Category: Antitrust & Trade Regulation

China and Australia Conclude Landmark Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

Sheppard Mullin Law Firm

Summary

On November 17, 2014, China and Australia completed their negotiations for a China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (“ChAFTA”)by signing a Declaration of Intent which contained the essential elements of the free trade deal and commits both countries to draft the legal text of the agreement for signature at a later date.  This agreement ends almost a decade of free trade negotiations between China and Australia.  The ChAFTA is significant because it will initially lower and ultimately eliminate tariffs on a wide range of exports between the two countries boosting bilateral trade between the world’s second largest economy and a significant U.S. free trade partner in Asia.

“Best Ever” Trade Deal with China

Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, described ChAFTA as the best ever between China and a Western country.  ChAFTA builds on Australia’s trade deals with Korea and Japan which account for Australia’s three largest export markets.  In the short term, ChAFTA will consolidate Australia’s competitive position in the resources and energy market by phasing-in zero tariffs on products including iron ore, coal, gold, and crude petroleum oils which comprise 4 of the top 5 leading exports (by value) from Australia to China.

ChAFTA will also reduce and eliminate tariffs on a wide range of Australia-produced agricultural products, foodstuffs and wine as Australia attempts to transition in the longer term to what commentators have described as a “mining to dining” export economy.

China has also offered Australia its best ever services commitments in an FTA (other than China’s agreements with Hong Kong and Macau) which includes new or significantly increased market access for Australian banks, insurers, securities and futures companies, law firms and professional service suppliers, education service exporters, as well as health, aged care, construction, manufacturing and telecommunication services businesses in China.

Importantly, ChAFTA will contain an Investor Dispute Settlement Mechanism (IDSM) which generally contain administrative, judicial and/or arbitral protections that enable companies to invest in China with greater confidence because an IDSM permits compensation claims against alleged government regulation that negatively impacts investments.

Promoting Chinese Exports and Investment in Australia

ChAFTA will promote further Chinese investment in Australia by, for example, raising the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) screening threshold for private companies from China in non-sensitive areas from AS$248 million to AS$1,078 million.  However, FIRB will continue to screen proposed investments by Chinese State Owned Enterprises regardless of value.

ChAFTA will also increase China’s exports to Australia, in particular, of telecom equipment and parts, computers, clothing, domestic furniture and children’s goods which comprise China’s top 5 exported products to Australia.

Potential Effect on U.S. Trade

The potential impact of ChAFTA on U.S. trade cannot be determined at this stage.  In general, recent economic studies suggest that the effect  of “hub-and-spoke” free trade agreements where one country, in this case, Australia, acts as a “hub” by establishing two different bilateral FTAs with countries that retain their trade barriers on each other’s goods, i.e. U.S. and China, is of positive and significant effect on bilateral trade among all three countries.  However, these economic studies do not incorporate the rules of origin (“ROO”) which are an essential part of FTAs because they define the conditions under which the importing country will view a product as originating in an FTA partner.

Without the full text of the ROO for ChAFTA, it is not possible to indicate the potential for more Australian manufacturing using U.S.-origin components that would otherwise attract high duty if exported directly to China but may not if incorporated into goods in Australia.  However, based on the proposed tariff-reduction on imported Chinese telecom equipment and parts, and computers, ChAFTA does suggest the potential for increased manufacturing in Australia for the U.S. market using Chinese components that could not otherwise be imported directly into the U.S. without paying significant duty.

Under the ROO of the U.S.-Australia FTA, Chinese-origin components would need to satisfy any applicable tariff-shift and/or meet any applicable regional value content.  Alternatively, those Chinese-origin components that did not satisfy an applicable tariff-shift could not comprise more than the de minimislevel of 10% of the adjusted value of the good.

Finally, ChAFTA offers the potential for U.S. investors to structure their investments in China using an Australian entity by taking into account the final text of ChAFTA’s IDSM because there is currently no investor protection offered by a bilateral investment treaty between the U.S. and China.

ARTICLE BY

Neil Ray
Jiamu Sun
OF
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

Protecting Trade Secrets in the Cloud

FINAL SW logo wLLP2

The business community’s growing use of cloud-based computing services provides great benefits due to cost-savings and mobile information access.  However, business leaders should understand the risks of storing valuable trade secrets in the cloud.  This article provides the business community tips on how to safeguard valuable trade secrets stored in the cloud from being freely disclosed to the public, thus putting the business at risk of losing protections that courts grant trade secrets.

As businesses’ profit margins have continued to shrink since the Great Recession, more companies have looked to reduce costs by reducing growing expenses related to their information technology departments.[1] The first line item to draw attention in the IT budget is frequently the rising costs associated with maintaining and upgrading system hardware.  Businesses often find that housing and operating multiple servers stretches IT budgets thin by increasing maintenance, labor, and operational costs.  The solution so many businesses have turned to is to move their valuable data to virtual servers, or the “cloud.”[2]  A recent survey of IT executives provides that companies will triple their IT spending on cloud-based services in 2014 over 2011.[3]  Cloud service providers have also seen demand increase as they increase their cloud capabilities.[4]

Although cloud-based servers provide businesses with substantial financial and operational benefits, businesses must recognize that there are perils to shifting data to the cloud.  One of the key concerns businesses should consider before moving data to the cloud is the risk that its valuable trade secrets will lose protection as a result of insufficient safeguards to protect against disclosure.  This article addresses that concern and provides businesses keys for seeking to protect valuable secrets in the cloud.

What is a Protectable Trade Secret

The initial step for a business to determine how to protect its trade secrets is to understand how the law characterizes a trade secret.  Information qualifies as a trade secret only if it derives independent economic value as a result of not being generally known or readily ascertainable, and be subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.  Trade secrets are broadly defined as information, including technical or non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing, process, financial data, strategies, pricing information, and lists of customers, prospective customers, and suppliers.

Businesses Need to Take Reasonable Efforts to Protect Trade Secrets in the Cloud

Trade secrets are only protectable when the owner takes reasonable efforts to prevent them from being freely disclosed to the public so that the information does not become generally known.

Information does not have to be cloaked in absolute secrecy to be a trade secret, as long as a business’s efforts to maintain secrecy or confidentiality are reasonable.  It is easy for one to imagine how a business may protect confidential documents that are stored locally.  Computer files may be password-protected with several layers of encryption software, with access limited to specified personnel.  Similarly, paper files may be stored in locked cabinets, in secured rooms, where only specified personnel are granted access.

