Category: Civil Rights

China Enacts New Employment Law Affecting Employers Who Do Not Directly Employ Their Workers

Sheppard Mullin 2012

China has a new employment law. This new law significantly impacts an employer who does not directly employ its own workers, but instead uses agencies such as FESCO or third party staffing companies, also known as labor dispatching agencies. At the end of 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the Decision on the Revision of the Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Amendment”). The Amendment will take effect July 1st of this year. The intent of the Amendment is to offer better protection to workers employed by labor dispatching agencies.

Labor dispatching is a common method of employment where a worker enters into an employment contract with a labor dispatch agency and is then dispatched to work in another company – commonly referred to as the “host company”. This type of employment arrangement has proved problematic because many of the dispatched workers are not paid wages commensurate with their work as compared to their direct hire, permanent employee counterparts. Additionally, the dispatched workers’ health and safety rights are not well protected. The Amendment tackles this problem by requiring employers to hire the majority of their workforce directly and by strictly controlling the number of dispatched laborers. Moreover, the Amendment clearly states that all employers shall stick to the principle of “equal pay for equal work”.

The four main revisions introduced by the Amendment can be found by clicking here:

MAIN SECTION:

Heightened Standards

First, the standards for establishing a Labor Dispatch Agency are heightened. Specifically, a labor dispatch agency is now required to:

a. have a minimum registered capital of no less than RMB 2,000,000 (previously only RMB 500,000);

b. operate from a permanent business premise with facilities that are suitable to conduct its business;

c. have internal dispatch rules that are compliant with the relevant laws and administrative regulations;

d. satisfy other conditions as prescribed by laws and administrative regulations; and

e. apply for an administrative license and obtain approval from the relevant labor authorities.

All labor dispatch agencies established after July 1, 2013, will need to meet these new local labor law requirements before they can start the company registration process. Existing agencies that are already licensed have until July 1, 2014, to meet all local labor law requirements before renewing their business registration.

Equal Pay for Equal Work

Second, one of the most problematic areas of the former dispatch model was the inequitable pay between dispatch workers and their similarly situated, direct hire counterparts. The Amendment adds the principle of “equal pay for equal work” such that dispatch agencies must provide the same remuneration standards for dispatched employees as is provided to the direct hire employees who hold similar positions.

Clarification of Acceptable Outsourcing

Third, the Amendment clarifies that labor dispatch arrangements should only be implemented for temporary, ancillary or substitute positions. The Amendment clearly defines these categories as follows:

  • Temporary position: A position that will last no more than six months
  • Auxiliary position: A position that is not a part of the main or core business of the company
  • Substitute position: A position that must be temporarily filled because a permanent employee is away from work on leave or for other reasons

The Amendment further narrows the use of outsourcing by limiting the percentage of outsourced workers a company may have. The actual percentage shall be prescribed by the Labor Administration Department of the State Council. This percentage of dispatched workers does not apply to representative offices established by foreign companies in China. This is because representative offices are not allowed to hire Chinese employees directly, and instead must hire them through a labor dispatching agency.

Tougher Penalties

Fourth, the Amendment imposes tougher penalties. Specifically, for entities providing labor dispatch services without a license, the labor authorities may confiscate all illegal gains and impose a fine of no less than one time, but not more than five times, the illegal gains on such entities. Where there are no illegal gains, a fine of no more than RMB 50,000 may be imposed.

Employers and dispatching agencies violating the law, and failing to correct the violations within a certain time period, may be fined between RMB 5,000 and RMB 10,000 per dispatched worker. Additionally, labor dispatching agencies may get their business licenses revoked.

Conclusion

How aggressively the new law will be enforced remains to be seen, but companies should be prepared none the less. Companies that use labor dispatch agencies should ensure that their service provider has the proper license. Furthermore, any company with a high percentage of dispatched workers should evaluate their employment model and prepare for potentially transitioning their employment strategies in order to comply with the new Labor Contract Law. This may include direct hiring for some of the currently outsourced positions. Lastly, companies should evaluate their internal policies to ensure that they are sufficient for any changes – especially those involving headcount – that may be made.

