Category: Administrative & Regulatory

State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) Announces Graphical User Interface (GUI) Related Design Becomes Patentable Subject Matter as of May 1, 2014

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

 

Recently announced by the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO), graphical user interface (GUI) design patent applications will be accepted beginning on May 1, 2014. Revised on March 17, 2014, the amended Patent Examination Guidelines will now include provision for GUI on an electrified device screen as patentable matter, including dynamic or animated GUI. The new standards will exclude applications not related to human-machine interaction, leaving video game interfaces, decoration wallpapers, and web page layouts unprotected under the revised examination guidelines. This change from SIPO comes as increasingly more devices across numerous industries are relying heavily on GUI innovation.

Article by:

Robert Greene Sterne

Of:

Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.

Leaders in Higher Education Call for Immigration Reform

GT Law

As the immigration reform debate endures in the House of Representatives, leaders in higher education are continuing their call for improvements to the nation’s immigration system.

Most recently, presidents of 28 Catholic and Jesuit colleges and universities united in a fast for immigration reform on Ash Wednesday (March 5, 2014). In doing so, they joined the “Fast for Families” movement, which reignited the immigration debate last fall when the movement’s leaders, supported by many members of Congress and The President, fasted for twenty-two days on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. Students have not been far behind in the campaign to reform the nation’s immigration system. In February, one hundred and fifty students from nine Catholic colleges and Universities held a Student Summit on Immigration Reform.

These are just a few of the continuing calls made by members of the higher education community for Congress to pass immigration reform. In late 2013, leaders of more than one hundred colleges and universities across the United States wrote to their Congressional representatives to support the overhaul of the immigration system.

In many ways, our nation’s colleges and universities are on the front lines of our broken immigration system. Roughly a third of their graduate students in STEM fields are foreign nationals – in some states it is well over half. Leaders in higher education see how often our immigration policies prevent the nation from retaining and capitalizing on these talented individuals and create obstacles to growth.

The higher education community is hopeful that its continuing efforts will prompt the Congressional leadership to renew its efforts to pass meaningful immigration reform.

Article by:

Nataliya Rymer

Of:

Greenberg Traurig, LLP

United States Expands Sanctions in Response to Activities in Ukraine, Names First SDNs (Specially Designated Nationals)

DrinkerBiddle

 

Early March 18, 2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order (E.O.) expanding on E.O. 13660, which was issued on March 10, 2014.  In addition to naming specific persons subject to the restrictions of E.O. 13660, including former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, the new E.O. expands the sanctions previously announced in response to recent actions of the Government of the Russian Federation in Crimea to include any person who is determined to:

  • Be an official of the Government of the Russian Federation;
  • Operate in the arms or related materiel in the Russian Federation;
  • Be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly of indirectly:
    • a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; or
    • a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or
  • Have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of:
    • a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; or
    • a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

Effective immediately, all property and interests in property that are in the control of U.S. persons (including foreign branches) will be blocked, and subject persons will be prohibited from entry to the United States.  The complete list of blocked persons is available here.

As the situation in Ukraine continues to unfold and sanctions are expanded, U.S. companies should be particularly cautious in screening transactions in the region and maintaining records.  In addition, companies with affiliates in the European Union should be mindful of changes to EU sanctions that could impact business in the region.

Article by:

Of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Letters Of Intent For On-Site Solar Energy Transactions

Sills-Cummis-Gross-607x84

An increasing number of retail, office, industrial and warehouse/distribution property owners are utilizing electricity generated by on-site photovoltaic (also referred to as “pv” or “solar”) systems to meet a portion of their properties’ electrical energy needs. The pv systems can be located on the roofs of buildings, in parking fields, on open areas of the property or on two or more of these locations.

One of the most common methods that property owners are using to obtain such on-site solar-generated electricity is to enter into a power purchase agreement, often referred to as a “PPA,” with a solar developer, frequently referred to as a “provider.” In a PPA, the property owner, often called a “host,” provides leasehold or license rights on its property to the provider for the installation and operation of the pv system, and the provider sells the electricity that the pv system generates to the host. The provider generally owns all of the governmental and utility company incentives provided in connection with the pv system, and the host usually owns the net metering rights for the pv system.

However, the negotiation of a PPA frequently takes more time and is more complex than the economic benefits of the PPA to the provider and the host warrant. One of the major reasons for this problem is that the typical initial letter of intent (“LOI”) for a PPA transaction frequently fails to address the issues that often cause the most difficulty when the host and provider attempt to negotiate and finalize the PPA itself. The balance of this article sets forth several of these additional issues that should be included in a PPA LOI and explores methods of ameliorating the conflicts they create between the provider and the host.

Electricity Rate Cap

Many LOIs include a cap on the rate that the provider will charge the host for the electricity that the pv system generates. The cap usually provides that the rate that the provider charges to the host cannot exceed the rate that that host’s regulated local electrical utility, referred to in this article as the “Utility,” or the host’s third-party power supplier, charges the host for electricity at the property in question.

However, in setting this cap, it is important to remember that the Utility charges the host, whether or not the host also has a third-party power supplier, for many items other than the electricity itself, some of which are based on electricity consumption and some of which are static. Accordingly, when the host and provider agree on the rate cap in the LOI, they should clearly state what portions of the Utility and third-party power provider rate are included in determining the cap.

Interconnection Agreement

In order to operate a pv system and to obtain net metering for the excess electricity that the pv system generates, the Utility requires that its customer, usually the host, sign an interconnection agreement. The terms of the interconnection agreement are set forth in the Utility’s tariff and are, hence, non-negotiable. While the host must sign the interconnection agreement, most of the undertakings in the interconnection agreement are the responsibility of the provider under the PPA. Accordingly, the LOI should provide that the host will sign the interconnection agreement and that each party will agree to perform its obligations under the interconnection agreement, while indemnifying the other party for its failure to do so.

Purchase Of Excess Electricity

Pv systems by their nature cannot provide all of a property’s electricity needs all of the time. Additionally, in most jurisdictions, either the Utility or a government regulator limits the size of the pv system, so that it will not generate more than a maximum percentage (for example, 80 percent) of a property’s electricity usage. However, notwithstanding these circumstances, there are times when the pv system will generate more electricity than the property is using, causing the Utility meter to run backwards, referred to as “net metering.” In many jurisdictions, usually by means of the interconnection agreement, the Utility will pay the host or credit the host’s future electric bills for the amount of this excess electricity.

For this reason, most PPAs provide that the host will purchase all of the electricity the pv system generates and own all the net-metering credits. However, before entering into a PPA, a host should review its third-party electricity supply contracts to make sure that they do not contain prohibitions against pv or other on-site systems or do not contain minimum usage requirements. The PPA and LOI should

also address the situation where the property becomes vacant, because most net-metering programs have limitations on how much excess electricity the Utility has to buy.

Electricity Production Guaranty

Many hosts assume, in their financial planning for a property’s operation, that the pv system will generate a minimum amount of electricity in each calendar year. Accordingly, they request a production guaranty. If the host wants a production guaranty, this should be set forth in the LOI. Additionally, the adjustments to the guaranty for weather, system shutdowns and force majeure events should be spelled out.

Taxes

Many jurisdictions provide limited sales and use tax exemptions on the sale of electricity from on-site pv systems and exclusions from increases in real property taxes by reason of their location on a property. However, other jurisdictions do not provide such exemptions or the exemptions are very narrow and do not apply to every situation. Accordingly, the host and provider should determine whether or not a tax exemption exists or applies before they enter into a LOI. If the exemption is available, the LOI should set forth which party is responsible for obtaining it. If no exemption applies, the LOI should set forth which party is responsible for the particular tax.

