Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Is Coming… Are You Ready? CBP Issues Hints at the Wave of Enforcement To Come

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.

What to Know

  • US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.
  • The new guidance imposes tighter timelines and a higher burden of evidence on importers to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor. If CBP does not make a decision within specific timeframes, goods will automatically be deemed excluded.
  • CBP is expected to issue additional technical guidance at the end of May or early June. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also expected to issue guidance closer to June 21, 2022.
  • CBP is scheduled to host informational webinars detailing their UFLPA guidance in the coming weeks.

What’s New: Tighter Timelines  

While US importers were eagerly anticipating the issuance of technical guidance regarding implementation of the UFLPA from CBP last week, which is now expected this week, CBP did post a new guidance document summarizing the UFLPA and forced labor Withhold Release Orders (WRO) enforcement mechanisms. Specifically, CBP’s authority to detain merchandise under the UFLPA will be pursuant to 19 CFR § 151.16, which provides for a much different timeline for the detention of merchandise than the WRO process. Under this process, if Customs does not make a timely decision regarding admissibility, goods are automatically excluded.

UFLPA Timeline Enforcement under 19 CFR § 151.16

Number of Days

Actions

5 Days from Presentation for Examination

CBP must decide whether to release or detail merchandise

  • If the merchandise is not released, it is detained
5 Days after Decision to Release or Detain

CBP will issue a notice to importer advising them of:

  • The initiation of detention
  • Date merchandise examined
  • Reason for detention
  • Anticipated length of detention
  • Nature of tests and inquiries to be conducted
  • Information to accelerate disposition
  Upon written request, CBP must provide importer with testing procedures, methodologies used, and testing results
Within 30 Days of Examination

CBP will make a final determination as to the admissibility of merchandise

  • If CBP does not make a determination within the 30-day period, the merchandise will be deemed excluded
  • This means any submission to rebut the presumption should be made before this 30 day period
Within 180 Days of CBP Determination/Exclusion Importers may protest CBP’s final determination
Within 30 Days After Protest Submitted The protest is deemed denied if CBP does not grant or deny the protest within 30 days
Within 180 Days after the Date the Protest is Denied

The importer may commence a court action contesting the denied protest (28 U.S.C. § 1581(a))

  • In a court action, CBP must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an admissibility decision has been reached for good cause
  • Customs can decide to grant the protest after the deemed denial but before a court case is filed

This is a much shorter timeline than the WRO process. Importantly, a company contesting CBP’s detention of merchandise pursuant to the UFLPA would be required to submit documentation to rebut the presumption within the 30-day period that CBP is assessing admissibility, whereas the WRO process permits 90 days. Like the WRO process, the importer may also file a protest 180 days after CBP makes its final determination regarding the exclusion.

CBP Listening Session: A Higher Burden of Evidence 

On Tuesday, May 24, 2022, CBP provided information regarding the publication of guidance and enforcement of the UFLPA:

  • CBP Publication of Guidance. CBP’s guidance regarding its enforcement of the rebuttable presumption and the UFLPA is scheduled to be published the week of May 30.
  • DHS Publication of Guidance. DHS guidance will be published on or about June 21, 2022, which will include information relating to supply chain due diligence, importer guidance, and the entity lists.
  • Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to Rebut the Presumption that Merchandise was Produced with Forced Labor. It was confirmed that the UFLPA will have a much higher burden of evidence required to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor than that of a WRO. Any exception to the rebuttable presumption must be reported to Congress, and thus the level of evidence that will be required to overcome the rebuttable presumption is very high. As a practical matter, it appears that very few detained entries will be released. Importers are advised to start conducting due diligence on supply chains in order to ensure that they will be able to obtain documentation should merchandise be detained once the rebuttable presumption goes into effect. Importantly, products that are subject to an existing WRO from Xinjiang will now be enforced under the UFLPA process instead of the WRO process.
  • Evidence Required if Merchandise is Detained. The forthcoming guidance will set forth information regarding how an importer may meet the exception to the rebuttable presumption and to demonstrate that merchandise was not produced with forced labor, by meeting the following three criteria:
    • Demonstrate compliance with the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force/DHS strategy;
    • Demonstrate compliance with CBP’s guidance and any inquiries that CBP raises; and
    • Provide clear and convincing evidence that the supply chain in question is free of forced labor.
  • Binding Rulings. Importers may apply for a binding ruling to confirm or request an exception to the rebuttable presumption under the UFLPA. Although CBP is still finalizing the process for importers to apply for a binding ruling, importers would be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that merchandise is not produced with forced labor. If the ruling is granted, it applies to future shipments for the specific supply chain in question.
  • Known Importer Letters and Detention Notices. Going forward, CBP will not issue Known Importer letters, and CBP will notify importers that merchandise is subject to the UFLPA through the issuance of detention notices.
  • Detention of Merchandise. If goods are detained by CBP because they are suspected of having a nexus to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), importers may either provide clear and convincing evidence that merchandise was not produced with forced labor or export the products. If detained products that fall under the UFLPA are comingled with other products that are not subject to the UFLPA, importers may request the segregation of the merchandise that is not subject to the UFLPA.
  • Chain of CBP Review for Importer Submissions Relating to Detained Merchandise. Chain of CBP review for the request of an exception to the rebuttable presumption has not been finalized yet. However, importers will be required to submit evidence that rebuts the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor to the applicable CBP Port Director. For the moment, the CBP Commissioner is the final individual who can ultimately make an exception to the rebuttable presumption, but CBP is deciding if it will delegate this responsibility to any additional persons.

Upcoming CBP Informational Webinars

CBP will be holding three webinar sessions, all covering the same material, to discuss and review its guidance relating to the UFLPA. The dates of the webinars and the registration links are listed below.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

Europol: More Than Half of Counterfeits Originate in China

On March 7, 2022, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) jointly released the Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment 2022. Per the Assessment, China (including Hong Kong) was the main source of counterfeits based on number of counterfeits and by value of the counterfeits seized at the EU external borders.  Almost 76% of the fake goods detained were for trademark infringement; design infringement was the second most reported at 23% while copyright was third with 15%.

China and Turkey remain the main countries of origins for counterfeit clothing, shoes, bags, watches, and jewelry seized at the EU’s border. These goods are mostly ordered online and discovered as part of postal shipments or on passengers entering the EU.

Similarly, China is the country of origin for most of the seized counterfeit electrical/electronic and computer equipment, mobile phones and accessories. With respect to mobile phones, the Assessment states,

…the visual appearance of the counterfeit devices is very convincing, closely mimicking the external characteristics of the original phones. However, typically some features and software characteristics are missing and the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is often fake.  The use of cheap and substandard electric components, which can be found in fake batteries, headphones or chargers, pose safety risks.

“China and Turkey were among the most frequently reported non-EU countries of origin for counterfeit food and drink seized at the EU’s external border.” Similarly, counterfeit perfumes and cosmetic products often originate from China and Turkey.

In addition to ready-to-use IPR-infringing goods, product components, such as aroma compounds, fixatives and solvents, are increasingly being seized. These components are used to create the final counterfeit products in the EU.

More worrisome, China and Turkey were the main origin of counterfeit pharmaceutical products.

Toys round out the top 10 counterfeits with China also being main point of origin.

The full Assessment is available here: IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_2022_FullR_en.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Chinese APT41 Attacking State Networks

Although we are receiving frequent alerts from CISA and the FBI about the potential for increased cyber threats coming out of Russia, China continues its cyber threat activity through APT41, which has been linked to China’s Ministry of State Security. According to Mandiant, APT41 has launched a “deliberate campaign targeting U.S. state governments” and has successfully attacked at least six state government networks by exploiting various vulnerabilities, including Log4j.

According to Mandiant, although the Chinese-based hackers are kicked out of state government networks, they repeat the attack weeks later and keep trying to get in to the same networks via different vulnerabilities (a “re-compromise”). One such successful vulnerability that was utilized is the USAHerds zero-day vulnerability, which is a software that state agriculture agencies use to monitor livestock. When the intruders are successful in using the USAHerds vulnerability to get in to the network, they can then leverage the intrusion to migrate to other parts of the network to access and steal information, including personal information.

Mandiant’s outlook on these attacks is sobering:

“APT41’s recent activity against U.S. state governments consists of significant new capabilities, from new attack vectors to post-compromise tools and techniques. APT41 can quickly adapt their initial access techniques by re-compromising an environment through a different vector, or by rapidly operationalizing a fresh vulnerability. The group also demonstrates a willingness to retool and deploy capabilities through new attack vectors as opposed to holding onto them for future use. APT41 exploiting Log4J in close proximity to the USAHerds campaign showed the group’s flexibility to continue targeting U.S state governments through both cultivated and co-opted attack vectors. Through all the new, some things remain unchanged: APT41 continues to be undeterred by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indictment in September 2020.