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Employee Shareholders: It’s Happening, but What Does it Mean?

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New Growth and Infrastructure Act introduces employee shareholder provisions that are expected to come into force later this year.

On 25 April, the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013[1] came into effect and, among other things, introduced employee shareholder or “rights for shares” provisions that are expected to take effect this autumn in the UK. Broadly speaking, these provisions amend the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the ERA) to allow employees to give up some of their employment rights in exchange for shares in their employer company. However, in the absence of any additional guidance, the practical scope and impact of these changes remains unclear.

What We Do Know

Any company with share capital can enter into an agreement with an employee to allow them to become an “employee shareholder”. An employee shareholder will receive fully paid-up company shares that have a value of no less than £2,000 on the day of issue.

In exchange, the employee shareholder will give up the right to

•    request to undertake study or training;

•    request flexible working;

•    not be unfairly dismissed; and

•    a redundancy payment.

Further, the notice that employee shareholders will need to give before returning to work after maternity, parental, paternity, or adoption leave will be increased to 16 weeks.

Employee shareholders cannot waive their right to claim unfair dismissal where their dismissal breaches the Equality Act 2010 or health and safety legislation or is automatically unfair under the ERA. However, employers can make a job offer contingent on an applicant agreeing to become an employee shareholder. If an applicant refuses to do so, the employer can simply withdraw the job offer.

Before becoming an employee shareholder, each employee (or applicant to whom a job has been offered) must receive independent legal advice paid for by the employer (up to a “reasonable” level). The employer must pay these legal costs whether or not an employee elects to become an employee shareholder. Employees and applicants will then be given a seven-day cooling-off period in which they can withdraw their agreement.

For any acceptance to be valid, the employer must have provided the employee with a statement of particulars that sets out, among other things, the following:

•    The rights the employee shareholder gives up

•    The rights attached to the shares, e.g., voting, dividend, and ability to participate in the distribution of any surplus assets on winding up

•    Whether there are any restrictions on the transferability of the shares

•    Whether the employee shares are subject to drag-along rights or tag-along rights

Finally, an employee must not suffer a detriment for refusing to accept an offer to become an employee shareholder. Moreover, the dismissal of an employee for refusing to become an employee shareholder will be regarded as unfair.

What We Do Not Know

Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE) Transfers.

If employee shareholders transfer across to an employer who does not operate an employee shareholder scheme or does not have any share capital, there is no guidance as to whether that employee shareholder automatically regains their rights or if they must surrender their shares first.

Share Schemes.

It is not clear whether companies that operate share schemes can make it a precondition of future participation in any company share scheme that an employee becomes an employee shareholder.

Termination.

On termination of the employment contract, a company can buy back shares from an employee shareholder. However, the conditions that must be satisfied before an employer buys back an employee’s shares are still unknown.

Potential Impact on UK Employers

•    £2,000 seems a relatively small amount when weighed against the potential value of rights that would be forfeited by employee shareholders. Employers can give shares worth more than £2,000, and it is therefore possible that, once the provisions are in force, along with salary, the sticking point in contractual negotiations will be the value of the shares given. That said, any deviation from the £2,000 figure may give rise to significant tax complications.

•    The provisions could create a two-tier workforce of employee shareholders and non-employee shareholders, with the former potentially subject to enforced contractual changes and other less favourable treatment that would normally result in potential constructive unfair dismissal claims.

•    In theory, an employer undertaking a redundancy exercise could simply select employee shareholders as redundant to avoid any unfair dismissal risk and/or any need to make redundancy payments.

By making both job offers and participation in employee share schemes conditional upon an employee’s accepting employee shareholder status, it is possible that some employers could significantly reduce and ultimately eradicate the risk of “pure” (i.e., non-discriminatory or non-whistleblowing related) unfair dismissal claims and the flexible working rights of their workforce.

[1]. View the Growth and Infrastructure Bill here.

Under Pressure: Unions Espouse New Organizing Models and Take Action

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Back in March, AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka summarized his view of the state of union representation in America: “To be blunt, our basic system of workplace representation is failing to meet the needs of America’s workers by every critical measure.” Last week in a Washington Post Op-Ed, this view was echoed by columnist and long-time advocate of big labor’s policies Harold Meyerson. Meyerson identified an “existential problem” facing unions, which are continuing to see membership numbers decline.

It is not difficult to understand the concern. Membership decline means one thing for unions: less dues. Measures that weakened public sector unions in Wisconsin and passage of right to work legislation in traditional union Midwest strongholds of Indiana and then Michigan, along with ever-shrinking private sector union membership, have forced labor into a place of critical self-evaluation. And what is emerging from this self-evaluation is a dedication to expanding the scope of union organizing.Union membership decline

In March, Trumka highlighted new targets of organizing that are being explored – non-traditional targets. Trumka noted home care workers, taxi drivers and others who don’t fit neatly into the traditional models of unionization will be targets. The point is: unions are increasingly setting their sights on individuals who “do not neatly fit the legal definition of an employee.” And businesses and employers who before may have not traditionally considered themselves targets for big labor should be paying attention.

Such efforts are not just anecdotal.  As we saw in Michigan with home health care unionization, these non-traditional unionization efforts can have a lot of upside for unions, even if they are not ultimately successful in keeping their representative status. SEIU collected $34 million in dues from more than 59,000 home health care workers in Michigan before it was ultimately forced to end its status as bargaining representative in 2012.

Meyerson also points out the recent one-day strikes of fast-food workers in New York and Chicago as evidence of a changing model. Workers in other cities, including St. Louis and then Detroit this past weekend, have followed suit. Employers will be mindful to pay attention to such trends.

Meyerson explains the AFL-CIO’s plan too. And, it starts with seeking more political power – not necessarily more dues paying members. As Meyerson explains: “The first part of this plan is to expand its Working America program, a door-to-door canvass that has mobilized nonunion members in swing-state working-class neighborhoods to back labor-endorsed candidates in elections in the past decade.”  Phase Two, according to Meyerson quoting Trumka, is “we’re asking academics, we’re asking our friends in other movements ‘What do we need to become?’” And Phase Three: “We’ll try a whole bunch of new forms of representation.  Some will work; some won’t, but we’ll be opening up the labor movement.”

Where all of this ends up is anyone’s guess – but this is clear: the model of unionization is changing.  Change means new challenges. The bottom line for employers: Be Prepared.

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Sixth Circuit Upholds Michigan Law Which Bars Schools from Collection Union Dues

Barnes & Thornburg

The 6th Circuit in Bailey v. Callahan, decided Thursday, May 9, has vacated an injunction entered by the District Court and has upheld Michigan’s Public Act 53 which prohibits Michigan’s public schools from assisting in the collection of dues and service fees for unions. The Court summarized the Union’s First Amendment challenge to the statute in this way:

“Unions engage in speech (among many other activities); they need membership dues to engage in speech; if the public schools do not collect the unions’ membership dues for them, the unions will have a hard time collecting the dues themselves; and thus Public Act 53 violates the unions’ right to free speech.”

The problem with that, according to the majority opinion, is that this argument has already been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009). Moreover, the Court determined that Public Act 53 does not restrict speech and is not designed to specifically suppress speech by teachers’ unions. Finally, the Court, in two paragraphs, rejected the plaintiff’s equal protection argument.

The opinion incited a lengthy dissent from Circuit Judge Jane Stranch who contended that the majority “mischaracterizes the First Amendment interests at stake, glosses over key distinctions the Supreme Court requires us to observe, and averts its gaze from Act 53’s blatant viewpoint discrimination.”

With a 2-1 decision and a lengthy dissent on a Constitutional claim, one would think this is headed for an en banc determination by the full Sixth Circuit.

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Circuit Court Upholds Michigan Public Act 53: Public Schools Prohibited from Collecting Union Dues

Varnum LLP

Responding to a challenge to the constitutionality of Michigan Public Act 53, which prohibits public schools from collecting union dues from employees, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the act is constitutional. The result of this ruling is that, at this point, public schools are statutorily precluded from collecting dues for the union under any bargaining agreement that was entered into, renewed or extended after March 16, 2012.

The plaintiffs, who are school unions and union members, argued that the act violates their First Amendment and Equal Protection rights.  The district court, agreeing with the plaintiffs, had issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the law.  The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, dissolved the injunction and remanded the case “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”  It is unclear whether any viable challenge to the statute remains for the district court to address or whether dismissal of the claim is now in order.

The 6th Circuit ruled that Public Act 53 does not violate the First Amendment.  The plaintiffs argued that unions need membership dues to engage in speech and if the public schools don’t collect the union dues for them, the unions will have a hard time collecting the dues themselves.  Therefore, Public Act 53 violates the unions’ right to free speech.  The majority opinion stated that the First Amendment prohibits government from limiting the freedom of speech, but it does not give the right to use government payroll systems for the purpose of obtaining funds for speech.  The court concluded that Public Act 53 does not restrict speech.  It “merely directs one kind of public employer to use its resources for its core mission rather than for the collection of union dues.”

Similarly, the Court decided that the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim fails.  The plaintiffs argued that Public Act 53 violates the Equal Protection clause of the 14 Amendment because it applies only to unions that represent school employees and not to other public employers.  The court held that there is a legitimate interest in this classification.  That is, the Michigan legislature “could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers.”

It remains to be seen whether the Sixth Circuit’s opinion ends the debate or if there will be continued challenge.

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Seventh Circuit Addresses Obligations Regarding the Interactive Process under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)

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A common scenario often faced by employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) involves an employee’s request for time off as a reasonable accommodation. In Basden v. Professional Transportation, Inc., No. 11-2880 (7th Cir, May 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals provides guidance in this area. There, the court explained that the employer was not liable under the ADA, even though it failed to engage in the interactive process, because the employee failed to show that the requested accommodation (a 30-day leave) would have resulted in her ability to perform the essential functions of the job.

Employee Two Weeks Shy of Leave Entitlement

Professional Transportation, Inc. (PTI) provides 24-hour ground transportation services. Terri Basden was hired as a dispatcher in June, 2007. After numerous absences in 2007 and early 2008, she received a verbal warning for absences in March 2008 and a written warning for further absences in April 2008.

Basden provided doctors’ notes reflecting that she had been referred to a neurologist with a possible diagnosis of multiple sclerosis after emergency room tests showed brain abnormalities indicative of the disease. After several job transfers, Basden was granted a request for a part time position on May 1, 2008. She incurred additional absences in May which resulted in suspension. While on suspension, Basden submitted a request for a 30-day leave of absence due to “complications due to medical illness (MS).” PTI policy provides employees with one year of service may be eligible to take a 30-day, unpaid leave of absence. However, Basden had not been employed for one year. PTI denied her request for leave, and thereafter terminated Basden when she failed to return to work following her suspension.

Employee Could Not Show Leave Would Enable Her to Perform Essential Functions

Basden sued PTI, claiming that PTI violated the ADA by terminating her instead of accommodating her request for 30 days leave, that PTI failed to engage in the interactive accommodation process required by the ADA, and that PTI did not show that the requested leave was unreasonable. The district court granted summary judgment for PTI.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first observed that an employee’s request for an accommodation under the ADA requires the employer to engage in a flexible, interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation. In this case, the employee requested a 30-day leave that, according to the employer’s policy, she would have been eligible for with two weeks’ additional seniority. The court noted that PTI’s response to this request, specifically, failing to engage in an interactive process, denying the leave, and terminating her, was not an appropriate employer response under the ADA.

However, the court held that PTI’s actions did not violate the ADA. The failure to engage in the interactive process is not an independent basis for liability under the statute, and in any event, such a failure is actionable only if it prevents identification of an appropriate accommodation. Thus, even if an employer fails to engage in the interactive process, that failure need not be considered if the employee fails to show that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation.

