Category: Civil Rights

Pregnancy and Disability Discrimination the Focus of EEOC Enforcement Activity

Poyner SpruillSince Congress’ enactment of amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 2008, making it easier to establish disability status under that law, the EEOC has directed more of its attention to claims of pregnancy and disability discrimination and accommodation of pregnancy-related limitations. In its 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan, the Commission identified the investigation and pursuit of this type of claim as a national priority.  This enforcement initiative was recently demonstrated in a lawsuit filed by the EEOC against an employer which allegedly denied accommodations to an employee who suffered from complications arising from her pregnancy. The suit, EEOC v. Engineering Documentation Systems, Inc.,settled for $70,000 before a judgment on the merits was reached. However, the case serves as a reminder to employers that the issue of pregnancy-related disability is now being targeted by the EEOC.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), prohibits discrimination against employees or job applicants on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. The EEOC takes the position that Title VII and the PDA require employers to treat pregnant employees in the same manner as other employees with temporary medical conditions. For example, according to the EEOC, if an employer provides leaves of absence or light duty to employees with short-term medical conditions which render those employees unable to work, then an employee unable to work due to her pregnancy must also be afforded the same treatment.1   But Title VII is not the only potentially applicable law in this circumstance. The ADA requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodation” to an employee with an actual (or record of) disability. This raises the question whether a pregnant employee has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

Under the ADA, a disability is defined in part as a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits a major life activity. Prior to the amendments to the ADA, temporary medical conditions generally were not found by the courts to constitute disabilities, on the grounds that short-term impairments were not “substantially limiting.” However, the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) has led to a more expansive interpretation of the term “disability.” Specifically, the EEOC’s regulations implementing the ADAAA state that an impairment may be substantially limiting of a major life activity, and thus a disability, even if it is of a duration of less than six months. While the EEOC still considers pregnancy itself not to constitute a disability (See EEOC’s “Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008”), it recognizes that certain impairments resulting from pregnancy may be disabilities if they substantially limit a major life activity. As stated on the EEOC’s webpage regarding pregnancy discrimination, this could include short term complications of pregnancy such as gestational diabetes or preeclampsia.

With the possibility that more medical conditions and complications arising from pregnancy will now fall within the definition of disability under the ADAAA, employers must be more cognizant of when an obligation to consider and provide reasonable accommodation to employees with a pregnancy-related disability arises. Such accommodations might include leaves of absence, job reassignment, light duty, or job modifications, unless such accommodations would result in an undue hardship to the employer. It is also imperative that employers engage in the “interactive process” with such employees to identify reasonable accommodation. The failure to take such proactive measures can result in liability for an employer, particularly given that the EEOC is now focused on this area of enforcement.

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Violence Against Women Act Renewed

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Early last month, Congress renewed and extended federal legislation known as the “Violence Against Women Act” or “VAWA.”  The VAWA was originally enacted in 1994, and at that time, its objective was as clear as its name – to prevent and address domestic violence, primarily against women.  The VAWA reformed how the law grapples with domestic violence.  But the VAWA’s enactment has perhaps transformed how we look at domestic violence and the victims who struggle with it at home.

The original legislation that made up the VAWA ensured free access to court protective orders regardless of income level, established the National Domestic Violence Help-Line, and was the legislative source for fiercely contested “rape shield laws” that prohibit evidence relating to a victim’s past sexual history.  The VAWA also required training among civil servants and medical personnel to help encourage victims of domestic violence to identify themselves and reach out for help.  We likely do not notice how the VAWA has kept us mindful of the dangers of violence in the family.  After all, how often does one reflect on anti-stalking laws?  Yet, with any trip to an urgent care, emergency room, or radiologist’s lab a medical provider will ask: “Are you involved in a relationship where you don’t feel safe?”  That’s the VAWA.  And while the VAWA’s name may seem to have everything to have to do with women, the act’s recent reenactment has a much more expansive view – and reach.

Under the original enactment, some Native American tribal members were previously left out in the cold following a 1978 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), which limited a tribe’s jurisdiction over non-Indian abusers.  Native American tribes will now have greater authority to prosecute non-Indian abusers under the reenacted VAWA, based on a special jurisdictional provision to the law. However, a tribe’s jurisdiction to address the victimization of a tribal member is restricted only to those non-Indians with significant ties to the prosecuting tribe, those who reside in the Indian country of the prosecuting tribe, or are employed in the Indian country of the prosecuting tribe, or are either the spouse or intimate partner of a member of the prosecuting tribe.  Although some critics question whether limited jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants will withstand Constitutional muster, many in support of the VAWA’s reenactment are hopeful that the ability of tribes to prosecute non-Indian offenders in some instances will reduce the nearly 40-70% of rape potential prosecutions against non-Indians that are declined by federal prosecutors.

The VAWA reenactment is also aimed at targeting cyber-bullying and other instances of abuse that were not the focus of the VAWA originally.  Protections for men and members of the “LGBT” (Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender) community who are struggling with domestic violence now enjoy greater recognition under the updated law.  These changes to the VAWA send a clear message that domestic violence is not a “women’s issue” – it’s a family one because anyone can be a victim of domestic violence.

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Employee’s Deactivation Of Facebook Account Leads To Sanctions

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The latest Facebook case highlights how courts now intend to hold parties accountable when it comes to preserving their personal social media accounts during litigation.  Recently, a federal court ruled that a plaintiff’s deletion of his Facebook account during discovery constituted spoliation of evidence and warranted an “adverse inference” instruction against him at trial.  Gatto v. United Airlines and Allied Aviation Servs., et al. , No. 10-CV-1090 (D.N.J. March 25, 2013).

The plaintiff, a ground operations supervisor at JFK Airport, allegedly suffered permanent disabling injuries from an accident at work which he claimed limited his physical and social activities.  Defendants sought discovery related to Plaintiff’s damages, including documents related to his social media accounts.

Although Plaintiff provided Defendants with the signed authorization for release of information from certain social networking sites and other online services such as eBay, he failed to provide an authorization for his Facebook account.  The magistrate judge ultimately ordered Plaintiff to execute the Facebook authorization, and Plaintiff agreed to change his Facebook password and to disclose the password to defense counsel for the purpose of accessing documents and information from Facebook.  Defense counsel briefly accessed the account and printed some portion of the Facebook home page.  Facebook then notified Plaintiff that an unfamiliar IP address had accessed his account.   Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff “deactivated” his account, causing Facebook to permanently delete the account 14 days later in accordance with its policy.

Defendants moved for spoliation of evidence sanctions, claiming that the lost Facebook postings contradicted Plaintiff’s claims about his restricted social activities.  In response, Plaintiff argued that he had acted reasonably in deactivating his account because he did know it was defense counsel accessing his page.  Moreover, the permanent deletion was the result of Facebook’s “automatically” deleting it.  The court, however, found that the Facebook account was within Plaintiff’s control, and that “[e]ven if Plaintiff did not intend to deprive the defendants of the information associated with his Facebook account, there is no dispute that plaintiff intentionally deactivated the account,” which resulted in the permanent loss of  relevant evidence.  Thus, the court granted Defendants’ request for an “adverse inference” instruction (but declined to award legal fees as a further sanction).

The Gatto decision not only affirms that social media is discoverable by employers, but also teaches that plaintiffs who fail to preserve relevant social media data will face harsh penalties.  Employers are reminded to specifically seek relevant social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, LinkedIn accounts) in their discovery requests since such sources may provide employers with sufficient evidence to rebut an employee’s claims.  This case also serves as a reminder and a warning to employers that the principles of evidence preservation apply to social media, and employers should take steps very early in the litigation to preserve its own social media content as it pertains to the matter.

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U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers

The National Law Review recently published an article, U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers, written by Jennifer Cerven of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

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The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal from Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan on the issue of whether state and local government employees can bypass the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and sue for age discrimination under an equal protection theory. The case is Madigan v. Levin, Docket Number 12-872.

