Category: Administrative & Regulatory

U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Grants No-Action Relief for End Users from Swap Reporting Requirements

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On April 9, 2013, the Division of Market Oversight of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued a no-action letter delaying the swap reporting compliance deadlines for end users and other swap counterparties that are not swap dealers or major swap participants (non-SD/MSP counterparties).  The relief provided to market participants is effective immediately.

The CFTC had issued regulations setting forth various reporting requirements for swap transactions (Part 43 — real-time reporting for swap transactions, Part 45 — transactional data reporting to a registered swap data repository, and Part 46 — historical swap data reporting) of the CFTC’s regulations. The rules had established a deadline of April 10, 2013 for swap counterparties that are not swap dealers or major swap participants (non SD/MSP counterparties). Citing implementation concerns involving technological and operational capabilities, a number of market participants requested that the Division of Market Oversight provide a six-month extension of the compliance deadline.  The CFTC’s April 9 no-action  letter does not grant the full six-month extension requested, but provides certain time-limited no action relief to nonSD/MSP swap counterparties as described below.

1.          No-Action Relief for Reporting of Interest Rate and Credit Swaps

The letter extends no-action relief for end users’ interest and credit swaps reporting untilJuly 1, 2013.  However, non SD/MSP swap counterparties that are “financial entities,” as defined in Section 2(h)(7)(C), must comply with reporting requirements under Part 43 and 45 on April 10, 2013.

2.         No-Action Relief for Reporting of Equity, Foreign Exchange and other Commodity Swaps

The no-action relief for end users who engage in swaps in other asset classes (e.g., equity, foreign exchange, and other commodities) is extended until August 19, 2013.  For non-SD/MSP swap counterparties that are “financial entities,” as defined in Section 2(h)(7)(C), the no-action relief extends until May 29, 2013.

3.         No-Action Relief for Historical Swap Data Reporting Under Part 46

The letter also extends no-action relief to end users’ Part 46 historical swap data reporting for all swap asset classes until October 31, 2013.  For non SD/MSP swap counterparties that are “financial entities,” as defined in Section 2(h)(7)(C), the Part 46 no-action relief extends until September 30, 2013.  Any pre-enactment or transition swap entered into prior to 12:01 a.m. on April 10, 2013 is reportable as a historical swap.

4.         Compliance Date for Recordkeeping Obligations has not been Extended

The letter also confirms that the no-action relief provided for reporting requirements doesnot impact any Dodd-Frank-related recordkeeping obligations applicable to SDs, MSPs or end users.  Thus, for historical swaps, end users must maintain records under the Part 46 rules for any such swaps entered into prior to April 10, 2013.   With respect to swaps entered into on or after April 10, end users must maintain records under the Part 43 and 45 rules, and obtain a CFTC Interim Compliant Identifier for this purpose by April 10, 2013.

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Employee’s Deactivation Of Facebook Account Leads To Sanctions

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The latest Facebook case highlights how courts now intend to hold parties accountable when it comes to preserving their personal social media accounts during litigation.  Recently, a federal court ruled that a plaintiff’s deletion of his Facebook account during discovery constituted spoliation of evidence and warranted an “adverse inference” instruction against him at trial.  Gatto v. United Airlines and Allied Aviation Servs., et al. , No. 10-CV-1090 (D.N.J. March 25, 2013).

The plaintiff, a ground operations supervisor at JFK Airport, allegedly suffered permanent disabling injuries from an accident at work which he claimed limited his physical and social activities.  Defendants sought discovery related to Plaintiff’s damages, including documents related to his social media accounts.

Although Plaintiff provided Defendants with the signed authorization for release of information from certain social networking sites and other online services such as eBay, he failed to provide an authorization for his Facebook account.  The magistrate judge ultimately ordered Plaintiff to execute the Facebook authorization, and Plaintiff agreed to change his Facebook password and to disclose the password to defense counsel for the purpose of accessing documents and information from Facebook.  Defense counsel briefly accessed the account and printed some portion of the Facebook home page.  Facebook then notified Plaintiff that an unfamiliar IP address had accessed his account.   Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff “deactivated” his account, causing Facebook to permanently delete the account 14 days later in accordance with its policy.

Defendants moved for spoliation of evidence sanctions, claiming that the lost Facebook postings contradicted Plaintiff’s claims about his restricted social activities.  In response, Plaintiff argued that he had acted reasonably in deactivating his account because he did know it was defense counsel accessing his page.  Moreover, the permanent deletion was the result of Facebook’s “automatically” deleting it.  The court, however, found that the Facebook account was within Plaintiff’s control, and that “[e]ven if Plaintiff did not intend to deprive the defendants of the information associated with his Facebook account, there is no dispute that plaintiff intentionally deactivated the account,” which resulted in the permanent loss of  relevant evidence.  Thus, the court granted Defendants’ request for an “adverse inference” instruction (but declined to award legal fees as a further sanction).

The Gatto decision not only affirms that social media is discoverable by employers, but also teaches that plaintiffs who fail to preserve relevant social media data will face harsh penalties.  Employers are reminded to specifically seek relevant social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, LinkedIn accounts) in their discovery requests since such sources may provide employers with sufficient evidence to rebut an employee’s claims.  This case also serves as a reminder and a warning to employers that the principles of evidence preservation apply to social media, and employers should take steps very early in the litigation to preserve its own social media content as it pertains to the matter.

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Second Circuit Bars Criminal Defendant from Accessing Assets Frozen by Regulators

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The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld a district court’s refusal to release nearly $4 million in assets frozen by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to help a defendant fund his criminal defense.

Stephen Walsh, a defendant in a criminal fraud case, had requested the release of $3.7 million in assets stemming from the sale of a house that had been seized by regulators in a parallel civil enforcement action. In denying Walsh’s motion to access the frozen funds, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government had shown probable cause that the proceeds had been tainted by defendant’s fraud, and were therefore subject to forfeiture. Though Walsh and his wife had purchased the home in question using funds unrelated to the fraud, Walsh ultimately acquired title to the home pursuant to a divorce settlement in exchange for a $12.5 million distributive award paid to his wife, at least $6 million of which, according to the court, was traceable to the fraud.

Agreeing with the District Court, the Second Circuit found that although the house itself was not a fungible asset, it was “an asset purchased with” the tainted funds from the marital estate by operation of the divorce agreement and affirmed the denial of defendant’s request. Further, since Walsh’s assets did not exceed $6 million at the time of his arrest, under the Second Circuit’s “drugs-in, first-out” approach, all of his assets became traceable to the fraud.

U.S. v. Stephen Walsh, No. 12-2383-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2013).

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U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers

The National Law Review recently published an article, U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) to State and Local Workers, written by Jennifer Cerven of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

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The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal from Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan on the issue of whether state and local government employees can bypass the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and sue for age discrimination under an equal protection theory. The case is Madigan v. Levin, Docket Number 12-872.

Appellate courts are split on whether the ADEA is the exclusive route for state and local government employees to bring a claim for age discrimination, or whether an equal protection claim via Section 1983 is available. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Plaintiff, a former Assistant Attorney General, could go forward with a Section 1983 age discrimination claim against certain defendants (including Madigan) in their individual capacity.  The Seventh Circuit decided that the ADEA does not preclude a Section 1983 claim, but acknowledged that its decision was contrary to rulings in other circuits holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.

The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that state and local government employees may avoid the ADEA’s remedial regime by bringing age discrimination claims under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1`983.

In the petitioner’s brief asking the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, Madigan noted the circuit split and argued that if the Seventh Circuit’s ruling were to stand, there would be about one million state and local workers in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin who would be able to bypass the ADEA’s administrative dispute resolution process at the EEOC and go straight to court.  Madigan argued that this would undercut the ADEA and would deprive state and local governments of prompt notice of claims.

The outcome of the case will be important not only for state and municipal employers, but also for individual employees.  As a practical matter, the plaintiff could end up with no further opportunity for an age discrimination claim if the Supreme Court decides that the ADEA forecloses age claims under Section 1983.  That is because the lower court decided that the employee fell under the ADEA exclusion of policy-making level employees, 29 U.S.C. §630(f).  Moreover, sovereign immunity applies to protect states from individual suits for monetary damages under the ADEA, under Supreme Court precedent in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S.  62.

The case is likely to proceed to briefing during the current term and may be scheduled for argument in the fall term.

© 2013 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

New generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) – ICANN Trademark Clearinghouse Goes Live

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Trademark Clearinghouse Launch

Complaints regarding inadequate protection for trademark owners will apparently not stop the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN“) from launching its new unlimited gTLD (generic Top Level Domain) program as quickly as possible in 2013. The new web environment will include hundreds of different words appearing to the right of the dot in domain names, in sharp contrast to the existing limited number of authorized strings such as .com, .biz, .net, and .info. Initial evaluations of over 1900 applications for new Top Level Domains have begun to be published by ICANN and will continue through August. Strings containing non-Latin script, known as Internationalized Domain Names (“IDNs”), of which there are over 100 in Chinese, Arabic and other alphabets, will launch first in May or June.

Trademark owners concerned about cybersquatting and counterfeit goods or services that could be sold at websites created at second level (before the dot) urls via domain name registrations obtained in the new gTLDs should consider filing registered trademarks with ICANN’s Trademark Clearinghouse (TMCH) which goes live this week. For example, a manufacturer of food products may consider recording its registered brand names with the TMCH to help protect against use of the brand name by an infringer who might purchase the name to the left of the dot in the new (dot)food domain. As long as the registration was applied for before the particular TLD application was published and was also registered before that TLD contract is awarded, entry of a trademark registration record into the TMCH will provide two benefits: (1) eligibility for Sunrise registrations before the general launch of any particular new TLD if a specimen of use is filed at the time the registration record is entered into the TMCH and (2) notification to the owner if a third party proceeds to register the owner’s trademark at the second level after being notified by the TMCH of the owner’s claim. Common law marks and state registrations are not eligible for entry into the TMCH, but marks validated through judicial process or by statute will qualify

There are caveats associated with these benefits because eligibility for Sunrise does not guarantee the trademark owner will get the Sunrise registration if other parties also own the same registered mark (perhaps for different goods or services). It’s easy to see how this might become a problem in proposed TLDs such as (dot)store. For example, Apple Records may want to sell downloadable music at apple.store, but Apple Inc. may also want to sell consumer electronics at apple.store. Registries will have a method in place for resolving Sunrise registration disputes and this may not be first come, first served. It could ultimately involve a bidding or auction process. Further, the notification described above will only be in place for the first 90 days after general launch of a new TLD so the holder may need to employ a watch service to track registrations purchased by third parties after that 90 day period.

Unlike the recent launch of the XXX domain, there is no “blocking” mechanism available to trademark holders in connection with the new TLDs. This puts a premium on obtaining a preventive Sunrise registration or being willing to follow up with cybersquatters on an “after-the-fact” basis once they have already obtained a registration.

In a decision issued at the end of last week, ICANN confirmed requested improvements for (a) 30 days prior notice of the launch of Sunrise, (b) extending IP claims notification from 60 days to 90 days out from general launch and (c) allowing previously “abused names” (such as those established as “abused” by way of prior UDRP proceedings) to be entered into the TMCH alongside the registered trademark even if not identical to the registered trademark. Presumably these previously abused names would then give rise to IP Claims notifications, but the implications are unclear since the TMCH has yet to issue its final Submission Guidelines based on these latest changes to the system. Entry of TMCH records will involve legal decisions, including, but not limited to (1) whether to enter a registration into the TMCH or not, (2) whether to seek Sunrise registration or not, (3) how best to provide proof of use if a Sunrise registration is desired in any new TLD, (4) which period of protection to select (1, 3, or 5 years), and (5) which domain names and previously “abused names” will qualify for TMCH protection.

©2013 All Rights Reserved. Lewis and Roca LLP

Congress Renews Violence Against Women Act, Expands Tribal Court Jurisdiction

The National Law Review recently featured an article by Brian L. Pierson with Godfrey & Kahn S.C., regarding Recent Congressional Actions:

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On February 28, 2013 the House of Representatives approved Senate Bill 47, which reauthorizes and amends the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The Bill, already approved in the Senate, became law when the President signed it on March 7th.

The VAWA is a major legislative achievement for Indian country. The Supreme Court held in 1978 that tribes lack inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. For the first time since that decision, Congress has authorized tribes to exercise such jurisdiction. Title IX of the VAWA amends the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to permit tribes to exercise “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indians who are charged with domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protective orders that occur on their lands. Features of special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction include:

  • either the perpetrator or victim must be Indian
  • the tribe must prove that the defendant has ties to the tribal community
  • tribal jurisdiction is concurrent with state and federal jurisdiction
  • the defendant has the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that –
    • reflect a fair cross section of the community; and
    • do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians
  • In the event that a sentence of imprisonment “may” be imposed, the tribe must guarantee the defendant the enhanced procedural rights added to the ICRA by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, including:
    • effective assistance of counsel, paid for by the tribe if the defendant is indigent
    • a legally trained judge licensed to practice law
    • published laws and rules of criminal procedure
    • recorded proceedings

Copyright © 2013 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

340B Drug Pricing Program Notices on Group Purchasing Organizations and Medicaid Exclusion File

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Following the recent release of new Program Notices regarding the Group Purchase Organization (GPO) prohibition and Medicaid Exclusion File, 340B participating entities should review their 340B program policies and procedures to ensure compliance with new and clarified guidance regarding GPO purchasing and dispensing of 340B drugs to Medicaid patients.

On February 7, 2013, the Health Resources and Services Administration Office of Pharmacy Affairs (OPA) issued new Program Notices related to the Group Purchasing Organization (GPO) prohibition and the Medicaid Exclusion File (the Program Notice).

GPO Prohibition 

Disproportionate Share Hospitals, children’s hospitals and freestanding cancer hospitals that participate in the 340B program are prohibited from purchasing “covered outpatient drugs” through a GPO or other group purchasing arrangement.  Covered outpatient drugs include most outpatient drugs obtained by written prescription, with the exception of vaccines and certain drugs classified as devices by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Prior to the release of the new Program Notice, OPA had provided little guidance regarding the scope and enforcement of the GPO prohibition.  The Program Notice appears to have resulted from OPA concern that certain hospitals may have been routinely using outpatient GPO accounts when unable to purchase drugs at 340B prices.  With the Program Notice, OPA has now formally established policies regarding the application of the GPO prohibition to drug shortages, outpatient clinics and virtual inventory/replenishment purchasing models.

With the new Program Notice, and accompanying FAQs released subsequent to the publication of the Program Notice, OPA advises that the GPO prohibition applies even when a covered outpatient drug is not available at the 340B price due to a manufacturer shortage.  In such cases, hospitals are instructed to notify OPA of the issue, but may not obtain the drug through a GPO.

The Program Notice also provides that the GPO prohibition does not extend to certain off‑site outpatient clinics.  A hospital may use a GPO to purchase covered outpatient drugs for an off-site outpatient clinic if all of the following requirements are met:

Further, OPA establishes that a hospital may not use a GPO to purchase covered outpatient drugs for dispensing to patients through a contract pharmacy.  This guidance does not prohibit a contract pharmacy that is not owned by a hospital (which is the entity that would be subject to the GPO prohibition) from accessing GPO pricing through its own account, so long as the hospital is not involved in the pharmacy-GPO arrangement and does not benefit from the pharmacy’s GPO pricing.

  • The off-site outpatient clinic is located at a different physical address than the hospital
  • The off-site outpatient clinic is not registered in the OPA 340B database as participating in the 340B program
  • Covered outpatient drugs for the off-site outpatient clinic are purchased through a separate pharmacy wholesaler account than the hospital
  • The hospital maintains records demonstrating that drugs purchased through a GPO for the off-site outpatient clinic are not utilized by or transferred to the hospital or any off-site outpatient location registered in the OPA 340B database

Hospitals, including their outpatient sites, subject to the GPO prohibition must discontinue GPO purchasing of covered outpatient drugs before the first day of their respective 340B program eligibility, although each may continue to dispense previously purchased GPO inventory.  Those hospitals that maintain pharmacy inventory through a virtual inventory/replenishment model, in which 340B drugs are purchased based on prior dispensing to 340B-eligible patients, are also prohibited from using a GPO to purchase covered outpatient drugs.  OPA has advised that hospitals utilizing a replenishment model in “mixed use” (inpatient and outpatient) pharmacies must now account for (“accumulate”) dispensed drugs for inventory replenishment as either inpatient, 340B-eligible or outpatient non-340B.  Drugs accumulated for outpatient non-340B replenishment may only be purchased through a non-340B, non-GPO account.  In addition, a hospital may not purchase drugs on a 340B account until the 340B-eligible accumulator reaches a full package size and/or minimum order quantity.  The result is that such drugs typically must be purchased at wholesale acquisition cost (WAC) or prices individually negotiated between the hospital and manufacturer.

The new Program Notice advises that hospitals subject to the GPO prohibition that are found in violation of the prohibition may be immediately removed from the 340B program and subject to repayment to manufacturers for the period of non-compliance.  However, in a separate FAQ on the OPA website, OPA advises that it will not enforce the GPO prohibition until after April 7, 2013.  Those hospitals that are unable to meet the compliance deadline are advised to either notify OPA of non-compliance and submit a corrective action plan (such submissions will be handled on a case-by-case basis) or disenroll either the entire hospital or, if applicable, non-compliant off-campus locations, from the 340B program.

Medicaid Exclusion File

Drug manufacturers are not required to provide a 340B discount and Medicaid rebate on the same drug.  In order to prevent these “duplicate discounts,” OPA maintains the Medicaid Exclusion File.  This database lists all 340B participating entities (covered entities) and indicates whether the covered entity has elected to dispense 340B drugs to Medicaid patients (carve-in) or obtain drugs for Medicaid patients at non-340B pricing (carve-out).  Covered entities that have elected to carve-in are listed in the Medicaid Exclusion File by Medicaid billing number.

State Medicaid programs are instructed to access the Medicaid Exclusion File to ensure they do not seek manufacturer rebates from those covered entities that are listed in the database.  In the Program Notice, OPA reminds states to use the Medicaid Exclusion File to prevent duplicate discounts and to report any discrepancies between provider billing practices and the information in the database to OPA.

The Program Notice advises covered entities of a change in OPA policy regarding the timing of changes to a covered entity’s decision to carve-in or carve-out.  While changes previously could be made at any time, OPA will now only permit changes on a quarterly basis.  OPA also clarifies that a covered entity may choose to carve-in or carve-out for a subset of 340B enrolled locations, but if it does so, must obtain a separate Medicaid provider number for any eligible locations that carve-in.  Covered entities are also reminded that they must ensure their information is accurately reflected in the Medicaid Exclusion File and that they may be subject to manufacturer repayment if the database reflects that the covered entity opted to carve-out, but the covered entity has been dispensing 340B drugs to Medicaid patients.

Next Steps

340B participating hospitals subject to the GPO exclusion should review their current operations and policies and procedures to evaluate compliance with the guidance released in the new Program Notice and FAQs, with particular attention to use of GPO purchasing to obtain covered outpatient drugs that are not available at 340B pricing and for replenishment inventory.  As necessary, hospitals should cease purchasing covered outpatient drugs through a GPO and begin revising purchasing procedures to ensure compliance by April 8, 2013.

Hospitals should also evaluate current policies regarding use of GPOs at off-site outpatient clinics not registered in the OPA 340B database to determine whether such locations may be eligible to purchase covered outpatient drugs through a GPO.  Previously, many such off-site outpatient clinics were restricted to only purchasing at WAC pricing due to the GPO exclusion.  The new Program Notice makes clear that, so long as purchasing is conducted through a separate pharmacy wholesaler account (not the hospital’s), hospitals subject to the GPO exclusion can use a GPO to purchase drugs for off-campus outpatient clinics that are not registered in the OPA 340B database.  Therefore, outpatient sites now have the flexibility to purchase drugs through a GPO for those clinics that are not yet eligible for 340B enrollment (e.g., they have not yet appeared on a filed Medicare cost report) and to opt-out of enrolling off-site outpatient clinic sites if certain locations would see greater benefit from GPO purchasing than from 340B participation.  Further, hospitals may wish to explore opportunities for selective enrollment of off-site outpatient locations to ensure patient access to certain drugs, such as intravenous immunoglobulin, that have historically been difficult to obtain at 340B pricing and cost-prohibitive to obtain at WAC.

All covered entities should review their information in the Medicaid Exclusion File to ensure the database reflects current Medicaid billing practices and be aware that any changes will only be effective as of the next quarter beginning January 1, April 1, July 1 or October 1.  Covered entities should also use this opportunity to review state Medicaid program requirements regarding carve-in or carve-out restrictions and billing rules related to 340B drugs.

© 2013 McDermott Will & Emery

Not so Fast at the Eden Roc

The National Law Review recently published an article, Not so Fast at the Eden Roc, written by Nelson F. Migdal with Greenberg Traurig, LLP:

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Within hours of the appeals court’s ruling [Marriott International v Eden Roc 3-26-2013.pdf], there have been announcements about the demise of the long-term hotel management agreement and the hotel owner’s inviolate right to terminate (revoke) management agreements “at-will.”  But the wiser course might be to not speak too soon, but, rather, to ponder the consequences.  Remember that Judge Schweitzer’s prior ruling on October 26, 2012 granted Marriott’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the hotel owner from removing the hotel operator in another of a series of “midnight raids,” where the hotel owner sweeps in and removes the hotel operator.  The hotel operator at the Eden Roc chose to stand its ground, and the injunction order maintained the status quo.  In many situations, the parties are able to resolve their dispute, either on their own or with the assistance of a mediator.  In fact, the Judge urged the parties to do just that.

The parties were not able to resolve their differences, and on March 26, 2013, a New York appeals court vacated Judge Schweitzer’s injunction.  This is not a sweeping and staggering new law. Citing the 1991 Woolley case, the order merely confirms that a principal may freely remove its agent and terminate the agency relationship “at-will” (absent the presence of a “coupled interest” as part of the contract; see the attached link to our prior piece on the Turnberry decision).  (To this extent, I disagree with the appellate court’s dicta that the agreement in question is not an agency agreement; in fact it is). The order further confirms that certain contracts that have the characteristics of a personal services contract cannot be enforced by means of an injunction.  It is also not news that if a hotel owner desires to terminate its management agreement with the hotel operator in this manner, that the hotel owner may be answerable in damages to the hotel operator.  Some blog posts within the last 24 hours make reference to the recent Fairmont Hotels & Resorts termination at the Turnberry Resort.  Very few of those blog posts complete the factual story and note that the hotel owner ultimately paid Fairmont damages reported to be roughly $19,000,000, representing the approximate present value of expected future management fees. Depending on the performance of the hotel, an Owner’s summary revocation of a hotel management agreement could be akin to selling “puts”; you get to own the stock, but do you really want to own it that cost?

So, let’s just be more judicious here.  Hotel owners and hotel operators actually do talk with each other more often than not, and do enter into legally binding agreements for management of the owner’s hotel.  I will continue to advocate for good faith negotiation over litigation, and monitor the complete story, including the fact that terminating the hotel management agreement may grant an owner its wish to regain the hotel, but that will come at a price, and then, the next step is that the hotel owner will need to replace the removed hotel operator with yet another hotel operator – which hotel owners realize can add a significant expense for the owner.

©2013 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in “Pay-for-Delay” Patent Settlement Antitrust Case

The National Law Review recently published an article, Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in “Pay-for-Delay” Patent Settlement Antitrust Case, written by Jeffrey W. Brennan and Glenn Engelmann with McDermott Will & Emery:

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On March 25, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States heard argument on the issue of pharmaceutical patent settlement agreements between branded and generic drug companies that contain so-called “pay-for-delay” or “reverse payment” provisions. Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., involves the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) appeal of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit’s order affirming dismissal of an FTC charge that such an agreement was an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  Proof that an agreement between competitors is anticompetitive under Section 5 (which only the FTC may enforce) and under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (for which there is a private right of action) is essentially the same.  The Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. Actavis will almost certainly have major implications for the viability of FTC and private suits alleging that pay-for-delay settlements are anticompetitive, and for the level of antitrust risk facing companies that enter into such settlements.

Pay-for-delay challenges arise from settlements of patent infringement suits by branded drug patent holders against generic drug applicants under the Hatch-Waxman framework.  Two provisions must be present for the theory to apply: a restriction on generic entry until a future date (even if the entry precedes patent expiration), and payment of money or other value by the brand to the generic firm.  The payment typically is part of an ancillary agreement, such as a supply or co-promotion arrangement or IP license (coined a reverse payment because the plaintiff pays the defendant to settle).  The FTC argues that this paradigm delays competition because it likely induces the generic to settle for later entry, or would have under exclusivity provisions if it won the lawsuit.  The FTC finds the agreements presumptively unlawful and would put the burden on defendants to prove otherwise.  Defendants counter that the patent conveys a right to exclude and that these settlements promote and accelerate competition, because they enable generic entry prior to patent expiration.  Defendants assert that the burden should remain with the plaintiff to prove an anticompetitive effect.

The facts alleged in the FTC complaint squarely fit this paradigm.  The settlement occurred in 2006.  Solvay marketed branded drug Androgel.  A formulation patent claiming Androgel expires in 2020.  Generic drug firm Watson (now Actavis) had applied to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for approval to launch a generic version of Androgel and certified that the generic product did not infringe Solvay’s patent and that the patent was invalid.  Solvay sued Watson and another firm for patent infringement, then settled.  The parties agreed that Watson would not launch its generic version of Androgel until 2015—five years prior to patent expiration—and that Watson would promote Androgel to a key customer source, urologists, and be compensated by Solvay for those services.  The agreement thus contains both components of an FTC pay-for-delay paradigm: a time-restriction on generic entry and a reverse payment.

The 11th Circuit followed its own precedent in rejecting the FTC case under the “scope-of-the-patent” test.  (The Second and Federal Circuits apply the same test.)  Under that analysis, if the patent was not obtained by fraud, and the infringement suit is not a sham (i.e., objectively baseless), then a settlement does not violate the antitrust laws if its terms do not expand the exclusionary scope of the patent, such as by prohibiting generic entry even after the patent expires.  Since the Solvay-Watson settlement provided for generic entry five years before patent expiration and did not otherwise allegedly fail the foregoing tests, the 11th Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FTC complaint.  The Supreme Court likely accepted the case because of a circuit split on this issue.  In 2012, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, in which the FTC was not a party, the Third Circuit reversed a district court and applied a legal analysis that rejects the scope-of-the-patent test and essentially adopts the FTC approach.

In the oral argument, the Justices directed a number of pointed questions and comments to each side.  As noted, the government would put the burden on defendants to show that their agreement is not anticompetitive, arguing that “agreements of this sort should be treated as presumptively unlawful, with the presumption able to be rebutted in various ways” that do not include an assessment of the patent’s validity or of the strength of the infringement claim.  Members of the Supreme Court expressed skepticism about that rule.  Justice Kennedy responded, “[t]hat’s my concern, is your test is the same for a very weak patent as a very strong patent.  That doesn’t make a lot of sense.”  Justice Scalia said that to not evaluate the strength of the patent in assessing competitive effects is to leave out “the elephant in the room.”  Justice Breyer remarked that the government proposes “a whole set of complex per se burden of proof rules that I have never seen in other antitrust cases,” adding, “I’m worried about creating some kind of administrative monster.”

Justices also had pointed comments for the companies’ counsel, particularly on whether it is appropriate to find that the patent has an absolute right to exclude even though it was being tested in court.  The companies’ counsel argued that “the patent gives the patentholder the legal right to exclude” and that unless the patent is legally unenforceable, the patentholder is “entitled to monopoly profits for the whole duration of the patent.”  Justice Sotomayor said “there is no presumption of infringement” by the generic product, “[s]o what you’re arguing is that in fact a settlement of an infringement action is now creating the presumption.”  She added, “I don’t know why we would be required to accept that there has or would be infringement by the product that has voluntarily decided not to pursue its rights.”  Justice Kagan remarked that “[i]t’s clear what’s going on here is that [the brand and generic firms are] splitting monopoly profits and the person who’s going to be injured are all the consumers out there,” and that under the companies’ proposed rule, the brand and generic firm will have the incentive “in every single case . . . to split monopoly profits in this way to the detriment of all consumers.”

The Supreme Court’s term concludes in June 2013, by which time a decision is expected.

© 2013 McDermott Will & Emery