Category: Civil Rights

Will Obesity Claims Be the Next Wave of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Litigation?

Poyner SpruillIn a new federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Whittaker v. America’s Car-Mart, Inc., the plaintiff is alleging his former employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when it fired him for being obese.  Plaintiff Joseph Whittaker claims the company, a car dealership chain, fired him from his job as a general manager last November after seven years of employment even though he was able to perform all essential functions of his job, with or without accommodations.  He alleges “severe obesity … is a physical impairment within the meaning of the ADA,” and that the company regarded him as being substantially limited in the major life activity of walking.

The EEOC has also alleged morbid obesity is a disability protected under the ADA.  In a 2011 lawsuit filed on behalf of Ronald Katz, II against BAE Systems Tactical Vehicle Systems, LP (BAE Systems), the EEOC alleged the company regarded Mr. Katz as disabled because of his size and terminated Katz because he weighed over 600 lbs.  The suit alleged Mr. Katz was able to perform the essential functions of his job and had received good performance reviews.  The case was settled after BAE Systems agreed to pay $55,000 to Mr. Katz, provide him six months of outplacement services, and train its managers and human resources professionals on the ADA.  In a press release announcing the settlement, the EEOC said, “the law protects morbidly obese employees and applicants from being subjected to discrimination because of their obesity.”

Similarly, in 2010, the EEOC sued Resources for Human Development, Inc. (RHD) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, for firing an employee because of her obesity in violation of the ADA. According to the suit, RHD fired Harrison in September of 2007 because of her severe obesity.  The EEOC alleged that, as a result of her obesity, RHD perceived Harrison as being substantially limited in a number of major life activities, including walking.  Ms. Harrison died of complications related to her morbid obesity before the case could proceed.

RHD moved for summary judgment, arguing obesity is not an impairment.  The court, having reviewed the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance on obesity, ruled severe obesity (body weight more than 100% over normal) is an impairment.  The court held that if a plaintiff is severely obese, there is no requirement that the obesity be caused by some underlying physiological impairment to qualify as a disability under the ADA.  The parties settled the case before trial for $125,000, which was paid to Ms. Harrison’s estate.

In June 2013, the American Medical Association (AMA) declared that obesity is a disease.  Although the AMA’s decision does not, by itself, create any new legal claims for obese employees or applicants under the ADA, potential plaintiffs are likely to cite the new definition in support of ADA claims they bring.  In light of these recent developments, obesity related ADA claims will likely become more common.

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Picture This: The National Labor Relations Board’s Division of Advice Wants to Sue Employer for Issuing Social Media Policy with Photo/Video Ban

Michael Best Logohe National Labor Relations Board’s Division of Advice (the Division) recently recommended that the Board issue a complaint against Giant Foods for implementing its social media policy without first bargaining with two unions, and for maintaining a social media policy that included unlawful provisions. Although the Division analyzed several social media policy provisions, its criticism of two provisions in particular—a ban on using photo and video of company premises, and restrictions on employees’ use of company logos and trademarks—makes it very difficult for employers to protect their brands while at the same time complying with federal labor laws.

Giant Foods’ social media policy forbade employees from using company logos, trademarks, or graphics without prior approval from the company. The policy also prohibited employees from using photographs or video of the “Company’s premises, processes, operations, or products” without prior approval as well.

The Division concluded that these provisions were unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and that the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) should issue a complaint against Giant Foods for implementing them. As employers are becoming keenly aware, the NLRA safeguards employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity. Such activity includes group discussions and some comments by individual employees that relate to their wages, hours, and other terms conditions of employment.

The Division concluded that banning employees from using company logos or trademarks was unlawful because: (1) employees should be allowed to use logos and trademarks in online communications, including electronic leaflets or pictures of picket signs with the employer’s logo; and (2) those labor-related interests did not raise the concerns that intellectual property laws were passed to protect, such as a business’ interest in guarding its trademarks from being used by competitors selling inferior products.

Additionally the Division concluded that restricting employees from using photo and video of company premises unlawfully prevented them from sharing information about participation in protected concerted activities, such as snapping a picture of a picket line.

Unfortunately, the Board’s expansive view will likely hamper companies’ ability to prevent damage to their brand and reputation.  Not allowing employers to ban the taking of videos and photos on their premises, or restricting the use of company logos/trademarks could lead to public relations nightmares such as the one Subway Foods recently endured after it was revealed that an employee posted a graphic picture on Instagram of his genitalia on a sub, with the tag line “I will be your sandwich artist today.”

Given the prevalence of cell phones with photo and video capabilities, and the ease of uploading photos and videos to the internet, a company that cannot control its employees’ use of those devices on their premises will be one bad employee decision away from public embarrassment.

What else can be gleaned from the Giant Foods Advice Memorandum? That the Board’s General Counsel will continue to prod employers to eliminate blanket bans on certain kinds of employee conduct from their social media policies and replace those bans with provisions that include specific examples of what employee conduct the policy prohibits. The Board and its General Counsel have previously found social media policies that restricted employee use of confidential information and complaints about an employer’s labor practices as unlawful; Giant Foods makes clear that the agency is also scrutinizing other kinds of policy provisions that potentially could infringe on an employee’s right to engage in protected concerted activities.

Accordingly, employers should review their policies with counsel so that they can tailor them to restrict employee conduct that will damage the company and its brand, but not be “reasonably” read to restrict employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activities.

Unpaid Internships – Opportunity or Liability for Businesses?

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Unpaid internships have long been viewed by students, recent graduates and industry newcomers as a chance to gain experience that might help them select or launch a career, and to some, a chance to eventually land a paying job.  Employers can capitalize on this to teach their trade or profession and find new talent; but, they should not use interns just to cut labor costs.

The United States Department of Labor and many states use six criteria to determine whether internships in for-profit company operations can lawfully be unpaid: 1) the internship must be similar to training given in an educational institution; 2) regular paid workers are not displaced; 3) the intern works under close observation; 4) the employer derives no immediate advantage from intern activities; 5) there is no guaranty of employment upon internship completion; and 6) it is clear up front that there is no expectation of payment.  The overarching theme is that unpaid internships must be educational and predominantly for the benefit of the intern, not the employer.

Some employers have no idea the criteria exist and unwittingly expose themselves to expensive single-plaintiff, class action and regulator’s claims to reclassify interns as employees and to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime pay, interest, multiple penalties and attorneys fees.  [For more on this see our post on Unpaid Interns Deemed Employees Under the FLSA].  Add to that, there are potential employer and decision maker risks for failure to withhold income and employment taxes.

“Warning bell” examples of internship programs that may be subject to reclassification include, use of unpaid internships to simply minimize labor costs or merely as an extended job interview to see if interns can make the cut later for a paid job; no real, supervised education and training, beyond what the intern might happen to observe; and a predominance of work assigned to interns that paid employees would normally do to generate or support the business.  Likewise, interns whose work is primarily running errands, answering phones, filing, organizing documents, data entry, scanning or coping images, or cleaning – even though they arguably have good exposure to work going on around them – tend to look like they are merely doing what paid support staff employees ought to be doing.

By contrast, if the intern is closely supervised and taught learning objectives that can be applied to multiple different employers, with occasional support staff type work incidental to the learning, with no guaranty of employment, and a writing that specifies a limited duration of an internship without pay, odds are better that intern can lawfully be unpaid.  As a practical matter, if a school or college will give the intern course credit, the odds of legal compliance increase.

A safe path to avoid classification risks is to pay interns at least minimum wage and for any overtime worked, afford meal and rest breaks, and manage their work assignments to reduce overtime needed.   Depending on employer policies and applicable laws, an intern who is part-time or a short-term temporary employee may not be eligible for certain employee benefits.

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Reporters Committee and Media Companies Back Google, Microsoft in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA)

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In a historic move for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP), the organization has filed an amicus brief with the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) to support the free-speech rights of Google and Microsoft. The July 15, 2013 action marks the first time RCFP has both filed with the FISA Court and backed the First Amendment interests of Internet companies.

The RCFP has provided free legal advice, resources, support, and advocacy to journalists for more than 40 years.  It is joined in the brief by the following media companies: The Associated Press, Bloomberg L.P., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Los Angeles Times, The McClatchy Company, National Public Radio, Inc., The New York Times Company, The New Yorker; The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC, Reuters America LLC, Tribune Company, and the Washington Post.

In June, both Microsoft and Google filed petitions with the FISA Court seeking permission to publish data on national security requests they received and which had been authorized by the court. The same month the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School filed a brief with the FISA Court requesting that it publish its opinions on the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act.

That section authorizes the government to obtain “any tangible thing” relevant to foreign-intelligence or terrorism investigations.  It was the legal basis for an April FISA Court order requiring Verizon to turn over “on an ongoing daily basis” to the National Security Agency all call logs “between the United States and abroad” or “wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.” The order was revealed by U.K.-based newspaper The Guardian in early June.

The amicus filing by RCFP and the coalition of news-media organizations supports the ACLU arguments that the court should release decisions that interpret the FISA laws and create binding precedent. However, the RCFP  brief emphasizes a related point: that the public has a First Amendment right to know both about the secretive court’s core activities and receive information from Google and Microsoft. The brief describes the two companies as “speakers” with significant free-speech interests who want to provide the public with information about the government surveillance programs in which they have been required to participate.

“In addition to implicating their rights as speakers, the Google and Microsoft cases raise important concerns relating to the interests of the public in receiving information, an interest that the Supreme Court has long recognized as a separate component of the speech and press freedoms under the First Amendment,” the brief argues. “Where the communications providers are willing speakers, the public has a heightened interest in hearing their speech. That interest is heightened even more when the government is itself choosing to provide information to the public regarding issues central to the Google and Microsoft cases.”

The information Google and Microsoft want to share with the public is not prohibited by law, the media coalition states, and this information “will better explain the nature of their participation in these (government-surveillance) programs and correct popular misconceptions about the operation of key antiterrorism initiatives undertaken by the government.”

The brief continues that the issues raised in the petitions are vitally important to both national security and civil liberties: “They inevitably and rightfully are going to be the subject of public reporting and debate, and secrecy is preventing the public and the press from having even the rudimentary information needed for the kind of informed discussion that the country deserves.”

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Virtual Communications with Real Consequences: Terminations for Social Media Posts Continue to Draw the Attention of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

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In the late autumn of 2012, an otherwise innocuous private Facebook discussion amongst employees of Skinsmart Dermatology (Skinsmart) suddenly devolved into an expletive-laced tirade. At one point during the conversation an employee boasted that she told her supervisor to “back the freak off,” called her employer “full of sh**,” and dared Skinsmart to “fire” her and “[m]ake [her] day.”

Notably, none of the other participants in the Facebook chat directly responded to the employee’s comments. One of those participants, however, reported the employee’s remarks to Skinsmart, who promptly fired her after concluding that it was “obvious” she did not want to continue working there.

Following her termination, the employee filed an Unfair Labor Practice Charge (ULP) with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) claiming that Skinsmart fired her in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA prohibits an employer from interfering with or restraining an employee’s right to engage in “protected concerted activities.”

As background, “protected” activities include discussing wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment with coworkers. “Concerted” activities include: (1) when an individual employee seeks to “initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action”; (2) where an individual employee brings “truly group complaints” to management’s attention; and (3) where employees discuss “shared concerns” among themselves prior to any specific plan to engage in group action.

After analyzing the evidence, the NLRB’s Division of Advice recommended dismissal of the employee’s ULP Charge. First, it found the terminated employee’s Facebook comments were “an individual’s gripe” rather than an expression of “shared concerns” over working conditions among employees. Second, it found there was no evidence that the terminated employee’s coworkers viewed her remarks as an assertion of shared concerns regarding employment conditions. Consequently, the Division of Advice concluded that the employee did not participate in concerted activity, and therefore Skinsmart did not illegally fire her in response to her Facebook comments.

Significantly, before recommending dismissal of the ULP Charge, the Division of Advice also considered whether the terminated employee’s comments constituted “inherently concerted” activity that deserved protection under the NLRA.[1] While the Division of Advice ultimately ruled that they were not, its consideration of “inherently concerted” activity suggests that it will continue to interpret “protected concerted activity” as broadly as it can.

Under the “inherently concerted” analysis, an employee’s expressions may be considered protected concerted activity if those expressions involve “subjects of such mutual workplace concern” like wages, schedules, and job security, even if there was no contemplation of group action. Because the employee’s posts did not relate to any of those mutual workplace concerns, the Division of Advice concluded, the employee did not engage in “inherently concerted” activity.

In light of Skinsmart, before taking any adverse action against an employee for inappropriate social media communications, an employer should scrutinize the employee’s comments to determine whether they constitute an individual gripe or protected concerted activity. Because the NLRB has targeted “Facebook firings” as infringing on employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity, we recommend that employers undertake this analysis with the benefit of counsel to minimize their exposure to a ULP Charge or other legal action.

[1] The term, “inherently concerted,” arose out of an earlier NLRB decision in 2012. See Hoodview Vending Co., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (2012).

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A Bad Smoke Break: Stringent Documentation of Work Rules Defends Against Unemployment Claims

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A recent Missouri case demonstrates the importance of documentation when defending against unwarranted unemployment claims. The case also underlines the need for the reforms passed by the Missouri General Assembly and pending signature by Gov. Jay Nixon.

cigarettes

Facts

James Sullivan worked as a part-time cook for nearly a year and a half at Landry’s Seafood House. One day, he disappeared during dinner service and was found 20 minutes later smoking and talking on his cell phone in the parking lot. He was fired and filed a claim for unemployment benefits. In Missouri, when employees are terminated for work-related misconduct, they can be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. However, a deputy at the Missouri Division of Employment Security initially determined that Sullivan was eligible for benefits. The restaurant appealed that determination to the Division Appeals Tribunal.

Appeals Tribunal Finds Willful Misconduct

During the hearing, which Sullivan failed to attend, Landry’s Seafood House offered the testimony of a senior kitchen manager. The manager said the restaurant had policies prohibiting employees from smoking at work or leaving their work area without a supervisor’s permission. Landry’s posted signs on its doors to remind employees of the rule and had discussed the policy with employees at shift meetings. Further, Landry’s provided employees with a copy of its policies. Sullivan had signed an acknowledgment of receipt when hired. Sullivan had been counseled for violating the rules in the past and had complied with the policies on several occasions by asking for permission to leave his workstation and clocking out before going outside to smoke a cigarette.

After the hearing, the Appeals Tribunal reversed the determination and found in favor of Landry’s. Sullivan was to be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because he was discharged for work-related misconduct. Sullivan appealed.

Court of Appeals Sides with the Employer

The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the decision in Landry’s favor, finding there was substantial evidence to support it. The court noted that Sullivan was aware of the rules, had signed a written statement acknowledging receipt of the policies, and had been counseled on the rules. The supervisor’s testimony at the hearing established these facts and constituted substantial evidence that Landry’s terminated Sullivan for work-related misconduct. The court explained that Landry’s rule on breaks was also reasonable because a restaurant’s business depends on employees preparing food for its customers in a timely manner. Landry’s rule against smoking on the clock was reasonable because an employer has a right to expect employees to be engaged in meaningful work while being paid.

Bottom Line

At the time of this case, Missouri law defined misconduct as a “wanton and willful” act in order to disqualify a terminated employee from receiving unemployment benefits in Missouri. But as the first decision made by the deputy at the Missouri Division of Employment Security shows, that definition can lead to inconsistent rulings. Although the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the employer, it was a time-consuming and expensive undertaking to work through the appeals process to secure a decision that would seem obvious to most people.

During the 2013 Legislative Session, the Missouri Chamber championed legislation to change the definition of misconduct to provide more consistency in unemployment compensation cases. Sponsored by Rep. Will Kraus, a Republican from Lee’s Summit, SB 28 is currently pending signature by Gov. Jay Nixon. House Bill 611 contains similar language and also awaits signature. Proof that you properly communicated your work rules to employees and required them to acknowledge receipt of the rules is key when seeking to establish that an employee’s violation of the rules was intentional. Landry’s actions in this case protected the restaurant from having to pay unemployment benefits to a former employee who violated its well-publicized policies.

Published in the July 2013 issue of Missouri Business, the Magazine of the Missouri Chamber of Commerce and Industry

New York State Court of Appeals Backs Starbucks Policy on Tip-Pooling

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Starbucks shift supervisors can legally participate in tip-sharing with other store employees, but the coffee chain’s assistant managers have enough managerial responsibility to disqualify them from sharing in customer tips, according to the New York State Court of Appeals.