Here, PTI cited regular attendance as an essential function of Basden’s job. Yet, Basden did not demonstrate that she was able to come to work regularly at the time of her termination, or that her regular attendance could have been expected either following the requested leave or with any other accommodation. Therefore, the court held, summary judgment for PTI was appropriate on the ADA claim despite any shortcomings in PTI’s response to Basden’s request. (Basden also alleged violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which the court also affirmed summary judgment on because Basden had not worked for PTI for 12 months at the time of her leave request and thus was not eligible for leave under the statute.)

Identify and Document Essential Functions

Of course, employers should continue to comply with their obligations to engage in the interactive process. However, as this case suggests, the obligation to explore and provide accommodation does not necessarily extend to accommodations that are or would be futile and would not enable the employee to perform essential functions. This case highlights the importance of well-written job descriptions that clearly set forth essential job functions. An employer’s identification of and ability to prove essential functions of the job can be used to guide the interactive process and its obligations to provide accommodation under the ADA, and can play a key role in defending a lawsuit under the ADA.

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Issues Guidance on Lawful Confidentiality Language

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On July 30, 2012, the NLRB (“Board”) issued a decision in Banner Health System dba Estrella Medical Center, 358 NLRB No. 93 holding, among other things, that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) (which prohibits employers from interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights), by restricting employees from discussing any complaint that was then the subject of an ongoing internal investigation.

To minimize the impact of such a confidentiality mandate on employees’ Section 7 rights, the Board found that an employer must make an individualized determination in each case that its “legitimate business justification” outweighed the employee’s rights to protected concerted activity in discussing workplace issues.  In Banner Health, the employer did not carry its burden to show a legitimate business justification because it failed to make a particularized showing that:

  • Witnesses were in need of protection;
  • Evidence was in danger of being destroyed;
  • Testimony was in danger of being fabricated; or
  • A cover-up must be prevented.

The Board concluded that the employer’s one-size-fits-all rule, prohibiting employees from engaging in any discussion of ongoing internal investigations, clearly failed to meet these requirements.

More recently, the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel clarified the limits of how such policies could be drafted without running afoul of Section 7 in an advice memorandum released on April 24, 2013 (dated January 29, 2013).   The Region had submitted Verso Paper, Case 30-CA-089350 (January 29, 2013) to the Office of the General Counsel for advice regarding the confidentiality rule at issue and whether it unlawfully interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights.  Specifically, the Verso Code of Conduct contained this provision prohibiting employees from discussing ongoing internal investigations:

Verso has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations.  In every investigation, Verso has a strong desire to protect witnesses from harassment, intimidation and retaliation, to keep evidence from being destroyed, to ensure that testimony is not fabricated, and to prevent a cover-up.  To assist Verso in achieving these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence.  If we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Reiterating that employees have a Section 7 right to discuss disciplinary investigations of their co-workers, the General Counsel’s Office found that the Verso Paper provision did not allow for a case-by-case analysis of whether or not the employer’s business justification for the restriction outweighed the employees’ Section 7 rights as required by Banner Health.  According to the General Counsel’s Office, the employer may establish this by presenting facts specific to a given investigation that give rise to a legitimate and substantial business justification for imposing confidentiality restrictions.

However, in footnote 7 of its advice, the General Counsel’s Office, after noting that the first two sentences of the Verso Paper rule lawfully set forth the employer’s interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations, surprisingly put forward a modified version of the remainder of the Verso Paper provision that it said would pass muster under Banner Health:

Verso may decide in some circumstances that in order to achieve these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence.  If Verso reasonably imposes such a requirement and we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Although this guidance is not binding, combining this language above with the first two sentences of the Verso Paper provision could certainly strengthen an employer’s argument that its intent was not to violate an employee’s Section 7 rights, but rather, to lawfully put employees on notice that if the employer “reasonably” imposes a confidentiality requirement, they must abide by it or face discipline.  However, employers must remain mindful that using a provision like this suggested does not obviate the need for the employer to engage in the particularized case-by-case determination of its substantial and legitimate business need that would permit it to impose confidentiality restrictions on the investigation.

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Pregnancy and Disability Discrimination the Focus of EEOC Enforcement Activity

Poyner SpruillSince Congress’ enactment of amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 2008, making it easier to establish disability status under that law, the EEOC has directed more of its attention to claims of pregnancy and disability discrimination and accommodation of pregnancy-related limitations. In its 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan, the Commission identified the investigation and pursuit of this type of claim as a national priority.  This enforcement initiative was recently demonstrated in a lawsuit filed by the EEOC against an employer which allegedly denied accommodations to an employee who suffered from complications arising from her pregnancy. The suit, EEOC v. Engineering Documentation Systems, Inc.,settled for $70,000 before a judgment on the merits was reached. However, the case serves as a reminder to employers that the issue of pregnancy-related disability is now being targeted by the EEOC.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), prohibits discrimination against employees or job applicants on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. The EEOC takes the position that Title VII and the PDA require employers to treat pregnant employees in the same manner as other employees with temporary medical conditions. For example, according to the EEOC, if an employer provides leaves of absence or light duty to employees with short-term medical conditions which render those employees unable to work, then an employee unable to work due to her pregnancy must also be afforded the same treatment.1   But Title VII is not the only potentially applicable law in this circumstance. The ADA requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodation” to an employee with an actual (or record of) disability. This raises the question whether a pregnant employee has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

Under the ADA, a disability is defined in part as a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits a major life activity. Prior to the amendments to the ADA, temporary medical conditions generally were not found by the courts to constitute disabilities, on the grounds that short-term impairments were not “substantially limiting.” However, the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) has led to a more expansive interpretation of the term “disability.” Specifically, the EEOC’s regulations implementing the ADAAA state that an impairment may be substantially limiting of a major life activity, and thus a disability, even if it is of a duration of less than six months. While the EEOC still considers pregnancy itself not to constitute a disability (See EEOC’s “Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008”), it recognizes that certain impairments resulting from pregnancy may be disabilities if they substantially limit a major life activity. As stated on the EEOC’s webpage regarding pregnancy discrimination, this could include short term complications of pregnancy such as gestational diabetes or preeclampsia.

With the possibility that more medical conditions and complications arising from pregnancy will now fall within the definition of disability under the ADAAA, employers must be more cognizant of when an obligation to consider and provide reasonable accommodation to employees with a pregnancy-related disability arises. Such accommodations might include leaves of absence, job reassignment, light duty, or job modifications, unless such accommodations would result in an undue hardship to the employer. It is also imperative that employers engage in the “interactive process” with such employees to identify reasonable accommodation. The failure to take such proactive measures can result in liability for an employer, particularly given that the EEOC is now focused on this area of enforcement.

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Violence Against Women Act Renewed

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Early last month, Congress renewed and extended federal legislation known as the “Violence Against Women Act” or “VAWA.”  The VAWA was originally enacted in 1994, and at that time, its objective was as clear as its name – to prevent and address domestic violence, primarily against women.  The VAWA reformed how the law grapples with domestic violence.  But the VAWA’s enactment has perhaps transformed how we look at domestic violence and the victims who struggle with it at home.

The original legislation that made up the VAWA ensured free access to court protective orders regardless of income level, established the National Domestic Violence Help-Line, and was the legislative source for fiercely contested “rape shield laws” that prohibit evidence relating to a victim’s past sexual history.  The VAWA also required training among civil servants and medical personnel to help encourage victims of domestic violence to identify themselves and reach out for help.  We likely do not notice how the VAWA has kept us mindful of the dangers of violence in the family.  After all, how often does one reflect on anti-stalking laws?  Yet, with any trip to an urgent care, emergency room, or radiologist’s lab a medical provider will ask: “Are you involved in a relationship where you don’t feel safe?”  That’s the VAWA.  And while the VAWA’s name may seem to have everything to have to do with women, the act’s recent reenactment has a much more expansive view – and reach.

Under the original enactment, some Native American tribal members were previously left out in the cold following a 1978 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), which limited a tribe’s jurisdiction over non-Indian abusers.  Native American tribes will now have greater authority to prosecute non-Indian abusers under the reenacted VAWA, based on a special jurisdictional provision to the law. However, a tribe’s jurisdiction to address the victimization of a tribal member is restricted only to those non-Indians with significant ties to the prosecuting tribe, those who reside in the Indian country of the prosecuting tribe, or are employed in the Indian country of the prosecuting tribe, or are either the spouse or intimate partner of a member of the prosecuting tribe.  Although some critics question whether limited jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants will withstand Constitutional muster, many in support of the VAWA’s reenactment are hopeful that the ability of tribes to prosecute non-Indian offenders in some instances will reduce the nearly 40-70% of rape potential prosecutions against non-Indians that are declined by federal prosecutors.

The VAWA reenactment is also aimed at targeting cyber-bullying and other instances of abuse that were not the focus of the VAWA originally.  Protections for men and members of the “LGBT” (Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender) community who are struggling with domestic violence now enjoy greater recognition under the updated law.  These changes to the VAWA send a clear message that domestic violence is not a “women’s issue” – it’s a family one because anyone can be a victim of domestic violence.

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Employee’s Deactivation Of Facebook Account Leads To Sanctions

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The latest Facebook case highlights how courts now intend to hold parties accountable when it comes to preserving their personal social media accounts during litigation.  Recently, a federal court ruled that a plaintiff’s deletion of his Facebook account during discovery constituted spoliation of evidence and warranted an “adverse inference” instruction against him at trial.  Gatto v. United Airlines and Allied Aviation Servs., et al. , No. 10-CV-1090 (D.N.J. March 25, 2013).

The plaintiff, a ground operations supervisor at JFK Airport, allegedly suffered permanent disabling injuries from an accident at work which he claimed limited his physical and social activities.  Defendants sought discovery related to Plaintiff’s damages, including documents related to his social media accounts.

Although Plaintiff provided Defendants with the signed authorization for release of information from certain social networking sites and other online services such as eBay, he failed to provide an authorization for his Facebook account.  The magistrate judge ultimately ordered Plaintiff to execute the Facebook authorization, and Plaintiff agreed to change his Facebook password and to disclose the password to defense counsel for the purpose of accessing documents and information from Facebook.  Defense counsel briefly accessed the account and printed some portion of the Facebook home page.  Facebook then notified Plaintiff that an unfamiliar IP address had accessed his account.   Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff “deactivated” his account, causing Facebook to permanently delete the account 14 days later in accordance with its policy.

Defendants moved for spoliation of evidence sanctions, claiming that the lost Facebook postings contradicted Plaintiff’s claims about his restricted social activities.  In response, Plaintiff argued that he had acted reasonably in deactivating his account because he did know it was defense counsel accessing his page.  Moreover, the permanent deletion was the result of Facebook’s “automatically” deleting it.  The court, however, found that the Facebook account was within Plaintiff’s control, and that “[e]ven if Plaintiff did not intend to deprive the defendants of the information associated with his Facebook account, there is no dispute that plaintiff intentionally deactivated the account,” which resulted in the permanent loss of  relevant evidence.  Thus, the court granted Defendants’ request for an “adverse inference” instruction (but declined to award legal fees as a further sanction).

The Gatto decision not only affirms that social media is discoverable by employers, but also teaches that plaintiffs who fail to preserve relevant social media data will face harsh penalties.  Employers are reminded to specifically seek relevant social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, LinkedIn accounts) in their discovery requests since such sources may provide employers with sufficient evidence to rebut an employee’s claims.  This case also serves as a reminder and a warning to employers that the principles of evidence preservation apply to social media, and employers should take steps very early in the litigation to preserve its own social media content as it pertains to the matter.

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