However, those seemingly straight-forward security protocols become murky when information is stored in the cloud.  Unlike storing data on local servers, storing data in the cloud requires the owner to disclose confidential information to a third-party vendor.  In most situations, disclosing data to a third-party eliminates trade secret protections.   Therefore, businesses must take additional steps to ensure that its data remains secure.

Three Keys to Protecting Trade Secrets Stored in the Cloud

There are no fail-safe measures to protect data stored in the cloud.  The best way for a business to protect its trade secrets is to locally store and protect its most valuable data with the proper data security protocols.  A business, however, should not fear the cloud as long as it takes certain steps to ensure that it exercises reasonable efforts to protect its cloud-based data.

First, business leaders must conduct appropriate due diligence before selecting a cloud-provider.  The business should conduct necessary research to select a reputable, well-established company that has the physical and technological capabilities to store and protect data.

Conducting due diligence on a provider includes ensuring that the provider has taken necessary steps to establish appropriate physical and virtual security protocols to protect the confidentiality of your information.  Inquire how the provider establishes physical security measures, and monitoring capabilities to prevent unauthorized access to its data centers and infrastructure.  Also, learn how the provider limits its employees’ access to customer data and determine the internal controls that the provider has in place to prevent unauthorized viewing, copying, or emailing of customer information.

A business should also inquire about the provider’s virtual security protocols.  A business must generally understand how its cloud-provider’s encryption software and security management systems work to protect data.  If your business is not capable of independently evaluating whether the provider has proper security protocols, a good indicator is to ask the provider for its client list.  If the provider has clients that are typically security-conscious companies, such as financial institutions or healthcare facilities, that is a good indication that the provider has been vetted and it has proper security measures in place.  Finally, the provider should maintain sufficient data-protection insurance coverage to protect against potential data breaches or system failures.

Second, a business must have contractual safeguards in place with its cloud-provider to adequately protect its intellectual property and trade secrets.  The contract should establish that the business owns the data, that it will be segregated from other data groups, and that the business may enjoy unfettered access to the data.  The contract should specify that the business can demand that the data be deleted or returned request, and detail how the provider will purge the data to ensure that it is properly deleted upon termination of the relationship.  The contract should require regular data backup and recovery tests, while restricting the provider from accessing, using or copying data for its own purpose.  Finally, the contract should establish the provider’s obligations to notify the business of a data breach or system failure.

Third, a business should also consider adding multiple layers of authentication and encryption to data containing trade secrets before transmitting it to the cloud-provider.  However, a business should consider if the additional encryption efforts could adversely affect the business’s ability to access, utilize, and port data for its normal business use.

Conclusion

There are several financial and operational benefits for a business to store data in the cloud.  However, businesses must understand that there are also risks to storing its valuable trade secrets on virtual servers.  Businesses need to take reasonable efforts to protect the confidentiality and secrecy of its most valuable data and information.

[1] Dave Rosenberg.  Reducing IT Infrastructure Costs via Outsourcing.  May 7, 2009.  news.cnet.com/8301-13846_3-10235742-62.html

[2] Thor Olavsrud.  How Cloud Computing Helps Cut Costs, Boost Profits.  March 12, 2013. www.cio.com/article/730036/How_Cloud_Computing_Helps_Cut_Costs_Boost_Profits

[3] Andrew Horne. Transformational Change in IT Will Drive 2014 Spending.  November 5, 2013.  http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/11/05/transformational-change-in-it-will-drive-2014-spending/

[4] IBM Commits $1.2bn to Cloud Data Centre Expansion.  January 17, 2014. www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25773266

Ebola Response Missing A Critical Player

Covington BUrling Law Firm

The Obama Administration has mobilized a number of government agencies to respond to the Ebola crisis in West Africa and to prevent its spread into the U.S. At the frontline of the Administration’s response is the Pentagon, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Center for Disease Control, the U.S. Agency for International development and, more recently, the Department of Transportation.

Conspicuously missing, however, is the Department of Commerce, which traditionally is the link to the U.S. private sector.

This omission is significant because U.S. companies are likely to get materials to the stricken countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea more quickly than the Pentagon.  In the instances in which they operate locally, the companies provide a valuable source of information and delivery infrastructure.

For example, in mid-August, more than 20 leading medical companies shipped 40 tons of supplies and protective equipment to Liberia.  The airlift was coordinated  by the California-based NGO, Direct Relief, and facilitated by Fedex. Companies such as Pfizer, Teva, Merck, Kimberly-Clark and Mylan Laboratories contributed 2.3 million gloves, 65,000 masks and 185,000 tabs of antibiotics. As of September 20th, Direct Relief had coordinated 11 shipments of supplies.

Equally important is the Ebola Private Sector Mobilization Group (EPSMG) which is a network of more than 40 companies active in West Africa and, especially, Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Chaired by ArcelorMittal and including companies such as Chevron, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, the group seeks to provide a single access point for the private sector to help mobilize and coordinate a response.  The group’s first principal is to “be part of the region’s long-term economic and social recovery and development.” EPSMG has met with Dr. Margaret Chan, Director General of the World Health Organization, and the U.S. ambassador to Liberia, Deborah Malac, and engaged with organizations such as the UN Ebola Task Force, the World Bank and various NGOs.

The in-country private sector plays other important roles.  ArcelorMittal, which has a workforce of nearly 3000, provides health care for its workers and their families and uses its internal communications network to convey accurate and timely information about the epidemic.  Firestone Rubber, which has been in Liberia since 1926, detected in first case of Ebola on March 30th, according to NPR. Since then, the company went into crisis mode, built its own treatment center and developed a comprehensive response that effectively stopped the transmission of the virus among more than 80,000 employees and family members who live on the sprawling plantation.

Local companies such as the National Oil Company of Liberia and the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Company have also made contributions to combatting the virus.

The importance of the private sector’s role in responding to health emergencies cannot be underestimated.  Companies such as Anglo-American, SABMiller and Ford Motor Company played critical roles in combatting the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa by making medicines and quality health care available to their employees and their families, and they continue to play this role.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Corporate Council on Africa are to be applauded for the role that they have played in helping to coordinate and publicize the U.S. private sector response to the Ebola crises.

The Obama Administration has effectively integrated the private sector into key development initiatives such as Power Africa and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which is the private sector component of Feed the Future.  It would do well to establish a similar mechanism as part of its Ebola response. Controlling the spread of Ebola and the development of viable health care systems in the three affected countries will require the sustained engagement of governments, NGOs, international organizations and agencies and the private sector.  The sooner that all parties are able to coordinate their efforts the more likely this virus will be controlled.

© 2014 Covington & Burling LLP
ARTICLE BY

Witney Schneidman
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

Renewal Deadline – 1 Year Trademark Clearinghouse Registrations

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

If your company was an early registrant in the Trademark Clearinghouse, it is likely your registrations had an effective date of November 5, 2014, the date the Clearinghouse went “live.” If so, the deadline to renew one-year registrations is November 5, 2014.

© 2014 Sterne Kessler
ARTICLE BY

Monica Riva Talley
Tracy-Gene G. Durkin
Ivy Clarice Estoesta
Julie D. Shirk
OF
Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.

New U.S. Restrictions on Russia: OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) Guidance and Industry-Specific Sanctions

Sheppard Mullin Law Firm

OFAC Expands the 50 Percent Rule

Last month, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released new guidance related to entities owned or controlled by persons designated as a Specially Designated National (SDN) on OFAC’s SDN list.  Although the guidance leaves intact the current meaning “50 percent rule,” the rule will now allow OFAC to take a far broader approach in determining when the 50 percent rule applies.

Under the 50 percent rule, as it stood before the August 13 release of the updated guidance, all entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an SDN (i.e., any entity of which an SDN owns 50 percent or more) are considered designated by operation of law and must be treated as SDNs.  Thus, companies owned or controlled by SDNs are blocked, even if they are not themselves specifically listed on the SDN list.  It is unlawful for U.S. persons to conduct virtually any business with any SDN.

In a major expansion of the 50 percent rule, OFAC will now aggregate the ownership interests of SDNs when it determines whether the rule applies.  Specifically, the new guidance provides that “any entity owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or moreblocked persons is itself considered to be a blocked person” (emphasis added).  According to OFAC’S updated Frequently Asked Questions on the issue, “if Blocked Person X owns 25 percent of Entity A, and Blocked Person Y owns another 25 percent of Entity A, Entity A is considered to be blocked.”  Taken to the logical conclusion, the new approach means that an entity owned or controlled by a large number of SDNs, each with a small interest in the entity itself, may nonetheless be designated, and afforded the same regulatory treatment, as an SDN.

Notably, OFAC did not provide for a transition period as the new rule takes effect, nor is there any mention of a general authorization for companies to end involvement in now-potentially prohibited transactions.

More than ever, companies must focus on conducting appropriate due diligence when operating in the universe of potentially covered persons, entities, or transactions.  Due to the expansion of potentially blocked entities, American companies must determine what policies and procedures need to be in place for vetting would-be business partners before engaging in any transaction, so they do not inadvertently conduct unlawful business with SDNs.

Russian Industry Sector Sanctions

Separately, On August 6, 2014, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule amending the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the most aggressive set of export controls against Russia in recent memory.  In short, the new rules will deny export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses for certain dual-use items for use in Russia’s energy sector.

Specifically, under the new EAR section 746.5 and amendments to other sections, a license is now required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) certain items when the exporter “knows or is informed that the item will be used directly or indirectly in Russia’s energy sector for exploration or production from deepwater …, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia that have the potential to produce oil or gas or is unable to determine whether the item will be used in such projects in Russia.”

The “certain items” referred to in the regulation include two classes of products: (1) any item subject to the EAR listed in Supplement No. 2 to Part 746, including fifty-two specific products listed by Schedule B number; and (2) any item specified in the following Export Control Classification Numbers: 0A998, 1C992, 3A229, 3A231, 3A232, 6A991, 8A992, or 8D999.  BIS includes the following list of illustrative examples of restricted products: “drilling rigs, parts for horizontal drilling, drilling and completion equipment, subsea processing equipment, Arctic-capable marine equipment, wireline and down hole motors and equipment, drill pipe and casing, software for hydraulic fracturing, high pressure pumps, seismic acquisition equipment, remotely operated vehicles, compressors, expanders, valves, and risers.”

With the exception of License Exception GOV, which authorizes certain exports and reexports to U.S. and foreign governmental agencies and intergovernmental organizations, no license exceptions are available to fulfill the new licensing requirement.  Thus, all exports of the restricted products will require a BIS license for export or reexport to Russia, regardless of whether those products were formerly exportable to Russia with no license required.  Further, the new BIS rule imposes a presumption of denial for license applications “when there is potential for use directly or indirectly for exploration or production” from deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia with the potential to produce oil.

The final rule does not contain a savings clause. That means any restricted products exported to Russia without a license on or after August 6 may be considered violations, even if the products were formerly exported under a license exception.

Those companies exporting items used in the exploration or production of oil or gas should immediately determine whether any of the products they export, reexport, or transfer to Russian end-users (or intermediaries with constructive or direct knowledge that the ultimate end-user is in Russia) are restricted products as defined in the new rule.  If so, companies should understand the implications of the new licensing requirements and the presumption of denial for license applications.  Further, if your company is unable to determine whether your products are used in the end-uses defined in the rule, the rule requires that such products be considered subject to the licensing requirements.  Thus, unless you can affirmatively determine that your products are not to be used for the energy-related activities defined in the rule, then your company should assume that its products are subject to the licensing requirements.

ARTICLE BY

J. Scott Maberry
Matthew L. Riemer
OF
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
Copyright © 2014, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

U.S. And EU Significantly Expand Sanctions and Export Control Restrictions Targeting Russia

In response to Russia’s continuing actions to destabilize Ukraine, the United States and EU took coordinated and significant steps on September 12, 2014, to expand and intensify sanctions targeting the Russian energy, defense, and financial services sectors. In tandem, the United States and EU also imposed additional restrictions on energy-related exports to certain entities in Russia, and the EU introduced new trade controls relating to certain dual-use exports.

In the United States, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) took three steps that target the Russian energy sector:

  • First, OFAC imposed a prohibition on the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology in support of deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale exploration or production projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in or offshore of Russia; and (2) involve any of five major Russian energy companies: Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, or Surgutneftegas. U.S. parties impacted by these new sanctions have two weeks to wind down their activities with these Russian firms, under the terms of a new general license.

  • Second, BIS imposed a license requirement for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these same five Russian companies of any item subject to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. This action – achieved by naming these companies to the BIS Entity List – represents an expansion of the previous BIS restrictions relating to Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale oil and gas projects, which we reviewed in our e-alert of July 30, 2014.

  • Third, OFAC added two Russian energy companies–Gazprom Neft and Transneft–tothegroup of companies whose ability to issue new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days is restricted. Those restrictions on new debt, which apply to U.S. persons and persons in the United States who transact in, provide financing for, or otherwise deal in such debt, were detailed in our e-alert of July 17, 2014.

    U.S. actions targeting the Russian defense and financial services sectors include new or expanded “sectoral sanctions” and the designation of Russian defense companies to BIS’s Entity List and OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. BIS also noted that it will “require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia,” but did not provide further elaborate on what this may entail.

    The new EU sanctions are set forth in two measures. First, Council Regulation No. 960/2014, which amends Council Regulation No. 833/2014 (described in our e-alert of August 4, 2014), introduces new restrictions on the access of certain Russian companies, including major Russian energy companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, to EU financing and financial markets. It also introduces new trade controls relating to certain dual-use and energy-related exports. Separately, Council Regulation No. 961/2014 designates 24 additional individuals for EU asset-freezing measures.

Collectively, the new U.S. and EU sanctions introduce a significant new range of trade controls, which will be of particular importance to companies in the energy, financial services, and defense sectors. The principal elements of the new sanctions are described below.

NEW U.S. SANCTIONS

A. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Energy Sector

Perhaps the most significant of the new U.S. sanctions are those targeting the Russian energy sector. The new U.S. measures have implications for both U.S. and non-U.S. companies that do business with the Russian energy industry, though they will impact U.S. and non-U.S. companies in different ways. As noted above, OFAC and BIS have taken three new steps to target the Russian energy sector.

OFAC Directive 4 and General License No. 2

The first key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s issuance of a new directive – Directive 4 – pursuant to Executive Order 13662. Directive 4 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production from deepwater (i.e., more than 500 feet), Arctic offshore, or shale projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in Russia or in maritime area claimed by Russia and extending from its territory; and (2) involve parties subject to Directive 4, their property, or their interests in property. These restrictions also extend to entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties. Currently, five Russian energy companies are identified on the U.S. Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (“SSI List”) as being subject to Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. Directive 4 also makes clear that any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions is prohibited, and that any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of Directive 4’s prohibitions is also prohibited.

At the same time that it issued Directive 4, OFAC expanded the guidance it offers on the sectoral sanctions through its Frequently Asked Questions. One of these “FAQs” (#412) explains that the prohibition on the exportation of services includes, but may not be limited to, drilling services, geophysical services, geological services, logistical services, management services, modeling capabilities, and mapping technologies. In contrast, Directive 4 does not prohibit the exportation or provision of financial services, such as clearing transactions or providing insurance related to the targeted activities. However, companies providing such financial services should ensure that those services do not constitute a prohibited dealing in new debt or new equity under Directives 1 or 2, which are addressed further below and apply independently of Directive 4.

Simultaneously, OFAC also issued General License No. 2 to authorize, for a limited time, certain wind down activities involving the Russian energy companies subject to Directive 4. Specifically, activities otherwise prohibited by Directive 4 are authorized until September 26, 2014, if they are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements involving persons determined to be subject to Directive 4 . . . that were in effect prior to September 12, 2014.” OFAC has made clear that General License No. 2 does not authorize the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology except as needed to cease operations involving the projects covered by Directive 4.

Any U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by General License No. 2 are required, within 10 business days after the wind down activities conclude, to file a detailed report with OFAC covering the parties involved in the wind down activities and the date, type, and scope of such activities.

Finally, even if General License No. 2 appears to allow an export or reexport of goods, services, or technology related to wind down activities, companies should also confirm that there are no BIS restrictions applicable to the export or reexport before proceeding.

Expansion of BIS License Requirements for Certain Russian Deepwater, Arctic Offshore, and Shale Projects

The second key action targeting the Russian energy sector is BIS’s addition to its Entity List of the same five Russian energy companies currently subject to OFAC’s Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. As a result of this action, BIS now requires all U.S. and non-U.S. persons to obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these five Russian companies of any item subject to the EAR if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. Moreover, applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial if the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, a deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale project in Russia that has the potential to produce oil. BIS previously issued guidance addressing the scope of the Entity List, including circumstances where an entity is owned or controlled by an entity on the Entity List. That guidance is available here.

This BIS action – which targets the export, reexport, or transfer of any item subject to the EAR – represents a significant expansion of the BIS export restrictions that were announced in early August, which targeted only certain enumerated items, not any item, subject to the EAR.

Addition of Two Russian Energy Companies to the SSI List as Subject to OFAC Directive 2

The third key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s addition of two Russian energy companies – Gazprom Neft and Transneft – to the SSI List as subject to OFAC’s Directive 2. Directive 2 was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662, and prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of entities identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 2, their property, or interests in property.

Because Gazprom Neft and Transneft are now subject to Directive 2, transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of Gazprom Neft and Transneft, Rosneft and OAO Novatek (which were added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 2 in July), and any entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties is prohibited as to U.S. persons and within the United States.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which supersedes General License No. 1 of July 16, 2014, and which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days issued by a person subject to Directive 2.

It is important to highlight that Rosneft and Gazprom Neft are subject to both Directive 2 and Directive 4 (described above). OFAC has made clear that persons dealing with either Rosneft or Gazprom Neft must ensure that such dealings comply with Directive 2 and Directive 4 independently. For example, even if the provision of services to Rosneft is permissible under Directive 4 because the services qualify as “financial services,” the entity providing those services must separately ensure that the services do not run afoul of the prohibitions of Directive 2.

B. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Defense Sector

OFAC Directive 3

OFAC expanded the sectoral sanctions targeting Russia to also cover the defense and related materiel sector. U.S. sectoral sanctions targeting Russia had previously focused only on the Russian financial services and energy sectors.

In particular, OFAC issued a new directive – Directive 3 – prohibiting the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of entities added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3, or their property or interests in property. Simultaneously, OFAC added Rostec, a Russia-based state- owned holding company for the Russian defense industry, to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3.

Like Directive 4, Directive 3 prohibits any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate Directive 3’s prohibitions. Likewise, Directive 3 prohibits any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, as discussed above, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days issued by a person subject to Directive 3.

Addition of Five Russian Defense Companies to the SDN List and Entity List

Separately, OFAC added the following five entities that operate in the Russian defense sector to its SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661:

  • Almaz-Antey GSKB (aka Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern Main System Design Bureau, JSC): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern (which was itself added to the SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661 on July 16, 2014) that designs and manufactures air defense systems for the Russian Ministry of Defense.

  • Dolgoprudny Research Production Enterprise: primarily engaged in the production of weapons and ammunition, including the Buk (SA-11 or SA-17) missile system.

  • JSC NIIP (aka Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern that develops anti-aircraft defense systems, including on-board radar systems for MiG and Sukhoi fighters, and anti-aircraft missile systems for land forces, including the Kub and Buk systems.

  • Kalinin Machine Plant JSC: a state-run company involved in the production of special purpose products, including launchers, anti-air missiles, and artillery guns for infantry and anti-air defense.

  • Mytishchinski Mashinostroitelny Zavod OAO: has produced weaponry and equipment, primarily anti-aircraft missile systems and chassis for tracked military vehicles.

U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any dealings with these designated entities or any entities that are owned 50% or more by one or more of the designated entities. Additionally, any property or interests in property of these designated entities that comes within the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person must be blocked.

Simultaneous with the OFAC designations, BIS added these same five entities to its Entity List, which means that any person – including non-U.S. persons – must obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer of any item subject to the EAR to the five designated entities. Applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial.

BIS noted in making these designations that it “will also require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia.” BIS did not further elaborate on what this may entail. We note – as explained in our e-alert of August 4, 2014 – that the EU previously imposed a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use goods and technology to Russia if those items may be intended for “military use” or a “military end-user.”

C. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Financial Services Sector

OFAC also has taken two key steps to expand and intensify the restrictions under Directive 1, which was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662 and which targets the access of certain entities in Russia’s financial services sector to U.S. capital markets.

First, OFAC amended Directive 1 to decrease the length of maturity of prohibited new debt from 90 days to 30 days. In its original form, Directive 1 prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity or new equity for persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1 (i.e., certain Russian banks), their property, or their interests in property. In its new, amended form, Directive 1 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1, their property, or their interests in property.

Second, OFAC added Sberbank to the list of Russian banks subject to Directive 1. Thus, the prohibitions under Directive 1 are now applicable to new debt of longer than 30 days maturity and new equity of the Bank of Moscow, Gazprombank, the Russian Agricultural Bank, Sberbank, VEB, and VTB.

As noted above, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days or new equity issued by a person subject to Directive 1.

NEW EU SANCTIONS

The EU Council first agreed to the core framework of the sanctions on September 8, 2014. However, the cease-fire between the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian armed militia — signed on September 5, 2014 — caused the EU Council to delay the entry into force of the new sanctions as the Council evaluated the cease-fire and the implementation of broader peace initiatives proposed earlier this month by the President of Ukraine.

The EU Council has signaled that it is prepared to take swift action to remove or reduce the new sanctions if the Russian Government demonstrates cooperation in resolving the conflict in Ukraine − or to further enhance the sanctions regime if Russia continues to contribute to the conflict.

The restrictions implemented on September 12, 2014 introduce a number of new measures, including features that do not have precedent in prior EU sanctions regulations. As in the case of the original version of Regulation 833/2014, the new provisions include a number of ambiguities that have already generated important questions from potentially affected companies, and the EU Member States will likely be called upon in the coming weeks to issue interpretive guidance relating to the new sanctions measures.

A. Additional Restrictions on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Regulation 960/2014 imposes a new prohibition − codified in Article 2a of the Amended Regulation 833/2014 − on the sale, supply, transfer, or export, directly or indirectly, of dual-use goods and technologies to any natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia that is listed in Annex IV to the Regulation. Annex IV currently includes JSC Sirius, OJSC Stankoinstrument, OAO JSC Chemcomposite, JSC Kalashnikov, JSC Tula Arms Plant, NPK Technologii Maschinostrojenija, OAO Wysokototschnye Kompleksi, OAO Almaz Antey, and OAO NPO Bazalt. This new restriction on dual- use items supplements the existing prohibition, reflected in the original Regulation 833/2014, against the export of dual-use items to military end-users or for any military end-use in Russia.

Regulation 960/2014 also prohibits the provision to Annex IV parties of technical assistance, brokering services, or any “other services” related to dual-use items and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, and use of those items. The provision to the Annex IV parties of financing or financial assistance for the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services, or other services is also prohibited.

The foregoing restrictions are expressed in the Regulation as prohibitions, rather than licensing requirements, thus implying that licenses will not be available to authorize transactions covered under the new restrictions. The new prohibitions are, however, subject to a number of important exemptions. Firstly, they do not apply to (i) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items intended for the aeronautics and space industry, or the related provision of technical or financial assistance for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, or to (ii) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items for maintenance and safety of existing civil nuclear capabilities within the EU, for non-military use, and for non-military end-users.

The foregoing provisions are also without prejudice to the execution of contracts or agreements concluded before September 12, 2014, and to the provision of assistance necessary to the maintenance and safety of “existing capabilities within the EU.” Regulation 960/2014 does not define the term “existing capabilities.”

B. New Oil and Gas “Services” Controls

Regulation 960/2014 also introduces a new Article 3a to Regulation 833/2014, prohibiting the direct or indirect provision of certain “services necessary for deepwater oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia,” including (i) “drilling,” (ii) “well testing,” (iii) “logging and completion services,” and (iv) “supply of specialised floating vessels[.]” The new measures supplement existing restrictions, set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation 833/2014, concerning transactions associated with oil and gas equipment listed in Annex II to Regulation 833/2014. The new Article 3a restrictions are not, however, limited to Annex II items or to any other defined products, and the Regulation provides no definition or guidance concerning the scope of the restricted “services.” Moreover, in contrast to Regulation 833/2014 and to trade controls restrictions in other EU sanctions regulations, which distinguish restrictions on exports of goods and technology from restrictions on the provision of related support (e.g., technical assistance, brokering, financing, or financial assistance), the general reference to “services” in Article 3a has invited questions − which are not easily resolved from the text of the Regulation − concerning whether the new measures are intended to capture the supply of goods, the mere provision of technical or other support, or both.

The Article 3a prohibitions are without prejudice to the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or a “framework agreement” concluded before September 12, 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. The term “framework agreement” is not defined in Regulation 960/2014. However, it presumably carries a broader scope than the term “agreement” used in similar grandparenting provisions in Regulation 833/2014.

Finally, Article 3a exempts services that are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment.

On a separate but related note, a recently published corrigendum to Regulation 833/2014 has clarified the scope of the restrictions on the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing, or financial assistance relating to the items listed on Annex II to that regulation. The corrigendum amends Article 4(4), correcting an error to the version of Regulation 833/2014 published on August 1, 2014, to make clear that competent Member State authorities may not authorize such assistance if the Annex II items are for Arctic or deepwater oil exploration or production or for a shale oil project unless the assistance concerns the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before August 1, 2014.

C. Additional Controls on Military Items

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 4 of Regulation 833/2014 to prohibit the provision of insurance and reinsurance relating to military items to Russian parties or for use in Russia; this prohibition applies in addition to the pre-existing prohibition against the provision of financing and financial assistance relating to military items.

D. Additional Financial Sector Restrictions

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 5 to Regulation 833/2014 to introduce a number of important new financial restrictions against designated Russian parties. The key amendments to Article 5 are as follows:

  • Regulation 960/2014 extends existing restrictions targeting “transferablesecurities” and “money market instruments” issued by Russian financial institutions listed on Annex III to Regulation 833/2014. Specifically, the new provisions introduce a restriction on the provision of “investment services” relating to those instruments, and lower the maturity period for covered instruments from 90 to 30 days (for instruments issued after September 12, 2014). Thus, Article 5 now renders it prohibited to “directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 1 August 2014 to 12 September 2014, or with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014[.]”

  • The newly-introduced term “investmentservices” is defined as“ (i) reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments, (ii) execution of orders on behalf of clients, (iii) dealing on own account, (iv) portfolio management, (v) investment advice, (vi) underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, (vii) placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis, and (viii) any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading facility.”

  • The definition of “transferablesecurities” has been amended to exclude negotiable securities giving rise to a cash settlement.

  • The amended Article 5 also introduces similar prohibitions on dealings in “transferable securities” and “money-market instruments” with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after September 12, 2014, by (1) certain designated Russian military entities, as listed in the new Annex V to Regulation 833/2014, and (2) certain Russian entities active in the oil industry, as listed in the new Annex VI to Regulation 833/2014. Notably, the latter list includes major Russian oil and gas enterprises Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft (the oil branch of Gazprom). Those new restrictions also extend to any entity established outside of the EU that is majority-owned by any entity designated in Annex V or Annex VI.

  • Similar to the restrictions imposed by Regulation 833/2014 against AnnexIIIbanks,the foregoing measures contain an important carve-out, as they do not apply to affiliates of the listed entities that are established within the EU. However, as with the Annex III bank restrictions, they extend to any entity “acting on behalf or at the direction of” the Annex V or Annex VI designated parties or their non-EU subsidiaries.

  • Finally, Regulation 960/2014 prohibits making or being part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 30 days available to any party listed on Annexes III, V, or VI after September 12, 2014. The Regulation exempts from that prohibition (i) loans or credit that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the EU and Russia, and (ii) loans that have a specific and documented objective to provide emergency funding to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for legal persons established in the EU that are majority owned by Annex III banks.

    As with the original Article 5, the foregoing restrictions are not asset-blocking measures — EU parties are not generally prohibited from conducting business with the Annex III, V, and VI parties if their activities do not trigger the specific restrictions outlined above.

    E. Additional Parties Subject to the Asset-Freezing Restrictions

    Regulation 961/2014 imposes travel bans and asset freezes on a further 24 individuals, including pro-Russian rebels, Russian lawmakers and state officials, and the chairman of the Russian Rostec conglomerate, Sergey Viktorovich Chemzov. This brings the total number of individuals subject to sanctions under this specific regime to 119, whilst the number of designated entities remains 23.

    In the same manner as prior EU sanctions measures, all funds and “economic resources” belonging to, owned, held, or controlled by the newly designated parties must be frozen. “Economic resources” include “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but which may be used to obtain funds, goods or services.” In addition, Regulation 961 prohibits making available funds or “economic resources,” directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the designated parties.

    F. Jurisdictional Reach of the New Sanctions

    Consistent with the pre-existing sanctions measures, the jurisdictional scope of the new sanctions extends (1) to conduct by EU-incorporated entities and EU nationals anywhere in the world; (2) to conduct by any party, irrespective of nationality, in connection with activities occurring in the territory of the EU or (with regard to legal persons) in respect of business “done in whole or in part within the Union”; or (3) conduct on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State.

***

The new sanctions represent the latest, although perhaps not the last, restrictions relating to the crisis in Ukraine. The EU has signaled that it will closely monitor the implementation of the new restrictions and their impact, and it will consider supplemental measures if circumstances in Eastern Ukraine warrant and consensus among the 28 Member States can be reached. Likewise, the U.S. government has stated that additional sanctions targeting Russia could be forthcoming if Russia does not work toward a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in Ukraine.

We are following the above-mentioned sanctions and export control developments closely and will provide further updates as they evolve. We are particularly well-positioned to advise companies and individuals on compliance with the U.S. and EU sanctions related to the Ukraine crisis, as well as on the broader impact of the crisis on foreign investment in both Ukraine and Russia and other legal and commercial interests in the region.

ARTICLE BY

Peter Flanagan
Corrine Goldstein
Peter Lichtenbaum
Kimberly Strosnider
David Addis
David Lorello
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

U.S. Sentencing Commission Weighing Recommendation to Increase Criminal Antitrust Penalties

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In June, the United States Sentencing Commission, which is appointed by the President to make recommendations to Congress on the criminal penalties for the violation of federal law, issued a request for comments regarding whether the guidelines for calculating antitrust fines should be modified. Currently, corporate fines for cartel price fixing are calculated on a sliding scale, tied to the amount of the “overcharge” imposed by the violators, with the standard maximum fine under the Guidelines for a corporation capped at $100 million and, for an individual, capped at $1 million. The deadline for such comments was July 29, and the views expressed on the issue varied considerably.

Contending that the current Guidelines do not provide an adequate deterrent to antitrust violations, the American Antitrust Institute urged the Commission to recommend an increase in the fines for cartel behavior. The AAI stated that the presumption in the Guidelines that antitrust cartels, on average, “overcharge” consumers for goods by 10% is greatly understated, and thus should be corrected to reflect more accurate levels. Pointing to economic studies and cartel verdicts, the AAI suggests that the median cartel “overcharge” is actually in excess of 20%, and therefore the presumption should be modified in the Guidelines. If adopted, the AAI’s proposal would double the recommended fines under the Guidelines for antitrust violations.

Perhaps surprisingly, the DOJ responded to the Commission’s Notice by stating that it believes that the current fines are sufficient, and that no increase in antitrust fines is warranted at this time. The DOJ indicated that the 10% overcharge presumption provides a “predictable, uniform methodology” for the calculation of fines in most cases, and noted that the Guidelines already permit the DOJ to exceed the fine levels calculated using the 10% overcharge presumption in some circumstances. Specifically, the DOJ noted that the alternative sentencing provisions of 18 USC 3571 already permit it to sidestep the standard guidelines and seek double the gain or loss from the violation where appropriate. Notably, the DOJ utilized this provision in seeking a $1 billion fine from AU Optronics in a 2012 action, although the court declined the request, characterizing it as “excessive”. The court did, however, impose a $500 million fine, an amount well in excess of the cap under the standard antitrust fine guidelines.

Finally, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Douglas Ginsburg and FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright offered a completely different view on the issue in comments that they submitted to the Sentencing Commission. Suggesting that fines imposed on corporations seem to have little deterrent effect, regardless of amount, they encouraged the Commission to instead recommend an increase in the individual criminal penalty provisions for antitrust violations. Notably, they encouraged the Commission not only to consider recommending an increase in the fines to which an individual might be subjected (currently capped at $1 million), but also to recommend an increase in the prescribed range of jail sentences for such conduct (which currently permit for imprisonment of up to 10 years).

The Commission will now weigh these comments and ultimately submit its recommendations to Congress by next May. If any changes are adopted by Congress, they would likely go into effect later next year. Stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY

James M. Burns
 
OF 
Dickinson Wright PLLC

Sizing Up the Competition: Antitrust Enforcement and the Bazaarvoice Ruling

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High-profile or highly profitable firms are no longer the sole targets of post-merger divestitures by antitrust enforcers. Today, firms that have little or no revenues, including some that operate in emergent industries with little or negative profits, also find themselves subject to merger inquiries, as demonstrated by the recent merger review of Bazaarvoice’s 2012 non-reportable $160 million acquisition of PowerReviews. 

Bazaarvoice merger antitrust

These competing firms were both operating at a loss in the relatively small Ratings and Review (R&R) market. Yet, the nature of competition in the industry and the industry’s potential importance to adjacent industries – combined with statements by the acquirer’s executives prior to the transaction – attracted the scrutiny of antitrust enforcers. Ultimately, Bazaarvoice agreed to divest all of its PowerReviews assets, including employees and client base, to a small competitor, Viewpoints – which had initially entered R&R space by building a solution for Sears – for $30 million.  

This article considers the economic arguments and evidence used by the court to reach its decision in United States v. Bazaarvoice.

Background

R&R platforms offer an online interface for customer reviews of different products, which can help to drive sales, increase product visibility, and offer valuable information on customers to brands and retailers, allowing brands to respond to customer concerns in real time. Leading platforms offer clients the following services: confirmation of the authenticity of customer reviews; moderation of reviews (e.g., removing offensive language); syndication that combines reviews from multiple retailers to increase the visibility of a product; data on retailers and social media analytics to support marketing; and search engine optimization to drive traffic. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews offered clients all of these services, but Bazaarvoice generally provided more customizable features at higher price points to larger clients. Bazaarvoice offered human moderation of customer reviews, for example, while PowerReviews offered only automated monitoring.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) applied competitive analysis that ignored more traditional focuses on supracompetitive pricing, high margins, and immediate harm to consumers.

In 2012, Bazaarvoice had 800 employees and revenue of $106.1 million; in 2011, the privately held PowerReviews employed just 80 people and reportedly had revenue of $11.5 million. Although PowerReviews did not publicly report its profitability, according to Bazaarvoice executives, the smaller firm was operating at a loss. Similarly, Bazaarvoice itself reported consistently negative operating margins in 2011–2013 that were no higher than -23%.

At the time of the court ruling (January 2014), actual competition from other platforms in the R&R market was marginal, composed primarily of a handful of start-ups with inferior products or of larger firms that offered complementary products. Direct competitors like Pluck, Gigya, Practical Data, Rating-system.com, and European Reevoo were tiny, with few customers and weak services. More established firms that might have acted as potential competitors, such as Google, Facebook, Oracle, and Salesforce, were more interested in partnering with Bazaarvoice than in competing in the R&R market. Meanwhile, Amazon accounted for 28% of e-commerce revenue and maintained (and still does, as of August 2014) its own R&R platform, which was not available to competing retailers. 

Competitive arguments and evidence 

In its review of the transaction, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) applied competitive analysis that ignored more traditional focuses on supracompetitive pricing, high margins, and immediate harm to consumers. The analysis focused instead on the nature of competition in the R&R industry, including barriers to entry and the anticompetitive potential for long-run harm to consumers as detailed in the assessments of Bazaarvoice senior staff.

Low margins: The parties were losing money. Their profits were a far cry from the supracompetitive profits often associated with companies targeted by antitrust litigation. In previous antitrust cases against Microsoft, for example, the company’s margins on Windows and MS Office had played a significant role at trial. Similarly, the potential for enhanced market power and exceptional margins contributed to the DOJ decision to prevent Microsoft from acquiring Intuit in 1994–1995.

Barriers to entry: Bazaarvoice’s extensive syndication network, in particular, became a major component of the case. The DOJ argued that it would be extremely difficult for competitors to develop a comparable syndication network of retailers and brands, allowing Bazaarvoice to leverage anticompetitive economies of scale across many important clients. These advantages, combined with the difficulty of switching from one R&R platform to another – as demonstrated by the reluctance of PowerReviews customers to switch to the Bazaarvoice platform – would effectively block new entrants from the market. While the DOJ’s argument was much less convincing with respect to other barriers to entry, such as the company’s technology and reputation, clearly antitrust enforcers had seized on important elements of the relationship between Bazaarvoice’s value proposition and the growth of the R&R market.

Bad documents: These potential anticompetitive implications were explicitly referenced in Bazaarvoice’s own internal documents, which became instrumental in court. The firm’s current CEO remarked that there were “literally, no other competitors” beyond PowerReviews, and the former CEO wrote that after the proposed acquisition of PowerReviews, Bazaarvoice would have “[n]o meaningful direct competitor.” Bazaarvoice senior executives openly acknowledged that syndication networks created high barriers to entry in the R&R industry and clearly described that the elimination of Bazaarvoice’s “primary competitor” would provide “relief from price erosion.” The DOJ seized on these documents, arguing that the merger would increase prices and eliminate the “substantial price discounts” that retailers and manufacturers received as a result of competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews.

Court’s opinion 

In this case, the court noted these apparent competitive weaknesses and remained on the lookout for changes in the R&R market. In fact, in the 18 months from the time of the acquisition on June 12, 2012, until the case’s ultimate outcome on January 8, 2014, the only post-merger evidence that was considered dispositive by the court was
the absence of serious entry to the market. The court explicitly rejected the use of pricing data, suggesting that it could be manipulated. The same pricing data that regulators might have expected to rise above competitive levels – and that therefore could have created space for new entrants in the R&R market at lower price points – was viewed as suspect. The DOJ case was structured instead around the absence of a credible entry threat in the R&R space, despite Bazaarvoice’s annual margins of around -30%. 

For Bazaarvoice, the challenge was less about responding to customer concerns or even to actual prices than it was about addressing the incendiary internal paper trail left by the company’s senior executives.

Discussion 

The court’s focus on the entry threat and its dismissal of pricing policies is curious, because the two issues are highly related. In an industry characterized by prices so low that the market leader is highly unprofitable, new firms have no incentive to enter. To become profitable, Bazaarvoice would have had to double its prices, and yet no evidence presented in the case demonstrated that entry would be impossible at that much higher price level. Surprisingly, the court did not connect these two issues in a meaningful way.

For Bazaarvoice, the challenge was less about responding to customer concerns or even to actual prices than it was about addressing the incendiary internal paper trail left by the company’s senior executives. In fact, as the testifying expert for Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews, Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh, pointed out, customers expressed no reservations about the merger, and Bazaarvoice had not raised prices. Ultimately, the court discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments related to the absence of actual anticompetitive effects, noting that the firms could moderate their behavior while under antitrust scrutiny and focused instead on the firm’s own internal documents, which had detailed a plan to block competitive pressure. Bazaarvoice found itself fighting its own internal assessment of the competitive effects of the proposed merger, in addition to the DOJ’s economic arguments. The internal documents and emails were far more difficult to explain away than the economic circumstances, resulting in a full divestiture.

ARTICLE BY

Rebecca Kirk Fair
 
OF 
Analysis Group, Inc.

The Disintegration of Iraq

Covington BUrling Law Firm

The news almost every day contains events which harken the end of Iraq as a nation state.  Radical Sunnis take over Mosul for their ISIS state.  Kurds tighten their control over oil in the north.  Shiites kidnap a top Sunni leader and his security men in Baghdad.

It is not surprising that Iraq should be dismembered.  To start with, the country was an artificial creation of British and French diplomats and cartographers who created new nations to control as they divided up the spoils of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.  Through its whole existence, Iraq was nothing more than three warring disparate groups:  Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, whose animosity exceeded their desire to work together.  The country was held together first by a colonial power, then by a monarchy, followed by the Baathists, and finally by the US military.

There was an opportunity during the US occupation to pump life into this moribund entity.  However, we did not engage sufficiently in effective nation-building, except when we drew Sunni tribal support during the surge, so that in the longer term, institutions were not in place for disparate Iraqi populations to share power in a democratic arrangement.  And perhaps it was impossible.  Nevertheless, we handed the keys to the Shiite Prime Minister Maliki and withdrew.

Rather than seeking to find common ground with Sunnis and Kurds, Maliki turned to Iran for help and set out to turn Iraq into another Middle Eastern Shiite nation.  We are now witnessing the results of Maliki’s biased rule.  When new maps are printed ten years from now, will there even be an entity known as Iraq?  It is doubtful.

ARTICLE BY

Allan J. Topol
Martin Gold
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

SawStop Dismissal Explained: Opinion Crosscutting SawStop’s Antitrust Lawsuit Released

Mintz Levin Law Firm

Judge Claude M. Hilton of the Eastern District of Virginia recently issued a Memorandum Opinion following up on his June 27, 2014 order (on which we previously wrote here and here) dismissing the complaint filed against the power tool industry bySawStop, LLC.

To recap, according to the February 2014 complaint, in 2000, Stephen Gass, inventor of “SawStop” and a patent attorney, began licensing negotiations with several companies now named as defendants in the lawsuit. As a result, the companies allegedly held a vote on how to respond to SawStop and shortly thereafter ended their individual licensing negotiations with Gass. The complaint also alleges the companies conspired to alter voluntary standards to prevent SawStop technology from becoming an industry standard.

In his opinion dismissing SawStop’s antitrust claims, Judge Hilton wrote:

An alleged antitrust conspiracy is not established simply by lumping ‘the defendants’ together.

Judge Hilton found no evidence that any of the named manufacturer defendants conspired through their industry organization, the Power Tool Institute, Inc. (PTI), not to license SawStop’s safety technology. Judge Hilton also found that the conspiracy allegations were belied by SawStop’s admissions in the complaint that it was actively negotiating with Emerson, Ryobi, and Black & Decker “well after the alleged group boycott began in October 2001,” concluding that “[s]uch history fails to show an agreement to restrain trade.”

The judge also pointed to other contradictions in SawStop’s complaint, including evidence that Ryobi signed an agreement with SawStop regarding royalties related to SawStop’s technology licensing during the time period of the alleged conspiracy. In addition, the judge ruled that Black & Decker’s proposed a licensing agreement with the SawStop, which was negotiated 6 to 8 months after the alleged conspiracy was formed, similarly contradicted SawStop’s allegations. The judge further dismissed SawStop’s arguments that Black & Decker’s 1% royalty payment offer was disingenuous, noting that even if that were the case, such actions do “not sufficiently infer conspiratorial conduct” and cannot be characterized as refusals to deal.

Finally, the judge found that SawStop failed to adequately plead that the defendants corrupted the standard setting process or otherwise agreed to a boycott, pointing out that the complaint alleged that only 5 of the 24 defendants had representatives on the relevant standards-setting committee. Moreover, the court found SawStop’s allegations of competitive harm resulting from the conspiracy (lost sales and profits from UL failing to mandate its safety technology on the market) insufficient, stating:

‘Lost sales’ do not amount to competitive harm because [users] were not ‘in some way constrained from buying [SawStop’s] products’ . . . and failing to mandate [SawStop’s] proposed safety standard does not thereby harm their market access.

Finding no support for an inference that defendants had entered into an agreement to boycott SawStop’s product or otherwise restrain trade, the court dismissed SawStop’s complaint in its entirety.

In addition to the antitrust lawsuit, SawStop technology is at the center of an ongoing rulemaking by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). You can read more about the CPSC’s rulemaking here.

Article By:

Helen J. Kim
Charles A. Samuels
Of:
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.