Appellate courts are split on whether the ADEA is the exclusive route for state and local government employees to bring a claim for age discrimination, or whether an equal protection claim via Section 1983 is available. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Plaintiff, a former Assistant Attorney General, could go forward with a Section 1983 age discrimination claim against certain defendants (including Madigan) in their individual capacity.  The Seventh Circuit decided that the ADEA does not preclude a Section 1983 claim, but acknowledged that its decision was contrary to rulings in other circuits holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.

The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that state and local government employees may avoid the ADEA’s remedial regime by bringing age discrimination claims under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1`983.

In the petitioner’s brief asking the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, Madigan noted the circuit split and argued that if the Seventh Circuit’s ruling were to stand, there would be about one million state and local workers in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin who would be able to bypass the ADEA’s administrative dispute resolution process at the EEOC and go straight to court.  Madigan argued that this would undercut the ADEA and would deprive state and local governments of prompt notice of claims.

The outcome of the case will be important not only for state and municipal employers, but also for individual employees.  As a practical matter, the plaintiff could end up with no further opportunity for an age discrimination claim if the Supreme Court decides that the ADEA forecloses age claims under Section 1983.  That is because the lower court decided that the employee fell under the ADEA exclusion of policy-making level employees, 29 U.S.C. §630(f).  Moreover, sovereign immunity applies to protect states from individual suits for monetary damages under the ADEA, under Supreme Court precedent in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S.  62.

The case is likely to proceed to briefing during the current term and may be scheduled for argument in the fall term.

© 2013 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Warning to in-house Counsel: Be Careful When Responding to Demand Letters

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP‘s Jerrold J. Wohlgemuth recently had an article, Warning to in-house Counsel: Be Careful When Responding to Demand Letters, featured in The National Law Review:

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It’s a common occurrence: counsel sends a demand letter to an employer explaining the basis for his/her client’s claim of discrimination or wrongful discharge, and threatening to sue, but offering to discuss settlement in advance of filing a complaint.  In-house counsel responds by explaining why the claim has no merit, but expressing a willingness to discuss settlement, with the understanding that in the event of litigation the correspondence would be inadmissible under Evidence Rule 408 as a communication concerning settlement.  It says so right in the Rule:  “a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim” is inadmissible “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.”  But the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey has reminded us that is not always the case.

In its recent decision in Bourhill v. Sprint Nextel Corp., the District Court affirmed the decision of the magistrate judge allowing the plaintiff in his cross-motion for summary judgment to rely on a portion of in-house counsel’s response to a demand letter.  In that case, the demand letter first described the factual basis for the contention that the employee’s discharge was unlawful under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, and then set forth counsel’s position that while he believed the case had merit, his client was willing to avoid litigation if the matter could be resolved by means of an “adequate compensatory settlement.”  In-house counsel wrote a two paragraph response under the subject line caption “Confidential/For Settlement Purposes Only.”  In the first paragraph in-house counsel denied that the discharge was unlawful and explained in factual detail that it had been made for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons.  The second paragraph expressed an interest in discussing an amicable resolution and requested a specific demand.  In the ensuing litigation, plaintiff’s counsel relied on the letter as an exhibit in his cross-motion for summary judgment, and defense counsel moved to strike.

Before moving on to discuss the decision of the magistrate judge it is important to recognize that in-house counsel responded in the normal, customary fashion when responding to a demand letter of this type.  It is the magistrate judge’s decision, and the subsequent decision of the District Court discussed in the next part, that should give every in-house counsel pause when responding to any demand letter.

The magistrate judge granted the defendant’s motion to strike with respect to the second paragraph inasmuch as it clearly invited plaintiff’s counsel to make an offer to settle, but denied it as to the first.  In this regard, the magistrate judge determined that the two parts of the letter were not “logically connected” and could therefore be evaluated separately because the first was addressed to the merits of the claim articulated in the demand letter while the second concerned the offer to compromise.  The magistrate judge then found that the first paragraph did not implicate Rule 408 because it did not “contain an actual compromise or a suggestion of a genuine willingness to resolve the dispute.”

On appeal, defense counsel argued that the letter should be read in its entirety as a response to the settlement inquiry, that the first paragraph was designed to make clear that the company did not place a high monetary value on the claim, and that public policy requires that the parties be free to express their positions in settlement communications without fear they will be used to prove liability.  The District Court did not disagree, but affirmed the decision of the magistrate judge based on the conclusion that he had simply made a finding of fact – that the paragraphs were not “logically connected” – which could not be overturned on appeal.

This is not the first time a court has determined that a portion of a communication otherwise covered by Rule 408 may be admitted into evidence because it did not directly address the subject of settlement.  But the decision should serve as a reminder to in-house counsel to be extremely careful when responding to demand letters, to avoid including any facts, statements or admissions that could be difficult to explain in litigation and to make clear in each paragraph that it has been written in response to the demand letter for the limited purpose of exploring the possibility of settlement.

©2013 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Congress Renews Violence Against Women Act, Expands Tribal Court Jurisdiction

The National Law Review recently featured an article by Brian L. Pierson with Godfrey & Kahn S.C., regarding Recent Congressional Actions:

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On February 28, 2013 the House of Representatives approved Senate Bill 47, which reauthorizes and amends the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The Bill, already approved in the Senate, became law when the President signed it on March 7th.

The VAWA is a major legislative achievement for Indian country. The Supreme Court held in 1978 that tribes lack inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. For the first time since that decision, Congress has authorized tribes to exercise such jurisdiction. Title IX of the VAWA amends the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to permit tribes to exercise “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indians who are charged with domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protective orders that occur on their lands. Features of special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction include:

  • either the perpetrator or victim must be Indian
  • the tribe must prove that the defendant has ties to the tribal community
  • tribal jurisdiction is concurrent with state and federal jurisdiction
  • the defendant has the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that –
    • reflect a fair cross section of the community; and
    • do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians
  • In the event that a sentence of imprisonment “may” be imposed, the tribe must guarantee the defendant the enhanced procedural rights added to the ICRA by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, including:
    • effective assistance of counsel, paid for by the tribe if the defendant is indigent
    • a legally trained judge licensed to practice law
    • published laws and rules of criminal procedure
    • recorded proceedings

Copyright © 2013 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Federal Circuit Courts Find No Causal Connection in Employee Retaliation Claims

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Federal Circuit Courts Find No Causal Connection in Employee Retaliation Claims, written by Katherine G. Cisneros of Schiff Hardin LLP:

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As employers know, retaliation cases are notoriously difficult to defend. However, two recent decisions from federal courts of appeal may help employers prevail in such cases. The Sixth and Seventh Circuit U.S. Courts of Appeals recently affirmed summary judgment in two retaliation cases, both courts holding that the employees’ claims did not establish a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action.

Timing Alone Insufficient Where Multi-Year Gap Between Protected Activity and Adverse Action

In Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., No. 2:08-cv-11652 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013), the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Hazel Park School District, finding no causal connection between a coach’s prior lawsuit and her subsequent removal from a coaching position. Fuhr served as the high school girls’ varsity basketball head coach at Hazel Park High. In 1999, Fuhr sued the school district, alleging gender discrimination based on the school district’s failure to hire her as the high school boys’ varsity basketball head coach. At the time, the boys’ and girls’ teams played during different seasons. Fuhr ultimately prevailed and in 2004 became the boys’ basketball coach. Anticipating a federal district court order requiring the basketball seasons be played at the same time, the school district removed Fuhr as the girl’ head coach in 2006 because it would be too difficult to coach two teams in the same season.

Fuhr sued, claiming that her removal as the girls’ coach and other harassing acts were retaliation for prevailing in her previous lawsuit. Fuhr claimed her principal told her that “this is a good old boys network….They are doing this to you to get back at you for winning the lawsuit.” The Sixth Circuit determined that the principal’s statement was too ambiguous to provide direct evidence of unlawful retaliation. The court next found that Fuhr failed to demonstrate a causal connection between her prior lawsuit and removal as the girls’ coach. While a close temporal proximity between events can constitute evidence of a causal connection, here, the “multi-year gap prove[d] fatal” to establishing causality. The court also added that even if Fuhr could prove causation, the school district was able to offer legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any alleged harassing actions. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the school district on Fuhr’s retaliation claim based on the lack of any temporal proximity.

Employee’s Disagreement with Employer’s Investigation Does Not Prove Retaliation

In Collins v. American Red Cross, No. 08-cv-50160 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the American Red Cross, finding that the employer’s investigation report, albeit possibly incorrect, is not evidence of unlawful retaliation or discrimination. Collins, an African-American woman, worked for the Red Cross. In 2006, Collins filed a racial discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on harassment from her co-workers. Collins received a “right-to-sue” letter, but did not file a suit. In 2007, Collins’s co-workers complained that, among other acts of misconduct, Collins said that the Red Cross was out to get minorities. The human resources officer assigned to investigate found that all of these allegations against Collins were “substantiated,” and Collins was terminated.

Collins sued, claiming that her termination was in retaliation for her filing of the EEOC charge. Collins claimed that the report did not really substantiate the claim that Collins said the Red Cross is out to get minorities, and therefore, the report must have been referring to the EEOC complaint. Although the report was “sloppy, and perhaps it was also mistaken or even unfair,” Title VII only forbids discriminatory or retaliatory terminations. Nothing in the report suggested the Red Cross was concerned with Collins’s EEOC complaint. Collins only provided speculation that the report was incorrect because of the EEOC complaint, and mere speculation is not enough to overcome summary judgment. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Red Cross on Collins’s retaliation claim because she failed to show a causal link between the filing of her EEOC complaint and her subsequent termination.

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed summary judgment on Collins’s race discrimination claim because Collins failed to prove that the Red Cross’ reason for termination was pretextual, emphasizing that “pretext means a lie.” The only piece of evidence Collins offered was that she denied all the allegations raised by her co-worker’s complaints. Denying the allegations is not enough to survive summary judgment because the “fact that a statement is inaccurate does not meant that it is a deliberate lie.” Evidence that an employer reached the wrong conclusion can suggest discrimination if the conclusion were “incredible on its face.” However, here, the court found that the report’s conclusions were not incredible, and there was nothing in the record to suggest racial animus toward Collins. While the Red Cross’s report may have been wrong, that is not enough for Collins’s claim to survive summary judgment.

Sound Employer Practices Remain Key to Successful Defenses

As is clear from the Seventh Circuit case, employer investigations remain a key component of successful defenses of claims. Employers should utilize human resources or other professionals who are trained in both conducting investigations and writing investigation reports to investigate allegations of harassment, discrimination or retaliation. Also keep in mind that, as the Sixth Circuit case suggests, if a long period of time elapses between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse action, it is likely that additional evidence of retaliatory conduct will be required in order for the employee to prevail. To defeat any such evidence, employers should be sure that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the actions taken are well-documented.

© 2013 Schiff Hardin LLP

Service of Process through Social Media

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Service of Process through Social Media, written by Philip H. Cohen with Greenberg Traurig, LLP:

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In the matter of Federal Trade Commission v. PCCare247 Inc., Case No. 12 Civ. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2013) (PCCare247), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sanctioned using social media as a means of circumventing the Hague Service Convention’s standard method of facilitating service among signatory states through designated Central Authorities. Granting the FTC’s motion for leave to effect service of documents by alternative means on defendants located in India, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer’s ruling appears to represent the first time a U.S. court has permitted service of process via Facebook.

In PCCare247, Indian defendants allegedly operated a scheme to convince American consumers that they should spend money to fix non-existent problems with their computers. After the Indian Central Authority was unable to formally serve the Indian defendants pursuant to the Hague Convention, the court granted the FTC’s request to serve process on the defendants by both email and through a Facebook account.

The FTC’s proposed service using Facebook presented the court with a novel issue.  Last year, another court in the Southern District of New York denied a motion to permit a party to effect service using Facebook because the plaintiff had not sufficiently established the credibility of the defendant’s Facebook account.  Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., Case No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (Fortunato).  Fortunato involved a domestic defendant accused of committing credit card fraud.  After several failed attempts at personal service, the court rejected the third-party plaintiff’s “unorthodox” proposal to serve process, including by Facebook, citing concerns about the lack of certainty and authenticity of the defendant’s purported Facebook profile.  The court questioned whether the Facebook profile was in fact operational and accessed by the party to be served, noting that the location listed on the profile was inconsistent with four potential addresses a private investigator had identified. The court opted instead for service by publication pursuant to New York rules.

Distinguishing  PCCare247 from  Fortunato, Judge Engelmayer articulated several considerations supporting his confidence in “service by Facebook.” The court observed that under Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court remains free to order alternative means of service on an individual in a foreign country so long as the means of service are not prohibited by international agreement and comport with due process.  The court acknowledged that although service by email and Facebook is not enumerated in Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention, India has not specifically objected to them. Therefore, under Rule 4(f)(3) the court found that it was free to authorize process by these means provided that doing so would satisfy due process.

Recognizing that the reasonableness inquiry is intended to “unshackle[] the federal  courts from anachronistic methods of service and permit[] them entry into the technological renaissance,” quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002), the court concluded that Facebook was “reasonably calculated to provide defendants with notice of future filings” in the case. In support of its conclusion, the court explained that the defendants ran an Internet-based  business and that the email addresses specified for the defendants were those used for various aspects of the  alleged scheme.  For two of the Indian defendants in PCCAre247, their Facebook accounts were registered to the same email addresses to be served. Moreover, the court had “independent confirmation” that one of the email addresses identified was genuine and operated by a defendant, because it had been used to communicate with the court on several occasions.  Additional evidence that the Facebook profiles were authentic included that some of the defendants listed their job titles at the defendant companies and that the defendants were  Facebook “friends” with each other. Additional considerations the court noted were: the FTC had made several good faith efforts to serve the defendants by other means; and defendants had already demonstrated knowledge of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the FTC’s proposal to serve process by both email and Facebook was a combination that satisfied due process as a means of alternative service and was highly likely to be an effective means of reaching and communicating with the defendants.

This decision suggests that under the right circumstances, where a party establishes a reasonable foundation for the authenticity of the accounts, service via email and social media may be an economical and effective option for serving process on foreign parties, or even domestic parties that are otherwise difficult to track down by traditional means.

©2013 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Preservation of Error: Prejudicial or Argumentative Closing Arguments

The National Law Review recently published an article, Preservation of Error: Prejudicial or Argumentative Closing Arguments, written by Jennifer R. Dixon with Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A.:

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The Second District Court of Appeal, last week, issued an opinion that reversed a trial court’s order granting new trial, Carnival Corporation v. Jimenez, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D455a, Case No. 2D11-5482 (2d DCA February 27, 2013).  The order was predicated on the trial judge’s finding that “comments made [by defense] counsel during closing arguments are perceived to have been prejudicial and highly inflammatory in nature because of their cumulative effect and their accusatory undertones.”  Id.

Jimenez was a personal injury case in which a large part of the defense strategy was to discredit the plaintiff’s expert/treating physician, because he had treated the plaintiff under a letter of protection.  According to the order on appeal, defense counsel “argued in closing . . . that plaintiff’s counsel . . . had collaborated or conspired with [the doctor] to conjure a non-injury into this lawsuit.”  While the trial court recognized that it had allowed evidence of the letter of protection, the introduction of such evidence “is to enable defense counsel to suggest that the doctor may have a financial bias, or stake in the outcome of the case.  Not for the impermissible purpose of allowing Defendant’s attorney to suggest a ‘neighborly’ conspiracy between the doctor and Plaintiff’s attorney.”  In sum, the trial court determined that the defense went so far in putting forth the conspiracy theory that the jury could not fairly assess the issues of causation and damages.

While the general rule is that improper comments made during closing argument may provide a basis for granting a new trial (see Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Moreta, 957 So. 2d 1242, 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)), the issue must be properly preserved by contemporaneous objection and a motion for mistrial.  Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006).  If the error has not been properly preserved, a new trial is only warranted when the improper behavior amounts to fundamental error. Companioni v. City of Tampa, 51 So. 3d 452, 456 (Fla. 2010).

The Jimenez court, noted that the plaintiff’s counsel only made two objections relative to the defense counsel’s references to the letter of protection.  Both were sustained, but there was no motion for mistrial.  The court, relying upon the 4-part test articulated in Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 1027-31 (Fla. 2000) determined that while the plaintiff established the first prong of Murphy–that the challenged conduct was improper–she did not establish the remaining three prongs:  that the challenged conduct was harmful, that the challenged conduct was incurable, and that public interest in our system of justice requires a new trial.

Because the application of the Murphy factors did not show that the challenged conduct was so highly prejudicial that it denied the plaintiff her right to a fair trial, the order granting new trial was reversed, and the final judgment was ordered to be reinstated.

Practice tip:  when objecting to prejudicial or argumentative closing arguments: 1) object contemporaneously, 2) request a curative instruction (if appropriate), and 3) move for a mistrial, or be bound by the heightened standard for new trials articulated in Murphy.

© Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA

Can Having Employees Pose for the Camera Pose Problems for You?

The National Law Review recently featured an article regarding Employee Photos written by Amy D. Cubbage with McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie and Kirkland, PLLC:

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Employers have a variety of reasons for using employee photos, including:

  • internal company use (for a company directory or in the break room);
  • external use (such as the company website or a blog post—you’ll find my picture below);
  • for safety precautions (name badges or scan cards); and
  • for commercial use in advertisements or marketing.

Employees are usually amendable to having their picture taken. But, there may be a few who express their genuine disinterest in being photographed. Such employees could simply be camera shy; others may have a more serious reason to refuse to have an image published.  Some may need to protect anonymity for personal reasons, such as past domestic abuse.  Others may adhere to religions forbidding taking pictures.

There are generally no legal ramifications for using employee photos, unless it is for commercial purposes.  Most states, including Kentucky, have laws that require permission before using an individual or their “likeness” for commercial purposes. This is due to the commonly held notion that a person has property rights in his or her name and likeness and those rights should be shielded from exploitation. Kentucky’s law is codified in KRS 391.170.

If you need to use employee photos for a commercial use, there is a simple solution. Have employees sign releases in which they acknowledge that their picture may be used in a company advertisement and they will receive no compensation for the use of their photo. Keep these releases on file.

Even in a state where consent is not required, it is always a smart approach to use a release so that employees will not be surprised when they see their face plastered on a promotional piece. If minors appear in the commercial materials always use extra caution. Use a consent form, whether required or not, to be signed by the child’s parents.

A warning about taking photos of potential employees: if you take photographs of applicants applying for a job (to help remember who’s who), it may put you at risk for a discrimination claim. A photograph creates a record of certain protected characteristics (i.e., sex, race, or the presence of a disability) that employers generally cannot use in hiring considerations. If this information is collected and a discrimination claim arises, the burden will be on the employer to prove the photographs were not used to make a discriminatory employment decision.

I will leave you with a little common sense about employee photos. Always remember to publicize when the office picture day will be; no one likes showing up ill-prepared. Offer a “redo day” for those who are truly unhappy about how their picture turned out. If all else fails, resort to photoshopping. A little lighting adjustment or cropping can work wonders for a shutterbug humbug.

© 2013 by McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC