Category: Antitrust & Trade Regulation

U.S.-China Trade Deal Shows Potential for Improved U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China

A result of negotiating techniques from Donald Trump’s book “The Art of the Deal” or a result of strategies from the ancient Chinese military strategy treatise “The Art of War”?

Who knows, but on January 15, 2020, the United States (“U.S.”) and China signed Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the U.S. and China (the “Agreement”).  The Agreement, which is set to go into force on February 14, 2020, attempts to end or at least ease the trade war tensions between the world’s two economic behemoths.  The Agreement, amongst other issues, addresses protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual Property (“IP”) rights in China.  While the Agreement does not resolve all IP protection and enforcement concerns faced by U.S. businesses in China, it is certainly a step in the right direction.

The importance of IP in establishing a fair and balanced bilateral economic and trade relationship is evident in the fact that the entire first two chapters of the Agreement are dedicated to IP protection and enforcement in China.  The Agreement addresses numerous areas of IP, including trade secrets, pharmaceutical related IP, patents, piracy and counterfeiting, trademarks, technology transfer, and other related topics.

The Agreement puts much of the responsibility on China to revamp its laws and develop new policies and procedures to implement the provisions of the Agreement and to address the long-standing concerns that have existed with regard to protection and enforcement of U.S. IP in China.

Discussed below are some of the areas under the Agreement where China has agreed to implement new laws and procedures to protect U.S. intellectual property.  In return, the U.S. has agreed to affirm that it already has equivalent or similar protection and enforcement mechanisms in place.

Trade Secrets

  • The definition of trade secret is expanded to include confidential business information.
  • The scope of acts that constitutes trade secret misappropriation is broadened to include electronic intrusions, breaches or inducement of a breach of duty not to disclose, and other unauthorized disclosures or uses.
  • Implements burden-shifting in civil proceedings, shifting to the accused party where the holder of a trade secret has produced evidence of a reasonable indication of trade secret misappropriation by the accused party.
  • Adopts provisional measures to prevent the use of misappropriated trade secrets.
  • Eliminates the requirement that the holder of a trade secret establishes actual losses prior to initiation of a criminal investigation for misappropriation.
  • Provides for the application of criminal procedures and penalties to address willful trade secret misappropriation through theft, fraud, physical or electronic intrusion for an unlawful purpose.
  • Prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of undisclosed information, trade secrets, or confidential business information by government personnel involved in government proceedings in which such information is submitted and provides criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for such unauthorized disclosure.

Pharmaceutical-Related Intellectual Property

  • Permits pharmaceutical patent applicants to rely on supplemental data to satisfy relevant requirements for patentability, during patent examination proceedings, patent review proceedings, and judicial proceedings.
  • Provides (a) a system to provide notice to a patent holder, licensee, or holder of marketing approval, that a person is seeking to market that product during the term of an applicable patent claiming the approved product or its approved method of use; (b) adequate time and opportunity for such a patent holder to timely seek available remedies; and (c) procedures for judicial or administrative proceedings and expeditious remedies, for resolution of disputes concerning the validity or infringement of an applicable patent claiming an approved pharmaceutical product.
  • With regard to pharmaceutical-related patents on new products and methods of use, provides an extension of the patent term, due to unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of the marketing approval process, of up to five years, and may limit the resulting effective patent term to no more than 14 years from the date of marketing approval in China.

Patents

  • Provides patent term extensions to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur in granting the patent or during pharmaceutical product marketing approvals. For this provision, an unreasonable delay shall at least include a delay in the issuance of the patent of more than four years from the date of filing, or three years after a request for examination of the application, whichever is later.

Piracy and Counterfeiting on E-Commerce Platforms

  • Provides enforcement procedures that permit effective and expeditious action by right holders against infringement that occurs in the online environment, including an effective notice and takedown system to address infringement.
  • Provides that e-commerce platforms may have their operating licenses revoked for repeated failures to curb the sale of counterfeit or pirated goods.

Geographical Indications

  • Provides that when determining whether a term is generic in China, how consumers understand the term in China will be taken in to account.

Manufacture and Export of Pirated and Counterfeit Goods

  • Provides effective and expeditious enforcement action against the related products of counterfeit medicines and biologics, including active pharmaceutical ingredients, bulk chemicals, and biological substances.
  • Sharing with the U.S. the registration information of pharmaceutical raw material sites that have been inspected and that comply with the requirements of Chinese laws and regulations; and publishing data on enforcement measures, including seizures, revocations of business licenses, fines, and other actions taken by the National Medical Products Administration, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, or any successor entity.
  • Significantly increasing the number of enforcement actions and publishing data online on the measurable impact of these actions each quarter.
  • Seizing and destroying counterfeit or pirated goods, including the materials and implements used in the manufacture or creation of such pirated or counterfeit goods.
  • Requiring a counterfeiter to pay right holders the profits from infringement or damages adequate to compensate for the injury from the infringement.
  • Increase the number of trained personnel to inspect for counterfeit and pirated goods.
  • Ensure that all government agencies and all entities that the government owns or controls install and use only licensed software.

Trademarks

  • Provide for criminal enforcement if there is “reasonable suspicion” based on articulable facts that a criminal violation of an intellectual property right has occurred.
  • Provide civil and criminal penalties sufficient to deter future intellectual property theft or infringements. 

Implementation

  • Within 30 working days after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, China will present an action plan to strengthen intellectual property protection and shall include measures that China will take to implement its obligations and the date by which each measure will go into effect.

Technology Transfer

  • Provides that U.S. businesses are able to operate openly and freely in China without any force or pressure to transfer key technology as a requirement for operating in China.

What does this all mean?  Well it’s hard to tell really at this point as the Agreement does not actually implement any new laws or regulations, but rather is a bunch of promises between China and the U.S.  Until China implements new laws or regulations to fulfill its promises we can really only speculate on its true impact.  Of course, implementation of new laws or regulations is only effective if there is suitable enforcement to back it up.  However, most would agree that if China does fulfill its obligations we can expect to see stronger economic and trade relations between the U.S. and China, in particular giving U.S. businesses greater confidence and predictability in protecting and enforcing their IP rights in China.

© 2020 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

For more on international trade negotiations, see the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation law section.

National Security vs. Investment: Are we striking the right balance?

The U.S. Treasury Department’s final regulations, giving it more power to scrutinize any national security risks that may arise from deals between U.S. and foreign companies, are scheduled to go into effect this week, Feb. 13, 2020.

CFIUS New Regulations

The regs implement the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) and provide the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) broader authority over certain investments and real estate transactions. Critics say the regs will change cross-border M&A deal-making for years to come, and advance increasingly protectionist U.S. policy.

Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin said the regs will strengthen national security and “modernize the investment review process,” while maintaining “our nation’s open investment policy by encouraging investment in American businesses and workers, and by providing clarity and certainty regarding the types of transactions that are covered.”

We have previously described in the MoginRubin Blog how not everyone shares the Treasury Secretary’s respect for CFIUS.

Financial writer and author Robert Teitelman described it in an article for Barron’s as “a creature from the shadows of the administrative state” that “defines obscurity in the federal government.” He said it “encourages the very practices the administration condemns in China.” Hernan Cristerna, co-head of global mergers and acquisitions at JPMorgan Chase, told the New York Times that CFIUS is the “No. 1 weapon in the Trump administration’s protectionist arsenal” and called it “the ultimate regulatory bazooka.”

Enacted in August 2018, FIRRMA gives CFIUS much greater reach into deals where national security is a potential issue. Specifically, the law extends CFIUS’s jurisdiction over “certain non-controlling investments into U.S. businesses involved in critical technology, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data. Big data, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and biotechnology are among the specific technologies the law was designed to protect. It also establishes CFIUS’s jurisdiction over real estate deals.

The regulations limit CFIUS’s application of its expanded jurisdiction to “certain categories of foreign persons,” and has “initially” designated a handful of countries as “excepted foreign states.” They are Australia, Canada, and the U.K., countries with which the U.S. has “robust intelligence sharing and defense industrial base integration mechanisms.” The list may be expanded in the future, according to the regs.

‘Controlling interest’ redefined.

Attorneys, in-house counsel and other professionals deeply involved in cross-border transactions are already experiencing some nuts and bolts changes that other professionals want to be aware of.

For example, deals that would give foreign companies “controlling interest” are no longer the only deals the committee will examine; it is now interested in deals that would transfer non-controlling but “substantial interest” when critical technologies, critical infrastructure, or the private data of U.S. citizens are involved. Deals that fall into these categories now require filing; previously they were optional. Deals that would once have sailed through scrutiny may now be delayed by investigations. CFIUS also has more time to review transactions. The initial stage ends within 45 days and the second phase can last from 45 to 60 days. Filing fees are set but cannot be more than 1% of the value of the transaction or $300,000, whichever figure is lower. And, of course, there is increased risk that they be ultimately be blocked.

The regs include a new definition of “principal place of business” as the “primary location where an entity’s management directs, controls, or coordinates the entity’s activities, or, in the case of an investment fund, where the fund’s activities and investments are primarily directed, controlled, or coordinated by or on behalf of the general partner, managing member, or equivalent.” If the entity is determined to be in the U.S. and has represented in its most recent submission or filing to a U.S. or foreign government that if either its principal place of business, principal office and place of business, address of principal executive offices, address of headquarters, or equivalent, is outside the U.S. then that location is deemed the entity’s principal place of business unless it can prove that the location has changed since the filing.

These new regulations will impact many purely private cross-border transactions, especially in the areas of critical infrastructure, sensitive personal data, and real estate.

Early consideration important.

M&A counsel must now consider CFIUS implications early-on, not only to avoid delay and frustration, but to account for CFIUS clearance in deal timing and closing deadlines. Fines may be levied if CFIUS notices are not timely filed.

Fund managers who make large investments in U.S. companies can also expect to be asked to represent in deal documents that their funds or investors do not require a mandatory CFIUS filing.

For more background and additional insights, please read our previous post, CFIUS: A Guardian of National Security or a Protectionist Tool? Also, you can download the regulations from the MoginRubin website:  Part-800-Final-Rule-Jan-17-2020  & Part-802-Final-Rule-Jan-17-2020

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Dan Mogin and  Jennifer M. Oliver of MoginRubin.
For more on CFIUS regulations, see the National Law Review Global Law section.

Can U.S. Companies Insure Against A Trade War?

The recent trade deal between the U.S. and China was welcome news for U.S. companies with investments in China.  The tenuous relationship between the countries, however, continues to cause substantial uncertainty for U.S. investors.  Their concerns are not unique to China—the Trump Administration has taken an aggressive trade stance even with nations usually considered friendly, including Brazil, Argentina, and France.

A growing number of companies are turning to political risk insurance to protect their foreign investments.  Such policies typically cover a variety of commercial losses stemming from political events, including expropriation, political violence, or currency conversion restrictions.

Are political risk policies a valuable tool in a company’s arsenal for mitigating the uncertainties of doing business in China or other countries embroiled in a trade war with the United States?  The answer depends, in large part, on the specific wording of the policy at issue.  There is no standard political risk policy form, and jurisprudence on such policies is extremely limited.  Potential policyholders must evaluate their needs carefully and be strategic during policy placement to ensure they are maximizing potential coverage.  For example:

Expropriation:  Political risk policies may cover losses stemming not only from a government’s outright nationalization or expropriation of a policyholder’s assets, but also from more subtle forms of unlawful discrimination against foreign entities.  The bounds of such coverage, however, are not always clear.  Many policies exclude incidental damages arising from lawful or legitimate acts of governance, which may give rise to disputes between policyholders and insurers as to the nature and motivation of a particular governmental act.

For example, the Chinese Government imposed tariffs and restrictions on U.S. companies doing business in China throughout 2019.  A policyholder seeking coverage for losses suffered due to these measures would argue that the restrictions were retaliatory acts in response to the U.S.-China trade war, meaning that its damages arose from covered acts of discrimination in violation of international law.  An insurer seeking to limit its coverage obligations may argue that China imposed these restrictions based on its view that the companies had violated market rules or otherwise damaged the interests of Chinese companies for noncommercial reasons—in other words, that these were legitimate act of governance taken in the public interest.

Given the lack of case law on the intended scope of expropriation coverage and the fact-intensive nature of disputes over the legitimacy of a particular governmental act, companies should seek to include the broadest possible definition of “expropriation” in their policy and to clarify the bounds of any exclusions.

Political Violence:  In addition to coverage for expropriation and related governmental acts, political risk policies also may provide coverage for losses stemming from physical damage to property due to protests, riots, or other acts of violence intended to achieve a political objective.  While U.S. investors may not commonly associate trade wars with physical violence, recent protests and riots over economic issues in countries such as Chile and Ecuador demonstrate the potential for severe economic turmoil (a common result of any trade war) to cause such violence.  As a result, U.S. companies with warehouses, offices, or other property in countries facing aggressive trade restrictions by the U.S., or in any nation suffering from substantial economic uncertainty, may find such coverage appealing.

The potential benefit of political violence coverage may depend, in large part, on how a policy proposes to determine the value of any damaged property or resulting financial losses.  Potential policyholders should ensure, for example, that a loss is valued pursuant to objective accounting standards and/or by a neutral third-party, as opposed to the insurer, who may have an interest in minimizing its liability.

Currency Inconvertibility:  A third component of political risk insurance is currency inconvertibility coverage—i.e., coverage for losses arising from a policyholder’s inability to convert currency due to exchange restrictions posed by a foreign government.  For example, such coverage might apply if a policyholder is unable to obtain repayment of a loan to a Chinese entity because of new restrictions by the Chinese Government on conversion of local currency to U.S. dollars or the transfer of funds to U.S. banks.  U.S. companies with investments in countries facing particularly extreme economic instability, such as Venezuela, may benefit most from such coverage, as those countries are most at risk for collapse of their currency exchange system.

As with political violence coverage, a policy’s proposed standards for valuing a currency inconvertibility loss are once again crucial to maximizing a policyholder’s protection.  Policies often calculate the value of a policyholder’s loss using the foreign country’s exchange rate on the date of loss.  In such scenarios, policyholders may benefit from defining the “date of loss” as occurring the first time the policyholder is unable to convert currency, as opposed to after a waiting period has occurred or after the insured has made multiple conversion attempts.  This may minimize the risk that the value of a covered loss decreases if the exchange rate in the country plummets while the insured fulfills other conditions for coverage.

Political risk policies likely cannot insulate U.S. companies from the full impact of a global trade war or other politically-inspired disruptions.  However, U.S. businesses can maximize the benefits of such coverage through careful policy drafting and strategic evaluation of their individual risk profile.

© 2020 Gilbert LLP

ARTICLE BY Emily P. Grim of Gilbert LLP.
More on recent US trade negotiations on the National Law Review Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation page.

Apollo Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations: Aircraft Lessors Pay Attention

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury has broad delegated authority to administer and enforce the sanctions laws and related sanctions programs of the United States. As a key component of its enforcement authority, OFAC may investigate “apparent violations” of sanctions laws and assess civil monetary penalties against violators pursuant to five statutes, including the Trading with the Enemy Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.1

An “apparent violation” involves “conduct that constitutes an actual or possible violation of U.S. economic sanctions laws.”2 An OFAC investigation of an “apparent violation” may lead to one or more administrative actions, including a “no action” determination, a request for additional information, the issuance of a cautionary letter or finding of violation, the imposition of a civil monetary penalty and, in extreme cases, a criminal referral.3 Investigations of apparent violations by OFAC often lead to negotiated settlements where a final determination is not made as to whether a sanctions violation has actually occurred.4

Upon the conclusion of a proceeding that “results in the imposition of a civil penalty or an informal settlement” against or with an entity (as opposed to an individual), OFAC is required to make certain basic information available to the public.5 In addition, OFAC may release on a “case-by-case” basis “additional information” concerning the penalty proceeding,6 and it often does. Such additional information will sometimes include informal compliance guidance, cautionary reminders and best practices recommendations. Such information is routinely consumed by corporate compliance officers seeking fresh insight on ever-evolving compliance and enforcement trends, particularly in the context of proceedings relating to industries with which they are involved.

On November 7, 2019, OFAC released enforcement information that has caught the attention of the aircraft leasing community, particularly U.S. aircraft lessors and their owned or controlled Irish lessor subsidiaries.7 The matter involved a settlement by Apollo Aviation Group, LLC8 of its potential civil liability for apparent violations of OFAC’s Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR) that existed in 2014–5.9 Although the amount of the settlement was relatively modest, the enforcement activity by OFAC in the proceeding has attracted scrutiny by aircraft lessors because, for the first time in recent memory, a U.S. aircraft lessor has paid a civil penalty to OFAC for alleged sanctions violations.

At the time of the apparent violations, Apollo was a U.S. aircraft lessor which became involved in two engine leasing transactions that came back to haunt it.

In the first transaction, Apollo leased two jet engines to a UAE lessee which subleased them to a Ukrainian airline with which it was apparently affiliated. The sublessee, in turn, installed both engines on an aircraft that it “wet leased”10 to Sudan Airways, which was on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons within the meaning of the “Government of Sudan.” Sudan Airways used the engines on flights to and from Sudan for approximately four months before they were returned to Apollo when the lease ended. Meanwhile, in a separate transaction, Apollo leased a third jet engine to the same UAE lessee, which subleased the engine to the same Ukrainian airline, which installed the engine on an aircraft that it also wet leased to Sudan Airways. Sudan Airways used the third engine on flights to and from Sudan until such time as Apollo discovered how it was being used and demanded that the engine be removed from the aircraft.

Both leases between Apollo and its UAE lessee contained restrictive covenants “prohibiting the lessee from maintaining, operating, flying, or transferring the engines to any countries subject to United States or United Nations sanctions.”11 Thus, by allowing the engines to be installed by its sublessee on aircraft that were eventually wetleased to Sudan Airways, and flown to and from Sudan during the country’s embargo, the lessee presumably breached the operating restrictions and covenants imposed by Apollo in the leases. Moreover, once Apollo learned that the first two engines had been used, and the third engine was being used, for the benefit of Sudan Airways, it demanded that the third engine be removed from the aircraft that the sub-lessee had wet-leased to Sudan Airways, and this was done.12

One might reasonably conclude from these facts that Apollo acted like a good corporate citizen. So what did Apollo do wrong from a sanctions compliance standpoint?

OFAC stated that Apollo may have violated section 538.201 of the SSR, which at the time “prohibited U.S. persons from dealing in any property or interests in property of the Government of Sudan,”13 as well as section 538.205 of the SSR, which at the time “prohibited the exportation or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of goods, technology or services, from the United States or by U.S. persons to Sudan.”14

What are the takeaways and possible lessons to be drawn by aircraft lessors from this settlement based upon these alleged violations and the facts upon which they were based?

First, according to OFAC, Apollo did not “ensure” that the engines “were utilized in a manner that complied with OFAC’s regulations,” notwithstanding lease language that effectively required its lessee to comply.15 OFAC is clearly suggesting here that aircraft lessors have a duty to require sanctions compliance by their lessees. And, in view of the fact that many sanctions programs are enforced on a strict liability basis, OFAC’s comment that Apollo failed to “ensure” compliance by its lessee and sublessees makes sense. Apollo was not in a position to avoid civil liability by hiding behind the well-drafted language of its two leases. If a sanctions violation occurred for which Apollo was strictly liable, the mere fact that its lessee’s breach of the lease was the proximate cause of the violation would not provide a safe harbor.

As an example of Apollo’s alleged failure to “ensure” legal compliance, OFAC observed that Apollo did not obtain “U.S. law export compliance certificates from lessees and sublessees,”16 a comment which is somewhat puzzling. To our knowledge, there is nothing in the law requiring a lessor to obtain export compliance certificates, at least not in circumstances where an export or re-export license is not otherwise required in connection with the underlying lease transaction. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would be difficult, at best, for an aircraft lessor to force the direct delivery of certificates from a sublessee or sub-sub-lessee with whom it lacks privity of contract. In view of the foregoing, one assumes that OFAC was looking for Apollo to install procedures by which its lessee would self-report on a regular basis its own compliance (and compliance by downstream sublessees) with applicable export control laws and the relevant sanctions restrictions contained in the lease.

Second, OFAC found that Apollo “did not periodically monitor or otherwise verify its lessee’s and sublessee’s adherence to the lease provisions requiring compliance with U.S. sanctions laws during the life of the lease.”17 In this regard, OFAC observed that Apollo never learned how and where its engines were being used until after the first two engines were returned following lease expiration and a post-lease review of engine records, including “specific information regarding their use and destinations,” actually conducted.

In view of the foregoing, OFAC stressed the importance of “companies operating in high-risk industries to implement effective, thorough and on-going, risk-based compliance measures, especially when engaging in transactions concerning the aviation industry.”18 OFAC also reminded aircraft and engine lessors of its July 23, 2019, advisory warning of deceptive practices “employed by Iran with respect to aviation matters.”19 While the advisory focused on Iran, OFAC noted that “participants in the civil aviation industry should be aware that other jurisdictions subject to OFAC sanctions may engage in similar deception practices.”20 Thus, according to OFAC, companies operating internationally should implement Know Your Customer screening procedures and “compliance measures that extend beyond the point-of-sale and function throughout the entire business of lease period.”21

As a matter of best practices, aircraft lessors should implement risk-based sanctions compliance measures throughout the entirety of a lease period, and most do. Continuous KYC screening by lessors of their lessees and sublessees is a common compliance practice. Periodic reporting by lessees as to the use and destination of leased aircraft and engines appears to be a practice encouraged by OFAC.22 Lessors can also make it a regular internal practice to spot check the movement of their leased aircraft through such web-based platforms as Flight Tracker and Flight Aware. If implemented by lessors, such practices may enable early detection of nascent sanctions risks and violations by their lessees and sublessees.

Finally, OFAC reminded lessors that they “can mitigate sanctions risk by conducting risk assessments and exercising caution when doing business with entities that are affiliated with, or known to transact business with, OFAC-sanctioned persons or jurisdictions, or that otherwise pose high risks due to their joint ventures, affiliates, subsidiaries, customers, suppliers, geographic location, or the products and services they offer.” Such risk assessment is an integral part of the risk-based sanctions compliance program routinely encouraged by OFAC, as outlined in its Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments on May 2, 2019.23 For aircraft and engine lessors, conducting pre-lease due diligence on the ownership and control of prospective lessees and sublessees, as well as the business they conduct, the markets they serve, the equipment they use and the aviation partners with whom they engage, are key to identifying and understanding the sanctions risks that a prospective business opportunity presents.

1 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, Final Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 27714, 27715 (June 14, 2019).

2 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section I.A.

3 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section II.

4 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section V.C.

5 31 C.F.R. §501.805(d)(1). Such information includes “(A) [t]he name and address of the entity involved, (B) [t]he sanctions program involved, (C) A brief description of the violation or alleged violation, (D) [a] clear indication whether the proceeding resulted in an informal settlement or in the imposition of a penalty, (E) [a]n indication whether the entity voluntarily disclosed the violation or alleged violation to OFAC, and (F) [t]he amount of the penalty imposed or the amount of the agreed settlement.” Id. OFAC communicates all such information through its website. 31 C.F.R. § 501.805(d)(2).

6 31 C.F.R. § 501.805(d)(4).

7 See OFAC Resource Center, Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Apollo Aviation Group, LLC (Nov. 7, 2019) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Page…) (the Settlement Announcement).

8 In December 2018, Apollo was acquired by The Carlyle Group and currently operates as Carlyle Aviation Partners Ltd. According to the Settlement Announcement, neither The Carlyle Group nor its affiliated funds were involved in the apparent violations at issue. See id. at 1 n.1.

9 See 31 C.F.R. Part 538, Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (7-1-15 Edition). Note that most sanctions with respect to Sudan were effectively revoked by general license as of October 2, 2017, thereby authorizing transactions previously prohibited by the SSR during the time period of the apparent violations by Apollo. However, as is true when most sanctions programs are lifted, the general license issued in the SSR program did not “affect past, present of future OFAC enforcements or actions related to any apparent violations of the SSR relating to activities that occurred prior to the date of the general license.” Settlement Announcement at 1 n.2. See also OFAC FAQ 532 (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#sudan_whole). 

10 A “wet lease” is “an aviation leasing arrangement whereby the lessor operates the aircraft on behalf of the lessee, with the lessor typically providing the crew, maintenance and insurance, as well as the aircraft itself.” See Settlement Announcement at 1 n.3.

11 Id. at 1.

12 Unfortunately, Apollo did not learn that the first two engines were used in violation of lease restrictions until they were returned following lease expiration and it conducted a post-lease review of the relevant engine records. 

13 The alleged application of section 538.201 to Apollo in the circumstances confirms the broad interpretive meaning that OFAC often ascribes to terms such as “interest,” “property,” “property interest” and “dealings,” which appear in many sanctions programs.

14 The alleged application of section 538.205 to Apollo in the circumstances suggests that a U.S. lessor of aircraft and jet engines may be tagged with the “re-export” of such goods and related services from one foreign country to another, notwithstanding the existence of a contractual daisy-chain of lessees, sub-lessees, and/or wetlessees that actually direct and control such flight decisions. In the context of U.S. export control laws, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) define the term “re-export” to include the “actual shipment or transmission of an item subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country, including the sending or taking of an item to or from such countries in any manner.” 15 C.F.R. § 734.14(a)(1). Thus, for export control purposes, the flight of an aircraft subject to the EAR from one foreign county to another foreign country constitutes a “re-export” of the aircraft to that country. 

15 Settlement Announcement at 1.

16 Id.

17 Id., at 1–2.

18 Id. at 3. (emphasis added).

19 Id. See OFAC, Iran-Related Civil Aviation Industry Advisory (July 23, 2019) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190723.aspx)

20 Id.

21 Id. (emphasis added).

22 In Apollo, OFAC reacted favorably to certain steps alleged to have been taken by Apollo to minimize the risk of the recurrence of similar conduct, including the implementation of procedures by which Apollo began “obtaining U.S. law export compliance certificates from lessees and sublessees.” Id.

23 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/framework_ofac_cc.pdf.

© 2019 Vedder Price

ARTICLE BY John E. Bradley of Vedder Price.
More sanctions actions on the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation law page.

U.S./China Trade “Deal” Short on IP/Trade Secret Specifics

With the announcement last week of a tentative partial trade agreement with China, the U.S. appears to be headed to a somewhat easing of tensions between the two superpowers.  Terms of the agreement are vague, with references to a reduction in tariffs, increase in agricultural purchases by China, and agreements to return to the bargaining table.

What is missing, though, are references to increases in protection of U.S. intellectual property: trade secrets, patents, copyrights, and trademarks, long espoused by the U.S.  This silence is in stark contrast to the stated goal of the U.S. that protection of U.S. intellectual property in China is among the key components to a successful and permanent trade deal.

The importance of such protection has been made manifest in several recent events.  The National Association of Manufacturers was hacked over the summer and blame was placed by investigators on Chinese nationals.  Earlier in the year, a former employee of a U.S. cast iron plant was sentenced to one year in prison after being arrested at the airport, en route to China with files of confidential information of his former employer.  Furthermore, China’s trademark register is full of foreign trademarks registered in China by its citizens.

China apparently has verbally committed as a part of an overall trade package to tighten up enforcement efforts in the IP arena.  But how does China quantify that commitment?  Such requires a change in the Chinese government’s mindset, its enforcement policies, and its recognition of the protectability of foreign trade secrets and other IP rights.  None of these can be reduced to tariff percentages, bushels or other common trade terms.  What can China offer in the way of a concrete plan to bolster protection of foreign confidential information?  Indeed, the silence of the parties as to this important issue is probably an indication of the difficulty the parties are having in reaching a verifiable agreement on IP.  With trust levels between the nations at their nadir, one can easily see how resolution of the IP protection issue may be a major stumbling block to a lasting trade agreement.  Will it become prohibitive?  Time will tell.

© 2019 Jones Walker LLP

More on IP agreements on the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

World Trade Organization Approves U.S. Tariffs on European Union Goods to Counteract Civil Aviation Subsidies

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has approved U.S. duties on $7.5 billion in products from the European Union (EU) after ruling that the EU had unfairly subsidized the production of large civil aircraft, such as those produced by Airbus. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will enforce 10 percent duties on imports of certain aircraft and 25 percent duties on imports of other goods (including agricultural products, apparel, machinery, and other products) beginning October 18, 2019.

The EU plans to impose retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion of U.S. exports in response to subsidies allegedly provided to American plane manufacturer Boeing. However, the EU will have to wait for WTO approval in separate proceedings. The United States and the EU have been involved in WTO dispute settlement proceedings regarding subsidies for large civil aircraft since 2004.

Duties of 10 percent apply to imports of passenger and cargo aircraft from France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (where the majority of Airbus production is based), provided that they have an unladen weight exceeding 30,000 kg.1

Duties of 25 percent apply to imports of other products from all EU member states (or a subset of these member states, depending on the product category). These products include certain cheeses, pork, coffee, seafood, fruit, dairy spreads, wine, whisky, apparel, bedding, optical instruments, appliances, tools, folding knives, and magnets.

Military aircraft, civil helicopters, and parts or components of civil aircraft are not subject to the duties.2

1 Examples of subject aircraft over 30,000 kg are regional jets capable of seating more than 100 passengers (such as the Airbus A220) and any larger aircraft (including long-haul, wide-body jets). Smaller aircraft, including recreational aircraft, private jets, most turboprop aircraft, and most regional jets with a capacity of fewer than 100 passenger, have an unladen weight of less than 30,000 kg and are excluded.

2 Airbus has production facilities in the United States, that rely on components imported from the EU. Additionally, some EU companies produce certain components of military aircraft for export to the United States.

©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

For more on international trade, see the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation or Global law pages.

Big Food Price-Fixing Update: Court Certifies Three Putative Classes in Packaged Seafood Litigation

What started out as a proposed merger between two of the largest packaged seafood manufacturers spawned a lengthy criminal investigation into antitrust violations in the tuna industry by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and multiple class and individual civil lawsuits. After four years of litigation, a major development in the class action lawsuits occurred– the Court certified three putative classes.

In 2015, the Department of Justice investigated a proposed merger between Thai Union Group P.C.L. (the parent company of Chicken of the Sea) and Bumble Bee Foods LLC. As the DOJ’s civil attorneys reviewed information related to the merger, they discovered materials that appeared to raise criminal concerns.[1]

Chicken of the Sea then “blew the whistle” to the DOJ regarding their anticompetitive conduct. This admission helped DOJ reach plea agreements with two other manufacturers, Bumble Bee[2] and Starkist,[3] as well as three packaged seafood executives—two from Bumble Bee[4],[5] and one from Starkist[6]. In connection with its guilty plea, Bumble Bee agreed to pay a $25 million fine, while Starkist’s fine is still pending. Bumble Bee’s CEO has also been indicted, and faces up to 10 years in a federal penitentiary. [7]

Now, the tuna manufacturers face a new challenge in the related civil actions. In 2015, on the heels of the DOJ investigation, three separate class actions were filed in the Southern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants took part in various forms of anti-competitive conduct, including agreeing to fix certain net and list prices for packaged tuna. Plaintiffs alleged that the conspiracy began as early as November of 2010 and lasted until at least December 31, 2016.

On July 30, 2019, Judge Janis L. Sammartino granted the respective Motions for Class Certification filed by the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs, as well as the two indirect classes–the Commercial Food Preparer Plaintiffs, and the End Payer Plaintiffs.[8] Judge Sammartino found that each class had satisfied Rule 23’s requirements and—contrary to the Defendants arguments—that common issues predominate over individualized issues within each class. For example, Plaintiffs contended that common evidence exists that would be used to prove the existence and scope of Defendants’ purported price fixing conspiracy.

The certification orders represent a major victory for each of the classes. They can now proceed to summary judgment and trial without any concern that their claims may be narrowed due to the mechanics of the proposed class. While dispositive motions are scheduled to be submitted later this month, no trial date is currently set. With certification rulings issued and merits briefing on the horizon, renewed settlement discussions are likely to come.

[1] https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2017/civil-investigations-uncover-evidence-criminal-conduct

[2] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bumble-bee-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing

[3] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/starkist-co-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing

[4] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/packaged-seafood-executive-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing-conspiracy

[5] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-charges-brought-investigation-collusion-packaged-seafood-industry

[6] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-packaged-seafood-executive-pleads-guilty-price-fixing

[7] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bumble-bee-ceo-indicted-price-fixing

[8] Case No.: 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD) United States Court of Southern District of California

© 2019 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP
This article was written by Jerry Goldsmith and Lori Lustrin of Bilzin Sumberg.
For more food industry news, see the Biotech, Food & Drug page on the National Law Review.

U.S. Announces Possible Retaliatory Tariffs on European Union for Airbus Subsidies

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced in a Federal Register notice published July 5 that the agency is considering increasing duties on certain goods from the European Union (EU). This move is connected to a long-running World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute involving EU subsidies for Airbus, the aircraft manufacturing company.

The USTR has invited public comments on the proposed list and will hold a public hearing on Aug. 5, 2019.

Requests to appear at the hearing are due to the USTR by July 24, and written comments are due by Aug. 5. The public comment and hearing process will provide importers of goods from the EU, as well as domestic producers that compete with EU producers, the opportunity to be heard with regard to the products that may be subject to tariffs.

In April 2019, the USTR published a preliminary list of goods from the EU that could be targeted with tariffs, which included aircraft, motorcycles and wine. The July 5 list contains additional products, including whiskey, coffee, olives, pasta, cheese, pork, and metals, among other items. The goods on both lists are collectively worth about $25 billion of imports per year.

The tariffs stem from a WTO case filed by the United States in 2004, which was resolved by the WTO Appellate Body in 2011. In that case, European Communities and Certain member States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (DS316), the Appellate Body found that certain EU subsidies for Airbus failed to comply with the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).

The EU made certain changes to its subsidy regime in response to the Appellate Body’s decision, but the U.S. later asked the WTO to determine that the EU had not fully complied with the decision. That request led to another Appellate Body decision published in May 2018, in which the Appellate Body agreed with the U.S. that the EU was still not in compliance with the SCM Agreement.

The WTO is expected to determine the amount of retaliatory tariffs the United States can impose sometime this summer, and the April and July 2019 tariffs proposed by the USTR are likely being prepared in anticipation of the WTO decision.

 

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more from the Office of the US Trade Representative see the National Law Review page on Antitrust & Trade Regulation.

FTC Charges Two Japanese Corporations with Alleged HSR Avoidance Scheme

Two Japanese corporations each agreed to pay $2.5 million to settle Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) charges of violating the premerger notification and waiting period requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act.

According to the FTC’s complaint (the “Complaint”), the scheme began when an independent investigation in July 2015 (triggered by an earlier investigation by financial regulators) publicly revealed long-running financial irregularities within Toshiba Corporation (“Toshiba”) and that Toshiba had been overstating its profits by billions. To strengthen its financial statement for FY 2015, Toshiba attempted to sell its subsidiary Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation (“TMSC”), which conducts substantial business in the United States, before the end of FY 2016 (March 31, 2016).  However, Toshiba did not resolve the TMSC sales process in a timely manner and found that, by early 2016, it would be almost impossible to file premerger notifications in several jurisdictions, including the United States, and receive premerger clearances in time.

To complete the acquisition before the end of FY 2016, the Complaint alleges that Toshiba and Canon Inc. (“Canon”), one of the potential bidders, devised a plan to (i) enable Canon to acquire TMSC, (ii) allow Toshiba to recognize proceeds from the sale by the end of FY 2016, and (iii) avoid filing the notification and observing the waiting period required by the HSR Act.  In March 2016, the companies completed this multi-step process as follows:

  1. Toshiba and Canon created a special purpose company, MS Holding Corporation (“MS Holding”), to use as the alleged HSR avoidance device.
  2. Toshiba rearranged the corporate ownership structure of TMSC by creating (i) new classes of voting shares, (ii) a single non-voting share with rights custom-made for Canon, and (iii) options convertible to ordinary shares.
  3. Toshiba sold TMSC’s non-voting share and newly created options to Canon for $6.1 billion while simultaneously transferring TMSC’s voting shares to MS Holding for a nominal payment of $900.
  4. Canon later obtained formal control of TMSC’s voting shares by exercising its options in December 2016.

The Complaint concluded that the companies were hiding the “true nature of the acquisition” because Canon, and not MS Holding, (i) bore the risks/benefits of TMSC and (ii) became the beneficial owner of TMSC in March 2016 when it paid Toshiba $6.1 billion.

According to the Complaint, the scheme devised by Toshiba and Canon “had no purpose” other than to complete the sale of TMSC prior to March 31, 2016, and avoid the HSR Act’s waiting period requirements.  The Complaint asked the Court to assess each Defendant a civil penalty of at least $6,360,000.

According to the proposed Final Judgement, each Defendant will pay a civil penalty of $2.5 million.  The settlement also requires Defendants to establish and maintain a compliance program to address the alleged violations and comply with inspection and reporting requirements, among other imposed obligations.

Why does this matter?

Unlike most HSR penalty cases, this one did not allege a mistaken filing analysis but rather an alleged HSR Rule 801.90 (“Transactions or devices for avoidance”) scheme.  A few notable takeaways:

  • Investment funds sometimes structure funds such that voting rights are given to the fund manager and economic rights given to the investors. This case stands for the proposition that, in such instances, the FTC will look through the formal division of voting/nonvoting securities to the substance of who has beneficial ownership of the shares (risk of gain and loss, etc.).
  • Although the statute says that “no person shall acquire” voting securities or assets without first making the required filing and observing the appropriate waiting period, the government here obtained voluntary civil penalties from the seller as well as from the buyer. When analyzing which party bears the risk of not filing HSR for a transaction, this case may be evidence that both sides bear the risk equally, at least in an 801.90 context.
  • Also note that, although the Complaint asks the court to assess each defendant a civil penalty of “at least $6,360,000,” the government accepted a settlement of $2.5 million each. Given the parties’ apparent decision that paying a potential civil penalty for not fiing an HSR notification was an acceptable cost of doing business, it seems that, with a fine of less than 1% of the $6.1 billion deal value, the regulators may be encouraging rather than discouraging such risk assessments despite having brought this case.

What happens next?

Companies and individuals should carefully determine whether they must observe the HSR Act’s notification and waiting period requirements before consummating their transactions in order to avoid fines of up to $42,530 daily (adjusted annually).  HSR rules and filing obligations can be complex and may change through amendments to the regulations or through formal and informal interpretations issued by the FTC.  Experienced HSR counsel should be consulted to determine if an acquisition may trigger a filing requirement and, if so, if an exemption is available.

© Copyright 2019 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
Read more on FTC Trade Regulation on the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation page.

 

U.S. Agencies Implement Latest Trump-Cuba Policy Changes

On May 30, 2019, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Cuba Regulations), 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (2019), removing authorization for group people-to-people education travel to Cuba. Certain previously authorized group people-to-people education travel may continue to be authorized under a grandfathering provision that will also be added to the regulation. The revisions are effective as of June 5, 2019.

Importantly, the revocation reflects the Trump administration’s significant shift in policy towards Cuba, as the revisions implement changes restricting non-family travel first announced by National Security Advisor John Bolton in an April 17, 2019, foreign policy address. Under an earlier tightening of restrictions in 2017, OFAC had only restricted the General License for group people-to-people travel to require such travel be conducted by organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction (see previous GT Alert, U.S. Implements President Trump’s Cuba Policy), while this latest move removes the authorization entirely.

Previously authorized group people-to-people travel will be eligible for continued authorization under the grandfathering provision if the traveler has already completed at least one travel-related transaction (such as purchasing a flight or reserving an accommodation) prior to June 5, 2019.

In conjunction with the above, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) license exceptions and its licensing policies to “generally prohibit non-commercial aircraft from flying to Cuba and passenger and recreational vessels from sailing to Cuba.”

The License Exception Aircraft, Vessels and Spacecraft (AVS) in EAR § 740.15 has been amended by BIS to remove private and corporate aircraft, cruise ships, sailboats, fishing boats, and other similar aircraft and vessels from eligibility for the license exception. This means that all such aircraft and vessels subject to the EAR may no longer be exported or reexported to Cuba under the AVS exception, and operators will instead need to apply for a BIS license.

The following types of aircraft and vessels remain eligible for License Exception AVS: 1) commercial aircraft operating under Air Carrier Operating Certificates and other Federal Aviation Administration certificates; 2) authorized air ambulances; and 3) cargo vessels for hire for use in transportation of separately authorized items.

Parties that intend to travel to Cuba or to provide Cuba-related transportation services should carefully review the revised regulations to determine whether the new measures impose licensing requirements or other compliance obligations. Parties with previously scheduled group people-to-people travel to Cuba may wish to check the dates of their travel-related transactions and confirm that at least one purchase was made prior to June 5, 2019.

Although these latest revisions do not affect the remittance allowances permitted under the Cuba Regulations, Ambassador Bolton specifically mentioned in the April 17 speech that new restrictions on remittances will be forthcoming. Interested parties should, therefore, expect the restrictions on remittances to be implemented in the near future.

 

©2019 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.