Category: Bankruptcy

Who Owns the Crypto, the Customer or the Debtor?

Whose crytpo is it? With the multiple cryptocurrency companies that have recently filed for bankruptcy (FTX, Voyager Digital, BlockFi), and more likely on the way, that simple sounding question is taking on huge significance. Last week, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Chief Judge Martin Glenn) attempted to answer that question in the Celsius Network LLC bankruptcy case.

The Facts of the Case

Celsius and its affiliated debtors (collectively, “Debtors”) ran a cryptocurrency finance platform. Faced with extreme turbulence in the cryptocurrency markets, the Debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions on July 13, 2022. As part of their regular business, the Debtors had allowed customers to both deposit cryptocurrency digital assets on their platform and earn a percentage yield, as well as take out loans by pledging their cryptocurrencies as security. One specific program offered by the Debtors was the “Earn” program, under which customers could transfer certain cryptocurrencies to the Debtors and earn “rewards” in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens. On the petition date, the Earn program accounts (the “Earn Accounts”) held cryptocurrency assets with a market value of approximately $4.2 billion. Included within the Earn Accounts were stablecoins valued at approximately $23 million in September 2022. A stablecoin is a type of cryptocurrency designed to be tied or pegged to another currency, commodity or financial instrument.

Recognizing their emerging need for liquidity, on November 11, 2022, the Debtors filed a motion seeking entry of an order (a) establishing a rebuttable presumption that the Debtors owned the assets in the Earn Accounts and (b) permitting the sale of the stablecoins held in the Earn Accounts under either section 363(c)(1) (sale in the ordinary course of business) or section 363(b)(1) (sale outside the ordinary course of business) of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion generated opposition from the U.S. Trustee, various States and State securities regulators and multiple creditors and creditor groups. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors objected to the sale of the stablecoins under section 363(c)(1) but argued that the sale should be approved under section 363(b)(1) because the Debtors had shown a good business reason for the sale (namely to pay ongoing administrative expenses of the bankruptcy cases). On January 4, 2023, the court issued its forty-five (45) page memorandum opinion granting the Debtors’ motion.

The Court’s Decision

Although the ownership issue may appear complex given the nature of the assets (i.e., cryptocurrency), the bankruptcy court framed the issue into relatively straightforward state law questions of contract formation and interpretation. The court first analyzed whether there was a valid contract governing the parties’ rights to the cryptocurrency assets in the Earn Accounts. Under governing New York law, a valid, enforceable contract requires an offer and acceptance (i.e., mutual assent), consideration and an intent to be bound. The court found that all three elements were satisfied. The Debtors required that all customers agree to and accept “Terms of Use.” The Terms of Use was set up as a “clickwrap” agreement that required customers to agree to the terms and prevented the customers from advancing to the next page and completing their sign up unless they agreed to the Terms of Use. Under New York law, “clickwrap” agreements are sufficient to constitute mutual assent. The court also found that consideration was given by way of allowing the customers to earn a financing fee (i.e., the rewards in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens). Finally, the court noted that no party had presented evidence that either the Debtors or the customers lacked intent to be bound by the contract terms. Accordingly, the court held that the Terms of Use constituted a valid contract, subject to the rights of customers to put forth individual contract formation defenses in the future, including claims of fraudulent inducement based on representations allegedly made by the Debtors’ former CEO, Alex Mashinsky.

Having found a valid contract to presumptively exist, the court turned its attention to what the Terms of Use provided in terms of transfer of ownership. In operative part, the Terms of Use provided:

In consideration for the Rewards payable to you on the Eligible Digital Assets using the Earn Service … and the use of our Services, you grant Celsius … all right and title to such Eligible Digital Assets, including ownership rights, and the right, without further notice to you, to hold such Digital Assets in Celsius’ own Virtual Wallet or elsewhere, and to pledge, re-pledge, hypothecate, rehypothecate, sell, lend or otherwise transfer or use any amount of such Digital Assets, separately or together with other property, with all the attendant rights of ownership, and for any period of time, and without retaining in Celsius’ possession and/or control a like amount of Digital Assets or any other monies or assets, and use or invest such Digital Assets in Celsius’ full discretion. You acknowledge that with respect Digital Assets used by Celsius pursuant to this paragraph:

  1. You will not be able to exercise rights of ownership;
  2. Celsius may receive compensation in connection with lender or otherwise using Digital Assets in its business to which you have no claim or entitlement; and
  3. In the event that Celsius becomes bankrupt, enters liquidation or is otherwise unable to repay its obligations, any Eligible Digital Assets used in the Earn Service or as collateral under the Borrow Service may not be recoverable, and you may not have any legal remedies or rights in connection with Celsius’ obligations to you other than your rights as a creditor of Celsius under any applicable laws.

Based on this language, the court held that the Terms of Use unambiguously transferred ownership of the assets in the Earn Accounts to the Debtors. Central to the court’s decision was that under the Terms of Use customers had granted the Debtors “all right and title to such Digital Assets, including ownership rights.” Based on this language, the court found that title and ownership of the cryptocurrency held in the Earn Accounts was “unequivocally transferred to the Debtors and became property of the Estate on the Petition Date.”

Finally, the court found that the Debtors had shown that they needed to generate liquidity to fund the bankruptcy cases, and that additional liquidity would be needed early this year. Accordingly, the court held that the Debtors had shown sufficient cause to permit the sale of the stablecoins outside of the ordinary course of business in accordance with section 363(b)(1).

Implications

Given the turbulent nature of the cryptocurrency market and the likelihood of further cryptocurrency bankruptcy filings, the court’s ruling is sure to have significant implications. First, unless it is reversed on appeal, the opinion means that the Debtors’ Earn program customers do not own the funds in their digital accounts and will instead be relegated to the status of unsecured creditors with a highly uncertain recovery. Second, the opinion underscores the Wild West nature of crypto and the fact that unlike deposits at a federally insured financial institution, deposits at cryptocurrency exchanges are not similarly insured and may be at risk. Third, customers or account holders in other cryptocurrency exchanges or businesses should carefully review the applicable terms of use to determine if those terms transferred ownership of their digital assets to their cryptocurrency counterparty. It is likely a fair assumption that such other terms of use transferred ownership in the same way that the Celsius Terms of Use did, in which case customers must remain vigilant of the financial health of their cryptocurrency counterparty. Finally, all parties engaging in on-line business transactions, including those outside of cryptocurrency, are on notice that clickwrap agreements commonly found in such transactions are, at least under New York law, enforceable. In short, those agreements mean something, and the fact that a party did not read the terms before agreeing to them through a “click” is likely not going to be a viable defense to the enforcement of those terms.

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© Copyright 2023 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Tom Brady, Larry David, and Others Named Defendants in Class Action Suit Filed Against FTX

Four days after FTX, once the world’s third-largest crypto exchange, filed for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy, former FTX investors filed a class action against 11 athletes and celebrities who promoted FTX in advertisements and on social media, including NFL quarterback Tom Brady and comedian Larry David.

The lawsuit, which also names FTX’s co-founder and former chief executive Sam Bankman-Fried as a defendant, seeks $11 billion in damage.

Background

The FTX bankruptcy filing covers about 130 FTX Group companies, including FTX.com, FTX’s US operations, and Bankman-Fried’s cryptocurrency trading firm, Alameda Research. According to published reports, Bankman-Fried had covertly used funds from FTX customers to make risky bets for Alameda Research – a hedge fund he also ran – and had commingled funds between the two entities.

Allegations Against FTX Celebrity Endorsers

The class action was brought on behalf of US investors who hold FTX yield-bearing accounts funded with crypto assets. The plaintiff and class-action members alleged that FTX lured them to its yield-bearing accounts and transferred investor funds to related entities to maintain the appearance of liquidity.

While an investor class action following bankruptcy is not necessarily surprising, the fact that the complaint named various celebrity endorsers and spokespeople as defendants is fairly unusual. Among them, Larry David starred in an advertisement for FTX that aired during the 2022 Super Bowl. The ad featured David being a skeptic on inventions such as the wheel, the fork, the toilet, democracy, the light bulb, the dishwasher, the Sony Walkman, and, finally, FTX, and cautioned viewers, “Don’t be like Larry.” Other conduct cited by the complaint includes:

  • Tom Brady and Gisele Bundchen: according to the complaint, Brady and Bundchen served as brand ambassadors for FTX, took equity stakes in FTX Trading Ltd., and appeared in an advertisement showing them telling acquaintances to join the FTX platform.

  • Kevin O’Leary: served as brand ambassador and FTX shareholder and made several public statements, including on Twitter, “designed to induce consumers to invest in” FTX’s yield-bearing accounts.

  • Naomi Osaka: the tennis star served as a brand ambassador for FTX in exchange for an equity stake and payments in an unspecified amount of cryptocurrency, appeared in advertisements, and promoted FTX to her Twitter followers.

The plaintiff and class members claimed that those FTX promoters engaged in a conspiracy to defraud investors and violated Florida state laws prohibiting unfair business practices. Specifically, in their civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff and class members alleged that “the FTX Entities and Defendants made numerous misrepresentations and omissions to Plaintiff and Class Members about the Deceptive FTX Platform in order to induce confidence and to drive consumers to invest in what was ultimately a Ponzi scheme, misleading customers and prospective customers with the false impression that any cryptocurrency assets held on the deceptive FTX Platform were safe and were not being invested in unregistered securities.” [1]

Celebrities Under Scrutiny in Crypto Industry

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has gone after celebrities for deceptively touting cryptocurrencies since 2017. In November 2017, SEC Chair Gary Gensler warned celebrities that federal securities laws require people who tout a certain stock or crypto security to disclose the amount, the source, and the nature of those payments they received.[2]

In October 2022, the SEC found that Kim Kardashian violated the anti-touting provision of the federal securities laws by plugging on social media a crypto asset security offered and sold by EthereumMax (EMAX) without disclosing the payment she received for the promotion.[3] Kardashian later settled with the SEC, paid $1.26 million in penalties, disgorgement, and interest, and cooperated with the Commission’s ongoing investigation.[4] “Ms. Kardashian’s case also serves as a reminder to celebrities and others that the law requires them to disclose to the public when and how much they are paid to promote investing in securities,” Gensler added.[5]

Investors have also gone after celebrities for deceptively touting cryptocurrencies. In January 2022, a group of investors filed a lawsuit against Kim Kardashian, along with boxer Mayweather and former basketball star Paul Pierce, for losses they suffered after the celebrities promoted EMAX.

Implications

This case offers a stark warning to celebrities and non-crypto companies that might be considering serving as brand ambassadors or paid influencers for crypto companies, or engaging in sponsorships. Any individual or organization considering entering into a co-promotion or sponsorship agreement with a company in the crypto industry should ensure adequate due diligence has been conducted on the potential partner and carefully scrutinize crypto and NFT offerings for potential liability or exposure under US securities laws. Notably, the US Federal Trade Commission is also carefully scrutinizing the use of influencers and endorsements in commercial marketing and imposes its own disclosure obligations.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

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FOOTNOTES

[1] See Complaint, Count Three.

[2] See SEC Statement Urging Caution Around Celebrity Backed ICOs, available at SEC.gov | SEC Statement Urging Caution Around Celebrity Backed ICOs.

[3] See SEC Charges Kim Kardashian for Unlawfully Touting Crypto Security, available at SEC.gov | SEC Charges Kim Kardashian for Unlawfully Touting Crypto Security.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

Quantifying Cryptocurrency Claims in Bankruptcy: Does the Dollar Still Reign Supreme?

In the past six months, four major players in the crypto space have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection: Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, FTX, and BlockFi, and more may be forthcoming.  Together, the debtors in these four bankruptcy cases are beholden to hundreds of thousands of creditors.  The bulk of the claims in these cases are customer claims related to cryptocurrency held on the debtors’ respective platforms.  These customer claimants deposited or “stored” fiat currency and cryptocurrencies on the debtors’ platforms.  Some of these funds allegedly were commingled or rehypothecated, leaving customer accounts severely underfunded when liquidity crunches arose at the various entities.  The total amount of such claims is estimated to be in the billions — that is, if these claims ultimately are measured in United States Dollars (“USD”).

Crypto-watchers and bankruptcy lawyers alike have speculated how customer claims based on digital assets such as cryptocurrencies should be valued and measured under bankruptcy law.  Given the volatility of cryptocurrency prices, this determination may have a significant effect on recoveries, as well as the viability of the “payment-in-kind” distribution mechanics proposed in Voyager, Celsius, and BlockFi.  A number of creditors appearing pro se in these proceedings have expressed a desire to keep their mix of cryptocurrencies through these proposed “in-kind” distributions.

However, a crypto-centric approach to valuing claims and making distributions raises a number of issues for consideration.  For example, measuring customer claims in cryptocurrency and making “in-kind” distributions of these assets could lead to creditors within the same class receiving recoveries of disparate USD value as the result of the fluctuation in cryptocurrency prices. Moreover, as has been discussed in the Celsius proceedings, the administrative burden associated with maintaining, accounting for, and distributing a wide variety of cryptocurrencies as part of a recovery scheme would likely prove complex.  Equity holders also might challenge the confirmability of a plan where valuations and recoveries are based on cryptocurrency rather than USD, as a dramatic rise in cryptocurrency values could return some value to equity.

Like most issues at the intersection of insolvency and cryptocurrency, there is little precedent to guide creditors through the uncertainties, but a recent dispute in the Celsius bankruptcy proceedings as to whether a debtor is required to schedule claims in USD, or whether cryptocurrency claims can be scheduled “in-kind,” may serve as a preview of things to come.

I.          General Background

Celsius Network (“Celsius” and, together with its affiliated debtors and debtors in possession, the “Debtors”), self-described as one of the “largest and most sophisticated” cryptocurrency-based finance platforms and lenders that claimed over 1.7 million users worldwide,1 filed petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 13, 2022.2  On October 5, 2022, the Debtors filed their schedules of assets and liabilities (“Schedules”).  Each Debtor’s schedule of unsecured creditors’ claims (Schedule E/F) lists the claims of the Debtors’ customers by the number of various forms of cryptocurrency coins and account types, rather than in USD.3

On October 25, 2022, a group of beneficial holders, investment advisors, and managers of beneficial holders (collectively, the “Series B Preferred Holders”) of the Series B Preferred Shares issued by debtor Celsius Network Limited filed a motion seeking entry of an order directing the Debtors to amend their Schedules to reflect customer claims valued in USD, in addition to cryptocurrency coin counts.4

II.         Arguments

a.         Series B Preferred Holders

Broadly, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a),5 the Series B Preferred Holders sought to have the Debtors amend their Schedule E/F to “dollarize” creditors’ claims, i.e., value customer claims in their dollar value as of the petition date.  As filed, the Series B Preferred Holders asserted that the Debtors’ schedules were “improper, misleading, and fail[ed] to comply” with the Bankruptcy Rules “because they schedule[d] customer claims in cryptocurrency coin counts, rather than in lawful currency of the United States as of the Petition Date.”6  The Series B Preferred Holders asserted that such amended schedules are essential to the Debtors’ ability to structure, solicit, and confirm a plan of reorganization under the requirements of Section 1129, including whether “(i) claims are impaired or unimpaired, (ii) holders of similarly situated claims are receiving the same treatment, and (iii) the plan meets the requirements of the ‘absolute priority rule.’”7  In support of their arguments that USD valuation of a customer’s claim should be required, the Series B Preferred Holders relied on provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules, Bankruptcy Code, and Official Forms.  The Series B Preferred Holders stressed that the motion “takes no position regarding the form of distribution customers” should receive under the Debtors’ plan, but rather that the Debtors must “add the [USD] amount of each customer claim in Schedules E/F to the cryptocurrency coin counts.”8

The Series B Preferred Holders also asserted that the requirement to denominate claims in USD is consistent with Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that when a debtor or party-in-interest objects to a claim, the court determines the amount of the claim in USD as of the debtor’s petition date.

b.         Debtors’ Response

The Debtors had previously indicated that they were not seeking to dollarize its customers’ claims; rather, the Debtors represented that they intend to return cryptocurrency assets to its customers “in kind.”9  The Debtors stated that they interpreted Bankruptcy Rule 9009(a)(1)-(2) and General Order M-386, dated November 24, 2009 (the “General Order M-386”) to allow the Debtors to remove the dollar symbol when scheduling claims regarding cryptocurrency coin counts.10  This approach, the Debtors argue, lessens confusion for its customer case and decreases administrative expense for the estate.11

Further, the Debtors argued that the Series B Preferred Holders’ reliance on Section 502(b) was misplaced because the application of such section is inapplicable at this stage of the proceedings where no claims objection has taken place.12

The Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“UCC”) agreed with the Debtors’ approach, stating that it “makes sense” for account holders to validate their scheduled claims by cryptocurrency type and that it wished to be consulted on the petition date prices used by the Debtors if they filed an amendment to the schedules.13

III.        Analysis

a.         Bankruptcy Code & Rules & Forms

Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(1) requires that a debtor’s schedules of assets and liabilities must be “prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Forms.”14  The relevant official form that a debtor must use to prepare its schedule of assets and liabilities is Official Form 206, which contains a USD symbol to denote the amount of liabilities that a debtor must list.15  Specifically, Official Form 206 provides:

As seen above, Official Form 206 does “hardwire” a dollar sign (“$”) into the boxes provided for claim amounts.  Bankruptcy Rule 9009 states that the official forms are to “be used without alteration, except as otherwise provided in the rules, [or] in a particular Official Form.”16  Bankruptcy Rule 9009 permits “certain minor changes not affecting wording or the order of presenting information,” including “expand[ing] the prescribed areas for responses in order to permit complete responses” and “delet[ing] space not needed for responses.”17  Lastly, General Order M-386 permits “such revisions as are necessary under the circumstances of the individual case or cases.”18 The introduction to General Order M-386 states that standard forms were adopted to “expedite court review and entry of such orders” and that courts will expect use of the standard forms “with only such revisions as are necessary under the circumstances of the individual case or cases.”19

b.         Section 502(b)

Bankruptcy Code Section 502(b) provides that if there is an objection to a claim, the court “shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the [petition] date . . . .”20  This “prevents the value of a claim from fluctuating by setting the claim as of the petition date and converting it to the United States dollars.”21  Acknowledging the “novel phenomenon” of dollarizing claims in cryptocurrency, the Series B Preferred Holders analogize this to cases where courts have required claims asserted in or based on in foreign currency or amounts of gold should be valued in USD.  However, these cases were decided in the context of a claims objection. The Celsius Debtors argued that these cases have limited utility in the context of a motion for an order directing the Debtors to amend their schedules pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a).22

IV.        The Court’s Order

Ahead of the hearing regarding the motion for an order directing the Debtors to amend their schedules, the Debtors and the Series B Preferred Holders were able to consensually resolve the motion and filed a revised proposed order prior to the hearing on the motions on November 15.23  The Debtors agreed to amend their schedules by filing a conversion table within three days of the entry of the order, in consultation with the UCC and Series B Preferred Holders, that reflects the Debtors’ view of the rate of conversion of all cryptocurrencies listed in the Debtors’ schedules to USD as of the petition date.  The idea is that the conversion table could be used by customers as a reference for calculating the USD value of their claim, to the extent needed for filing a proof of claim.  The conversion table is not binding – the order preserves the rights of all parties to contest the conversion rates and does not require a party-in-interest to file an objection that is not stated in USD “solely on the basis that such claims should be reflected in [USD].”24  The order also requires the Debtors to file updated schedules “dollarizing” its account holders’ cryptocurrency holdings to the extent required by any future court order or judicial determination.

On November 17, 2022, the court entered the revised proposed order.25

V.         Cash Is Still King?

Other bankruptcy courts have taken similar approaches as the Celsius court in this issue.  An earlier cryptocurrency case, In re Cred Inc., the debtors did not schedule cryptocurrency claims in USD, but included a conversion table in their filed schedules, which set forth a conversion rate to USD as of the petition date.26  Debtors in other cases, such as Voyager Digital, scheduled the amounts of their customer claims as “undetermined” and listed them in Schedule F in cryptocurrency.27  BlockFi, which filed for bankruptcy on November 28, 2022, already has filed a proposed plan that would distribute its cryptocurrencies to its customers in–kind in exchange for their claims against the BlockFi debtors.28  To date, neither BlockFi nor FTX have filed their schedules, and it remains to be seen whether they will follow the pattern established in Celsius and Voyager.

For creditors and equity holders, whether claims are measured in USD or the applicable cryptocurrency is only the beginning of what will likely be a long and contentious road to recovery.  It remains to be seen whether any of these debtors will be able to confirm a viable restructuring plan that relies on any sort of “in-kind” distribution of cryptocurrencies.  Further issues are likely to arise in the claims resolution process even further down the road as claimants and liquidation trustees (or plan administrators) wrestle with how to value claims based on such a volatile asset, subject to ever-increasing regulatory scrutiny.  However, for the time being, the bankruptcy process continues to run on USD.

FOOTNOTES

1 Declaration of Alex Mashinsky, CEO of the Debtors ¶¶ 1, 9, 20, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 23].

2 Id. at ¶ 131.

3 Debtors’ Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statements of Financial Affairs, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 974]; see also Schedule E/F, Case No. 22-10967 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10970 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10968 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10965 [Docket No. 6]; Case No. 22-10966 [Docket No. 7]; Case No. 22-10964 [Docket No. 974]; Case No. 22-10969 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22- 10971 [Docket No. 5].

4 Series B Preferred Holders Motion to Direct Debtors to Amend Schedules, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1183].

5 “On motion of a party in interest, after notice and a hearing, the court may order any . . . schedule . . . to be amended and the clerk shall give notice of the amendment to entities designated by the court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a).

6 Series B Preferred Holders Motion to Direct Debtors to Amend Schedules ¶ 1.

7 Id. ¶ 3 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(2)-(4), 1129(a)(1), 1129(b)).

8 Series B Preferred Holders’ Reply ¶ 10, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1334].

9 See 8/16/22 Hr’g Tr. at 35:5-7 (“The company is not seeking to dollarize claims on the petition date and give people back a recovery in fiat.”); id. at 42:11-16 (“[The UCC is] pleased that the company is not focused on dollarization of claims . . . an in-kind recovery is absolutely critical.”).

10 General Order M-386 is a resolution of the Board of Judges for the Southern District of New York, which provides for “a standard form for orders to establish deadlines for the filing of proofs of claim . . . in chapter 11 cases” to “thereby expedite court review and entry of such orders.”

11 Debtors’ Objection to Series B Preferred Holders’ Motion ¶ 9, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1304].

12 Id. ¶ 12 (citing In re Mohr, 425 B.R. 457, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio)).

13 Id. at 42:12-16 (“We are pleased to hear that the company is not focused on dollarization of claims . . . receiving an in-kind recover is 16 absolutely critical.”); UCC Statement and Reservation of Rights ¶ 6, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1303].

14 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b)(1).

15 See Official Form 206, Part 2, Line 4 (using the USD sign into Form 206 for scheduling the debtor’s liabilities).

16 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009(a).

17 Id.

18 General Order M-386 ¶ 9.

19 General Order M-386 ¶ 2 (unnumbered, preliminary statement).

20 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).

21 In re Aaura, Inc., No. 06 B 01853, 2006 WL 2568048, at *4, n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2006).

22 In re USGen New Eng., Inc., 429 B.R. 437, 492 (Bankr. D. Md. 2010) (using the exchange rate in effect on the petition date, in the context of a claims objection, to convert the claim to USD), aff’d sub nom. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. USGen New Eng., Inc., 458 B.R. 195 (D. Md. 2011); Aaura, 2006 WL 2568048, at *5 (“Section 502(b) converts Aaura’s obligation to repay the obligation in gold into a claim against the estate in dollars, but it makes this transformation only as of the petition date, not retroactive to the date on which Aaura first became liable.”); Matter of Axona Intern. Credit & Com. Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, 608 n.19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting Section 502(b) refers to the petition date as “the appropriate date for conversion of foreign currency claims”), aff’d sub nom. In re Axona Intern. Credit & Com. Ltd., 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); ABC Dev. Learning Ctrs. (USA), Inc. v. RCS Capital Dev., LLC (In re RCS Capital Dev., LLC), No. AZ-12-1381-JuTaAh, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4666, at *38-39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 16, 2013) (same).

23 Notice of Proposed Order, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1342].

24 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.

25 Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1099 Directing the Debtors to Amend Their Schedules in Certain Circumstances, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1387].

26 Schedules at 12, In re Cred Inc., Case No. 20-128336 (JTD) (Bankr. D. Del. 2021) [ECF No. 443].

27 Schedules, In re Voyager Digital Holdings, Inc., Case No. 22-10943 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2022) [ECF No. 311].

28 Joint Plan of Reorganization § IV.B.1.a, In re BlockFi Inc., Case No. 19361 (MBK) (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022) [ECF No. 22].

Article By Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

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© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Is Crypto Collapsing?

November 11, 2022, brought news of yet another massive crypto bankruptcy filing. One of the largest crypto exchanges, FTX, filed a petition for bankruptcy protection in Delaware. FTX, Alameda, and other affiliates estimated in their filings that they have more than 100,000 creditors. With their estimated range of between $10 and $50 billion worth of assets and liabilities, this could well be the largest crypto-related bankruptcy ever filed.

This follows a slew of other big names in crypto which have filed bankruptcy petitions recently, including lender Three Arrows Capital (3AC) and the Celsius crypto exchange. Others have sought similar protections overseas, such as Zipmex’s proceeding in Singapore.

Why are these companies filing bankruptcy? The reasons vary.

  • Business models built on unsustainable growth rates in cryptocurrency prices
  • Collapse in cryptocurrency prices, leading to “runs on the bank”
  • Financial irregularities

Is your crypto safe? That depends on what it is and where you park it. Some newer tokens and wallet software may not have been extensively tested, and so may have weak points that an attacker might exploit. Even “safe” currencies like Bitcoin can be hacked if stored in a hot wallet. Of particular interest, customers of a bankruptcy exchange may find it difficult to recover their crypto deposits because their investments may be treated as mere unsecured claims against the exchange, drastically reducing the odds of recovery.

Filings by crypto-based entities come with a host of thorny issues. The most obvious is whether a crypto exchange’s bankruptcy estate owns the tokens it holds for others. But there are many others, including privacy concerns with respect to what previously were anonymous transactions and questions about the propriety of large financial withdrawals by high-ranking individuals in the days surrounding the filing of bankruptcy petitions.

For More FinTech Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Large Corporate Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Decrease through First Half of 2022

Most industry groups saw bankruptcy filings decline from mid-2020 pandemic highs.

New York—Following the spike in large corporate bankruptcy filings triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, filings in 2021 and the first half of 2022 fell to levels below historical averages, according to a Cornerstone Research report released today.

The report, Trends in Large Corporate Bankruptcy and Financial Distress—Midyear 2022 Update, examines trends in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by companies with assets of $100 million or higher. It finds that 70 large companies filed for bankruptcy in 2021, down significantly from 155 in 2020 and below the annual average of 78 filings since 2005. In the first half of 2022, only 20 large companies filed for bankruptcy, compared to midyear totals of 43 in 1H 2021 and 89 in 1H 2020. The 20 bankruptcies in 1H 2022 were the lowest midyear total since the second half of 2014.

“U.S. government stimulus programs, low borrowing rates, and high debt forbearance helped disrupt predictions of continued growth in the number of bankruptcy filings,” said Nick Yavorsky, a report coauthor and Cornerstone Research principal. “Looking ahead, however, there are some concerns that increased corporate debt levels, rising interest rates and inflation, and a potential global recession may contribute to an increase in bankruptcy filings.”

In 2021, there were 20 “mega bankruptcies”—bankruptcy filings among companies with over $1 billion in reported assets—a substantial decline from the 60 mega bankruptcy filings in 2020. The first half of 2022 saw four Chapter 11 mega bankruptcy filings, compared to nine in the first half of 2021 and at a pace significantly lower than the annual average of 22 filings in 2005–2021.

Most industry groups saw bankruptcy filings decrease in 2021 and the first half of 2022, including those industries with the highest number of filings following the pandemic’s onset: Mining, Oil, and Gas; Retail Trade; Manufacturing; and Services.

Read the full report here.

Article By Allie Schwartz, Joseph B. “J.B.” Doyle, Nicholas D. Yavorsky, and Diego Vega San Martin of Cornerstone Research

For more bankruptcy legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2022 Cornerstone Research

The Unredeemable Debtor

The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.

– Oliver Wendell Holmes

Bankruptcy law decisions are replete with references to the “worthy debtor.”  In re Carp, 340 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2003); In re BankVest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291 (1st Cir.2004); In re Institute of Business and Professional Educ., Inc., 79 B.R. 948 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Nickerson, 40 B.R. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Marble, (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); In re Doherty, 219 B.R. 665 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1998).

These decisions typically employ the “worthy debtor” nomenclature in the context of the entitlements that are afforded by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  It is always the “worthy debtor” that is entitled to a discharge of debts, a “fresh start”,  or to reject cumbersome contracts. This usage bespeaks a universe that also contains the “unworthy debtor,” a party whose behavior does not merit the statutory benedictions of the Bankruptcy Code. The identity of these parties is most often examined in the context of the discharge of debts and the behavior or actions that merit a denial of discharge or the finding that a particular debt is non-dischargeable.

There is a larger and more amorphous question though that also merits consideration, namely are their industries, companies, enterprises whose function and purpose is so odious and inconsistent with the precepts of good citizenship and the “moral development of the race”, to quote Justice Holmes, that they should be denied the benefits of reorganization afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.

If there is an argument to be made to prevent such enterprises from receiving the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code, to deny them the colloquial label of “worthy debtor”, that recourse likely lies within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that require that a plan of reorganization be “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).  The “not forbidden by law” requirement is of limited utility in situations where the behavior is recognizable as immoral or intrinsically evil to most but has not yet been sanctioned by any legislative authority. Notably, and perhaps inversely, enterprises engaged in the sale and growing of cannabis are without access to the Bankruptcy Code because they act in contravention of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., which has been found to take precedence over state laws allowing the sale of cannabis. See, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005).  As a result, bankruptcy being a creature of federal law, cannabis cases are generally being dismissed at the outset for cause in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and not making it as far as the confirmation standard. See, In re Way To Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).

If “forbidden by law” is unavailable as a source of relief, the last best hope to prevent the sanctioned reorganization of the unworthy debtor lies within the requirement that a plan be proposed in “good faith.”

“Good faith” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, a fact that makes it more likely that our  understanding of good faith may be transitory and that as the ‘moral development of the race’ proceeds, so might our understanding of ‘good faith.’  In other words, what was good faith yesterday might not, in light of our communal experience and growth as citizens, be good faith today.

In the first instance, we can understand from the ordering of the words within section 1129(a)(3) that the good faith standard exists independently of the ‘forbidden by law’ standard.  A plan of reorganization may describe a course of action not forbidden by law, but may still not meet the ‘good faith’ standard.

The good faith standard as used within section 1129(a)(3) is most commonly described as proposing a plan that fulfills the purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.  Those purposes and objectives within the context of Chapter 11 are most commonly understood as being “to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”  NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983);  see also, Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 452 (1999) (“[T]he two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 [are] preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors”)

This case law, which is by far the most consistent usage of the term, emphasizes paying back creditors and preserving an ongoing enterprise. It does not suggest the existence of anything more amorphous beyond those standards and it supports the idea that the ‘good faith’ standard is not meant to be an existential inquiry into the moral worth of a particular industry.

Bankruptcy courts have, however, recognized that the absence of a definition of good faith leaves courts without “any precise formulae or measurements to be deployed in a mechanical good faith equation.”  Metro Emps. Credit Union v. Okoreeh–Baah (In re Okoreeh–Baah), 836 F.2d 1030, 1033–34 (6th Cir.1988) (interpreting good faith in context of Chapter 13).

Any successful collateral attack under section 1129(a)(3) on the ‘good faith’ of the immoral enterprise must likely follow the path of connecting the good faith standard to the “public good.”  Bankruptcy Courts have invoked the ‘public good’ in refusing to enforce certain contracts and have followed the dictates of some courts that “while violations of public policy must be determined through “definite indications in the law of the sovereignty,” courts must not be timid in voiding agreements which tend to injure the public good or contravene some established interest of society. Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass’n., 697 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1982).

The concept of the ‘public good’ is not a foreign one in bankruptcy courts.  Seeking relief for debtors that are the only providers of a service within their geographic area is an immensely easier task, no court, and no bankruptcy judge, likes to see a business fail and when the business is important to the community, support for reorganization from the bench often works to make reorganization easier.  Bankruptcy courts, although restrained by a statutory scheme, are as a matter of practice courts of equity.  Employing those equitable arguments to support a reorganization is both achievable and a reality of present practice.

Whether equitable arguments can be inversely employed to graft a sense of the ‘public good’ onto the good faith requirement within section 1129(a)(3) is decidedly uncertain and is not directly supported by the case law as it exists.

Somewhere out there though in one of those small border towns between the places of unelected legislators and the judicious and novel application of historical precedent lies the “moral development of the race” and the bankruptcy court that finds that incumbent within the concept of good faith is fair consideration of the public good.

Article By Peter J. Haley of Nelson Mullins

For more bankruptcy and restructuring news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

“My Lawyer Made Me Do It” is Not an Absolute Defense to Bankruptcy Court Sanctions

Last year, we offered a lesson and a moral from a North Carolina district court decision reversing a $115,000 sanctions order by a North Carolina bankruptcy court.

The lesson from the case was that the bankruptcy court cannot sanction a creditor if there is an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct is lawful.

The moral was that a creditor can avoid the time, expense, and risk associated with litigating contempt and sanctions issues by taking basic steps to ensure that confirmed Chapter 11 plans are clear and precise.  The moral is even more glaring now because a recent decision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reveals that the parties continue to fight in court over the easily-avoidable sanctions order.  The decision also clarifies when and why a bankruptcy court can sanction a creditor.

Factual Background

In 2009, the Beckharts filed Chapter 11.  At the time, they were almost a year behind on a loan secured by the property at Kure Beach.  The loan servicer objected to planning confirmation because it did not specify how post-petition mortgage payments would be applied to principal and interest.  The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan without clarifying the issue, but the servicer did not ask the court to reconsider its order, nor did it appeal.

The Beckharts paid for five years.  Shellpoint acquired the loan from the original servicer and treated it as in default based on unpaid accrued arrearages.  Periodically, Shellpoint sent default letters to the Beckharts, who disputed the default.  Counsel for Shellpoint advised that the confirmation order had not changed the loan contract terms and that the loan remained in default.  The matter escalated with the Beckharts filing complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Shellpoint commenced foreclosure, then represented to the Beckharts that it was ceasing foreclosure, but then posted a foreclosure hearing notice on the Beckharts’ door (allegedly due to error).

Litigation

In January 2020, the Beckharts moved the bankruptcy court to find Shellpoint in contempt and award them monetary sanctions.  The court held a hearing in June and, in September 2020, found Shellpoint in contempt.  The court tagged Shellpoint with $115,000 in sanctions for lost wages, “loss of a fresh start,” attorney’s fees, and travel expenses.

Bankruptcy courts have the power to hold a party in civil contempt and to impose sanctions for violation of a confirmed plan.  The test for liability is based on a recent United States Supreme Court decision — Taggart v. Lorenzen.  The Taggart test prohibits sanctions if there was an “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.” There can be contempt for violating the discharge injunction only “if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.”

In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court noted that the plan and confirmation order did not state how much the debtors would owe on confirmation, did not say how the $23,000 in arrears would be paid, and did not set the amount of the first payment.  Confusingly, the confirmation order also said that the original loan terms would remain in effect, except as modified.  Finally, the district court pointed out that Shellpoint was repeatedly advised by counsel that their behavior was authorized, and reliance on the advice of outside counsel is a sufficient defense to civil sanctions.  Based on all these facts, the district court found that Shellpoint acted in good faith and interpreted the confirmation order in a manner consistent with the contractual terms of the loan, and that was objectively reasonable.

Taggart was a Chapter 7 case involving a discharge violation, but the Fourth Circuit held that the “no fair ground of doubt” test applied broadly in bankruptcy – including in Chapter 11 cases.

But the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s decision to reverse the bankruptcy court because the creditor had requested and received legal advice from outside counsel.  The Fourth Circuit held that advice of counsel is not an absolute defense in civil contempt.   The Court suggested that, under the Taggart test, advice of counsel “may still be considered in appropriate circumstances as a relevant factor” and “a party’s reliance on guidance from outside counsel may be instructive, at least in part, when determining whether that party’s belief that she was complying with the order was objectively unreasonable.”

The Fourth Circuit held that both lower courts had made mistakes and sent the case back to the bankruptcy court to “reconsider the contempt motion under the correct legal standard, including any additional fact-finding that may be necessary.”

Creditors can take some comfort in the “no fair ground of doubt” test, which is more forgiving than a strict liability standard.  But creditors can’t blame their lawyer for perilous conduct and expect the court to exonerate them.

But the most important takeaway hasn’t changed:  Creditors should insist on clear and specific plan terms.  After over two years of litigation, Shellpoint remains in peril of sanctions.  All of this could have been avoided had the loan servicer insisted the plan specify how the Beckharts’ payments would be applied to satisfy the arrearage.

Article By Lance P. Martin of Ward and Smith, P.A.

For more bankruptcy legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

Debt Ceiling Shrinks for Small Business Bankruptcies

Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which took effect in February 2020, creates a more streamlined and less expensive Chapter 11 reorganization path for small business debtors.  Under the law as originally passed, to be eligible for Subchapter V, a debtor (whether an entity or an individual) had to be engaged in commercial activity and its total debts — secured and unsecured – had to be less than $2,725,625.  At least half of those debts must have come from business activity.

In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the CARES Act, which raised the Subchapter V debt ceiling to $7.5 million for one year.  Congress extended it to March 27, 2022.  A bipartisan Senate bill would make the Subchapter V debt limit permanent at $7.5 million and index it to inflation.  But Congress has not yet passed the legislation or sent it to President Biden for signature.  So, for now, the debt ceiling has shrunk to the original $2,725,625.

Subchapter V has proven popular, with over 3,100 cases filed in the last two years (78 in North Carolina).  Many of those cases could not have proceeded under Subchapter V but for the higher debt limits.  The American Bankruptcy Institute has reported that Subchapter V cases are experiencing higher plan-confirmation rates, speedier plan confirmation, more consensual plans, and improved cost-effectiveness than if those cases had been filed as a traditional Chapter 11.  Anecdotally, most debtors in North Carolina are filing under Subchapter V if they are eligible.

We will continue to monitor legislative activity and report if Congress passes a law to reinstate the $7.5 million debt ceiling.

Article By Lance P. Martin of Ward and Smith, P.A.

For more financial and business legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

Cannabis and District Courts: Are Those Courthouse Doors Closed Too?

We have written many times over the past few years about how the bankruptcy courts are off-limits to state-legalized cannabis businesses.  This past year brought no new relief to the cannabis industry, and the doors to the bankruptcy courts remain shut.  Are the other federal courts off-limits as well?  A recent district court decision from the Southern District of California sheds some light on this issue, and indicates that the district courts are at least partially open to participants in legal cannabis businesses.

Factual Background

The facts of Indian Hills Holdings, LLC v. Frye are relatively straightforward.  Plaintiff Indian Hills Holdings (“IHH”), Construction & Design Professional Corp. (“CDP”) and its principal Christopher Frye (“Frye” and, together with CDP, the “Defendants”) entered into a contract whereby IHH paid Defendants to purchase Cultivation “Adult” Extreme Cubes (the “Cubes”).  Defendants in turn contracted with ICT Centurion Investments, LLC (“ICT”) to purchase the Cubes.   The Cubes were marketed as a “fully integrated growing container system” used in indoor cannabis cultivation.  When ICT sold the Cubes to another party, Defendants were unable to deliver the Cubes to IHH.  Defendants refused to return the money, and IHH sued, asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment and fraud claims.

A default judgment was entered against CDP for failing to respond to IHH’s complaint.  Frye, however, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing in part that IHH did not have standing to bring its claims.  Noting that Frye only “cursorily” raised the standing issue and that the “issue is a complex one”, the court reframed Frye’s argument as follows:

  • The contract is illegal under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq.(the “CSA”);
  • Federal district courts will not enforce contracts that violate federal law;
  • Because federal district courts will not enforce contracts that violate federal law, IHH lacks an “actionable injury”; and
  • Because IHH lacks an actionable injury, the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Legal Analysis

The court began its analysis by considering whether the parties’ contract violated the CSA.  Section 863(a) of the CSA makes it unlawful to sell or offer for sale “drug paraphernalia,” which is defined to include “any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing … a controlled substance.”  Because the Cubes are used to grow cannabis, and because cannabis is a controlled substance, the sale of the Cubes would seemingly violate section 863(a) of the CSA.  However, the CSA contains an exemption, whereby section 863 does not apply to any person authorized by state law to manufacture, possess or distribute drug paraphernalia.  California allows the manufacturing of drug paraphernalia, which would include the Cubes.  As a result, the court wrote that the contract “may fall within the CSA exemption.” Additionally, the court noted that the U.S. Department of Justice has declined to enforce the CSA’s prohibition on the sale of marijuana when the marijuana is bought or sold in accordance with state law.  For these reasons, the court concluded that enforcing the parties’ contract would likely neither violate the CSA nor public policy.

While the contract may be legal, the court still had to consider whether assuming jurisdiction over the dispute would result in a violation of federal law.  After all, federal courts will not assume jurisdiction over a dispute where the court will be required to order a legal violation.  The question therefore became whether a plausible remedy existed for IHH that would not require the court to order such a legal violation.   The court held that it could fashion a remedy without violating the law by simply awarding IHH monetary damages.  A judgment for money damages, unlike an award of specific performance, would not result in IHH obtaining the Cubes and growing cannabis.  Instead, the result would be a return of the monies paid by IHH to Defendants for the Cubes.  The court’s ruling was consistent with prior cases involving state-legalized cannabis business, where the courts found ways to provide relief without violating the CSA.  E.g., Polk v. Gontmakher, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53569 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 22, 2021) (noting that “recent case law involving cannabis-related business contracts does not espouse an absolute bar to the enforcement of such contracts”); Mann v. Gullickson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152125 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (court may consider breach of contract claim arising from sale of cannabis business when “it is possible for the court to enforce [the] contract in a way that does not require illegal conduct”).

Takeaways

As the legalized cannabis industry continues to grow and develop, market participants will undoubtedly need access to courts.  The bankruptcy courts remain off-limit, thus requiring distressed cannabis businesses and their creditors to turn to state-law insolvency proceedings (e.g., assignments for the benefit of creditors; receiverships).  To those in the industry, it may be a welcome relief to know that at least some federal district courts have made themselves available to these parties and that these courts thus far have shown a willingness to adjudicate disputes arising from the cannabis industry.  However, any party seeking their day in federal court needs to ensure that they are not asking the court to grant relief that would violate federal law, including the CSA.  This means that while money damages should be available, specific performance of the contract is likely off the table.

Article By Mark A. Salzberg of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Not So Fast! How Poor Planning Can Doom Your Chapter 11 Filing

A Texas bankruptcy court’s decision earlier this year to dismiss the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) chapter 11 bankruptcy case as a bad faith filing illustrates the perils of a poorly planned chapter 11 filing, and highlights the need, even in crisis situations, to establish solid objectives and develop a sound strategy prior to seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code. In re Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 628 B.R. 262 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2021). Unique facts and circumstances notwithstanding, In re Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. provides textbook examples of things you should not do when filing a corporate chapter 11 case.

In its opinion, the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court highlighted recent events in the history of the NRA prior to the bankruptcy filing, including: (1) the New York Attorney General (“NYAG”) opening investigations into the NRA in 2017; (2) the New York Department of Financial Services urging insurers and financial institutions in April 2018, to evaluate whether their relationships with the NRA were harmful to their corporate reputations and jeopardized public safety; (3) multiple whistleblowers notifying the NRA Audit Committee in July 2018 about alleged misconduct by NRA management, including conflicts of interest of senior management and board members and improper reimbursement of living expenses for certain employees; and (4) the NYAG filing a complaint against the NRA in New York state court on August 6, 2020 seeking dissolution of the NRA (the “NYAG Action”).

Approximately 3 months after the NYAG Action, on November 23, 2020, the NRA retained counsel to advise them on bankruptcy and restructuring options. The very next day, the entity “Sea Girt, LLC” was formed, as “a transition vehicle to facilitate the NRA’s relocation to Texas.” Id at 267. At a board meeting on January 7, 2021, the NRA board approved the employment agreement of the NRA’s Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre, which included language allowing Mr. LaPierre to “exercise corporate authority in furtherance of the mission and interests of the NRA, including without limitation to reorganize or restructure the affairs of the Association for the purposes of cost-minimization, regulatory compliance or otherwise.” Id. at 267-68. There was no discussion of bankruptcy or reorganization at the board meeting, and the board was never informed that the employment agreement authorized Mr. LaPierre to unilaterally file a bankruptcy petition for the NRA. A few days after the board meeting, on Jan. 15, 2021, the NRA and Sea Girt, LLC filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11.

Approximately one month into the bankruptcy case, multiple parties, including the NYAG, filed dispositive motions seeking various relief that the bankruptcy court categorized as generally falling into three buckets: (1) dismissal; (2) appointment of a chapter 11 trustee; or (3) appointment of an examiner. Id. at 270. In adjudicating the motions, the bankruptcy court adopted the Fifth Circuit’s flexible view that the term “cause” in Section 1112(b)(4) could include “a finding that the debtor’s filing for relief is not in good faith.” Id at 270.

The Court’s good faith analysis largely focused on the NRA’s reasons for filing bankruptcy. After evaluating the relevant arguments and evidence, the Court concluded that the real purpose for the bankruptcy filing was to avoid dissolution in the NYAG Action. The Court noted that although there was “some evidence that the NRA want[ed] to streamline litigation and control litigation costs,…” that did not appear to be “the real purpose” behind the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 278. On the contrary, there was testimony that the NRA could afford to pay its legal fees and there had not been any analysis done of the comparative cost of litigation outside of bankruptcy versus the cost of litigation within the bankruptcy case. While the question of “[w]hether the NRA’s desire to leave New York and reincorporate in Texas was a true reason for filing bankruptcy [was] a closer call,” the Court was not persuaded that the conditions faced by the NRA predating the NYAG Action were an existential threat and reason to file bankruptcy in order to move to Texas. Id. at 278. Testimony of the CFO, that “he was not aware of any reasons to file for bankruptcy” was also not supportive of the argument that the bankruptcy was filed for financial reasons. Id. at 279. In the Court’s view, the other reasons that the NRA gave for filing bankruptcy, such as “preserving the NRA as a going concern” could all be grouped under the general reason of avoiding the dissolution in the NYAG Action. Id. at 279.

For its subsequent analysis of whether avoiding the dissolution in the NYAG Action was a valid purpose, the Court conducted the 2-pronged inquiry used by the Third Circuit, namely: “(1) whether the petition serves a valid bankruptcy purpose and (2) whether the petition is filed merely to obtain a tactical litigation advantage.” Id. at 280. The Court reasoned that a lawsuit seeking a monetary judgment, which could be financially ruinous for a debtor, was different from a state enforcement action specifically seeking dissolution under that state’s laws that must satisfy certain requirements. The Court found the NRA case to be a bad faith filing because its purpose was (1) “to deprive the New York AG of the remedy of dissolution, which is a distinct litigation advantage” and “[to deprive] the state of New York of the ability to regulate not-for-profit corporations in accordance with its laws.” Id. at 281.

In considering whether appointment of a trustee or examiner was in the best interest of creditors, the Court noted “cringeworthy” facts such as the evidence of the NRA’s past misconduct, including deficiencies in financial disclosures by senior management. Id. at 283. Even more concerning to the Court was the “surreptitious manner in which Mr. LaPierre obtained and exercised authority to file bankruptcy for the NRA,” where he had excluded key people such as the CFO and the general counsel from the decision-making process. Id. at 284. The determination of whether or not to appoint a trustee or examiner was further complicated because the NRA’s mission was, “at times, political and polarizing” and because “[t]he NRA does not sell goods or services” it would be difficult to find the appropriate fiduciary to serve as trustee or examiner. Id. at 284. Touting progress the NRA had made in recent years resulting in more disclosure and self-reporting, the Court concluded that, “[o]utside of bankruptcy, the NRA can pay its creditors, continue to fulfill its mission, continue to improve its governance and internal controls, contest dissolution in the NYAG Enforcement Action, and pursue the legal steps necessary to leave New York.” Id. at 284-85.

In re Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. vividly demonstrates the danger of hastily filing a chapter 11 case, and then formulating a narrative post-petition as to the reasons for the filing that are not supported by evidence. Profoundly damaging to the NRA’s position was the inconsistency between the NRA’s arguments in bankruptcy court and the NRA’s own publicly announced reasons for filing bankruptcy, including a posting on its NRA website which stated, “This action is necessitated primarily by one thing: the unhinged and political attack against the NRA by the New York Attorney General.” The Court also expressed frustration at the lack of clarity caused by conflicting testimony of witnesses about the purpose of the bankruptcy filing. When the CFO testifies there is no financial reason to file bankruptcy, how do you argue that the bankruptcy was filed to reorganize the debtor? Also detrimental to the NRA’s position were corporate governance failings where there was no vote or even any discussion by the Board about bankruptcy and restructuring options, and it was clear that the decision to file chapter 11 was made by one person. This case shows that, given the significant costs attendant to an imprudent bankruptcy filing that is later dismissed, it is essential to establish clear objectives, articulate a coherent strategy, and practice good corporate governance prior to filing a chapter 11 case.

Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

Article By Zana Scarlett of Nelson Mullins

For more articles on Chapter 11, visit the NLR Bankruptcy & Restructuring section.