Starbucks’ policy provides for weekly distribution of gratuities to the company’s two lower ranking categories of employees, baristas and shift supervisors, but not to its two higher ranking categories of employees, assistant managers and store managers. In addressing questions certified by the Second Circuit regarding the validity this policy, the Court of Appeals concluded that since shift supervisors, like baristas, directly serve patrons, they remain tip-pool eligible even if their role also involves some supervisory responsibility. But assistant managers, because they are granted “meaningful authority” over subordinates, are not eligible to participate in the tip pool.

The decision provides guidance to the Second Circuit as it hears appeals of two suits, Barenboim et al. v. Starbucks Corporation, No. 10–4912–cv, and Winans et al. v. Starbucks Corporation, No. 11–3199–cv, each brought by a different putative class of Starbucks workers. The plaintiffs in Barenboimare Starbucks baristas who argue that only baristas, and not shift supervisors, are entitled to participate in tip-sharing. The Winans plaintiffs are assistant managers who claim that they should be allowed a share of the tips. In both cases, the Southern District of New York awarded summary judgment to Starbucks, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the interpretation of New York Labor Law §196-d, which governs tip-pooling.

Shift Supervisors Are Not Company “Agents”

New York Labor Law §196-d prohibits an “employer or his agent or an officer or agent of any corporation, or any other person” from accepting or retaining any part of the gratuities received by an employee. It also states, “Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as affecting the… sharing of tips by a waiter with a busboy or similar employee.”

According to the plaintiff baristas in Barenboim, Starbucks’ policy of including shift supervisors in the stores’ tip pools violates §196-d because the shift supervisors are company “agents” and therefore not permitted to “demand or accept, directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee.” Starbucks argues that shift supervisors are sufficiently analogous to waiters, busboys and similar employees, and should therefore be permitted to share in the gratuities pursuant to §196-d.

The Court of Appeals, in deciding that shift supervisors are entitled to share in the tip pool, deferred to the New York State Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) long-standing view that “employees who regularly provide direct service to patrons remain tip-pool eligible even if they exercise a limited degree of supervisory responsibility.” The Court compared the shift supervisors to restaurant captains who have some authority over wait staff, but are nonetheless eligible to participate in tip pools pursuant to the DOL’s Hospitality Industry Wage Order and DOL guidelines dating back to 1972.

“Meaningful Authority” Standard

In Winans, the Starbucks assistant store managers argue that they should be deemed similar to waiters and busboys under §196-d (and therefore eligible for tip-sharing) because they do not have full or final authority to terminate subordinates. The Court of Appeals disagreed: “[W]e believe that there comes a point at which the degree of managerial responsibility becomes so substantial that the individual can no longer fairly be characterized as an employee similar to general wait staff within the meaning of Labor Law §196-d.” That line is drawn, according to the decision, at “meaningful or significant authority or control over subordinates.”

Examples of meaningful authority, according to the decision, are the ability to discipline subordinates, the authority to hire and terminate employees, and input into the creation of employee work schedules. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim, authority to hire and fire is not the exclusive test for determining whether an employee is similar to wait staff for the purposes of §196-d.

Tip-Sharing Required?

In addition to the question of which employees are eligible for tip-sharing, the Second Circuit asked the Court of Appeals to consider whether an employer may deny tip pool distributions to an employee who is eligible to split tips under §196-d. The Court held that §196-d excludes certain employees from tip pools, but does not require employers to include all employees who are not legally barred from participating.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals decision provides specific guidance to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in connection with the two Starbucks cases pending on appeal, but it also provides helpful clarity to any employers with tip-sharing policies. In particular, the decision confirms that employees who regularly provide direct service to patrons may still participate in tip-sharing, but are not required to do so, even if they exercise a limited degree of supervisory responsibility. On the other hand, employees with meaningful authority over subordinates are not eligible to participate in tip-sharing. Employers should carefully review their tip-sharing policies in light of this guidance from the Court of Appeals.

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Michigan Supreme Court Won’t Give Advisory Opinion on Right-to-Work

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Saying simply that “we are not persuaded that granting the request would be an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion,” the Michigan Supreme Court on Friday denied Gov. Rick Snyder’s request that the high court render an advisory opinion about the constitutionality of Michigan’s new right-to-work law.

Relying upon the provision in the state’s constitution’s that allows the governor to request the “opinion of the supreme court on important questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its effective date,” the Governor had asked the Court for a ruling largely because the state’s public workers’ collective agreements are set to expire at the end of 2013. In a brief filed in support of the request for an advisory opinion, Michigan Solicitor General John Bursch said that an advisory opinion would prevent an “impasse at the negotiating table.”

Notwithstanding the Court’s decision, six lawsuits continue challenging the Act. Two of them are brought by unions or labor coalitions. Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Callaghan has been brought in federal court and challenges the constitutionality of the Act as to private sector workers. UAW v. Green, currently pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals, challenges the constitutionality as it applies to public sector workers. Here’s a helpful link to a chart describing the pending litigation.

SG Bursch also said in his filing with the Supreme Court that barring Supreme Court action, the state would consider filing a motion seeking an expedited ruling in the Green case.

The Detroit Free Press coverage on the court’s decision can be found here.

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What Windsor Means for Same-Sex Married Couples Seeking U.S. Immigration Benefits

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On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Windsor that Section 3 of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional. This Section of DOMA prohibited the U.S. government from conferring any federal benefits to same-sex couples who were married in any jurisdiction in the world.

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What does the Windsor decision mean for same-sex couples seeking immigration benefits?

On the immigration front, DOMA has been the main obstacle prohibiting married same-sex couples from accessing any immigration benefits that would otherwise flow to a spouse. For example, a U.S. citizen may sponsor a spouse who is a foreign national for permanent residence, and that foreign national spouse is considered an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen and exempt from annual numerical limitations on immigrants. Before Windsor, this option of “immediate relative” sponsorship did not exist for same-sex couples. Same-sex spouses also were not able to qualify for derivative nonimmigrant visas, or to qualify as dependents in an employment-based immigrant visa or adjustment of status process. Windsor has permanently shifted this landscape, with same-sex married couples being recognized as married and therefore able to access immigration benefits, provided they can demonstrate eligibility under the law for the specific benefits sought.

What marriages are valid under Windsor?

Generally, if a couple’s marriage is valid where it is performed, it is valid for purposes of immigration law. If you and your foreign national spouse were married in one of the 12 U.S. states that recognize same-sex marriage or in a foreign country that recognizes same-sex marriage, such as Canada, your green card sponsorship and application process should be treated exactly like the application of a different-sex couple. In fact, Edie Windsor, the plaintiff in Windsor, married her wife in Canada. To determine the validity of the marriage, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) focuses on the place where the marriage took place, not the location where one or both spouses live. This same principle is applied by other agencies within the Department of Homeland Security as well as at U.S. Embassies and Consulates.

Recent Guidance from the Federal Government

We expect government agencies to implement the Windsor decision swiftly. This means that immediately we will see changes at the various federal agencies that process applications for immigration benefits and visas. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a statement following the Court’s decision. She directed USCIS “to review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse.” Recent Department of Homeland Security guidance is now clear that family-based immigrant visas will no longer “be automatically denied as a result of the same-sex nature of your marriage.” Following the Court’s decision, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the Department of State (DOS) will work with the Department of Justice and other agencies “to review all relevant statues as well as benefits administered” by DOS. We expect to see guidance from U.S. Consulates in the coming weeks.

Conclusion

Same-sex couples who are married now have equal access to immigration benefits. The scope of the Windsor decision extends to same-sex spouses of individuals pursuing employment-based immigration benefits, such as green card and nonimmigrant visa sponsorship. We will continue to monitor developments in the law and provide guidance on immigration options for LGBT families.

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In a Pro-Employee World, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings Offer Employers Hope

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In a pair of important opinions released last week, both of which are helpful to employers, the U.S. Supreme Court raised the bar for employees asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. _, No. 12-484 (2013), the Court ruled that an employee claiming retaliation must do more than show that retaliatory animus was a “motivating factor” for discipline – it must be the “but-for” cause.  In Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. _, No. 11-556 (2013), the Court ruled that for employers to be held vicariously liable for the actions of a “supervisor,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “supervisor” had power to take a “tangible employment action,” such as transferring or terminating the employee. Authority merely to direct aspects of the employee’s work will not suffice.

Nassar and Vance represent significant victories for employers faced with Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims. The heightened requirements that charging employees now face should enhance an employer’s prospects for obtaining summary judgment and, failing that, impose a more rigorous hurdle for plaintiffs at trial.

Nassar Imposes More Stringent “But-For” Causation Test for Title VII Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff in Nassar was a physician of Middle Eastern descent. The defendant university hired him as a member of its medical faculty, and under the terms of the university’s affiliation agreement with a local hospital, the plaintiff also worked at the hospital as a staff physician. The plaintiff alleged that the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine harassed him because of her discriminatory “bias against Arabs and Muslims.” The plaintiff ultimately resigned from the university faculty, and accused his superior of discriminatory bias in his letter of resignation, which he sent to the university’s chair of Internal Medicine and other faculty members. The chair was allegedly dismayed by the public accusations of discrimination, and said that the chief must “be publicly exonerated” of the charges against her. When he learned that plaintiff had been offered a staff physician position at the hospital, the chair objected that the affiliation agreement required all staff physicians to also be faculty members, and the hospital therefore withdrew its offer to plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that he had been constructively discharged by reason of the chief’s discriminatory harassment, and that the chair subsequently allegedly retaliated against him for complaining of that harassment. A jury found for plaintiff on both claims, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed only as to the retaliation claim, holding that retaliation claims under Title VII required a showing merely that retaliation was a “motivating factor” for an adverse employment action rather than its “but-for” cause.

The Supreme Court vacated that decision, concluding that “the text, structure and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim … must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” The Court reasoned that because Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision appears in a different section from the status-based discrimination ban, which utilizes the lesser “motivating factor” causation test, the “but-for” standard applies to Title VII retaliation claims. Accordingly, “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” To establish a retaliation claim, employees must now show that their employer would not have taken the challenged employment action but for the employee’s protected activity.

Vance Limits “Supervisors” to Those with Power to Take a Tangible Employment Action

In a second critical decision for employers, plaintiff in Vance, an African-American woman, worked in the university’s Banquet and Catering Division of Dining Services. Plaintiff alleged that a fellow employee, a white woman named Davis, harassed and intimidated her because of her race.  Plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging that her white co-worker created a racially hostile work environment. “The parties vigorously dispute[d] the precise nature and scope of Davis’ duties, but they agree[d] that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.”

The District Court granted defendant summary judgment, holding the university was notvicariously liable for Davis’s alleged actions because she could not take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff and therefore was not a “supervisor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “who qualifies as a ‘supervisor’” under Title VII. The Court held that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII [only] if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim” and affirmed.

In analyzing when an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, the Court defined “tangible employment actions” to include effecting “‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” The Court specifically rejected the EEOC’s definition of “supervisor,” which tied “supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily work[,]” as “a study in ambiguity.” Hence, under Title VII, if an employee is not authorized to impose tangible employment actions against another, the employer cannot be vicariously liable for the subject employee’s alleged harassment.

Vance enhances an employer’s ability to limit the company’s responsibility for harassment. Employers should remain mindful of the duties of their employees, ensuring that only key management and supervisory personnel possess the power to effect a “significant change in employment status”. Clear definitions of an employee’s responsibilities should greatly limit any future claims of vicarious liability against employers. This more precise definition of “supervisor” should, like Nassar, increase the likelihood of dismissal at the summary judgment stage and help obtain favorable in limine and trial rulings.

Conclusion

Nassar and Vance afford significant advantages to employers defending against discrimination and retaliation claims.  Importantly, although the decisions themselves were concerned with claims arising under federal anti-discrimination (not just Title VII) laws, the Court’s reasoning may well find acceptance among state courts, which frequently apply the Title VII analysis to claims asserted under analogous state laws. Nassar and Vance are likely to prove valuable tools to employers defending against claims of discrimination and/or retaliation, increasing both the prospects of obtaining summary judgment and, if necessary, the odds of success at trial.

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