SNDAs

Most properties are subject to mortgage secured debt. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in most jurisdictions, the PPA can provide that the pv system is the personal property of the provider, not a fixture, and thus not subject to the lien of the mortgage on the property. However, most loan and security agreements for most mortgages also provide for security interests in the personal property located at the property. The language in these documents is often extremely broad. Additionally, the provider needs access rights over the property to install and repair the pv system and rights to place the pv system on the property. PPAs generally provide these rights as leasehold or license rights. Finally, many mortgages require mort- gagee consent for the installation of pv systems on the property.

Accordingly, the LOI should set forth whether or not, and at whose cost, the host will obtain subordination, non-disturbance, attornment and lien waiver agreements (“SNDAs”) from all current and future holders of mortgages on the property. Such a provision can provide for the sharing of the cost to obtain the SNDA between provider and host, with a waiver or cancellation option if the cost exceeds a certain amount.

Non-interference With PV System And Property Access

Many retail tenants, in particular, have consent rights over the roofs of their stores, rights to install HVAC systems and antennas on their roofs and exclusive rights over certain parking lots and common areas. The provider cannot allow its pv system to be moved, damaged or shaded. Additionally, the provider needs laydown, storage and parking areas for its installation, repair and maintenance of the pv system. Accordingly, the LOI should address tenant consents and lease and OEA amendments, if required, in order to insure non-interference with the pv system and necessary provider access. The LOI should also address which party is responsible for obtaining the consents and access and non-interference rights and at whose cost. Additionally, the LOI can provide for a non-penalty termination of the PPA if these consents and rights cannot be obtained.

Temporary PV System Relocation, Removal Or Shutdown Most PPAs have a term of 15 to 20 years. During such a time period, roofs often have to be repaired and parking lots resurfaced. The cost to relocate or temporarily remove and reinstall a pv system is significant. Additionally, the cost to the provider in lost electricity revenue and more importantly lost incentive revenue can be substantial. Accordingly, the LOI should set forth which party will bear these costs or how they will be shared. Cost sharing may shift later in the term of the PPA because the provider’s loss of incentive revenues will likely be less and the need for repairs will be more likely to occur.

PV System Purchase Options

If the PPA is going to provide for a purchase option, the LOI should address at what times in the term the host can exercise its option and set forth the method for determining the fair market value of the pv system at the time of the exercise of the option, including what factors will be used in determining the value of the pv system.

Assignment

The LOI should state when, under what terms and to whom the parties can assign their rights under the PPA and whether a party and, if applicable, its guarantor, remains obligated under the PPA after an assignment.

Limitations On Liability

The LOI should specify whether the parties will be responsible for consequential damages, whether there will be absolute limitations on all damages, including indemnification obligations, and the dollar amount of these limitations.

Parental Guaranties

Most pv systems are owned through a single-purpose entity whose only asset is the pv system, and most shopping centers are owned by single-asset, single-purpose entities. Accordingly, the provider and the host should determine in the LOI if they are going to provide parental guaranties to each other and under what terms.

Conclusion

While the list of issues this article covers is by no means exhaustive, the author hopes that it will be helpful in streamlining the negotiation of PPAs.

This article appeared in the March 2014 issue of The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. Copyright © 2014 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. All rights reserved.

Article by:

Kevin J. Moore

Of:

Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.

EEOC & FTC Issue Joint Background Check Guidance

Jackson Lewis Logo

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued joint informal guidance concerning the legal pitfalls employers may face when consulting background checks into a worker’s criminal record, financial history, medical history or use of social media.  The FTC enforces the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the law that protects the privacy and accuracy of the information in credit reports. The EEOC enforces laws against employment discrimination.

The two short guides, Background Checks: What Employers Need to Know andBackground Checks: What Job Applicants and Employees Should Know, explain the rights and responsibilities of both employers and employees.

The agency press releases state that the FTC and the EEOC want employers to know that they need written permission from job applicants before getting background reports about them from a company in the business of compiling background information. Employers also should know that it’s illegal to discriminate based on a person’s race, national origin, sex, religion, disability, or age (40 or older) when requesting or using background information for employment.

Additionally, the agencies want job applicants to know that it’s not illegal for potential employers to ask someone about their background as long as the employer does not unlawfully discriminate. Job applicants also should know that if they’ve been turned down for a job or denied a promotion based on information in a background report, they have a right to review the report for accuracy.

According to EEOC Legal Counsel Peggy Mastroianni, “The No. 1 goal here is to ensure that people on both sides of the desk understand their rights and responsibilities.”

Article by:

Jason C. Gavejian

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

EEOC Sues Wal-Mart for Age and Disability Discrimination – Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

EEOCSeal

 

Keller Store Manager Harassed and Then Fired Because of His Age; Also Denied a Reasonable Accommodation for His Diabetes, Federal Agency Charges

Wal-Mart Stores of Texas, LLC discriminated against a store manager by subjecting him to harassment, unequal treatment and discharge because of his age, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit filed in federal court today. The EEOC’s suit also alleges that Wal-Mart violated federal anti-discrimination law when it refused the manager’s request for a reasonable accommodation for his disability.

The EEOC charges in its suit that David Moorman, the manager of a Keller, Texas Walmart store, who was 54 at the time, was ridiculed with frequent taunts from his direct supervisor including “old man” and the “old food guy.” The supervisor also derided Moorman with ageist comments such as, “You can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” The EEOC further alleges that, after enduring the abusive behavior for several months, Moorman reported the harassment to Wal-Mart’s human resources department. The EEOC contends that not only did Wal-Mart fail to take any corrective action, but the harassment, in fact, increased, and the store ultimately fired Moorman because of his age.

The suit also alleges that Wal-Mart unlawfully refused Moorman’s request for a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Following his diagnosis and on the advice of his doctor, Moorman, a diabetic, requested reassignment to a store co-manager or assistant manager position. Wal-Mart refused to consider his request for reassignment, eventually rejecting his request without any dialogue or consideration.

Such alleged conduct violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age 40 or older, including age-based harassment. It also violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which protects employees from discrimination based on their disabilities and requires employers to provide disabled employees with reasonable accommodations. The EEOC filed suit, Case No. 3:14-CV-00908-M, in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process.

The EEOC seeks injunctive relief, including the formulation of policies to prevent and correct age and disability discrimination. The suit also seeks damages for Moorman, including lost wages and an equal amount of liquidated damages for Wal-Mart’s willful conduct. The EEOC will also seek damages for harms suffered as a result of the non-accommodation.

“Employers should be diligent about preventing and correcting conduct that can amount to bullying at the workplace,” said EEOC Senior Trial Attorney Joel Clark. “They have an obligation to stop ageist harassment after it is reported. The company’s failure to take remedial action to stop the harassment, as well as the denial of a reasonable accommodation for a disability, and the ultimate termination of the discrimination victim demonstrate a disregard for equal opportunity laws. The EEOC is here to fight for the rights of people like Mr. Moorman.”

Robert A. Canino, regional attorney for the EEOC’s Dallas District Office, added, “The open mockery and insulting of experienced employees who have committed themselves to work for a company are totally unacceptable. It’s unfortunate when supervisors and managers lose sight of the importance of valuing employees. But we are hopeful that a constructive resolution which promotes the common goal of achieving a respectful work environment will emerge from this process.”

Article by:

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Of:

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Bittersweet Ending for Plaintiffs in Chocolate Price-Fixing Litigation

In a February 26, 2014 Memorandum, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for three defendants Mars, Inc., Nestlé USA, Inc., and The Hershey Company in a detailed opinion. The plaintiffs filed suit against chocolate manufacturers nearly six years ago, claiming that they conspired to fix the prices of various chocolate products. The decision is helpful for defendants as precedent that even lock-step price increases are not enough to survive summary judgment in a price-fixing case, at least in a market with few competitors. Judge Conner’s decision also demonstrates for defendants the value of developing and shepherding a comprehensive record to support the argument that their decisions were independent and economically and rationally defensible.

The plaintiffs relied on circumstantial evidence and an inference that parallel price increases were the result of a tacit agreement to engage in collusive behavior, “actuated” by a conspiracy in Canada that resulted in at least one guilty plea by a Canadian chocolate manufacturer. Judge Conner relied in part on a finding that the Canadian conspiracy made a similar conspiracy in the United States more plausible in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538 (M.D. Pa. 2009).

Judge Conner found at the summary judgment stage, however, that there was no evidence that executives responsible for pricing in the United States were aware of any anticompetitive activity in Canada, and concluded that the rest of the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to preclude summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs had no direct evidence of conspiracy, so they were required to show both that the defendants consciously raised prices in parallel as well as sufficient evidence of “plus factors.” In this case, the court considered three plus factors: (1) the defendants’ motive and market factors; (2) whether the defendants’ behavior was against their self-interest; and (3) traditional conspiracy evidence. The plaintiffs’ evidence of parallel pricing was the strongest part of their case. The court concluded that Mars, Nestle, and Hershey raised prices in parallel because¾three times over the course of five years¾Mars initiated a price increase, and both Hershey and Nestle followed in quick succession (within one to two weeks) with nearly identical price increases (varying only once, and even then only by two-tenths of a penny).

The court recognized, however, that parallel price increases were not sufficient, especially in a market controlled by a few competitors (or an oligopoly) to support an inference of antitrust liability. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted against their own self-interest as required by the second plus factor. In reaching this conclusion, the court first pointed to evidence that the defendants increased prices in anticipation of cost increases, stating “it is rational, competitive, and self-interest motivated behavior to increase prices for the purpose of mitigating the effect of anticipated cost increases.” Judge Conner also cited to what he described as “extensive” internal communications before each increase in which each defendant unilaterally discussed whether they could raise prices as evidence of “independent and fiercely competitive business conduct,” not collusion. Finally, the court agreed with Nestle’s argument that widely supported economic principles supported its decision as the defendant with the smallest market share to follow the price increases of its competitors. In doing so, the court likely rejected an argument¾often made by plaintiffs¾that it was in Nestle’s best interest to cut prices and gain market share.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ traditional evidence of conspiracy was insufficient to satisfy the third plus factor. The plaintiffs relied on three pieces of evidence to satisfy this factor: (1) the Canadian conspiracy; (2) the defendants’ possession of competitors’ pricing information; and (3) the defendants’ opportunity to conspire at trade association meetings. While the court accepted that the Canadian conspiracy could, in theory, facilitate a conspiracy in the United States, it found the facts did not support the application of the theory in this case because there was no evidence that U.S. decision-makers had knowledge of the Canadian conspiracy and there was no tie between the pricing activities in the two countries. From the court’s opinion, it appears the plaintiffs had little traditional conspiracy evidence beyond the supposed connection to Canada. The court rejected an argument that a “handful” of documents suggesting that the defendants were aware of competitors’ price increases before they were made public supported an inference of conspiracy. There was no evidence that the pricing information came from competitors, and the court concluded that this exchange of advance price information was as consistent with independent competitive behavior as it was with collusion. Finally, the court ruled that the presence of company officers at trade meetings¾without any evidence that they discussed prices there¾was insufficient to permit an inference that the price increases were the result of collusive behavior. Reviewing the record as a whole, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had produced no evidence tending to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently.

Judge Conner’s opinion is a relatively straightforward application of the standard for ruling on summary judgment in antitrust cases set forth in the Supreme Court’s Matsushita decision and for parallel pricing cases as set forth in the Third Circuit’s Baby Food and Flat Glass opinions. If appealed, Chocolate Confectionary is unlikely to result in a decision changing these standards significantly.

On the bright side for the plaintiffs, they reached a settlement with at least one defendant, Cadbury, before the summary judgment motion was ruled upon, so they will not be left empty handed.

Article by:

of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

United Auto Workers (UAW) and Volkswagen (VW) Efforts to Establish First Works Council in the U.S. Fails

Michael Best Logo

 

The United Auto Workers (UAW), which already represents most of the largest carmakers in the United States, was unsuccessful in its efforts to unionizeVolkswagen’s (VW) plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee. What makes this noteworthy is that leading up to the February 14th representation election, the German company was actually campaigning for the UAW not against it in an employer-union alliance seldom seen in this country.

While the “big three” American carmakers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) are all unionized, foreign carmakers have avoided unionization by locating their plants in Southern states with strong Right to Work laws. Volkswagen, however, considers the creation of a so-called “works council” a crucial element of its business. Works councils are common under German law, and Volkswagen has established works councils at all its foreign plants, with the exception of Chattanooga and China.

Under these works councils, all workers in a factory regardless of position and whether they are unionized or not, help decide things like staffing schedules and working conditions, while the union bargains on wages and benefits. They also have the right to review certain types of information about how the company is doing financially, which means that they tend to be more sympathetic towards management’s desire to make cutbacks during tough financial times. Each Volkswagen plant throughout the world sends its delegates to a global works council that influences which products the company makes and where. This arrangement would have represented a new experience for the UAW, unlike its relationship with Chrysler, General Motors and Ford, which would have involved sharing control with the works council.

A tough question for Volkswagen and the UAW is whether a works council would be legal in the United States without a union. There is no provision in the NLRA for the kind of German-style works council Volkswagen seeks. Volkswagen’s best option for creating a works council would have been for its workers to accept UAW representation. Volkswagen must now rethink its options in seeking a way to create a works council. Options include talking with a different union that might be more popular with its workers or encouraging workers to organize their own independent union. Another option would be moving ahead without a union and risking an NLRB challenge.

After the UAW was defeated by a 712-626 vote in its bid to represent workers at the Volkswagen plant, the UAW promptly requested a new election claiming Tennessee politicians and outside organizations coordinated and vigorously promoted a coercive campaign to sow fear and deprive Volkswagen workers of their right to join a union. Senior state officials including United States Senator Bob Corker, TennesseeGovernor William Haslam, State House Speaker Beth Harwell, and State House Majority Leader Gerald McCormick, made statements in an effort to convince the workers to reject the UAW. The UAW’s alleges this was part of an unlawful campaign which included publicly announced and widely disseminated threats by elected officials that state-financed incentives would be withheld if workers exercised their right to join the UAW’s ranks. However, on February 25, 2014, a group of Volkswagen workers sought to intervene in the UAW‘s bid, and argued that the election results should stand.

Article by:

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Facebook Post Breaches Confidentiality Provision of Settlement Agreement

Jackson Lewis Logo

 

A Florida appellate court has ruled that a teenaged daughter’s post on Facebookmentioning her father’s confidential settlement of an age discrimination claim breached a confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement, barring the father from collecting an $80,000 settlement. Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay, No. 3D13-1952 (Fla 3d DCA Feb. 26, 2014).

The plaintiff, Patrick Snay, was a headmaster of Gulliver, a private school in the Miami area. After his contract was not renewed, he sued for age discrimination. The parties reached a settlement pursuant to a written agreement, which included a detailed confidentiality provision. The provision stated in part:

13. Confidentiality . . . [T]he plaintiff shall not either directly or indirectly, disclose, discuss or communicate to any entity or person, except his attorneys or other professional advisors or spouse any information whatsoever regarding the existence or terms of this Agreement. . . A breach . . . will result in disgorgement of the Plaintiff’s portion of the Settlement Payments.

A couple of days after the agreement was signed, Snay’s daughter, who had recently been a student at Gulliver, posted the following on her Facebook page:

Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially paying for my vacation to Europe this summer. SUCK IT.

Snay’s daughter had about 1,200 Facebook friends, many of whom were current or former Gulliver students. Gulliver notified Snay of the breach and refused to tender the $80,000 to Snay under the terms of the settlement. (Snay’s attorneys received their portion). Snay moved to enforce the agreement. Limited discovery revealed that Snay and his wife notified their daughter “that the case was settled and they were happy with the result.” Snay denied ever discussing a trip to Europe. The district court held that Snay’s actions did not violate the terms of the agreement, but the appellate court reversed, noting that Snay was prohibited from “directly or indirectly” disclosing even the “existence” of the settlement.

The decision offers lessons for counsel, litigants, and parents. Counsel and litigants need to remember that these types of confidentiality provisions with disgorgement penalties are taken seriously by the courts and can be enforced. Parents need to remind their children to be mindful of what they post on social media, because it might have adult consequences.

Article by:

V. John Ella

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

California District Court Holds that Providing Cellphone Number for an Online Purchase Constitutes “Prior Express Consent” Under TCPA – Telephone Consumer Protection Act

DrinkerBiddle

 

A federal district court in California recently ruled that a consumer who voluntarily provided a cellphone number in order to complete an online purchase gave “prior express consent” to receive a text message from the business’s vendors under the TCPA. See Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. CV 13-999 SVW, 2014 WL 320205 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).

In Baird, the plaintiff booked flights through the Hawaiian Airlines website. In order to complete her purchase, the plaintiff provided her cellphone number. Several weeks later she received a text message from the airline’s vendor, Sabre, Inc., inviting the plaintiff to receive flight notification services by replying “yes.” The plaintiff did not respond and no further messages were sent. The plaintiff sued the vendor claiming that it violated the TCPA by sending the single text message.

The central issue in Baird was whether, by providing her cellphone number to the airline, the plaintiff gave “prior express consent” to receive autodialed calls from the vendor under the TCPA. In 1992, the FCC promulgated TCPA implementing rules, including a ruling that “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” In re Rules & Reg’s Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8769 ¶ 31 (1992) (“1992 FCC Order”). In support of this ruling, the FCC cited to a House Report stating that when a person provides their phone number to a business, “the called party has in essence requested the contact by providing the caller with their telephone number for use in normal business communications.” Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102–317, at 13 (1991)).

The court found that, while the 1992 FCC Order “is not a model of clarity,” it shows that the “FCC intended to provide a definition of the term ‘prior express consent.’” Id. at *5. Under that definition, the court held that the plaintiff consented to being contacted on her cellphone by an automated dialing machine when she provided the number to Hawaiian Airlines during the online reservation process. Id. at *6. Under the existing TCPA jurisprudence, a text message is a “call.” Id. at *1. Furthermore, although the plaintiff only provided her cellphone number to the airline (and not to Sabre, Inc., the vendor), the court concluded that “[n]o reasonable consumer could believe that consenting to be contacted by an airline company about a scheduled flight requires that all communications be made by direct employees of the airline, but never by any contractors performing services for the airline.” Id. at *6. The Judge was likewise unmoved by the fact that the plaintiff was required to provide a phone number (though not necessarily a cellphone number) to complete the online ticket purchase. Indeed, the court observed that the affirmative act of providing her cellphone number was an inherently “voluntary” act and that, had the plaintiff objected, she could simply have chosen not to fly Hawaiian Airlines. Id.

Baird does not address the October 2013 TCPA regulatory amendments that require “prior express written consent” for certain types of calls made to cellular phones and residential lines (a topic that previously has been covered on this blog). See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(2), (3) (emphasis added). “Prior express written consent” is defined as “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorized such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8). Whether the Baird rationale would help in a “prior express written consent” case likely would depend on the underlying facts such as whether the consumer/plaintiff agreed when making a purchase to be contacted by the merchant at the phone number provided, and whether the consumer/plaintiff provided an electronic signature. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8)(ii).

Nonetheless, Baird is a significant win for the TCPA defense bar and significantly reduces TCPA risk for the defendants making non-telemarketing calls (or texts) to cellphones using an automated dialer (for which “prior express consent” is the principal affirmative defense). If that cellphone number is given by the consumer voluntarily (and, given the expansive logic of Baird, we wonder when it could be considered “coerced”), the defendant has obtained express consent. Baird leaves open a number of questions worth watching, including how far removed the third-party contractor can be from the company to whom a cellphone number was voluntarily provided. Judge Wilson seemed to think it was obvious to the consumer that a third-party might be utilized by an airline to provide flight status information, but how far does that go? We’ll be watching.

Article By:

Of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP