Category: Antitrust & Trade Regulation

The Disintegration of Iraq

Covington BUrling Law Firm

The news almost every day contains events which harken the end of Iraq as a nation state.  Radical Sunnis take over Mosul for their ISIS state.  Kurds tighten their control over oil in the north.  Shiites kidnap a top Sunni leader and his security men in Baghdad.

It is not surprising that Iraq should be dismembered.  To start with, the country was an artificial creation of British and French diplomats and cartographers who created new nations to control as they divided up the spoils of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.  Through its whole existence, Iraq was nothing more than three warring disparate groups:  Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, whose animosity exceeded their desire to work together.  The country was held together first by a colonial power, then by a monarchy, followed by the Baathists, and finally by the US military.

There was an opportunity during the US occupation to pump life into this moribund entity.  However, we did not engage sufficiently in effective nation-building, except when we drew Sunni tribal support during the surge, so that in the longer term, institutions were not in place for disparate Iraqi populations to share power in a democratic arrangement.  And perhaps it was impossible.  Nevertheless, we handed the keys to the Shiite Prime Minister Maliki and withdrew.

Rather than seeking to find common ground with Sunnis and Kurds, Maliki turned to Iran for help and set out to turn Iraq into another Middle Eastern Shiite nation.  We are now witnessing the results of Maliki’s biased rule.  When new maps are printed ten years from now, will there even be an entity known as Iraq?  It is doubtful.

ARTICLE BY

Allan J. Topol
Martin Gold
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

SawStop Dismissal Explained: Opinion Crosscutting SawStop’s Antitrust Lawsuit Released

Mintz Levin Law Firm

Judge Claude M. Hilton of the Eastern District of Virginia recently issued a Memorandum Opinion following up on his June 27, 2014 order (on which we previously wrote here and here) dismissing the complaint filed against the power tool industry bySawStop, LLC.

To recap, according to the February 2014 complaint, in 2000, Stephen Gass, inventor of “SawStop” and a patent attorney, began licensing negotiations with several companies now named as defendants in the lawsuit. As a result, the companies allegedly held a vote on how to respond to SawStop and shortly thereafter ended their individual licensing negotiations with Gass. The complaint also alleges the companies conspired to alter voluntary standards to prevent SawStop technology from becoming an industry standard.

In his opinion dismissing SawStop’s antitrust claims, Judge Hilton wrote:

An alleged antitrust conspiracy is not established simply by lumping ‘the defendants’ together.

Judge Hilton found no evidence that any of the named manufacturer defendants conspired through their industry organization, the Power Tool Institute, Inc. (PTI), not to license SawStop’s safety technology. Judge Hilton also found that the conspiracy allegations were belied by SawStop’s admissions in the complaint that it was actively negotiating with Emerson, Ryobi, and Black & Decker “well after the alleged group boycott began in October 2001,” concluding that “[s]uch history fails to show an agreement to restrain trade.”

The judge also pointed to other contradictions in SawStop’s complaint, including evidence that Ryobi signed an agreement with SawStop regarding royalties related to SawStop’s technology licensing during the time period of the alleged conspiracy. In addition, the judge ruled that Black & Decker’s proposed a licensing agreement with the SawStop, which was negotiated 6 to 8 months after the alleged conspiracy was formed, similarly contradicted SawStop’s allegations. The judge further dismissed SawStop’s arguments that Black & Decker’s 1% royalty payment offer was disingenuous, noting that even if that were the case, such actions do “not sufficiently infer conspiratorial conduct” and cannot be characterized as refusals to deal.

Finally, the judge found that SawStop failed to adequately plead that the defendants corrupted the standard setting process or otherwise agreed to a boycott, pointing out that the complaint alleged that only 5 of the 24 defendants had representatives on the relevant standards-setting committee. Moreover, the court found SawStop’s allegations of competitive harm resulting from the conspiracy (lost sales and profits from UL failing to mandate its safety technology on the market) insufficient, stating:

‘Lost sales’ do not amount to competitive harm because [users] were not ‘in some way constrained from buying [SawStop’s] products’ . . . and failing to mandate [SawStop’s] proposed safety standard does not thereby harm their market access.

Finding no support for an inference that defendants had entered into an agreement to boycott SawStop’s product or otherwise restrain trade, the court dismissed SawStop’s complaint in its entirety.

In addition to the antitrust lawsuit, SawStop technology is at the center of an ongoing rulemaking by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). You can read more about the CPSC’s rulemaking here.

Article By:

Helen J. Kim
Charles A. Samuels
Of:
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Commerce Department Rulings Spur Oil Export Battle

Covington BUrling Law Firm

As reported in our blog post of last week, the Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) recently determined in two private classifications that lease condensate — a type of stabilized and distilled light crude oil — is not subject to the United States’ broad ban on crude oil exports.  BIS has for years defined “crude oil” in its regulations as “a mixture of hydrocarbons that existed in liquid phase in underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating facilities and which has not been processed through a crude oil distillation tower.”   Although the regulations state that this definition includes lease condensate, BIS appears to have determined that lease condensate that has been distilled is a refined petroleum product that is not subject to the broad ban on crude oil exports from the United States.

While BIS claims that there has been “no change in policy on crude oil exports,” the recent determinations have spurred the debate over whether the U.S. should change its position on crude oil exports.  In particular, Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Edward Markey (D-Mass.) — who have been vocal opponents of lifting the ban on crude oil exports — wrote a letter to Commerce Secretary Priztker alleging that BIS may have impermissibly approved the exports of lease condensate and demanding copies of the two determinations and information on the legal rationale for approving such exports by July 14, 2014.  Senators Markey and Menendez argue that allowing exports of crude oil would increase reliance on foreign oil and cause domestic gas prices to rise.  However, with U.S. crude oil production surging as a result of the advancements in hydrofracking technology, Senators Lisa Murkowski and Mary Landrieu have championed the effort to reconsider the ban on crude oil exports, which has been in place since the Arab oil embargo and global energy supply shortages of the 1970s.  In particular, Senator Murkowski has issued a report calling for a “renovation” of U.S. energy export policy, which includes an April 2014 white paper in advocating for condensate exports.

While some view BIS’ approval of condensate exports as a step towards a greater liberalization in crude oil export policy, financial analysts such as Morgan Stanley are not bullish on any significant changes occurring before this years’ mid-term elections.  Moreover, recent reports indicate that the White House may not have been aware that BIS was planning to issue such determinations, and therefore this may not represent a conscious effort on the part of the Obama Administration to change crude oil export policy.  Indeed, Secretary Pritzker has confirmed publicly that the rulings were not a change in policy.  However, the Secretary also said that “it’s a mistake to think there isn’t serious conversation going on within the administration about what we should do,” and that the issue of energy exports overall should be “examined holistically from an economic, strategic, and diplomatic standpoint.”  These statements suggest that the Administration is not backing down from the condensate rulings, and is considering the broader policy issues involved in allowing exports of other oil products.

Article By:

E. Donald Elliott
Peter Flanagan
Sarah Liebschutz
Of:
Covington & Burling LLP

 

Too Good To Be True: FTC’s Crackdown On L’Occitane’s Body Slimming Almond Extracts

Sheppard Mullin Law Firm

L’Occitane Inc’s advertisements for its topically-applied body sculpting almond extracts seemed straightforward: “Almond Shaping Delight 3 out of 4 women saw firmer, lifted skin. This luxuriously lightweight massage gel instantly melts into the skin to help visibly refine and sculpt the silhouette” and “Almond Beautiful Shape Trim 1.3 inches in just 4 weeks. This ultra-fresh gel cream helps to visibly reduce the appearance of cellulite, while smoothing and firming the skin.”

Unfortunately for L’Occitane, an international skin care company with over 150 shops across the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found those claims dubious at best, and earlier this year charged the company with violating the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).

According to the FTC’s complaint, which was filed on January 7, 2014, L’Occitane had been manufacturing, advertising, and selling the two products at issue, “Almond Beautiful Shape” and “Almond Shaping Delight,” in interstate commerce and violated the FTC Act by promoting them as being able to slim and reshape the body. The FTC alleged that L’Occitane did not have sufficient scientific data to support L’Occitane’s advertising claims that the creams could trim the user’s thighs, reduce cellulite, and slim the body in just weeks. The FTC asserted that  L’Occitane based its advertising claims in large part on two unblinded and non-controlled clinical trials and greatly exaggerated the results from one of the studies. The FTC charged L’Occitane with violating Sections 5(a) and 12 of the FTC Act, which declare unfair or deceptive acts or practices unlawful and bar false advertisements likely to induce the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics. As part of the final consent order, the FTC fined L’Occitane $450,000 and prohibited it from making future false and deceptive weight-loss claims.

L’Occitane, however, is not the only entity which the FTC has recently fined because of questionable advertising claims. The FTC has also charged Sensa Products, LeanSpa, and HCG Diet Direct with violations of the FTC Act for allegedly misleading the public with unfounded weight loss claims and misleading endorsements relating to their products. These complaints, along with L’Occitane’s, were part of the FTC’s recent “Operation Failed Resolution” initiative, aimed at combating deceptive weight-loss claims.

One of the companies charged, Sensa Products, which claimed weight loss results from one of its dietary supplements, had to pay a $26 million fine for FTC Act violations. As a part of “Operation Failed Resolution,” the FTC also released an updated media guide for spotting deceptive weight-loss claims in advertising, entitled “Gut Check: A Reference Guide for Media on Spotting False Weight-Loss Claims.”

Manufactures and marketers of health products, cosmetics, drugs, and dietary supplements should be mindful of the FTC’s continuing and increasing vigilance in taking action with respect to enforcement of the FTC Act to stop unfounded weight loss claims. Companies making weight-loss claims in advertising and marketing materials must make sure that their claims are defensible and supported by sufficient credible scientific data.

Jordan Grushkin contributed to this article.

Article By:

Theodore C. Max
Of:
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

New Updated FTC Care Labeling Rules: “Do’s and Don’ts”

Sheppard Mullin 2012

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforces federal labeling requirements that require manufacturers, importers, sellers and distributors of certain textile and wool clothing  to accurately label their products. For example, FTC rules require that manufacturers indicate the country of origin and fiber content in their clothing. In addition, the Care Labeling Rule requires that manufacturers and importers attach “care labels” to garments and certain piece goods.

Navigating these various labeling requirements can be tricky. On May 5, 2014, the FTC amendment of the labeling rules, known as the Textile Rules, became effective.

Care labels, which can influence consumers’ purchasing decisions more than labels indicating fiber content or country of origin or manufacture, are important to carefully consider.

“Do’s” for Clothing Manufacturers and Importers:

Place all care labels permanently, securely and visibly, so that consumers can easily see or locate them prior to purchase. Ensure that labels will remain legible not just at the point of sale, but throughout the lifecycle of the product.

Include a washing or drycleaning instruction (or both) if either method is safe for the product. If a product can be neither washed nor drycleaned, the label must state “Do not wash – Do not dry clean.” A simple “dryclean” instruction is acceptable in most cases, unless “any part of the drycleaning process would harm the product.” In that case, more specificity is required (e.g., “Professionally Dryclean” or “Dryclean. No Steam.”).

Indicate whether the product is to be washed by machine or by hand. The FTC has stated that water temperature settings must be indicated if “regular use of hot water will harm the product.” Similarly, if using chlorine bleach will harm the product, whereas other bleaches will not, the label must state “Only non-chlorine bleach, when needed.” The appropriate label in the event that no bleach is safe to use is “Do not bleach.”

State how to dry the product and how to iron it, if the product requires regular ironing. Temperature settings for drying and ironing are not needed unless the “regular use of high temperature will harm the product.”

If selling a garment with multiple pieces, only one label is required if the same instructions apply to all parts of the garment, and if the garment is sold as a single unit. The label should be attached to the “major piece” of the garment. In the event that the garment is not sold as a single unit, or if the instructions differ from one part of the garment to the next, then each separate piece of the garment needs its own care label.

If the garment cannot be cleaned without damaging the garment, potential customers must be warned on the label. It is imperative that following the care labeling instructions does not ordinarily lead to product damage. Along these lines, labels must inform consumers not to engage in certain procedures that they may erroneously but reasonably assume are acceptable, given the instructions of the label. For example, if a label indicates that clothes can be washed, a reasonable consumer might infer that the product can also be safely ironed. If these understandable assumption is incorrect, the FTC has stated that the label must indicate the risks involved.

One should always have a “reasonable basis” for everything written on a care labeling instruction. If a piece of clothing indicates that it cannot safely be ironed, there must be some proof (based upon experience, industry expertise or testing) known to the manufacturer or importer that ironing the clothing would cause damage. The FTC has alternatively stated that the manufacturer or importer must have “reliable evidence” to support all warnings or instructions on product labels. Guesswork is insufficient. However, what constitutes “reliable evidence” or a “reasonable basis” does depend on the circumstances. It is incumbent on manufacturers conducting tests to ensure that the results of any tests conducted on only one portion of multi-part garments do, in fact, have applicability to the entire garment.

Importers must ensure that these labels are placed on products before they sell them in the United States. It is not necessary for the labels to be attached as the products enter the country, however. Domestic manufacturers similarly must ensure that care labels are placed on finished products prior to sale.

“Don’ts” for Clothing Manufacturers and Importers:

Certain kinds of exempt apparel, including gloves, hats, and shoes, do not require care labels. Many items are also excluded from the care labeling requirements, including handkerchiefs, belts, suspenders, neckties, or non-woven garments made for one-time use. For piece goods sold for making apparel at home, it is not necessary to include care labeling instructions for any “marked manufacturers’ remnants of up to 10 yards when the fiber content is not known and cannot be determined easily.” These items are exempted from the Care Labeling Rule.

Garments custom-made from fabrics provided by consumers, or products sold directly to institutional buyers for commercial use (e.g., uniforms sold to Office Depot for use by clerks during business hours, and not purchased directly by the clerks), do not require care labels. This also includes items that the consumer may ask to be added to the garment (e.g. lining or buttons).

Use non-standard terms on labels. The FTC recommends, but does not expressly require, that manufacturers ensure that any terms they use on labels are in accord with the definitions in the Rule’s Appendix A glossary, where applicable. For example, the term “Warm” applies to initial water temperature ranging from 87 to 111 degrees F [31 to 44 degrees C]; “Hot” is from 112 to 145 degrees F [45 to 63 degrees C]; and “Cold” is up to 86 degrees F [30 degrees C].

