps to allow consumers to easily review the types of information accessed by the apps they have downloaded.  The “dashboard” model would enable consumers to determine which apps have access to different types of information about the consumer or the consumer’s device and to revisit the choices they initially made about the apps.
  • Icons.  The Report notes that operating system providers currently use status icons for a variety of purposes, such as indicating when an app is accessing geolocation information.  The FTC suggests expansion of this practice to provide an icon that would indicate the transmission of personal information or other information more broadly.
  • Best Practices.  The Report recommends that operating system providers establish best practices for app developers.  For example, operating system providers can compel app developers to make privacy disclosures to consumers by restricting access to their platforms.
  • Review of Apps.  The Report suggests that operating system providers should also make clear disclosures to consumers about the extent to which they review apps developed for their platforms.  Such disclosures may include conditions for making apps available within the platform’s app marketplace and efforts to ensure continued compliance.
  • Do Not Track Mechanism.  The Report directs operating system providers to consider offering a “Do Not Track” (DNT) mechanism, which would provide consumers with the option to prevent tracking by advertising networks or other third parties as they use apps on their mobile devices.  This approach allows consumers to make a single election, rather than case-by-case decisions for each app.

App Developers

Although some practices may be imposed upon app developers by operating system providers, as discussed above, app developers can take several steps to adopt the FTC’s recommendations, including:

  • Privacy Policies.  The FTC encourages all app developers to have a privacy policy, and to include reference to such policy when submitting apps to an operating system provider.
  • Just-In-Time Disclosures.  As with the recommendations for operating system providers, the Report suggests that app developers provide just-in-time disclosures and obtain affirmative express consent before collecting and sharing sensitive information.
  • Coordination with Advertising Networks.  The FTC argues for improved coordination and communication between app developers and advertising networks and other third parties that provide certain functions, such as data analytics, to ensure app developers have an adequate understanding of the software they are incorporating into their apps and can accurately describe such software to consumers.
  • Participation in Trade Associations.  The Report urges app developers to participate in trade associations and other industry organizations, particularly in the development of self-regulatory programs addressing privacy in mobile apps.

Advertising Networks and Other Third Parties

By specifically including advertising networks and other third parties in the Report, the FTC recognizes that cooperation with such networks and parties is necessary to achieve the recommendations outlined for operating system providers and app developers.  The recommendations for advertising networks and other third parties include:

  • Coordination with App Developers.  The Report calls upon advertising networks and other third parties to communicate with app developers to enable such developers to provide accurate disclosures to consumers.
  • DNT Mechanism.  Consistent with its recommendations for operating system providers, the FTC suggests that advertising networks and other third parties work with operating system providers to implement a DNT mechanism.

Trade Associations

The FTC states that trade associations can facilitate standardized privacy disclosures.  The Report makes the following recommendations for trade associations:

  • Icons.  Trade associations can work with operating system providers to develop standardized icons to indicate the transmission of personal information and other data.
  • Badges.  Similar to icons, the Report suggests that trade associations consider developing “badges” or other visual cues used to convey information about a particular app’s data practices.
  • Privacy Policies.  Finally, the FTC suggests that trade associations are uniquely positioned to explore other opportunities to standardize privacy policies across the mobile app industry.

Children and Mobile Apps

Commenting on progress between the February 2012 Report and December 2012 Report, both of which relied on a survey of 400 mobile apps targeted at children, the FTC stated that “little or no progress has been made” in increasing transparency in the mobile app industry with regard to privacy practices specific to children.  The December 2012 Report suggests that very few mobile apps targeted to children include basic information about the app’s privacy practices and interactive features, including the type of data collected, the purpose of the collection and whether third parties have access to such data:

  • Privacy Disclosures.  According to the December 2012 Report, approximately 20 percent of the mobile apps reviewed disclosed any privacy-related information prior to the download process and the same proportion provided access to a privacy disclosure after downloading the app.  Among those mobile apps, the December 2012 Report characterizes their disclosures as lengthy, difficult to read or lacking basic detail, such as the specific types of information collected.
  • Information Collection and Sharing Practices.  The December 2012 Report notes that 59 percent of the mobile apps transmitted some information to the app developer or to a third party.  Unique device identifiers were the most frequently transmitted data point, which the December 2012 Report cites as problematic, suggesting that such identifiers are routinely used to create user “profiles,” which may track consumers across multiple mobile apps.
  • Disclosure Practices Regarding Interactive App Features.  The FTC reports that nearly half of the apps that stated they did not include advertising actually contained advertising, including ads targeted to a mature audience.  Similarly, the December 2012 Report notes that approximately 9 percent of the mobile apps reviewed disclosed that they linked with social media applications; however, this number represented only half of the mobile apps that actually linked to social media applications.  Mobile app developers using a template privacy policy as a starting point for an app’s privacy policy should carefully tailor the template to reflect the developer’s actual privacy practices for the app.

Increased Enforcement

In addition to the reports discussed above and the revisions to the COPPA Rule, effective July 1, 2013, the FTC has also increased enforcement efforts relating to mobile app privacy.  On February 1, 2013, the FTC announced an agreement with Path Inc., operator of the Path social networking mobile app, to settle allegations that it deceived consumers by collecting personal information from their mobile device address books without their knowledge or consent.  Under the terms of the agreement, Path Inc. must establish a comprehensive privacy program, obtain independent privacy assessments every other year for the next 20 years and pay $800,000 in civil penalties specifically relating to alleged violations of the COPPA Rule.  In announcing the agreement, the FTC commented on its commitment to continued scrutiny of privacy practices within the mobile app industry, adding that “no matter what new technologies emerge, the [FTC] will continue to safeguard the privacy of Americans.”

Key Takeaways

App developers and other key stakeholders should consider the following next steps:

  • Review existing privacy policies to confirm they accurately describe current privacy practices for the particular app rather than merely following the developer’s preferred template privacy policy
  • Where practical, update actual privacy practices and privacy policies to be more in line with the FTC’s expectations for transparency and consumer choice, including use of opt-in rather than opt-out consent models
  • Revisit privacy practices in light of heightened FTC enforcement under COPPA and its other consumer protection authorities

© 2013 McDermott Will & Emery

Women Really CAN Have it All – Ridding the Legal Field of “The Mommy” / “Tiger Lady” Oxymoron

The National Law Review recently published a book review of, Women Really CAN Have it All – Ridding the Legal Field of “The Mommy” / “Tiger Lady” Oxymoron, by Heidi R. Wendland of The National Law Review / The National Law Forum LLC:

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Long gone is the notion that a woman’s place is at home. Anne Murphy Brown has had her own success in balancing motherhood with a legal career as a litigator, corporate attorney and currently as an Assistant Professor and Director of Legal Studies at Ursuline College. Anne Murphy Brown finds more than 20 other women who have enjoyed the same successes and profiles them in Legally Mom: Real Women’s Stories of Balancing Motherhood and Law Practice. She does an excellent job in making this book relevant to every woman by carefully selecting a diverse array of women to profile. She finds women practicing at law firms and at governmental agencies. She also profiles women who have started their own law firms, who pursue a legal career from home, and who work as in house counsel at corporations. Each chapter contains a different woman’s personal experience and perspectives in balancing motherhood and her legal career. While all of these women face unique challenges depending on which course of work they pursue in the legal field, a common theme prevails throughout the entire book. The recipe for success of “having it all” is the same: these women have been successful because they have had support, drive, and a realistic grasp on their own personal limitations.

Many of the women within Legally Mom are able to pursue a career and be a mother because they have strong support from their husbands. Their husbands help split the parenting duties allowing the mother to keep up with the demands of her career. Other women profiled are not as lucky, and have to find support outside of the home. Some find support from family members in the form of child care. Others find support from within their workplace through understanding bosses, flexible hours, and policies enacted for mothers within the firm such as paid time off, nursing rooms, and child care offered on the premises. Anne Murphy Brown also provides the reader with a great resource: www.mamalaw.com . This website was created by a group of career moms to serve as a forum for other career moms to lend support to each other.

All the women profiled share a desire to succeed as both a mother and a lawyer. The book demonstrates how women have to fight for their right to pursue a career while being a mother and every woman profiled gives excellent advice as to how to do so. They have to be comfortable in confronting their bosses in order to achieve what they want. In fact, one woman profiled mentions an excellent point that it is to a firm’s detriment to not be flexible for women attorneys. Law firms and companies lose many educated women to motherhood because they do not enact policies that provide for flexibility to pursue both. This interesting perspective gives the reader a great negotiating tool when confronting her employer.

Women who want both a career and to be a mother must still acknowledge that there are limits since there are only 24 hours in a day. The women in the book all prioritize their lives in different ways and give advice as to how to live with the choices they make. In the end, the women do what works best for their own unique situation.

For some women profiled, being a mother and pursuing a legal career was something they always knew they wanted to balance. For other women profiled, being a mother was an afterthought and it was not until they had established themselves within their career did they consider starting their families. Every woman who is considering whether it is possible to be a mother and pursue a legal career should read this book. Every woman who thinks it is impossible to have both should certainly read this book. While woman have a huge task in front of them when deciding to be a mother and a career lady, this book proves it is not impossible. With effective time management, a woman can pursue a successful career and be a good mother. Legally Mom serves to enhance the feeling of female camaraderie in a traditionally male dominated career of law, and will no doubt inspire every reader and continue the movement for change and women empowerment.

Copyright ©2012 National Law Forum, LLC