Both Russia and China continue to conduct cyber-attacks against both private and public networks in the U.S. and there is no indication that the attacks will subside anytime soon.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

U.S. House and Senate Reach Agreement on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

On December 14, 2021, lawmakers in the House and Senate announced that they had reached an agreement on compromise language for a bill known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act or “UFLPA.”  Different versions of this measure passed the House and the Senate earlier this year, but lawmakers and Congressional staff have been working to reconcile the parallel proposals. The compromise language paves the way for Congress to pass the bill and send it to President Biden’s desk as soon as this week.

The bill would establish a rebuttable presumption that all goods originating from China’s Xinjiang region violate existing US law prohibiting the importation of goods made with forced labor. The rebuttable presumption would go into effect 180 days after enactment.  The compromise bill would also require federal officials to solicit public comments and hold a public hearing to aid in developing a strategy for the enforcement of the import ban vis-à-vis goods alleged to have been made through forced labor in China.

This rebuttable presumption will present significant challenges to businesses with supply chains that might touch the Xinjiang region.  Many businesses do not have full visibility into their supply chains and will need to act quickly to map their suppliers and respond to identified risks.  Importers must present detailed documentaton in order to release any shipments that they think were improperly detained, a costly and time-consuming endeavor.  Notably, the public comment and hearing processes will guide the government’s enforcement strategy, providing business stakeholders an opportunity to contribute to an enforcement process that could have implications for implementation of the import ban more broadly.

China’s Xinjiang region is a part of several critical supply chains, lead among them global cotton and apparel trade, as well as solar module production.  According to the Peterson Institute:

Xinjiang accounts for nearly 20 percent of global cotton production, with annual production greater than that of the entire United States. Its position in refined polysilicon—the material from which solar panels are built—is even more dominant, accounting for nearly half of global production. Virtually all silicon-based solar panels are likely to contain some Xinjiang-sourced silicon, according to Jenny Chase, head of solar analysis at Bloomberg New Energy Finance. If signed into law, the bill will send apparel producers and the US solar industry scrambling to find alternative sources of supply and prices are bound to increase.

Article By Ludmilla L. Kasulke and Rory Murphy of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more legal news and legislation updates, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2021 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

China’s New Civil Law Adds Right of Publicity

The Third Session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) voted and passed the “Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China” on May 28, 2020. This law will come into effect on January 1, 2021.  Part IV of the law is dedicated to Personality Rights, which include portrait rights, which is similar  California’s right of publicity and right of publicity for the deceased.  Portrait rights in China were previously protected under the General Principles of Civil Law and the new law provides significant clarification on these rights and also codifies existing case law.

Article 990 defines personality rights as “the rights of life, body, health, nameportrait, reputation, honor, privacy and other rights enjoyed by civil subjects.” However, these rights cannot be waived, transferred or inherited per Article 992.  Even though there is no inheritance, a spouse, children and parents can enforce the deceased rights per Article 994.  This codifies existing law from the Supreme People’s Court  case Zhou Haiying v. Shaoxing Yuewang Jewellery and Gold Co., Ltd., which held a close relative was entitled to sue for a violation of Lu Xun’s portrait right after his death.

Article 995 confirms that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation and injunctions for the violation of personality rights.  Article 996 adds that the compensation may include damages for mental anguish. Article 997 adds preliminary injunctions are available when when “a civil subject has evidence to prove that the perpetrator is or is about to commit an illegal act that infringes on his personality rights, and if he fails to stop it in time, his legal rights and interests will be irreparably damaged.”

Article 1018 defines the right of portrait as “…image that can be recognized by a specific natural person reflected on a certain medium through video, sculpture, painting, etc.” and gives natural persons “…the right to make, use, disclose or permit others to use their own portraits in accordance with the law.”

Article 1019 expands on Article 995 by stating “it is forbidden to make, use or publish portraits of portrait right holders without the consent of the portrait right holders, except as otherwise provided by law.” However, exceptions are provided in Article 1020 including personal use, art appreciation, education or scientific research, news, government use with the required scope of their duties, images of public environments where it is inevitable that people will be present, and public interest.

Articles 1021 and 1022 cover portrait right contracts and are favorable to the portrait right owner.  Per Article 1021, if there is a dispute in the meaning of a term, the explanation should favor the portrait right owner.  Article 1022 covers term of the contracts. If no term is specified, either party may cancel at any time but provide reasonable notice. If a term is specified, the portrait right owner can cancel the contract before the end of term as long as reasonable notice is provided.

Article 1023 states the right to name and voice are also covered similarly by this section IV of Personality Rights with respect to portraits.

The new Civil Law may have a favorable impact on famous foreigners looking to protect their rights in China.  For example, Bruce Lee’s heir has recently sued a fast food chain for portrait right infringement and Michael Jordan has several long running disputes with Qiaodan Sports Co., Ltd. (Qioadan is the Chinese pronunciation of Jordan) over use of his name and likeness and recently won a victory on the trademark side.


© 2020 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Control Freaks and Bond Villains

The hippy ethos that birthed early management of the internet is beginning to look quaint. Even as a military project, the core internet concept was a decentralized network of unlimited nodes that could reroute itself around danger and destruction. No one could control it because no one could truly manage it. And that was the primary feature, not a bug.

Well, not anymore.

I suppose it shouldn’t surprise us that the forces insisting on dominating their societies are generally opposed to an open internet where all information can be free. Dictators gonna dictate.

Beginning July 17, 2019, the government of Kazakhstan began intercepting all HTTPS internet traffic inside its borders. Local Kazakh ISPs must force their users to install a government-issued certificate into all devices to allow local government agents to decrypt users’ HTTPS traffic, examine its content, re-encrypt with a government certificate and send it on to its intended destination. This is the electronic equivalent of opening every envelope, photocopying the material inside, stuffing that material in a government envelope and (sometimes) sending it to the expected recipient. Except with web sites.

According to ZDNet, the Kazakh government, unsurprisingly, said the measure was “aimed at enhancing the protection of citizens, government bodies and private companies from hacker attacks, Internet fraudsters and other types of cyber threats.” As Robin Hood could have told you, the Sheriff’s actions taken to protect travelers and control brigands can easily result in government control of all traffic and information, especially when that was the plan all along. Security Boulevard reports that “Since Wednesday, all internet users in Kazakhstan have been redirected to a page instructing users to download and install the new certificate.

This is not the first time that Kazakhstan has attempted to force its citizens to install root certificate, and in 2015 the Kazakhs even applied with Mozilla to have Kazakh root certificate included in Firefox (Mozilla politely declined).

Despite creative technical solutions, we all know that Kazakhstan is not alone in restricting the internet access of its citizens. For one (gargantuan) example, China’s population of 800 million has deeply restricted internet access, and, according to the Washington Post, the Chinese citizenry can’t access Google, Facebook, YouTube or the New York Times, among many, many, many others. The Great Firewall of China, which involves legislation, government monitoring action, technology limitations and cooperation from internet and telecommunications companies. China recently clamped down on WhatsApp and VPNs, which had returned a modicum of control and privacy to the people. And China has taken these efforts two steps beyond nearly anyone else in the world by building a culture of investigation and shame, where its citizens could find their pictures on local billboard for boorish traffic or internet behavior, or in jail for questioning the ruling party on the internet. All this is well documented.

23 countries in Asia and 7 in Africa restrict torrents, pornography, political media and social media. The only two European nations that have the same restrictions are Turkey and Belarus. Politicians in the U.S. and Europe had hoped that the internet would serve as a force for freedom, knowledge and unlimited communications. Countries like Russia, Cuba and Nigeria also see the internet’s potential, but they prefer to throttle the net to choke off this potential threat to their one-party rule governments.

For these countries, there is no such thing as private. They think of privacy in context – you may keep thoughts or actions private from companies, but not the government. On the micro level, it reminds me of family dynamics –When your teenagers talk about privacy, they mean keeping information private from the adults in their lives, not friends, strangers, or even companies. Controlling governments sing the song of privacy, as long as information is not kept from them, it can be hidden from others.

The promise of Internet freedom is slipping further away from more people each year as dictators and real life versions of movie villains figure out how to use the technology for surveillance of everyday people and how to limit access to “dangerous” ideas of liberty. ICANN, the internet control organization set up by the U.S. two decades ago, has proven itself bloated and ineffective to protect the interests of private internet users.  In fact, it would be surprising if the current leaders of ICANN even felt that such protections were within its purview.

The internet is truly a global phenomenon, but it is managed at local levels, leaving certain populations vulnerable to spying and manipulation by their own governments. Those running the system seem to have resigned themselves to allowing national governments to greatly restrict the human rights of their own citizens.

A tool can be used in many different ways.  A hammer can help build a beautiful home or can be the implement of torture and murder. The internet can be a tool for freedom of thought and expression, where everyone has a publishing and communication platform.  Or it can be a tool for repression. We have come to accept more of the latter than I believed possible.

Post Script —

Also, after a harrowing last 2-5 years where freedom to speak on the internet (and social media) has exploded into horrible real-life consequences, large and small, even the most libertarian and laissez faire of First World residents is slapping the screen to find some way to moderate the flow of ignorance, evil, insanity, inanity and stupidity. This is the other side of the story and fodder for a different post.

And it is also probably time to run an updated discussion of ICANN and its role in internet management.  We heard a great deal about internet leadership in 2016, but not so much lately. Stay Tuned.

Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
For more global & domestic internet developments, see the National Law Review Communications, Medis & Intenet law page.

New Rules Offer Clarity On China’s Outbound M&A Crackdown

On August 18, 2017, China’s State Council issued guidelines clarifying rules passed a year ago by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) limiting outbound investments as cover-up to move money out of China.

The new guidelines provide different policies for Chinese companies’ investment overseas, broadly dividing overseas investment into three categories:

  • investments in “real estate, hotels, entertainment, sport clubs, [and] outdated industries” are restricted;

  • investments in sectors that could “jeopardize China’s national interest and security, including output of unauthorized core military technology and products” and investments in gambling and pornography are prohibited; and

  • investments in establishing R&D centers abroad and in sectors like high-tech and advanced manufacturing enterprises that could boost China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and investments that would benefit Chinese products and technology will be encouraged by Chinese outbound regulators.

These guidelines are new and we have to wait and see how they will be interpreted and implemented by regulators. Still, there may be reasons to believe they will have a net positive effect on the China-U.S. M&A market. The new guidelines bring about greater certainty to buyers, lenders and targets on whether a deal will get approved by Chinese regulators.

The volume and size of Chinese outbound M&A is already on an upward trajectory in the second quarter of 2017, as buyers are already getting more acclimated to SAFE rules announced at the end of 2016 restricting the outflow of Chinese capital. Chinese buyers completed 94 deals totaling $36 billion in Q2, compared to the 74 deals totaling $12 billion in Q1. The current Chinese outbound M&A trend, coupled with greater certainty under the new guidelines, is likely to result in more Chinese outbound M&A deals during the last quarter of 2017, as well as in 2018.

This post was written by Shang Kong & Zhu Julie Lee of Foley & Lardner LLP © 2017

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

China Proposes “RoHS 2” Framework for Comment

On May 15, 2015, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology  (“MIIT”) released a latest Draft for Comments (“May 2015 Draft”) of the “Management Methods for the Restriction of the Use of Hazardous Substances in Electrical and  Electronic Products” (“Methods”) (Draft for Comments in Chinese). The new Methods is designed to replace the existing regime, promulgated in 2006 and commonly referred to as “China RoHS.” The May 2015 Draft is now open for public comments until June 17, 2015. It makes several important proposed changes to the existing China RoHS regulation.

Since 2010, the Chinese government has attempted to push forward an updated RoHS regulation, and MIIT has released several draft revisions, but none have been enacted. The May 2015 Draft generally retains the requirements on both materials restrictions and information disclosure, but makes several important changes:

  • It aligns its scope with the EU RoHS 2. The new open scope of covered “Electrical and Electronic Products” (“EEP”) is not limited to “electronic information products” but would now extend to all electrical and electronic equipment (“EEE”) that meets voltage specifications. The definition is almost identical to that of EEE in the EU RoHS 2 Directive, except that it excludes “devices involved in electrical power production, transmission and distribution.”;

  • The May 2015 Draft will remove the current “manufactured for export” scope exclusion;

  • The renamed “Compliance Management Catalogue” will likely, once issued in the future, include the hazardous-substance content limits (to date not yet imposed under China RoHS 1).

  • With respect to certification, the May 2015 Draft proposes a new, multi-agency, two-step system to replace the current program. Products on the “Compliance Management Catalogue” will first go through a “conformity assessment” process. After the conformity assessment, that assessment will be subject to a subsequent verification mechanism, which will be developed later by MIIT along with Finance and other ministries.

It remains unclear how the new conformity assessment and the following verification mechanism will operate in practice. The language implies that the MIIT may need to take further actions to specify the details of these programs;

  • The May 2015 Draft will remove the disclosure requirement for product packaging materials from the existing regulation.

It remains to be seen whether this May 2015 Draft will be finalized as the new China RoHS 2 regulation and whether the above changes will remain in the enacted rules.  Parties that are interested in submitting comments on this Draft may do so via either of the two approaches listed here (in Chinese).

Mr. LaMotte graciously acknowledges the assistance of Shengzhi Wang, a summer associate with the Firm, in the preparation of this Alert.