*Gregg Re Summer Associate contributed to this article.

Article By:

Theodore C. Max
Of:
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

The Redskins Decision: Much Ado About (Probably) Not Much

Dickinson Wright Logo

I’ve been having fun listening to commentators – most of whom appear to know little or nothing about trademark law – expound on last week’s decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel six trademark registrations for variations of the wordREDSKINS as the name of Washington, D.C.’s pro football team. One observer described it as a “landmark” decision, and several have prophesied that it marks “the beginning of the end” of the team’s controversial nickname.

The decision may turn out to have significant impact on the team politically and in terms of public relations. But legally…not so much.

Into the Time Machine

Many of the “beginning of the end” analyses treat the TTAB decision as a referendum on current public opinion about the Redskins name issue. A spokesman for the National Congress of American Indians, which supported the plaintiffs, said, “I don’t know how the team doesn’t recognize at this point that it’s not just a small group of Indians anymore. It’s more than that. People and fans and the country itself are saying, ‘Let’s just change the name.’”

Maybe they are – but the TTAB decision has nothing to do with that. As the dissenting judge (it was a 2-1 decision) wrote, “To be clear, this case is not about the controversy, currently playing out in the media, over whether the term “redskins,” as the name of Washington’s professional football team, is disparaging to Native Americans today.” The task before the TTAB was not to render a judgment on the propriety of naming a football team the Redskins. Rather, the task before the TTAB was to conduct a kind of time-machine research project: to determine, as a matter of empirical historical fact, whether the term Redskins was considered offensive by a “substantial composite” (not necessarily a majority) of the Native American population at the time when the first of the REDSKINS registrations was granted – in 1967.

In performing this task, the Board was limited to the evidence placed in the record by the parties. It didn’t do any independent research or fact-finding of its own, and it was not allowed to take “judicial notice” of any information that may have come its way by other means. This procedural limitation is crucial to understanding why the decision may be vulnerable to being overturned on appeal.

“Déjà Vu All Over Again”

It is important to bear in mind that we have passed this way before. In 1999, in a case called Harjo v. Pro Football Inc., the TTAB canceled the very same six trademark registrations for the very same reason: that the word “redskin” was considered disparaging by Native Americans at the time the registrations were granted. Pro Football appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and won: the court overruled the Board’s decision, holding – bear with me, this is the important part – that the evidence concerning the disparaging nature of the term “redskin” in 1967 was insufficient. The petitioners then appealed to D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court – without disturbing the ruling on insufficient evidence. The six registrations – which had remained intact throughout the appeal process – were thus definitively preserved.

Flash forward. The case decided last week, Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., was essentially a re-run of Harjo, with different plaintiffs but with essentially the same evidence. The parties stipulated that all the testimony, expert reports, affidavits, and other documents from Harjo would be received into evidence in Blackhorse as well, and the new petitioners made a strategic decision not to add any substantial new evidence.

Same Evidence, Same Result?

This appears to have worked well in the TTAB: the same tribunal, asked to decide the same issue by examining the same evidence, came to the same conclusion.

But the same strategic decision may backfire in the appellate courts. Note what happened in Blackhorse: the petitioners went into court armed solely with a body of evidence that a higher court had already ruled was insufficient. As the dissent inBlackhorse wrote, “The consequence of petitioners’ decision to rely on the same evidence [that was] previously found insufficient to support cancellation[,] without substantial augmentation[,] is that the evidence before the Board in this case remains insufficient as well.”

Will the appellate courts agree, and overturn the Board’s decision a second time? The picture is clouded by the fact that, owing to an intervening restructuring of the federal court system, the initial appeal might be heard this time by the U.S. District Court for the District of Eastern Virginia, rather than the District of Columbia. Will the new court agree with the old? Only time will tell. But the petitioners may have a hard time persuading anycourt that a body of evidence already deemed insufficient had somehow grown in stature merely as the result of growing 15 years older.

The initial aftermath of Blackhorse, however, will be much the same as that of Harjo. The TTAB has already stayed execution of the Blackhorse decision on the assumption that Pro Football will appeal. So the six REDSKINS registrations will remain in full force and effect throughout the appeal process, which could take several years (as it did last time).

What Impact?

Let’s suppose that Pro Football’s appeal ultimately fails, and that the six registrations are, finally and definitively, canceled. What then? The fact is that the impact of such an outcome on the Washington Redskins team would likely be far less than many observers have suggested.

For starters, the team would not need to change its name. The TTAB decision does not cancel the REDSKINS trademarks, only the federal registrations for those marks. To be sure, federal registration provides important benefits. But as my trademark law students could tell you, under U.S. trademark law rights ultimately come from use of a mark in commerce, and even unregistered marks can become quite strong by virtue of long-standing and widespread use, substantial investment in advertising and promotion, and strong “name recognition” among the public. By any of those measures, REDSKINS is a very strong mark indeed, and Pro Football would not find it difficult to enforce its common-law trademark rights against infringers.

Purely as a matter of legal and economic reality, the post-cancellation world of the Washington Redskins might not look much different than the current one.

IP Rights and Censorship

All this, of course, addresses only what may happen as a result of what is done in courts of law. The court of public opinion is a different matter. Blackhorse appears to have triggered significantly stronger public reaction than Harjo, which may help bring other forces to bear on the situation.

One thing that has not changed is my conviction that deciding issues of this nature is not a job for the Trademark Office. The judges who decide cases in the TTAB are experts on trademark law. They shouldn’t be expected to be experts on the kinds of social and political issues that drive cases like this one, or even on the kind of historical research questions such cases present. Nor do they have the opportunity to submit fact issues to a jury, which might be better positioned to render a verdict about what is or is not “immoral” or “scandalous.”

The Lanham Act is the only intellectual property statute that includes a censorship provision. Why do we feel it is improper to place a government “stamp of approval” (the ® symbol) on a trademark that is “immoral” or “scandalous,” when we have no qualms about placing another such symbol (the © symbol) on copyrighted pornography or hate speech, which we do all the time?

The Redskins case raises many interesting, and important, issues. But none of them are really trademark issues. That’s why their ultimate resolution will likely have little to do with what happened in the Trademark Office last week.

Article By:

John C. Blattner
Dickinson Wright PLLC

US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Announces Trusted Trader Program Test

DrinkerBiddle

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) announced today the commencement of its long-anticipated Trusted Trader Program test which will run for 18 months in collaboration with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) and theU.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). In effect, the Trusted Trader Program will combine the current Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (“C-TPAT”) and Importer Self-Assessment (“ISA”) program with the objective of streamlining the process through which importers can establish that they strive to secure their supply chains and strengthen their internal controls for compliance with the laws and regulations administered or enforced by CBP, including those of other government agencies.

Currently, importing companies can participate in C-TPAT, which focuses on securing supply chains, and ISA, which focuses on strengthening internal controls to comply with Customs laws and regulations in exchange for special benefits. If a company wants to participate in ISA, that company must also be in C-TPAT. By combining the two programs, the Trusted Trader Program will move toward a whole-government approach to supply chain security and trade compliance thereby strengthening government collaboration among different government agencies – CBP, the FDA, and the CPSC. It will also align with the Authorized Economic Operator (“AEO”) programs around the world, which focus on a combined security and compliance model.

Benefits of Participation

To encourage participation in this dual model, CBP is offering the following additional benefits to those currently offered to C-TPAT and ISA members:

  • A reduced FDA targeting/examination risk score;
  • A penalty offset, upon request, as part of a CBP penalty mitigation decision;
  • For Reconciliation program participants, an ability to flag and unflag entries retroactively after the entry summary is filed up until 60 days prior to the date of liquidation;
  • A reduction in Foreign Trade Zone on-site inspections;
  • An exemption from on-site visits from Drawback Specialists, for drawback claimants;
  • A limit of one full desk review per year for drawback claimants;
  • An exemption from random Non-Intrusive Inspections (although the right is reserved to conduct the inspections as appropriate for operational reasons);
  • A quarterly submission of the CAS number, the use, and the description for the chemical compound in advance of the calendar year quarter;
  • A promise from CBP to process Post-Entry Amendments on unliquidated entries within a 90-day timeframe;
  • A choice of exam location when CBP selects an entry for examination;
  • When a single entry contains multiple containers, but only one container is selected for examination, the remaining articles will be released; and
  • Additional incentives for the companies that complete the Product Safety portion of the Trusted Trader application.

Application Process

Importing companies that are interested in participating in the Trusted Trader Program test and meet the eligibility criteria must submit an email; if they are provisionally selected they will be given the Trusted Trader application. CBP will begin accepting emails on Monday June 16, 2014, and plans to begin selecting the initial test participants no later than July 16, 2014. CBP plans to limit the Trusted Trader program test to fewer than 10 participants. Specifically, CBP is looking for test participants to include at least one importer currently participating in C-TPAT, one importer not currently participating in any CBP partnership programs, and one or two participants monitored by CPSC and FDA.

To be eligible to apply for the Trusted Trader Program test, a company must be an active U.S. or Non-Resident Canadian importer with an Importer of Record or CBP-assigned number and at least two years of importing history. The company must also have written policies and procedures pertaining to its import process, a business office staffed in the United States or Canada, and a valid continuous importation bond filed with CBP. A company must also conduct an assessment of its supply chain based on C-TPAT’s security criteria for importers, implement and maintain security measures and supply chain security practices meeting C-TPAT’s security criteria, have a designated company officer responsible for C-TPAT, and create and provide a C-TPAT security profile. Finally, it must maintain books and records to establish compliance with U.S. Customs laws and regulations.

Through the Trusted Trader Program, CBP will: achieve integrated U.S. government collaborations that will result in enhanced efficiencies leading to a reduction in government-wide resource expenditures; expand information sharing between government agencies; reduce administrative costs by streamlining the application and validation processes; and increase efficiencies in the existing trade programs. Just as CBP has done with C-TPAT, ISA, and the Centers of Excellence and Expertise, the Trusted Trader program should strengthen security, identify low-risk trade entities, and increase overall efficiency of trade by segmenting risk and processing by account.

Article By:

Kathleen M. Murphy
Beata K. Spuhler
Mollie D. Sitkowski
Of:
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Apple Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Dynamic Advances, LLC, Decision Denying Institution

DrinkerBiddle

Takeaway: A voluntary dismissal of a litigation without prejudice will not nullify service of a complaint for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) if that litigation is immediately continued in a consolidated case.

In its Decision, the Board denied institution of the Inter Partes Review as time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because it was not filed within the statutory period of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  The date of service of two different complaints was an issue of primary focus by the Board.

In a first patent litigation, Patent Owner (Dynamic Advances) filed a complaint on October 19, 2012. Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01579-DNH-CFH (N.D.N.Y.)(Dynamic I).  The complaint for the first litigation was served on Petitioner (Apple) on October 23, 2012.  In a second patent litigation, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Dynamic Advances jointly filed a complaint on June 3, 2013. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. & Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00633-DNH-DEP (N.D.N.Y.)(Dynamic II).  The complaint for the second litigation was served on Petitioner (Apple) on June 6, 2013.

The Petition in the instant proceeding was filed on January 3, 2014.  Thus, the service date of October 23, 2012 for the first litigation (Dynamic I) was more than 12 months prior to the filing of the Petition, whereas the service date of June 6, 2013 for the second litigation (Dynamic II) was less than 12 months prior to the filing date of the Petition.  The Board found that service of the first complaint on October 23, 2012, rather than service of the second complaint on June 6, 2013, controlled for purposes of determining whether the requested inter partes review was time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  Because the service date of October 23, 2012 for the first litigation (Dynamic I) was more than 12 months prior to the filing of the Petition, the Board found that the Petition was not filed within the statutory period of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

The Board’s rationale in reaching this conclusion related to the fact that on July 22, 2013, the court ordered consolidation of Dynamic I and Dynamic II under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.  In doing so, the court ordered that pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties, Dynamic I was “dismissed without prejudice and the parties would proceed to litigate their claims and defenses in [Dynamic II].”

Petitioner argued that under the decision in Macauto U.S.A. v. BOS GmbH & KG, IPR2012-0004 (“holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice nullified service of the complaint for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)”), service of the first complaint on October 23, 2012 was not effective.  According to Petitioner, as in Macauto, the facts of the present case have the effect of leaving the parties as if the first action had never been brought.

The Board disagreed, finding that “Dynamic I cannot be treated as if that case had never been filed under the rationale of Macauto.”  Instead, the Board found that it was “persuaded that the circumstances in the instant case weigh in favor of close scrutiny of the effect of the dismissal of Dynamic I, because that cause of action, although dismissed, was continued immediately in Dynamic II.”

This proceeding was the third time that Petitioner had petitioned for inter partes review against the ‘798 patent.  In IPR2014-00077, institution was denied.  IPR2014-00320 was filed concurrently with the petition for this proceeding.

Apple Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Dynamic Advances, LLC,IPR2014-00319
Paper 12: Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
Dated: June 12, 2014
Patent 7,177,798 B2
Before: Josiah C. Cocks, Bryan F. Moore, and Miriam L. Quinn
Written by: Moore
Related proceedings: IPR2014-00077; IPR2014-00320; Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01579-DNH-CFH (N.D.N.Y.); Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. & Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00633-DNH-DEP (N.D.N.Y.)

Article By:

Christopher Bruenjes
Of:
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Do Public School Athletic Leagues Have To Admit Private Schools?

Womble Carlyle

Liberty Christian Academy (LCA), a private high school in Lynchburg, Virginia, has filed an antitrust action against the Virginia High School League (VHSL), a non-profit organization of public high schools in Virginia.  The lawsuit was filed June 2, 2014 in the Charlottesville Division of the Western District of Virginia.

The VHSL organizes public schools into districts and regions for purposes of conducting athletic competitions and statewide playoffs.  LCA filed its lawsuit because, as a private school, LCA is barred from membership in the VHSL and claims to be unable, with limited exceptions, to schedule athletic games with the nearby public schools.  LCA complains that it has to travel far distances to play games against inferior opponents.  LCA argues that the VHSL’s rules are akin to a group boycott and constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of federal and state antitrust laws.  The relevant markets alleged in the Complaint are the markets for commercial exhibition of high school football contests and basketball contests in Virginia.

Although some states allow private high schools to join their public high school athletic leagues, other states have separate private and public leagues, such as Virginia, Maryland and Texas.  In the lawsuit, LCA argues that the prohibition on non-public high school membership in the VHSL has no pro-competitive purpose and cannot be justified on any claimed basis that it is necessary to promote fair on-field competition.  I suspect that the ability of private schools to recruit and give scholarships to football and basketball players from a wide geographic area (unlike public schools who have to find players within their own geographic district) would be one of the reasons for the VHSL’s rule.

The Complaint’s reference to the “integration of public and private schools into one athletic association” appears to suggest a strained analogy to civil rights and the racial integration of public schools in Virginia.  LCA should be very careful in suggesting any such analogy, given that LCA was specifically founded in 1967 as a segregation academy in response to the integration of public schools in Virginia.  There is no small amount of irony in LCA’s complaint that it is being excluded and segregated from public school athletic competition.

Several public high school athletic programs are described in the Complaint.  These schools are very familiar to my ears: T.C. Williams in Alexandria, famous from the movie Remember the Titans; football powerhouse Oscar Smith High School in Chesapeake; and Brookville High School outside Lynchburg, my fathers’ almar mater and the arch rival of my high school, Jefferson Forest.

Article By:

Jason C. Hicks
Of:
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

Price Comparison Advertising – Massachusetts Law

GT Law

Retailers doing business in Massachusetts should ensure that their price comparison advertising complies with Massachusetts law, particularly 940 C.M.R. § 6.05 (Section 6.05). Otherwise, they may face a civil enforcement action by the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General (MA AGO), a putative class action brought by a consumer under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act – Chapter 93A, or even a civil action brought by a competitor alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices.

What is price comparison advertising?

As defined in Section 6.05, price comparison advertising “is a form of advertising used in the sale of products whereby current prices are compared with the seller’s former or future prices, the prices of other sellers, or other stated values to demonstrate price reductions or cost savings.” According to the regulation, which was promulgated by the MA AGO, (1) “price comparisons based on false, arbitrary or inflated prices or values deceive or mislead the public” and (2) “[a]buse also occurs when sellers fail to disclose material information which is important to enable consumers to understand the price comparison.” To protect against this alleged deception and abuse, Section 6.05 regulates price comparison advertising.

Which practices does Section 6.05 deem unfair or deceptive?

Section 6.05 is divided into various sections (as more fully described below) that provide retailers with guidance concerning what the MA AGO deems to be unlawful. Violations of Section 6.05 may be enforced by the MA AGO in a civil enforcement action as well as by consumers, who may seek to assert claims individually and on behalf of all those “similarly situated” under Chapter 93A.  Massachusetts law even supports civil actions brought by competitors harmed by unlawful advertising practices.

Specifically, Section 6.05 provides that the following are unfair or deceptive acts:

  • Unidentified Price Comparisons. Sellers cannot state or imply that they are offering any product savings by making a direct or indirect price comparison, unless they “clearly and conspicuously”1   describe the basis for the comparison; provided, however, that sellers may claim a savings or make such a comparison (without disclosing the basis) if they are making a comparison to their own “former price” (as determined by Section 6.05(3)).
  • Comparison to Seller’s Own Former Prices. Sellers cannot compare their current price with their own former price for any product, unless such former price is a “bona fide, actual price” that they had offered “openly and in good faith for a reasonably substantial period of time in the recent past” to the public.2
  • Introductory Offers and Future Price Comparisons. Sellers cannot make an introductory offer or compare their current product price with a future product price unless (i) the future price takes effect immediately after the sale and not later than 60 calendar days after “the dissemination date of the introductory offer or price comparison” and (ii) following the effective date of the future price, the product is offered “openly and in good faith” at that price for at least equal to  the period of time offered at the introductory price, but not less than 14 days (except for certain circumstances).3
  • Use of “Sale” Terminology. Sellers cannot use the words “priced for sale,” “on sale,” “sale,” “selling out,” “clearance,” “reduced,” “liquidation,” “must sell,” “must be sacrificed,” “now only $X,” or other terms which state or imply a price savings unless certain specific factors listed in Section 6.05 are met.4
  • Use of “List Price” or Similar Comparisons. Sellers cannot compare their current product price with a “list price,” “manufacturer’s suggested retail price” or similar term, unless the list or manufacturer’s suggested retail price is the price charged for the advertised product by a reasonable number of sellers in the seller’s trade area as of a particular “measurement date” determined by Section 6.05.5
  • Comparison to Other Seller’s Price for Identical Product. Sellers cannot compare their price with another seller’s price for an identical product, unless the stated higher comparative price is at or below the price at which the identical product is being offered in the seller’s trade area as of the “measurement date” or other specifically identified period under certain circumstances.6
  • Comparison to Seller’s Own or Other Seller’s Price for Comparable Product. Sellers cannot compare their price with their own price or another seller’s price for a comparable product unless the comparable product is being offered for sale as of the “measurement date,” or other specifically identified period, at the stated higher comparative price, unless certain factors are met.7
  • Price Comparisons on Price Tickets or Labels. Sellers cannot imprint or attach any ticket or label to a product that contains a fictitious or inflated price which is capable of being used by sellers as a basis for offering fictitious price reductions.8
  • Range of Savings or Price Reduction Claims. Sellers cannot state or imply that any products are being offered for sale at a range of prices or at a range of percentage or fractional discounts unless various factors are met.9
  • Use of Terms “Wholesale” or “At Cost.” Sellers cannot state or imply that any product is being offered at or near a “wholesale” price or “at cost” (or words of similar meaning) unless the price is, in fact, either at or below the price paid by the seller at wholesale, or, in the case of a service, the seller’s cost for the service excluding overhead and profit.
  • Use of Terms “Two for the Price of One” or “Buy One – Get One Free.” Sellers cannot state or imply that products are being offered at the usual price of a smaller number of the same or a different product unless (i) they clearly and conspicuously disclose all material sale conditions being imposed; (ii) the price advertised as the usual price for the smaller number of products is their own “former price”; and (iii) the products are of substantially the same quality, grade, material and craftsmanship as the seller offered prior to the advertisement.
  • Use of Term “If Purchased Separately.”  Sellers cannot make any price comparison based on the difference between the price of a system, set or group of products and the price of the products “if purchased separately” (or words of similar meaning) unless: (i) a reasonable number of sellers in the trade area are currently offering the products as separate items at or above the stated separate purchase price as of the “measurement date”; or (ii) they have actually sold or offered the products for sale as separate items at the stated separate purchase price.
  • Prices for Parts or Units of Sets or Systems. Sellers cannot advertise a price for any product that normally sells as part of a pair, system, or set without clearly and conspicuously disclosing that the price stated is the price per item or unit only, and not the price for the pair, system or set.
  • Gifts. Sellers cannot state or imply that any product is being offered for free or at a reduced price (“a gift”) in conjunction with the purchase of another product unless various factors are met.10
  • Use of Disclaimers. Sellers cannot use a price comparison that is prohibited even if the advertisement contains disclaimers or explanatory language.
  • Are there any other requirements11  that sellers should consider when assessing their price comparison advertising?
  • Record Keeping Requirements. Sellers must maintain records for a period of six months after the last dissemination of subject advertisements and provide those records to the MA AGO, upon request, to substantiate the propriety of such advertisements.12
  • Deceptive Pricing Generally, Examples, and Loss Leaders. Although not contained within Section 6.05 itself, the MA AGO has adopted a more general regulation dealing with “Deceptive Pricing” set forth in 940 C.M.R. § 3.13(2).13  This subsection describes generally what the MA AGO deems deceptive and provides some examples. In addition, related § 3.13(3) prohibits sellers from selling or offering for sale so-called “loss leaders” to induce a buyer to make a purchase of a product sold only in combination with other merchandise on which the seller recovers such loss.
Article By:

Michael E. Pastore
James P. Ponsetto
David G. Thomas
Of:
Greenberg Traurig, LLP

1 “Clearly and conspicuously” means that “the material representation being disclosed is of such size, color, contrast or audibility and is so presented as to be readily noticed and understood by a reasonable person to whom it is being disclosed.” Section 6.01 provides guidelines for determining if disclosures are proper. 

2 Section 6.05(3) lists various factors that are considered when determining whether a “former price” is a “bona fide, actual price.” Section 6.05(4) provides certain safe harbors for comparison prices.  A complete list of factors and a description of the safe harbors are contained in 940 C.M.R. §§ 6.05(3)(a) and 6.05(4), which are available at  http://www.mass.gov/ago/government-resources/ags-regulations/940-cmr-600.html  (MA AGO’s Website). 

3 These circumstances and exceptions for certain offers limited to certain consumers who are deemed “first time purchasers” as defined in the regulation are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(5), which is available at  the MA AGO’s Website. Also, Section 6.05(5) contains separate requirements for health clubs. 

4 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(6), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

5 Section 6.05(7) contains separate requirements for manufacturers or franchisors. Also, the “measurement date” is defined in Section 6.01. 

6 These requirements are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(8), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

7 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(9), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

8 There are certain exceptions for prices that are pre-ticketed by manufacturers or other sellers, as contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(10), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

9 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(11), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

10 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(16), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

11 This advisory does not contain an all-inclusive list of the MA AGO’s advertising regulations and requirements. Sellers, among other things, should be aware of additional requirements set forth in 940 C.M.R. § 3.00 (General Regulations) and 940 C.M.R. § 6.00 (Retail Advertising). 

12 940 C.M.R. § 6.14 contains specific and detailed record retention requirements for price comparison advertising, which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

13 This more general regulation is available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/government-resources/ags-regulations/940-cmr-3-00/940-cmr-300.html.